JPRS ID: 8513 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060024-8
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JpRS L/ssi~ -
14 June ].9 79 I -
~
TRANSlATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS -
CFOUO l5/79)
U. S. JOIt~T PUBLICATiONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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Jf'R5 publicaCinns coneaitt informaCion primarily from fnrcign
ncwgp~pers, periodicalg ~nd books, buC glso from new~ agency
Cransmissions ~nd broadrasCs. MaCerials from �oreign-l~nguage -
' sources gre translated; Chose from ~nglish-langugge sources
- gre Cranscribed or reprinted, with Che origit~al phrasing and
orher characreristics reCained.
Headlines, editorinl reporCs, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Procesaing indicaCors such as [TexG] _
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- processed. Where no processing indicaCor is given, the infor- _
maCion was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phoneCically or transliteraCed are
enclosed in parenCheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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- original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
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- The contents of Chis publication in no way repreaent the poli-
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JPRS L/8513
i4 J~e 19 79
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
cF~UO 15/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
Comraents on U.S. CPX 'Nifty Nugget'
(V. Georgiyev; ZARUBE2HNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 79)..... 1
_ Comments on International Centers of 'Ideological Diversion'
(G. Arzumanov; ZARUBEZHNUYL VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 79)..... 4
� Comments on Air Defense of NATO Ground Troops
(A. Sherstyuk; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE~ Feb 79)..... 10 -
~ Commenta on Defense in a U.S. Motorized Infantry Battalion
(M. Borisov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 79)....... 16
- Western Efforts To Im~rove Tank Mobility Described
(Ye. Viktorov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENDiOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 79)..... 21
- Comments on Effects of Technology on Fighter-Interceptor Tactics
(V. Kirilov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb,Mar 79)... 27
~
Western Development of Aircraft Cannons Reviewed
(N. Germanov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNaYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 79)...... 45
Development of U.S. Nuclear Surface Ships Described
' (N. Petrov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 79)........ 49
Development of N:hTO Naval Electronic Warfare Systems Viewed
(P. Gindin; ZAR:TBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYc OBOZREI~IIYE, Feb 79)........ 55
NATO Naval Train.ing Exercise Described
_ (V. Khome~~skiy; ZARUBEZHNOYE ~OYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 79).... 59
- a ' ~III - USSR - 4 FOUO)
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a:;
, COI~tENTS ON U.S. CPX ' NIFTY NUGGET'
Moecow ZARUB~ZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 79 signed to presa
5 Feb 79 pp 8- 9
[Article by Lt Col V. Georgiyev: "Exercise "Nifty Nugget"]
(TextJ Along with the implementation of numerous and expensive programs for
equf.pping Che armed forces with the lateat weapons, the PeaCagon and the bosses
of Che U.S. military-industrial comnlex are devoCing great attention to increas-
ing mobilizatior. re~sdiness and Che gaming of individual etages in Che conduct -
of war. In justifying their militarisCic preparations, they intensely intimi-
date the peoples of the western co~intries with the myth of a"Soviet threat." _
~ T}iis is indicated by a atrategic ;:ommand-poat exercise (CPX) which was conducted
in the period from 10 October through 8 November 1.913 under the code name "Nifty
Nugget."
The basic goal of the regular demonstration of imperialism's might was the check
of existing mobilization plans and the refinement and elaboration of basic
~ r~easures to convert the armed forces and some branches of the U.S. economy from
a peactime to a wartime status.
Accordtng to a report in the foreign press, the following took part in the exer-
cise: directorates and divisions of the Department of Defense :~hich are di-
rectly responsible for the planning, preparation, and canducC of mobilization -
deployment; headquarters of ~oint and special commands located in the continental
United States; and representatives of a number of federal depaitments and
agencies including the Departments of Energy, Transportation, Commerce, Labor, ~
_ Interior, the Treasury, and Justic.e. Headqaiartera and, in a number of cases,
_ also individual subunits of regu3ar troops anc; the:r reserve components {the
National Guard and reserve branches of L�l:e arr.ied forces) were included in the
exercise on a seiective basis.
The exercise was gamed in accordance with plans of Che Joint Chiefs of Staff
of the U.S. Armed Forces and was directly worked out and prepared in 11 months
by two of its directorates (operations and re~r services). The armed forces
of the socialist countries were openly considereci as the specific enemy.
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A special operationa grcup wr~s creaC~d Co direct the exercise. In addition
Co highly placed military figures~ it inr.luded representaeives of civilinn
depnrtmente which parCicipated i.n ~ given measure. The course of Che CPX play
was moniCored B.y the Secreeary af De~ense, H. 9rown.
The operational-aerategic backgxound nf the exercise was a"war in Europe"
which arose between the counCrteg of Che Nor!:~i Atlantic bloc and the Warsaw
Pnct. "Com~~~ operations" were iniCiated afCer some peri.od of aggravaCion of ~
Che international situatian. In the opinion of the Peneagon leadership, iC
_ is tihis type of war in Europe which w~ll require the United SCaCea to implemenC
a bruad mobilization deployment in compressed times and on large acales.
A~ fnreign military specialiats believe~ the lifting of the main portion of
the straCegic reserve, including Ground Force and Air Force large unita and =
uniCs during the first month of c:ombaC operaCions to the European ti~eater of
- war is envisioned to ass-ieC America's NATO allies. Along with this, it is
' also planned to send reserve su6units (so-called early deploymenC) to this
region of Che world.
AccordinR to the concept of the exercise, the NAT.O c~mmand ha~ prelimi*~ary
informaCion of an attack that allegedly was being prepared and had a c^rtain
amounC of time availa6le to expand the NATO armed forces and the economies of
the NATO counCries for war. In accordance with this, ~nobilization of large
- units and units of the Nationul Guard and reserve branches of the U.S. Armed
Forces was begun ahead of time, prior to the initiation of the conflict in
Europe and could be accomplished by stages and covertly.
Essentially, in the course of the exercise many measures on the mobilization -
eYra~nsion of :he armed forces and the country's economy were conducted hypo-
, theEically; however, auComatic control systems and computers were widely em-
ployed. They were used to check calculations which were conducted and, in
some measure, problems in the call-up and notification of reservists were
worked out in a practical manner and the call-up of a small contingent of
this category of reservists was actually accomplished on limited scales.
This was done under the guise of conducCing annual summer camp~~.
In addition to the measures which have been considered, ~ military drgfC system
was introduced hypothetically and problems in rhe call-up of recruits were
- worked out. For this purpose, a so-called SelecCive Service System was seC up
which, in peacetime, functions at reduced streng*.h and is occupied primarily
with q~iestions of estimating the U.S. dra~tee contingent and planning mobilt- _
zatian expansio:..
Foreign specialis.ts b.elieve that in case of war the United States will be re-
quired to ~:all up 1QQ,00.0 recruits in the first two months afCer the declara-
tion of mobilization and.650,00Q men in the first half year. With today's _
reduced staff (98 people) the Selective Service System does not ensure mobili-
- zation of the necessary conttngent in the indicated times.
,
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Aa repnrted in the foreign preas, on Che exercise apecigl ateention was al-
lotted eo questione of converting the country'~s economy to a war statue. k'irs,t~
integrated mea~ure~ were worked out on niohilizing indusCxy and resourcQS o�
atrategic raw materials and e~xpanding miliCary product3on i:n reduced Cime~.
Accnrdir~g to tt~e appraisal by Pentagon s.pecialisCe, exercise "Nifty Nugget" die-
closed a number of suhstantial ehorCcomings in the plans~for ehe mo6ilizaCion
expansion of Che armed �orcns and the trans:fer of Che U.S. economy to military
rnils: the absence of the required numher of trained reservists intended to
bring Che regular large units and untts up to fu11 etrength and Co make up
- l.osees suffered in the initial period of the war; a delay in r~pleniahing the
armed forces with personnel (it is tielieved Chat the Selective Service Syatem -
can ensure the arrival of recruits in the CALIbSC aubunits no earlier than 110
_ dnys after the announcement of mobilization); difficuttiea in the preparation
ttnd timely transfer of ineans ofCransporCation to be at the diaposgl of the mi.litary `
authorities, ~.n particular the required number of commercial airplanes which
it is inCended Co use actively Co lift troops and combat equipmenC Co Europe;
the slow expansion of a number of branchea of industry, including those which `
provide the producCion of armored equipment, vehicles, a~unition, and equip-
menC. However, it is noted that many of the indicated shortcomings were pre-
senCed to substantiate the neceasity for a further increase in militarist~c
preparations.
It is stressed in the foreign press thaC the CPX "Nifty Nugget" was the biggest
in a series of such exercises conducted in the United States afCer World War II.
In the opinioa of the Chairman ot the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General D. Jones,
"strong and weak aspects of the mechanism for implementing mobilization on a
national scale" were disclcsed "and now tlie Department of Defense has a clear
_ view of ways for its further improvement."
These words of a high-ranking Pentagon figure confirm once again the true in-
tentions of the United States military-industrial complex--to continue to
intensify militaristic preparations.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
6367
CSO: 1801
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COMMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL CENTERS OF 'IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSION'
.
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOY~ VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIXE in Russian No 2, Feb 79 signed to
preas 5 Feb 79 pp 14-19
[Article by Col G. Arzumanov: "International Centers of Ideological Diversion"] -
[Text] Ideological diverston is a specific form of subveraive activiCy by the
reactionary forces of imperialiem against Che main revolutionary detachments
cf contemp~rary times which is widely employed both under conditions of peace
and in time of war. Serv~ng tfie class interesCs of the monopolisti~ bourgeoisie~
it combines within itsetf. propaganda and secret actions of intelligence
organs, diplomacy and economic 6lackmail, and tlie direct and indirect use of
armed forces. Ideological diversion always accompanies the foreign-policy
actions which are most important for imperialism and frequently anticipates
them in order to introduce discord and dissension in the camp of the opposing
side. Because of this, the activity of ideological saboteurs which differs in
- forms and methods used is distinguished by strict organization and centrali- _
zation of control at the highest level, primarily in the United States and NATO. ~
In the United States, anticommunism was elevated to the rank of state policy
immediately after World War II, and questions of ideoingical diversiona occu~y
a prominent place in the work of the National Security Council (NSC) which is
headed by the President. The NSC accomplishes overall supervision of the ac-
tivity of all government institutions which are involved in foreign policy propa-
ganda. The directozs of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Inter-
national Communications Agency (ICA) and representatives of military intelli- -
gence and co~nCerintelligence as well as of other departments which are engaged
in subversive actions and anticommunist propaganda abroad are systematically _
calle~ on for participation in its work.
In 1948, that is, less than a year after the start of its activity, the NSC
recommended, in particular, the undertaking of "tremendous propaganda efforts"
whic.h are called upon to supplemet~t and ~ustify the arms race which had been
initiated by the United States, organize a psychological offensive against the _
Soviet Union;'and to consider propaganda "the fourth weapon o~ foreign pol_fcy"
which follows directly behind mili~ary, diplomatic, and economic measures.
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- ~n Che apj.zi~ of Chese recammendaCione, sCate appropx3aCions for aubvereive
propngandn began to incre~ae steadiYy beginning in 1949, and by 1951 the
� Congresg adopted an unprecedented 1aw which openly provided for the allocation -
of 100 million dollar~ for diversionary work against the aocialist countries.
~ The next year, khe Interdepartmental Bureau for NaCional Psychological Strutegy
wna cre~Ced and, in 1953, the U.S. Information Agency which has now been re-
nr~anized ~s the JoinC Agency for Tnterrational Communlcations--the main execu-
_ tive organ for the conducC of American propaganda abroad.
. According tU its official status, the agency is a governmental dppartment
= which is d:rectly accountable to the U.S. SecreCary of State and the Preaident
_ nf rhe counCry, It passesseB conaiderable independence: iC has ita own budget
- and its own s,ysCem for the training and assignment of peraonnel, and it has 10
- separare inseitueiona i.n WashingCon and 189 secCione in 120 countries of the
world. But it by no means operates on its own fear and riak. ICs activity is
regulated by the U.5. rulinA :.;ircles' "interests of s~rategic policy." And it
is not by chr~nce thnt the of!.tcial U.S. diplomatic repre~entatives abrosd in
t~or~e countries where ICA seGLions are located have been directed to consider
th~ agency's activiCy as one of the importanC elemenCs of U.S. representation
_ sbroad.
The technical base which the iCA inherited in 1978 from its predece~sor, the
- liSIA, consists of more Chan 11S radio transmitters, high-volume publishing and
_ printing facilities capable of providing the weekly publication of several
. dozen ~~4cnals witt~ a circulation of 1.3 million copies, moCion picCure studios -
which produce up to 50 films per year, and so forth. The framework for the
agency's activity is provided by tremendous appropriations to propagandize tli~
"American way of life" and to implement a policy of licentious anti-Sovietism
and anticommunism. They increased from 31 million dolla:s in 1949 to almost
400 million at the present time.
The CIA, Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National SecuriCy Agency, an~~ the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are working in the field of ideological diversion
hand in hand with the ICA and its peripheral centers, although on independent
budgets. The offspring of the CIA is a complex of subversive radio stations,
Clie biggest of which are "Radio Freedom" and "Radiu Free Europe." Organizing
and conducting secret operations and implemenCing espionage-diversionary ac-
tivity against the USSR and other socialist states, the departments which have
been named come forth as the most important suppliers of misinformation which
is directed toward the deception of public opinion. Fake documents and fabri-
cations are sent by means of a Iarge number of recruited ~ournalists by the
CIA alone to dozens of information ag~ncies, radio and television stations,
and big publishin~ houses in a number of countries as well as to hundreds of _
newspapers.
- Many emigre organizations and anticommunist centers are supported by the CIA--
the Wtiite Guardist "Popular-Labor Alliance" (NTS) as well as all kinds of
"unions," "organizations," and "essemblies" of former Vlasovites, Banderista,
and rabble like them. The emigre rabble from these "organizations" are
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arCrgcCed to Che conducC of anCi-Soviet acCiona against the crewa of our vesaels
which ca11 at forei~n ports, atCempC to provoke 5oviet citizens and citizens of -
other socialise countriea who are on official bu3iness erdps ~nd ~r.~.irtsC
- trips abroad, initiat~ purpoaeful talks, pump Chem for information, r~nd try
= to establish contaces, eomeCimes even compla~.ning about their own faee to -
cause pity and compassion.
But the inCereyt in Che life of the SovieC people which ta displayed by ehe
hirelings of the CIA serves as camouflage to cover the main misaion of the
provucateurs--intelligence which is conducted eo facilitate the acCivity of
~ the ideological saboreurs. This sub~ect was discuased frankly in the book,
"Fourth Weapon," wh3ch was recently published in London. It~ auChor, a certain
Charles Cruikshank, who claima to be an all-around specialisC in the field of
"psychological operations, propaganda, and subveraive operations" without falae
modesty, writes: "There can be no propaganda, at least effective propaganda,
- wiChout carefully provided intelligence. Ttie propagandist must sCudy the
country and the people to whom he is appeal3ng in the most detailed manner.
- He must know them so that noC one false note creeps in in his radio appeal or
leaflet. He must know what the housewife ia saying when she is sCanding in
_ 11ne at the food sCore, what questions interest the plant workers, and the
peasant3' atCitude toward the government.... The living conditions and atti-
Ludea of the people ehould be known in ~etail primarily in order to deCermine
. more precisely where and when to attack in proFaganda and what ammunition
to uae."
If the National Security Council steps forth in Che United States as the organ
for strategic planning, and the ICA and intelligence agencies as the immediate
organizers of ideological diversions, the brains of their centers are about
200 specialized scientific-research instiCutions which are etYgaged in the
"ideological" servicing of anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaigns. Amang ,
- them are the Hoover InstituCe on War, Kevolution, and Peace, the Russian
Institute and Research Center on Problems of Communism at Columbia University,
the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, the Institute for the Study
of Communist Strategy at the University of South Carolina, and others. The
activity of these formally private and independent institut3ons in the field
of ideological diversion is closely coordinated by government instituCions,
in particular by the Federal Consultative Commission on Information Questions.
~ A number of other capitalist countries also have their own national centers -
for the conduct of ideological diversion on an international scale. In the
FRG, for example, propaganda campaigns abroad are organized by the Federal
Department of the Press and Information which is directly subordinate to the
chancellor and has an annual budget of up to 120 million marks.
In Great Britain, the role of chief cooriinator in the conduct of a policy and
propaganda of anti-Sovietism is played by the Joint Intelligence Committee and
~ the Interdepartmental Committee on Info rmation. A mighty state institution
with an annual bt~d~et of about 60 million pounds sterling, the so-called.
British Council comes forth as the main organizer of British propaganda
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_ Abro~d. The hardened gpy-diplomat, R, B. Lockh~rt, acted in the role of one
_ of thie organ�s leaders for long years.
Lockhart died eight yeara ago. But~the traditions which he fnundeci itt the
organization o~ secret operations against socialism are being preseYVed
; and are being developed by Britiish ideolog~.ca1 saboteurs. We11 known, in
particular, ia the plan "Liotey" [as Cransliterated] which was worked out in
the depths of GreaC Britain's inte113gence organs "for the entire period of
~ peaceful coexistence." The plan envisages causing "friction in the highest
spheres of the Warsaw Pnct counCries," rewarding ao-called dissidents--renegades
_ uf socialiat society, ahattering the fraternal collaboration of Che peoples
' in the socialist countries, and attaining rhe breaking away of individual -
atates fram the socialisC family.
Increasing acCivity in the field of ideological diversion is being shown in
recent years by Israel which is using the propaganda of Zionism to camouflage
iCs aggressive policy and to set the Jews aga3nst Che non-Jewieh population of
~ny country. The Zionists are sparing no resources for subversive activity
= against the world social3.st system. -
The general council and executive commiCtee of the World Zioniat Organization
w~,th headquarters in New York and Jerusalem and the so-called Jewish Agency
which con~r.ols the radio station "Voice of Zion" and which is conducting con-
~iderablE printed propaganda, has a network of branches in more than 40 coun-
tries, and has ":i,te own people" in many organs of mass information and in
public and religious circles including Catholics and ProtesCants sCep forth -
as the main organizers of 7.ionist ideological diversion. The Zionist-fighters
who are used for terrorist acts and for sabotage, diversion, attd espionage
are united in the ranks of an organization with a fascist trend called the
"Jewish Defense League."
The Bei~ing Maoists, who are attaining hegemonistic goals in the international
arena, are also stepping forth as assistants to the ideological saboteurs _
from the camp of imperialism. A specially authorized member of the Politbuxo
and corresponding departments of the Central Committee, CommunisC Party of
China, are directing and coordinating subversive actions within the communist
and workers' movement, the creation of MaoisC groups in individual countries,
and the activity of emigre associations of fellow-countrymen and press organs
with a pro-Bei~ing orientation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ,
New China News Agency, the Administration for Matters in the Publication
and Dissemination of Literature in Foreign Languages, the Admini-
stration ~or Tourism, and the Tlain Administration for Radio and Television
with the StaCe Council of the People's Republic of China are stepping forth
as the administrative headquarters for ideological diversion.
Joining the anticommunist camp, the Bei,jing ideologtcal saboteurs are playing
- into the hands of the most extreme forces of world reaction. Abusing th~
authority of the CCP and the Chinese revolution which was won earliei, gamb-
ling on socialist ideals, and taking refuge behind revolutionary slogans, they
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ln e~sence opened a new front ir. Che ideologica~.-poliCical sCruggle againet
ancialism, are falatfying and distorCing ,~cien~:L�ic communism, apread~.ng
bourgeois-natlonalle,tic ideology and anti-~~ovietiem, and trying ~0 1u11 the
vigilance af the peaples in xegard to imperi,~lism.
The impartanC leading centers of ideo~.ogical divers:ion on an inCer-
national scale nre concenCrated, finally, in NATO. 'The NATO Council and
the three permanent committees which �unction in it--on poliCical quest3ons,
on questions of infortnaCion and cultural ties, and on prablems of contemporary
society--form a sort of main staff which defines the general strategic line
for aubversive propaganda against Che socialisC coun~ries. Executive organ
of Cti3s headquarters is the NATO Information DirectoraCe which works out Che -
basic propaganda theses in Che interesGs of Che organization's members, pub-
lishes official mAterials, and coordinaCes the activity of the ideological
saboteurs from various bloc countries. Maintaining close ties wiCh the infor-
maCion agencies of Che capitalisC world, the NATO Information DirectoraCe has
the opportunity tu use more than 5,200 newspapers and radio stations to spread
anti-Soviet and antisocialist frauds.
Coordination of the activity of ideological saboteurs in preparing to wage
"psychological war" under combat conditions is also accomplished primarily
within t~e framework of NATO. In particular, a conference of 120 representa-
tives or :Lnteiligence and propaganda services of NATO countries as well as
psychologistsy physicians, and other specialists took place from 1 through 10
August 1~~78 in Khania on the island of Crete. The participantn in the con-
ference heard and discussed almost 20 reporCs on the social trend, co~?tent,
forms, methods, ~nd planning the act.'.vity of information resources as a
weapon of "psychological war."
In the opinion of NATO specialists, "psychological weapons," that is,
refined, purposeful propaganda in combination with blackmail and varfous types
of diversion can have a signif~cant influence on the opinions, fee]in~s, atti-
tud~s, and behavior of enemy servicemen as well as the civilian population.
It is called upon to cause fear and panic, undermine the resolve and will of
people, thrust ca~itulatory convictions upon enetuy troop personnel, mislead
Chen~, and reduce the combat capabilities of large units and units. In one of
Che plans for unleashing aggressive NATO acCions against the Soviet Union
which was prepared in deep secrecy under the code name "Dropshot" but recently -
became public property, it was indicated in this regard: "'Psychological war'
can serve as an extremely important weapon to introduce dissidence and disorder
= among the peoples of the ~J5SR, to undermine tiheir morale, and to inttoduce
disturbances and disorganization in Che life of the country. A special effect
should be expected from subversive operations conducted among individual ethnic
graups with Che use of nationalistic arguments and slogans of liberation....
In general form, the regulation documents of the '~ATO countries' armies point
out that the main goal of "psychological war" is to undermine the resolve and
. will of the enemy for victory and lower the combat moral;e qualities of his
troops. To weaken the combat effectiveness of the troops, it is recommended
that "surprise and disquleting actions, flexibility of maneuver, propaganda,
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misinformarion, provocatl.ons and intimidation, sahotage~ and terror" be.em-
ployed and that "the enemy muat be given no respite and the opportuniry to .
_ re8~ore the troops physically and with regard to morale." -
Witihin the framework of the NATO military structure, responsibility for the
planning, preparation, and conduct of "psy~ahalogical warfare" againsC Che enemy
troops and populaCion is assigned to the commandera of armed forcea formationa
in theaters of military operationa. The direcCor~tes for civil affairs as
we11 as operaeions directorates and.intelligence directoraCes and sectione
of Che appropriate headquarters are the working apparaCus of the commander.
_ Tn the headquari:ers of Che supreme commander of Che NATO combined arm~d forces
tn Europe, a"special warfare" secCion is Fart of the civil afEairs di-
rectorate.
Ttie direct leadership of the "psychological warfare" units and subunits ia
assigned to the commanclsof each individual NATO country and their staffs. 'fhe =
men and equipment for "psychological warfare" include special battalions and
companies which are called upon to accomplish boCh large-scale ideological
- operations against the armeci forces and population of one or another ~~ountx'y
as a whole and small diversions whose mission is to contribute to the combat
succesa of friendly troops on individual sectors of the front. -
The tr~ining of personnel for the accomplishment of ideological diversion by
the NATO cour.trfas is conducted in the United States at the "Special Warfare
Center" (Fort 3raog) and in three schools for the conduct of "psychological
warfare" which are iunctioning in Great Brftain, tne FRG, and France.
Under contemporary conditions, the activity of international centers for ideo- -
lo~ical diversion is wholly and completely subordinate to attempts of the most
wicked reactionary forces ~o slow down the process of detente. They are sowing
dissension between peoples, crganizing anti-Soviet and anticommun~.st ballyhoo,
- and camouflaging the imperialist policy of aggression and interference in the
internal affairs of ~ther states. The present activity of the ideological
saboteurs is one more illustration of the sagacity of the Lenin indications
of the imperialists' perfidy: "...if now they cannot come against us with =
_ weapons in hand, they come with weapons of the 1ie and slander..." (V. I. Lenin,
"Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete WorksJ, Vol 42, p 365). -
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
G3G7
CSO: 1801
- 9
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~Ott OE~'~ICtAL US~ pNLY
~
, COI~tENT5 ON AIR b~F'~fiS~ 0~ NATO CItOUNU TROOP5
!~odrow ZARUB~~HNbY~ VbYENNbYE OBbZtt~NIY~ in Rug~ian No 2~ ~~b 79 signed to
pres~ 5~eb 79 pp 29-33
(Arcicle by Mgj Gen Arty A. Sherstyuk, candidate nf. military gcience~~
docent: "Air Upfense of NATO Ground Troopg in e TheaCer of OperaCions"]
;TextJ The military leadership of the aggressive NATO bloc is devoting great
actention eo air defen~e ie a theater of operations, gtressin~ that
und2r contempor~ry CondiCions the ground forces cannoC count on success in
an operatio:i ir their basic groupings are not cov~red reliably from enemy air
strik~s and reconnaissance.
The predominant views on the role, place, and principles for or~anizing air
defcnse ;Abj of. th~ ground forces in a thegt~r of operations, it is noted in
the forei~n press, are the views of the American command. Moreover, the ~
armies of the majority of NATO countries are armed with air defense complexes
and fighter aircraft which are primarily of American produr.tion.
Uespite certain differences in AD weapons~ the organizational and manning
scructure for air defense, and in existinf; views on individual questions in
its organiLation and conduct which have existed up to now in the armies of the
NATO countries and exist at the preeent time, as evide+nced by the foreign
press work is continuing on improving the air defense system of the NATO
ground troops.
The ~ir defense syster~ of the ground forces in a theater of operations func-
tions within the limits of a zone of combat operations Which has a depth of
up to 200 km (depending on the operational deployment of the troops) and is
the first operational echelon of the entire NATO air defense in Europe. It
consists of a basic number of weapon~ to combat the aerial enemy, especially
loW-flying targets.
The comr.iander of the armed forces in a theater of operations is responsible
for air defense as a Whole. He distributes the air defense means Which he
has available between the communicati;ion zones and zones of combat operationa
and between his subordinate troops. As a rule, the Air Force commander is
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deyign.~t.ed ;1r defeng.e cvmmgnd~r in g thenter df opergeidn~~ In ndditinn to
fighter avietidn, the ~r~und ~ir defen~e we~p~ng in the Communic~Cidn zone
nre opergtLonally ~ubor~inate to him.
7'he com,nander df g fdrmgtinn (l~rg~ uniC) i~ r~eponeible for the org~nizgtinn
~nd cnnduct of ~ir dpf~ns~ ~f ~ ground fnrc~ fnrmation (l~rgp unitj. ICg im-
medi~te or~gnizaCion ig gccompli~h~d by the genior Command~r~ nf organic
or ~ttached gir def~nge unieg ~nd Che conCrdl el~mentg of cnmbinpd-armg
he~dquarter~ tactiC~1 nper~einns centera (TOC) ahich they deplny in wnr-
- time: in the ~rmy grnup--by the Ab gection of the army group headquarterg;
in the field army (if prpsent)-~the commnnder nf the air defenge artillery
lar~e unit and the AD gection c~f the TOC; in the corps--thc Comm~nder of the -
~ir defense artillery lgrge unie (unit) and AD eectinn of the Corps TOC; in
the division--by the cnmmander nf Che air defen~e unit and the AU section of
the divigion TOC. -
Tt~e Americ~n pres~ points out that the fighting strength of the nir defense
io:ces in a theater of oper~tions which are inCended for coverir~g the ground
fdrees is nnt const~nt and deppnds on the imporCance of the theater of opera-
tions, the number and national affiliation of the troops which comprise it,
r.he grouping attd pnssible scale o~ operations of the aerial enemy, and other
elements of the situation. Thus, accordi~g to their views, about 70 percent
of the air ~efense migsile complexes and 40 percent of the eir defense fighters
from tt~e cor~~ined NATO air defense system in ~urope is concentrated on the
main, Central. ~uropean 'Theater of Operations while about 25 percent of the air
ctefense r~issile complexes [ZRKj and 45 percent of the AD fightcr~ are in the
Southern European Theater and only 5 percent of the ZRK and 15 percent of the
AU fighter~ are in the tvorthern European Theater.
According to reports in the foreign press, the fighting streagth of the AD men
::nd equipment in this theater of operations numbers 13 "Nike-Hercules" bat-
cal:ons, 20 "Nawk" battalions, a squadron of "Bloodhound" antiaircraft guided '
missiles (AAGMJ, a squadron of "Rapier" f~ACM's, and 10 squadrons of air defense
fighter aircraft. Together :~ith the air defense weapons of the ground forces~
this comprises approximately 2,000 ZKK's,of them abour 200 "Chaparral" 2RK's,
850 antiaircraft guns, and 15U AD fighters.
Tl:e foreign press points out that the major portion of the a:r defense weapons
w!~ich are at the disposal of the commander in the theater af operations are
used in ttie disposition area of the groundforce large units (formations) and
thcir basic rear area installations.
The air defense of the ground forces in a theater of operations consists of
~ air defense men and equipment of the forward area, corps rear area, army group
r2ar area, or rear area of ar.oth~r ground force operational formation which
cooperate With each other in a coordinated manner and is supplemented by a
system of fighter cover which is organizeci on a scale of the theater of opera-
tions (AD zon~~).
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~nlt d~~ICIAL US~ dNLY
Anei~ircreft we~pdn~ which grp mn~,t adapt~d for ~ng~ging ldw-flying uerinl
egrg~t~, including helienpC~rg~ gr~ lncaeed in Che aren ocCUpied by divi~ion~
- of Che firgt echeldn~ In Che U.S. divigion, thi~ ig g mixed "Ch~p~rr~l-Vu1C~n"
nir defense b~ttalinn (24 "Chgpnrrnl" eir def~n~~ compl~x~g ~nd 24 '~VU1Can''
Z()-mm 75U (c~nti~ircr~ft ~elf-prnpel]ed nreill~ry mount~) ~nd abdut 70 portpbl~
"Rcd Ly~" 'L WC'e; th~e ~'ltC~-gn air defense battalion (36 40-mm twin zSU'~ gnd 15
4U-mm ~ntigircrnfe guns) ~nd porCgbl~ ZRK's of the "It~d ~ye" typh; Creat
Britain--g gubunit of portable "Blowpipe" z1tK'g; rhe N~ehr_rlandg--gn anCi~ircr~rtt
nrtillery b~tt~lion (18 40-mar ~ntigircrgft gune); and in Che Belgign ~ivigion-- _
Z2 2b-mm ~nCi~ircrgft guns coneisting of a?~rittircrgfr platoons gnd brigad~g.
The re~ul~tiong c:f Che grmiea af the United SCgteg and Che other NATO counCries
point out that the performance chgr~cCeristice o� ehe eir defense wenpone in
the inventory do not permie ehe cr~ntion of ~ continuoug zon~ nf cover in the
division'g ~ntire zone of acCion. Ther~fore~ it is recommended th~t or~anic
or gttBC~lpd weapnng be uged for Che clns~-in COVpr nf the combaC uniCe which
nr~ oper~ting on the direction nf the main effort gnd division command pogt~.
In the divisioits which are operating in Ch~ corps second echelons and in rhe
- divisions of gecond-echelon corpg, the regulations recommend that the ~rtillery,
control posts, and rear area installations be considered ~e the main AD nbjec-
e.ives.
bes~truction vf the aerial Pn~my by the first-echelon division's AD weapons
("Chaparral" and "Red ~ye" ZRK's) is accomplished, as a rule. above the combat
~ formations o: the troons being covered. In order to destroy the aerial enemy
prior to his accomplishment of hia co~r,bat misgion, it is recommended that
i~ possible the air defense weapons be located on the approaches to the
troops and objectives being covered. As not~d in the foreign press, this re-
quirement can be satisfied only when covering objectives and troops which are
at some distance from the line of contact of the troops.
- T:ie contemporary air defense weapons of divislons in the ground forces of the
United States and other *lATO countries are not capable of destroying enemy
means of aerial attack at night and in difficult weather conditions. There-
Eore~ the regulations note that under these conditions the missions fer cover-
ing the divisions are assigned, aa a rule, to the corps "Hawk" air defense
complexes. -
Forei�n military specialists believe that in the future the increase in the
effectiveness of the AD system will be furthered by including in the tables
of or~anization and equipment of divisions of the United States, the FRC, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and other NATO counCries the new "Roland" 'LRK and the
"Gepard" ZSU. The British press expresses the opinion concerning the possi-
bility of adopting in the inventory of the division the "Rapier'' ZRK which
initially was intended for use only at the corps level.
Corps weapons, according to the views of commanda of the United States and
other ~IATO countries, are intended for th~ creation of an all-weather zonal
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An gy~C~m~ prim~rily ~t la~ gnd medium alCitude~. The U.5. army ~orpg may be
r~infnrCed by nn ~ir defenee grCillery group cnneigCing of three or four ''N~wk"
bgttnlions ~nd nne "Chapgrrel/~ulcan" battalion. '1'he areill~ry diviBion of
th~ 9ritigh corps hng twd "It~pier" nir defense miseile regimenC~ while th~
_ g~lginn corpg hag gn air defenee arCillery group di two "Hgwk" b~tegllnng gnd
~n nn~i~ir~:raft b~tt~lion. A~ ~ rulp, Ch~ grmy cc~rp~ of the FRC as well. as in
gome other Countries where the "Hawk" gnd "Nike-Herculeg" ~ir def~nse missile
unity ~re pnrt nf ehp Air ~orce hge only en gntiaircraft grcillery uniC. In ~
thia eagp~ th~ Covering of the ~rmy corpg is ~lso ~cGOmpli~hed by one or twn
"H~wk" batCaliong from the ngCional Air Force.
'The "Hawk" nir defense battalions which are ~etached to the corps or support
it (from the Air ~orce) are uaed to cr~aCe a continuous xone of cover for the
corps eroops nnd ob~~ttives. A$ a rule, one "Haw:c" battalion is deployed in
tl~e znnp of gction of pach firgr-echelon division with the mission of rein-
forcing the diviBion air defense~ destrnying Che aerl.~1 enemy on the approaches =
to the troop~ being covered at altitudea beyond the reach of division weapone.
At night and undpr difficult weather conditi~na the "Hawk"battalion xceually ac-
compli~hes the misgion of division air defenae independently,withouC the parCicipa-
tion of division antiaircraft weapons.
7't~e second imnortant mission of the "Nawk" air defense battalions ie to cover
thE "Lance" g~ided missile batta~ion, large units of the aecond echelon
_ (reserve), control posts, and other important corps inatallations.
The air defense of the army corps is organized, as a rule, on the principle
of the AD are~ (zonal syatem) whose essence is covering the troops and ob~ec-
tives from enemy air strikes from all of his pos~ible directions of operation.
This is attained by arranging the batteries of the "Hawk" air defense battalions
in several lin~s at mutual distances which ensure covering their killing zones.
The American regulations note that the zonal air defense is not uniform. It
must envision the reinforcement of cover on approaches to the most important
oo~ectives and on the most probable direcCions of an eneiny air raid.
The firs~t line of "Hawk" batteries is deployed at a distance from the FEBA
(forward ed~e of [he battle area] which excludes their destruction by field
artillery: up to 15 km for "Hawk" self-propelled ZRK's and up to 30 km for -
towed "liawk" ZRK's. A second and, sometimes, even a third line of "Hawk"
batteri.es is deployed at a distance of 15-40 km from the pxeceding line. The
intervals between batt~ries in the first line fluctuate between 10-30 km~ and
in the second and subsequent lines--30-40 km.
As reported in the foreign press, "Hawk" air defense battalions which are
part of the NATO countries' ~round and air forces are deployed on a line which
is 30-40 km from the eastern borders of tt~e FRG and other NATO countries.
Comprising the first air defense missile position for the c~mbined NATO AD
system, at the same time they are the cnain grouping of corps air defense weapons
of the NATO armies with their initiation of aggressive combat vperations against
the Warsaw Pact countries.
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~
r ~Oft nF'~ICIAL USC dNLY -
'The gCgCemenCS uf individugl wes.tern gpe~ialig.tg sCregs Chae with ~n insu�fi~
cient numb~r df "Hawk" zRK's (which is typicgl nf Che army corp~ of several
NATO cnunCricH) tt~~ cnvering of only the moeC importanC ob~ectives ie orgnnixed
nnd only from the main pro6able directione of ~nemy ~p~rationH~
The next imporCane element ig ehe AD gystem which is created in Che operational
farmgtinn (f3eld army nr army group) which is reittforced by an nir defenee _
~rtillery lgrge unit or sev~ral units ("Nike-Hercules" and "Hawk" ZP.K's)~ several
"Ch+aparral/Vulcan" mixed baCtnl:ons, and ~lectronic-countermeasurp (ECM) bat~
tnlions. In the armies of Belgium, the Netherl~nde, and several other NATO
r.ountries missions for covering troops and ob~ectives locaCed in the rear area
of the operattonal fnrmaCion are assigned to the air defense missile units which
nre parr of the Air ~orce.
In the reur area of the operntional forn~tion~ "Nike-Hercules" nir defenge
b~tC~lions form a continuous AD zone aC medium and high (up Co 30 km) altitudes
for the enCire depCh of the zone of combat operations with iCs extension Co the
approaches to the troops in the enemy's direcCion and to the flanks. The a-
mountof extension ofChe killing zone varies from 30-40 to 80-100 km depending
on alCitude.
Existing American regulations recommend arranging the "Nike-Hercules" batteries
in approximstely a checkerboard order at mutual distances of 50-60 km to cre-
ate a cenriuuous killing zone. The first line of "Nike-Hercules" batteries is
deployed 40--60 km from the front line and the next two or three lines, as a
rule, at a distar.ce of 40-60 km from each other. The great range of destruction
of the "Nike-Hercules" ZRK (up to 160 km) permits concentrating the main efforts
on covering both individual ob,jectives as well as directions with the relaCive
uniform distribution of the bstteries through the maneuver of fire. Thus, the
"Nike-Hercules" air defense battalions suppl~ment the AD sysCems of divisions
' and corps, c:eating a zone for killing the aerial enemy at great ranges and
altitudes which are unattainable for division an~i corps air defense weapons.
- Furthermore, they create a killing zone above important ob~ectives having
operational significance: nuclear-weapons units, large units of the combined-
arms reserve (second echelon), and organs for the control and supply of troops.
Airfields of a considerable part of tactical and army aviation fall intn their
- zone of cover in addition to the ground Croops.
The "Hawk" battalions which are left under the orders of the aperational forma- ~
tion are also used to create the zonal air defense of such important objectives
as nuclear-weapons units, large units of the combined-arms reserve or the
second echelon, and organs for the control and supp~y of the troops. The
deployment density of the "Hawk" air defense batteries in the rear area of the
operational formation is considerable less than in the corps rear area. There-
~ore, some of the objectives are covered by the objective air defense system
rather than by the zonal system.
Air defense artillery battalions and mixed "Chaparral/Vulcan" battalions are
used for the direct objective covering of nuclear-weapons units and main
control posts. _
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'1'he NATO militnry lettderohip ~tracheg greet gignificgnce Cd neuCrglizing ehe
n~rinl enemy's nirborne ~lecCronic equipment. The employment df speciul EC1i
~ubunird Ls ~nvignged for thie purpoge. Thus~ nncording to thc vi~ws of
Amerlcan specialists~~n ECM company can be att~ched to en ~ir defenge ~rtillery _
group. .
_ At present, air defense complexes are considered to be the bagic AU means of
the ground forces in a theater of operations. AD fighter aviation g~pplemenCs
the operations nf the gir defense weapons, as a rule covering the gro~nd forces
by extending their zoneg of combat operations beyond the limits oE the nir -
defense wc~apons' ki113ng zones. The main forceg of AD fighter aviation in a
the~ter nf operations are disposed at sirfields 150-200 km from the fronr line.
- In the opinion of the NATO countriea' miliCary specialisCs, such deployment
ensurer~ cnvering ehe AD gircraft from air strikes by the "Nike-Hercules" and
"Hawk" air 3efense c:omplexes, at the same Cime pprmitCing Che exeettgion of
the AU fighters' zones of combat operations beyond the limita of air defenae
weapung'killing zones to the front, to the flanks, and to the rear.
As indicated by the foreign military preas, the NATO command is devoting con-
siderable aCtention to the deployment of effective air defense weapons in
theaters of operations. According Co the views of western strategists,
further improvemenC of the AD system of NATO ground forces will follow the
_ pat:i of equipping the bloc's armed forces with ne�.~ ZRK's having long and
me~ium range, all-weather and highly mobile short-range air defense missile
and artillery complexea~ the adoption of new sirplanes of the F-15A and F-16A
types in the inventury to accon?plish the mission of winning air superiority,
the introduct~on of new automated systems to control AD weapons, and the
development of inethods for their combat employment under various conditions
and situntions.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhuoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
6367
CSO: 1801
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COI~tENT5 ON bEFENSE IN A U.5. MOTORI2ED INFANTRY BATTALION
Moacow ZARUBE2HN~Y~ VOY~NNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 79 aigned to
press 5 Feb 79 pp 38-41
[Article by Col M. Borisov: "U.S. Army Motorized Tnfantry (Infantry) BatCalion
in the Defense"]
(Text] Attaching primary significance to the further improvement of tactics
in active offensive operations by ground forces in a Cheater of operationa,
the mili~ary Zeadership of the United States is also working out oroblems in
the organization of the defense of small units, units, and large units. In
particular, U.S. Army regulations note that the succesa of the defense as a
whole is greatly dependent on its correct organization at the loweat element--
the batCalion.
As stressed by the American military press, the motorized infantry (infantry)
battalion conducts defensive operations as part of one of the brigades in a
mechanized (infantry, armored) division, being in its first or second echelon.
In individual cases, it acts independently, covering the flanks or gaps in
the division combat formation and operating as part of the covering and
security force in the security zone.
For th~ accomplishment of specific missions in the defense, the brigade com-
mander may create battalion tactical groups based on the battalion, thanks to
which the greatest effectiveness is attained in employing each of the subunit's
weapons. In the opinion of the American coc:m?and, battalion tactical groups
should be balanced in their com~osition so that flexibility in their combat
employment on various terrain is ensured. Thus, when conducting defensive
. operations on terrain which is favorable for tank operations and their conduct
of fire at maximum ranges, battalion tactical groups are created with the pre-
dominance of tanks in them. And conversely, on difficult terrain with a limited
view as well as in populated places, preference is given to the motorized in-
fantry. On the battalion co~mnander's decision, company tactical groups may
be created in the battalion tactical group.
The reserve battalion tactical group (brigade second echelon) is usually used
, to block the enemy wt,o has made a penetration, to re~nforce first-echelon bat-
talion tactical groups, for the conduct of special counterattacks, and to
cover an open flank. _
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. -
....r ~
~yuu de~Toro
~ ~ ~ pCM1~{YI
rn~ ' t ~
~ ~ ~
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~ ~ ~ ~
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Combat Formation of a Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion in the
Defense (Variant)
Key:
~ 1. Combat outpost position 6. Motorized infantry battalion
2. Motorized infantry platoon (with tank company)
3. Motorized infantry company 7. Tank company (minus tank platoon)
4. Antitank guided missile platoon 8. Up to 2.5 km
5. Motorized infantry company with 9. 1-2 km or more
tank p~atoon
In the position defense, the combat formation of the battalion tactical group
can be organized in one or two echelons. The company tactical group, which is
part of the second echelon (reserve), is disposed on a tacL�ically advantageous
position or terrain sector. The battalion mortar subunits are 1.ocated close
Co it, as a rule.
The Cank subunits which are detailed to the battalion tactical group are
usually employed to conduct special counterattacks and to engage enemy tanks
which have broken into the depth of the defense. Sor.~etimes, the tanks may
operate together with company tactical g:oups of the first echelon to repel
tank attacks in front of the battalion's FEBA [forward edge of the battle
area].
'The foreign press notes that, being in the brigade first echelon, the battalion
defends an area up to 3 km frontally and up to 2.5 km in depth. Company strong
points which have�received engineer improvements and prepared for the conduct
of a perimeter defense comprise the basis of the battalion defense area.
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Imprnvemene df rh~ area will depend on the ~vailgbiliCy of time and engineer~
ing equipment. 'rhe primary srrong pointa, cover �or pergonnel~ and conCrol
poaee arp prepared �iree. The sysCem nf atrong poinCs ig nr~;~nized in such
a way as to force the enemy Co gttack in a direction which is advantageou~
_ for the defender (see figure).
The ronin element of the defense is the fire system whi~h ia nrganized so ag Co
creaCe the max~mum fire density on probable directions of enemy attack wirh
organic weapons. ~nvisioned simultaneously is the creation of a zone of con-~
tinunus, barrage, and concentraCed fire a~ well as the use of the fire of
- r~rmvred personnel carriers (69 vehicles in the motorized infantry battalion)
which are under cover or on prepared positions. -
~ One nf the hasic requirements imposed on the defenae is the ability to repel
mass enemy tank attacks *o prevenC their breakthrough into the depth of the
company strong points. To accomplish antitank defense misaions, the battalion
has rather e�fective organic antitank weapons. They include the "TO~J" ATCM
;antitank guided missile] (18 raunchers) and the "Dragon" ATGM (27 lannchers).
ATGM subunits are disposed under natural cover ar in field fortifications, and
tt~eir firing positions are improved in such a way as to desCroy Canks at Che
diatant apnroaches. In addition to supporting counCerattacks to destroy the
enemy who nas made a penetration, the tank subunits which are attached to re-
inforc~ Che battalion are nlso assigned missions to engage tanks~ In addition,
a11 battalion personnel are trained to combaC tan~CS, and it is recommended that
well-trair,ed groups armed with various antitank weapons be created in its
companies.
The battalion's air defense is organized within the division's overall air
defense system, and the close-in cover of the main elements of the battalion's
combat formation--by "Red Eye" ZRK [antiaircraft missile complex) sections
(five complexes).
American military specialists believe that the survivability of the battalion
deiense can be attained through the maximum us e of advantageous terrain condi-
tions, good engineer improvements of the combat positions, and cover for
personnel and armament, and also thanks to careful camouflage.
Primary and alternate positions are prepared for the battalion's weapons, and
shelters are prepared to provide cover for the personnel against weapons of
mass destruction, air strikes, and arCillery fire.
I[ is believed that the most important means to increase the battalion's combat
power in the defense are obstacles which force the attacking enemy to deploy
prematurely and reduce the rate of his attack. Engineer obstacles and the
fire system of the battalion strong point should supplement one another.
Minefields and wire entanglements are installed in front of the ~EBA and in the
gaps between strong points, obstructions and antitank ditches are constructed,
and bridges and sections of the road are blown. Switch, blocking, and dummy
~ positions are ereated in the depth of the defense, and minefields on tank
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nvenueg of approgch. It is Cnn~idered expedient to Gongtrucr nbstacles along
and ncrn~s probgbl.e enemy directions of gCCack 700--500 metexs ~rom one gnother
nnd at a diatance of 100~,20Q meCers from Che limit of the bttreal~on wegp~ns'
- effeceive rnnge of fire, As a rule, it ia recommended that min~t~.~iag of the
mixed type be lgid: gnCieank minea reinforced wiCh antipersonnel (fragmen- -
tatinn and b1geG) and aomet3mea chemical and napalm minea. Such a mixed
minefield may number about 1,000 antitank and up eo 4,000 apecial mineg~ .
Concealed routes which should provide ~he dependable cover of Che displ~cing
yubutiits from enemy observation gnd fire are selecCed and prepgred ahend of
time to execuee Che maneuver of the battalion's men and equipment in the
cuurse of a defensive bnttle. In addition Co the battalion personnel, combat
engineer aubunits are uaed to accompliah the mosC laborious engineer work and
build the obsCacles.
AcCOrding to the views of the American command, the conduct of defensive battle
te characterized in the following manner. In the absence of direct contact
with the enemy, the field artillery in direct support of the battalion forcee
C}ie enemy to deploy on the diatanC approaches to the defense by fire. Tactical
air launches sCrikes against the enemy columns which are moving up and heli-
copter gunships which are operating in the battalion zone of defense deatroy
his tanks.
As the attacking units and subunits approach, defenaive battle is initiated with
them by the aattalion combat outposts which, with the active support of the
- artillery and mortars, try to prevent the enemy from conducting reconnais-
sance, mislead the enemy concerning the ouCline of the battalion's F'EBA
.1nd to force him to deploy to organize i~s breakthrough.
After acco~aplishment of the assigned mission, the combat outpost withdraws to
; the disposi[ions of the battalion combat formation. When the enemy reaches -
the ~'EnA, fire is intensif~ed by means of all battalion weapons. Tanks and
ATGM's located in the first-echelon company strong points open fire on the
enemy tanks which are deploying for the attack.
In case the enemy succeeds in penetrating the defense, he is counterattacked
by forces of the battalion second echelon (reserve). With an unsuccessful
outcome of the counterattack, the battalion's subunits occupy switch and block-
ing position~ and, holding them firmly, provide conditions for the conduct
of a counterattack by forces of the brigade or division second echelon
(reserve).
The battalion's defensive battle is supported by field artillery fire as well
as by strikes by tactical air and helicopter gunships, for the accomplishment
of which representatives from the field artillery group and tactical air con-
trol group may be detailed to the battalion.
The motorized infantry (infantry) battalion can also conduct delaying
operations. The essence of these operations consists of the successive holding
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of intermediate defenaive pog~.tions to force th~ attacking enemy to deploy _
inCo combat format3on repeatedly for rhe breakthrough of these poeitions and~
- thexeby, to reduce rhe rates of hie advanc~. Judging from reporta in the
foreign prese, the battalion wi11 conduct delaying operat~on~ moet often in
th~ defenHe nf th~ e~curity zone, as part of thQ aoverin~ force, ~ttd in the
depth af the de�ense nfter loaing the main defensive 1ine. As a r~le, the
baCtalinn wi1~ receive a wider zorie when conducting delaying ac?:ions.
COPYKIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye"~ 1979
6367
cso; ~.soi
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~dlt 0~'FYCIAL US~ ~qNLY
WESTERN EFFORTS TO TMPROVE TANK MOBTLITY DESCRIBED
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 79 signed to
press 5 Feb 79 pp 41-48
[Article by Engr-Col Ye. Viktorov: "Ways for Increasing Tank Mobility"]
[Excerpts] High mobility, along w?th fire power and dependable armor, is
presently viewed by foreign military specialists as one of the most impor-
~
tant characteristics in the combat effectiveness of a tank. This contrib-
- utes to a substantial reduction in tank vulnerability and provides an oppor- -
tunity to impose combat on the ene~ in surprise and under conditions dis-
advantagec~us for it. Abroad it is felt that tank mobility must be divided
into operational and tactical.
By operational mobility one understands the possibility of rapidly concen-
trating a large number of tanks in a designated area for the purpose of
their subsequent use in an operation. It is felt that this depends upon
the average speed and range of the tank over roads, the dependability of
its motor, transmission and running gear, the convenience of the crew's
work, as well as upon the weight and size of the tank which determine its
ability to be transported by various types of transport.
Tactical mobility includes the capacity of the tank (under any geographic
and weather conditions) to travel rapidly on the battlefield And cross
natural and manmade obstacles in the combat area. In addition to mobility
during straight-ahead travel over solid ground, great significance is given ~
to maneuverability of the tank in skirting obstacles and avoiding enetr~y
fire, as well as cross-country capacity over swa.mpy, sanc~y and other ter-
- rains with ground having a poor bearing base.
The speed, maneuverability and cross-country capacity, has the basic indi-
cators of ope-rational and tactical tank mobility, depend mainly upon its
specific capacity and engine acceleration, the performance nf the trans-
mission and control system, the braking qualities, the running gear and
the amount of clearance.
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In developing the engines for the new tanks of the NATO countries, baeic
_ ~ttention has been given to increasing their power-~o-size ratio, as this,
~s has been pointed ~ut by foreign specia~iats, helps to maintain the combat
weight and dimenaions of the tank within the establ.ishec~ ~imits, and its _
mobi~ity is dependent upon this. An increase in the power-to-size ratio of
diesel engines 3s achieved primarily by th~ir supercharging by in~ecting
a3r under an increased pressure and by increasing the crankshaft speed.
These measures shorten the service life of the engine. Never~heless West
- German specialists feel that the diesel engines of the MB-87? series which
have a power of up to 200 horsepower per cyl3nder are most suited for the
tank~ being developed in the FRG.
Testing has als~ been carr~~u out on another version of a 12-cylinder diesel
engine with intreased-volume cyl3nders. This has made it possible to in-
crease the engjner power (the rated power equaled 1,800 horsepower and the
brief tolerabl~ power reached 2,000 horsepower) and also improve such pec-
forraance as torque and acceleration. Such an engine has been proposed for
use on the West German experimental mo!~el of the 38-ton turretless Leopard-3
tank which is being developed, and the power-to-weight ratio shoul.d be around
50 horsepower per ton.
Many foreign specialists consider that the power of the diesel engines is
already approaching a limit, and on tanks they are endeavoring to use gas
turbine engines which are characterized by a high size-to-power ratio. Thus,
on the experimental model of the XM1 tank developed by the American Chrysler
firm, they have used an AGT-1500 gas turbine engine with a power of 1,500
horsepower.l It weighs ar~und 1,000 kg, and in volume is almost 2-fold less
than the equal-powered experimental model of the diesel engine which is used
on the XM1 tank of General Motors. The AGT-1500 engine is 1,615 ~ long,
1,015 mm wide and 710 mm tall. Its compactness is achieved basically by
using a new ring heat exchanger which is located around the reduction gear
and the exhaust diffuser of the turbine, and because the overall dimensions -
of the engine were not increased. The presence of an ad~ustable turbine
nozzle ring made it possible to improve its acceleration and econorr~y.
The foreign press has pointed out that recently, in developing the basic
combat tanks abroad, particular attention has been given to high accelera-
tion for the possibility of using this to escape from enerr~y fire. It is
felt that the acceleration of the tank will play an even greater role than
speed.
The maneuverability and cross-country capability of a tank also depend upon
the transmission. In addition to the possibility of transmitting high power,
it should also be able through the entire speed range of having good con-
trollability and braking qualities, as well as minimal overall dimensions
1For a drawing see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 11, 1978, p 31.
Editors.
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and weight. In a ma,jori~y of foreign tanks the tranamission is combined
with ~:he engine ~nd its servicing system into a single block which is usu-
a11y mounted in the rear of the tank on three or four suspension mounta,
_ 'Tank transmtssions are divided into hydromechanical and mechan3cal. -
The use of a torque converter in tank transmiss3ons combined with a plane-
tary gear box (PGB), has facil3tated the de~velopment of an ~utomat3.c trans-
- mission system. Such a system in the form uf an electrohydraulic device
which provides preselect3on of the required gear, is found on the Leopard-2
- tank in which they have employefl the HSWL-35~/3 hydromechanical reversible
transmission produced by the Renk firm2 with four speeds forward and two
reverse. The PGB consists of three planetary sets with disc brakes on
the first, second and third speeds and a disc clutch on the fourth speed.
The Allison X-1100-3A automatic transmission for the XM1 tank has a four-
speed PGB with an interlockable torque converter. Its PGB consists of five
clutches and three planetary sets which provide four speeds forward and two
reverse. This transmission opez~ates under automatic conditions in the three
_ higher speeds a;~d the shifting of them is done by the electrohydrau].ic drive.
This is operated by the driver using a T-shaped lever. The electric drive
for fuel supply is also operated by this. �
However, full automation of the shifting process, in the opinion of Western -
military s~ecialists, in certain instances is disadvantageous. Thus, in -
driving over very rugged terrain, the use of only automatic shifting can
lead to the frequent use of low gears, as a consequence of which the average
speed is reduced. Tt is felt that the driver should also be able to select
the driving conditions (particularly on descents). For this reason in both
the West German and American transmissions, in the PGB provision is made for ,
manual shifting but with the automatic interlocking of the torque converter.
In this instance the transmission is semiautomatic.
In the opinion of the foreign specialists, the PGB with a torque converter
and an automatic shifting system is more complicated, expensive and poorer
in terms of its absolute volume and weight indicators than synchronized
_ shaft gear boxes. Moreover, the possibilities of repairing them under
field conditions are limited. However it is assumed that the ability to
_ be used on high-powered engines and their advantages in ensuring the mobility
performance of the tanks provide grounds to consider such transmissions as
the most promising for further developments.
The transmission control system, in the opinion of foreign military special-
ists, should ensure the smooth starting up of the tank, the shifting of the
forward and reverse gears, the control of the turning mechanism and braking
2For the drawing see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIXE, No 11, 1978, p 32.
Editors.
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~Oit O~~tCIAL U5~ ~NLY
;yr,tem. 'I'he per`fbrmunce of the ~dntral ~y~temg influence~ tt?e Cdntro~.lu-
bility ~.nd tractian indi~~torg, while the type of controlc~ and the ef�ort _
requirel to operate them inFluen~e th~ ~egree df driver f~tigue~ A mechgni-
eal trannmin~sion control sygtem in ~mploy~d t~n the AMX-30 t~n1t, nnd meGhan-
ical. hydraulic nne on the M60A1. mh~ mo~t eff~ctive is ednGidered to be the
mechunicnl ele~trohydraulic one which is used dn the t,~~p~rd-1 and 2, the
Chi~ftain and the XM1 tanks.
mhe turnir~ mechani~m~ of foreign tanks usually empldy elutch el~mentg
(A.~SX-30, t}i~ Ghiei'tain, the r4b0A1 ~.nd the t,~~pgrd-1) dr Nith hydrnulic
tr~n~mi~sinn~ (the Leopard-~, }(Ml, S'I'XV-103~ and pz68). tiowever, acCOrdin~;
to ~tatementg in th~ for~ign presc, the turning mech~nisms ef the AMX-~0,
Chieft~in cand M~OA1 tanks do not provide st~ble straight-ah~ad mt~vement of
tt~e machine~ aith varying resist~nCp on the tr~rks due to the differentinl
~ rouplin~ of the drive xheels and the ~bsence nf st~bilizin~ ~lutch element~.
As is felt thi~ i~ their shortr~ming uhich reduce~ the ~v~rag~ spc~d. 'I"hir,
has been eliminated in the turnin~ m~ch~nisms nf th~ remaining bg~fe tank~
by using pl~net~ry s~ts and hydr~ulic tr~~smi~sinn~.
_ In the opinion of foreign milit~ry specialists, ~ Comm~n shortcdmin~ of
tihe
planetary turning mech~nisms (P'rM) is the high lo~se~ in friction ~nd th~
ir:?possibility of pra+~iding a uniform depend~nc~ betW~en the position of the
~~ontrols and the turning radius. ~tren When th~ P'rM employs rlutehes operat-
in~ in oil and Which have ~ rather stable coefficient of friction, in de-
terminin~ the ponition of the rontrols, the turning r~dius of the vehicle `
can v~ry broadly. ~'or this reason the driver is forced to operate the con-
trols periodically, and this leads to an abrupt change in the gn~ular -
velocity nnd turning angle of the vehicle. As ~ ronaequenCe ot' thi~ tank
cantrollability is Wcrsened and apeed is lost in pagsing through curvalinesr
lep,s of a route.
Th~ use of a hydraulic transmission Which makes it possible tn change the
Lurnin~ radius smoothly and to obtain a uniform dependence betWeen *.he can-
trol xheel and the turning radius (as in Wheeled vehicles) eliminates the
chief st~ortcoming of turning mechanisms employing clutch elements. It i~
considered that the use of a hydraulic transmissfon facilitates tank control,
and helps to reduce driver fatigue and speed losses in curvalinear areas.
A~ u result the average speed is increased.
Zn the vieu~ of foreign specialists, the basic evaluation indicator~ for
tank braking qualitie~ are brakin~ distance and deceleration. Until quite
recentl;r all the basfc tanks of the NATO countrfes had mechanical had stop-
pink; bra}:es uhich as a whole provided the required deceleration performance
or emergency braking. But the absence of poxer braking and the difficulties
of ensuring the xorkability of inechanical brakes s~ith frequent or extended
brakin~, for example, With the movement of a tank dovn slopes, as well as
the increase in the poWer-to-Weight ratio and the increase in the average
sp~eds led to an increase in the intensity of brake use. 'I'he turbosuper-
charFinP, also sor~e~+hat reduced the braking properties of the en~ines. For
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thi~ re~~nn far imprdvin~ br~.kin~ perf'~rm~nc~, ~ cambined type df brake f~ _
u~ed aith a hydradyn~.mic d~l~r~r (a hydr~uli~ ~iut~h nn the dutput ~hr~ft oi'
the tran~mig~i~n). ~'or th~ Lenp~rd-~ and M~i0A1 tsnlts which are equipp~fl
uith them, br~king di~t~nce at a npe~d op 40 km per hour is i5 and 2~ minuten,
regpectively~
7'he susp~n~ion gnd running g~~?r sbroad are vt~~r~d ~g arg~?tig r~hich to a sig-
nific~ht de~ree determine the puggibility of u~ing the hi~h power-td-ueight
ratio s~ith the movement of
t~r?ks over rugg~d t~rrgin. It is felt th~t the
gu~p~n~ion shdulci prdvide ~uffi~i~ntly high dyn~mic opere~tion of th~ road
wheelg, whi1~ the trgckg mu~~ have high ground-gripping prnpertieg and
c~use minimum pdWer losses in gpinning. ~ -
Modern �oreign tankg ~mploy ~n individual torgion gnd hydropneumatic3 sug-
pensidns (the Jap~nese 74 tank anfl th~ Swedish STFiV-11738)~ In seleetin~
the type nf susp~rtgidn for the XM1 Americ~n tank b~fng dev~loped, attention
was ~;iven to th~ir op~ration~. perfo~m~?nce, Weight, cost, ~~ge of muinten-
~nce ~nd rep~ir, vulner~bility unfler combat eonditiotts, and other fnctc~rs.
Acc~rding td gtatements in the fnreign pregs, a comp~rison of the rreight
nnd cost characteri~ties affirm~d th~t for thes~ indicators the torsfon and
hydrophewnatic suspensiong are apprnximgtely ~qual. Hor+ever, considerin~
the technologicgl efficiency, th~ requirements for maint~nanc~ and repairs,
and loa vulnerability iu combat, preference aas given to the torsion sus-
pension d~velnped by Chrysler. The XM1 tank uses geven doubled road Wheels
per side s+ith torsion bars from high-grade steel and improved blade-type
shock absorbers mounted nn the first, second and geventh wheels. American
~pecialists feel thnt in using seven Wheels (inst~$d of six as or the M60A1),
the service of the running gear elements will be increased by reducing the
lond on them. The road wheels af the xMi tank 635 mm in diameter have been
manufactured from an eluminum alloy. The poaer stroke of the Wheel is 380 mm.
ihe runnin~ gear of the Leopard-2 tank also has seven road Wheels (70Q mm in
diameter) and a torsion suspension. bisc Priction shock absorbers are
mounted on the first, second, third, sixth and seventh Wheels, and these
provide a rather smooth ride of the tank.
_ In the opininn of foreign military specialists, the effective use of t~nk~
in operation~ in theaters of act!on to a signiPicant de~ree Will depend upon
th~: durabilfty of the tracks and their dynamic characteristics. Here they
consi~er thut in terms of cross-country capability the future tanks xill
obviously not surpass the existing ones (see the table) [not translated~. _
Ho~+ever, the use of long-life tracks ahould lead to a significant rise in
tank mobility.
3For the drauing ~ee ZARUBEZHIIOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Tlo 11, 1978, p 33.
Editors.
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~C~It d~'~ICIAL US~ nNLY
~'or thin purpdne fdr the XM-1 tank the United St~t~ea h~.g develdped the m-147
tr~ck r~ith a rubber-metal link f~r a tra~k b35 mm rride. It i~ degignad to
npergte up td B,OOn km. ~tg design m~lc~~ it poggibl~ td use r~movable rub-
ber cughion~ fnr p~dg Which prevent rre~r in tr~v~ling dvpr hard nurfaced
rn~dn (cnncrete and agph~lt). In travelin~ over gnow or 1~oge ~rnund, the
padg cgn be remov~d, gna en th~ bottiom of
tih~ traeka th~re ~r~ steel p,ripn
Which st~nffic~ntly improve the tractidn qu~liti~~ of the trgck.
'Te~tin~ has been c~rri~d out on th~ L~op~rd-~ tiunk far a rubber-metal trgrk
made ~y the Western Germ~n Di~hl firm and thi~ provid~s g lffe up to 6,500 km
nver rd~d~. A pgrticul~r f~ature here is thp pogsibility of ingtalling
special snnwshoeg which are mounted on ~ach eighth 1ink.
Judging from the gtatem~ntis in the fc~reigr: presa, the NAmO countrieg, ~nd
above ~11 the United States and the F'~2G, without ati11 having completed
the d~v~lopment af the future XM1 and Leopard-2 te~nks Which wil]. be th~
bugic ones in their ~rmed forceg until the end of the 1990'g, hav~ ~lregdy
begun tn develc~p tanks which have higher speeds, maneuverability gnd
cross-country capa~ity. These eha.racteristics, in the opinion of foreign
- militttry speciglists, should in the future help to significantly reduce
the wlnerability of tanks in eombat.
COPYFiIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye oboxreniye", 1979
io272
Cso: 1801
~
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~OIt O~FICIAL U5~ nNLY
CdMM~NT5 ON ~F~'ECTS 0~ TLCNNOLOGY ON FIGN1'~R-INT~RCEPTOit TACTICS
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOY~ VOYLNNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Itugsian No 2, ~eb,
No 3, Mar 79 signed to press 5 F'eb 79, 7 Mar 79 pp 53-60,
43-49
(ArticLe by Col V. Kirilov, candidate of military sc:ence:
"The Modern ~ighter in Air Combat"]*
[No 2, ~eb 79, pp 53-60j
['CexeJ The Unite~3 States and the other countries of the aggressive
NATO bloc are preaently devoting incregsed attention tu studying the
fuCure develo~pment of fighter aircrnft and their capabilities to con-
duct modern air combat. The current nature of this ~roblem is linked
- to generalizing the experience of local conflicts and Co the delivery
of more madern aircraft into the air force inventory.
5cientista, deaignere and experienced flying peraonnel are
conducting these studies. Moreover, achievementg in the field
of cyberneCics are being used on a wideepread basis; they make
it possible to program fighter operationa during certain phases
of combat and to create mathematic models to obtain the required
charar.teristics and to use them aa a hasis fc~ .-~:~u~;:~�_ :urecasting.
The flight experiment (full-scale modeling) occupies an important
place in this; during the experiment, theoretical conclusiona
are Cested and tactics suitable for a given type of aircraft
a.re formulated. Analog-aircraft and specially trai~ned cre~~s--
wi~ich simulate enemy acCiona--~ake part in the experiments.
When modeling modern air combaC, foreign military specialists
definitely take into account the experience of past combat
operations. The evaluaCion is conducted according to the
folloWing basic criteria: speed, altitude, time, ra~:qe and
aspect for employing aircraft weapons systems and also the
number of aircraft particlpating.
* This arcicle reviews foreign specialists~ views on the effect
of equipment and weapons on the tactics for waging air cambat.
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~dlt dr~ICIAL USL dNLY
nuring ~ld~ure or di~~nggg~menC, flighC gp~~d ~e~.dom exc~eded -
MaCh 1~5 gl.tihough tihig did noC gppro~ch Che cgpgbi.litie~ of
eupereon~.c gircrgfti which are able eo develop ~peede in excege
of Mnch 2.2. Afeer Che adver~ariee gcquired egch oeher~
maneuvering beggn in the Ma~h 0.9-1~5 range and ended cloee
t~ th~ limie~ for eta11 epeed~ While Crying to gain an
advanC~g~oua poeieiott ~~l~eive to Che enemy, piloCe tried to
stay in the high subsonic flight envelope (Mach 0.8 +.l)
which gu~ranti~~d a maximum rare of Curtt.
buring fluid combat, flight altieude wns limie~ed to 1,500-7,000
meCers. Ae ~1Citudpe gbove and below ehese limita, only eingle
ntieacks were conducred with the fighter immediaCely escaping
from the target. The fightere did not fighC in the straCo-
sphere (gbove 12,000 m); therefore, their high altitude character-
ietice also were nor fu11y uaed.
Uue tn the energy uspd and not being able eo replenish it nfeer -
accomplishing unexpecCed (accelerated) turng, an overall trend
of reducing apeed and altitude was abserved during fluid combaC.
Conaidering the poasible build up in effort, the time of combat--
which broke down into individual fights after initial engagement--
was 2-7 minutes. Combat uau,ally ended due to the enemy's defeat,
diaruption of formation inte~arity, breaking contact with the
target or a ahortage of fuel,
The range and aspect, for weapona employment were characterized -
by small vgluea, *_haC is, combat was conducted aC short range
limited by the vieual contact between adversariea and a Carget
kill was only po~sible during a real hemisphere attack.
AI assisted launch (prior to acquiring the target visually) -
of inedium range missilea (Sparrow) was complicated by the un-
reliable identification system and the resulting danger of
fratricide. Short range missiles (Sidewinder) were greatly
limited by G-load (approximately 2.3) which made it almost
impossible to employ them during a high-G maneuver. Only
weapons which were not effected by large G-loads were effective
at short ranges (600-1,100 m), i.e., guns which were installed
on American fighters only toward the end of the war in Vietnam.
Based on the experience of local conflicts, foreign specialists
concluded that the weapona systems in being were not suited for
the nature of current air combat--formation and fluid.
The number of aircraft fluctuated from 1-2 dozen at the beginning
of combat down to an element (or individual crews) at the end
of combat. A pair of fighters was conaidered an "element," i.e.,
an inaeparable fire and tactical unit. However, the integrity of
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~n elemenr wg~ frequ~nely di~rupCpd du~ Co the ponr f~.eld nf
~ view from the gircr~fr COC~CpSC and du~ to rhe3r 1nw maneuver-
nbility~
The foreign presg pointe out thaC, in~t~ad of ehe intercepte
for which the pilots and equipment were prepared~ air combaC
wae conducted according Co Che classical aystem where adver-
sari~s tried ro come out on each other'~ tgi~ in the actual -
combge siCuation. Neither the aircrafe, ehe wegpons syst~me
nor th~ crewe were prepared for such a turn in eventa. ParCial
improvement~ gnd modification~ did not legd to any aignificanC
chang~s in tactics. Therefore, even during the war in Vietnam,
requiremenCs began to be developed in the US for a new generation
of sir superiority fightera. Later, programs for building
specific models of Cheae aircraft were adopted. '
As a reault of the work conducted, the new F-14 and ~-15 entered
- the US Air Force inventdry; the following charact~ristics were
changed for Chem: maneuverability in the high subannic flight
envelope was significantly improved--in the Mach 0.8 * Q.1 rnnge
of speeds where the maximum rate of turn and the minimum climb
time are attained; enemy acquisition range for internal radars
was increased and IFF syatems were improved; the capabilities
of weapons systems were expanded--systeme which ensure an enemy
kill both hea~-on and in dogfighting; aircraft handling wae
improved at the edges of the fli~ht envelope--thia protecCs
aircr~ft againat early departure into a spin d�ri�ng unexpecCed
maneuvers and increases the air combat enveiope in altitude
and speed.
In the opinion of fore~gn specialists, all of this places the
F-14 and F-15 in the catagory of modern fighters and it should
also be reflected in the methods for their combat ewployment and
it should introduce new elements inCo air combat tactics.
A Formula for Modern Air Combat; Many factors have an unequal
effect on the success of air combat. 5teadfast attempts have
recently been made abroad to determine the most important of ~
these factors and to�rank them in the order of their importance. �
At first, the simplified formula "pilot--aircraft--weapons--
electronics" appeared; iC reflected the relationship in anoverall
form and it gave preference to the experience and level of. train-
ing of flying personnel. Then, a more detailed formula of "air-
~ craft capabilities f.or atr combat".appeared in the WesC German
magazine TRUPPENPRAXIS. It is not a mathematical expression wtiich
makes it possible to calculate some sort of quantitative data or
numerical ratios. Certain foreign military specialists believe
that this formula makes it possible to provide a qualitative
evaluation of the effect of individual factors on achievingsucceas
in combat by making use of the advantages of equipmenC and weapons
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sygCem~. ~nch v~lu~, enken ~.ndep~ndenely or in Combinat~.on
wieh ~noeher, is related to ~ombat CgCti~.C~ be~w~~n specifi.c
aircraft. The go-called ~.ogic of combgti is formulated on the
bg~i~ nf a comparison beCween their cheracCer~.atics.
P�Sl.SEP~T.A1.Dd,5~~N,We~,g~
The formula ~.ooka like thi~ : a~,Q~
However, to underetand Che following discuseion of iC, it
can be pregented in the followin �orm:__
~ C~, �SEP.T~M~Bd~51~N.Wa~.B~
L��
e: L--"airctiaft capabiliCy for air combat"; `S~'~C~
wher
P--engine thrust;
G--airborne weight;
S--wing area;
SEP--surplus energy or apecific excesa power;
T--deceleration; ~
M--effect of high-lift devices;
Bd--sircraft controllability;
Si--aircraft st~tbility;
- N-~individual defense (invincibility);
Wa--warning equipment.capabilities; '
B--weapons ayatema characteristics;
Cr--aircraft dimensions;
P -aircraft thrust-to-weight ratio;
G
~--wing loading.
5
The for.mula can also contain a certain constant value which
reflects the effect of factors like weather conditions, the
advantage of acquiring Che enemy first, over whose Cerritory
the fight takes place, etc.
These characteristics are reviewed below in the order of their -
importance (some of them are combined into overall factors and
others are examined independently).
The Weapons Factor: Weapons are raised to the fourth power
in Che formula; this emphasizea their special importance in
modern ai�r combat. Foreign specialista believe that the
new weapons with which modern fighters are equipped make it
possible for them to conduct combat at long and medium ranges
in addition to dogfighting. This leads to a revision of tactical
principles and it makes significant changes to the methods
for fighters to accomplish their operational missions. _
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Lnng ranp~e weapon~~ In sCudying eh~ characeerigrice of the
Phoenix mis~i].e ~nd Che AWG-9 weapona ConCrol gy~tem (muximum
targee ncquieieion rgnge of 280 km, automatic eargeC era~king
begine at 180-190 km, miesilee are lgunched over 100 km aw~y,
six missiles can be launched ei.multaneously), foreign epc~cial-
iet~ concluded Chati the empl.oyment of thie type of weapone
s}?sCem ha~ gctuglly trgneformed combat into target detection
and missile launch. Combat will consiat of Cwo phases--
searCh and aeCack. The tradition~l phaees l.ike closure, _
dogfighting and diaengagement w~.ll disappegr.
According to the magazine AVIATION AND MARINE, a fighter
- equipped with long range missiles is able to achieve an enemy .
kill before the latiter reaches ita own weapona employment
envelope. In gddition, i.t is posaible to oppose a num~rically
auperior enemy by launching several misai~ea�againet several
targeta. However, as a stand-off delivery platform for euch
weapons, the aircraf~ "becomes heavier" and ia not able to
conduct a successful dogfight. American apecialiats are
Crying Co develop Cactica for F-14 fighter units by taking
these ideas into account.
Specifically, the foreign press has reported ehat the F-14
has launched Phoenix miasiles at altitudes between 120-16,000 m,
speeds between the minimum up to Mach 1.6�and with G-loads of
1-6. Zn one of Chese launchea, six missilea were almoat launched
simultaneously; four of them hit the targets at ranges greater `
than 80 km, the fifth did not reach the impact point due to an
equipment malfunction and the sixth missed due to a high-G
Carget maneuver.
~
Althnugh long range co~r.bat �is atill r:ot being discussed as some-
thing which has been developed and tes~ed, there is no doubt
among foreign specialists about the long-term prospects for it.
Medium range weapona (like the Sparrow miasile) determine the
fighter's capability for air combat at medium ranges (5-50 km).
This combat is ch4racterized by two basic feati:rea: by the
ability to achieve an enemy kill during the closure phase,which
merges wiCh the attack phase,and also by eliminating the require-
ment to maneuver to the CargeC's rear hemisphere. These weapons
are usually emplc~yed against an enemy who is not being visually
observed. The pilot takes his bearings ~n the situation from
instruIIent readings--azimuth, range and rate of closure with the
target. When the head-on zange to the target is reduced to 15-20
km, there is not enough time to prepare for a missile launch
at present closure rates and Che pilot is forced to transition
to a dogfight.
The foreign press has reported that the following minimums for
a head-on attack were recorded during live missile firings of
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~ the AIM-7~' Sparrow from the ~-:L5 fighti~r ~g4~.n,sti r~moti~ly
cnntrnlled tiargetg: an acquisitinn range of 50 km, a J.ockon
(automatir. Cracking) range of 37 km and missile launch at 22 km.
]n ana1~?zing tne reau].ta of live m3.se~.le firings and of maehe_
matical models, American specia~ieCa have concl~ded tihat air
combnt uaing mediuu~ nnd long range missiles is characrerized
by a narrow range of d~iveraity anc? a small number of possible
alCernaCives; therefore, it can be programmed to a certain -
degree. In Chis case, target acquisition, identiificnCion and
selection are the�moeC importarit phases for tihe piloC. If launch
~ conditions fall with~.n the 1lmita eatablished, the weapons system
can be employed automatically againat a target in the auro-
erack mode. An analysis of the inaCrument regdinga ia Che
basis for the pilot's decieion. In medium and long range combat,
maneuver~.ng takea a atrictly subordinate poaition to firin~.
Short range weapons ~(guna and mis~ilea like the la~esti modifi-
caCions t~ the Sidewinder). When miasile�-armed,'supersonic
fightera appe~ired at the end of the fiftiea and air intercepea
occupied Che ~3ominant poaition in tactics, guna were removed
from aircr~ft. They have again taken their place on the new,
air superiority fightera and they have given the pilot the
capability to fire against maneuvering Cargets at ahort range.
However, gune~ have a limited range and a low kill probability.
After the war in Vietnam, new weapans were built for cloae-in
combat--missiles--which do not r.eplace guns but only supplement
them since they also have shortcomings. The limitation on '
minimal launch range is one of the shortcomings. The foreign
press points out that it is poasible to employ the AIM-9L
Sidewir~der for dogfighting on the F-15 and F-16 (Figure 1)
[figure not reproduced] due to the removal of Che limitations
- which the previous versions of this missile had. Specifically,
the minimum launch range was reduced to 300 m(instead of
1,000 m) and the allowable G-load during launch was increased
Co 6(instead of 2.3). ather characteristics of the missile _
were also improved. American apecialists believe that all-aspect
dogfighting may become a reality after the inerease in the
missile's operational range. The weapons employment envelnpes
for a dogfight are shown ir, Figure 2. The appearance of short-
rangP missiles brought about a requirement to improve siting
systems and methods of�firing against maneuvering targets.
The creation of helmet-mounted sights and the development of
procedures for firing by "guestimating" are of greatesC
interest in this respect.
As pointed out by the forei,gn press, helmet-mounted sight:~ remove
the excessive workload--which appears when sighting--from the
pilot and they increase the overall capabilities of the
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"pilot-we~pon" ~y~tem. Th~ exper~.ence n� combat operatione
in Southenat Aaia gnd Che M~.ddle ~gsr hgv~ shown tihat eh~ -
conditions of modern air combat demand swift, preciee and effec-
tive actions from ehe a~.rcraft crew. Moreover, the communica-
rione syaeem between the firer and tha weapons eys~em muet
ensure tihe complete uti.lization o'f ~he �ormer's motor skille
and h~.s capability to perceive Che e~Cuation.
- 1
+4 kM
~ ' ~
ZKM
~ 1~
~
' 2KM ~ ~4?cM ~
6?cM~
~2~ ZKM
~
' ~4KM ~
,~3~ ~
Figure 2. Weapons Employment Envelopes for Fighters During
a Dog Fight (from TRUNPENPRAXIS magazine).
Key:
1. Aimed gunfire envelope.
2. Employment envelope for modern, close-in missiles.
3. Employment envelope for future all-aspect,
close-in missiles.
The creation of helmet-mounted sights is one of the promising
directions in the modern de�velopmental stage of the "pilot-
weapon" system. There operational~�principles are as follows.
Either a visor with a sight pipper or an electro-optical sensor
with a crosshair is firmly mounted on the helmet. The pilot
keeps the visually acquired target in the crosshair and special'
mechanical or electrical systems~�which transmit guidance com-
~ands to the radar, televiaion camera, miasile homing head or
computer, track the position of the helmet.
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In tihe opinion nf forei.gn sp~c~.aliati~, ehe idenl proc~se of `
eighting in a dogf~.ghe is gu~.ding tihe we~pona ~ystem on Co tiargeC
afeer the pilot has located it vi~ua~.1.y (eyeball~.ng Che Cargeti)
and launch�ing Che m~.esi,le along Che line of sight. In th~.s
case, the a~.ght muet simultaneously perform two functione:
determining Che location of the line of ei.ght and controlling
the weapon.
The method af sighring by eyeballing the target (determining -
the posiCion of the eye's line of sigh~t) ie atitiracting a
great deal of attention among foreign scieneistis. As reported
by the foreign presa, the posaibility of uei.ng a remote occuo-
meter [okziometr]--which estimates the direction of,the line
of sight accordi.ngtn Ghe value for the angle of infrared rays
reflecCed �rom Che cornea--is being inveatigated to implement
this method. According to AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
the requiremene to inatall rather cumbersome a3.gheing'equipment
on gircraft will disappear when such a method is implemented.
In the opinion of foreign specialista, using the eye as a sight
will significantly expand the pilot's capability to fire in
a dogfight.
Firing by "guestimating" belonga to the new methoda fo~r. weapons _
employmenC. The foreign press pointa out that the air combat
experience acquired during local conflic~ts has shown that the
rate of change in the line of sight during a target attack -
frequently exceeded 30 degrees per second while the lead angLe -
exceeded the limits of the sight's optical syetem and it
was impossible Co fire. In addition, small mistakes~in target
tracking caused relaCively large mistakes in computations.
Due to the difficulty in tracking a maneuvering target, some
American pilots preferred using the iron sight and aiming by
eye.
In the opinion of foreign specialists, Che method of firing by
"guestimating" is based on a more efficient division of reapon-
sibilities between the pilot and the compuCer. They believe that
the pilot has a beCter ability to predict target.movement based
on his knowledge of the logic of combat and his analyais of the
current situation. Therefore, it is his duty to determine
the most probable direction for target movement and the lead
angle. The computer calculates the flight tra3ectory for the
round (missile) relative Co the attacking aircraft. The estimated
"track" is painted on the sight display; by using it, the pilot
must carry out a maneuver to pl�ace the "track" on target. If
there is a range finder, the distance is automatically computed.
In principle, nothing new is introduced into the attacker's maneu-
ver: after "guestimating" the lead angle, the pilot must turn
the aircraft to that angle and keep the range pipper on the
target.
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rd~ o~rrct~ usL oNi,Y
The developmen~ of sigh~ing equ~.pmenti ro f~re by "gu~aCima~ing"
ie undergoing tegCing.
~ Overgll, tha weapone factinr gg nppl~.ed tio combgt meehods
determines the figHter's capabillCy eo deatroy ~ CargeC
_ (botih mnn~uvering nnd nonmaneuvering) ~r different rangea _
and differenC uspect~. Tn increase their operntional cap~ `
~bili~y~ a3rcrafC ~re usually armed with m~.ssiles wiCh different
~ ranges when tihey are ~ccom~lishing the miasion of proeecCing =
grdund b$sed or marieime ob~eceives, Specifically, the ehort- -
range 5ldewinder missiles gre up-lnnded on Ch~ F-14 along with
the Phoenix missiles. When escorting aviation attack forces, -
four medium range Sparrowa and four short range Sidewinders
are the weapona load.
When accamplishing the air superioriCy mission, the F'-1S (gee
colored insert) [insert not reproduc~d] hns ehe following ~
weapona loade: 2 Sparrows and 4 Sidewinders; 4 Sparrowa and
2 Sidewinders; 4 missiles of boCh types. ~ -
The I~'actor of Timely Target Acquisition: In the formula
cited above, this fac~or ia only represented by Che figure
for warning equipment capabilities. The fact that it is raised
to a power of three aetests to tihe importance of the pilot's
obtaining timely information an Che danger of an attack. In
analyzing the results of air combaC, American apecialists con-
_ clucled that the piYot will only have an initial tactical ad-
vgntage if he acquires Che enemy in a timely manner.
In the classical intercept system, the enemy's initial position
was determined by the capabilities of- ground-based and internal
acquisition and identification systems. The one that acquired
the targeC first was the firsC to begin active operations. Only
in this case can he evaluate the siCuation early enough, make
a decision, Cake up an advanCageous position for weapona employ-
ment and open fire--whether it is aerial combaC using long or
- medium range missiles or a dogfighC using ahort range missiles _
or guns. The foreign press points out C�hat obtaining a warning
~n the enemy before he employs long range weapons is a complex
problem but it is h'ard Co count on success in modern air combat
without a solution to it. ~
[No 3, Mar 79, pp 43-49]
The f~rst part of this article discussed some of the basic data
upon which foreign specialisCs base their evaluation of fighter
capabilities and also the effect of weapons and timely target
acquisition on air combat tactics. Data on the effect of the
remaining Factors are published below.
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The Maneuverabilitiy ~acCor: Th~.s conc~pt includes the airczafC
~hru~~-Co-weigh~ ratio (P/G), epecif~.c win g loading (G/S) and
a figure which reflects the effecC of wing high-lift devicea
(M). , -
URbNANCE magazine wrote that high, aupereonic speeda and alti-
Cudes are no longer the most importan~ fighter characteristics.
AfCer study~.ng the axpeYience of, air combat in Vietnam, 'a high
thrus~-to-weighe ratio, a 1ow apecific wing loading and rhe
~ppropriate weapona systeme have moved ~o the fore.
A high thruaC-to-weigh~ ratio--which ia frequently eatimated
as Che value for excesa thruet--ia especial~.y required during
the firet phaae and at the end o� air combaC, when it ie neceasary
tn climb quickly or increase speed to close with or diaengage
from the enemy. ~
In comba~ tactica, the amount of exce~s thruat is considered as
a measure of ~he aircraft's capability to accelerate furCher
during any sect,ion of the tra~ectory, including the vertical.
In this case, the piloti can control his diatance to Che enemy,
i.e., he can reduce iC or increase it according Co the require- _
menta of the aituatiron. Overal�1, i~t i�s believed that a higher
aircraft thrust-to-w~ight raCio opens up the:possibility of
- taking ~he offenaive in air combat.
In the clasaical intercept system, the initial positions of the
adversaries were eo a significant degree dependent upon the _
capabilities of ground based and internal acquisition and
identification systems. Closure began with target identification,
and the rate of climb and aircrafC acceleration--which were
- dependent upon the size of the excess thrust--became most im- _
porCant at this time.. If the~excess was greater than the enemy's,
the aircraft could gain the altitude and speed required to carry
out the attack quicker. If there was no superiority in thrust,
the initiative was lost and the enemy began to dictate the terms
of combat.
Wing loading is very important in dogfighting. Sustained turning -
speed is considered the primary characteristic.of aircraft
maneuverability. Foreign specialista point out the following
in evaluating this parameter: approximately 85 percent of Che
increase in the rate of turn is attained by reducing wing
loading and only 15 percenC is att~ined by increasing the
thrust-to-weight ratio. Target kill probability is more dependent
upon excess thrust (Figure 1 A) and the fighter's survivability
in combat is more dependent upon wing loading (Figure 1 B).
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A s .
(i) (3~ o
z~~'s d~8=245Kr~M2 ~ a~ 29 ? ~
~ ~ ~ a � A~ -
~ ~ m 0
~ e 293 ~ 34 00 / n~9
~d ~ E ~
~ o ~~Z ~ z o� ~~aAcO
~ ~ ' 390 440 o G\
~
a
~ 0 W
o ,
~~5 1~5 O,S 1,0 1~5 _
( Z> P/o npu asneme ~ 2~ P/o npu aoneme
' Figure 1. Graphs Showing Fightier Effectiveneas in Air
Combat: A. Target Kill Probability; B. Own Aircraft
- ProbabiliCy of Surviving (enemy aircraft parameCere: wing =
loading G/S = 340 kg/m2; thrust-to-weight ratio P/G = 0.7).
(From AIAA magazine)
Key: ,
1. Target kill probability.
2. Thrust-to-weight ratio at take off.
3. Survival probability.
American specialists point out that pilots frequently exceed
the allowable G-load for a coordinated maneuver and they reduce
their forward speed when trying to turn on the Qnemy (or away
~ from him) quicker. By decelerating, the rate o'f~turn increases;
its instaneous value .is inversely proportional to the wing loading
and it is not dependent upon the thrus~-to-weight ratio.
The wing loading is raised to the second power in the formula.
It is believed abroad that dogfighting has not lost its position
under contemporary conditions. In this regard, FLUG REVUE maga-
zine wrote: "As before, maneuverabilit~? which guarantees counter-
action during an attack.is of primary imporCance in air combaC.
- Therefore, the number of turns sustained can be considered an
efficient measure of the time o.f defensive combat, which will
- always be maneuverable in nature. The minimum required for !
counteraction is a function of the advantage in turning speed."
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a
~ Wing high-lift devi~~~. An imprnv~m~nt in gircrnft mgtt~uv~r-
ability i~ gl~d gttain~d by in~tgliing g~rodyn~mic devicee on
it which autom~tic~lly c�h~ng~ thp wing ingd ~nd th~r~by improv~ -
the ~ircrnft'g cnpgbiliey tn quickly ~h~ng~ eh~ dir~ction nf
flight~
An improvement in m~neuv~rgbility vig enhanC~d wing high-tige
~ deviceg rran b~ ex~mitted bgsed on the exgmpl~ of th~ modificgtinn
to the ~-4 Phantom. In ~onCrest tn the ~-4~ which p~rticipeted
in rhe wnr in ehe Middl~ ~a~t~ the ~.~te~t ver~ion of iC, the
F-4p, doee not hgve ~ boundary lgy~er control ey~tem gnd leading-
edge flnp~; lending-edge ~l~te wer~ tnstalled in it in place of -
them. Thi~ made it pnggibl~ to incr~~ge 1ift, reduce drag r~C
high attack angled ~nd imprnve aircraft stabiliey and hgndltng
throughout ehe flight envelnpe. The new fighCer i~ mor~ euitable
for fluid combat. In aompgrigon wiCh the ~-4~ (~igure 2) (figure
not reproduced), its tim~ for accomplishing a eustained turn
~ (at an altitude of 3,000 m with maximum thrueC) wag reduced from
19 to 14.2 seconds and its turning radius wae reduced fram 1.18
to 0.89 km. In modernizing Che Phantom~ special attenCion was _
- devoted to improving maneuvering characteristice ut altitudes
lower than 9,000 m and at high eubaonic epeeda. The McDonnel
not,RlF~~~ Company hopes that the new version of the aircraft will -
meet the state-of-the-art for aircraft into the mid-80's.
The ~-Sti's maneuvering characteristica were algo improved in
the high subsonic flight envelope by improving the wing high-lift
devices (in comparison with the previo+is versions--the F-SA,
NF-5).
Formulating the lo gic of combat (based on a comparieon of aircraft
charaeteriatics). Since the thrust-tn-weight and wing loading
- indices are, in the opinion of foreign specialisCs, the primary
indices for determining fighter advantagea, they are uaed in -
modeling combat between specific adversaries (the effect of
command, control and coordination factors relating to formation
combat are not considered in this case).
The foreign press point~c out that the fighter with the greater
kill zone for its internal weapons systems should dictate the
combat tactics to its adversary. The chances for success are only
reduced when the pilot is poorly trained and when he is not able
to use the advantages of his aircraft. However, the experience
of past wars showa that the sides usually had the same type of
aircr~ft at their disposal: a fighter had superiority over his
adversary in certain characteristics but was inferior in others.
It Was only possible to achieve success in combat when the pilot
was able to make full use of the strong points of His aircraft 4
and the weak points of the enemy's aircraft.
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AmeriC~n fighr~r piloe trgining prngr~m~ pre~enely provid~
_ combgt tr~ining gg8in~t gn "en~my" witih die~imil~r p~rforman~e
eh~r~et~rietir~, fdr ~x~mpl~, b~twe~n the ~-4 ~nd th~ F-SE.* -
in thig cge~, the pilot'g gctione gr~ ~ubordinaC~d Co a certgin
logic: egrrying nuC m~neuvere which are tov compllceC~d or
, dia~dv~ntag~ou~ for Ch~ "en~my."
In cnmparing gircr~ft Chgr~ce~rigeiC~, T~CHNIK REVUE mgg~xine
writ~~ eh~t the pilnt nf the lighter ~-5~ muet Gry to quickly
trengition to clage-in aombet and to maneuver at lower spe~de
thgn the t'-4 in order eo obtgin nn ~dvantage in position. The
~-4 ie as good as the F-SE ia turning ~peed but its turn radiue
ig gregt~r. !{driznnCgl man~uv~ring wiChouC a loes in epeed and
altitude i~ the be~e taceic for th~ ~-SE. If the "enemy"
adopt~ thig CacCiC, th~ ~-5~ pilot will take up gn gdvgneageoue
pngition within the ehort rgnge weapon~ ~mp1L?ym~nt envelope
fir~e. In turn, due eo iee greaCer excpes thru~t, Che F-4 hae
gr~~ter frpedom nf action in Che vertical plane and it has ~
sp~ed ~dventage in a horizontal maneuver during clo~ure and
dieengagemenC--the pilot can impoae a fight on the ~-SE by
conCrolling the dietance. Yts beet tactic ia a serie~ of
glashing gtCacks against Che "enemy" without engaging in cloee-
in combat. Moreover, primary emphaeie ie placed on suzprise
- nnd using itg better raCe of climb to attack from behind and
below. After losing the element of surprise, it ie only
adviseble to maneuver for repeat straight-in attacks or to ehift
the fight to thp low-altitude, high-G load envelope.
In developing requirements for the new F-15 (Figure 3) [figure
not reproducedJ, USAF apeci.alists pursued the Cask of guarantee-
ing it an advantage in all the parameters which have the
grentest effect on aircraft capability for air combat: thcuet-
to-weight ratio (P/G = 1.2), wing loading (G/S e 293 kg/m2) and
armament for both dogfighte and all-aspect intercepts.
The ~nergy Factor; Aa wus already pointed out~ foreign apecial-
ists include excesa thrust--i.e., the size of the thrust available
rr.lated t.? aircraft airborne weight after subtracting that part
of iC used to overcome drag--in the category of the moat impor-
tant parameters effecting combat. The specific exceas power
parameter (SEP)--which is the excess thruat producesl by flight
speed--is usually used in the foreign literature recently. The
size of the SEP is a measure of the aircraft capability to obtain -
additional energy and, when modeling a battle, it makes it
possible to show how quickly it can change altitude und speed
or both together. Western experts believe that the correct use
of energy and ~ethods for nccumulating it are now indicatore
- of the fighter pilot's high level of akill and hie readiness to
oppose a strong enemy. Considering this innovative approach
- *For more detail 3n this, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
No 3, 1978, pp 5~-60.--Ed.
39 -
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t~ ev.~lu~Cinn c~ritertu~ ~peninll~Cg in el~e UniCgd SCgCe~ nnd eti~ nCti~r -
NATd cdunerie~ nr.e w~~rking on creating meChode for mangging
~ircraft anergy and on de~ignitng in~trumenCe which indicate Ch~
i~~~i nf energy gnd changee in 3e during fli~ght.
On~ of rhe~e in~erumenee wae tested on the ~-4~ It digplayed
the gircraft'e energy seaeue and aleo the meximum va].uee for
epeed gnd altiCude ae each ~nergy level; Chese v~lues h~lped
Che pilnt f1y the aircrafr correcrly when climbing Co the
required altitude or when aecelergting to a high epeed and
they make it possible for him to maneuver more freely or to tgke
rimely acCions to increase the aircraft'e energy reservee.
The InvulnerabiliCy F~ntor; Foreign epecialiges inClude in ehie
fgcCor the aircraft's own invulnerability (N)--which is deter-
mined by Che level of its armor, the effectiveness of self-defense
equipment, etc.--and a value which is inversely proportional
to ita dimensions.
In the Unitad States und nther capitalist countries, special attention -
has recently been devoted to equipping aircraft with ECM
equipment which operatee in con~unction with the warning equip-
ment. According to INTERAVIA magazine, the McDonnel-Douglasa
Company conducted tests which sho~aed that loases of the new
F-15 per 1t~0 combat sorCies could be: 12.5 aircraft without
employing Electronic Warfare equipment and 5.5 when the indiv-
idual protective equipment was completely installed. For
the same number of sorties, F=4 losses could reach 20 and
12.5 aircraft, reapectively.
~
Based on Che experience of combaC operations, exercises and
tests, American specialista are working on the development of
automated systema which could analyze the radar signals being
received,determine their nature, the azimuth and range to the
cadar (which was painting the aircraft) and the degree of
threat presented and communicate this to the pilot; it could
also control the active ~amming equipment.
The threat is countered by active jammfng on a certain frequency,
by dropping chaff or by releasing decoy targets. In addition,
the pilot makes an avoidance maneuver after obtaining the aignal
on the dan ger of an attack. He selects the type of maneuver
~epending on the situation (enemy azimuth, zange and vertical
separation and the nature of his actions).~
When new aircraft are being built, so-called paseive defensive -
means--specifically, painting aircraft the color of the sky,
clouda or ground or reducing the radar cross aecCion by applying
an ab~orptive or dispersing surface--are used widely.
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In Che opinion nf foreign ~ppcialigCe, ~ucc~a~ in ddgfigheing -
in Vietnam ~nd th~ Middlp ~get was directly d~pendenC upon the
rgnge for vi.~ugl target dee~ction. Therefore, they con~i,d~r
the rgpgbiliCy fnr conaealed npererinn~ ~a gn important qualiCy
for fighC~r~. ~xperiments have ~hown Chgt ~n gircraft can
remein undeeeceed l~nger when it i~ ~mg11 (as f~r g~ this ie
poesibl~) in ~ixe, doe~ nor legve g gmoke tr~il behind it from
engine oper~eions (like th~ p-4) gnd when it use~ passive ~ysteme
fnr tgrgeG acquigition and weapons cnntrol.
It wa~ pninted out ChgC the ~-15 figheer ig ae lgrge ae the
F-4 gnd, therefore, it did not have any advantage in concealed ~
opernt3one in aombat training wiCh the latter. For exgmple, -
piloC~ of the ~ma11 F-SB had thi~ advantgg~ in gimulated ~ir
c~mbaC with oCher Cypea of~fighters. Ae AIRCRAI~T maggzine
wrote~ ehe F'-SE is practiC~lly invisible when airborne in the
horizontal plene even at a diatance of about 1.6 km, while the `
~-4, with afCerburner engaged, is acquired by an experienced
J pilot at a range of 16 km. It ia accepted abroad Chat the
allowable apeed during a eustained, banked turn should not exceed
Mach 1.45 bag~d dn visibility conditione when the turn radiua
reaches 6.5 km. Exceeding these limits actually makea it im-
posaible for the pilot to keep even a large target in view.
Foreign specialiste emphasize that gung with optical sights
for ahort range miseiles wiCh IR aeekera were used in ehort
range combat. However, they believe that it ia not poaeible
to relinquish active or semi-active methods of weapons guidance
when attacking a Carget at medium and long ranges.
The Field of View and Handling Factors: The foreign press points
out that, although it is difficult to link these two factors
together, there ia a firm, logical relationahip between them
' (in relatian to a dogfight). The view from the cockpit muet
enable the pilot to continually observe a target which is
sharply changing its flight attitude, while aircraft handling
should not hinder those maneuvers c~hich guarantee the pilot's
achieving and keeping a posiCional adv~ntage in combat.
It was previausly thought abroad that low aeats and protecting
the pilot with the fuselage increased the ovarall survivability
of the fighter; however, survivability was significantly reduced
due to the bad field of view. As shown by statistics, 80 peYCent
of the American fighCers shot down in Vietnam were hit from the
rear hemisphere; moreover, a significant part of them were shot
down due to the poor view from the cockpit, a view which made it
difficult to conduct a 360-degree search. It w~s neceasary to
give up the "cloaed" canopies and "sunken" seats which were on
the old generation of interceptors. As a result, high, tear-shaped
41 ~
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canopies were in~eglled on Che new American fightere (ehe ~'-14,
~-15 gnd ~-16)~ glthough thi~ ~1go c~us~d g a~rCain increg~e~ in _
aircraft drag,
A~ fgr ag ehe problem ofconerdllnbility ie concerned, INT~ItAVIA
magazine wroee that good flying characterietics make it poseible
to make better uee of ehe enh~re range of th~ fighter'e maneuver-
ing pdC~nCigl ~nd thae air combat requires maximuw attentiion
from the pilot a~d it i~ completely impermissible thae his
gttenrion be distracted by poor controll~bility This is exactly
how ie was on the F-4 where the pilot wae frequently not engaged
in aighting during g dogfight but was fighting with the inatab-
iliCy aC laxg~ englee of aetack and fighting eo prevent the
aircrafe from going into e wing stia11.
J Experience hae shown that the aircraft's capabiliey to come out
of an uninCenGional spin is a g~eat deal lesa imporCgnt Chan
iCe natural resietance to entering a spin. Therefore, foreign
deeigners attempCed to find the opCimal combination between
controllability and stability for the new fightere. Specifically,
the F-15 has better controllabiliCy than the F-4. Ita maximum
ateack angle is 26 degreea and thia guarantees a sufficient
reserve against atalling. The foreign prese reported Chat, _
while demonatrating �controllability.~ during aimulated air combat
with an F-4, an F-15 pilot, while keeping Che "enemy" in hie
aights, carried out maximum, sCeep turne with afterburner
engaged; moreover, the F-15's engine apeed did nnt exceed 86
percent of the maximum and air speed was maintained within the
Mach 0.8-0.9 range.
The Deceleration Factor; It can be included in maneuverability--
which includea acceleration and deceleration--but it is especially
isolated to emphasize its importance in dogfighting tactica.
Foreign specialists emphasize that a sharp reduction in forward
- sp~eed does not contradict Lhe principles of efficient energy use--
the level of which reflects the aircraft's offeneive capability--
and that deceleration is only recommended in strictly defined
situations to achieve important goals of combat. And, this
element is only within reach of the experienced pilot who is
w~le to correctly evaluate the situation and predict the enemy's
' behavior.
The foreign press provides cerCain recommendations on using
deceleration. For example, after closing on head-on courses,
the aircraft turned toward each other with the maximum allowable
_ rate of turn in order to take up an advantageous position
~ closer to the attack envelope. After paseing abeam (the enemy
is located precisely off to the side), the pilot sharply
reverses the aircraft bank and begins to close again. The
flight paths intersect and the one that lagged behind by
climbing or extending the air brakes turns out to be in the
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bp~C poeition. This mgneuver ie called rhe "sciseore" in th~
American prees and ehe ~liding deceleratinn during the turn ie
~ull~d g "reveree."
IC i~ pdinted oue Ch~C tihe "reveree" should be accompli~hed in
~ timely gnd preci~e mgnner since it ends in gn aCtack aC low
~peed~ A ln~~ in ~ner~y without coming out into gn attack can ~
legd to e r~versal in the pilots' roles: Che ~etacker goes over
to a pag~3.ve defenee ~and the defender C~kes the offe.nsive.
buring offensive operatione, an gbrupt deceleraCion is also -
required when attgcking a slow-fiyingCarget in order eo reduce
the high closure rate which prevents precise aiming.
When being attgcked, it is only recommended tihaC ehe pilot
deceleraCe to escape from a crieical situaeion when Che enemy
has reached hia firing envelope. In this case, a delayed
reacCion by the attacker--who is engrosaed in the pursuit--
and an "over~hoot" are relied upon. A eharp turn with a
maximum G-load and a reduction in apeed (by.increasing the
drag) is called a"break" ("break" or"brake").
If it ia not possible to lure the enemy int'o an "over~hoot,"
- then maneuvering.and periodic deceleration are used to eacape
to the aide (to increase the angle of attack relative to the
enemy's hzading). The aircraft is placed in~a position where
ite nose is a lot lower than the horizon and a Curn wit~ a tranaition
into a dive ia carried out. The engine ap~ed is reduced and the
air brakes are extended. This maneuver ia called a"defensive
spiral." It forces the enemy to increase the interval--to go ~
to the outside which is not suitable for firing. After diving,
it is recommended that the pilot put the sircraft in a steep,
vertical climb while turning to the opposite side.
In this case, the attacker will have two options: to continue the
pursuit by repeating the enemy's maneuvera or to remain on top
and wait for a chance to reaCtack. Purauit �is related to the
posaibility of using the extreme edges of the flighC envelope
(low speed, high angles of attack). At thia point, stability
andcontrollability--which were diacussed previously--begin to
_ play a decisive role.
In summarizing some of�Che results of the studies of the effect
of technology on the outcome of modern air combat, TRUPPENPRAXIS
magazine wrote: "Although everybody agrees in principle that air
superiority is needed, the problem of how to attain it remains
open. It is clear that it is undoubtedly~more difficult to do
this today than it was in the past. It should be remembered
that a comprehensive atudy of sircraft and weapons eystems
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F'Ott OF~'ICIAL US~ UNLY
- capabillCie~ shou].d not replace tihe rule which ia confirmed by
experience: victo~y in ai.r combat is more dependent on the
pilot than on the equipment." ~
COPYRIGNT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozren3ye", 1979
9001
CSO: 1801
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WF;STERN DEVELOPMENT OF ATRCRAFT CANIQONS REVIEWID
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYII~INOYE OBOZRENIYE in Ruasian No 2, Feb 79 signed to
press 5 Feb 79 pP 65-69
[Article by Engr-Lt Col N. Germanov: "The Development of Aircraft Cannons"]
~ [ExcerptsJ The experience of the conduct of air combat in the aggressive
wars started by the U.S. imperialists in Southeast Asia and by Israel in
the Near East has shown the rather high effectivenesa of cannons. Accord-
ing to the data of the foreign press, out of the total number of losses
suffered in air combat by the aviation opposing Israel, more than 15 percent
of the aircraft were shot down by aircraft cannon fire. In considering that
cannons play a marked role in the overall system of aircraft weapons, in
the basic capitalist nations close attention is paid to their further im-
pro�rement which, ~udging from materials in the foreign press, is closely
related to the basic directions of airplane and helicopter development.
At present, according to the data of the Western press, in the United
States and the E~.iropean NATO countries, extensive scientific research an~
experimental design work is being carried out to develop new aircraft
cannons and to modernize the ones already in use. -
For carrying out the program of the U.S. Defense Department for developing
high-speed and maneuverable fighters (of the F-16 and F-18 typ~) for win-
ning air superiority, a new light rapid-Yiring cannon was required and
which could also be used on other modern aircraft. It has been assumed
that about 27.9 million dollars would be required for its development.
According to an announcement in the foreign press, during the 1975-1976
fiscal year, 0.71 mil].ion dollaxs were allocated for research and develop-
ment in this area of the U.S. Air Force, in the 1976-1977 fiscal year 0.8
million, and in the 1977-1978 year, 3.5 million. The financing is planned
through the 1981-1982 fiscal year inclusivel,y to the completion of the de-
velopment program for the new cannon, after which they plan to carry out
competitive testing of it and the 20-mm M61A1 Vulcan cannon Which is pres-
ently in service. If the new weapon in terms of its performance is better,
then a decision will be taken for its series production.
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In arming the d.~r~c~ ~ir support aircraft, in the NATO countries an 3mpor-
tant ro~e is given tn the cgnnon systems designed for hitting armored equip-
ment on the battlef3eld. During the per3od from 7.971 through 1.974, (3enera~.
Electric developed th~ GAU-8/A cannon gpecifically for this purpose to be
uaed on the A-10A attack plane. Tt~ ground e,nd fligh~ teat firing ehowed
the hi~h accuracy in hitting ground te.rgeta by u~ing the 30-mm frQgmentation-
HE-incenfliary and armor-piercing-inC~ndiery ahel~s, According to data pub-
13shed in the fore3gn preas, during the flight test firing held at Nel].is
Aii~ Force gase in Nevada, 24 passes by an A-l0A aircraft were made against
15 tank targetsy 7 of which were destroyed and the remainder put out of ac-
tion. F3ring was carried out at a re~te of 2,100 and 4,200 rounda per min-
ute at r~nges of 1.8 meters, in burst~ lagting l and 2 seconds. Firing
accuracy was about 4 millirs~da.
In April 1976, the Air Force signed a contract with the firm to produce the
cannon and ammunition for it for a total of 41.2 million dollars, in accord
with which in the i976-1977 fiscal year, 100 units were to be manufactured
in order to ensure the planned delivery of all 173 cannons in the 1977-i978
_ fiscal year.
The GAU-8/A cannonl is a more advanced weapon in terms of design, as the
proportion of ammunition for it in terms of weight of the entire cannon
system is 82 percent, while in the 20-mm M61A1 it is ~ust 19 percent. In
t.he opinion of American specialists, in the following generation of cannons
there will be a further increase in this indicator.
Under competitive conditions designing is being carried out for a light 30-mm
airc.raft gun called the CHAG (Compact Hi-Performance Aerial Gun) for a future
air combat fighter. According to the conditions of the contracts concluded
by the Air Force with Ford Aeronutronics and General Electric, each of them
will deliver a working model of the gun and will fire 10,000 rounds each in
the course of the ground testing. Overall leadership will be provided by
the Air Force Weapons System Development and Testing Center located at
Elgin Air Force Base in Florida. As Air Force officials have announced,
this gun is designed only for future fighters and will not be mounted on
existing aircraft. According to preliminary data, its rate of fire will
be 2,000 rounds per minute and the weight is 135 kg�
One of the directions for increasing the effectiveness of cannons is re-
search on the possibility of developing an aircraft cannon with a liquid
propellant. Its design is based on a completely new principle, the essence
of which is that the shot occurs as a result of the combustion of the
liquid explosive which is sprayed into the shell space.2 The research
caxried out by Grumman Aerospace has shown that such a cannon can be a
iFor more detail on the cannon see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 11,
1977, Pp 57-58. Editors.
2For more detail see ibid. Editors.
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very effec~ive weapon for fu~ure fighter a3rcraft. ~n the opinion of
the
f3rm'g specia~3sta, the probability of h3tting an ~irborne target in firing
from it ig 3-fold greater than in fir3ng a standard ~0-mm cannon with which
modern f3ghtera xr~ ~rmed.
The foreign prees has stQted that Hughe~ Aircraft is develop3ng a 30-mm
cannon with an "open" chamber for the Arn~r helicopters and NQVa1 avietion.
It usea cartridgeless ammunition which ia 20-25 percent lighter thgn the _
exi~ting emmunition of the same caliber. Thia makea it possible to in-
crease the bQttle acale of ammunition respectively. The rate of fire of
the new cannon wi17. be around 350 rounds per minute. -
In the United Stateq, along with develop3ng new cannon syatema, the exi~t-
ing ones ere being improved. According to e~ statement in the Western press,
at present a program is being carried out at the Air Force Weapons Systema
bevelopment and Testing Center for improving ~he M61A1 Vulcan 20-mm cannon
end the ammunition for it. The program provides for an increase in the
rate of fire for the cannon (from 6,000 to 7,200 rounds per minute) and
the development of new shells which have a high~r muzzle velocity (1,125
meters per second), improved aerodynemics and increased efficiency in com-
parison with the ammunition of the M50 series.
The foreign press has announced that the shells used in the NATO nations
for aircraft cannona (fragmentation-HE, armor-piercing with a charge and
armor-piercing with a core) basically wi11 not undergo substantial changes.
However work is being done to improve them, including an improvement in
piercing performance, an inerease in muzzle velocity, and so forth.
~ The problem of developing ammunition loaded with aero-shaped Sragments is
also at the center of attention of the U.S. militaxy specialis~~s. Research
and test firing have shown that such elements manufactured from depleted
uranium possess high armor-piercing properties~
In the opinion of foreign specialists, the practical realizatfon of the
above-given directions for a qualitative improvement in cannons and ammuni-
tion will make it possible to significantly increase the fire poWer of NATO
aviation.
In addition to the United States, other nations and in particular the FRG
are also concerned with improving cannon weapons. At present the FRG is
developing a Mauser cannon with a caliber of 27 mm for the multipurpo~e
Tornado fighter and the light Alpha Jet attack ~lane.
By the spring of 1976, according to the data of the foreign press, 32 test
models of the Mausei� cannon had been manufactured for conducting flight
- test firing. In April 1977, testing of the cannon located in a suspended
container on an Alpha Jet aircraft was conducted in France. In each of
the six aircraft sorties, 150 shells were used. Firing was carried out in
bursts at a rate of 1,000 and 1,700 rounds per minute with a flight speed
_ af 890 km per hour and accelerations from 0.5 to 5.0. The test results,
47
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in ~he ~gtimate of fnre~.gn gpeci.al~at~, ehowed ~he high firing and op~ra-
tion~l qualitieg of the new cannon.
The ba~ic epec3fications of certa~n mod~1~ of aircr~?ft cannons in the capi-
_ t~,li~~ etates ~re given in the t~b1e [not reproducecl]~
mhe materia~s of the foreign preag have po3nted ou~ ~ha~ the United Sta~es
and other countries of the NATb bloc are p~ying particular attention to
gtandardizing the aircr~ft cannons. In particular, the rang~ of th~ cali-
bers for the cttnnons being developed in the United 3tet~s w311 be 20-40 mm,
and the step in the change of caliber should be 5 mm for cannons with con-
vention~l cartridge ammun3tion. For e~.~h caliber a minimum nwnber of shell
typeg has b~en estab~ished under the condit3on of their complete inter- -
changeability. _
For the purposes of implementing the U.S. standardixation program for avia-
tion ammunition, in 1976 a decision was taken to halt the development of
the WECOM-30 she11 for the 30-mm cannon and designed for use on future
helicopters. Instead of them sh~lls will be produced which are compatible
with the 30-mm Aden And Defa cannons which are used in the air forces of
the European NATO countries.
The military special.ists of the United 5tates and certain Weatern Europe~n
countries feel that the further development of aircraft cannons in the
capitalist countries will oecur in the following basic directions: An
increase in the caliber and rate of fire; a reduction in the overall xeight,
the dimensions of the cannon systems and an improvement in their operational
qualities (reliability, barrel life, ~afety, and so forth); an f ncrease in
the muzzle velocity and destructive properties of the ammunition, as well
as standardization and unification oP cannon weapons within the countries
. of the NATO bloc.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
10272
CSO: 1801
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~n[t O~~ICYAL tl5~ tlNLY
nEV~LOPM~iT 0~' U~ S. NUCL~A~ SUFt~'ACE SHIp3 bE3CRIg~b
Moscow ZAFiU$~ZHNOY~ VOY~NNOY~ OBOZRENIY~ in Russian No 2, ~'eb 79 gigned to
press 5~eb 79 pp 71-76
[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank N. Petrov: "Atomic Surface Vessels of the
U.S. Ngvy"~
(mext~ The U.S. Navy is a mogt important instrument for carrying out the
ttggressive policy of the ru].ing circlea in that country. Thig was elo-
quently nt~ted by the Secretary of the Navy in his repor~ to Congress
(Februsry 1978) in which he emphasized that over th~ last 30 years, the
U.S. Armed ~orces ~hsd~ been involved in more than 200 conflicts, the Navy
had been in 80 percent of them, and in 100 instences only naval forces had
been used. 2'he foreign presa has point~d out that the Pentagon places the
folloWing missions on the Navy: The winning and maint~ining of ~ea superi-
ority, the makfng of nuclear missile strikea against enen~? territory, sup-
porting ground forces, conducting amphibious landing operations, trans-
porting troops, rreapons and supplies. Under peacetime conditions the U.3.
Navy hg~ been Widely used for demonstrations of strength and for putting
military and political pressure on foreign atetes.
In carrying out the designated tasks, a particular place has been given to
the surface fleet, and in particular the atomic-poxered carriers and cruisers
Which are part o� it. The impetus for building these ships aas provided by
the rapid development of nuclear engineering.
At the beginning of the 1950's, the United States commenced research and
development on ship nuclear propulsion plaats (NPP) for submarines, and
someWhat later for surface vessels as well. American specialists felt thgt
in this instance the surface vessels Would have the folloxing advantages: -
Almost unlimited range and high speed ~hich xould increase the combat capa-
bilities of the ships and signiffcantly broaden the regions of their opera-
tions and the time Which they could remain in these regions; a lesser de-
pendence upon supply ships as a result of Which there Would be a reduction
in the number of flielings and during ~hich the maneuvering of the ships Was
limited snd they themselves Would be more vulnerable to enen~y attack;
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~'Utt O~~IC~AL US~ dNLY
gr~at~r ad~ptubility fnr op~rationn unc~er ~he cond~,tions nf u~ir.~ we~pons
o~' m~gg d~gtruction (~~dmie, biological and ch~mic~l) atimospher3c oxygen
i~ no~ requir~d for the operation of the NPP e.nd the ship cgn be be~ter
~~~~ed; ~ r~du~~ion in r.orros3on.on antenna syatema of radio e~.ectronic
equipmen~ du~ td the abgence of ~mokestack gases which also complicate ~h~
~~ck ~~nding conditione for ~h~ ~irp~~nes and helicop~ers. -
A11. of the deaignated adv~ntgges seemingly opened up broad prospects for
gurf~c~ ~tomic-powered shipbuild3ng. However, at present within the Ameri-
can Navy ~here is a comparativel.y sma11 number of atomic-powered surface
ships. 2'his is ~xpl~ined by their rather substan~ial dre~wbacks among which
foreign ~peci~lists put: The gree.t~r weight of the NPP in comperison with
other types df propulsion ple~nts, and this maltes it possible to use the NPP -
only on ships with a displacement ~onnage of at least $,000 tons; the com-
plexity of manufacturing and operating th~ NPP; the high cost of building -
~n atomic-powered ship.
The designated drawbacks have led to a situation where among the capitalist
countries on~y the United States has b~en able to carry out individual and
~ sma1.1-s eries construct3on of atomic-powered surface ships.
The first stomic-powered surface shipa in the American Navy were the carrier
"Enterprise" and the cruiser "Long Beaeb" (they were commissioned in 1961).
SomeWhat later th~ atomic cruisers ~'Bainbridge" and "Trakston" were built.
Then followed a long break, and only from the middle of the 1970's were new
utomic-powered carriers and cruisers commis~ioned for the Navy.
The development of the atomic-powered carrier was explained by the degire
of the U.S. Naval Command to increase significantly the combat effective-
ness of the carrier force. According to statements of American nava~ spe-
cialists, a force with an atomic-power~d carrier is capable of remaining at ~
sea without taking on provisions for over 30 days, attack coastal installa-
t.ions to a depth of 1,300-1,800 km, and move a distance up to 600 miles
(around 1,110 km) in 24 hours. This impedes its detection, it provides
surprise and makes it possible to arrive quickly in a region where a con-
flict has broken out. At the ~ame time the presence of escort ships with
conventional propulsion plants in such a force would substantially restrict
its combat capabilities, since the advantagec related to the use of the NPP
could not be fully realized. For this reason the United States began build-
ing atomfc-powered cruisers with a basic purpose of air and antisubmarine
defense of the atomic-powered carriers.
At present the U.S. Navy has three atomic-powered carriers (the "Enterprise"
and txo of the class "Chester W. Nimitz"), the atomic-powered cruisers
"Long Beach," "Bainbridge," and "Trakston," two of the "California" class
and three of the "Virginia" class. In addition, one other ship ~f the
"Chest er W. Nimitz" class and one of the "Virginia" class are under con-
struction. The basic specifications of the atomic-powered surface vessels
are given in the table [not reproduced].
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The "Enterprise" was star~ed in ~'ebruary 7.958 and wQS built in 3 years
8 months. The ship designs were based upon the conventional carrier~ of
- the "Forrestal" class With me,~or changes being msde in the architecture and
design. These changes not on1.y improved its performance but also subatan- -
t3a11y altered the appearance. This involved most of all the architecture
of tYle superetructures of the so-called "i~land." The use of the NPP pro-
vided an opportunity to eliminate the smokestack and the air intakes of
the ~oiler fans, as a reault of which tfie d3menstons of the ~'3sland" were
reduced and its vulnerability was lowered. In addition the chemical, b3o-
logical e~,nd radiological defense of the ship was sigr,I.ficantly improved,
and also 3t was possible to have a better placement of the radar antennas.
The leadership of the U.S. Navy, after the first period of operating the
ship, noted a number of advantages which the carriers gained with a transi- _
tion to nuclear power. First of all thi~ wa~ the capacity to rapidly pick
up and drop speed, and this.is very important~with carrier flight opera- ;
tions. Smoke and smoke gases also disappeared and these not only had com- '
plicated the aircraft landing r_onditions, but also had a ma,jor corrosive
effect on the radar antennas, the aircraft and the other equipment. The =
freeing of tanks of boiler fuel made it possible to increase the supplies -
of aviation fuel. The NPP completely supplied the operation of the steam
catapults under various condition~ and made it possible to have a reserve -
of steam for the immediate launching of the aircraft. The absence of a
steam scarcity made it possibl~ to increase the installed capacity of the -
turbogenerators and meet the ever-increasing needs for electric power.
The atomic-powered carrier could hold ~,lmo~t double the amount of aviation -
fuel (11,000 tons in comparison with 6,000 tons carried on the ships of
- the "Forrestal" class) and 50 percent more ammunition for the aircraft
than on a conventional carrier.
The glans of the ship also provided for the mounting of two Terrier anti-
- aircraft guided missile complexes on its stern sgonsons. However, due to
the significant construction costs which greatly exceeded the planned, the
Navy Command completely refused to outfit the carrier with rocket axtillery _
weapons. Only in 1966, with the sending of the ship to partiaipate in the
aggressive war in Vietnam, were two Ser~ Sparrow antiaircraft guided mis-
sile launchers placed on it. During the reloading of the cores of the
nuclear reactors in 1971, a third Sea Sparrow launcher was installed in
addition.
' The carrier is equipped with modern radar. First of all these are the
AN/SPS-32 and -33 aircraft detection radaxs. In addition the ship carries
the AN/SPS-10 sea search radars, the APT/SPN-6, -10 and -12 air traffic con-
trol radars with antennas in the upper portion of the superstructure, the
Tacan navigation system and the NTDS [naval tactical data system].
The NPP of the ship consists of four Westinghouse main geared turbine units
(MGTU), the steam for which is produced by eight Westinghouse water-cooled
reactors of the A2W type (the heating capacity of each is 150 megawatts)
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~ ~OR n~~ICrAL U5E dNLY
connected With ~2 steam gener~tdr~~ mhe firat nuclear resctor reached a
critic~l level at the end o~ ig6o, goon after the launGhing nf the vegsel.
Aftec~ 3 y~urg of operation during which the nhip traveled more than 200,OOd
milen, the coren of the nucle~r r~actorg durin~ the period from Ndvembcr
t9~~i through June 1~65 were replaced, APter thie the carrier sailed abnut
3d0,000 milea. tn the next re~.oading of the nuclear re~ctorn durin~ the
overhuulin~ of the ship (from October 196q through Janu~ry 1971), they were
landed With neW cnres the life of which, according to ~t~tementg in th~
forei~n press, is up to 13 ye~rt~. ~
- The carrier~ of the "Chester W~ Nimitz" ~lgss are a further development of
the "~nterprise" carriers. In terma of their architecture, Weapons, the
number and placement o� the catapult~ ~nd ~ixcraft elevators (four each),
ns well n3 in termc of the numbcr of aircraft based on th~m, these ships
arc virtu~lly identical. However, ~he comp:lete displacement tonnag~ ~f
- the neu ships is ~,000-6,Od0 tons greater. In addition, they differ in
t}~e number of reactora (two A4W rer~ctors are used instea~d of the eight A2W
nuclear reactors) und the compnsition of the radio electronic weapons which
include the following radars: 'I'he AN/SPS-46 and -55 sea search radar3, the
Ati/SP:d-42, -1~3 and -44 air traffic control and r~ircraft landing support
ra?dars, the AN/SPS-43A distant aircraft detection radars, the AN/SPS-48s
three-coordinate radar, the AN/SPS-58 search and tracking radar for low-
flyin~; winged missiles and aircraft, as well as the NTDS.
The range of the carriers is 90 days, and the supplies of aviatfon fuel pro-
vide for continuous combat operations for approximately 2 weeks with two
daily sorti~s for each aircraft.
Tt~e air uings based on the carriers of ~oth classes include: Two fighter
squadrons (24 aircraft), three attack plane squadrons (about 40), one squad- -
ron cf antisubmarine aircraft (10), one squadron of antisubmarine helicop-
ters (9) and one squadron of reconnai~sance ~t~ack planes (3), detachments
os airborne early warning airplanes (4), electronic warfare airplanes (4)
and tanker aircraft
~ The fir�st American atomic-powered guided missil~ cruiser the "Long t3each"
aas cor~~nissioned in 1961. The use of the NPP s~~lved the problem of the
duration of traveling at full speed, as well as made it possible to dis-
pense with smokestacks and have a new approach in designing the upper
=uperstructures of the ship in the aim of providing the best conditions
for Lhe operation of electronic equipment. The elongated bow superstruc-
ture has the shepe of a cube and on the sides of it~ are located the radar
- ant~nna systems. The ship is flush-deck, wit~out armored plating.
It carries numerous and diverse electronic u~apcns, fncluding the AN/SPS-32
and -33 aircraft detection radars, the AN/SPS-10 and -12 sea-search radars
mounted on the xalls of the bridge With ax~tennas on the foremast and the
TJTDS .
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__~J
~Olt O~FICtAL US~ ONLY
Ite~ardlen~ c~f
a nwnb~r ni' pogit3ve f~~tnrg (i;he ug~ ~f the NpP and the
, arming r~f the ship uith m~dern anti~ircrg.~t ~uid~d miggil~ ~ygtem~ gnd
electrdnic equipment), the high Gogt nf building, the ~reat digplncement
tonnage, th~ eompl~xity of design ~nd a nwnber af c~ther factor~ told nn
thE pl~n~ for building ~tomic-poaered cruisers. ~'or thi~ rea~on in the
United St~t~g dnly c~ne gueh ghip vra~ built.
The further ge~rch for optimum ~rchit~ctur~l ~nd c~esign deCisions and
Weap~nry led to the building of the atomic-powered guic~ed-mis~ile cruie~rn
the "bain~rid~~" ~nd "Trakgton."
$oth cruiserg have the s~tne desSgn of th~ bow and gtern extremitiee, th~
elongated forecastle and the high freeboard in th~ boW and mid-eertions,
and this reduces the wetness of~the ships~ In the bulbous row is located
the sonar dome~ ~'he upper deck is unincumbered, and a mg,~or3ty of the
d~ck mechani$ms and devicea h~ve been put b~neath it or inaide the guper-
struature~. The sb~en~e of amok~stgcka creates the begt conditiong for the
placement and dp~rntion of
electronic equipment.
The ~tomir-powered guided-missile cruiser "Trakston" aas developed con-
sidering the experience of building and operating the preceding guided-
missile cruiser thc "Bainbridge." The specifications of the ahips are
bgsically the same, and there are certain differences i~i the weapons and
displacement tonnage. Ttie fourth atomic-powered guided-missile cruiser
the "California" (the head ship in a series of two units) was commissioned
ctlmost 7 years after completing the construction of the atomic-poWered
guided-missile cruiser "Trakston." In 1g75, the atomic-powered guided-
, mis~ile cruiser "South.Carolina" was commissioned, and thi~ was a second
ship of the "California" cless. The displacement of the ne~? ships is
bver 10,000 tons. In building them, according to the statements in the
foreign press, great attention has been paid to standardizing the designs.
The radar equipment of the cruisers includes up to 7 different types of
radars: The AN/SPS-48 three-coordinate radars, the AN/SPS-40 aircraft
detection radar, the AN/SPS-55 sea-search and loW-target radars, and the
AN/SPG-51A missile and artillery fire control radar.
The guided-missile cruisers of the "Virginia" class in terms of their ap-
pearnnce and specifications are largely similar to the guided-missile
cruisers of the "California" class.
'I'he third carrier of the "Chester W. Nimit2" class (the "Carl Vinson") is
to be commissioned in 1981. The further building of ships of this class
as yet is not planned. The superior leadership of the U.S. Defense Depart-
ment and Navy, in referring to the high co~t of the atomic-poWered carriers,
in the future has proposed building carriers of smaller nisplacement ton-
_ na~e with conventional type propulsion units.
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~'he prdgpects fnr the dpvelopment ~f atomic-pnwer~d cruieerg ar~ gnmewhab
dif~er~nt. There ~re plans to build fnur atomic-pow~red guided-migsile
crui~er~ o!' the C(}N42 c1.as~ (the pl.ana were worked out on the basis of the
guided migsil~ ship "VirginSa"). The bui~ding of the head sh3p he~~ been
plann~d for the beginning of the 1980's. Theae cruisers w311 have a total -
digplacement of 12,000 ~one, and a top epe~d o~ 30 knots. mheir weQpong
- include: 7'he I(}IS antiairrr~ft guided misgilea and the ASROC antigub-
maric?p guided missiles, two 127-mm artillery guns, tiwo 20-mm antlaircraft
~autom~tic~ guns, two trSple tubes for firing antisubmarine torpedoeg, and
two Mk3 LEI~IPS helicopt~rs. There are plans in the futur~ to equip them
with thp Harpoon antishipping guided miasilea. The new cruiaers are de-
signed for escorting atomic-powered carriers and conducting independent
operations pc sea.
~Captior. of untr~n~le~ted table:) Basic Specifications of Atomic-Powered
Surface Vessels in +he L'.S. Navy
COpYFiIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obo2reniye'~, 1g79
10272
Cso: 1801
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~Ott O~FICIAL USE ONLY
DEI/ELOPM~NT OF NATO NAVAL ~T,~CTRONIC WARF'ARE SYS~fl~+15 VIEWID
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russia.n No 2, Feb 79 signed to -
press 5 Feb 79 pp 76-82
[Article by Engr-Cspt lst Rank P.(lindin, candidate of technical sciences,
and Lt Capt S. Chukalin: "Naval Electronic Warfare Equipment of the Euro-
pean NATO Countries"]
[Faccerpts] The ruling circles of ~he European members in tt?e e~ggressive
NATO bloc, under U.S. preasure, year after year have increased their mili-
tary might. Here great attention has been given to further improving naval
weaponry and military equipment, including electronic warfare (EW) equipment;
this includes electronic intelligence (Elint) and electronic ,~amming (EJ) `
equipment.
The electronic intelligence equipment is being developed in a direction of
further introducing digital data processing methods into it and can be used
autonomously and ,jointly with the EJ equipment as a single electronfc war-
fare complex. �
Creat Britain has developed a modern ship Elint the Suzy (three varia-
tions), for equipping surface ships and submarines.
In the British Navy and in the navies of the other NATO countries, as the
Western press has shown, extensive use is made of el-int equipment of the
RDL series produced by Decca. This is designed according to a modular prin- _
ciple, and this makes it possible to put together an optimum set of equip-
ment considering the missions carried out by the specific carrier.
A standard set, the RDL-1BC is used on patrol boats.
For submarines, Decca produces the sets RDL-1BCS (a range oP 2-12 gigahertz)
- and the RDL-4BCS (2.5-20 gigahertz). These operate together with an antenna
system consisting of 16 antenna elements contained in hermetic capsules.
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ber.ca h~s alsa developed the new ship el-int sygt~m, Cutl~s~. Tngt~nd of
traditional aignal se~rch methods, it hag used th~ pni~nciple df omnidirec-
tional. panoramic rec~ivin~.
f~ecca ha~ also developed ~he MIR-2 ama11-aized radar detector~ J'udging frc~m
the recent 3nformation in the foreign pre~s, they plan to install this on
patrol bdatg.
~'rom th~ data in ~hp foreign press, the new Itoyal Navy cruisers end frigateg
are to be equipped wi~h the Abbey Hill e1-3nt equipment for automatic gign$1
detection, identifica~ion of the type of rad~r and the clags of carrier. In
terms of its basic characteristics, 3t corresponds to the Anierican AN/WLR-8.
Grea~ Britain for the ~ast several ye~rs has produced the Sari digital analy-
ais and iden~ifica~ion equipmen~ designed for proceasing data received from
ship radars. It automatical.l.y measures the pu].se repetition rate, the
repetition frequency oacil].ations, the pulae duration and the scanning
periods. 7'he operator can introduce additional signal characteriatics (the
values of the carrier frequency, bear3ng, the type of acanning, the type of
modulation, and the particular features of frequency' oscillation). All
these parameters are compared with the standard recorded in the memory.
The processing results which include the type of radar and cla.ss of carrier
~re displayed on a screen in an alphanwnerical fo'rrti.~ Iiientification takes
less than 150 microseconds.
In France, the Thomson-CSF ffrm has developed the Arial analysis and identi-
fication equipment built according to the modular principle. The small di-
mensions and low weight of each instrument included in it make it poasible
to install this equipment on ships of all classes, submarines and naval
aviation aircraft. The specific tactical and technical requirements are
satisfied by selecting the required set of instruments and connecting them
to the base DR-3012 signal-seeking receiver. This receiver provides omni-
dimensional search in a broad range of frequencies and makes it possible to
detect at great distances signals from both pulse radars as well as
continuous-sending radars, to measure the frequency, the pulse repetition
period, and the bearing, wfth the automatic delivery of this information
for subsequent analysis and identification. _
On the ships of the basic classes in the Norwegian Navy, the SR-lA el-int
radar is used and this has a tuned radio-frequency receiver (a band of 2.5-
18 gigahertz). The antenna system includes a fixed antenna which consists
of eight horns which provide omnidirectional receiving, and a turning
ciirectional antenna for direction finding. The accuracy of direction find-
ing is 3.5�, and here the rotating speed of the antenna is automatically
selected within the limit$ of 0-500 rpm, proceeding Prom the conditions for
optimum detection of the radar signals.
On submarines and sma11 ships, the YR-1B and VR-1C el-int radars, and these
differ only in terms of antenna design. In the first instance the antenr.a
is nanufactured from stainless steel and is designed to be submerged to a
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depth of 320 mptcrg, $nd in th~ E~tCOrid~ frnm 1i~hter materir~ln in thr fnrm
of two nemicircleg placed around the mast. 7'he ~nt~nnn con~intg nf
ei~{ht
group~ of horng mgking it poaeible to provide omnidimenaion~l receiving in
a range of 2.5-18 glgahertz. The high sensitivity of the radgr receiver
makea it poagibl~ to detect rade?rs aver the hnrizon. Begring ie determined
from th~ numb~r ~f the group of horns rece3v3ng ~he sign~ls, ~nd for thig
reri8ori the range-finding error may reach +22.5�. The rad~r uses a detector
receiver. ~'he signal from 3ts output gnes to the anal.yzer indicator using
a double-beam tube with a~.ogari~hm3c time scan scale. ~'his provides ~n
opportunity for the operator to measure ~he duration a,nd frequency of the
pulse repetition w3thout aw3tching the meter3ng limits.
For subm~rines e, simple NE-l0A radar warn3ng receiver has been developed
(its lightened model is produeed 3n a waterproof houaing and is mounted on
ahipg and hel3copters). The antenna syatem (we3ght 12 kg) is designed to
be submerged to 300 m~ters, and provides omnidirectional receiving in hori-
znntal (0-360�) and vertical (0-90�) planes. The receiver covers a fre-
quency band of 2-11 gigaherti and captures signa7.s within the limits of
direct line of sight. Light and sound w~rning signals are emitted in de-
tecting a radar signal.
The FRG produces the ND210 and ND260 e1-int radars which cover, respec-
tively, the bands of 170-470 megahertz and 450-1,000 megahertz. They employ
logoperiodic antennas. The load factor of the frequency band with s3.gnals
is indicated on the screen oP a panoramic search receiver in the fbrm of a
brightness-modulated line under which is displayed a quartz frequency grid
with an interva7. of 10 megahertz. This fgcilitates and accelerates the
counting of the signal frequency. By a speciel device, up to 5 3nterceptor
_ receivers can be connected to the search receiver. In addition a apectrum
analyzer, a frequency meter and a range finder can be connected as part of
these radars.
For the Italian Navy, the firm Electronica is pro~ucing the NA~I/SPR-A radar
warning device (a range of 1-10.5 gigahertz). Its antenna system consists
of four directional antennas with overlapping patterns. This makea it
possible to provide omnidimensional receiving. The detector receiver of
the radar is not designed to meter the parameters of the received signal.
Electronic ,~amming devices. According to the estimate of foreign special-
ists, Great Britain holds first place among the European NATO countries in
terms of the quantity and development of naval EJ equipment. Britain has
developed the Scimitar 3ammer which works together with the Suzy equipment
(a range of 1-16 gigahertz). It has a~amming power of 200 watts under -
continuous sending and 600 watts under pulsed, and provides for the setting
- of various types of ~aamiing.
_ Decca manufactures ~ammers of the RCM series which are employed with the
. RDL and Cutlass el-ints equipment. The 3ammers of this series have a vari-
able ,jamming band and can emit both selective and barrage ,jamming. According
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~OIt 0~'~ICYAL US~ ONLX
to information in the foreign press, ~h~y are capabl~ of creating effective
countermegnuree for en~n~y obaerva~ion, navigation, iden~if3catiion end
control equipmen~.
Decca has also developed a n~w ~esmner witihin the development of the Cut~aes
system. 7'h~s ,jammer, in contrast to th~ ~ammers of the RCM series, can auto-
' mat3ca11y trQek ~he terget both 3n terms of azimuth and elevation, and this -
provides a significantly h3gh~r level of emitted power (over 300 kilowatts).
7'he ~nglish Vickens firm supp].ies Corvus launchers for launching unguided
miasiles with antiradar reflectors. The ships of the basic cl.asses c~rry
two ~uch unite, and each includes a cylindr3cal turning paxt fastened on
the deck with eight barrels which are located in ~hree tiers with a fixed
elevation angle of 30�. The Corvus units are widely uaed in the naviea of
Great Britain, France and certain other countries.
As the foreigc. press has announced, Great Britain has developed a new multi-
charge unit, called Protean, for dropping dipole reflectors. It has four
rechargeable magazines (with 36 grenade~ in each). Firing is in salvoes of _
nine grenadea from each magazine. Five seconds after the salvo, a cloud is
formed at an a].titude of 40-60 meters and this creates a radar defense with-
in the bands of 5-10 and 15-20 gigahertz.~ The unit is controlled from the
data of the ship el-ints equipment.
In France the Thomson-CSF firm produc~s the Alligator 3ammer which works
compatibly with the Arial el-int~equipment. For launching unguided missiles
on the~ships of the basic classes, the Er~glish-produced Corws launchers are
employed, and on small ship,_~, the Fr~nch-produced Sillex which are to be
replaced by the more advance~d Dagay.
The foreign press has also announced that on the ships of the Italian Navy,
they are to employ the Sclar launchers produced by Breda Meccanica and de-
signed for firing unguided missiles (a caliber of 105 mm) with dipole re-
flectors over a distance of up to 12 1~. The unit has 20 guide tubes lo-
cated in four rows. In addition to the rockets with dipole reflectors, it
can fire rockets with infrared decoys. Usually a ship carries two such
launchers (one on each side).
This, briefly, is the basic electronic warfare equipment used in the navies
of a number of the European NATO countries.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
10272
CSO: 1801
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E
NATO NAVAL TRAINING EXERCTSE DESCRTBID
Moacow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 79 aigned to
press 5 Feb 79 p 89
[Article by Qapt~3d Rank V. Khomenskiy: "The NATO Navies in the Display
Determination-78 Exercise"] ,
[Text] From 19 September through 13 October i978, in the Southern European
theater of military operations, as the foreign press has announced, an exer-
_ cise of the NATO Joint Arm~d Forces was held under the code name "Display
- Determination-78" with the predominant involvement of the navies. Its basic
aim was to shift the ~oint arm~d forces of the bloc in the theater of opera-
tions from a peacetime to a wartime footiing, the reinforcing of the armed
forces and the conducting of operations in the initial period of a wa�r with-
out using nuclear weapons.
Participating in the exercise were the commands and staffs of the ,joint and
national armed forces, the NATO mobile forces, the units and subunits of
ground forces, the 5t h and 6~ h JTAC, the strike and ~oint YATO navies
in the Mediterranean, individual marine units and subunits, over 100 combat
ships and auxiliary vessels (ineluding the American multipurpose carriers
"Forrestal" and "John F. Kennedy," the English attack carrier "Arc Royal,"
_ and the French multipurpose carrier "Foch"), and over 250 combat airplanes
and helicopters (including 150 carrier-based airplanes). The total number
of personnel was 35,000 men, including 3,000 marines from the United States,
Italy and Greece.
In the exercise they worked on the following procedures: The forming and
deployment of operational formations and groups of different types in combat
areas, the combating of "ene~r" naval groupings in the interests of winning
air and sea superiority, the conducting oP amphibious landing operations,
the providing of direct air support for ground forces fighting on coastal
sectors, the escorting of convoys with troop reinforcements and protection
of the sea lines of conanunications.
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With the start of the exerc3se, ~hree carrier strike groups were deployed -
(in ~he zone of the Straits of Gibraltar, and in the western and central.
parts of ~he Mediterranean), as well as ASW forces on the probable deploy-
men~ routes nf the "enemy" ship forma~ions. ~he carr~.er-based aviation
carried out migs3ons oP winning superiority 3n the given regione of the
Mediterranean and escor~ed the ocean convoy from the Atlantic and an amphibi-
ous landing force from the Balearics.
After establ3shing superiority in the western Medi~errsnean, the deck-
~.aunched aviation from the carrier "Forrestal" and airplanes from the 5th
JTAC began to prov3~e direct air support to the ground forces fighting on
] the coastal sector in Northern Italy.
,
Tt~e landing of a landing party was carried out on 9 October in Western
Thrace (Greece) by landing craft and helicopters.
The combat of the sides was conducted under conditions of electronic weapons
_ and was supported by the NATO ,joint air defense system in Europe.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
10272
cso: i8oi
END
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