JPRS ID: 8505 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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JPRS L/8505
8 June ~979
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TRANSU~TIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
CFOUO 24/79)
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� JPR5 L/8505
. 8 June ~,979
- TRANSLATIONS ON N~AR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(~ovo a4/~9)
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAZRS
Arab Involvement in Africa Increasing
(Raghida Dergham; THE MIDbLE EAST, May 79) 1
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Polisario Aska Moroccan, Mauritanian~Troops To Leave Sahara
(Hassen ZenaCi; AFRIQt1E-ASIE, 30 Apr-15 May 79)......... 3
~GYPT
'Guardian'C,orrespondent Int~rviews Government Officials
(Osama al-Baz, Butrus Gt�ali Interview; THE GUARDIAN, ~
25 May 79) 8
LIBYA
Qadhdhafi Works To Restructure Soci~ty
(THE MIDDLE EAST, May 79) 11
Qadhdhafi Hopes To Marry Tunisian SCudent
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 May 79)............ 15
Proposed Tunisian Liaison Detailed
(LE NaWEL OBSERVATEUR, 1 May 79) 20
Briefs .
Report on Executions 22
Uganda Refuses Offer 22
Libya-Romania Agreement 22
MAURITANIA
Coup Leaders Pro-Moroccan, Likely To Resume Saharan War
(CAMBIO 16, 29 Apr 79) 23
- a- [III - NE ~ A- 121 FOUO]
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CONT~NTS (Continued) , pag~
~
Ould Saleck Uescribed as 'Finished Mgn'
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 May 79)............ 26
Background~of Ou1d Daddah's Release Notied
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 May 79)............ 31
Walfougui Not Taken Seriously in Mauritania i
(Abdelaziz Dahmatti; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 May 79)..........~. 33 j
TUNISIA '
;
Letter From Peoples Revolutionary Party Discussea SituaCion
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 30 Apr-13 May 79)m 34 ~
Commentary on Nouira SCatemenCs on Habib Achour ;
(MARCHES TROPTCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 27 Apr 79)........ 37
WESTERN SAHARA
I
Saharan Peace Prospects Become More Complicated ;
(~bdelaziz Dahmani; JLUNE AFRIQUE, 16 May 79)............ 44 '
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IN'T~It-AI2AI3 A~CAIR5 , ~
ARAB INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA INCREASING
London THE MIDDLE EAST in Engliah May 79 pp 16,18
[Article by Raghida Aergham]
[Text~ 'I'he wnr~ in Ugande brought to the fore 'i'his nnturally prompted Egypt ta baclt
Arub�African tensions which heve bee Tan,:anie and sup~~t included the o:~er of
aimmering in~~ the beckgmund for aevera~ 10 MiG�1? jet fightera with their crewe
yeera. Quite apart fmm a long hietorv of duri~;d the visit of Vice�President Hupni
Arab domination of black Africa which 1~lubnrnk to Dar es�Sal~em earlier this year,
lenders of the stntes south of the Sahara But Libya's policy wAS short�eighted and
cannot entirely fdrget, the feeling has been ill�adviaed. B~~ supporting e leeder who wns
gmwing since 1973 that the Arab atates nn embarrassment to the whole of b1ACk
- never properly recompen~d Africa f~r the Africa it rnnfirmed suspiciona that Africa
Ic~ses�they incurred by breaking ties with ~~~as becoming little more than e battlefield
Israel. far the feuding Arab atetes es well es for the
Incrensing Arab involvement in African superpowere.
nffairs, the Moraccann and Egyptians in Algerie elone, of all the Areb stntes Aeems
7.~~ire, the i.ibyens in Ched and now the tn hnve been aware of this and it supported
I.ibyans and Algerinns in Ugende, heve Tenr.ania partly t,o try to repair some of the ~
donr little to nlley fear~ end much to revive damege done by Libya. One Algerian
- c~ld memories. And recent rnciel conflict ~~fficial stressed to The Middle East that
between blacks and Arabs in Meuritanie, Algeria will not pgrmit any African country
, C:had and tn eome extent Sudan is just e to sllege that the Arebs helped Ugende's
reflection of the ~n~~erall siluatian. Amin. Condemn any country by name not
Libya's dispatch of troops to Ugende to br reg~~n."
pmp up the unpopulnr and increesingly tVl;erie is aware of how little it wnuld talce
precarious re~ime of Idi Amin was juatified tn p:r~uade the Africans to resume their tiea
by the Libyan AmUacSOdor to the UN on the ~~=.h Larael if the present atmosphere dces
Krounds of "co�operntic>n with the le~itimete ~~nt improve, especially in the weke of the
Govemment which asked for help". But H:~~ptien�Israeli treaty.
there were undoubtedly also Libyen in� E~~en so, its involvement in the Uganden
teresS~ to protect. For Libya had invested a episcxle ~as not entirely sltruistic, for it cen
~ lut both finenciaily end politicall,~� in hardly be coincidence that Tenzania
l'~;nnde. Liln~nns hnd to some extP^t caken re~ently reco~nised the Saharan Democretic
~~~�erfromtheA~innhu;~inc~.a;:~;~,~:~;isityex� Republic.
~u~ll~~d in 1971. ;~1ormv:r, Colonel I~toreover Algerie's support for Tanzanie ~
1lunrmm~r (~nddafi anw Ugenda as a possi- p~~~~ed in Morocrn on the side uf Uganda -
I~Ie renr I~ase for the Pelestiniena and as e the extension into black Africa of yet
ii~eful elly in his feud with Egypt end anuther inter�Areb dispute.
tiu~lnn. '.:~~en so, Algena's involvement can
prrhaps be more easily justified than thet of
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the other three Arab stetee. It~ long�
atn~~ding all{ance with ,socinliet Tanz~nie
and Angola in any case hae a certnin logtc
~ nlwut it,
1~everthelese, all the Arab statee, in�
rluding Algeria, will have to be e little moce
rircumspect tn their dealinga with black -
Africs in future if reletions ere not to
deteriorate beyond the point of no return,
As Lealie Harriman, Nigeria'e Am�
l~nssador to the UN told The Middle East,
"1 nm concemed about any Arab�African im
trn�ention in African affaire, be it Egypt's
nnd Morocco's intervention in the Shaba
I'ro~~ince or Libya's in Ugat~da,"
The Areb ststes of North Africa belong to
tl~e Organiaetion of African Unity as well es
tu the Arab League (except Egypt) and
binck Africans feel that they ahouid eettle
their own differences before they iook
w~athwards,
COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC Mag~:.~~nes, Ltd.~
CSO: 4820
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NOItTH A~R~CAN Al~ b'A71t5
POLISARIO ASKS MOROCCAN~ MAURITANIAN TROOPS TO LEAVE SAHARA -
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 30 Ap~-1.5 May 79 pp 14-16
[Article by Hassen Zenat3] ,
[Text] Rabat~s latest.attempted maneuvers in the
Maghrc;b are f~~aught with consequences. Zs
it really possible to go on 3n a sit uation �
that is nei~her war nor peace?
Was peace really close enough ta touch, �or the Saharans and
Mauretanians? Zs war truly at the gates? Can the Polisario
afford to waste time wh'ere, quite obviously, the new strongman
of Nouakchott, LtCol Ahmed Ould Bouceif~ is scrambling to ga3n
it ?
All these are questions that have been with us since the April
coup in Mauretania~ The answers are not what one might call
simple. And yet, there is something like naivete in talking of
"a situation that is neither war nor peace,~~ and soraething of
the absurd in calling for peace before one has renounced war.
Theoretically, if :;ou believe the public statements of the new
men in charge i,n N~auretania, all that stands betwen the Boucief
team and that of Ould Salek is a msre nuance. It is, however,
a fairly sizable nuance.
The fact is that with Ou].d Boucief at the head of the Military
Council for National Salvation, there is a new political logic
taking over, which looks very like a sister to the one that was
dumped on 10 July 19~8, when Mokhtar Ould Daddah fell.
He, too, wanted peace, i.n compliance with the military alliance
with Morocco, for which tZze only conceivable peace in the Wes-
tern Sahara is the unconditiona]. surrender of the Saharans and
the annexation of their territory. On this count, Ould Boucief
has pulled back a good deal by comparison with Ould Salek. Th~e
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new ~ac~or here is tha~ Ou~.d D~ddah was f3.ghting ~he Poli~r~r3o
~'ront and los3ng av~ry d~y whoreas Ou1d Bouc3.e~ has the
advantage o~ a"no-war~ no-peacQ� s3.~u~~ion~ which he hopes to
make i:he mos~ o~. But can ~ha~ 1.as~?
Be th~~ as i~ m~y, thore is deep disappoin~men~ amor~g the people
in Maur~.t ania. Faradoxical~.y, reaction is divided between �ear
of an immedia~e resumption o~ hostilit3es~ with their ir~evitable
train of death and destruction a�ter 9 months of relativ~ calm,
and tihe desire to break the cease-firo~ so as t~,o keep the new
team �rom getting a breathing-spell and digging in cleeper ii~ the '
Morocct~n impasse. '
The desire for peace~ c3.early voiced by aY1 the peop~.e be they
riverbank dwellers or desert nomads after the fal~. of Ould
Daddah has been thwarted. But, ~ike an echo~ ~here is growing
popular acclaim for those tnen~ civilians or military now ousted
from government but still at liberty, who wanted to take prac- ,
tical steps toward, opening the peacemaking process with Polisario.
They a~e~ according to reports from the Mauritanian capital, Fast ~
becoming the objects of a genuine cul~, which places some bind- ~
ing constraints oan the new team in power. To what degree, come
to think of xt, has the new team actually made allowances �or
this, by keeping O~:ld 9alek, will-he, nil].-he, in its ranks, al- :
beit con~igning him to a purely decorative r8le? Seaause, pre-
cisely~ Ould Salek; still represents, rightly or wrongl,y, the
reassuring symbol of a confused longing for peace that is still ~
very much alive among the people.
The truth is that the zigzag path of the previous strongman of
Mauritania was difficult to follow, but at least his objective
was clearly stated: get the country out of a ruinous war tha~
has wearied it to death, even threatening its fragile political
and social equilibriwn. Do it in accord with Rabat, if possible. .
Do it alone, if he must.
Trial of Strength
Whatever reproaches one may lay at his door today for his hesi-
tant way of moving along the path of peace~ for his shilly-
shallying, for his lack of daring while his interlocutors in the
Sahara were holding out a thousand lifelines to hi.m, he must be
given full marks for the fact that he wound up concentrating on
his contacts with Polis,ario rat;~er than pursuing what was cer-
tainly an illusory "global p~ace" wl~ich his Moroccan partner and
ally apparently was not even seriously considering.
His mind was made up on that c~ount last September, after a stormy
meeting with Hassan II. The t�wo men had already reached the ed~;e
of an open break, with the king quite willing to threaten the
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Mauri~an3.an pres3dent wr.~h d3.recb 3.ntorvent3.on by tho Morocct~n
axped3bionary corps sta~3.oned in Maur~.~ani~ 3f ho dared move
~~.onc~ ~oward pe~ce.
And in fact there were aeveral. skirm3ahc~s a~ tho ~ime betweori
~he roy~?1 forces and Mauritariian troops~ wh3.ch were quickJ.y
charbnd up to "3.nev~.tab7.e frict3.on~~ or "irresponsib~.e behavior."
Ould Sa1ek knew, as of then, that he was cau~ht in a del.icate
r~ce aga3nst the c~.ock, and that Hassan IZ would try, one day
or another~ to ge~ rid of him. He was also convinced ~hat no-
~hinb could be done with Polisario so long as Moroccan troops
were occupying his country. Hence his dec~.sion to send them
home and~ unilaterally, to set a deadl3ng �or thei .r w~.tltdrawal
�rom Mauri~ania a~ the end of 1.ast month..
The tria~. of s~rength was on. The cabinet reshuffle Ould Salek
perform~d on 20 March eliminating samultaneously the leaders
of ~he two opposin~ factions who had been squabbling ti�ainly since
last July within the milit ary Council for National Recovery
would, he ~hought, allow him to move a little ~aster along what
seemed to be his own path to a separate peace with Polisario.
That is believable. What is certain, in any case, is that, with
the Moroccan albatross of� his neck, Ould Sa1ek would have had
a lot more elbow-room.
How did things start to fall apart? What chain reaction led to
the emergence of still a third eharacter?~��
There is a rumor current in the Maur.itanian capital that Ould
aouc ief decided to steal a march following a discreet warning
From the Moroccan ambassador to Nouakchott that his name was on
a list of people to be arrested on 10 April, although he had
just been taken back into the government. True ur false, nobody
knows now and maybe we shall never know.
Anec dotes and intentions hidden or affirmed on both sides, a de-
1ic ate chess game is now b eing played out in Mauritania. Its
main characters are not necessar.ily those visible at center-
stage. France is in it, for one.
Despite discretion and his diplomac~, there was considerab3.e
comment on the coincidence between the brief stopoff by Mr Rene
Journiac~ the Elyseets secret diplomacy boss, in Mauritania anai
the start of the coup against Ould Sa1ek. The Saharan leaders,
for their part, pointed out that the rise of Ould Boucief in
Nouakchott was hailed (or at least accompanied by) a statement
that can most moderatel.y be descrihed as curious from Mr Jean
Francois-Poncet~ the Frc.nch foreign minister, attributing the
conflict in the Western Sahara to a quarrel between Algeria and
MorQCCO.
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- Th~t; 3.s an o1d argumeizt which seemed tn have been dropped by
P~ris s~.nce Giscard d~Es~ain~ ~o1d ~ Febru~ry press conferenc~
that he favored ~"polit~.ca~. ~o~.ution, and admitted ~hat this
was a'~prob7.em of deco~.onizat~.on, " oven quotin~ in passing, and
i'or ~he �irst time, ~he Polisario.
How do~s one exp~.ain t;lii~ hesitation waltz? Paris seems in no .
hurry to r�espond ~t.o ~the Saharans~ questions, which may require
a little more than a�riendly 1itt7.e speech when the French mi-
niste pays a cal~. on Rabat. What is more evident is that France
was opposed~ tooth and nai1~ to any separate Saharan~Mauri~anian
peace reached wi~hout it, and leaving Morocco alone against the -
Saharan �ighters and against... world opinion.
The Morocco Lobby
France, th:.,ugh apparently it feels that the war in the Sahara has
gone on 1.ong enough (hurting its economic and trade relations with
Algeria, with~ut bringing in the expected rewards from Moroc,
_ much less Mauritania), considers itself properly on the receivin~
end in any "peace dynamic~," and even hopes to pull the strings.
It is clearly indicative that it is not on the issue of peace or
war that the Maurit~anian backers of a bigger r8le for France in
their country have come out in~o the open. But it was by play-
on t}ie omire,is string of the "cultural conflict" between Mooi~s .
and I3lacks, aiid w~ving the notion 1ik~ a sword o� Damocles over
Uu1d Sa1ek's head, that the downf al1 of the previous rebimc was
broug}tt about. It is significant, ~oo, that this �cultural con-
f lict" seems to have vanished since Ould Salek took over the go-
vernment, which says a lot about the aims and means of secret di-
plomacy.
Missing from the scene for 3 years, the Americans are stirring in
the region again~ with Ha~san ZIts military position plus social
pressures feeding thea.r anxiety.
The Morocco Lobby in Washington, which brought �ormidable pres�-
ure to bear on the Congress to get authorization for Morocco to
use American weapons beyond its own borders against the Saharan
fighters, managed in par~ to achieve its goals. The Moroccan
general staff is not diong without right now, but it would like
this piraticai practice to be ].egalized and made permanent. In
si.milar vein, we have just learned that there have been American
officers for some time on an ultra-secret mission in El-Ayoun,
capital of Western Sahara. Maybe they're there to maintain the
- Moroccan F-$s? ~
Will they go so far as to provide direct military aid to rescue
the Rabat re~ime from a military debacle?
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So here we are again, right back where we started a few months
ago. Are we squar3ng tho ca.rcle?
Tn any case, so far as Po~.3sario is concerned~ thero c an bo no
quest~.ono� renewed talks with either Morocco or Maurit ania un-
bi~. a~.l their troops have been pulled out o� the Wostern Sahar~.
�Making con~acts for the sake o� contacts no longer interests us~~~
warned ~he Front~s secretary~general~ Mr Mohamed Abdelaziz.
There you have the end of one m3.sunderstanding.
C~PYRIGHT: i979 Afrique-Asie
6].82 ~
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CGYPT
'GUAItDIAN' CORR~SPOND~NT INT~RVIEWS GOVERNM~NT OFFICTALS
London TH~ GUARDIAN in Engl3.sh 25 May 79 p 21 LD
[InCerview with Osama al-Baz, EgypCian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs,
' and Butrus Ghali, Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister in Cairo by Eric Siiver:
"A Longing for Peace, But No Desire for :'~rienc:ship"; daCe not given]
[Excerpts] In an 3nterview with THE GUARDTAN, Osama al-Boz~ the under-
secretary for foreign affairs, vigorously re~ected Menachem Begin's
programme for Palestinian self-rule under Israeli sovereignty. "It is
utterly unacceptable to us," he said, "and we are not going to talk on
this basis. IC is contrary to the letter and spiriC of Camp David. If
they behave in this way, it means they don't want us to reach any agreement."
A1-Baz, a short, wiry diplomat who talks like a machine gun, blamed Israel
for Che intensfi:y of the Arab reaction. "Ar3b hostility serves no interest
but tl~at of Israel," he insisted. ''rtost of the Israeli actions or sCate-
ments beEore the ink was dry on the peace treaty were designed to give
rl~e message to Che Arabs thaC noChing was going to happen on the Palestinian
plane, that this was a separate agreement. Every statement by Begin and
his aides was designed to increase and deepen the rifC in the Arab world
and to scare away all the moderate elements among the PalesCinians."
Fiut the EgypCian negotiator was not yet writing off the chances of. react~-
ing an agreement befor~ the twelve-month deadline set by the peace treaty.
The situation, he argued, was dynamic not static.
"We will not allow Israel to get away with esCablishing a phoney municipal
council for the West Bank and Ga2a under the banner of self-governinR
authority. It must be a real self-governing authority with genuine control.
The present position of the Israeli Government is untenable. They cannoC
maintain it in negotiations.
"They know very well that no Palestinian can accept this formula. Egypt will
never deliver the West Bank to Israel. We want to deliver the West Bank and
Gaza to the Palestinians in an orderly manner that does not invite violence
or hatred between the two sides."
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_ A1��13nz di~c~ln~~d t}~nt th~ I:gypCi~:n e~~m wdu1J d~mand m m~r~tnrium on ~aetln~~
n~~nt durin~ the npgnCinCinn~. "Wp think," he gaid, "Chet th~ Jcwigh
~cttlements ~h~uld nne gtsy afeer the five-yQar Cransitional phag~ to
1'~l~~rininn ~elf-d~t~rmin~tiion. They ~h~uld be evecu~ted 1ik~ eh~ s~eel~-
m~nC~ in Sin~i."
~
Whi.lc r~cngni~in~ I~rael'~ gnxiety ~bouC ieg gpcurity, A1-Ba~ r~fug~d to
i:nn~ ~nE,laCe Cdnrinued Ieraeli cnnrrol ov~r the West Eank's externaL r~nd
int~rnal g~ruriry, ag rpquired by the Bpgin plan. "The~~ feurs," he
mnintain~d, "are not gaing tn be eliminated by rerrieorial expaneion or
nccup~tion. Don't te11 me thati any average Iaraeli thinke it would nor "
be pnsgibl~ to guaranCee th~ir security by such mnasures as 1LmiCing
armnm~nt, demiliterieation and international inepection.
"bccup~tic.~ ie an acr of vinlence. They gre not eending Che philharmonic
to che uccupied terriCories, th~y are gending thirteen thousand armed men. ~
This ar.t nr' viol~nce invites ~counter-violence."
i~'or all hi~ tough talk, A1-Baz acknowledged Egypti's dilemma of negoeintin~
by proxy fnr unwilling Paleatinians. He did noti exClude the pogsibility
_ thae gelf-rule might have tio be introduced piecemeal in Caza, where ~gypt
hnd leggl as well as tiistoric and geographic connections. It governed
ehe gerip under the terms of United NaCions Security Council resolution
from 1949 rr~ ]967, buC did not annex it. -
Ne insi~tc:d, however, that the separation of Caza and Che West Bank mugt
npply only Co Che phasing of implementat3on.
Another member of Sadat's team, the Deputy Foreign Minister Butrus Chali,
argued Chat jusC as the French had been forced to eat their words ~~nd ~
give up Algeria, so Igrael would have to accept the creation of a
Palc~einian enCity in the West Bank and Caza.
Unconvincingly, Chali also put Arab oppositior. Co the peace process in
' historic perspective: "There have been thirCy-three inCer-Arab dispuees
~ince 1945. Look at the way those disputes have been solved. We believe
that this inter-Arab dispute will be solved more easily. Now we are at
the pe~k of the inter~Arab confrontation."
Sadat's negotiators know, nonetheless, that they have few cards to p1Ay in
the Palestinign r.ause. They will make Israel pay for every shuffle towards
normnl relations. This weekend's opening of borders and a civil air corri-
dor will be no more than symbolic. There are still no direct communications
between Jerusalem and Cairo.
Ultimately the Egytians are putting their money on Washington. They 1~ope
Carter has staked too much c~n a successful treaty to let his Israeli
_ proteges settle for less. In an election year the equation is finely
balanced. The United States President must consolidate one of his few
foreign policy achievements, but dare he alienate the Jewish vote? How far '
,can he go in putting Saudi o~l supplies at risk?
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On Ch~ir own, the ~gyptiians wiil in th~ end confronC Bpg~n with ehe choice
~~Cween territory ~nd p~ace. "'i'hey will have to ~iv~ up rh~ Westi Benk ~nd
G~zn," BuCrug Ghg1i ineieted. "OCherwise they wili have no peace~" You
wi11~ howev~r~ find well-placed sceptice in Cairo who ~uspecC rhat SadeC,
with or wiChout the connivance of hia ~'orei~n Mini~try hawke, wili back
down fir~e.
COPYRIGHT: Cu~rdian Newspapera Limited~ 25 May 1979
CSO: 4820
r
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LIHYA
QADHDNAFI WORKS TO RESTRUCTURE SOCIETY
tondon THE MIDDLE EAST in ~nglieh May 79 pp 53-54
(TexC]
Colonel Muammar QaddaB hae been ruling Libya for almost 10
year~. The kind of regime he ie trying to egteblieh, hia foxeign
policy and the uee he ie making of L[bya'e oil wealth remein a
myetery not only to the Weet but a18o to meny in the Areb worid.
Andrew Lycett looke at Qaddafl'8 pre-annivereary efforts to re-
inetill the eptrit of Ielamic eocialiem and direct democracy into
both home end forelgn affaire following a period of comforteble
elack tn revolutionary fervour.
1Vith the lOth annive~ary of hu revolution Hi~ i~ome con~tituency hed been getting
coming up on 1 September, Libyen leeder aleck, invalideting ~ume of hia e[fnrta to
Culunrl QaddaB hea been et peine to onn� ex~~rt hi~ Third Unlvennl 'i'her~ry, 't'he
iudidnte nnd extend his rule. Until now the perpetuation of a rich end powerful
Socielist peoples Libyen Arab Jame� merchant cless in Libya provided e focu~ of
heriyah, (5PLA.)), has ezi~ted despite, opposition to his regime and his ideas, end
_ perhe{~ even beceu.ae of, the often glaring had to be curbed.
nmtredictinn+ between its rhewric end ite :~o last December, in e apeech to the
reality. ~ederation of Chambcr~ of Commerce end
Bu~incK.rmen he~�e grow~n rich es a result Industry, Qaddefl epelled out e new order uf
of ine~~ive de~�elopment programme~ thin~, ARer yen~ of ambivelence on the
finHncrd by oil revenues. In epite of deily role of private cc~mmerce and weelth in the .
pn?pagnnda to the rnntrery, ordinary Lihyan eccmomy, e further end un-
l.ibyan people heve grc~wn complecent, cumpromi~ing d~e of radical egeliterieniam
_ ~ttefrrring the ee~e of their ~ut~idi.~ed city wa~ introduced.
life, with free housing nnd s~x:iel service~ W [n eccorclance with the theoretical
~he henlshi~ of tcue revnlutionary ectivity precept,+ of the Creen fi~bk, (the ~ernnd pe~t
~?nrtirulurly the grind ~~f wixking in deaen of which - ccmceming �c~mumic.r - had heen
lielcl~r fi~r Nti~rirultunil +elf�yufficiency. publishecl enrlier in the yeer), free a?m�
F~errntly Qnddati hn:+ :~en fit to rea+~ert merce, waKe~ and ren~~ u?~ere to be
thr re~~~lutiunnry credentiel.+ of hi~ re~ime, elx~lished. '"They are Ix~und t~~ vani,h
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. ehat nn p~r~un wi11 U~ g raru~iC~ nn nnuth~r," Qadd~�i ~eid. "'Thig way
jug~ic:~, ~r,;;a.LiCy, ~~euriCy, freedom and happine~~ wi11 b~ uchi~v~d."
In ~dvor.~eing r~n~w~~.f ~cnttomic r~volutinn, h~ clp~rly h~d c~rtain Cnrg~e~
in mind. "Cc~~~eract~rr~ have r~a~~~~d large profit~ after th~ r~voluCion ag
g r~~ult ~f m~~~iv~e nr~~~cCe, ~ince rh~ cnunCry had ear~3er been d~veid of
ae~~Lnnm~nr~L e~eivities in g11 field~. The 10 year p~riod given by th~
r~v~l~,_tun t~ m~~c~h~nC~, contrncCor~ and otherg for making gains was also
~uffi..i~nt for che maturation of ideas which led to Che appparanc~ of tit~e
Cr~~n Book and its the~eg. mhere can b~ no rruce afCer rhis p~riod."
'Chig ~ignalled rhe ~tart of th~ seaond pha~e of the l~test economic rc~volu-
ei~n which began earlier last y~ar with Liby~n workers taking ov~r facCorie~
~nd offiee~. M~nagpra ~nd businegemen were gent packing and ordinary peopl~
ag~erC~d rh~Lr righC~, defi~~ed in the Green Book, Co parCnership in indu~try.
The ba~ic unitis of Che Libyan revolution, pop~lar congreases, werp set up ~
gt plnc~s of work throughout the country, and many buginessmen fled while
tlie gaing was good. And ~usC in time, for ;1ot only were they dispogsegsed
of Ch~ir commercial asseCs, but Qaddafi made it clear Chat they would no !
lon~er be able to rely on renCs from urban flats or rural farms. ~ach ~
Libyan was to be limited to~one dwelling, which the aCaCe would h~lp him
ro buy, furnish, end, if it was a farm, make productive. But the excesses ;
of private l~ndlordism were to be abolished. ~
Concurrently with this extension of the economic revolution came consoli- ;
dation of polieical development. For three years Qaddafi has been talking '
about h and in g over power to his nominally democratic creation of basic
peoples' congresses. ~
In the first part of his Green Book, he emphasized the failure of Western
parliamentary democrac;~ !.n which the wishes of 51 Fer cent overrule those
of the other 49 per !ent~ The solution he offers is a system of popular
congresses through which decisions can be thrashed out at all levels.
' Uelegates are ap~ointed to carry the will of the masses to higher authori-
ties und cnngresses, culminating in the General Peoples Congress, an
annual decision-making gathering responsible to the whole country.
In their first two years, however, the congresses were more a show piece
than a reality. Undoubtedly decisions have been taken at all levels, and
- even qaddafi's policies have been questioned and rejected. But it is
impossible to achieve the smooth working of such a system overnight, thus
meerings of the General Peoples Congress have seemed stage-tnanaged rather
than spontaneous. And it is difficult to generate local decision-making
in a country so dependent on a single, centralised source of revenue for
its development--oil.
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, Nu~ ~~ndilnl{ iN ~b~~~~~illv drterm(ned, In nu~,+ruf~~m", Hut ~~nddufi wnh inxietant and
thr ~?nvl ~~~~nr 1?r hn~ refurm~~d th~ t+yplem, the t(tlh rrmnined; "1 helievr nll thc wnrld
' ?i~Itii~~ up ~tli l~i~~ic ~n~ita. 7'I~ry will each will l~e chnnged inln lhia ki~jd nf ~x~litiral ~
~li~~~u~,4 Ih~~ir ~u~~~~ly wul priarities, and re~ime which le Jn?nnhurfynh," hr ex~~lnined
pn~rnt Uu~ir liud~~~~r lu Ihe Knvernm~nt fo~ reCently, "end the Nturc will I~e t.hn futurr
(innncb~u. 'I'h~~~~ ~~ill Nrnd Ihri~ delegat,ee of Jmm~hAriynha in the wurid, We nniy hnpe
(nnt re~ve~enlnti~~r:+), tn mectin~a of the fnr the ere ~f mn~+eg, the erp nf
~~II~It1liV (Y11111111111't'N fl~ (I1C CC11C~9I I~EtlpIlB Jemahuriyahs, ee the ~rench revnluti~n
Cc?nKrcw.a cm ~~ciu~~nt i~m, ngriculture and eetablishrd thp ern nf rnpublic~, and we hem
n~hrr pubjrria, nn~~r F~ ~~rnr Ihey will meet at can say Libyn nnw is entering the ern of
Ihr Crnrrnl i'�?pl~~fl Gm~~ where, JnmaMeriyahe,"
nmun~t nlher thin~,n~, they will elect a But why did Raddafi chcxwe thin tnnment
Cnbinrt, Ihi~,mtienlly junt a fnrum of ta innugurat~ the er~ of Jamnhnriyahg? HIe
yecrclnrier uf Il~r ~~nrinu~ r~nnmittees nf the revnlutinn was cousting feirly ramfnrtably,
~~~nKt~~ nnd the ~r~t tnngible result~ of the S26bn
Tn rmphn+iyr Ihr nutunumnus nnture of ~cnnomic nnd Saciel'I~eneformetibn Plan
thr ayntrm, (~nci~n(i rr~i�ned his pc~sition a9 were br~inning ta show, for exemple at thp
rnie af th~ ti~~r�mnn (~rnrrnl Secretariet of MiAUrete iron ~nd Steel romplex end et the
IM@ ~iCI1C~AI I~19?~)It',r C~~n,,,~:v, as did the pgriculturel stations in the descrt oesce.
c~thpr fnur - nl) ptr~~iuu~ly mrmbc~ of the Snme Libyang were getting very rich on the
itr~~~dutiunnn~ Cummnnd Cnuncil which proceede of develapment ~nd evpry~n~ in
u~~erthre~~ hin~ Idri+ in 1~JGJ. Qeddefl said the country was benefitting, Libya wee even
thnt hr ~~~nn~rd in devnte himaelf to finding a modua vivendi with the United
"rn~~olutinnnn~ activitie.+". Asked what States, the arch enemy of its rhetoric. The
exactly this mrnnt, l.ibynn nfficials snid Jamahariyeh had got used to e cosy
thnt he hnd ~,h~~en up ~he reins of govem� relationship with the Americen oil com�
ment e1nnK ~~~ith ita day�to�day panies which drill for ita oil and ae1140 per
m,}xm,ibilitic�, in urder tn "prnd the peo� cent of it to the other side of the Atlantic.
ple" inlnfurth~~r n~~~~+lutiunnryzeal, American firn~s had even hegun tn atep up
Tn the c~~nirnl, (~nd;le~i eppear.? to be their sal~s to Libya, a tendency underlined
~,h~~ing up thr ino~ strin~a of democretic by e Cangress decision to free the embargo
prc~om~teMilit~~ - ~ I~n~u~h hi~ membership of on a ahipment of large trucka to 7~ipoli.
the Ceneral tirrrriAtlAl of the Gene:al $ut the eesing up of revolutionery zeal
PM~ples C.cm~,~r~~c - G~r hi4 u~~~n revolutionary hed brought Quaddefi more headeches than
ends. benefita. The viaion of a more comfortable,
But perhe~r~ thrre i.~ nothing wrong with less frenetic Libya hed ceused eome people
that, for hr hna nl~~~,rvs thrived in his self- to wonder why they needed the trappings of
nppninted n~lr e a~dAy of the e Jamahariyeh et ell.
Atediterrnnen~~, l,nrk of precision in hia Sections of the enriched merchent claso
idee.a nnd hi. ~x~ili~n~ h~.a been ~ hall�matk, wanted to throw o~f the restrictions Qeddefi
even a stren~,~th af his regime. dt hes given had placed on the atcumulation of weal~h.
him ~~alu~bie frc~~dam tn menoeuvre~ not Moreover, according to widespread repnrt~e,
tied to nm� ~Mrtirulnr ideology, be it there was unrest in the ermy which, along
w~cinli~m nr I