JPRS ID: 8521 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE SECRETS OF THE SOVIET BANK IN FRANCE

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~ ~ ~ . ~ '
~
eY JEAN MONTALDO

i8 JUNE i979 CFOUO 37r79~ i OF 2
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,rpr~s r,/es~~ .
18 June 1979
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTER(~ EUROPE
(FOU~ 37/79)
� ~ .
- SECRETS OF THE SOVIET BANK IN FRANCE
BY ~EAN M~NTALDO
U. S. JOINT PU~LIC~TIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR OFFICI~L USE ONLY -
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.7PRS L/8521
18 June 1979
TRANSLATIONS ~N WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 37/79)
SECRETS OF TH~ SOVIET BANK IN FRANCE _
Paris LE5 5ECRETS D~ LA BANQUE SOVIETI~UE EN FRANCE in French
1979 Editions Albin Michel pp 7-79, 81-90, 94-].02, 108, iio,
115,116, 118-124, 134-185, 187-216.
[Book by Jean Montaldo. Passages encZosed in s].an~l,ines printed
in italics]
CONTENTS ~ PAGE -
CHAPTER 1. The Bank of the PCF, the CGT and the Communist
Embassies 1 -
CHAPTER 2. 1948: A Socialist Minister Already Proves Collusion
Between~the CommunisC Party and the BCEN [Commercial
Bank for North Europe] 16 '
CHAPTER 3. 1948-1918: The Rise of a Truly Different Bank........ 20
- CHAPTER 4. Thousands of Coded Accounts: PCF, CGT, Embassies,
Corporations 36
CHAPTER 5. The Amazing Tribulations of the Soviet Bank's
Traveling Salesmen 60
CHAPTER 6. Games Played by the ~tarxist MulCinational and the
- Party 'That Wears the Colors of France' 86
" a - [IZI - WE - 150 FOUO]
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C~iAPTL;R 1. 'THE BE1NK OF TH~ PCF, THC CGT ANb 'I'HE COt~tUNI5T ~Mf3A5SITs5
(Text]
The PCF, the CGT and the Soviet Bank--"Wearing the ~Colors of France"
'This book is based on thousands of original documents. The smallest details =
are documented. My sole regret is that I was unable to use all of the mass
of information I had at my disposal concerning the Soviet Bank in Paris.
It has the reputation of being the most impenetrable in Frunce. My investiga-
_ tion was not easy; I came up against the extraordinary system of precautions
that is the Soviets' alone--the masters of the art of secrecy. But the most
perfect machine always has a flaw; I found it, than~cs to that "human factor"
dear to Graham Greene, which the communists have so often been able to make
use of.
In referring to the Commercial Bank for North Europe/Eurobank as the /Soviet -
Bank in Paris/ I am employing /literally exact words/.
Of course, on the legal and administrative level the BCEN has French status.
Foreign banks are constrai.ned by our laws to equip themselves with a French
P-DG [president-director general]--a ridiculous guarantee of the "national"
nature of their activities. Thus in the BCEN, whose titular president since
1965 has been Guy de Boysson, Soviet capital amounts to 99.7 percent of the -
shares, underwritten by two Moscow banks: the State Bank (Gosbank) and the _
~ Bank for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank) of the UaSR.
The remaining 0.3 percent is in the hands of the French, who offer every =
guarantee, in the eyes of Moscow.
Consequently, the BCEN/Eurobank is u?uch more foreign than all the other for-
eign and private banks established in Franc~. It is in tru+th the bank of a
foreign state--which has the double advantage cf presenting itself, thanks to
its soothing name, as being both French and private at the same time.
_ When we speak of the Morgan Bank or the Bank of Bilbao, of the Borges c Irmao
= Bank or of Lloyds, of the Citibank or Barclays, we immediately know that
these are banks, subsidiaries, agencies, having their roots elsewhere.
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Ilowever, becuuse their capital is div~;rsified they arc; incomparubly morc
~ Nret~ch th~n tlie DCEN, aiid because they are independent of any stnte g~vcrn-
ment they ure infinitely more free. _
'Che U55R enjoys the unrensonable privileg~ of I~aving in our country a statc;
. ~ank disguised "in the colors of I~rartcc." I
' Although the pxesident-director general of the Soviet bank in Paris is
Guy de ~oysson, a former Communist deputy, its real master is the vice-presi-
dent-director genc;ral, .~ladimir Ponomarev. Altl?ough he is a second cousin of
I3oris Ponomarev, u member of the Central Committee of the Commuriist [~~rty of -
the Soviet Union, filliiig in for the Politbureau and in charge of rel~tions
_ wixh the brother parties of Western Curope, his every act, like the acts of
the other lcaders, officers and employees of the bank, is supervised by a di-
- rector zppointed for the purpose. In recent years this role has devolved up-
on Mr 6likhailov, who was born in 1933 in Moscow arad arrived at the ~CLN in
1972 (he was appointed director in 1975) after serving at the Atoscow Narodny '
L~ank of Lo~idon, its twin sister,
Mr Ponomarev has no autonomy of action; constantly monitored by the KGB, }ie -
plainly carries out instructions froru Moscow. This is liow he is summoned to
the USSR Embassy: ~
Por Mr Ponomaxev
Uate: 12 October 19';'8--Time: 1235 ~
In ;+our absence, the Soviet Ambassador telephoned. _
_ You are requested to come to the ~mbassy on 17 October at 1730,
` Cxtension 291
Addrsssing the vice president-director general of the Soviet bank, the anon-
' ymous person who leaves this barrack-room message will "n~t recall it" and
_ will not want it to be "recalled."
In short, the BCEN/Eurobank is a Sovi~;t bank with Soviet capital, directed by ~
Soviet officers, operating exclusively on behalf of the Soviets. n,ecause of
the total of its balance sheet it is first on the official list of foreign -
banks in France.
I plan to examine here its activities and the unusual relations corinecting it ~
- with the French Communist Party and the CGT.
I
The latter shout their independence from the Kremlin all over the ~~lace; their ~
- declarations, repeated 1,000 times, are full of protestations alon~ that line.
I shall prove here that Mr Marchais and Mr Seguy relinquish their funds into
the hands of the Soviets; how could they entrust them to bankers with whom
they would have real ideologic and political differences?
In money matters, more than anything else, abso:ute confidence is indispensable.
The PCF and the CGT give to Moscow the right to know about, to collect and to
maninulate tlteir funds. That is the best demonstration of an intimacy they ~
dare not avow.
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_
~~ox o~rTCini, usc orr~Y
Frnncs, Rublos and ~oxes
It is 26 Octob~r 1978, ~t 77, 79 ~u~d 81 Boulevard liaussmann, headquurters of
the ~CI~N/Eurobank, the Soviet bank in Paris, whose records I nm examining.
7'hree 1900 buildings with rejuvenated facades, sl~utters ~nd bullet-proof inet-
al doors. Although the Soviet bank is already distinguished from its compet- -
itors by these defense devices, the difference appears even greater when one
realizes that the bank holds some 3,500 "numbered accounts," national and fc~r-
eign, reputedly the best guarded in France.
This very closed club, to which small and medium-sized savers have scarcely
any access, is distinguished by its homogeneity: it brings together t}~e fine
flower of militant communism--intellectual, trade uni~~i, business, diplomatic
and law enforcement. I give the ex~ct report below; one law makes banking se-
crecy an obligation for the bankers concerned, but anot}ier law demands that
the ;iournalist provide proof of what he reveals. Only matters of national de-
fens-e and the protection of minors are bound to secrecy.
Eiere~ then, is what I discover on this date:
Georges Gosnat (deputy, Central Committee member and treasurer of the PCf):
Account No 05316-6, credited with 2,682,634.76 francs
. "Regular demand account"
Soviet Information Bureau:
Account No 40218-6 820,SO1.QQ francs
"Foreign demand account,
regular"
CGT (Confederation headquarters): ~
Account No 5101-2 9,500,000 francs
' "Fixed-term account, 3 months"
- "Regular demand account +1,056,469.02 francs
_ * 10,556,469.02 francs
USSR Embassy
Account No 30213-5 -
(commercial agency) 269,776.89 f=ancs
- Account No 30214-3 104,075 francs
"Demand, interim accounts"
Account No 40203-8 (permanent
- delegation to UNESCO) 22,197.64 francs
_ "Foreign demand account, regular"
, *As for the PCF, the CGT and the othex Soviet bank customers, I cite liere
only a few representative accoi:nts.
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Account No 40213-7 1,975,318.70 francs
(Conunorcixl agency) *
Account No 40214�5 90,488.36 francs
"Foreign domand, regular accounts"
Account No 40877-9 7,409,810.63 francs
"Foreign fixed-term account"
Total of accounts listed here 9,871,667.22 francs
L'HUMANITE (central organ of the PCF):
Account No 5024-6 277,737.50 francs
- (Making net progress: on 16 October
this demand account was debited
254,170.17 francs) ;
- Account No 8602-6 (L'HUMANITE
festival) 1,274,314.60 francs
Account No 8683-6 (displays,
- L'HUMANITE festival) 355,929.70 francs
- Total 1,907,981.80 francs ~
Cuban ~mbassy in Paris (omitting 2 dozen
of its other accounts, including the
embassy in Algiers):
Account No 30342-2 116,095.48 frr~ncs -
Account No 30584-0 14,915.79 francs
Account No 40343-4 393,398.94 francs
Account No 40349-9 (UNESCO
delegation) 78,722.60 francs -
Account No 40363 (delegation) 18,633.12 francs
Account No 40387-9 104,244.67 francs
Account No 40395-2 48,572.63 francs -
Account No 40421-6 254,322.61 francs
_ Account No 40441-4 (press agency) 215,888.65 francs
Account No 40490-1 (press agency) 5,900.38 francs -
_ Account No 40514-8 (commPrcial -
department) 506y012.89 francs ~
Account No 40585-8 (fishing
department) 17,033.68 francs ~
Account No 40603-9 4,474.39 francs ~
Account No 40678-1 18,830.89 francs
+
- Total of accounts listed here 1,921,565.16 francs ~
*Down from 16 October 1978 total (274,997.64 francs).
*After the PCF and the CGT, Cuba is the "custoraer" with the most accounts in
the Soviet bank. ~
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RQna Andrieu (member of the PCF C~ntral Committee, editor-in-chieF of
L'HUM.ANITE) :
Account No 03710-3 6,835.55 francs
"Regulax demand account"
"Fixed-term account: +2 to 3 years" +90,000.00 francs
Total 96,835.55 francs (as compared with
108,737.67 francs
on 16 October 1978)
GDR ~mbassy:
Account No 40304-4 1,046,923.87 francs
Account No 30304-2 30,22~.65 francs =
Account No 40324-2 (foreign econom-
_ ic relations office delegation) 603,759.21 francs
, Account No 30324-0 (idem) 87,032.84 francs
Total of accounts listed herP 1,767,944.57 francs
_ LA VIE OUVRIERE (CGT weekly, President-Editor Henri Krasucki, member of the
Confederal Bureau of the CGT and the Political Bureau of the PCF):
Account No 5051-9 103,535.89 francs (compared with a
debit of
486,266.15 francs
_ on 25 January 1979)
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [as published]:
Account No 30331-5 961,161.55 francs -
- Account No 30826-4 541,572.59 francs
Account No 40331-7 23,074.96 francs -
Account No 40331-7/0002 972,294.43 francs
Account No 40621-1 1,495,578.31 francs
Account No 40681-5 569,599.18 francs -
Account No 40708-6 605,511.26 francs .
Account No 30689-6 (commercial
division) 12,110.24 francs
Total of accounts listed here 5,181,002.52 francs
Jean Elleinstein, assistant director of the Center for Marxist Study and Re-
search, who is called a"s~cial-democrat" in the PCF but is still bowid up
with his comrades, has an account (No 20856-3) in the Soviet bank, as do the
editorial-writers of L'HUMANITE, Andre Wurmser (Account No 20712-8) and -
Laurent Salini (Account No 20563-5). ~
I do not cite these names at random. They offer a glimpse of the files of
the BCEN/Eurobank, a Marxist multinational run like other deposit banks but
differing from them in that it gives all its operations a very special ideo-
logic coloration. Even at the level of recruiting customers: on 16 January '
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1979 I pxese;~t myself, accompanied, in the lobby of the bank to open an ac-
count in the name of a private person, tatally apolitical. Q,n employee un-
hupefully refers us to another, who replies, "We are a commorcial bank; not -
being equinped for it, we cannot authorize a deposit accotmt for you. If
you live in this neighborhood, try the BNP [National Bank of paris], which
is near here."
~ At the ~C~N, it is not Andrieu wtio is turned away.
The Russians never ~ive a gift without a quid pro quo. So on this 26 October
1978, tlie date on which I begin the writing of this book, the bank's 378 em-
. ployees are punctually carrying out the service regulation, repeated on
1 September 1977, establishing the "Commission Rates Arplicable to the
Customers" (when funds are moved).
All customers--banks, commercial firms, individual and legal entities, etc.--
are subject to the payment of variable "commissions."
- All, except for the seven privileged customers enjo;~ing the extraordinary ad-
vantage--in view of the colossal amounts of money they manipulate--of the dis-
tinction "Free" (see Document No 1, p 19):
People's Welfare -
_ Kanapa
- G. Gosnat
Aeroflot
Sovexportfilm
AGfiNCE TASS
Intourist
For the Russian bankers, the PCF and its legal representatives*are on the -
same footing as the official znstitutions of the Saviet Union. ~
1
~
People's Welfare: a charitable organization (formerly Red Welfare) controlled
by the PCF, although it denies it, whose general secretary, Julien Laupretre, ~
holds the same title on the Central Committee. Kanapa: the man whom
Mr Marchais calls "my best friend", who until his death--in September 1978-- -
was a member of the Political Bureau of the PCF and head of the foreign po- ,
_ licy department of the Central Committee. G. Gosnat: treasurer of the PCF.
Aeroflot: the USSR airline. Sovexportfilm: Parisian agency of the large ~
Soviet company that exercises a near monopoly in cin~matographic markets for
Moscow over the rest of the world. It works in direct relationship to the ,
USSR Embassy. AGENCc TASS: the Soviet press agency. Intourist; the state- i
owned organization that controls and arra~nges trips in the USSR.
e
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. roR orFZCl~t, usc ot~Y
: The Most howerful Apparatchik urtd t}ie Most Uiscreet
It has Ueen this way since 1920, the date the French Communist Party was
founded. After Prague, after Solzhenitsyn, after the unimpeachr~ble revelu-
tions about the Gulag, the style of relations between Moscow and certain for-
- eign Communist Parties had to change. It is no longer possible to proclaim a
monolithic faith in the U~SR. A pro-5oviet propaganda witho~at any shndings -
here, in 1979, would run up against general skepticism; circumstances are
forcing communists to express, now and again, timid criticism of rthe repres-
sion in the USSR. Soviet politicians are too well-informed not to understand
it. Naturally they would prefer the strict obedience of former tir.;~s. But
as realists they calculat�e better than anyone the disproportion--favorable
to their interests--that exists between the unconditi.onal support* granted Uy
the PCF to Moscow's foreign policy and its rare reservations about the in-
ternal regime of the USSR.
As far as the Kremlin is concerned, support for its actinns on the world cliess-
board takes precedence over any other considera~ion. Soviet expansionism -
has need of agents who glorify it; in exchange it tolerates discordant notes -
on life in the U5SR.
Communist propaganda no longer dwells upon the virtues and beauties of social-
ism a la Brezhnev. It gives priority to praising the merits of the USSR,
"the defender of peace, friendship and the liberation of peoples oppressed by -
capitalist imperialism." This slogan maintains some credibility among the
non-communist Frencfi, who are not much inclined to accept a collectivist
_ society for themselves.
The French Communist oress tirelessly presents a cartoon in which the United r
States, West Germuny, France, Japan and now China embody evil-doers, while
the USSR and its friends--Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, persanify the
good. This basic loyalty to Soviet policy is worth a few sacrifices of form;
this enormous service rendered by the PCF, its p~ess and the trade unions in
its power to the USSR is worth all the credits, all the loans. all the unse-
ctred transactions, all the facilities that Moscow grants thruugh the agency
of the BCEN to the CGT, to L'IiUMANITE, to the Party's publishers and to the
- commercial firms that feed its treas~iry.
_ Moreover, the Soviets have at their disposal, to "hold" the PCF whexe they
want it, an ineradicable guardrail, Georges Gosnat. The communist newspapers'
meager freedom to criticize the USSR stops right where his power begins.
Titular treasurer of the party, he is also the head of ~ts "Press, Informa-
tion and Propaganda Bureau." This accumulation makes him the PCF's most pow-
erful, but also most discreet apparatchik--he who, by opening or closing his
hand, breathes life into or inflicts death on its print media. The hinge be-
tween the PCF and the Soviet bankers, tens and tens of billions have been pass-
ing through his personal account at the BCEN for 30 years. The Russian bankers
have never complained about him.
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1-low could anyone Uelieva that this man, whom successive masters of the USSR--
Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev--found impeccable in the handling of
funds deposited in their Parisiw~? bank, will one day turn against Moscow the
millions put at his disposal?
= The year 1947 and the beginning of the Cold War arrive. The political result:
Communists are getting out of the government. The economic result: a re-
structuring of the financial ties between Moscow and the PCF is imperative.
France-Navigation is sold. From now on the E~arty's financial affairs are di-
vided into two sectors: one, hidden, is in the hands of Jean Jerome; the
- other visible, is under the supervision of Georges Gosriat, wh~ is temporary
treasurer until 1954. On ~hat date he comes ~~raight to the point in the
Central Committee and becomes titular treasurer of L�he Party.
, The PCF's diversification in economic affairs quickly prodc~ces an important ~
- difference between the strictly commercial sectur (a whole gamut of monopolis-
tic companies that are beginning to be developed profitably) and the propa-
garida sector (press-publishing), which traditionally 5hows a loss. So it is
shown to be indispensable for the treasurer to supervise both, even at the -
price of giving admonitions ta the second of the two or pronouncing banish-
' ments from it, if only to keep the confidence of Moscow and its bank. -
- The �ormer editor-in-chief of L'HUMANITE, deputy and member of the Central
Committee, Pierre Herve, when he broke with the Party told how in 1952 he
learned of the suppression of the weekly ACTION, which was ostensibly inde-
pendent of the PCF but wus actually financed by it:
"One day I was called to Central Committee headquarters, where I learned from
Gosnat--the Party treasurer--t}?at ACTION was to suspend publication as of xhe
- following week. As I was trying to argue, Gosnat told me that he was just
supposed to ask me fox the list of contributors to the newspaper, so they
could eventually be reinstated. The decision had been made. Although I was
editor-in-chief of the paper, I hadn't even been consulted." (Letter to
~ Sartre, 1956, p 21-22.)
The concentration of economic power in the hands of Mr Gosnat was made com- _
plete by a promotion of a political kind: when the legendary "son of the
people", Maurice Thorez, dies in July 1964, it is Gosnat who succeeds hi.m as
deputy from Ivey, the city that was th~ location of the early ex~loits of his
father, who taught him the virtues of money as the "sinews of the revolution."
Ivey, where he is seen less frequently than at the Soviet bank, where his
daughter is also employed. Like her father, she maintains the best relations
with the assistant manager, Edmond Laroze, Marcel Trigon's brother-in-law,
a former BCEN employee who became a member of the PCF Central Committee,
mayor of Arcueil and--alternate to Georges Marchais in the National Assembly. �
Mr Gosnat's Denials
= The BCEN is an old acqua*ntance of mine. After introducing it in my work,
"The Finances of the PCF , I made other revelations on the subject in
*Eclitions Albin Michel, 1977. pp 54, 55; 177-206
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~ "Communist H'rance"*. In that book I stressed its decisive role as tlio
driving force of the ~conomic and c:ottunercial empire of the PCF in the service
- and widor the control of Moscow, Tlie press, politicians and speciulists drew
}ieavily o~i my investigations, but they did not always understand the signifi-
cance of the ties between tiie Soviet bank and the Communists. For their part,
Georges Marcl;ais and his comrades still feign indignation when the question ~
- of their relations with Moscow is brought up.
- Ueputy Georges Gosnat, who has been treasurer of the PCF for about 30 years--
even he makes every effort ~o trivialize the bonds betwe~n th~ PCF and the
' Soviet bank;
"T am not saying," he states, after denying that the ~CEN has any centraliz- '
ing role in the Party's financing, "that such-and-such a company }ias no re- ~
lationship with this bank, but that doesn't concern the actual fin~ncing of
the Party. Iii reality, we have sev~ral banks, such as the Societe Generale,
or the Credit Lyonnais. Currently the Party must have hundreds of accounts
in I don't know how many different banks.*"
- That denial belongs on the interminable list of false ar?d overstated denials -
the PCF has knowingly maintained since it was created.
5ince the "BCEN has no centralizing role in the financing of the Party,"
_ . hcw is it that all the Communist newspapers, all the principal PCF organiza-
tions, all its partnerships and unofficial companies, the CGT and most of the
_ trade unions pile up accounts in the Soviet bank and do evsrything they can
to conceal the fact? There is no eauivalent to be found iii the Societe Gen-
erale or the Credit Lyonnais.
Four Soviets to Manage the Treasury of the PCF and the CGT
Let us analyze still more closely the statement made by Mr Gosnat.
Sliding over the existence in the BCEN of a milli~naire account labeled with
his na~ne but belonging to the PCF, which delegated the signing to him (see
llocument No 2), the deputy-treasurer is content to say:
"We have several banks...At present the Party must have hundreds of accounts
in I don't know how many different banks."
~
Let us ~a,rry that logic to its conclusion. If I had been satisfied on
26 October with the single account (268,000,000 francs and some centimes)
held by the PCF in the Soviet bank, with Gosnat as intermediary; if I consid-
- ered that the Party has as much money in "hundreds of accounts" in no one
~ knows "how many different banks," I would conclude that it is (as I showed in
"The Finances of the PCF") not merely the wealthiest bank in France, but rich-
er than Croesus.
It is true that the Party has deposit accounts nearly everywhere in France;
I have verified this.
* In "Secret Money" by Andre Campana, Ed. Arthaud (1976), p 161.
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- 1'hcir vdlumc (which Mr Gosnat refrsins from giving) is by nn me~ns ~~mp~r~bl~
to tl~~t of the ~oulev~rd H~ussmann m~n;~~ed tre~sury. Vl~dimir ponnmarev
- w�arches over tt�t gold mine, assisted by s~veral of his comp~triGts, inr.lu.d-
ing direc~ors V~ctor Krivocheev, Vladislav 5oud~kov and 5crguei Vunine. M;~~y
5ovi et offi~cers are i.nvnlved, who ~re st~tion~d at [3oulev~rd Il;~ussm~nn nnJ
trcatc~ accdrdingly by +he Eurnb~nk personn~l dep~rtment. On 7 UCC~mber ly7g
tl~e lattPr c~rried out, by me~ns of "simple pnyments" ("reference:
SL'~ JC P. [~xp~nsion urtknown~ 285") tit~ settlement of the r~ntnl taxes in
which they wer~ concerned. ~or Mr ponomarev (2247 ~nd Mr 5oudgkov (1213
to the chicf tre~surer df Neuilly-sur-5eine; for Krivnchec~ ~~d V~nine tn tiie
chicf tre~sure~ of the 16th distriCt (second division). ~our ap3rtments pro-
~ vided in buildings where counts ~r?d cnuntesses live-~~nd in the most rhiC
, neighborhoods. The bank's ~rench personn~l obvidusly is not entitled to the
sar,~c adv~ntages and executive privilo~es th~t the party leadcrs must enjoy ~
regularly.
In reality the ~C~N, whirh mi~rofilms ~11 its d~cuments for Mdsrdw, has in _
the finances of the ~C~ and its empire the centr~lixing role th~t Mr Gosttat
boggles at admittir.g--~ repugnance th~t would be incomprehensible if the
Soviet bank were a barik "like the others."
Billions in Uebts nwed to Moscow
Th~ conwunist press and publishing houses are the BC~N's biggest Customers.
For several years they have been enduring an insurmountable crisis, th~ir _
cost far exceeding their circulation potential and commercial support. To
' alleviate the chronic financial weglcness of this propaganda netaork, the
5oviet bank grants it accommodations it would not find anywhere else and help
in hanging on artificially to life~ despite its lack of readers and advertis-
ing. _
A t able drawn up on 1 August 1978 (reference MfB/MPA [expansion unknown])
dealing xith "customer operations" and with "running totals of principal cus-
tomers" (facsimiles in appendix, p 257-262) tells us that the deposits ("dc- ~
nand capital accounts; fixed-term accounts") of .L'HUMANIT~ (Account
Iro 5024-6) amount to 1,622,000 francs. Of this total the bank itself has
loanc~l it, in the form of "short-term coa?mercial drafts," 1,500,000 francs
(!SO,AOO,Q00 centimes). -
~or its part, the CULP (Center for Book and Press Dissemination--Account
No 05131-9), which coordinates the activities of the Party's publishing houses,
scrves the huge system of communist libraries, organizes "Book City" and the
L'IiU~WtvIT~ Festival and monopoliZes the markets of the Joint Production Com-
mittees and the 1,813 communist municipal~ties, has "capital" amounting to
452,000 francs, but was granted "financial assistance" of 2,000,000 francs
(2C~0,000,000 centimes).
The Fishmonger Management Company (Account No 0667-1: 0.00 francs) receives
"financial assistance" amounting to 1,229,000 francs. It manages the property
and buildings of L'HUMANITti and other publications of th~ PCF (see below
- p 225) .
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'Ch~ Centr~l Advertising Agency--ACP (Account No 08217-3), whosc "cgpit~l"
_ ~mdtu?ts to 957,000 francs, enjoys "~ssistance" in the ~mmount nf 1,392,000
- fr~ncs. It governs the ~dv~rtisfng df all the orggns of the CGT gnd the PC~. ,
'Che GI~LD--the gonks ~nd Records L'�conomic Interest Group--on~ of th~ PC~'s
mg~n commerciul ent~rprises (s~e belnw p 2~4), appp~rs to havc~ ndthing in its
account No 8772-7, but the "fin~nci~l ~ssistgnce" given to it by the ~C~N -
is 1,314,000 fr~n~s.
The Uiderot Book Club (see below p 237) oper~tes on "financigl assistuttce"
~mro~unting to 5,~43,000 frnnrs, whereas its Account No 0883d-S is credited
with b~rcly 265,000 ~rancs.
The CAL--Culture, Arts and Lett~rs-- (see below p 237) really puts its burk
- into it: it obtained "assist~nce" of 2,651,U00 fr~ncs, while the total of
its "demand capital account, fixed-term ~ccount," under th~ No Og838-6--is
illustrated by ~ zero total.
The G~LC--E3ook Publishers' Collectiv~s Group (Account No 8843-6) is in a less
~ disproportiongte relationship: 1,631,000 cash balance against 2,253,000 francs -
indebtedness tio the BC~N ( on 26 October the C~LC debit exceeded 1,672,293.~6 ~
~ francs) .
The Messidor Club (see below, p 237), Account No 8951-7: 0.00 francs against
1,175,000 francs af "financial assistance" to }~elp out with its musical activ-
ity.
In view of these enormous figures, one cannot help concluding that the Soviet
bank is holding the communist press and publishing houses at arm's length.
Omitting here spveral other loans, a total of 19,457,000 francs has already
been reached, or nearly 2,000,000 centimes in financial assistdnce.
Under those circwnstances, how can their independence be credible? HoM can
- we believe that they could rebel without being suffocated by their financial
backer? The Soviet shareholdcrs in the gCEN, the Gosbang and the Veshtorg-
bank of Moscow and their authorized agents in France, Vladimir Ponomarev,
Serguei Vanine, Victor Krovocheev, Vladislav Soudakov, would certafnly not
open sueh phenomenal lines of credit to press and publishing firms th~t were
really free to criticize the 5oviet regime. They know this money is placed at
a loss; it is an ideologic investment that they uould terminate on the vcry
day this press and propaganda chain displeased Moscow. Pierre Daix will bear -
me~out; in his Look "I Believed in the Morning" he told how the Soviets as-
phyxiated his weekly L~S LETTR~5 FRANCAISES, ahich had taken the liberty of
deviating too often from the line.
Would it be for the same reason that today Party*organs that are a shade criti-
cal of the authorities--L'AVANT-GA~tDE and CIARTE -_seem to have been abandoned
to their miserable fate by the treasurer? I read in the report of the Exe~cu-
tive Cotmnittee of. the Customer Department of the BCEN for 21 December 1978
(reference SP/HD texpansion unknoxnj:
*L'AVANT-GA(tDE: Weekly of the French Young Communist Movement. CLARTE: theo-
retical, political, ideologic and cultural organ of the Com~nist Students
Union (UEC).
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AVAN'C-GAttll~/JOURNAL CLART~ (gp [expgnsinn unk>>own] ) .
W~ r~c~ll thnt the AVANT-GA~D~ account is still being hit with vuriou5
~arnishmcnts.
Its direCtors h~v~ infdrm~d us that m~asures ar~ being taken with the
vnrinus cr~ditors to obtain cancellations of the orders.
Concerning the ~c~ount of the newspaper CLART~, which operates under the
s~un~ signatures, we indicate that it is not convenient at this time to
issue g checkbook.
To be follow~d.
When the communist press changes bankers, we can begin to believe that it is
pla.cing itself "under France's flag."
The gC~N docwnents are reasnn to fear that tomorrow will not be that time.
The PCE Cannot Leave the BC~N. ~
~ L~ck of curiosity on the part of those it deals with and its adversaries has
caused the PCE and its leaders to act with too much offhandedness. Is it "
conceivabl~ that the gigantic total I have just revealed is considered by the
Party treasurer a negligible quantity ~nong the "hundreds of accounts" scat-
tered throughout "I do not know how many banks"?
At the end of the statement quoted Mr Gosnat added candidly:
"Moreover, the PC~ cannot leave the BCEN. Such a decision would be taken as
a political maneuver."
For once I am in agreement. The Party "cannot leave the BCEN." Indeed,
"such a decision would be taken as a political maneuver." Not by the French,
but surely by the Russians. They would see in it a sign of the independence
they could not accept, with all due respect to their customer Jean Elleinstein,
to whom we owe these two flights of tancy, generally taken for gdspel truth
by some media: ~
6 November 1978*: "As for allegiance to Mosc~w, I believe it is very
clear in spite of everything that tlie PCF, with delays, contradictions,
hesitations, is nevertheless on the way to total independence with re-
spect to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union..." ~
September 1976*: "It [the PCF] is financially independent of any /for- ,
_ eign/ or national influence, capi.talist or socialist."
The holy innocents are going to war in the PCF. ~
*On the "Questionnaire" brnadcast (TelevisioM-First Network) of
Jean-Louis Servan-Schreiber.
*In his book, "The PCF," Grasset Publishing, p 91. ~
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~~ox or,~'IC 1 AL US~ dNLY =
'I'he I'srty llidcs its l3ank Crom thc Itank ~nd Cile
1'h~ Coi~unut~i~t t'arty docs ndt pro~~osc to its membcrs und fricn~ti thut th~y =
E~uy tl~uir as:~es:;m~~i~ts, coi~t.ributiun5, 5ub5cripti~~nti, et~. tc~ th~ :,avi~t hui~k
thut pwnps nut it~ monc;~_ Like th~ nther politic;~l partic:s it uses pnstul -
_ c:hCChing accounts, but unlike them ir uses them only as a scrcett and n relay
st~tiot~ for a tiot~-~rench b~nk. It is the only party tl~at surrendcrs its
- trettsury ~nd thc se~:re~ts of its activities to forci~n bunh offiCC.rs.
What would Mr March~is say, he who was such s~ p~triot, such n chuuvinist in
his time, if a majority party or the 5ncialist party put its finances and
~11 the details of its operations into thc h~nds of' ~gents of the: White Ilouse
or the West German beutsche Bank7 ~vr Vladimir ponomarev, Victor Krivocheev, �
Vladislav Soud~kov and 5erguei Vanine are not acting privately. Thcy h~ve
~ been of�icially appointed by Moscow tn supervise and report ~~hat happens in ~
/its/ rrench bank. Thus the Kremlin quite naturally hns a total daily ~nd ~
exclusive view ot the least acts ~nr~ gestures of tlie PCr und its adjuncts--
trade unions, mass nrganizations, fellow trnvelers, etc.
It was not by c;han~e that I began the writing of this book on 26 Oetober 1978.
On the Jay before, the PC~ Political Bureau had reached the peak of cynicism =
i~i a vcry long stat~ment concerning the financinb of the ~~artias. _
Presented in the form of "the PCF's reply to Mr Barre," it analyaes in exten-
so, among other subjects, President Giscard d'~staing's initiatives for
- financing parties out of public funds.
Worried about the prospect of having to prove the "transparency"--the presi-
dent of the Republic's expression--of its financial operations, the Political
Bureau invokes, in order to oppos. the move, "respect for the independence of `
- the parties, which is absolutely contradictory to public financing." It
adds that "or~ thc other hand, it is natural for that financing to relieve
~ from /~xclusive responsibility/ the members and sympathizers of each paxty
and /that it be place~ under their control."
That is what I am doing; I am placing under the actual coritrol of the membcrs
and sympathizers of the PC~ the secrets of the Party's financing.
Farther on, the PCt' "declares it is ready to submit to control by a parlia-
mentary investigative commission nade up in proportion to the vote collected,
of t}ie financial activities of all the political parties."
M excellent idca. I hope this honorable commission will ultimately see the
light and that, to facilitate the Lask, the PCF will agree to lead it to the
Soviet bank. Yn the meantime I am surrelidering my documentation for the con-
sideration of the Communist ra~ik and �ile who have "the right," as the Polit-
ical Bureau says so well, to "to be familiar with the resources and expencli-
tures of the organization to which they belong."
*L'HUMANITE, 27 Octobcr 1978.
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'Phe E~oremost roreign [3~nk in I~r~nc:e
It is impcrativc that we retrace the bro~d li~c st~ges nf thc I3CLiN und exum-
ine its oper~tion.
Nhat we h~ve ~lready seen u?~d will comc ba~k to is tliut it is tnday, bC~uuyc
o~ its c~pital, Ch~ volum~ nf its tr~ns~ctions, th~ ~xt~nt of its np~ratinns,
th~ tdp-r~ttking fdreign c~pit~l bnnk of those estublished in Friu~~ce. ror u
long time it h~s surp~ssed, in our territory, its Americun rivals, including
Morgrin Gu~ranty '~rust and the two Parisia.n agencies of the highest-ranking
banks in the wnrld, th~ ~ank of America and Citibank. Moreover, it m~intains
the Uest relations with those giants of c~pitalism. In th~ir long "Report
of a Trip to t}ie U5A" (8 to 12 May 1978), reference PL/CD/fa [expansion un-
known~, Mr Lacoste (man~ger) and Uel~ye (of the 'Creasury Uepartment Deutsclie
Mark exch~nge division), o~i 26 hlay 1J78 tell of their visit to the centrul
h~~dquarters--in New York-- of Morg~n Guar~nty Trust Company:
"A very friendly welcome from Mr Viermertz (vice-president), wlto, 1~avi~ig
been Morgan's chief exchange broker in paris for five years and then tlie
manager of the A1 5aoudi Bank in London, gnve us a careful economic and
monetary an~alysis..."
At the end of some very interesting news, to which I shall return, the em-
issaries of the Soviet bank express themselves in especially affectionate terms
concerning those super-bosses of the American multinationals that L'IIUMANIT~,
~ItANC~ NOW~LLE, LA VIE UUVRIERE, and so many of their other "loyal customcrs"
are in the habit of dragging through the mua:
"Gur relations witi~ 6forgan/Paris and other headquarters in L�urope are of -
course excellent; however, it would be proper to tighten our bonds with
Morgan/New York by a series of telephone calls, rather than by Telex."
The telephone leaves fewer traces than does the Telex of the conference be-
tween Russians and Nnericans, behind the back of the world pr~letariat.
- Even if the left were to win in the last legislative elections the BCL'N and
the Morgan were not running much of a risk of a government having Communist
ministers. The Common Program--I emphasized this at the time--did not provide
for any measure for nationalizing foreign capital bdnks; the USSR would have
been displease:d to be deprived of its bank.
tiioscow's Continued Support
In five years, from 1973 to 1978, the "social capital" of the BCEN went from
150,000,000 to 350,000,000 old francs. A more than remarkable increase
- which, according to the latest report of the Board of Directors (in re~ular
general meeting, 24 May 1978), is due to the "con*inued support consistently
- given to the BCEN by its principal shareholders, ehe State Bank of the USSR
and the Foreign Trade Bank of the USSR."
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I
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Tho nnnrd intcnds that "support" to bc re~~firm~d ~ur the benefit of the
b~nk's "num~rotis correspondents" in "th~ entire world", ~nd o~ its "loyul
clientele."
A bnsic guarantee for the purpose of:
1. Consoliduting and cxtending its fingncial und commerci~l ampirc (wlth
which the PCF is alsn assnCiated, through int~rmedfary per5ons),
based in large part nn the monopolization of the huge markets betw~~n -
~ast and West. Hence the tactical necessity for the BC~N/Curnb~nk
to transmit to the seismographs of its capitalist "correspondents"
the inarguable data Confirming that it is still, by th~ grace of
_ Moscow, the epicenter of that fruitful activity which is based on the
use of the most wildlY capitalistic methods
2. Galvanizing the pride and conf~.dence of a"clien~ele" that is all the
more "loyal" because it is in large part totally devoted to the U55R,
whoso bank--their bank--is therefore successful yQar after yenr in
staying ~t the top of the foreign establishments in Paris.
From a treatise on foreign banks in France* prepared at the University of
Parxs 1(Pantheon-Sorbonne, "Private Law" Series), I glean this fact:
\
"Based on the total of its balance sheet, the foremos~ foreign bank in
France is neither American nor Ertglish, b~rt Soviet; it is the BCEN..."
Farther on, mentioning "the plurality of justifications advanced fo: the pre-
_ sence of the banks of Eastern Europe, such as the BCEN, in Western countries,"
the authors of tl~is dacument add:
"The manager of this bank does not believe that the existence of institu-
tions like his is vital for trade between East and West, a statement that -
seems to be denied by the analysis of the balance sheet of that bank, car-
ried out by a French officer, which points out the signifi.cance of the
financial operations it carries on. An interriational jurist thinks
these banks are only a means for Eastern Europe to obtain foreign curren-
cy, while a French banker believes they come rather to familiarize them-
selves with the financial customs in effect in the West."
- Md with those of our communists who, in order to liquidate liberal capital-
- ism are employing all the weapons offered to them by liberal capitalism.
*J.Stoufflet, Ch.Campet, M. Koszul, P. Moran and M. Sarmet, preface by
Eienri Fournier: Pantheon 6405, University of France Press.
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CHAPTER 2. 1948: A SOCIA?.,IST MINYSTER ALRk:ADY PROVES COLLUSION BETWEEN
- THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE BCEN [COMMERCIAL BANK FOR NORTH EUROPE]
[Textj
An ~loquent Balance 5heet
The balance sheet? The last published b~Iance w~~ 14,200,000,000 n~w francs
(1,420,000,000 old francs). The State $ank and the Foreign T'rade Bank of
the USSR, as always, waived collecxing the dividend. A sacrifice all the
more meritorious since the "pxofits aftex taxes, redemptions and provisions"
realized by the bank in recent years are magnificent:
1973 28,623,000 francs
1974 27,037,000 francs
1975 40,187,000 francs
1976 38,845,000 francs
1977 35,356,000 francs
Total 170,048,000 francs
Or, over 17,000,000,000 centimes.
Despite the economic crisis, the Soviet bank in Paris is doing well. In the
category of "deposit banks under foreign control," it is followed by Barclays,
whose latest balance is 4,500,000,000 francs. I cannot compare it to the
Citibank or the Morgan, which are merely "agencies of banks having their head-
quarters abroad."
The BCEN enjoys an initial advantage: unlike the other banks it has almost
no expenses for share promoting, advertising, or public relations for re-
- cruiting customers in France. The PCF, the CGT and the Controlled Business
Committees in themselves are in the beginning an impressive and attractive
main striking force. Large capitalists quickly understood the advantage of
a(banking) alliance with the devil that holds the pursestrings of the trade
union-party.
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~nx n~~rr.tnL us~ nrr~Y
, Uorn nf Wliite [tussit~ns ~
~
'Tt~~; ~C~N has Ueen an axc~llent affair ever since it w~s created. ~ar Itussians
= and for rrench communists.
L~g~tid Cnntiot add much L�o its ric1~ and unusuul hist~ry. . ~
_ It is founded in paris by White itussi~n immigrants who pluce their quickly
- exhausted funds in it (one does not become a financicr extemporaneously) dur-
ing the years Following the 1917 revolution. 7'he ruin enables the I3olsheviks
to take possession of the b~nk; in 1924 they redeem its sl~~res. Our govern-
ment (this was the period of the "Cartel of the Lefts") views the opera~tion
_ witii u favorable eye; it can give hope to the 1,500,000 carri~rs of Russian -
lo~ns, Thc Soviets play on the illusion that normalizing relntions between
the two countries will result in reimbursing the ~rench holders of savings
ruined by the revolution. _
Th~ BCEN has a sister in London, the Moscow Narodny ~ank, also founded by
- aussiuns, in 1916, and taken over in 1919 by the Moscow government. Both
banks have a precise prim.:~~y mission: to buy back the cl~ims against the
USSft held by European merchants who had sold merchandise to it on credit.
- The recovery of these unhonored certificates will restore the confidence of
the Westerners who, at the end of several years of regular payments and nper-
_ ations rigorously conducted by the BCEN and the Moscow Narodny Bank, will no
longer be afraid of wipleasant surprises.
After successfully passing through that first stage, the BC~N extends its ac-
tivities and becomes the financial command post of the PCF, of its organiza-
tions, its many commercial corporations and its pro-Soviet trade unions. _
This is the second mission, still in effect today, that the 5oviet state has
entrusted to the bank. -
On 7 January 1918, less than three months after the coup d'e*at that brought
them to power, Lenin and Trotsky signed the. ~allowing decree :
"Considering th~t the Itepublic of the Soviets was founded on the principle
of international solidarity of the proletariat and fraternity between the ~
workers of all countries and that the battle against war and imperialism
can only lead to victory if it is conducted on the international level,
the people's council of ministers judges it necessary to lend aid and as-
sistance by all possible means to the international left wing of the work-
_ ers' movement in all countries, without considering whether these countries
are at war with Soviet Russia or its allies, or are neutral.
"For this reason, the people's council of commissioners decides to grant
2,000,000 rubles in support of the international revolutionary movement
atid to put it at the disposal of the representatives abroad of the for-
- eign affairs commissariat."
*Quoted in "Soviet Documents on Fo:eign Policy," vol. 1, Oxford University
Press, 1951, p 22.
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A former Companion of Lenin's, t~oris 5ouv~rine writes cnncerning th~ period
when the gC~N is beginning to preside over tho nconomic cl~stiny oF the PCr:
"Uuring these four years over 25,000,000 have been swallowed up by tlie
psoudo-commur~ist "apparatus, in m~ny disguises. }~ut dues do not reprosent "
th~; 'lOth part of iti. 'Th~ di5prnportion between the Party's own resour~es
and outside aid is monstrous,..The more money the Party receives, the few- -
er members it has. The richer it is, the poorer its thinking. The Party
now lives only on balloons of oxygen from the 5oviet st~te...
- "...I.eaving for Moscow in April 1924, I learned from the business manager -
i of L'HUMANITE, Justinart, that of the 300,000 some francs in subscriptions
published in the newspaper, only about 30,000 francs were actually re-
ceived."
I explained in "The ~inanc~s of the PCF" how the Party laundered unacknowl-
edgable receipts with the he~p of subscriptions and collections. An old
system. The Party correctly believes it to be unstoppable. What Finance Min-
ister, what manager of the Bank of France, would dare to set in motion serious -
control over the funds which, in the BCEN, directly or indirectly concern tl~e
PCF and its affiliates? What inspector would dare to audit the operations of
customers whose accounts are in the series 3,000 to 9,000, 20,000, 30,000, _
40,000, 91,000 to 95,000? To do this, they think, would be to provolce the
anger of Moscow and foment diploma~ic complications.
- During its long history the BCEN has only once been of service to the plans of
the I'rench government; at the time of the Spanish war, it was officially auth-
orized to serve as a relay point between the USSR and tr,e Republican regi~;c.
_ Which enabled it to collect substantial profits us the intermediary in the
traffic of weapons to the Red zone.
Closed under the German occupation, it reopens its doors in 1946 and resumes
the administration of the business of the PCF ~.nd the CGT. Although the rule -
of secrecy, so wel�1 observed during the long prior period, is still compulsory
in their ranks, the Communists cannot prevent escapes this time.
An investigation pressed by the Interior Minister results in bringing to
- light astounding proofs. My own discoveries in 1978, 30 years later, confirm
t~hat nothing has changed.
The PCF Violates the Constitution
Art 46 of the PCF statutes stipulates concerning the elected Communist: "The
mandate he holds is at the disposal of the Party. Salaries, insurance and re-
tirement connected with an elective mandate are paid to the Party and the Cen-
tral Committee determines how it i~ used."
This is a real taisuse of universal suffrage. Elected representatives are paid ~
in order to guarantee that they are independent. According to Art 3 of the
Constitution: "National sovereignty belongs to the people, who ~xercise it _
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~nR n~'F'1.(~IAL US~ ONI~Y
through their represontatives...Neither uny scction of tha peoplc nur nny in-
dividuul mtty assume th~t sovereignty,"
That is exactly what the PCF is doing; it is also violuting Art 27 of th~ Con-
stitution: "All Qloction pledges are invalid. The right to vote of the mem-
bers of Parliament is pQrsnnal.,.." -
Jul~s Mocl~ continually returns to t}te charge. The more proofs he ex}~ibits,
the more tl~e Communists foam ut the mouth.
'I'}ie It~terior blinister: I would also add, Mr Uuclos, that you t~ave a speci~l
skill for transposing what one says and making it s~y what one did not say,
so us to be able to deny...
I repeat that you have thrae accounts in this bank: a Dorval account, an
~ Oswald accow~t, a Gosnat account. The swindlers also have several accounts,
_ so they can transfer money from one to the other and cheat justice. (Loud
objections from the extreme left. Applause from the many benches of t}~e left,
center and riglit. )
Jacques Duclos: Scoundrell
Florimond Bonte: Bastard!
Jackques Duclos: Wretch!
Maurice Thorez: Murderer!
The enormity of these insults is in direct proportion to the Communists' in-
ability to refute the overwhelming proofs assembled by the Interior Minister.
Thirty years later we find the same situation again. But in the meantime the
Soviet bank has made tremendous progress. Its business is not confined to
French territory alone. It has become the c~enter of an international network;
- the disclosure in 1948 of its role in the service of Soviet imperialism did it
absolutely no harm. Far from it; after a close shave that,,due to the Frerich
capacity for foxgetting, lasted for only one autwnn, the BCEN intensified its
_ activities. As if paradoxically the revelation of those activities had served
to attract rather than to repel. . _
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~'OR OrrICIAL U5~ ONLY
CHAPTL'R 3. 1948-].978: THE RISE OF A TRttLY DI~FERENT BANK
(Text~
1978: Thirty Years Lttter, Nothing has Changed and Everything is Worse
Despite the nearly-unanimous condemnation of Parliament at the time of the -
"cold war", the Communist Party and its satellites did not think it necessary =
to change in any way their relations with the BCEN. In 1979, the money owed _
to the elected Communist representatives still ends up in the Soviet bank;
the accounts of straw men are still there, but in greatex numbers; the same
Mr Gosr.at, higher in rank and now treasurer of the Party, gathers in his own
name, with the same persistence, the PCF's treasurer; the Communist commercial
corporations, now 300 times more numerous, still concentrate their fruitful
operations there (fruitful, tao, for the USSR and'the Party); the communists
of the entire world still pass through its filters. -
- The only noticeable difference is not in methods, but in clientele. Hundreds
of trade unions born of the CGT-FO [Workers' Force] workers' schism and the
shop councils of the largest national firms today entrust their money to tlie
~ Russian multinational. And although in 1948 the BCEN had just one sister bank
in London, it is now part of a vast family, thanks to the successful business
- in Paris.
In Moscow: Foreign '"rade Bank of the USSR (Vneshtorgbank) and State
. Bank of the USSR (Gosbank).
In Paris: BCEN/Eurobank.
In London: Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd (with two branches, in Singapore and
Beirut).
In Frankfurt: Ost-West-Handelsbank A.G., founded in 1972.
In Tehran: Russo-Iranian Bank.
In Luxembourg: East-West United Bank.
In Vienna: Donau Bank A.G., opened in 1973 with BCEN participation.
In Zurich: Wozchod Handelsbank A.G.; Wozchod Commercial Bank Ltd; Commer-
cial Bank for Northern Europe. -
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_ rUR UI~I~ICCAL USIs ONLY _
- I should explain why the ~C~N ~dded the qualifier "~urobank" to its nFUne.
On 5 June 1974 L~ MOi~?DE dismantled the mechanism o~ tho fantast~c "~urodol-
lars" m~rket, whose �or~wiate creator was the BC~:N.
_ Tl~e appearance o� eurodoll~rs is generally uttributed to the fact that ut tha
- ond nf the Knrean War in 1953 the monetary institutions of tha communist c;oun-
trios, fe~ring a freeze of t}~eix dollar holdings in New York bnnks, d~cided
to transfer them to ~urope in the name of the Commercial Bank for Northern
~urope (gC~N), the French affiliate o� tho State Bank of the USSR, which usc:d
= them to finance commercial operations of the classic type. Since the gCEN's
tele3rapiiic address was "~urobanque", the name "eurodollar" was given to
- those "traveling" dollars.
There is actually no difference between dollars and eurodollars, except for
the fundt~nt~ntal f~ct that the latter are held by operators not residing in
the United States. Almost all of them, in fact, come from the accumulated
deficits in the A~uerican balance of payments and constitute credits on banks
located in the United Stat�es. Their volume has been piling up since 1953.
' Acc~rding to the 9ank for International Settlements, this volume reached
91,000,000,000 at the end of 1973 and at least 13,200,000,000 at the end of
1974, but ac~ording to Mr Ashby, the first econo-mir~ister of the Bankers
- Tru~t, these figures would be, respectively, 165,000,OOO,U00 and
200,000,000,000.
The characteristic of the eurodollars market is that it is subject to almost
no control, which makes eurodollars attractive for use by multinational com-
panies and--states themselves.
Tlie Great Game of the New Boss, Guy de Boysson
It has just been seen once more that the Soviets employ their own weapons to
fight capitalism better. As usual, for Marxists, the end justifies the means. _
The existence of a huge mass of floating dollars is one of the causes of the
financial crisis that is shaking the world. French con~nunists rQmember it
constantly. But they do not add that Soviet bankers and the USSR itself
are profiting considerably from this situation.
The BCEN's prosperity and the Soviet Ui~ion's economic progress are tied in -
with the continued increase in East-West trade. Everyone closes his eyes to
the political side-issues ot the operations--particularly import-export--
arranged directly or indirectly by the BCEN on the recommendation of csrtain =
French authorities. The BCEN brings along a nucleus of commercial companies
close to the PCF, which take in enormous profits or commissions in France or
- abroad. Indirectly, these firms draw to the BCEN a vast non-communist cli- -
entele that contributes indirectly to communism's financial prosperity.
Until 1965 the BCEN was presided over by Charles Hilsum, who was immovable
despite the 1948 scandal. On his death he was replaced by Guy de Boysson, -
who had gone to the bank in .1952.
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Z~OIt UI~'FICiAL US~ ONLY
- According to the "diction~ry o~ tht French Nobility"1, th~ "~oyssons were
raised to the nobility by order of the advocate general ut tho Court of tlio
~ Aydes de Montauban in 1967. The ~amily had had sevoral Toulouse municipal
magistrates since 1522 and ari adviser to th~ Toulouse Parliament since 1559."
Their heraldic bearings are: "Silver with a chevron of ~ules accompanicd
by chief o� two crescenrs of the same and by a point of u bush growing out
of a field o~ green, on a chief of blue charged wit}~ three gold stars." `
No one could doubt Mr de ~oysson's loyalty to the communist ideas. lie em-
braced t~iem fram the time of his youth, after his studies at the Lyon 5emin-
ary, the J anson-de-Sailly School (Paris 16th), a degree from the Indepenc;ent _
School of Political Science, a doctorate and a law thesis on Marsl~al Petain.
_ Decorated with the Croix de Guerre, the son of the director of the Paris-
u Orleans Railway Company, married to Genevieve Chevrillon, therefore belonging
- to and related to upper bourgeois families, a little page at the wedding of
t}ie Count of Paris--nothing seemed to destine him to beco~;~,~ a Commwtist mem-
ber of the ProR?isional Consultative Assembly. In succession he was a PCF
deputy in two Constituent Assemblies, a deputy from Aveyron (1946) and coun-
selor of the French Union (1948). His official political career stops there;
for five years Moscow had also entrustad to him the post of president of the
"World Federation of Democratic Youth," but after 1950 he leaves the front of
' the stage. At 34 he discreetly joins the staff of the Soviet bank, where l~e
presides today. During those 26 years, with the discipline of a militant and
the distinction of a gentleman, he has served Stalin, Malenkov, Krushchev and
Brezhnev, by means of the Kremlin's financial channel.
"The Top Soviet Bank in the Capitalist World"
On 8 Uecember 1966 he presents his first annual report as president-general -
managEr. In it he proudly speaks of his role as agent for Soviet finances:
"Might it be said that the volume of our balance is such as to influence
- the opinion of other banks and consequently our own activity? We know it _
serves to bring about a general arrangement between establishments. This
question really seems to assunte considerable importance for us. To say
nothing of the fact that our counterparts give first ~:lace in their ap-
praisal to /our belonging to the Soviet Union/2; the result of our own
activi~ty, as shown by the balance sheet, can undoubtedly influence their
attit ude toward us."
And he adds:
- "Are we interested in surpassing the balance figure of the Moscow Narodny
Bank', so as ~o asswne the position /of the top Soviet bank in the cap-
italist world
1. F. de St. Simon and E. de Sereville, Edit. Contrepoint, 4, rue Cassette,
Paris 6th.
2. Author's italics.
- 3. London sister to the BCEN (ND1'A [author's note]).
4. Author's italics.
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FUR UCi'TC tAi, U:il: ONI,Y
With the h~:lp of time, oxperience, the business und the advice of Moscnw,
Mr de 13oysson }ias become morc cunning; }ie now avoids that outspoketu~ess tliat
would drive away the clientele necessary to the progress of com~nunist influ-
_ ence in t}ie Western countries.
On 14 Uecember 1973 he reminds }iis personnel that prudence is indispensabl~:
"Indeed, ~urobank does not live in a closed and prntected world, but is sub- '
jected to increasingly lively competition..."
In order to face it better, the Soviet bankers had transferred the socia.l
l~eadc{uarters from 21 rue a~s Arcades (2,750 square meters, not very function-
, al, be}iind a forbidding facade) to "an agreeable and more spacious working ei~-
vironment", boulevard Haussmann. The new 3,750 square meters arc rich, "bour- -
geois" and c~mfortable: counters of massive wood, Knoll furniture, antiques
and bar furnishings (for Boysson) from Madame Higghins (antiquary), Lurc~t tup-
es~ries,Corvisart kitchen, glassware and silverware from Christofle. The
quarterly rent for these premises, paid to the "Duty and Providence" Insur-
ance Company, reaches 616,625.90 francs in October 1978. I must ~ormulate a '
~ single reservation: the economies employed in equipping the vault, about
which I will say na more, lest I harm the bank that is reputed to be the most
hermetically sealed in France.
Mr de Boysson congratulates himself, of course, on the "extraordinurily low
number of resignations recorded in our bank", but, he adds, "we must show...
more vigilance in navigating to avoid the many reefs with which our road can- ~
= not fail to be strewn."
~ The competence, the sincerity, the devotion of the 26 Frenchmen admitted to
the various command posts in the building is not tha only master trump in
Mr de Boysson's game. T~ie vice president and official representative of tiie
USSR, Vladimir Ponomarev , is in close permanent contact, not only with Mos- -
cow, where he goes several times a year, but also with the Soviet Embassy in
Paris, which summons him regularly, generally by telephone at his extension,
313/337.
As for the manager, Victor Krivocheev, to whom the bank's departments direct
daintily embroidered and beautifully written reports in Russian; he often uses
his veto prerogative, as for example on 32 [as published] October 1978:
~ "kiave nothing to do with:
"Robin International
"Nikrais
"These two firms belong to or are subordinate to a Mr Nicolas Resini
*
"Possibly see F.F. " -
*Vladimir Ponomarev: holder of a"Soviet service ~~assport", No 20318, deliv-
ered by the USSR Embassy in France on 31 October 1~)77 and good until 31 Octo-
ber 1982. He is the one at the bank who has supreme contxol over entry visas
to the USSR. Obliging, in 1978 he even obtained them for the officers of oth-
er banks, including Credit Lyonnais.
- *F.F.: Mrs Fany Francois, nee Sandlaz, a member of the executive team of the
BCEN. Charged with delicate missions in France and abroad. She often
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~~ok orrtCrnL us~ dNtiY
Worriccf about relie~', Mc~scow is devoting speci~l ~ttention tn tr~ining Sovict
officers to repl~ce the present le~d~rs, llence the c~nstgnt w;~ltz of tr~in-
ees, surrounded by exqu~site cancern, in Paris ~s well ~,5 in Moscow. 'I'he lat-
est arriv~l in ~rance, Mr Atchk~ssov, deputy director in the for~ign dep~r.t-
ment of the Vneshtorgb~nk (g~nk for ~oreign Trade o~ the U55~), ;is filling a =
w~ll-sto~ked program, s~re~d nut from 2 O~tober 1978 to 3 April 197g. It i~i-
cludes ~nurses in ~rench ~t Berlit~, ~s well as talks with p~risinn b~nkers
and periods nf working in every department d~ th~ ~CCN.
~s in th~ Aga Kb;~.~'s st~bles, the Kremlin's Co1ts are trained to become super-
tiorses in a hurry, I questioned Mr Atrhkassov; aft~r twn months hc alr~,~dy ~
knew how to reply "nn cdmment" to que$tion~ concerning th~ gCEN-pC~-CGI' ~nd _
company ties,
"Visitinq Cgrds far 5ocialists, Lurc~t ~ards for Capitalists"
Every year the BCEiN th~ks its clientel~ by distributing gifts; in 1978 thc
beneficiaries nf this attention fill~d 11 p~ges. Althnugh it is hardly ~s-
tonishing to find there the n~mes nf enrpor~tians connected wlth the pC~, -
deserving communists suCh a~ the writer Vladimir Pozner, comedi~n Jean Negroni,
lawyers Joe Nordm~nn and Jules gorker, Mr Marchais~ counsel, it is h~rder to =
understand why the BC~N treats with such respect the CNP~~ seven higt~-ranking
nfficials of the Bank ot France, four fro:n the General Directorate of Customs
- ~nd Indirec:t Duties, seven from the Treasury Board, and another from the In-
ternational gusiness Department of the Ministry of ~coriomy and ~ingnce. 50 `
many administrative departmet~ts ~ccused by our ~nmmunists of being "in th~ ex-
clusive service of the government, itself the aLent of bi.g capital and big
monepolics."
~nc precise note: "Visiting cards for socialists, Lurcat cards for capital-
, ists." 'I'his reproduces, in color, the Villa Seurat tapestry, by thc famous
co,:munist artist Jean Lurcat, which adorns the lobby of the BCI:N. Militants
ma;~ find this inside-out discrimination bizarre, since it pushes the Soviet
- bank into being more generous to~;ard capitalists than toward socialists.
Bruno Mercier, deputy director of the Chemical Bank in Paris, is indeed very
awarc of this. On 2 January 1979 he sent the BCEN, not Without humor, "best
regards and sincerest good wishes from A~~nerican capital."
- ~mbassies, diplomats and large institutions of the socialist nations reply in
al~ ays-identical uords to the "wishes" traditionally sent to them by the man-
agement of the BCCN at the end of the year and for 1 May. Ponomarev and
de ~3oysson have this friendly correspondence (letters and Telex) especially
~ c:~ssified. The co:lection of "wishes received and sent from 1967 to 1972"
bore the notation "to be destroyed in 1977." On page 2 I find the list of
"national holidays and anniversaries of socialist countries," including China
up to 1969.
Year after year r.he "director of the Economics Institute to the Committee of
' Social Sciences of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [as published]" repeats
the same thanks in the jargon of communist cells:
represent:, the Soviet bank at meetings of employers' organiZations: the CNPF
[National Council of French En~ployers], the French Banking Associations, the
sub-group of foreign banks, etc. 24
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i~'blt U1'~tCtN. US~ ONI~Y
"Cnmr~de nircCtdr
"Commerciul b~nk for North~rr E:urope
- "Ucdr C~mrad~ Uire~tor:
"On the occasion of the tVew Year, ~n beh~l~ o~ ull th~ Tnstit!ate's scien-
, tific wnrkers...
"I hnpe th~t wider your lec~dership the Conunercinl ~3nnk fnr Nnrthern L:urope `
will ~chieve th~ gre~t~st su~cess in developing godd rel~tian$ betwecn
~11 pcople5,"
ror his part, the fir~t viCC ~r~sident of the Vietcombank "~~pes that your
honorable instftuti~n, under your clev~r eciministr~tion, will ~chieve new nnd
~ brilli~nt surcess in its productive activities."
All thnt is due to the "Great 5ocialis~ October a~volution," commemdr~ted ~very
, year by the nfficers ~f the gC~N by hlazing l~tters to the U55a ~mbussy. Onc
~ gdmires th~ir epi~ flights: "...our sinc:ere eongratulations on the grent
~chie~~ements arcnmplished ~ince 1~17, nf which your country c~n be justly
proud..."
A comical vocabul~ry ~nd curious demonstrgtions of solidarity, coining from ~
_ bankers wlio are abcve needing anything.
A Surprisingly Rich French Personnel
There are s~me really strange mysteries surrounding certain deposits in thc
Bank of Northern Eurape--and some flagrant disproportions between the accounts
of the Soviet manager, Victor Krivocheev, those of the vice president and gen-
eral manager, Vladimfr Ponomarev, which post credits that are to all intents
and purposes either nonexi~tent or modest, and the amounts credited to sotne of
- their employees. The record is held by a female assistant manager ahose bal-
ance is no less th~n 8g7,U00 francs, compared to 449,604.81 francs for another.
5he is closely followed by the widow of' a top-ranking officer of the house:
432,138.4~ francs. Another assistant manageress: 336,103.97 francs. Then
come staff and emplnyees on lower levels, with sums as high as 330,877.05
francs, 314,73~.92 francs, 2g1,395.06 francs, 262,886.66 francs, 256,844.36
francs, 24 7,538.21 francs, 232,955.78 francs~ etc.
Prime Mir?ister Rdyr.?ond Barre may be satisfied. i~is appeals for saving arc be-
ing heard--st the Russian bank of the PCF and the CGT. But is it really for
the sake of economy? 'They say it is.
Various hypotheses may be envisaged; the first is that the two Soviet managers
do not consider their bank the securest place for their savings; or that the
BCEN is p�ractising total overthrow of the hierarchy, depriving its employers
and burying its employees in gold.
,
A hypothesis to be rejected: Manager Soudakov is informed on 25 January 19i9
"that the sum allotted to you as payment for the fiscal year 1979 is inc~eased
~
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~'Uit dH'~IC:tAL U5~ dNLY
ta 3A7,20U fr~?ncs, This ~m~unt is subject tn upwgrd modifi~utidn."
Accdrding to the CGI': "InjustiC~s ~nd Uistdrtinns~" Cnmmon Currenry in th~
ISCIiN
A prophet is definitely without honor in his nwn r,ountry. Ilow is it to be
imagined th~t red bankers, those high-ranking noncnmmissioned offi~~rs of the
proletari~n revdlution, C~n beh~v~ tow~rd their personnel (who ~rc ~lso p~rt
of their sh~ck c:li~ntrle) lik~ vulg~r c~pit~list exploit~rs nf the working
class7 'I'h~ evid~nce h~s tu bc ~?CCepted: the ~mp1~y~~s di th~ ~C~N, wl~ose
~ aptitude for hd~rding mdn~y I h~ve just ~lemonstrated, have nevertheless thc
wor~t dpininn of their m~nggers, khom th~y c~nsider tn b~ r.either more nnr
less th~n ~xplnit~rs.
HowCVer, the 5oviet bank personn~l nffers, id~ningically, ~11 guarantees.
H~ndpicked, the 3~8 emplnyees of the ~C~N form a homogeneous team. Only thc
CG'C, n~turally, has recruits. Which of the bank's w~ge-e~rners would h~ve
thc t~m~rity tn express his disagreement with th~ CG1'~ the pC~ or the U55a7
Nevertheless, rebellion is rwnbling, if we can believe this le~flet distrib-
uted by the CG'I', to be sent out "as fast gs possible; for the employees of
E. Marchand (extension 558) or Mr Uebrie (extensinn 524); for the st~ff at
Mr Uagorn (extension 359) or Mr Lavglle (extension 390":
"'The CG7' Ueleg~tion of th~ ~urobank Personnel"
"proposes to assist you by means of this paper in filling out the
first line of your sal~ry vuucher.
"Thanks to information ~ivcn by a11 the personnel of the b~nk, the dele-
gates will be able better to f~ce the injustices and distortions that are
renewed every year and have been for a long time, the data needed to fight
being la~king in most cgses. This leaflet will ~lso enable the Pcrsonnel
Uelegates to tretter arm themselves for argument to defend those persons
who ask to have their cases reviewed after the end-of-the-year rating.
"We count on your cooperation all the more since the Personnel ~oard has
refused up to n~w, despite several requests on our part, to furnish us
with this informat~on, which is indispensable for defending the interests
of the personnel..."
hihen the CGf entrusts its funds to the BC~N it do~s not even have the excuse
that it is dealing with a bank that is less despoiling than the others.
Mr Seguy knows, through his own members and their four dclegates who signed
thc leaflet (the document quoted above), that in social matters the BCEN is
committing "injustices and distortions" that are neither fortuitous nor acci-
dental, since they "are renewed every year and have been far a long time."
It is an additional proof that only political and financial constraints are _
obliging the CGT and all its large trade unions to surrender themselves, bound
hand and foot, to the Russian bankers.
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.
t~'btt Ul~i~'tCiAL US~ dNLY
- '~h~ trade uni~n s~ctidns h~ve tiCCil lnsi5tin~ irt rcc~nt times thut th~. UCEiN
~ take u st~nd dn thc CG'I''s s~lnry demands, which the lc~d~rship hns continu~lly
~voideJ. Nn 1G df ~bN'I'ACT-~"u tradc union newsp~per--CmpldyCC5, r~nk ~nd filc
~nd dfficers of thc L'urcbrank"--f.s devoted to ~ knowledg~ubl~ study dn "our
purchusi~ig pnwer in thc ~Cr:N," It s~ys thnt "our progress [wit}~ regurd to thc
leudership] conforms to CGI' orirntntion, is gimed nt effectivcly gunrunt~eing -
the purch~sing power of s~l~rfe~, with pratection of thc ~dvuntuges ~chieved."
'Ch~t wns not the c~se in 1978 in th~t firm wi~i~h, r.onsidcring its ideoingy
and thc st~te it serves, wduld h~ve to be nn unblemish~d ex~mple. CONTACI'
says: "We remember that in b~cemb~r 1977 th~ f~~t thttt they h~d seen ~.?ly an
~dditiori~l third df a month ln~te~d di th~ h~lf-mnnth expected in acco~d~nce
with pr~ceding ye~r$, h~d been resented by nearly all the persnnnel as a'lnss'
from the privileges customarily grgnted to the gC~N." In that ~re~?, the sit-
u~tion was reestablished in April 1978, but it worsened immedintely. Thus,
after minutely ex~mining the figures, CONTACT cwt~l.ucled.the ~rticle with
these words:
"The result of dur calculatidns d~monstrates that on 30 5eptember the loss
of our purchasirg power was between 1.14 and 1.21 percent...In ~ccdrd~nce with
our principles ~nd our pr~ctice of several years' standing, we hope thnt the
salary ~djustment will be carried out in the fnrm of a daily subsi~tence ~1-
~ lowance, the effect of which is to favor the lowest sal~ries."
Checked, Controlled and Rated Personnel
T1~e very hi~rxist ger~erai managem~nt of the BCCN dnes not at all shure the CGI''s
economic analyses. It refuses to automatically satisfy its demgnds. There,
too, in apparent contradirtion with Marxist dnctrine, it holds onto the old
crit~ria of profitability, continually recalled by its president and general
manager, formerly a Communist deputy, Mr de Boysson: profits, stability and
prosperity for thc establishment. ~irst of all it demands of its personnel n
m~ximum profit. ~or that purpos~ it installed in 1977 a system of "profession-
al ratings", the methods for which a.re recalled by the general secretariat in
its letter of 18 September 1978, "Tc department heads and all personnel." 1
am transcribing here the essential part (Doctsment reference J5/BS, appendix,
p 2G3 and 267) . It coulc3 be countersigned v^~-` ;;~e severest censor
ot the Janson-de-5ailly school where Guy de ~oysson was trained.
Suc}~ a system is worthy of the most �astidious capitalists. It cert~ainly does
not rule out an effort to get together with the CGT, which since 18 February
1977 has taken a position against 8 of the 14 cases appearing in the form en-
titled "Professional Ratings" (document in appendix, p 265). Each employee
and officer was urged to support the "proposal" of Mr Seguy's ur~ion: abolish-
ing ratings No 1(on "the profession~l conscience"), No 3(on "the reliability
of work performed"), No 6(on "punctt~ality and regularity of attendance at
work"), No 7(on "the desire to learn''), No 8(on "relations with colleagues"),
No 10 (on personal "judgment"), No I1 ~~n "awareness of banking risks"),
No 13 (on "judgment in outside contacts"). Mother CGT demand that is fortun-
ately unsatisfied (here I am speaking in thc Soviet interest): to just point
out the "date of the last increase or promotion" instead of the three preceding,
as the leadership wish~s to have done.
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pntern:~lism is Gndd Wh~n ie i~ R~d -
~~r 1~Ck nf pbwer ta invdke nvertly th~e n~eds of the cnmm~n politicgl C~U5C~
_ th~ m~n~gement nf the 5oviet bank ~xcels in paternulistic ~loqu~nce; the prose
it send to the ranks, to ~nnvince gnd persuade th~m, hns itcs placo in gn nnY
thology n~ smooth-tongued styles. Ott 9 June 1978 the g~n~rgl secretary of
th~ b~nk, J, S. 5tr~uss, used ho~ey~d tnnes in nddr~ssing hims~lf, und~r re-
; f~rrnc~ JS/Mg, to:
Anywh~re but at t}ie Soviet b~nk this condescending sty1Q ti~ould ~ttr~ct thun-
dorb~lts frnm communist unions.
We pdint out td the unionized and communist personnel of the BC~N that in c~n-
tr~?1 ~~e~dqu~rte~s--Moscow--of the banks on which they depend, the sal~ries of
th~ir Soviet count~rparts ~re miserable comp~red to their own. Over there,
it is true, the 5trausses ~nd gnyssons do not dip their pens in the ink of a
non~xistent ngreement.
'Che Class 5truggle at the 5oviet nank
_ Guy de Baysson himsel� goes to bat to de�use the discontent in the rnnks, whom
he threatens in passing with reprisals. During a meeting with the Executive
Committee on 14 Dec~mber 1977 he reports in very clear words on his "meeting
with th~ represe~tatives of the union sections:"
"We have informed them that since the days of the general strike, and es-
peci~lly the quite recent day of the first instant, we have been concerned
about the number of absentees, that they had responded to the strike order -
or had simply taken advantaAe of it, and the consequences for the climate
in our firm. That leads us to envisage holding back the pay for such a
day in the future, for the benefit of the Shop Council, in such a way as
to clarify things. 'Those we are talking with, even while acknowledging -
that certain abuses are being produced that the uniun is trying to allev- -
iate, so far without success, emphasized their devotion to the current
practice of nonretention of pay.
''We are agreed that the president would content himself with advancing
'che idea in his customary note at the end of the year, but that a definite
decision would not be made until afterwards."
A good communist, Mr de Boysson does not like strikes or a bad contentious
climate around him.
In his traditional "Informative Note" at the end of the year, dated 16 December
1977, he illustrated this very clearly for the personnel:
"IV. 5trikes at ~urobank:
"Following the strike of 1 December, which was not followed very much
throughout the banking professi~n, but which occasioned over 50 percent
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ubg~nt~~ism (~xcluding thns~ w~hn wer~ ill) in ~urobnnk, the mnnngCment
wns l~d to discuss th~ uttitudc to be adopted wt~~n new strik~ movements
ncCUr. It hns infdrmed your uninn del~gates; how~v~r, it did not wunt
- tn m~ke ~ny h~sty decisinn, but to tak~ intd account the long-standing
truditions th~t exist in this ~rea of the b~rik.
"We int~nd to return to this subject after the holiduys, by oxpl~ining =
in writing nur,point of vi~w, so that overyone can think abouz it, for
w~ think the situation ~t ~urob~nk gt the time of the strikes became wn-
biguous, gnd consequ~ntly needs to be clnrified.
"But in the menntime we hope you spend excellent holidays, on the eve of
~ new yegr that we hope will be ~ happy one for you und yours, and nlso -
gs good g year us possible for the bank.
~ "'Cl~e ~urooank General Management"
Although they do not like strikes--such as that of 21 January 1y79, which w~s
followed by nearly all their "employees in contention" and parading down the -
street--Mr ponom~rev and rtr de Boysson are pleused, on the other hand, with
the letter sent on 8 September 1978 by the "CGT-FSM [World Federation of Trade
_ Union] trade union sections for employeQS, st~ff and officers of the Commer-
cial Bank for Northerr? ~urope/Eurobank" to Lucien Forget of the E3ank of Indo- ~
china and the Suez, 44 rue de Courcells in Paris, 8th:
"Dear Comrade,
"Please find enclosed a check for 4,000 francs, the result of the collec-
tion we undertook at the Commercial Bank for Northern Europe (Eurobank)
to support the action you are conducting and in which you are the princi-
pal victim of the management of the Bank of Indochina and the Suez.
"Your attitude ~nd your battle strengthen the union struggle for us all.
"With the assurance of the support of all the comrades at Eurobank, please
accept our fraternal sentiments.
Enclosure: check No 3262817"
It..is not known whether the Soviet officials of the BCEN took part in what
Lucien Forget of the Suez Group calls, in his thank-you letter dated 11 Sep-
tember 1978, the "moral support you show us in the struggle we are conducting
_ heneagainst employer high-handedness." But they do applaud when on 31 March
1978 President and General Manager Guy de Boysson addresses "the secretaries
of ~urobar.k's union sections," brandishes his favorite argument (he hits at
everyone) in favor of tabling the old demand to incorporate bonuses into sal-
aries: "This is a proc.ess in which the general management has no intention of
engaging, because it would immediately lose the confidence of its sharehold-
_ ers..." In other words, of the Soviets.
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_
t~�nK or~tctnL us~ oHr,v
No Job Cr~ating ut th~ gC~N
- Mr do Bnysson, like the other employers, is still gr~ppling with questions n~
sal~xies, bonuses nnd honnrari~.
nn tho employment problem he c~mps on the C1~55~C positions o~ f~rench employ-
ers denouncCd by Mr Seguy and Mr Mnrchais: "As lung as the volume nf our op-
erations re~ches its m~ximwn," he snid ~n 21 June 1978 to the Shop Council,
"it would be dangerous for the bank to increase its ~Ctiv~ staEf; such ~n in~
Crex$e would ~lso be di��icult to justify to /nur/ shnr~holders."
Creating jobs, especially in the large n~ultingtional and super-capitulist
firms, is one of the principal themes of the CGT and the PCF. They tireless- -
ly stigmatize "employers who, realizing huge profits, boggle at hiring people." ;
The Soviet bank, we repeat, acknowledges an operating profit o� 73,300,000 in '
- 1977. In Mr de $oysson's eyes this is not enough to justify hiring personnel.
_ "The bank's shareholders"--that is, the 5oviets who hold 99.7 percent of the
: capit~l--could ~iot accept itl The CGI' no longer insists; when the "share-
- holders" are Russians, it approves.
During the same Shop Council meeting, Mr de Boysson repeats his arguments.
We read in the minutes (page 14) that Mr Rameaux recalls "the concern of t}~e
trade union sections to see that the advantages they have achieved are pro-
tected, especially in salary matters. Mr de Boysson confirms that management's
goal is really to protect and .improve working tools and conditions, including
carrying out the necessary investment expenditures and maintaining the achieved
advantages--but without compromising the anticipated upward progress of our
activity and our results, for example by increasing our staff when it is not
absolutely necessary."
r
Mr de Boysson, who is admirably versed in his profession as banker, never dc-
parts from the language of a cold techn3~ian. Communicating to the personn~l
on 21 June "the results of the fi.scal y~ar just past and the prospects for the
bank's activity for the near future," he is not afraid to say:
"The past year was characterized by a voluntary limitation of the bank's
activities, due on the one hand to the prolonging of the international eco-
nomic crisis, which must urge us toward great prudence in the choice and
volume of our risks, on the other hand to recommendations by /our author-
ities/ on the necessary reduction in the "transformation" effected between
the duration of our resources and th~~ of our jobs."
Why would not the argument of "the int~rnational economic crisis that urges"
Russian bankers "toward great prudence" not also apply to French businesses?
~ According to the CGT and the PCF "the international crisis" is merely an ex-
cuse, invented moreover by "big capital and the multinationals" in order to
better accumulate profits to the detriment of the "laboring masses" who are
condemned to austerity. But the Soviets do know that a concrete reality is in- ~
volved, and they handle their affairs accordingly. Those billionaire BCEN cus-
tomers, the CGT and the PCF--have they never debated French and world economic
questions with Ponomarev, Krivocheev, Mikhailov and Company? It is one of two
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t~�ox c~rrtcr.nr, usL nrtLY -
things: aithor tti~y hnvc been ~munCipnt~~1 wid ure lying when thay sprcud
slogcuts cnntr~ry to the fc~cts reCOgnfzad by Mdscow, or the mnther hous~ does
not cnnsider tihem worthy of being informed. I3n~h hypntheses ar~ ~quully o~- -
fensive to Mr Seguy und Mr Marchnis,
"The nubious Credits of Zaire and North Kore~"
_ The principle o� operationnl secrocy--considaring the very speciul ch~ractcr
of its clientele--is r~sp~cted more strictly ~t the IiC~N th~n anywhere else. `
At the titnQ o~ the Shop Council meetings no indiscreet questions burst fortl~;
?io one is un~w~re of the bank's political background. And despitc: protests
nbout working problems and the unpopularity of the bosses, the personnel is
. theoretic~lly unanimous on the objectives of the house.
That m~kes even more enjoyable the performance of Mr Cassio, a titular member
of the Shop Council and, at the bank, u high-ranking official in the foreign
exchange-treasury department, where he is occupied witn the pound sterling.
= On 21 June 1978 he questions Mr de IIoysson on several delicate mattcrs. We
let the official report spe~k for itself:
- "hir Cassio asks several questions of a technical nature. ile has noticed
that in ordcr to improve our transformation coefficient we havc obtained
the cooperation of our shareholders and otl~er banks, and that this cooperu-
_ tion obviously has to be paid for--he asks what is thc evolution nf its
cost. Mr de Boysson replies that the totals for cooperation are relative-
ly modest and their conditions are of course discussed in terms of the
market. He asks if the current limitation on the activity of some of our
sister Uanks has h~d any impact on us. Mr de Boysson replies that it has
- had an impact chiefly on their colleagues in respected positions.
_ Hinally, Mr Cassio asks what are our prospects regarding our dubious creci- -
its to Korea and Zaire. Mr de Boysson replies that it is very difficult
to outline them in detail; in any case, there are more risks for states
than for firms, and we share them somewhat with the principal internation-
al banks
This cryptic duel puts into relief the virtuosity of Mr de Boysson, the master
of evasion, and the duplicity of the Soviet bankers. At the end of the delib-
erations, one will still not know how much the BCEN is paying for the coapera-
tion of its Muscovite employers, nor the repercussions in France of the prob- -
lems of the other members of the Russian multinational.
~ Eurobank is not a glass house.
Nevertheless, Mr Cassio deserves homage: he teaches us first of all that the
credits on North Korea, that exemplary people's democracy that our PCF sup-
ports and praises unrestrictedly, are "dubious" in the eyes of the Soviet
employers. If the abominable expression "dubious credits" had becn employed
by any bourgeois newspaper at all, L'HUMANITE would have hurled fire and flames
at such a sacrilege! "Dubious"--the credits of a people's democracy? Dubious,
the word of Comrade Kim I1 Sung?
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- Mr do I3oyssnn dnes not even try t~ conceal his distrust, md justify th~
"dubious credits" }i~ prnducos ~ miserabla (but ~dequnte) escuse: the risks
taken represent only a("modest"~ proportion of the whole nsswned by "the
principal internation~l banks." (This further confirms tha gCCN's do~lings -
witlt the other multinationals, and the m~gnificent cuckold's role that the
_ 5oviets reserve for W~stern capit~lists in the wasteful re�loating of certinin
sociulist e~onomies.)
'Thus, the humble contributions of French workors doposited in the BCEN by thc
hundreds of trade unions thut keep their money there serve chiefly to suffer
the losses due tn the "dubious credits of North Korea:" to make them pay, in _
addition, for Zaire's losses, is--unfortunately for them--the most comical of
swindles.
The insults that the PCF and the "progressives" have poured upon Mobutu, in
order to condemn the operation of the French army, which saved so many lives
at the time of the events in Kolwezi in May 1978, are still in everyone's
- memory. L'HUMANIT~, Rene Andrieu, Georges S~guy and the CGI' exhausted their
repertoire of insults in characterizing Mobutu and denouncing the "support"
given to him by Mr Giscard d'Estaing.
Did they know that their bank, the BCEN, and with it the funds of the PCF
and the CGT, entered the "imperialist" pool that "took risks" on Zaire and
maintains Mobutu's government?
I propose to Rene Andrieu, the author of an unforgettable editorial devoted
to the French militar~? intervention in Zaire and entitled "And So, Knapsack
on Back?" (L'NUMANITE, 2 June 1978), an arithmetic problem: what does he
estimate is the value of his contribution to M~butu's survival, through the
deposits of the BCEN, a modest but solid pillar of the Zairean regime?
Thanks to M~scow's "Confidence"
To reassure his personnel, Mr de Boysson continues to remind them that the
Eurobank enjoys th~ confidence of Moscow. The memorandum quoted (dated ~
21 June 1978) contains these eloquent phrases:
"Our shareholders, in particular the new president of the Gosba;ik,
M. V. Alkhimov, have been eager on several occasions to reaffirm their _
confidence in the competence and capability of the Eurobank personnel. ~
So we are justified in concluding that they attach importance to the "im-
age" that Eurobank has been able to create, of a well-managed bank--w??ich
the Le Poupon Report also recognized. Consequently, Eurobank should pre =
= serve the means of maintaining its activity at a high level, and the re-
cent capital increase, the fourth in four years, augures well for its do-
ing just that. ~
"For that reason, as a result of the visit to our shareholders last March
to report to them on the results of 1977, the Eurobank management has s~et
, as its objective to try to obtain in 1978 results better than those of
1977 or--to mention them in order of their size--about 40,000,000 francs -
- of profits after 40,000,000 francs of taxes on profits."
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t~~~k nrrrcznt, usL orti,Y ~
Iti must b~ ucknowladgad that f3scnl yc~ur 1977 wus "bnt~er than untiCiputed",
i� otily b~cuuse "/our/ sharaholders" (/thttt is, tl~o two Muscnvita b~nks/)
have on sevor~l occnsidns renewed "their con~idenco" in the sincarity of the ~
~urob~nk mnn~~oment and in the quality ~nd competonce of its pQrsonnel, At -
tho risk of repe~ting himself, Mr de Boysson strasses "the continued Interest
of /our/ s}inraholders in our activities."
The minutes n� the meeting o� the Shop Council on 29 March 1978 (pabc~ 4),
"The situation, taking into account the t~lks thut Mr Ponomarev and
Mr de lioysson h~ve just had in Moscow, appears as follows: -
"On the one hand, management errors and losses incurred in some nf our
sister banks led our common shareholders to take measures to control ~nd
- limit the activities of all their foreign affiliates. As far as we are
concerned, no blame has been addressed to us, however; the controls to
which we have been subjected on the part of the Bank of France ~nd our
shareholders were revealed as positive. Our shareholders therefore re-
newed their confidence in us and restored greater freedom of decision,
which is an appreciable easing of oux.situ~tion.
"But on the other hand, the international economic and financial situation
remnins bad. The increase in the volume of business obviously brings with
it increased risks. In this crisis period, even though we have at our _
disposal greater freedom of action, we must on our own adopt a policy of
prudence in the selection and volume of our business.
_ "Our shareholders' confidence has taken a very concrete form in their a-
greement not to collect dividends again this year, which will enable us
to propose to our next General Assembly that the capital be raised from
300,000,000 to 350,000,000 francs."
This good report card granted in such a resounding and quavering voice to his
French employees assumes political significance. Justly proud, Mr de Boysson
points out that in Moscow's eyes the BCEN works better ~han its "sister banks"--
established in Zurich, Singapore, Beirut, Luxembourg, Vienna, Tehran, London.
The Kremlin, which is curtailing their activities, is pushing the BCEN, im-
proving its position and "restoring" to a"greater margin for decision."
Within, of course, a very much reduced autonomy of maneuver. The very words -
that Mr de Boysson employs, the constant reference in all his communications ~
to the wishes, orders or instructions of Moscow--which he always calls "our
= authorities"--are enough to show that the BCEN has only the statutory appear-
~ ance of a French bank.
~ Its high-ranking staff inembers have given the Kremlin all the necessary signs
of allegiance. They belong more to the Russian civil service than to French
employers, they execute the policy dictated by Moscow. If Mr ~e Boysson and
Company are manipulating the money of the PCF, the C GT and their branches, it
- is because Moscow wants it; the management is not free, either in its choice
of customers nor in the way it manages their funds.
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H'OIt qi~ CIC'CAL USC ONLY _
I stir~ss this point becauso analysis oF thQ rol~tions botwe~n the I3CLN mun-
agement and persnnnel shows onCe moro the dependencQ of the pCt~ ~nd ~hr. C GC
on Moscow.
The Kremlin is always generous to its faithful servitors, Witness this scene, _
which tnkes place in the L'xecutive Committee on 18 OctoUer 197g:
~
"At the begiiining of the session, on the occttsion of the SOth anniversury
of Mr Peillon, Mr Ponomgrev presents him with good wishes and ~n ex-
pression of recognition from nur shareholders, especi~lly Mr Alkhimov,
presideiit of the Gosbank. Mr Koulikov, president of the Mosnarbank in
London, joins him. Mr de 8oysson, on behalf of all the members of the
management and himself personally, joins them in his turn." _
To Propagate Love for the U5SR and L'HUMANITE
Naturally the BCEN managemen~t is obliged to propagate, and cause to be propa- -
gat~d, love for the US5R in its personnel.
When the 5hop Council meets on 29 March 1978 to discuss its 1978 draft bud-
get, the Travel Commission is allotted 54,000 francs (against 46,000 in 1977).
But "this total," says Mrs Passeron, "does not include participation in the -
two visits to Leningrad at Easter and Ascension Day (86 participants on that
day), since the /management o.f the bank has agreed to contribute one third/
~ (personnel and spouses)."
Tliese trips to Mecca are very frequent. Who would do himself h~rm by system-
atically refusing to ~o? Practically all the personnel who have worked at
the bank for a certain length of time have already visited the fatherland of
the revolution. Two trips--from 18 to 25 NovemUer 1g78 and from 25 November
to 2 December 1978--have just taken place. Witness the note on the letterhead
of the Shop Council of the BCEN (reference RL-461-or 385), dated 22 August
1978, from its secretary, M. R. Locher, to the leaders of the Leisure/Vacation =
Commission:
"Dear Comrades,
"Our Shop Council, within the framework of ths Touristic Activity Pool of
Tourism and Work, has subscribed to a certain number of trips to the USSR
for autumn 1978 (Minsk-Moscow-Leningrad), of one week's duration.
"As of this date there are still 10 places available: 6 places for 18 to
25 November 1978; 4 places for 25 November to 2 December 1978
At a price of 1,785 francs (Paris to Paris),
With all meals.
We would be grateful if you would inform the personnel of your firm of our
proposal. This is the 1977 price (the date these trips were purchased)."
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Q~ coursc, tha "Tnurism und Work" Associutiion, u membor o~ thc: [~Cr's cnm-
morci~l nmp3re, u gr~~t speciulist in trips arrunged in the U551t und thc
peopl~'s d~~nocracies, is in intimut~ and d~ily cont~et with the l3CUN's Shnp
Council. It is with a very informnl "Uoar Comrudes" th~t Mr Locl~or thunks
"Tourism ~nd Work" ~or its help.
It is r~lso logicul for a bulletin to circulate in the bank urg3ng "employees,
' staff ~nd officers" of the I3CEN to attend the 1978 L'HUMANI'fC F~stival. One -
is ~sked to reply "~s soori as possible" to the following text:
" As it does every year, L'kiUMANITL' is asking for our coopers~tion for
the festival on 9 and 10 September at Courneuve.
"Colleagues desirous of taking part in taking charge of the cush at the
Gabriel-Peri entrance ~re asked to sign up at the bottom of this sheet.
"The windows are open from 0800 until 22~0-2300 (in shifts of two or more
_ hours)."
One wonders why L'HUMANITE, contrary to its custom, never points out in its -
colwnns the bankers' participation in the Party's big fair-mass. Good will, =
however, is not lacking. In 1978 the women (it is true they are a majority =
in the bank) largely triwnplied over the men. _
ttighly politicized (especially at the executive level), the persc~nnel of ttie
BCEN plays a great deal of bingo, is crazy about tap-dancing (courses are _
given regularly), drinks Giraud champagne (almost exclusively), eats large _
quantities of chocolate and bonbons, Russian and Swiss, prefers weekends in
Sicily to "outings in the country", spends more for group fishing trips than -
- for skiing, is initiated into yoga to the de~riment of football, is preoccupied
with Boulevard Haussmann health conditions, is cool toward the introduction of
"real time" and the installation of the Swift system in the central Telex,
is pleased that additional security dispositions have been put in place (God
be praised!) and that the accident rate has been lowered (in one year, "14
accidents in transit and two falls on our premises," say the minutes of the
6 June 1978 meeting), applauds the "adjusting of the heat and ventilation, -
which seem to have reached the maximwn," is absent tno often--which irritates
Mr 5trauss--, asks the management for loans. In short, it differs not a whit
in its daily behavior from other banking personnel. _
Except that it is politicized, it serves a unique bank, a totalitarian party
and a foreign state.
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= CHAPT~R 4. THOUSANDS OF CODED ACCOUNTS: PCF, CGT, Et4BASSTES, CORPORATIONS _
- [~xcerpts] A Clientele Un3.on round: the PCF and the un~.ons
The Soviet bank's clientele has a characteristic Chat is unique un the ~aris
scene--the density of communists and communist-connected people found there.
Obviously, the BCEN also has on its books the names of individu~ls and firms
without political coloration. Through them they carry on an average type of
business. But they are the minority; in most cases, one is at the BCCN/
- Eurobank for reasons of ideologic affinity, to arrange financing, disguises,
~he circulation of the money of French communists and communists of many
other nationalities.
I have been able to identify this clientele with certain knowledge; it is
classified by its bankers into diverse distinct families.
As do all banks, the BCEN uses computerized accounting and filing.
It has several types of listings. �
The ordinary operations list (current accounts, fixed-term accounts and others) -
is presented in the usual way. The top of Document No 2, p 84, shows how the -
account of Mr Gosnat is labeled ("page 2"--"day 10/26/78"); he is treasurer
of the French Communist Party. Below, the facsimile of another listing fall- -
ing on the same day, gives us the det ails of the operations between the 23rd
_ and the 25th of October, referring to his credit balance of 2,682,634.76 francs. ~
The Keys to the Codes
On the other hand, on the "listings of numbered accounts" and the "listings
of alphabetical-denomination accounts", each account number is followed by a
key figure. For L'HUMANITE: 06.
I know what this nwnber corresponds to, as well as all the others. '
; -
~ -
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~o~ o~rzctnrr us~ ornY
The Soviet bank hms arranged its cards in catogorios: idoologic, politicul, _
trado union, diplomatic, business, etc.
5o it was not I, but rather ldr arezhnev's agents who assembled under the num- '
~ ber 18 all the individual and legal entities they consider to be communists,
and wl~om they tre~t accordingly, 5o the reader may have a graphic view, I
_ am enclosing the code 18 in a diamond shape on one of the 32 pages of the
_ "listing of numbered accounts" (Document No 3, p 87). And here, as in 1948,
is "Mr Gosnat, Georges", treasurer, figurehead o� the "French Communist Par-
ty, 2 place du Colonel-Fabien, 75019 Paris, Account No 05316-6-001-/18/."
It is important to reproduce here the complete lists of account laUels, in
order to prove my observations.
The Registration Number "18", for What is Actually the PCF
Except for possible omissions, I record in numerical order the following head-
ings bearing tlis registration number 18:
~
No 05008-9-001-18: Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education
(CERES)'~
05025-3-001-18: Neveu Nenri, Coordinating Committee, Camps. [expan-
sion unknown] Association.
Valued in Germany (Colombes).
05032-9-001-18: National Women's Fses. [pxpansion unknown] Union.
05055-0-001-18: French People's Welfare, National Committee.
05114-5-001-18: Sports Cooperative, Inc. (Villejuif).
O51?.0-2-001-18: Sports Gymnastics Labor Federation (FSGf)....
And others.
_ A total of 94 accounts. Francs, as of 26 October 1978: 7,548,008.74 francs,
- includin~ a debit of 313,283.85.
The French Communist Party having no legal existence--I found no trace of its
~ statutes on file, in accordance with the 1901 associations law--it does not
declare either money or property of any kind in i.ts own name. That is the
best way to escape all control, any potential pursuit, seizure or interdiction.
And that is why PCF funds go through private accounts. For example, the ac-
count of Andre Reau, treasurer of the Paris Federation of the PCF (120 rue
Lafayett, 10), or of Guy Charpentier, 13 rue Pasteur in Aube:rvilliers.
We note that on the above list there are popular France-democracy friendship -
associations, a number of other organizations such as the National Council of
the Peace Movement, the Lungful of Air for the Children of France, the People's -
Welfare, French Women, Tourism and Labor, the Union of the Elderly of France,
several trade union organizatior,s, the Municipal Recreation Center for Children
*At its headquaxters on the premises of the powerful CGf steelworkers' federa-
_ tion. Not to be confused ~,rith Mr Che3v~ nement'S CERES.
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~Ott OI~'~ICIAL U5~ O1~I.Y -
� of Ch~mpigny-sur-M~rne (Mr M~rch~is' City), the 5t. Ouen 5ister City ~ommittee, -
the Hobigny Cnnununxl Cultur~l Center, the Audonia~rt Cultur~l Associ~tion, the
".zechoslov~k Natives Assdci~tion the Nanterre 1{all nf Culture, th~
- CEUIRC ~expansion unknownj, Tele-Freedom, L~nd of Men, the Gennevilliers
Works ~nd Offices, the Itenault 5hop Council~ ~tc., etc., ~11 nf whiCi? clnim to
independent nf the Pgrty.
pre~s and publishfng Under the ttegistr~ti~n Nwnber "06"
Just like g number of individual and legal entities lined up und~r the Code
number O6~ which I put in ~ squgre~ dn E~csimile No 4 nf the "listing of
accounts." Th~ 06 brings tog~ther organiz~tions and press ~nd publishing ~om-
p~nies that the Soviet b~nkers ~on$ider to be communists or communist-con-
nected. 5ti11 in numerical order:
No 05019-6-001-06: Ve~illant publishing Comp~ny.
~ 05024-6-001-06: L'NUMANIT~.
_ 05038-G-001-06: Avant-Garde Publishing Company. -
0SO46-9-001-06: FIt~NCH WONf~N,
OSO50-1-001-06: LA T~RIt~, 5ARL [Limited Liability Company]
05063-4-001-OG: ~rance-U5SR Publishing Company... ~
- And others.
In all: 87 accounts. ~rancs, for the period 16-26 October 1978 the 5oviet `
agency TASS excepted): 7,8~5,133.51 (including a debit of 1,418,962.04 francs).
To which it is proper to add the total of the "financial cooper:.:ion" (loans)
granted by the bank: '
19,4S7,000.00 francs (BCEN estimate ~s of 1 August 1978). -
17,544,537.26 francs (my estimate, the ~aost careful, as of 27 October
~ 1978)
Total minimal credit balarces for accounts under code 18 (the PC~ and its ap-
~ pendages) and for those carrying the registration number 06 (press publish-
ing, propaganda, etc.): 32,947,679.51 francs, including a debt of _
19,27G,783.15 francs (financial cooperation and unsecured loans). 5everal
additional tens of millions should be added, having to do with financial co-
operation und unsecured loans granted to communist co~ercial companies (see
below).
- Code "21" for Trade Unions and Their Subsidiaries
� The reader will have noticed that under code O6 there were some of the later-
al organs that are spokesmen for para-communist organizations. It is most
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FOEt O~~ICrtAt. US~ ONLY
str~king td s~e, includ~d quite n~tur~lly emong tham, the w~ekly LA VIL
OUVa~~it~, deta~h~d from the cnde nwaber rQServed fdr the CGT ~nd its cm~nn-
tinns, ~1 (see ~acsimil~ No 5, oppasite, a~here I have ~ircied th~ number wl).
There ~r~ 205 und~r this r~gi$trgtion nwnber~ in nuroericai ordcr a~ follows:
Nn 05022-U-001-21: N~tional Underground Workers' ~eder~tion,
05026-1-001-21: Sm~ll Hr~ndcraft gnd Apparel Industries Union, Paris.
U5033-7-001-21: Pa~is CGI' Trade Union (teg. ~expansion unknownj
05035-2-001-~1: CGI' Steel Union of the pari.s ttegion.
05041-0-001-21: National Govornment Workers' Federation.
[
05047-7-001-21: Nationnl ~nergy Industry ~ederatfon.
05053-5-001-21: Textile Workers' Federation.
05057-6-001-Z1: Steelworkers' ~ederation.
050~9-1-001-21: National Railroad Workers' Federation.
05085-7-001-21: 8akcry Workers' Union, Seine, Seine-et-Oise, 5cine-
et-Marne.
OS101-2-001-21: CGT.
OS108-7-001-21: National Glass Industry Federation... _
And others.
Thus, a total of 205 accounts belonging to union or para-unfon organizations
that are genuinely red. Francs: 48,458,006.78, in~luding a debit of
459,413.99 and a reserve of. 31,014,263.00.
'1'he Companies in 09
The number 09 designates commercial companies, chiefly con~munist (see Docwuent
No 6 opposite). I spoke of them in my book "The Finances of the PCF." I will
not go over again here the activities of some 30U firnts that fnrm the PCF's
financial empire. Nearly all of them are to be found in the BCEN, in the com-
pany of others which for various reasons are integrated into its clientele,
such as Fiat-France, the Assembly Gallery (a borrower from the BCEIV and an
antiques dealer on the strcet floor of the Socialist Party headquartcrs,
place du Palais-Bourbon, the Chausson factories, Bowling of Paris (the Zoolog-
ical Gardens), the Club Mediterranee, Lenchener Real Estate or the JEUNE AFRIQU~
- pre~s group. I cite here those that seem to me to be the most important:
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~OEt d~~tCtAL U5~ dNLY
Na n5U62-G-001-09~: T~~ C'Cei~phnne ~nd R~dio~ Wnrkers' Cnop~er~tivc,
p~xis 10,
05088-1-001-09: Busindss G~nt~~n ~urch~sing ~eder~?tion.
d5244-n-OU1-09: Commercigl Central Imp. (expansion unknown~, 1'uris J~
05371~1-U01-09: Mad~me Luci~ W~ill, p~ris 6.
05457-8-001-09: gotr~ns Cnmpany Ynternation~l 'Cr~nsport~ p~ris 2.
_ 05486-7-001-09: B~RIM [~xpgnsion unknownJ Comp~ny, pgris 13...
Md others.
Aii the "5~~iglist" ~mbassies
The number 03 (facsimile No 7) cnvers doz~ns of impdrtant fdreign and ~rench
import~export companies, gll of them connected with the trade between Frgnce
and the communist ~ountries, from petrosian Caviar-5almon and family to
Bollnre P~per Manufacturing, including Regie Renault, or Hong Kong and Macao
Traders. The grnup of the famous red billionaire Jean-B~ptiste Doumeng oc-
- cupies an important position here; I shall speak of it again later (below,
p 140) .
~mbassies, diplomats and related activitiPs are encountered under the comput-
er number 24. In 3975 there were 324 of them--an absolute record for g bank
in France--,listed under the agreeable color blue which is reserved for them.
Szill more numerous today because of the constant increase in staff at the
eaib~ssies of the communist countries in rrance, I discovered there the names
of many persons with ties to the world of intelligence.
Cubans (a plethora nf staff inembers), Guineans, Mongols, Russians, Nungar-
ians, Czechoslovaks, Poles, Bulgarians, Vietnamese (curiously. the biggest
spenders), come~into contact with Palestinian travelers, Israeli,
Uruguayans, Algerians, etc. For in the midst of the official world of the -
communist diplomats there is also a fauna of intermediaries, coramission agents,
etc., domiciled in Portugal, Liechtenstein, Yemen, Mali, ~iong Kong, Tripoli,
Rio, Buenos Aires, Kinshasa, Beirut, Hanoi, Tokyo, Thessalonika, Jedda, Bogota,
Algiers, Lagos, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, London, Zurich,
Basel, Geneva (see appendix, p 269 to 282).
The 81 key is that of insurance companies, including the Black Sea and Baltic,
which serves the Soviet diplomats.
1,300 Private Individuals
Finally, code 15 (Facsimile No 8, where I have *~inted the~ out with a tri-
angle), includes over 1,300 privete individuals, admitted as such into the
Boulevard Naussnann club. The gentry of intellectuals, artists or sports fig-
ures who are communists or sympathizers, aho for the most part affirm their
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~dk U~F'tCtAL U5~ dNLY
ind~pendencc vis-a-vis Moscow, glitter briliittntly th~re, 5dm~tim~s they
tu~~.~redits, sdmetimes debits; w~ cite them in no pgrticul~r ord~r:
'Che Billidns in CG'1' 5avings
Annther characteristic of the 5oviet bgnk is thnt it swgrms with illustrinus
p~dple, but the communist r~nk ~nd filc nr middl~ offfGers are conspi~uous by
th~ir ~bs~nce. Cert~inly th~y gre indirectly pres~nt in their records. gut
th~y c~ntribut~ invnlunt~rily to th~ bank's fartun~; their modest pgym~nts ~nd ~
~ontributinns enrich the treasuri~s of the org~nizatiuns of the P~rty, which
in their turn nm~ss them in this b~nk th~t is reserved for th~ nristoCr~ts of
the revolution--
--Or those who ~re just aristocrets:
Mrs ~dwige Chevrillnn*: 232,900 francs p~id on 2b Octob~r 1978 on a
= thr~e-mnnth term acc~unt (No 20690-~).
Mrs 5abine de Boysson*: 731,559.76 fr~ncs, also on a s~vings account,
No 20861-3.
- With regard to snvings, I note to my surprise that the CGi' unions are inclined
to h~ve their "savings" bear fruit in the 5oviet bunk. The:se patriots dis-
trust the French establishments. The socialisL members of the CGT will be
happy to lenrn that thc unions and the Shop Councils listed below have well-
lined savings accounts in the BC~N (see Docwnent No 11 of 26 October 1978, op-
posite, bearing the title "Balance listing, certain accounts", "page 67:"
4. "~ixed-Term Accounts": "Three Months"
06581-4: Union Hall
93 rue Grange-aux-Belles 795,010 francs
06829-7: Railroad Orphanage 50,000 francs
- 4. "Fixed-Term Accounts": "Three Months to Two Years"
07265-3: Gas Transport Froduction Personnel Union, Reg. Paris
Gas Company of France 70,000 francs -
08468-2: ~ederated Transportation Retirees' Union 80,000 francs
18. "V~ucher accounts"--three months
~
05033-7: CGT Reg. Parisian Union Federation 210,000 francs r
*Mrs Edwige Chevrillon, nee Noetinger: niece of the late Andre Chevrillon, a
member of the French Academy, mother of Olivier Chevrillon (reporter of the
- Council of 5tate, president and general manager of the weekly ~E POINT), of
Remi Chevrillon (an engineer and oceanographer, customer of and borrower from
the BCEN) and of Genevieve Chevrillon, wife of Guy de Boysson, whose sister,
Marie-Pierre (deceased), married Remi Chevrillon. Sabine de Boysson is their
relative. During vacations they may ~il be found at their properties on thc -
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~Ult ()I~~ICtAL U5~ ONLY
05d53-5: T~xtile Workers' ~ederation 800,000 ~rttnCs
6. Uem~nd Ac~ounts: +three months to two years
05~36-4: National Clothing Wnrkers' ~ed~r~tion 7,000 francs
06052-6: Wgter Personn~l Union 20,000 ~r~ncs
And others.
A Ch~llenge to the CGI'
On the eve of the 40th CGT Congress the magazine L'EV~NEf~NT (Channel 2) on
16 Nov~mber 1978 broadcast an investigation by journalist Francois Gault of
. "The �inances of the CGm": "For the first time," he said, "the Federation
h~s agreed to open its aceount books." The treasurer, ~rnest Deiz, told him
that "in 1971 the CGT has 7,300,000 francs, ~0 percent of it deposited in a
single bank. In 1977, this amount had increased to 21,500,000 francs, de-
posited in equal shares in four banks...." ~
I am e~ger to transcribe these official statements by the highest-ranking
leaders of th~ procommunist Confederation in order to confront them with data
taken from the books of the BCEN,
As is their custom, the secretary general and the treasurer of the CGT play
with words, c~tch fish and evade the real questions. The verbs "have nt one's
_ disposal" and "deposit" make no sense in this case. "To have at one's dis- -
posal 21,500,000" normally means that such are the resources of an institu-
tion whose balance sheet is balanced.
Well, only at the ~C~N, the single Account No 05101-2 of the Confederation
(213 rue Lafayette) is credited on 15 October with:
1,044,488.56 francs in a"regular demand account" and
9,500,000 francs on "term" deposit (three-month cash vouchers) -
(that is, in reserve).
On 26 October:
1, 056, 449. 02 francs (on demand)
9,500,000.00 francs "fixed-term."
The falsehood is patent. If the money that the CGT "has at its disposal" is
really "deposited equally among four banks", its "availabilities" would be shown
between the 16 and 26 October as over 4,000,000 withdrawable on demand and
38,000,000 fixed-term. In all, over 4,200,000,000 centimes.
- I challeng th~ CGT to show bookkeeping vouchers to verify its holding on those
dates as much money in three other banks as in the Soviet banic, whose name
it refrains from mentioning in its las~ two balance sheets, published in
Ile de Re. A cousin of Mr Guy, Mr Max de Boysson is the director of the
_ Banking and Partnership Company (SBP), in which other CGT funds are on deposit.
- (See "The Finances of the PCF" p 205.)2
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~Ott d~'~ICIAL USE ONLY
LC pf3UpLC, its bimnnthly bulletin, No 1045 for 5-20 5eptembar 1978. Ei~re _
is th~ infnrmgtion it pr~vidos for its members:
IV. Av~ilable gssets
~ wik deposits 21,555,ODU.00
On demand
Cash........... 205,542.57
CCP [po$t offic~
aCCOtutt~....... lOO,OOO.OO
_ Batiks . . . . . . , . . . 1, 898, ~456. 41
2,203,998.98
Nothing more; this is very normal, Mr 5eguy, Mr Krasucki and those who have
a place in the PCF's Politic~l Bureau as CGT leaders have to conceal from the
_ (non-communist) majority of the 2,300,000 members of the Confederation the
financinl pr*ctices of the (communist) minority that holds the coromand posi-
tions there.
The Millions of Unions and Shop Councils are Diverting Funds From Their
Intended Purpose
With those words I am pointing ou a remarkably serious infraction committed -
_ by certain Shop Councils working with the BCEN. In violation of the legal
provisions they do not need, they have at their disposal, to the profit of the
CGT and the PCF, millions of which they are the trustees. The Soviet bank
assists them in this diversion of funds which constitutes one of the biggest
scandals of our time, the*Shop Councils of the most important national firms
being associated with it. Besides Regie Renault, most of them are firms with
an interest in national defense: Dassault, SNIAS [expansion unknown],
SNECMA [expansion unknown], etc.
Every year the Shop Councils have an effect on a variable percentage of the
total wages. It is at S percent in aviation, powerfully represented in the
Kremlin's bank where their billions have ended up for a long tim~. Rich, ex-
empt from tax audits and tuking advantage of the ignorance of timid employers,
they manipulate this money without a care in the world for the cc~*.radiction ~
between their pro:ession of faith ("we buy, we invest and we manufa~tu�re
Prench") and their political-financial conduct. The Dassault Shop Cow.cil,
which is currently in trouble despite considerable income, guaranteed a loan
from the bank to a private individual. That firm's salaried workers will ap-
preciate that. For its part, the CGT P.ublic Utilities Federation is "guaran-
tor" for another individual. I doubt very much if the contributors to tha
CGT approve of such commitments.
*When I speak of "communists...as CGT leaders" I refer to indications given by
Jean Elleinstein in his book "The PCF" (pp 185 to 192).
*See "Communist France" pp 80-84, 279-284, 296-301.
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- ~'UR OFFICIAL U5~ dNLY
Political Lo~ns Cglled "personal Loans"
On~ g~es from surprise to surprise with the files beuring tho titles "Customcr
P~rtfolio--Situ~tion of Personal Loans to Cliertts" a.nd "5ituation of Loans to
- Corporations as of 18 Octob~r 1978."
The CG'I', th~ PC~ and the Itene Andrieus save at the BCEN. When borrowing is
involved, certain communist dignitaries also s~lect the Soviet U~nk.
- Robert Gelly (mayor ef Plessis-Itobinson, candid~te in the 1978 legislutive
- elections and the cantonal elections of 1979, husband of Jacquelinc Gelly,
- a member of the~ ~ntral Committee and getieral secretary of the ~rench Women's
Union), and Guy Charpentier are beneficiaries of these political loans that
are called "personal loans." It is true they seem to need less than two
- higher-ranking borrowers, Laurent 5alini of L'HUMANITE and Jacques Denis, the
0mr..G.~orges Mgrcli~is trusts, a memUer of the PCF Central Committee since 1961
and a foreign pol:.cy specialist.
With such heavy debts, it would be surprising if when the time came they
could have any freedom of action with respect to Moscow.
In the case of the Medical and Social Cooperative Project (OSCM) of Ivey-sur-
Seine (a communist municipality), the Soviet bank's cooperation takes on im-
measurable proportions. On 2 December 1976 the BCEN granted the OSCM an
"initial loan of 1,238,500.00 francs." On 12 October 1978 the ~xecutive Com-
mittee of the Customer Department of the bank analyzes the OSCM's situation:
"We recall that in anticipation of the sale of their Ivey premises (es-
timated at approximately 4,000,000 francs) we granted a credit on the
mortgage of 800,000 francs (see Executive Committee, 4 July 1978).
"We received the president of that association, who informed us that the
sale was to take place immediately (two serious purchasers were in compe-
tition).
"Meanwhile, the OSCM, which has decided to cease activity in the next 12
months (but gradually, so as to satisfactorily solve the financial and
' social problems that arise), is asking us to increase our 800,000 francs
ta 1,100,0~0 francs, so that its maturity date may be honox~ed without re-
jection on 30 September 1978.
Following an interview with Mr de Boysson, we agree to grant an additional
loan of 300,000 francs with the guarantee of the Public Utilities and _
Health Personnel Union, but we are informing the leaders of the OSCM
that they will have to make all provisions for the loan to be paid on
10 October."
A devout communist, Mr de Boysson is r~evertheless forcEd to set certain limits
_ on the Soviet bank's generosity, even though as wealthy a CGT union as the
Public Utilities and Health Personnel has given its guarantee. _
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~da ~~~~r.r.tnt, usi: ONLY
In ~11 these oper~tions l~onom~rev, KrivoCh~v, 5oud~kov, V~nin~ and
de t3oysson t~k~ the opinion of a cert~in communist, Robert F~irolli. A
�riend of Gosnat ~nd M~rchuis, whom he ussisted in the nagoti~tions for th~
Conunon Program of the Left, assistant lecturar at the PolytechniC 5chool,
this accounting expert for over a year has bc~en pluying n consideruble role
in Manufrance, which wus on the edge of bankruptcy in rebruary 1979. It wus
he who wlth Mr Gosnat proposed to the 5t, l:tienne communist administratio~z ~
the two lnst presidont-gennral managers, ~rancois Gadot-Cl~t ~uicl Itenc; Mcstries.
_ Ile is the auditor for tlie I~CEN, the pC~ a~td its com~ne~ci~l companies, includ-
ing t}ie Parisian Documents Offica of the GIFCO [~conomic Interest Group--
Iiquipment ancl Supplies for CollectivesJgroup (see below, p 238). In one of
t~is reports to the regular general meeting of that company, I find confirm~-
tion of the uso of CG'T funds by the PCF. Under the heading "Other Debts of
_ More Than one Year" ha.mentions, in fact, considerable loans to the Papcr l3ox
Federation, the National State Workers' ~ederation, the Nationul CG'I' press
- Union, the CCT Darblay Chapel Union, etc. And he concludes: "Ttiis m~tter is
fully expanded. 1'he treasury is comfortable, the indebtedness well balanced."
Thanks to t}~e money of the CGT unions, subsidized by the stnte and the employ- _
ers. In this way the BCEN is relieved of a burden; the PC~ is costing it
enough already.
- Behind the CCP Screen
What are the Soviets doing to control the communist and union organizations?
It is simple. In addition to the commercial companies that the BCCN already
has a solid hold on (see below), the French communists have among their fi-
nancing met}~ods collections, solidarity campaigns, subscriptions and other
entries. This mass could escape Soviet surveillance and constitute pocket
money that would confer on them a certain freedom. But these funds, alw~ys
called for to be paid into u string of CCPs, inevitably terminate their gal~-
lop with Mr Ponomarev. After being checked and dispersed throughout the
multiple records of the Eurobank, the same money reverts, if needed, to thc
same or other CCPs. -
The round trip has a triple usefulness:
1. It enables the Soviets to have the exact content of the Party's
means, including satellites.
_ 2. It makes it possible to collect sums of anonymous provenance which
= are innocent at the level of the people's contributions.
~
_ 3. It makes it possible to conceal from the millions of Frenchmen who
subscribe to the newspape=s and respond to CGT-Communist appeals
that the true depositaries of their gifts are the Soviets.
I will explain. ~
When the PCF Folitical Bureau, in plthetic accents, opens "a national sub-
scription for solidarity with the Vietnamese people" it adds a postscript*:
* [No footnote provided] �
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~~o~t o~r~r,~ni. usr nN~,Y
"~unds must be ~ddressed to the CCP G. Gnsnat No 636571 ~ pnris." (L'1-fUMAN-
I7'~, 24 Novomber 1978) .
~ebruary 1977: the PCF publ~s}ies the first issue of POLICL' CT NATION, ~
"newspapor for police officials." A box (reproduced in subsequent issues)
usks them to "lielp POLICC LT NATION to livo, to dovolop, to live up evcr t~et-
ter to your ~xpoctntions, Do it by sending your subsr.riptions to
G~nrges Gosn~t, CCp No'636571, Paris."
It is the same for all the other campaigns and requQSts for pennies, the PC~
, hgving as many CCPs as it needs.
Because they automatically receive these funds reserved in the BC~N by
Mr Gosnat and his comrades, the Soviets are aware at every moment of the
Party's and the CGT's ability to mobilize the masses. They arQ informed
down to the last f~rthing, about their financial health. It is enough to re-
fer to the casQ of the great annual PCF ina~s--the L'HUMANITE Festival. -
Mr Marchais will not tell Mr Ponomarev falsehoocis about the opera~ion's bal-
ance sheet; the BCEN knows it better than he does.
It has all the necessary elements, since it knows from the records the cost
of the festival and its proceeds as well. It receives in two accounts
(No 08602-6, L'HUMANITE Festival; No 08683-6, Entertainment L'HUMANITE Festi-
val) the money paid on that occasion. Whether the friends and comrades send
their contributions by bank check or via the CCP, the only information sup-
plied by the Party, in either case they will not know that their money will
be sent to the Soviet bank. On 27 January 1978 L'HUMI~~NITE, for example,
transfers 700,000 francs from its CCP to its BCEN account. The makers ap-
pearing on the "checks remitted" (26 January 1978) by Andre Reau, treasurer
of the Paris Federation of the PCF (Document No 12) aad the General Steel- -
workers' Union (Document No 13) are unaware of this coming and going.
The Movement of Funds
Once we have explained this mechanism and its reasons for being, let us look
at a few typical cases.
On 7 vovember 1978, the president of the Gennevilliers People's Vacation and
Recreation Project (OVPLG), which is part of the municipality (mayor:
Mr Lanternier, a Communist), sent to the Commercial Bank for Northern Europe
(Document No 14):
"Sir,
"Please transfer from the account of the OVPLG, CCP 1428-405, the sum of
300,000 francs.
- "The remainder, including interest, remaining blocked in our acc~unt...."
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" Let us tr~nslut~ this into plttin language: since it noods to cxrry out th~
regulntioiis, th~ OVPLG has its money put into the CCP unique indic~tion
appeurs on its letterhead); a BC~N "credit note" dated 14 Novembor 1978
(Uocwnei~t No 15) informs us t}~at this hns been done, OVPLG's correspoiideiits
will not be paid with checks on the Soviet bank, but by postal check, Why
this pretensQ?
The CGT proceeds in the same way. On 20 November 1978 the Confederal 13urenu
}ias the BCEN pay 50,000 �rancs into the CCP of the Lducational Center--
Courcelle Manor-- (Uocument No 16); the latter is not in the BCEN and they do
not want to put it under the secrecy of the gods. For its part, LA VIE
OUVRIERE on 12 January 1979 closes its CCP, consisting of 166,780.83 francs
received from correspondents who must be unaware of what Yinally happens to
their money (Document No 17).
When camouflage is unnecessary, the movement of funds is carried on betweeii
initiates: communists and CGT members use BCEN checkbooks and internal trans-
fers:
LBS CAHIERS DU CO&IINUNISI~ to Georges Gosnat: payment of 45,557 francs
- on 23 January 1978 (Document No 18).
ALAP [Parisian Literary and Artistic Agency for Cultural ~xchange] Enter-
tainment to Aero�lot: 341,000 francs (Document No 19).
The CGT Railwaymen's Federation to LA VIE OUVRIERE: 163,911.30 francs
(Document No 20).
L'HUMANIT~ to the New Library (of the PCF): 15,918.40 francs (Document
No 21) .
The CDLP in the GIELD group: 5~0,000 francs on 12 January 1979 (Document
No 22) .
The SNECMA [expansion unknown~ Central Shop Council to itself on 2 Janu-
ary 1979: 327,700 francs, the amount of a subsidy it received in October
1978 (Document No 23). We mention that SNECMA works for our ground, sea =
and air armies: AMX [Issy-les-Mouineaux Construction CompanyJ tanks,
submarines and nuclear reactors, plans, etc.
In conclusion, being aware that the BCEN is not a bank like the others, the
Party, the unions and the para-communist organizations prefer not to let it
be seen that they operate through it. And even in his private life Mr Gosnat
is careful to use only his truly personal BNP checkbook--Ivey, 76 rue Lenine.
- I find these conjuring tricks in the thousands of receipts of interest to the
whole of the accounts cited above, especially the French Women, People's Wel-
fare, L'HUMANITE (credited with 4,724,320.12 frar~cs on 25 January 1979),
FRANCE NOUVELLE, LA VIE OUVRIERE, France-USSR, the SNECMA Shor Councils, LMf
[expansion unknownJ, ABG [expansion unknown], the Spring, Da~;ault, etc.
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"Loan Grantod by a Foreign Organization"
Commnrcial companies directly or indirectly connocted with the Communist Pnr-
ty constitut~ tl~e shock Uattalion o� the 5oviet bank, which owes a purt of its
continued growth to them. But in their turn these firms would not have been
able--and still would not be able--to impose their game on ~rench and Western -
capitalists without the indispensable conpertttion given them by the Lurob~nk.
I have explained elsewhere (see ab~ve, p 59) how this interdependence, from
whicl~ the PCF profits greatly, operates. In the Document I reproduce in the
appendix (pp 25~-262), in ~ddition to tl~e red press there are several stars
of the communist commercial empire: BERIM [13uroau for Modern Industry 5tudy
and Research], Interagra, CIFAL [expansion unknown], Actif Avto, S~COPA [expan-
s3on unkno~,m], Stanko France, Ipitrade, CED [exgansion unknown] Foods, 5upemec,
etc. The reader will find descriptions of some of them in the appendix.
'Rhe BCEN also deals with a number of noncommunist firms and with an enormous
number of affairs worthy of its position as the top-ranking foreign bank in
France. There would be no poin~ in beginning an exhaustive report on them
here. I will content myself with a general view with the help of the most
suitable pilot--the BCEN's "customer department." 'I'he department authors
weekly activity reports. And I will devote one whole section to the group of
the red billionaire, Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, who really deserves one. -
An excerpt from the "Report of the Management Committee of the Customer De-
partment, 12 October 1978" (reference Sp/Hd-16 October 1978):
_ "CDLP Group
"Mr Lasfargues talked with Mrs Thomazo and Mr Moreau.
"We indicated that the general restructuring operations were coming to an
end. -
"At present they are going ahead with reorganizing the financial services...
For the immediate future, to meet the October maturity date, /the people
we are dealing with are asking for a temporary agreement--in anticipation
of setting up a loan granted by a foreign organization/. We are agreeing
~ to a loan of 3,000,000 francs--in the form of discount o~ a promissory
note falling due on 6 November 1978, guaranteed by L'HUMANITE."
We emphasize the information from th~ Soviet bank: the CDLP (Communist),
which says so proudly that it is "under the French flag" is expecting "a loan
granted by a foreign organization." Which one? Of what nationality? It
would be interesting if the communists would say. We emphasize that far from
- appealing to the French masses, they prefer, in order to save the Party's
press and publishing organs that are in distress, "to solicit the foreigner."
Modestly, the BCEN, itself a foreign bank that has long continued to put new
life into the tuberculous treasuries of the PCF's organs, does not name it.
Doesn't it know? Is it pissible that Mrs Thomazo and Mr Moreau, leaders of
the CDLP and high officers in the Communist Party, had not communicated to
their friend and comrade de Boysson the identity of the benefactors?
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I now giv~ them the opportunity to inform not oiily Comradu Ponomgrev of it,
Uut--espacinlly--tl~e runk nnd file, who h~vo never heard in the colls, mcet-
ings ~nd congresses of the PCF that the pCF ~sks for loans outsid~ rrench
borders.
Alwuys ~�fectionate and understanding toward th~ ~rench comrudes, thn ~CCN ,
_ is still consolid~ting, thrQe weeks later, the CDLP's sh~ky situ~tion~ I
re~d in the report of its Gustomer Department of 2 November 1978:
"CdLP Group
"We have agreed to discount exceptionally for Odeon Broadcasting a draw-
i~8 on the SODI5 [expansion unknown] Company of 750,000 francs, due date
31 January 1979."
On 4 January .1979: "report of the good news received concerning SODIS...we .
. agree to grant to the CDLP a discount line on this signature of 5,000,000
francs."
On the condition th~t in the lot there be no books of Soviet or French con-
tenders. It was precisoly at that moment that the communist newspapers de-
nied access to their columns to Jean and Nina Kehayan, tho authors of "Red `
Proletarian Street", a book that recounts this French communist couple's sad
experience in Moscow. Was this pure coincidence?
On 21 December 1978 the Management Committee of the Customer Department of :
, the Soviet bank examined the shaky situation of the PCE's [expansion unknown] '
Social Publishing, known to have refused to publish this work:
"We agree to discount in exr,ess of the 300,000-franc ceiling--exception-
ally, 550,000 francs drawn on tlie CDLP group. -
WP meet to review further this line set in 1974 within the framework of -
the talks that are to take place early next year between our management
and the CDLP group's management."
The BERIM's Bill of Health
On 22 June 1978 the Management Committee of the Customer Department examines
the health of ~he BERIM, which has a monopoly on the markets of communist
municipalities :
"BERIM
"Mr Lasfargues, Mrs Francois and Mr Paumier participated in the annual
meeting organized by the BERIM leaders, in which Miss Usclaff, an in-
spector at the Market Fund, also took part.
= BERIM's activity for fiscal year 1977 is shown by a turnover of 30,000,000
francs, an increase of 27 percent over 1976.
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roti oi~rtr,r~, us~ ortt,Y
"In tlie arca of crodits we ura granting thc ~dllowing uid: _
"C~sh ACCOITqi10cI8t30ri 200,000 francs
- Commerciul discount According to the c~se
navnn~as on cnrti~icates,.~ 200,000 fr~ncs
CNM~ ~oxpansion unknown] linc (risks sl~ured 50 per-
c~nt with CNMii) 4,000,000 francs
Tre~sury credit (guarantor Mutual 5urEty Company)
currency bala~?ce 69,000 francs"
On 14 5eptember the E3ERIM, definitely insatiable, returns to t}ie churge for a
credit of 100,000,000 centimes to install and improve its offices; then it is
thQ turn of another PCE monopolistic enterprisa, 50COPAP*, to ask the BCEN for
' still more mi,llions. Taking into account the fuvorable d~velopment of the -
activity about which we were informed in this customer's last report, and the -
good results obtained, we are not opposing this increase."
Fr~nco~USSIt strikes at the fuiid on 2ti October for an advance of 450,00(i francs _
on an "Intourist" note. Agreed, agreed, and that will give a free hand to
the p~rtnership with Moscow: "We are meeting with the leaders of France-USSR
during Novembex to study the aid we could grant them in meeting their due
dates in late November and December."
- Mr Rochon of the ALAP'" contacts Mr Lasfargues; his agency would need an accom-
modation of 500,000 francs to launch the "Notre Dame de Paris Spectacle" at
the 5ports P alace, in "an adaptation by Alain Decaux, Robert Hossein and
G~orges Soria, production by Robert Hossein" and for, between now and December
1978, circus performances on ice by the Soviet Union and the Kirov Ballet
Troop of Leningrad. Mr Rochon stresses the coming of the Bolshoi to Paris in
1979. Agreed, agreed, a cash accommodation of 500,000 francs; these excel-
lent ambassadors of Soviet culture must be encouraged. Date for payment--
end of DAcember 1978, and the premiwns will be deducted monthly. On 2 Navem-
ber 1978 the "Lumbroso" spectacles solicit an accommodation of 90,000 frane;s
as an advance on a payment of the same amount as VAT [Value Added Tax]. Com-
mitments made in September for 150,000 francs were upheld. Agreed, again
agreed. -
Soviet Money to Card-Index the French
Certain aspe cts of sports contests also interest the Eurobank. I reproduce
the 7 5eptember 1978 deliberations of the "Customer Department" concerning:
"Soviet Money for the 1980 Olympic Games
(See Customer Committee meeting of 10 August 1978)
- "As arranged, we called Mr Latinier of the German Lyon Bank--the estab-
lishment that plays the role of "wholesaler"--to ask him for an appoint-
ment. On that occasion Mr Latinier informed us that the selling price to
French clientele could not be set until after a meeting between Numinter,
Lazard and the German Lyon Bank on the one hand and the French Olympic
Committe e on the other....
*Paris-Province Commercial Company; see "The Finances of the PCF" on this sub- `
ject, and see below, p 238. 50 -
*See below, p 234.
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, ~ox orrtct~ us~ ornY
"lle prapos~d leuving on deposit two series of "L~.ncirculut~d" silver coins
- and a s~ries of "proof" pieces, stating that if we had to let tl~em go for
Q50 to G00 francs (sic) respectively ''we ~ould not be losers." We are do- _
ciding not to sell any ser.ies before the price is definitely set."
Does nnt th~ PCF riglitly see in this kind of trade an ideal method--fznd the
most typically capitalistic method--for realizing gold mines? It consists of
_ selling precious meCal to collectors at exorbitant prices in relatiori to
bullion prices. T}ic~ co~unis~ions are in the same proportion. Obviously the
Marxists have thoroughly assimilated the idea of unearned increment.
To finish with this subject, for the list would be in danger of becoming tire-
some, I will mention that the "Customer's Committee" on 26 October 1978, re-
viewing its relations with the SOGIR [expansion unknown], a company created
_ by L�he PCF to put the French into computer files, recalls that "our customer
- is a creditor of the Intercommunal Union for Data-Processing of Aubagne for
the sum of 1,100,000 francs..." 'That really confirms that the SOGIR is no
= longer limited, as I explained in "The Finances of the PCF" and "Communist
= France", to indexing the French who reside north of the Loire; its activi-
ties now cover the southeast zones, where the PCF is strongly implanted
(Aubagne, Arles, Istres, Port-Saint-Louis-du-Rhone, Port-de-Bouc, Nimes, etc.)
To Invest in liourgeois Stone
Elow many Frenchmen know that they inhabit premises partly owned by the Soviet
- bank?
_ As shrewd businessmen the leaders of the BCEN are making a colossal invest-
ment in stone, The USSR aspires to become the most important landowner in -
France. The real estate department of its Parisian bank has for some time
been experiencing a striking development. In the four corners of France it is
fina~lcing or acquiring participation in a pleiad of companies. Among the most
- important are:
5CI [Building SocietyJ Buffon; SCI Haxo; SCI Romainville; SCI Borrego; Villa
St. Michel; Pyrenees; Axenord Stou Real Estate; Mouffetarci Real Estate; Villa ~
- St. Michel Real Estate; Crox Louveciennes Real Estate; Olympic Ci~fal Real
Estate; Passy Kennedy Real Estate*; Forest Edge Real Estate; Light Horses
Real Estate; Fcncic Real Estate; Sazic 5000 Real Estate; Parkrentier Real -
Estate.
The total of the BCEN's financial participation as of 27 October 1978 for all
building societies: 119,287,651.14, or nearly 12,000,000,000 centimes (a sum
equivalent to the combined holdings of the PCF, the CGT and their satellites).
We add that at first sight HI~M [Low-Cost Housing Program] or workers' housing
are not involved. The BCEN, the red bank, leaves the social aspects to French
_ capitalism. This appears to be the ultimate paradox, but isn't really.
" *On the property of the former Peuge~t factories, between the Bir-Hakeim
_ Bridge and Radio Hall, Kennedy Embankment, Paris 16.
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J'
I~UEt ~1~'1'ICIAI. US~ ~NLY
'I'hc Inevit~blc Mr U~wnen~
I wil.l not write here the story of Jeun-~aptiste Uoumeng, ~ colorful persdn~l-
ity whnm tl~e F~rench now know well, thnnks to r~porting~ ~rticles and bxo~d-
c~,~ts over radio ~nd television which h~ve recently been devot~d to him. No
one today is unaware of thc activitics of this r~d billidn~ire~ n fnitl~~ul
communist milit~nt wlin hns U~come the obligatory interm~di~ry fnr thc l~rgc
~nd small business cnnCluded betwe~n the West on one h~nd, Moscow ~nd the
cnuntries in thc 5oviet orbit on the other. He goes to the Unit~d 5ti~t~s,
who now give him ~ visa without az?y difficulty, ~fter h~ving fo.bidden him to
visit their territory (for ~ commercinl infraction); he is received in Ngv~n~
with open arms by ~idel Castro, who entrusts to liim the sule nf his Idb$ters
in ~urope and the entire world; he frequents the Kremlin Palace, as ~ft~n us
the ~rerich ministries and t}ie favorite p~l~ces of the oil magnates. ,
~ N~turully, it is through the ~CEN that he prepares and executes his vast,
splendid ~rtd comple~ operations; thanks to the documents of that very 5oviet
- bank, he now widerst~nds even better the structure of an empire of which
Interagra is tlie triumphal ~rch.
'I'ne reports of "the Manngement Committee of the Customer Uepartment" are an
inexhaustible tre~sure of information on this subject. I will take from them
s~veral excerpts that are indispensable to an understanding of the subject.
Un 15 June 1978 the I~CL'N is studying the situation of:
- "Interagra Group
' "We havc received the balance sheets and explanatory notes from the com-
panies of the Interagra Group, which acco~panied the annual request for
renewal of t}~e aid we grant these companies.
"1. Interaora Company
"Increase of stable resources: capital that increases from 10,000,000
f rancs to 15,000,000 francs--long-and middle-term debts increase from
4,500,000 francs to 8,000,000, bringing a comfortable increase in operat-
ing funds...
_ "Good profitability: profit +25 percent over 1976.
"It asks us to carry our lines as follows:
1977 1978
C ash facilitics 1,00(?,O('0 1,500,000
Commercial discount 2,OOO,U~O 2,000,000
- CreJocs [translation unknownJ......... 2,000,000 2,000,000
Guarantees, security 1,0~0,000 1,000,000
~
6,000,000 6,500,000
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~ I
[
~OA'. U~~ICIA1. U5~ t1NLY
"Agr~ed,
"We c~ll to mind thnt we gnve our agr~ement Lo the horse oper~tion:
'Total Our Shnre
80 porcent
C~sh faciliti~s.,.,,.,,.... 2,OOO,U00 1,600,OU0 -
Uiscount 2,5Q0,000 2,OOO,U00 �
Credocs 5,200,000 4,160,OU0
"2. Intern~tional ~quipment Comp~ny CIM -
"Turnover on the increase, goes from 29,000,000 francs tn "s4,000,~100
francs. Thi;~ increase is basi~ally due to the expo.rt turnover of
11,000,000 francs--the Bulgarian contract. The turnover for France is
decreasing by 23 percent.
"5torks, whosA le~~el has remained very high, are the subject af Spec;.sl _
attention by the leadexs of the CIM and dynamic measures ~re to b~ taken,
notably with a view of effecting direct sales over 12, 18 or 24 months,
which will necessitate appropriate aicf.
"We rec~ll that the aid granted to the CIM is secured by the Interagra
Company.
"It has asked us to bring them up to the following ceilings:
1977 197E
Cash facilities........... SOO,d00 SOO,U00
Commercial~ discount 900,000 1,000,000*
*250,000 of this out of securities at over 9A days.
"3. 5EPStOI~C [expansion unknown]
"Two distinct activity sectors:
- "1. Agro-equipment: "turnkey" marketing of cattle feed manufacturing
- entities--cattle raising farms--storage silos--good ir~crease in activity.
"2. Noe Stockings and Knit Goods: Manufacture and direct marketing to
cooperatives and Shop Council, of fitted articles. Turnover increasing
well.
"The 1977 balance sheet is balanced...
"1978 prospects are optimistic, especially for the Agro-Equipment Sector.
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.
x~x n~~ic~ni. us~ art~Y
"`Ch~y h~v~ ~.sk~d us td r~nCw th~ 1ine~ gr~nt~d for 1~77:
C~sh fgciliti~W~~ 250,ODU frnncs ~
Uisc~unt 25(~,UUO franc~$ .
"AgrQed.
~
"A. CCU xonds
"~nrmed dn 21 n~cemb~r 1g77, C~U ~ouds is a~~ntinu~tidn of th~ op~r~tidn
of restructuring the C~n, whi~h hnlds 7d p~rc~nt di the capit~l (se~
Custom~r Conunitt~e c~f 5 Janu~ry 197~) .
' "The balanc~ she~t is b~l~nced, the turnnver is incre~sed ~0 17~20U,000
, fr~ncs~ thc op~rgting profit to 183,000 franCS. ~
"We recall that we registered our agreement at the timQ of the company's
restructuring, to renew in C~U ~oods' favor th~ ~?id formerly granted ta
the C~U: -
Tota~l Aid Our 5har~
; C~sh facilities 15,000,000 1,000,000
Commercial discount, or MC [expansion
unknownJ 50,000,000 5,000,000
Credocs 25,000,000 2,500,000
Bon~ls 50,000,000 5,000,000
Warrants 20,000,000 1,000,000
~ Total 160,000,000 14,500,000
"5. Ipitrade
- "The 1977 balance sheet shows a healthy turnover increase, comfortable
results, a well-balanced structure.
"It is not asking for general aid; we are studying case by case the re-
quests for financing international trade operations."
A Small Personal Loan
_ on 14 September 1978, according to its report (reference SP/ML-18 September
1g78), the "Customer Committee" is deciding on:
"Loan to Mr poumeng
"Mr poumeng asks if we wot~ld be disposed to extend by two months the loan
of 1,000,000 francs that we granted, with a due date of 15 September 1978.
"Agreed, with the guarantee of Mrs Doumeng."
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~0lt U~~ICIAL US~ dN1.Y
Uorn Uenise Trinqu~t, Mrs Uoumeng is the d~ughter of ~ whol~es~lc but~her and
fdrmc~r snCinlist m~yor of Capens, in H~ute-G~ronne, her husUund's fuvdrite
p~rt of the country.
- It is bizarre to note that tl~e 5oviet b~nk, bQttcr informed th~n ~nyone on
the stute of Mr Uaum~ng's busin~ss, consid~rs it ne~essury to usk h~m for n
gu~rantce when he snlicits the extension of u small persdnnl loun. Would
thc 5nvi~et b~nkers, ton, be beginning to wnrry gbaut the grnwing disproportion
between Mr doumeng's ambitions and his potential7 Or might the red "billion-
nir~" n~t h~ve ~.ctut~l pdssession of the ~ortune he is s~id to poss~ss7 On
14 U~cembCr 1978 the Management Committ~e di the Customer Uepnrtm~nt reex-
~nines th~ situ~tion of Mr Udumeng, to whom on 7 U~c~mber it grnnted new _
financi~l cdoper~tinn of 3,00O,OOd francs. In any case, on 19 nctober 1978
the "Customer Committee" (reference 5P/NU-25 October 1g76) carri~d nut a de-
tailed ex~mination of the "preparation (sic) of the balanre sheet" of the
Interggrg Group, in the compnny of Mr Grandin, Mr Uoumeng's cownunist ussis-
tant, ~nd Mr Ch~m~k, ~ former ~~dr~ of L~isure and Vacation for Youth pCf~
mass org~ni~ation), in charge of relations with the bctnks for the Uoumeng
group, und of its internal control:
"Request formulated to the Interagra b~nkers to maintain the balance be- �
tween resources and fixed assets, to del~y middle term, ~s in yegrs past,
the anticipated current maturities of the financ:ial cooperation, and in
certnin cases to supplement them with new aid, to result in the follow-
ing ~tn~unts: -
"Credit Lyonnais: 2,500,000 francs...; CCBP [exp~nsian unknown]:
800,000 francs...; Louis Dreyfus: 800,000 francs...; Wnrms: 600,000
francs...; B~C~ [expansion unknown~: 1,000,000 francs...; BVCP [expan-
, sion unknownj: 600,000 francs....
"As far as we are concerned, our outstanding bill is 600,000 frnncs....
"We note our agreement in December to bring our aid to 1,000,000 francs...."
The ~ruitful Markets of the "Red Billionaire"
. One week later on 26 October 1978 (reference SP/HD-30 October 1978) the same
"Customer Committee" takes an important decision concerning thc exporting of
French cattle to the US5R--by means of Interagra, of course.
_ Once more on this occasion we note Mr powneng's monopoly over all types of
commercial markets between East and West:
"Interagra, Cattle/USSR
"Interagra has concluded the sale to Prodingtorg of 5,000 head of cattle
for approximately 55,000,000 francs to be shipped from October 1978 to
February 1979, CIF [expansion unknownJ Soviet port. The suppliers have
paid 80 percent on embarkation, 20 percent remaining by bill of exchange
payable 55 days from date of BLs [bills of ladingJ. The freight is pay-
- able on embarkation.
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"~or res~le:
1978 shipments (25 Uctobor gnd 5 Novemb~r) will be payable by
Prodingtorg on 1S J~nuary 1979 at 100 percent;
"b. 1979 shipments will tnke placc ut thc opening of CD [expansion un-
known] nf VI'g [Viteshtorgb~nk], ~0 p~rc~nt pay~Ul~ ~guinst dn~u-
ments and 20 p~rCent 55 d~ys from BL dgte.
"Consequently, for 1978 shipm~nts, Interagr~ is asking us to mobilize its
cr~dit agginst presentation to our Uank of docwnents p~yable on
15 January 1979, or:
"In November 3,500,000 francs approximately
In Uecember 850,000 francs approximately
"W~ register our ~greement."
On 9 January 1979, under reference SP/HD, the leaders of the bank receive the
report of the Customer Committee meeting held five days before. It register- -
ed its agreement to a contract of 10,000 tons of sugar (as compensation for
the butter operation, details of which will be given later on).
r
This contract--under the heading Interagra Sugars/USSR--has already taken
place:
"~or 2,500 tons--in favor of CD [expansion unknown] Prodintorg, opened
by the UBAF [expansion unknownJ, resold by Interagra to Ipitrade for de-
livery to Mali, space CD of the BDM ~expansion unknown] opened at our
bank for approximately 5,500,000 francs (entirely provided for) payable
in 90 days. We hav discounted for Ipitrade our payment commitment to
25 March 1979.
"For 5,000 tons, prepayment envisaged for 15 December 1978 did not take
place, but Interagra informs us it has resold 3,000 tons to Algeria
against CD of the BNA [expansion unknown] to be opened with our funds).
"For these 3,000 tons Interagra is going to rsk us to issue documented
~ collateral in favor Prodintorg for $1,20~,~00 payable 90 days from date
of bill of lading. ~
"We have registered our agreement."
Interagra/Fromancais won a contract for 26,000 tons of butter, placed in the �
USSR, coming from Holland, France and Ireland, total value ~29,382,250:
"Settlement to occur 10 days from date of presentation of documents to Mos- _
cow; we have provided Fromancais with various relays of financing:
$3,480,000 from 28 December 1978 to 3 January 1979...; $6,570,000 from
, 28 December 1978...; $3,390,000 from 3 January 1979...."
These agreements are certainly favorable to the Doumeng group, to the BCEN
and the PCF. Every time the Soviet bank and its on-duty billionaire pocket
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some prdfits, p~rt of th~m must strengthen Cor~nunist funds,
It is public knowledge--and no secret els~where--that Mr poumeng shares his
business commissions with tlie PCF. It is not only in order to Ue ~groenble
that the communists of the ~ast and the West h~ve agreed that h~ should h~ve
the monopoly on commercial trunsnctions betweon the capitalist ~ind tho "so-
cialist" world. _
'Che Most Capit~~listic Methods Used to ~inance the Party
flere I must explain the methods that make it possible to set aside a vaxiable
percentage of the profits ea:ned in the dozens of companies with ~rencli
facades. In complicity with 5oviet bankers in the kiast and the West, their
managers organize channels nf rare complexity. Tens, hundreds of documents
attest to the fact that they hardly ever use a straight line to get from onc
place ta another. Their boundless affairs are well-stocked with multiple a~~d
varied payments to agents, or people claiming to be agents when they ttre abroad.
These combined amounts represent an enormous figure every year. Pract.'tsed by
capitalists, this commi~sion system is denounced in the press of the PCF and
the CGT as a fraud organized behind the state's back. It nPglects to assoc-
inte it with the commercial and monopolistic empire of th~. PCF, which is a
master of this art,, wliether national or international trade is involved.
It is obviously not with its official budget (about 10,000,000,000 centimes)
that the PCF can allow itself an increasingly huge propaganda effort, hun-
dreds of publications, billions of posters, 16,000 actual instead of 860 de-
clared agents, a real property patrimony comparable to that of the Church,
_ whicii no other party possesses or could acquire, etc. The 100,000,000,000
centimes necessary--from one budget or the other--for this tentacular ap- -
paratus to function, is of course not the product of the modest contributions
of the rank and file, the rebates from those elected which are constantly be-
ing paid to the Soviet bank (which often pays them a salary much higher than
that of a skilled worker, which they claim to be), nor of the collections
launched successively and at great expense, to mobilize the rank and file
whilc persuading them, as well as public opinion, tr~at they are the only mon-
ey-lenders the Party has. The 100,000,000,000 comes--I demonstrated this in
"The f~inances of the PCF--from the acta.vity of ~ome 300 companies connected _
with the Communist Party, which--most often with BCEN support--go ahead with
a genuine diversion of funds in the 1,813 cities, the thousands of Shop Coun-
cils and the East-West trade controlled by the communists. _
So that no trace will be found of the occult profits realized in the vast mar-
kets with socialist countries, other methods can be applied than commissions
"due" to Geneva, Zurich, Vaduz, Nassau, Frankfurt, etc.
Thanks to the Soviet bank, which inspires fear of international complications
in any potential holder of control, there is nothing to prevent soliciting -
such a bank in Geneva for a loan for some French company or other, within the -
- framework of an international Operation X. The Bank of France will give its
visa and the funds will arrive in Paris. The interest will be paid regularly
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~ox oFrzcT~, crs~ ornY
and on the due dato the sum will be reimburs~d, In re~lity the Genev~ bnnk
h~s just sarved ~s d cover, the money lent being the proper~y of tlie ~rench
canp~ty that is the borrower. The latter has in an ordinary way tr~nsformed
into ~ paid-up debt (the interest on its own loan) capital deposited abroad
and undeclared. That is what in pxoper terms is called "outflow of cnpital"--
in complete security. In thot world, those wl~o carry suitct~ses ~re no long~r
in style.
Tha monopolistic system is the only one that can sufficiently restore funds
to the communists. It has for its logic the multiplying of eaxnings, thanks
- to this type of boundless dissimulation--which is apparently perfect. Just
like any other bank established in France, the BCEN can rightly wash its liands
of it. It is not in competition with a post o�fice.
By indirectly involving in this channel the Soviet state bank in Paris, one
or several Swiss financial establishments, the Bank of France and i� neces-
sary several national or privately-owned banks subject to the law on commun-
ist merchants, one is given the means to make sophisticated ~nd perpetuate
a financing mechanism of the PC~.
That mechanism consists of fleecing the capitalists so that Moscow can avoid
spending its gold. All the industrialists, producers, business men are com-
plaining about this racket. They all are familiar with the game, so ruinous
~ for our states and our businesses, that prevails in East-West commerce:
I
As is well known, official lists (tariffs) of trade establish for every lot
of inerchandise a price that fluctuates in weak proportions. Customs taxes,
insurance, transportation, etc. vary in terms of this initial data.
" By establishing the "pxo forma" invoice--that is, the document that, duly
legalized later by chambers of commerce and consular authorities, will serve
as a voucher for each transaction--the seller and tne buyer set a fictitious
- unitary price for import as well as for export.
The difference between the stated price and the actual price is paid under
the t~ble. Given the scope of the markets, a small differential (higher or
lower) each time is enough to constitute very substantial profits.
The surplus occult commissions accumulated partly in the East will not appear
on the books of the companies with French fronts, which, among other direct
advantages,~ will enable them to free .their too-larg~ taxable profits and, es-
pecially, give them the opportunity of using them then for the "common good"
by dispatching them in discreet ways. What then remains is to transfer
to Switzerland, for example, the product of these commissions and have them
arrive in France or elsewhere, using all the classic methods:
Bank clearing games
Transfer of funds by multiple channels (fictitious companies, for example)
invented long ago by capitalism and socialism swindlers
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Purchases and s~les of fictitious gold, etc.
These commissions will generally finish their course in the form oF anonymous
payments for PCF subscriptions (the PCF, just like all other pnlitical par-
ties, is not under fisaal control), or even in the gC~N in the pivot accounts
concerned. The same things discovered by the Socialist Interior Ministor
Jules Moch in 1948 I find, inimovable sentin~ls and even more numerous, in
1978/1979.
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H'OR O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
CHAP'1'T:lt 5. THE AMAZYNG TRIBULATIONS OF THE SOVIET BANK'S TRAVELING SALESMEN
- ['Cext )
P,usiness Everywhere
Like all large banks doing business on a planetary scale, the BC~N/~urobank
has an immense network of "correspondents" and contacts in the four corners
o� the globe. It cultivates its public relations very carefully, in France
as well as abroad. Its remarkable team of traveling salesmen criss-crosses
- the continents in search of news, with a view to creating or tightening ties
with official and economic circles.
Eurobank is the insidious agent of Soviet penetration. In France and in
~urope it occupies a position of near-monopoly in trade with the countries of
communist Europe, Cuba, Vietnam and certain "revolutio~iary" African states.
It is most often the preferred--almost inevitable--intermediary for transac-
tions Uetween the Western world (United States and Canada included) and the
Soviet empire. Through its intervention the Kremlin's influence extends ev-
erywhere, behind a soothing mask. But the business circles of the entire
world are aware of the influence of Eurobank; it embodies the USSR. To deal
with it is to deal with Brezhnev through Guy de Boysson and Vladimir Ponomarev.
When Eurobank's missi dominici are announced somewhere, their hosts know whom
they represent. The reception is rarely cool or distant.
The Soviet multinational uses the same approach procedures as its cour.~terparts--
American or others--, approaches so vilified by the communists and the ~eft in
general.
I am amazed to find that, far �rom imitating their illustrious elder, Jules ~
Moch, our new socialists--still so quick yesterday to align themselves with
the PCF--are keeping silent about the secular arm of Soviet imperialism in
France. -
' Indefatigable denouncers of a French pseudo-neocolonialism that would have
our bankers and business firms as tools, Rocard and Mitterrand never mention
the patient attempts at infiltration into the francophile African world to
which the BCEN is devoted.
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~~ox nrrzcx~ us~ oNLY
'I'he well-trait~ed le~ders o~ the ~nreigti Uepartment of the k3C~N are well known
for the ~ase with which they rub elbows with the richest managers. To see ~
- ~nd hear them, no one would suspect their ullsgi~nco to a Marxist apparatus.
~esides, they are ~ioti takan in by fine words. Cold, precise, concisQ, they
- unr~lyze n~tinn~l ~nd world ev~nts from day to day, without sectaxi~nism, with-
out verbi~ge, without locking themsclv~s into plans t~nd slogans i~i use among
communists. They coiiverse, deal, drink and fe~st wit}i representatives o� ~uro-
pean and world capitalist banking. lietween Nlonday 16 October and Friday
2Z October 1978 the foll~owing were received at ~oulevard Haussmann: the
director a~id assistant director of the I3anca DQ1 Gottardo de Lug~no, the 5wiss -
It~lian b~nking center, the dire~tor (arbitration-securities) of the Den
Uanske ~ank of Luxembourg*, the Paris representutive of the Bank of Nova
Scotia, the ~ssistant director of the Swiss Credit of ~asel, the vice presi-
de~it of the M~tiufacturers H~u~over Trust Company of New York, one of the ~CEiN's -
best connections in the USA'", The vice president of the Gosbank, the state-
owned bank of the U5SR, which controls the BC~N--does he come to Paris? Lun-
cheon ~ifter luncheon with the directors of the BNP [National ~ank of Paris],
I'aribas, Credit Lyonnais, the General Association.
All of these get-togethers ~zre the object of refined preparations. The guests -
are received in the smartest and most expensive restaurants. Mr de ~oysson
- and Mr Ponomarev have a predilection for Taillevent. 'I'hey are received there
with the respect reserved for the ambassadors of the czar. The table and dish-
es, which have been studied for several days beforehand, are the object of
bills for service, as is Pverything in the Soviet bank. On 17 November 1978
the secretary's office of the general management received this bill for the
luncheon (6 persons: 2,728 francs) to be offered on 20 November to the lead-
ers of our National Bank for Agricultural Credit:
"At the time of your last talk with Taillevent, did you also settle on
the menu?"
Among the Swiss Bankers
At the same time the bank's emissaries are going back and forth, like hard-
working ants, between the ~ast and the West. On 10 October 1978 Mr Dupuy and
Mr Laroze inform the "Management Committee" of the results of their latest
= journey to Czechoslovakia; they are pleased with the "very good welcome" they
received, at the Statni ~anka as well as at the Cekobanka. They recall that
the first of these establishments has important deposits in the BCEN, With re-
gar~ to the Cekobanka, they point out that at their request for intensifica-
tion of trade they were informed of "the difficulty of communicating with
Paris." The Cekobanka "might be interested in a four-ye3r loan." But there
= is "no loan on the Eurodollars market before 1979."
The Boulevard Haussmann multinational is particularly interested in Swiss bank-
ers. In addition to its Zurich sister, the Scviet financial antenna to the
Swiss, the BCEN has close and constant relat:ons with Swiss Credit, the Confed-
eration's third largest bank. In March 1977 Mr Peillon and Mr Roche leave
Paris for a huge operation to inform and se~luce their Swiss confreres. When -
*Luxembourg is the banking capital of thP stipranational Europe that communists,
assiduous customers of BCEAI, daily expose to contempt.
- *We will speak of it later, as well as the Credit Suisse.
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they return th~y too emphas~zo "the qunlity of the welCOme" reservad for
them by "the banks visited" , and continue:
"In addition to questions relative to our mutual business relations, the
talks we had with each of tho banks naturally dealt with large themes of
the day: the international monetary situ~tion, the sitiuation nf 5witzerlnnd
� and France, ~he Third World, etc.
- "The points we deem useful to mention particularly are as follows:
- "a. Everywhere we weiit we were asked ~any questions ~bout tihe indebted-
ness of the countries of the East .
"b. The large Swiss banks, especially the Swiss Bank Association and
the Swiss~Credit, strongly recommended that we work with their -
Luxembourg affiliates, Swiss $ank Association (Luxembourg), Swiss
Credit (Luxembourg)."
The exclusive report of details of a celebrated swindle that had sltaken the
Swiss in 1977, embellished the luncheon given by R. Berthoud, principal di-
rector of Swiss Credit-Zurich, and his associate, R. Schriber, assistant di-
rector for precious metals, for Mr Sigaudes and Mr Marty of the BCEN.
Such a misadvanture, which cost its partners billions, cannot happen at the
BCEN; controls there are too severe.
- In the USA, "A Very Warm Welcome; We Shall Tighten Our Bonds" -
~ BCEN leaders carry on regular and in-depth explorations in the United States.
They make reports in which no detail is missing of the climate of their talks _
and the results of the investigations for which they were responsible.
The report--19 pages--of the trip into the heart of American capitalism made _
by Mr Lacoste and Mr Delaye, from 8 to 12 May 1978, is a model of the genre.
Following a strict schedule--they have just four days for the trip--the am-
bassadors from the BCEN ga first to Ph~ladelphia, where they are received at -
the Fidelity Bank and at the First Pennsylvania Bank. In New York no less
than nine banks are honored with a visit from them: Bankers Trust Company,
Marine Midland Bank, Union of Swiss Banks, Morgan G Trust Company,
- Credit Lyonnais, Euramcor, Harris Bank International, Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Company, Industrial and Commercial Credit.
Though I am elsewhere purely professional, I cannot resist the temptation to
quote large excerpts from Lacoste and Delaye's "log book"; it is indeed an
edifying document and very revealing of the Soviet t~ank's relations with the -
- worst representatives of international plutocracy. Thsre is also no doubt that
it is a subject for meditation and bitter disappointment for communist and
CGT depositors of the BCEN.
*I wager the next time will be different.
*I shall return to this. 62 _
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"At the ~idelity ~ank, Philadolphi~:
~ "This w~s the first visit to Philadelphia since Mr de ~oysson"s t~rip in
1972. It should be emphasized that the welcome was vory warm, our re- ~
ception ~pparently having been prepared by Mr de Dumast...,
"Mx Linds~y, for liis part, mentioned the possibility of getting tugothcr
- on mattors of international financing for socialist countries. We arQ
not to hesitr~te to contact them.
"At the end of this visit, we can say th~t this bank made a good impression
on us, Its bal~nce sheet, of $3,200,000,000, its fourth-place position
among Pennsylvania banks..., which might meri~t increasing the limit that -
we grant it,"
- Concerning the First Pennsylvania Bank, Philadelphi~, Lacoste and delayo writo:
_ "{~lith n balance she~t of $8,300,000,000 at the ei~d of 1977, the First
; Pennsylvania is the foremost bank in the state and the 22nd in the United
States...
"In the international area...it is interested in loans to socialist
countries, but prefers the Soviet Union. Mr 5chmidt, who went to Moscow ,
on a visit two years ago, has regretted not having been invited into the
last operation in favor of VTB [expansion unknown]...
"From our conversatiai, we also interested them in participating selective- -
_ ly in international financial loans, because they are worrieci about the
troubles of certain countries like Zaire or Turkey (on the latter coun-
try we believed we understand that they were rather committed). They
like Algeria better than Morocco and Tunisia. Finally, they are sorry
that Beirut is disappearing as a financial center....
"At the Bankers Trust Company, New York
"The people we talked with believe that New York's position is becoming
increasingly important since the arrival en masse of the foreign banks--
(we were asked whether we intend to establish ourselves there).... -
The missi dominici from the BCEN, cautious, answered nothing. It is for
Moscow to decide, without their help.
"At the Dfarine Midland Bank, New York:
"..is still one of our best connections in New York in foreign*exchange
and is seeking to develop its deposit operations through Nassau .(We
have also lent them $10,000,000 in one month). Therefore we will try -
_ through telephone calls and Telex to further expand our field of activity..." _
*Nassau in the Bahamas is one of the most highly-valued fiscal paradises in
the Western world.
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Alw~ys, ~lw~ys this prenccup~tion with being present more and more at the
centnr of the capitalist citadell
"Mr Luscher of thA Union of Swiss Banks, New York, knows us well, h~ving
liud numerous occasions to work with us previously. But he has to loarn
to know the American exchange murket, and it is probable thut at first
our cdntncts will be less oasy than in the past. However, we ugreed to -
continue our series of regul~r calls..."
The DC~N does not neglect any contact. Having arrived at Morgan Guaranty
_ Trust Cnmpany, New York, Lacoste and Delaye boast of a
"...very warm welcome from Mr Vi~rmertz, who, having been the chief ex- ~
change �roker at the Morgan in Paris for five years, and then director
of the A1 Saoudi Bank in London, gave us a very care�ul economic and mon-
' etary analysis. This bank is exceptional in general analysis (as it lias
nften been in the past, by the way) and in the exch~nge rate of the US _
dollar as new situations occur. -
"Much less optimistic than the chief dealers of the market, Mr Viermertz
believes that American currency will be called upon to declino on the ex-
change markets during the second part of 1978. In fact, he believes that
' factors unfavorable to the US dollar continue to exist. Thus he thinks
the trade balance would scarcely improve, the balance of payments should
be aggravated by a deficit rising to $21,000,000,000 to $25,000,000,000
for 1978, inflation cannot be smothered this year. Our p artner in dialog
refers more to the wholesale price index in the USA than to the retail
price index, to demonstrate his points. According to him this situation
brings with it a decline in ability to compete among American firms, and
this shows up clearly in the trade sta~istics published since the begin-
ning of the year....
"Of course our relations with Morgan Paris and the bank's other headquar-
ters in Europe are excellent; however, we should tighten our bonds with
Morgan New York by means of a series of telephone calls, rather than by
Telex."
Tlie bosses of Credit Lyonnais in New York, Michel L. Canny, first vice presi-
~ dent, Miss Christine T. Wheller, vice president and chief trader, _
Mrs Martine Parmentier, assistant secretary, Bruno Merlin, chief foreign ex-
change, gave a sumptuous luncheon for a couple of agents of the Russian bank: �
"We were very warmly welcomed at the highest level. Mr Canny, during the
_ meal developed at length the activities of Credit Lyonnais in the USA,
which are constantly on the increase.
~ "No operating results were put forward for fiscal year 1977, but informa-
tion received elsewhere would indicate that the Lyonnais in the USA did
not have good results....
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roR orrtc:r~ vs~ oM.a~
_ "Mrs Parmentier ~nd Mr Canny are pleased with tho gnod relntions with -
~urnbank i~t the iuattr,r o~ clearing opQrations, und with the lack of in-
cidents to date since we chose them as our sole connection for daily ex-
change opor*tion~. Mr Canny, however, was eager to remind us thut
, Mr 5igaudes was a rough negotiator....
"Mr Canny hopes �or the development of xreasury and ~xcliange operations
betwoQn our two banks und great possibilities certainly exist in this -
- area....
"Althcugh Miss Wheelor seemed very competent to us, the t~am as a whole
did not seem very homogeneous."
Tallcs of a political nature played a large roYe at the European American Bank-
ing Corporation: '
"Very f.riendly welcome....
"In the long discussion that followed, Mr Duseberg introduced us to the
America~i economy's strong points and weaknesses....
~ "The most warrying thing is the Carter administration's weakness, and
- Mr Lluseberg hopes he will have only one term as president, while hoping
~ that in the meantime the White House host will surround himself with a
more competent team than the "Georgians" who are currently in place. It
is thought that at the current level the US dollar is undervalued and, in
particular tliat Ger~nan industry is beginning to suffer for its exports, ~
its present activity being still based on previous contracts."
"New York Illuminated at our Feet"
- The meeting with the leaders of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, New York,
which is one of Eurobank's principal transatlantic partners, makes Lacoste
_ and Delaye lyrical. Received, invited to lunch and dinner by Messrs Sura, -
Faulhaber, Deviiie, Hazard and Meginty--l-ianover Trust's big guns--, their wel-
come "measured up to our relations, extremely cordial throughout an extremely
long afternoon and evening, duxing which on the one hand we visited the for-
eign exchange room and on the other hand dined sumptuously with New York il-
_ luminated at our feet."
~ No leader of the CGT or the PCF, who are customers of the BCEN, had been in-
vited to enjoy this super-capitalistic fairyland. -
- After a brief stop at the Harris Bank International, Lacoste and Delaye com-
plete their tour by greeting the Industrial and Commercial Credit, New York:
"Altliough it has not developed its activities as strongly as the Credit
Lyonnais, the CIC [Industrial and Commercial Credit] (which by the way -
opened its agency later) is r~aking rapid strides. Mr Ravise was detached
from Paris two and a half years ago and has developed the exchange service,
which is one of the most active in New York with regard to the French �ranc.
*Raymond Sigaudes: assistant general manager of the BCEN.
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~~ox ~t~i'~CIAL US~ ONi.Y
'Che people we t~lked with ~lso invited us to cnnt~ct them for deposits
in U5 Jdllgrs, in whi~h they clnim to be very cdmpetiitive...,
"Our visit to th~ CIC was the lnst one wc m~de in New 1'drk, The people
we talk~d with had ~lmost the s~m~ opinion ~s their CO11C~gU~5 on thr
cfoll~r rutc. Ch~ exch~nge and taking intn ucCOUnt thc politicgl stt~bility
in Frunc:e, th~y are predicting ~n even firmer ~rench franc."
'fhis perfectly oUjective report confirms the coclness of the BCL:N m~nagement
and their intentinn of developing to the m~ximum their juicy bits nf business,
~specially in matters of exchange, with the plutocrats. Unlik~ the nnalysts
certified by the pC~ and the CGI, they are certainly not pre~icting that the -
capit~listic system wil~ coll~pse.
tlunting for gillions--in Iran
'I'he same prudence, doubled by a curiosity tinged with indiscretion nbout po-
litical events, sees the light of day in the 11 very thick p~ges (r~ference
Iran 1978--CB/mjp) of the "Repnrt of 7'alks with Christian ~oehm at Tehrun--
. 7 to 15 April 197g."
A mc:mber of the Communist Party who is totally unknown to the r~nk nnd file,
this tiigh-ranking dignitary of the Soviet bank, who is 53--bluc cyes and ele-
g~nt gl;~sses--is promised a finer future. Nothing in his appea~rance allows ~
one to guess the eminent role entrusted to him. Ne is the one who in all logic
sliould replace Mr de Boysson when the latter is called upon to retire. perli~ps ~
- t~c ~~ill then consent to abandon his home in red su~iurbia for t~ne 16th
North or Neuilly, the neighborhoods that customarily fall to tl~e big bosses
of t}ie house. -
Mr Boehm arrived in Iran at the time when the present crisis was starting. _
'I'he questions he asks exceed the framework of current affairs and err on the
side of indiscretion. For Mr Boehm has succumbed to the demon o� cur-
_ iosity.
~
One law for the rich, another for the poor. In Paris, in the communist pre~s,
tt~c shah and his regime will be flogged in writing and caricature; in Tehrai~,
thcy are going to speak, dialog, exchange points of view, solicit the opin- _
iori of Iranian financiers on the events in their country. The Soviets like it.
In Tehrar~ there is a bank with 10~ percent Soviet capitalization. It is part
of the multinational of which BCEN is the head in the hiest. Mr Boehm's first
- priority is to contact this bank during a visit that includes the following -
appointments:
Bar~ks visited: Russo-Iran; Saderat; Bank of 'Tehran; Sepah; Etebarate
Iran; ~felli; Markazi; Sanaye Industrial Credit Bank; IMBDI [expansion un-
' known~; Iranshahr; BNP (Delegation in Iran); BUE [expansior~ unknown]
. (charge de mission in Iran).
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Cinns visited: SpIL' [~xpansion unknown] B~tignolles; Creusot-Lalre;
Atomic Cnergy Orgnniz~tion o~ Iran (AL'OI).
Other individuals met with: Indosuea; COGCMA (General Nucleur Materinls
Cnmpany).
When h~ goes to the B~nk of Tehran h~ receives n"traditinnal w~lcom~, th~t -
is rather cold." They are suspicious, in f~ct, of Moscow's emiss~ries. 'Chnt
docs not discourage him:
"To ~ncournge conversation, I r~called our previous offers of lines of
credit--the answer ex~ected, 'we do not need them.' Changing the sub-
ject, I wanted to know their point of view on the reality of the recent
events rel~ted by the ~uropean press, telling of tensions in Ira~i.
Mr Cha~ha: 'I don't grasp your question very well. Oh, perhaps you are
alluding to T~briz7 That is all settled; it was the fault of two police
officials who let things get to them."'
Mr Boehm drew a blank; they gave him some of his own back!
On the ott~er hand, the ambiance was charming at the Russo-Iran B~nk. There, ~
they confided in him pal-to-pal. The Itusso-Iran Bank is--as I have suid-- -
the equa.valent of the BCEN in Tehran. Mr Boehm learns from the mouth of its
Russian president, Nikolaev (foreign nationals can direct banks in Iran),
that 5oviet plans in Iran had been too ambitious. The Russo-Iran ~ank agen-
= cy in Is~ahan has not been doing well (it is to move into a more modest build-
ing) and consequently the anticipated opening of four other branches in the
country's large cities is deferred sine dic.
Mr Nikolaev docs not fail to furnish an explanation of the failure:
"Althoug}i economic relations at state level are still important between
the USSR and Iran, the present political climate in Iran does not en-
courage--to say the least--citizens of this country to develop their re-
l~tions with the Russo-Iran Bank, the only 100-percent subsidiary of a
foreign b~nk." `
To encourage their good relations, "his friend" Nikolaev asks Mr Boehm to
help "one o� its big customers, Mr Kashani, who owns, atnong other things, a
plant for a~sembling�television sets, the tubes for which are purchased from
the Videcolor Company of Lyon."
It will be done; how could the BCEN say no to the Soviets?
At the 5cpah Bank the welcome is "friendly." They talk about foreign currency,
they promisc to review it. When Mr Boe}un crosses the threshold of the Ete-
~arate Iran Bank, where he has "a long talk with Mr Moizan (assistant general
manager) in a very friendly climate, as usual," he is still burning with the
unsatisfied desire to know hox Iranian b~nkers envisage the political situation.
There, he gets his money's worth:
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rox d~rzr,rnt, us~ dx~,Y
"On th~ recent events, Mr Mdizan is of the opinion th~t they werr th~
result'of u growth crisis. In ~ny rase not a populnr movem~nt, but r~Ch-
er ~ combinution of ~ctions by landowners dispossessed by the "whit~ re-
vnlution" (~grgri~n reform) of the shah, of religious londers (mullal~s),
stud~ntis recruit~d from thc most well-off circlos, whnsa common idcology
is ~n intc~grist Isi~mism (~lthough the authnriti~s questio~i the "Isl~vnic
Murxists" who ure thus reactfng against the tod-r~pid ~vdlution of snci~l '
st.ructures ~nd mores) brought ubout by the pacc and style of th~ country's
development.
"t{owever, t}�re are real problems like too-significunt socinl distortions,
authorit~rianism in government, corruption, the absence of representative
iiitermediary bodies (the Mwiicipal Council of 7'ehran, a city of 4~500,000
inhabitgnts, was "elected" by 15,000 voters)i CtC."
Mr ~oehm adds no commentary as to whether he believes in this "capitalistic"
ttn~lysis, which on the whole is identical ta the official version. llc records
it, and says nothing. But one feels he is not taken in by the communist and
CGI' propagands on the "popular" nature of the revolt against the sl~ah. And
the prospect of conducting fruitful relations with the regime of the "execution-
er of Tehran" (as L'HUMANI'fL generally calls him) does not take away his ap-
petite. Quite the contrary; it makes his mouth water. Patiently, cleverly,
_ he proposes the BC~N's services to the Melli gank, the Markazi ~ank, the
5anaye Bank (which he wants ~s ~ partner in Mexica and Brazil), the Industrial _
- Credit Bank, the IMBDI, the Iranshahr Bank .~taking sponsorship inte Account,
entering into relations would appear to be judicious"), so many institutions
representing the flower of Iranian supercapitalism, indeed the circles close -
to the shah. There he discusses wonderful transactions in which the money of
French trade unions and Iranian billionaires will be mixed by 5oviet specula-
tors in the same package, to fill, among other things, the pockets of that -
"assassin of the working class," the "torturer", the shah. ~
The BCEN in "The Murderers' Camp" `
Assassin, torturer; we find those words in a thousand and one statements of
the PCf and the CGT. On 18 October 1978 LA VOIX DES EMPLOY~S ET CADRES, the
_ CGT monthly, absolutely condemned "the bankers and Iran." The text I am re-
- producing here is approved by the National Group of CGT Cadres (account
No 05346-3 in the BCEN):
"The Bankers and Iran
"The press has widely echoed the presence in Iran of 120 bankers on the
day following the massacre of a crowd that was demonstrating peacefully
~ (nearly 3,000 dead were counted).
- "They were there at the invitation of the Iranian authorities to celebrate
the anniversary of the Melli-Iran Bank.
"Allowing for error on our part, the principal ~rench bankers, especially
the management of the nationalized banks, were represented at the recep-
tion.
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"Uefinitely, one hgs th~ frf~nds on~ deserves. ~veryo~i~ I~as chnsen his
cc~np l
Unlike thc bankers who chns~ thc c~np di the tortur~rs, the CG'C C~mp will
nlw~ys be the c~mp of the workers gnd the Iranign peopl~." -
Uo~s not the CG'I' know that its own bnnk hgs chosen the camp of the "murder-
~rs", gg~inst whom the pC~ Politicnl Bureau end the Nntfonal Bure~u of the
Young Communist Movement launched this appeal on 2 January 1979:
"The ~rencli Communist Party again dennunCes the crimes of a di~t~torship _
that is only maintained with the support of the American imperialism un-
der whiCh tens of thousands of military advisers are staffing t}ie Ira.nian
ar???y. . . .
"We c~ll t~pnn communists, workers, men of courage, laborers, employees,
intellectuals, women and youths of the Parisian region who mean to express
- their indignation at the mgssacres and their solidarity with the people
and the working class of Iran /to go in delegations to the embassy of
Iran, 4 Avenue d'Iena on Friday S January at 1830. ~
"Halt the massacresl _
"Immediate withdrawal of the American militaryl
"~reedom and independence for the Iranis~n peoplel/"
The PC~ Political Bureau obviously could not ask the "communists, workers,
men of courage..." to "go in a delegation" to the Soviet bank, its bank, to
demand the "immediate withdrawal" of the millions of dollars it invested in
this dictatorship.
'Che BCEN, which needs to infiltrate, to be everywhere, wi~.dly macks the Iran-
ian proletariat, behind whose back it is going to take profits which will en-
able it, in its turn, to render service to the CGT. The buckle is fastened;
sEe how Seguy and Marchais have become bloodthirsty men, through the medium
of the bank, with regard to their dear Persian brothers.
I am not exaggerating at all. When Mr Boehm notes, as he does nearly every-
where, the "very friendly welcome" by Mr Le Lay, the general delegate of our
BNP, hc knows that he comes to propose: "The BNP," Mr Boehm writes in his re- ~
port, "is co-leader of most of the contracts signed by French industry in =
Iran. They also make direct connections with private Iranians, Goface cred-
it~ and installment refinancing, because local banks do not want to commit ~
chemselves for the middle term. /I am pointing out our interest in being con-
tacted for these operations"."
1 With private Iranians! Those frightful people! The bank of the CGT and the
PCF is dreaming only of credits and /middle-term/ refinancing with the vampires
of Iranian capitalism! Notice the expression "m~ddle term." While Marchais
and Seguy sing of the Iranian "revolution" their Soviet bankers are betting on
*,Author's note: Italics mine.
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the regime. Mr ~oehm is up to his old tricks and Communieates to his 5oviet
bossc~s the conclusion ~f tho gNP leaders in Tehran: "They are formulating a
positive opinion on development in Irar~ for the next five to sPvQ~ y~a~s."
Clear, cgtegoricnl Fu?d candidl
Thus reassured, Mr goehm goes away with a nimble ste~~, to take on the super-
capitulistic ~rench firms established in Iran by Giscardian neocoloniglism
(as Rene Andrieu would say) in order to starve the Persian masses. At the
_ 5pI~ gatignolles ("contact arranged through the BUE"), Mr Boehm gets dizzy -
listening to the general delegate, Pierrel babanne, juggle billions in nu-
clear contracts by "doubling the ~andar-Chapour railroad (on the Gulf of
Oman)--Caspian sea, gas pipelines, etc.: "There is work there," Mr Boehm .
exclaims, "for 15 yearsl"
- Let the BC~N run fast, with the money of the PCF, of the CGT and the Shop
Councils, to lend assistance to these magnates' marvelous plans! -
;
At Creusot-Loire Mr Boehm is proud to find that its "general manager, dele-
gated by the group in Iran, Mr Lebourgeois, knows our bank well. He reviews
the activities of the group in Iran."
My listing them will fill with joy the financial experts of the PCF, who are
so opposed to the activities of the multinationals:
IGAT [Lranian Gas Trackline) Pipeline 2: the US5R built the first as
a result of a barter (including the Isfahan steelworks) in return for
supplying the southern regions of the Soviet Union with gas; IGAT 2--
1,900 km--will convey 27,000,000,000 cubic meters from the Kangan re-
servoir near the Persian Gulf, 17,000,000,000 of which will be used by
the USSR for the energy needs of the three Transcaucasian Soviet Repub-
_ lics. The USSR will replace it with Soviet gas from Oujgorod, on the
border between Czeclioslovakia and that country, then Austria (2,000,000,000
cubic meters), the FRG (5,850,000,000) and France (3,800,000,000).
- Nuclear: FRAMATOME [Franco-American Atomic Construction Company]
Transportation: doubling the transiranian railroad line; Batignolles,
Civil Engineering, SPIE for electrification, MTE [expansion unknown]
hopes to have the rolling stock.
Gas compression stations--steelworks.
Similar manna stirs up Mr Boehm, who perhaps thinks of the accounts (numbers
- 03497 and 03781 respectively) that Comrades Antoine Acquaviva and
Robert Lambotte of L'HUMANITE have in the BCEN. To better help these humble
men, lost in his millionaire clientele, he hopes that Creusot-Loire (let us
say, the French super-monopoly whose~nationalization was provided for by the
Common Program) will benefit from the IMBDI loan now in preparation on the
~uro-currency market, /from which for us there is encouragement to res~ond
favorably if we are invited./*"
*Author's note: Italics mine.
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ro~ o~~icr~ us~ ocn,Y
Oh, yes, oh, yes, the BCCN will be invited. And in tliis way the 14,515.23
francs that the L'HUMANI7'E journalist Made.leine Riff~ud entrusted to comrudes
Guy de ~oysson and Ponomarev, can increase nnd multiply, under th~ protective
wing of Creusot-Loire and the shah. Because--Mr ~oehm confirms this ecstatic-
ally--Mr LeUourgeois, too, is "quite confident about Irun's future. Lven if
the shah should abdicate in ~our years, as is rumored a~ court, he is per-
suaded that his succession is provided for�here and now by the military."
- gillions for the Shtih; 15 ~rancs for "his Victims"
~ravo, Mr Lebourgeois! You saw it almost correctly. And lottg live those .
noble spldiers Mr Marchais and Mr 5eguy are holding up to public censure, but
thanks to whora the red bankers will succeed with their flourishing business,
enabling them on 16 October 1978 to grant the PCF's press-publishing and propa-
_ ganda sector an overdraft of 500,000,000 centimes ~the most prudent evaluation)
and approximately 2,000,000,000 in loans.
I have left for the last the account of Mr Boehm's latest meetings in Tehran.
The one with the "Commercial adviser to the embassy of France in Iran--
Mr Dalberto--'~ did rtothing to shake Mr Boehm's conviction that the shah is on
solid ground. Mr Dalberto told him of the "anxiety points:"
" Agriculture: they will never arrive at self-sufficiency, because this
is not a profitable activity ~or the private contractor. Instead they
will develop agro-food activity from imported products.
"Flight of capital: (the figure of $3,000,000,000 per year is quoted)
which illustrates a lack of confidence in the future of the new Iranian
bourgeoisie.
"PetrQlewn: reserves are limited. Gas is hard to sell. Non-petroleum
exports are nonexistent.
"Inflation: (2 percent per month)--manpower shcrtage, desire for economic
slowdown on the part of the authorities, to combat inflation.
"Iience fewer contracts currently being signed, for lack of budgetary ap-
propriations. However, among the projects to be signed are mentioned:
new Tehran airport and subway; a first section was opened symbolically.
_ Doubling the railroad; SPI~ Batignolles is in a good position, but nothing
, has be~n signed.
"Among the contracts signed: Airbus, but financing problems not yet set-
tled (COFACE (expansion unknown]/Eiermes purchaser credits or loan on
Eurocurrency?).
- "Peugeot: financing no more definite there.
"Nuclear: they are still discussing credit condition~. The Iranians ac-
cept the 3-percent management board, but reject the 3 percent hiring board.
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They barely ~ccepted the COFACE guarantee bo~rd by denying thQ oxistence
of risks to their country.
"To his knowledge the Finance Ministry is not intervening to form bunking
pools. They are limiting themselves to choosing tho top man."
These shadows o~i the picture are ~ompensated for by an appeasing statemc~nt:
"Concerning the recent troubles, Mr Dalberto believes the new fact is not
that they are being produced, but that the Iranian press speaks of them,
because it is now authorized to do so.
"The troubles are largely inevitable, because of the country's too-rapid
development. The foxce that is resisting this development is animgted
chiefly by the Muslim clergy, which is losing power."
Leaving the spacious premises of our embassy, Mr Boehm goes to the most in-
teresting institution in Iran--the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
All covetousness is centered in it, given the fabulous volume of its business.
A piquant, picturesque detail to enchant Mr Marchais: at the time when
Comrade Boehm, on behalf of Brezhnev and Ponomarev, went to greet this bastion
of Iranian tyranny, the head of the AE I was a man very close to the shah and ~
considered the real master of the Persian economy, Mr Khadjavi. Mr Boehm was
wsrmly recommended to him by Mr Alcay (authorized representative of the Bank
of the European Union in Tehran), who "did not want his name given as a refer-
ence." I gladly do it in his place. This indiscretion has scarcely any im-
portance today; for some months Mr Khadjavi has been in prison, a~~i~tim of
the campaign against corruption unleashed by the arr.ny in the govert?ment.
Mr Marchais' bankers' associations are not always vc~ry estimable.
What does Mr Boehm do in Mr Khadjavi's lair? He passion~.tely pleads the cause
of the BCEN, which wants to participate in the shah's feast, even if it means
picking up the crumbs. Mr Boehm throws himself into a r.�inging speech, which
he summarizes thus:
"A report on the characteristics of our bank, its activity in Iran, its
relations with the French firms interested in several important contrac~s,
including nuclear power plants, in such a way that they know what we are
if our name happens to be proposed to them by our Parisian confreres on
the occasion of new contracts or for extending contracts or subcontracting
that have already been sigred.
"The people we talked with say they agree with this step; actually, there
will be repercussions on the matters already signed and they have other -
plans: creation of an atomic research center in Isfahan, with French
participation. They indicate that they are disposed to enter into rela-
tions with 'an important bank like yours.'
"We agree that I will send them documentation on the bank, both the Legal
Department and the Financial Department."
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Mr Boehm surely deserved well of Mr Ponorogrev; the A~OI is now counted mm~ng
the partners nf the SoviQt bank in pttris, which h~s m~intained tn tha end its
help to the shah's rQgim~. On 1 De~ember lg7g, in full insurrection ngainst
the "tyrant" and while the opposition is putting ~ stop to th~ petroleum man- _
nt~--the supr~me weapon for def~ating the sovereign--the gC~N is concernod with
i~nvesting Capit~l in Iran which will serv~, on th~ other hnnd, to increase
- production,
On that day th~ ~oreign Trnde Uep~rtment dQals with 22 matters, all o� prime
importance. The l~th conCerns:
"Indosuez/~lr Aquitaine/Iran
"See Affair No 2220--contract for 1,200,000 francs--for starting produc-
tion of the .Sisri C nnd Sirri D oil-bearing field.
"We are participating at the level of 2 percent in the prefinancing
credit of 606,800,000 francs.
- "Indosuez informs us that the validity of this aid is extended to April
1979 (agreement of the Bank of France obtained), because of the delay in
the work of putting the oil-bearing fields into production.
"We confirm our agreement to participate."
The ~CL'N would have been perfectly well able to refuse it and withdraw the
12,000,000,000 centimes it had invested in this more than fabulous operation,
_ put together at the time by the shah's omnipotence. It preferred to keep its -
money where it was; Moscow did not believe in Khomeiny's victory. However,
in October-November 1978, 117 of the bank's employees, "profoundly angered by
the terrible events that are plunging Iran into mourning and in order to come
to the aid of the children, the families that are victims of the repression,"
will, t*eir small change ringing, respond to the appeal of the French People's
Welfare .
Heading for Portugal _
This indefatigable globe-trotter takes himself from Iran to the Maghrib and
Portugal as easily as a dragonfly. Here he is in Lisbon, where he participates
from 14 to 18 October 1978 in the "Eighth Seminar for Foreign Bankers", or-
ganized by the Banco Portugues do Atlantico. On 23 October he transmits to
de Boysson, Ponomarev, Soudakov and Peillon the first fruits of his Lusitanian
cogitations. Is there azry need to state that they do not at all coincide with
those of the PCF and the CGT? Mr Boehm perhaps feels some political nostalgia
at seeing Portugal leave the Marxist orbit, he contents himself, as a banker, -
_ with exploring better ways of exploiting Portugal's "return" to capitalism,
for the benefit of the Soviets.
- Of all the leaders of the BCEN/Eurobank, Mr Boehm is the only one who has
"states of mind" that give his writing a personal coloration. We give lrim
the floor (p 2 of his report):
*French People's Welfare: A PCF organization (Account No 05055 in the Soviet
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"Although the Portuguegerovolution of spring 1~J74 w~s of the "1789 type, ~
- ~n uir of Itestoration is flouting in the ~ir of Lisbon in the Full of
1J78; thn ~migres ~ro roturning, not from Koblonz, b~it from 5uo ~uulo und
tl~~ "Congress of Vienna" headquarters in Washington."
A picturesque mini~ture, in which are missing the opprobriwus thgt Marchuis and
Seguy cause to rnin on the latest Portugue~egovernments. Mr Boehm concludes
liis lyric couplet� with this formidable justi�ication oF the present regime:
"After three agitated years, Pnrtugal has deeply felt the necessity for u
~:olitical truce in the face of the urgency for meeting serious ecunomic prob- ~
; lems." Resulting from the participation of the Portuguese Communist party
(supported by the PCF) in government and the follies that caused it to be ex-
pelled from it.
The bank of the CGT and the PCF really wants to contribute to repairing the
damages brought on by the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party].
If, naturally, the conditions proposed are good ones.
To inform himself, Mr Boehm "paid a visit to the following four banks:"
- The Bank of Portugal: "Cxcellent welcome...I seized the opportunity to list
our aid of various kinds to Portuguese banks and institutions: COFACE credits
(20,00O,OOn francs), financial credits, $7,000,000."
Another secret of the Soviet bank in Paris that its customers, the PCF and
the CGT are completely ignorant ofl While they howl against the Portuguese
regime, their bankers are eager to proclaim their support ror it.
At the Banco Espirito Santo e Comercial the bosses "say they are optimistic
about the situation in general, which is going to continue to settle down.
- They are hoping that the present provisional government of Nobre da Costa
(t}ie pet aversion of the communists and the Portuguese trade unions that are
devoted to them) can remain in place until the elections of spring 1979, for
it is made up of competent technicians and workers, unlike their predecessors
(the Mario Soares cabinet)." -
_ The French-Portuguese Credit and its manager Mr Agostini, according to
hfr Boehm, deserve a good mark. However, Mr Agostini "is very reserved about
the economic situation. The industrial productive apparatus, which is nation-
alized, is not profitable." An appraisal that does not produce the slightest
reticence in Mr Boehm, despite the dogma so jealously supported by Marchais
and Seguy, that it is necessary to nationalize as much as possible. Which was -
done by the Portuguese "revolutionaries" who led t~e country into bankruptcy.
Mr Boehm abstains from theoretical debates; they might disturb Mr Agostini,
' who is "so well disposed, for example, to lend us, for six months, 2,000,000
marks at a rate slightly higher than the market."
How can such a temptation be resisted?
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It is negligable, neverthele,s, in relation to the cupidity that takes -
possession of our Soviet bank when it learns from A. Contreras, assistant
managor of the Banco Borges e Irmao, that "their Paris agency has significnnt
cash res~rves in francs and would bo intorestod in recoiving proposals ~or
diversi�ied re-use of them. To contact his mnnager, Mr Mach~do; indoed, out
of 90U,000 Portuguese living in France, 500,000 are settled in the Parisian
region."
This makes the Soviet banker dizzy.
If one were successful in unionizing these 500,000 into the CGT, they would
automatically become customers of the BCBN.
One's interest is actively aroused.
To Support Regimes Denounced by the PCF and the CGT
'I'he BCEN's emissaries do not nourish any anxiety concerning their traveling
expenses. When the eternal Mr Boehm, flanked this time by P. Remond, left
on a/ten-day/ trip (from 18 to 28 September 1978) to Libya and Tunisia, he
. had already had in his pocket since the morning of Friday 15, the fare so-
licited for them at the BCEN's travelers' exchange department by its for-
eign trade department. Each of them collected for the occasion $1,000
($800 in travelers' checks and $200 in banknotes) and 5,000 francs (4,500 in
travelers' checks and 500 in banknotes). Almost 1,000,000 centimes apiece.
What is so amazingT you will say. Expense accounts are a fact of all corp- ~
orations of a certain size, and there has to be a minimal fare for traveling.
Certainly. But why is L'HUMANITE drwnming inta our ears slogans of this kind:
"How Many Times the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage]?" and why
does it launch into a d~scourse on occasion against abuses of "expenses" by
certain employers? Incontestably Boehm and Remond will have enough money to
pay for some clandestine whiskeys in their rooms at the Mediterranean Hotel,
Tripoli, to thoroughly prepare for the conversations with the "managers" of
, the "Central Bank of Libya", the "National Commercial Bank," the "Libyan For-
eign Bank," the "Wanda Bank," the "Umma Bank," and with the commercial coun-
selor of the French Embassy, Jean-Paul Leroy on 20 September at 1300.
I pxefer, considering its content, ta keep to the expenses in the report of _
these talks. It will suffice to know that Col Qadhdhafi and the Soviets are
- thick as thieves--at our expense, naturally. Th.eir complicity in all fields
~ is too well known to need demonstrating; instead let us take a look at the
BCEN's dealings in Tunisia: They contribute proof that the Soviets are making -
_ a considerable effort--increasingly crowned with success--to penetrate Franco-
phone Africa, and that their strategic requirements are leading them to sup-
port regimes that the CGT and the communists violently denounce every day.
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~oK o~�rtcl~ us~ ox~Y
In '1'unisia, tho 13C~N Itefutes tho Nonsense from the PC~ nnd tlio CGT
The case of Tunisi~ is an example. ~or months the CGT has boen exprnssing its
~u11 and entire solidarity with the trade unionists arrested by Bourguib~ and �
charged w3th "having unleashed the murderous troubins nF 26 Junuary 1978."
In France their pxoceodings aroused storms of protost. No udjective is i~ttrd
~ onough, in the hands of tho communists and CG'1' memburs, to withor l3ourguibu
and I~Is regimQ. Twa excerpts will illustrate what I am snying.
From L'HUMANIT~, 2 August 1978:
"The militia in dungaxees, armed with clubs, that one saw in January leav-
ing the headquarters of the pestourian 5ocialist Party in power...had o-
rased the image of a liberal Tunisia...Nothing remains of Tunisian "lib-
eralism" except the support given it by another liberalism, this one "ad-
vanced,"~ the liberalism of the Giscardian government...."
On 4 October, from tlie tiVFTU (World rederation of Tx~de llnions, wliich is pro-
Soviet) and the CGT, which: -
"firmly protest this new attack on the freedoms and rights whose victims
are once more the leaders of the Tunisian working class
Well, as usual, fortified by the money of its CGT and communist customers, it -
is the BCEN and not the Giscardian government that coldly finances this dis- -
graced regime, and gets ready to consolidate it. Boehm and Remond's report
furnishes irrefutable witness to that fact.
It begins with an analysis of the Tunisian situation, under the title of
- "Tunisian Realism on Trial."
After a panaromic view of the economy, the report gets down to the present _
- facts (p 1) :
"Affected by the international crisis and confronted with unprecedented `
- social problems, Tunisia has entered a waiting phase, the next stage of
which might be the verdict in the legal action of the Tunisian unionists,
_ for which some see a model sanction matched by a pardon measure.
"A first cyclical balance sheet makes it appear that: -
"Some of the most costly plans of the Fifth Plan have been deferred,
_ "Recourse to foreign indebtedness remains reasonable, servicing the
debt represents 11 percent of current receipts,
"Inflation remains confined to between 6 and 7 percent,
*On the same date, "General Circular No 15" (9 August 1978) of the "National
~ Federation of Employees and Cadres of Insurance, Credit, Social Security and
Others" is posted on the bulletin boards of the CGT-BCEN. It denounces "the
practice of torture" and "the abominable conditions of impris:?nment" in
Tunisia. -
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~ok o~rici~. us~ ox~.,Y
"The educntion and tr~ining policy is a success: 95 porcnnt of the
young population is providod with education; Tunisi~ ~nnu~lly "pro-
duces" 15,000 with bachelors' degrees."
We emph~size that, unlike their CGT and communist customors and friends,
aoehm and Remond t~ke notQ of the regime's positive ~spects. Solid and real-
istic, t}iey make fun of the slogans and opprobriums of the CGf and the PCF,
wh.ining that the masses are being used, And they are not content with ob-
serving the purely economic aspects of the situation. They continue:
"What is happening to the political and social climat~? The January
strikes and their brutal repression were a shock to the Twiisians, and -
they say many young people are looking abroad, especially to the "South-
east," no doubt in the hope of higher salaries and better use o� their -
degrees. ~
"The Tunisians w.e talked with do not minimize.the magnitude of these
phenomena, which have their origin in part in the post-Bourguiba political
uncertainty.
"Two hypotheses are to be envisaged:
"A technocratic government of the Nouira type,
- "A political government in which either the Neo-Destour Party or the -
Masmoudi-Mestiri group would have the best of it; in either case,
generally, a crisis of regime and the upset of foreign alliances are
ruled out."
No one could be more categorical or refute more peremptorily the nonsense of
the CGT and the PCF. -
Received Like Emirs in Bourguiba Territory
Once the premise is presented that the regime will not be overthrown and will
not change its foreign alliances (with the West), the leaders ot the Soviet
bank tell of their one-week stay, from 21 to the marning of 28 September, in
- the capital of the tyrant Bourguiba:
"Our welcome was once more excellent and te~tifies to the quality af our
relations with Tunisian banks.
"Our business relations are on three levels:
"In cash, the Central Bank is currently lending us $15,000,000, it
, is one of our regular depositors; _
- "Our financial commitments vis-a-vis the principal industrial corpo-
� rations and the Republic of Tunisia amount ta ~5,000,000;
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_
~OR UFFICIAL USE nM.,Y
"We are part3cipating in seven buyers' credits for a total of
20,000,000 francs, as well as in a framework agreement of lOQ,000,000
francs recently signed between the Gafsa Phospi?ates Company and sev-
eral French banks.
"We made our usual visit to tha �ollowing banks:
"Bank of the 5outh
- ~ank of Tunisia
_ Banking Union for Commerce and Industry
International Banking Union
N ational Bank of Tunisia
Tunisian Bank Company
- Central Bank of Tunisia
Tunisian Econamic.Development Bank
"as well as to the Commercial Counselor, and for the first time to the
Gafsa Phosphates Company." -
This perfect� resume saves me a long expose of affairs in which the BCEN works
hand in glove with 8ourguiba. However, it is instructive to reproduce some _
fragments of the report.
Welcomed at the Bank of the South by Miled Allouche, Boehm and Remond mention _
"areas in which we might get together: for example the mobilization of debts
held by their customers on foreign suppliers (especially Eastern countries)~
One of their customers, Star, the first Tunisian insurance company, would be =
the borrower of $6,000,000 over seven years. The Bank of the South will talk
to us again about this when the operation is put together."
~ The 13CEN never forgets its role as honest age~it for the countries of the East.
At the B~nk of Tunisia, Ben Brahim, manager of the foreign department, "re- ,
_ reived us kindly and was optimistic about Tunisia's economic situation; the
= resumption of relations with Libya would serve as an outlet for their manpow-
- er. However, many projects are in suspension while awaiting the verdict in
the unionist proceedings. He believes Mr N~uira is the natural successor to
President Bourguiba."
Boehm and Remond do not contradict him at all.
At the "Banking Union for Commerce and Industry" they are informed of "Tunis-
ian investment plans, notably a refinery in the Gabes gulf, near a gas field _
- recently brought to light by Elf Aquit aine, replacement of extraction equip-
ment and refining of phosphates (20,000,000 dinars)."
_ They would like "the International Union of Banks"--the third largest Tunisian
commercial bank, which is in the midst of its development," at which on
22 September at 0930 they received a"friendly welcorae," to draw up the docu-
ments, "however platonic our relations are, because of the importance of the -
participation of Credit Lyonnais (33 percent), which at the same time as the -
"Europartners" is their preferred connection." ~
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Even red bankers are never platoiiic.
'The more they liko someonE, the more they press. Although Hassen Riahi,
assistant general manager of the "National Bank of Tunisia" had on that same
day "arr~.nged an extremely congenial luncheon, bringing together, besides
his colleagues Mr Benzoubeir and Mr Redissi, directors of the BNT ~Nationul
_ Bank af Tunisia], Bach Hamba of the Central Bank and the journalist ~
Jean-Francois Chauvel, who is preparing a work on Tunisia," a roast lamb and
_ some zalabias ~translation unknown] in haney are not going to satisfy our in- _
satiable canvassers from the Soviet empire. Boehm and Remond comment (p 6):
"U;~ to now our very good relations have not been made concrete by a reg-
_ ular operations movement, we promised each other to seek together means
- of ~ooperating, perhaps within the framework of their commercial opera-
tions with European countries. There again, the means to develop our re-
lations will have to be found through the UTB [expansion unknown] in Paris."
- The customers of the "top-ranking commercial bank in Tunisia," the Tunisian
Bank Company (Sotubank) are '~interested in Eastein European markets." Our -
two samaritans "proposed to Moncef Maaoui (assistant general manager) that we
help ~hem with their early contacts...."
Informed by a French Diplomat
No one is proof against unpleasant surprises. We pity the Boehm/Remond tandem, _
_ whose lunc'�eon on Monday 25, on the invitation of Hedi Tnumi, manag~r of the
Central Ba_ik of Tunisia--"one of our good counterparts, in exchange as well
as in deposits; it regularly allows us between $10,000,000 and $20,000,000, _
currently $15,000,000"--was seasoned with disagreeable news:
"We mentioned the different kinds of aid our establishment grants to
_ Tunisia, notably the recent to the Republic of $100,000,000 run up by
~ BOA [West African Bank], and we were amazed to learn that our participa-
tion in the buyers' credit pools was not well knosvn; it represents
20,000,000 francs divided into 7 operations now, according to Bach Hamba."
Le` Bourguiba know as soon as possible that the Soviet bank, the handlers of
CG1' and PCF funds, the saviors of the French Communist nPWSpapers who are drag-
ging him through the mud, those who grant People's Welfare exceptional condi- -
tions in order to help the imprisoned Tunisian unionists, are largely contrib-
uting toward financing the Tunisian regime. .
Boehm and Remond were seized by anguish at the idea that the honorable myrmi-
dons of the Tunisian regime dici not know the true role of the BCEN. It had _
to be pointed out. Marchais' and Seguy's bankers w�~re eager to circulate in -
high places the good news of their agreement with Bourguiba. Especially at
the very neocolonialist "Gafsa Phosphates Company," where Hassen Riahi (head
_ of the Resources Department of the Economic Development Bank of Tunisia),
"was kind enough to arrange an appointment for us with Amor Chebbir, commercial
general manager, and Radhouane Grena, financial director." Thank God, as
Boehm and Remond wrote, "our establishment was nct unknown to the people we
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wnr~ tniking with; nevertheless we wer~ aUlc to rcmind them of tha rnle
pluyed by ~urobank in many agrc~ements--as muCh fin~ncial, which r.hcy knew
ubout, as in buyers' credits, which they did not know about--run up by the -
~renct~ b~nks."
~
'They had been bot, the l3C~N directorsl Th~nks to their indefatig~ble dili-
gence, everyonc in business in Tunisia is now ~ware Chnt Moscow is betti;~.~ on
Hourguib a.
As for thc~ ~rrestc:d Tunisian union members, goehm and ~emond did nnt havc
- timc to visit them, or to bring them the snlidarity funds their own bank is -
responsible for CO11~Ct111g. ~
tiowever. as usual they loosened the tongue of the c~mmercial counselor of
the French Embassy. 5nme will be embarrassed at the triought that reports
expressing the thoughts of ~rench diplomats at their posts will, several days
lutrr, lalid on Mr Ponomarev's desk and will automntically and immediately be ~
transmitted to the Kremlin. What Henri le Corre said on Tuesday 26 Septem-
ber 1J78 at 1530 to the agents from the Soviet bank--Moscow knows. Md if
Moscow knows, why not inform France?
"Tlie commerciul counselor, Nenri le Corre is well known to us, since he
oc:cupied t}~e post in Havana from 1972 to 197G; he granted us a pleasant
and relaxed interview for an hour and a quarter.
"7'he counselor tackled two subjects more in detail: Franco-Tunisian re-
lations and Tunisia's economic situation."
I will not go over the first part, which is extremely interesting, dealing -
witla "Frai?co-Tunisian relations;" let us go on to t}?e second part 11) :
~ "'I'he counselor considers the economic situation healthy; Tunisia is not
too indebted, its resources are being used wisely, finally the present
gove rnment has been prudent enough to defer certain investments believed
to bc too ambit:.~::,: a refinery, a n.itrate ferti]izer plant, doubling
the si~e of the Bi~srte s~eelworks, projects which would cost
1,000,000,000 to 2,000,000,000 francs each.
"Dir le Corre nevertheless discerns several worrisome signs: increased
- trade deficit, inflation ~n the order of 7 percent, a social imbalance
linked with a certain unemployment, and political uncertainties connected =
with f~resident Bourguiba's succession. He sets two assets against those
items: Tunisia's good reputation on tha international level, especialiy
' with the World Bank, in consequence of which Tunisia is able to borrow -
whatever it wants at very favorable rates; and the stability of the in-
stitutions, which has made it possible to assimilate in four months the
most serious crisis Tunisia has experienced since its indspendence."
.
'~v'ith that clear and optimistic analysis, Mr le Corre fortified t}ie Soviet -
desire to support Bourguiba, with our workers' money.
~
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~o~ n~~TCrni, usL c,x~,Y
Amnng tihe 5acr~ts of nur ~ml,,nssios
'I'he qucst for in�orm~tion from our diplom~ts is one thing; the holding of dnc-
uments one is ttot ~uthorized to possess, nor even tn re~d, is annther, 'I'he
- 5oviat b~nk in pnris toxts whose content is vcry strictly clnssifi~d. In
Oc:tobor 1978 Mr Krivoch~ov w~s holding onc of Clic copies of tl~c: IfULL~7'IN
U'IN~OI~TION ~CONOMIQU~ NO 51 of tho ~rench Embnssy in thc Cerman Democ:rutfe
Republic (108 Berlin, Unter den Linden 40).
If all our secrets are, glasl ~s well gunrded, the Kremlin must h~ve been
z~mused to read on the cover this warningr "T'he present bulletin is strictly
resorved for the information of the individuals and services to whom it is ~
- addressed."
The BCEi~ does not appear on the list of persons or institutions entitled to
examine it. How did it get there? By what mir~a~cle?
- ~requenting f~rench diplnmat~c circles yields ~ mine of information for the
5oviet bank's emissaries. 'They scrupulously make notes on the "dope" thus
obtained. When P~ul aey, assistant manager of the BCEN, reports to his man-
aging committee on his "mission~from 15 to 25 October 1978--Moscow/Leningrad"
- as a member of the Franco-5oviet Chamber of Commerce, he cites, among other
sources, the cocktail party given by the French commercial counselor, and then
the
"Luncheon (small) given by the /French ambassador, Bruno de Leusse/, dur-
- ing which Mrs Bruno de Leusse told me that the appointment of the
amb~ssador to the General Secretariat at the Quai d'Orsay was announced
- too widely and quite prematurely. -
"The ambassador and madame asked me to send their affectior~ate greetings
- to the president-general manager of Eurobank." -
No comment.
. With Those who Hold the Italian Wealth
It would be impossible to follow in the footsteps of all the BCEN's couriers.
Their per~~:ual movement makes one dizzy.
In Vienna, in Austria, Peillon and Louvet stay from 18 to 20 October 1978 and
in 72 hours contact many bankers, among them the "managers" of the _
"Creditanstalt/Bankverein--which is sorry it mounted an operation on behalf
of Czechoslovakia without.,consulting the BC1:N;" It was agreed that in the
future we will be approached; of "Oesterreichische Laenderbank"; of the
~ "Bank fur Arbeit und iVirtschaft Ag.", with which "there are possibilities for
cooperation", consideririg that it "continues to look for ventures with social-
- ist countries:; of the "Donau Bank Ag.", etc. -
And how could we follow the BCEN delegates to the Leipzig fair, to Gern~any
(Communist) from 3 to 10 September 1978?
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At thC nlnvdiv �~ir (August 1978) in aulgnri~, whcre tha l3CEN is reprC~ent-
- ed by Mr 5oulerot: "~tirob~nk's presence is vcry mu~h ~ppr~ciat~d by our
t3ulgari~n conttections, and the ~rench firms we meet with are v~ry h~ppy tn ~
find th~re ~ggin th~ ~urobank they know well from all the fairs of the ~~st-
ern countrie~." The French diplomats, delighted to see Mr 5oulerot therc,
Mr Boehm's diligent assistnnt, are eager to plegse him: "Je~n-Louis
'Ch~wninux, tlie commercial counselor, was ~nxidus to inform mo personully that
h~ hud curtly shown ~ certain important person, Mr I~um~s, the door; h~ had
come ta complain to him about proceedings tak~n by our bunk, of which h~ wus
the object."
In fart, it is not nntural for a~rench citizen to complain to the ~rench
authorities ~bout proceedings used against him by a Russinn bank.
liowever, gulgaria does not fire the ~C~N with enthusiasm. As usual, the
general report on a socialist country contradicts both the PC~ and the CGT: _
"[3ulgarin hns become an industri~l state, while retaining a solid agri-
cultural base. It tnok 30 years...The present era is one of savings.
It is not one of large investments, but for making the industrial instru-
ment profitable~�-especially since Bulgaria has emerged from a year 1977
t}iat was difficult, to say the least...Agricultural production declined
_ G.3 percent, whereas ~ 4-percent increase had been envisaged for 1977;
tobacco production fell from 140,000 to 106,000 tons."
L'ltUh1ANITE and the CGT never revealed that. Their theses are well known:
"In socialist countries there is no crisis, there are no savings, production
continues to increase there and there is no difficult year..."
Gilbert Lasfargues and the insatiable Christian Boehm are careful not to re-
peat these commonplaces to Spanish bankers at the time of their stay in
Madrid (Melia Eiotel) from 11 to 16 December Y978.
On behalf of Mr Brezhnev, the BCEN had already made its contribution to the
historic compromise with those who hold the Italian wealth. The Soviets dream _
of opening a bank in Rome, the sixth sister of the BCEN. They attach such
importance to this project that Mr de Boysson in person traveled, accompanied
by Mr Sigaudes, to our transalpine brothers, from 5 to 9 November. _
After numerous meals and business conversations, c:ven a communist banke;: has
need of some relaxation. ~;specially if he deserves well of the Muscovite
- head office. Leaving Rome, Mr de Boysson goes to relax romantically among
the gondoliers:
"Friday 10, Saturday 11 and Sunddy 12 ;rovember: Mr de Boysson's weekend _
in Venice. Return to Roissy-Charles de Gaulle on the 12th at 2040..in
first class." -
First class, too, for Ponomarev and Peillon, passengers on Air France Flight
No 033, Paris-Toronto, on 18 September 1978. They are going to Canada ;o
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me~t with the dir~ctnrs of the C~nadi~n Lnperial Bunk nf Commarc:o, the ~gnk
of Nov~ 5cotiu nnd th~ Toronto Dominiott g~nk. -
In ~he c~pital of Quebec, which they reuch on 20 September by Air C~n~d~ =
~light No 4Z4, Mr Ponomarev hgs himself announ~ed at the Royal tiank of Cgnada,
the Canudiun National $ank, the provincinl Bank of Cunadu und the gunk of
_ Montr~ul. At tho end of this tour hQ returns to P~ris, still in first c:luss
- (Air Francu F~light No 032)~ on 23 Septemb~r. A bricf stopovQr, They urc -
w~iting for liim in Moscow, with his aide-de-c~mp.
Ilere is how, on 21 5Qptember, the officigl who ~rranges travel informs Presi-
dent-Genernl M~nager Guy de Boysson of thQ preparations for the mission:
"Concerning Mr Ponomarev, what you told Mr Vanine is true, that h~ l~ope~i
to leave Moscow two days before you by train..to arrive the same day you
will be traveling by air. (Eie left instructions to that effect for me,
for when I would know Mr Alkhimov's answex.)
"I }iave thought it over: supposing that Mr Ponomarev reacts quickly and
can take Air France Flight No 032...this Friday at 2209, don't you think
that in order to respond to his wishes, it would be a good idea for him
to book on 5NCF [Prench National Railroad], Paris-Moscow, to depart
Saturd~y at 2309..even if he cancels it afterwards...?"
Let us hope, for the sake of the Soviet bankers, that journeys between
hioscow, Paris and elsewhere taken by millions of PCF and CGT members require
_ fewer complications.
The Egotistical Instrwnent of a Greedy and Unscrupulous Foreign Capitalism
5ent by ttio BCEN to the Algeria Fair being held from 20 September to 6 Octo-
ber 1978, Mr Deloziere and de Regard visit Algiers and "Lucien Gerber, an
agricultural specialist in the Economic and Financial Mission attached to the
French Embassy in Algeria. He confirmed that the agricultural sector had be- _
come very much of a priority in Algeria and that French industrialists had
_ shown real interest in concentrating their efforts there." Good news, which
Eurobank, already well established in Algeria, exploits in d~pth.
During this fortnight with Boumediene, "the welcome for the bankers was every
bit as warm as on preceding trips." They are familiar with the position the
BCEN occupies in the Russian financial apparatus, and the importance of its
operations in Algeria. So one can only smile at the pretext that Deloziere
_ and de Regard offer in response to an ill-timed request from Mr Ghamri, hcad
of the Finance Department of the Algerian national company, SONELEC (Algerian -
National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Elec-
tronic Equipment).. Mr Ghamri, either too shrewd or too naive, wants the BCEN
to grant him "Eurocurrency credits to finance additional expenditures within
the framework of contracts...whose common peculiarity is that they are entrusted '
to foreign firms (FRG and USA)." Eurobank is not interested in playing the
_ game of the German and American "imperialist" competitors. So in order to -
sidestep the pest, Mr Pc~iomarev's two subord~nates find a superb parry: "We ~
*Serguei Vunine: a director of the BCEN.
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~~ox nrricr~. us~ ox~,Y
were nble to disengago ourselves onsily from this bunch of "requ~sts" by re-
calling our "~ronch orient~tion."
Comical and geniall
Nothing better te5tifies tn th~t "French orientation" than the instructions
rQCeived i.n Moscow by Mr Itey on the occasion of his previously-mentioned visit -
- from 15 to 25 October 1978. Uuring i~is lunch with the VTB bosses
_ "'The people we are talking with ask us.,.t~ study the appropriate measures
to be decreed to increase the role of the Eurobank in Franco-Soviet trans~
actions (relations witll banks and clientele)." -
Now, to "increa5e the role," already enormous, of Eurobank "in Franco-5oviet
- transactions" is to diminish the French role all the more, because Curobank
is a Soviet bank, not a French one, and its profits enrich the USSR, not -
Hrance. The Soviets happen to be working hard at further diminishing the al-
ready extremely meager "role" of the FrenCh--thanks to tlieir Trojan horse, the
RC~N, which is being informed by certain commercial counselors at the Quai
d'Orsay.
The next, day, 18 October, the general staff of the Muscovite bank "Gosbank"-- _
Voronin, Mikhailov, Mozhaiskov, Tatsy and Korneev--which the BCEN is subordin- _
ate to, gives the latter's envoys a"luncheon with an anniversary toast in
honor of Mr Peillon (administrator-general manager of Eurobank, who had pre-
viously been complimEnted in brotherly fashion in Paris by Mr Panomarev)."
The report of these ~oyous reunions speaks for itself:
"No particular problem, general questions were examinc:d at the time of the
recent visit (to Moscow) of the president-general n~anager (de Boysson)
and vice president-general manager (Ponomarev). However, it was recom-
mended that we tr; to increase the role of Eurobank (and its share in the -
financing pools) f,n Franco-Soviet trade, in order to compensate for the
- limitations impos~~d on other plans. To my comment on the necessary equi-
librium for our cooperation with French banks on multiple plans, he an-
swered that Eurobank's wise policy would know how to reconcile ~~he two
imperatives."
= In other words, since French law prevents the Soviets from gaining--if not
monopoly, at least control--of operations "on multiple plans" in which Euro-
- bank is forced to respect "a necessary equilibrium with French banks" (the
delightful formula manages to prove that the BCEN is not a French bank), it
is a question of pushing the advantages as far as possible in a field where
, the Russians, that is Eurobank, enjoy a situation of nearly-exclusive domin-
ance.
Mr Marchais might say--it is certainly the case--that the French are paying -
for the Soviet bankers' feasts.
- I have been anxious to present these documents--I have a thousand others no
- less revealing--so thdt the most convinced, sincere, naive communist militant -
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will ~inally raalize thut tho 13CGN, the depositury ~f liis humble contribu-
tidns, is not ~ bnnk "w~gring ~rancc's colors" but the egotistical tool of
a gre~dy nnd unscrupulous foreign capitalism. �
Of course it h3s n legal existence, However, the time has come to wonder if
it is right to maintain a fiction that is grotesque and prejudici~l to Frr~nce.
The Moscow-Paris-Moscow Trips
Of course our country must support trade with the USSR, but economic imper-
= ialism and political infiltr~ttion must not find too many facilities here, to
the detriment of our own national interest. The BCEN's intexests are identi-
fied with the USSR, whose creature it is. No nne can harbor resentment against
it because of its reason for being. On the other hand, we can watch to see
that it does not hurt us. At present, its action is hurting France--unless
- you believe that what is good for the USSR is good for us, following the thesis
that our PCF has long defended unconditionally. Mr Marchais, who says he now -
maintains no functional connection with Moscow--"I see Brezhnev less ofteii -
than Giscard d'Estaing does," he said one day with his usual irony--is per-
haps unaware of the intensity of the hi:man traffic circulating along the .
Mosc~w (mother house)-Eurobank Paris (her eldest) umbilical cord.
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CHAPTER 6. GAMES PLAYED BY THE MARXIST MULTINATIONAL AND THE PAR'PY 'THttT
4IEARS 'l'HE COLORS OF FRANCE' -
[TexC]
With the Trusts and the Big Monopolies
I refuse to drag�the reader down the tortuous paths of Eurobank's business with
Moscow, with the Soviet zone, with the "pxogressive" Third World countries
and with countries far from Muscovite influence, where it seeks stubbornly,
patiently, to infiltrate. Nor am I addressing speci~.~lists or technicians.
Leaving aside the thousands of documents I could use, I simply want to attract
attention to the prodigious power of this multinational, capable of hs~ndling
billions everywhere in the world. Never has the image--so dear to the commun-
ists--of "the capitalist octopus" been so correct. No region escapes the _
BCEN's covetousness; it is on the receiving end of all kinds of business.
Where it thinks it will bain some benefit, it quickly associates itself with
trusts and large monopolies.
_ First, to Help the "Socialist Countries"
The Soviets never exert theynselves futilely. One o� the BCEN's roles is to
help them in financing their operations. As a bank with French status, it
sets up loans--or participates in them--for the profit of the USSR. Here, -
for example, is a documert (reference SB/JS)--13 March 1978) concerning
"Financial Loans" in favor of the International Investment Bank (IIB) and the
- International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC), both with headquarters iri
_ Moscow. The loans are spread out over five years: `
International Finai~cial Loans to the IBB (in dollars*) '
i
- In March 1973
Loan for a total amount of: $50,000,000 -
in which we participated for: 5,000,000....
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In April 1975
Loan for ~ totnl amount of: ~0,000,000
_ itt which we participate for; 7,000,000*....
In October 1975
Loan for a total amount o�: 350,000,000
Our participations: -
Direct for ~2,000,000 ~
- Assigned by Moscow
London* 3,000,000 S,OOO,U00"`.,..
- In January 1977
_ The Vneshtorgbank proposes and we agree _
to take silent participation totaling: 5,000,000
in its share of: 33,000,000
in a loan f'or total amount of: 600,000,000
(signed in June 1976)....
In June 1977
Loan for a total amount of: $500,000,000
in which we participated for: 2,000,000
Loans to the IBEC, Moscow
?
Direct Business in Pools: -
Outstanding as of 9 Ma,rch 1978: ~oreign ~xchange market ~~llars
12,160,000
for the ~~llowing three operations:
1. Matter initiated in July 1973:
Head: BCI [expansion unknownJ London
= Total amount: $70,Q00,000 .
Our share: 5,000,000....
- 2. Matter initiated in June 1974:
Head: . Credit Lyonnais
Total amount: 50,000,000
= Our share: 5,000,000....
S. Matter initiated in February 1975:
Head: Credit Lyonnais and Eurobank
Total amount: 60,000,000
O~~r share: 5, 000, 000. .
*On 25 January 1979, the day the man.~~cript of this bock went to the printer,
- the dollar was worth 4.24 francs in Paris.
*Total credits for 1977: $2,750,000
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As the table below indic~tes, the ~CBN also grants treasury assistance'" to
Soviat banks, The imbalance between the loans granted by the BC~N to the zIB
and its bo rrowings from the same bank wi11 be noted. Thus it procures from
the IIB additional resources it could not obtain d3rectly.
I6EC, Mos cow
Outstanding treasury as of 9 March 1978:
Our lo ans: $62,214,066 (foreign exchange market dollars)
~ Loans to us: 5,372,328 (foreign exchange market dollars)
Our loans: Loans to us: '
15,000,000 deutsche marks $1,800,000
10,000,000 deutsche marks 4,000,000 deutsche marks -
5,000,000 Swiss francs 3,000,000 Swiss francs
6,000,000 Swiss francs
With interest payable semi-annually or annually: -
$2,000,000
1,300,000 '
15, 000, 000 marks ~
5, 000, 000 marks
10,000,000 marks -
2, 000, 000 Swiss francs "
_ 5, OOU, 000 Swiss francs
5,000,000 Swiss francs
12, 500, 000 Swiss francs
8,000,000 Swiss francs
8, 000, 000 Swiss francs
8,, 000, 000 Swiss francs
IIB, Moscow
Outstanding treasury as of 9 March 1978:
Our lo ans: $43,653,672 (foreign market exchange dollars)
Loans to us: 3,608,604 (foreign market exchange dollars)
- Our lo ans: Loans to us:
- $ 5,00 0,000 35,000,000 Belgian francs ~
$20,000,000 79,000,000 Bel~ian francs
$ 3, 000, 000
_ *Treasury assistance: loan granted by one bank to another to enable it to
ba;ance its resot~,rces and emplc~yment over a given period. ~
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$ 5,000,000 -
$ 2,000,000
6,700,000 deutsche marks '
~ 5,000,000 Swiss �rancs
5,000,000 Sw~ss francs
- In Millions of Rubles
The BC~N has made of its relations with the USSR and the socialist bloc its
preferred area, but it does not neglect any branch of banking activity or any
geographic zone.
It establislles its accounts in millions of rubles, at the request of its share-
holders. Here are two recapitulative documents giving a global view of its
world activities:
Recapitulation
Aid as of 3.January 1978 (in sni.l.~ions of rubles)1 ~
Total
V'TB2 185.9
IBEC and~IIB3 77.0
Banks of socialist countries (,~g,2 _
-including loans to businesses 144.0
Other Soviet banks abroad 4.4 _
Banks ~nd institutions of capitalist coun-
tries and developing countries 911.9
Firms of capitalist countries, developing
countries and clientele 439.2
47.1
2,344.7
(equal to 15,136,914,260.00 francs)
= 1. On 25 January 1979 Moscow rated the ruble at 6.4650 francs for the trans-
fer from France to the USSR and 6.4558 for those from the USSR to France.
A ruble was woi~h $1.5175.
2. VTB: Vneshtorgbank or USSR Foreign Trade Bank, shareholder of BCEN.
- 3. IBEC: International Economic Coaperation Bank-Moscow; IIB: International
Investment Bank-Moscow. -
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Recapitulation -
Itesources as of 3 January 1978 (in millions of rubles) -
Total
- Banks and �irms of socialist countries
and developing c.,untries 1,460.8
- VT~ 385.7 -
- IgEC and IIB 14.3
~anks of socialist countries 336.9
Other Soviet banks abroad 12,7
Own funds 44.4 ~
capital......~ 2.8 ,
reserves 72.4
Sundry liabilities. Rediscowiting effects.
Vneshtorgbank 14.7
- 2.344.7 ~ `
- These two tables, expressed in millions of rubles, referring to the date of
3 January 1978, illustrate the BCEN's activity in the East and West. ~
The share of the "socialist countries" is significant, in "resources" as well
as in "employment" (of funds). Also, it is per~ect~y isolated by the BCEN ac- !
counting. ;
The V'I'B, the IBEC, the IIB, the banks of the socialist countries, the other
_ Soviet banks abroad, the Vneshtorgbank's own funds and rediscounting effects
= represent 811,500,000 rubles out or a total of resources of 2,344,700,000, or
34.6 percent. ~
~ In the matter of emplc~yment, the same elements are added to reach ~
946,500,000 rubles, or 40.3 percent. Although the BCEN is very well supported
by the "socialist" Goni~,ributions, it knows how to send back the elevator. In
fact there is an imbalance in its employments over its resources of about
135,000,000 rubles, to the benefit of the countries o~ the Eastern bloc.
But it must also be noted that the remainder of its activity is reaii~ed with
non-"socialist" countries. It draws two thirds of its resources from the cap-
italist world and it devotes 60 percent of its financing to it. Without wor- ~
~ rying about Marxist ethics. ~
- Vietnam: to :fake the Capitalist Pay '
,
= The BCEN's extremely rare errors represent a minute percentage in the huge mass ~
= of its successes. Red bankers make very few mistakes, for they d~ not prac- -
= tise philanthropy at all.
Their attitude toward Vietnam is a striking example.
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Th~t cnuntry's diplomats h~ve been seen to deposit their money in tho BCLN;
ns ovaryone knows, the USSR is Hano3's protectox. In Paris tho whole PCF
(wit}i L'fIUMANITE and Rene Andrieu at the head) outlinQ tho campaigns for ViaC-
nwn. Lot AmQrica pay for the war damagel Let our government protect Hanoil
Lot the French aid its admiruble regimel
_ 'Che Sov:iet bank in Paris might be expected to n~ake a point of using in Ilanoi's
- service the billions deposited with it by our communists and union members.
A serious error! The Kremlin has no intention of opening its purse to klanoi.
That role f~lls upon.tiie proletariat of the whole world, first on France,
which is urged to bleed itself white for its Vietnamese communist brothers.
On 23 November 1978 the PCF Political ~ureau urges, "faced with the intolerable
cvnpaign of disparagement," "supporting the Vietnamese people," who are "con-
fronted with enormous difficulties that are the result of the war's devasta-
tion." Denying the existence of an Indochinese Gulag, a glaring lie by those
who "emerge from the pools of blood to brandish hypocritically the flag of
human rights," the Political Bureau adds:
"Fortunately, Vietnam is the beneficiary of significant aid from a number
of countries, especially the Soviet Union."
~ Consequently it asks French workers to demonstrate "their solidarity" to the
sound of their money. ,
The former Communist deputy, the present director of the Soviet bank in Pari.s,
Mr de Boysson, does not hear the siren songs.
On 16 October 1978 "the Foreign Relations Secretariat" of the BCEN tells in -
its Report No 33 of the "visit of Mr Ha Huy Sung."
"On 10 October 1978 Mr de Boysson and Mr Roche received a visit from
h1r Ha Huy Sung, representing the Vietcombank, Hanoi, in Paris.
"Mr Sung came to speak to us again of the Vietcombank's plan to launch =
on the market a loan of $100,000,000, utilizable in November 1978. _
"We assured Mr 5ung that we were no longer in a position to be the ar-
_ ranger of such a loan, contrary to what we did in 1975, but that we would
certainly participate--for a modest share only--in a loan arranged by ,
others."
, Those lines, astoundin~ly cynical, a~e worth stopping for. �
The BCEN, the head or the partner of thousands of business m,~tters, the BCEN
of enormous liquid assets, the extremely rich and super-powerful BCEN, would
_ be no longer in a position, in 1978, to "launch on the market a loan of
~
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~ rox orricinL us~ orn~Y -
$100,000,000" ~or Viotnam? f~iowever, on the same day it agroes to be "co-mF?n-
~ger," at the invi~ation of "Luzard Brothers nnd Company," in ~ pool with
oight other banks, of a loan nf $250,000,000 grantnd ta--the 5oviot bank,
Vneshtioxgbr~nk. To quoto i.n this connection the Itepor~ No 36 (7 November 1978)
of the "Foreign Relntions Secretariat," we "have agreed to be co-manager."
Communist bankers lend anly to the rich.
In reality tho BCLN; m,ore solid tlian ever, is in a perfect position to do for
the Vietn~?mese in 1978 what it did for them in 1975. But the USSR is not
anxious to help Hanoi ~~~~ectly. It yielcls that thankless job to the capital-
ist states. Its uwn bank, the BCf:N, "would ;participate only for a modest
share in a loan axranged by others." An abridement summarizing the philosophy
of the 5oviet bankers to the PCF and the CGC: it is for the capitalists to
pay, for us to pocke~ the proceeds.
I~rom Yugoslavia to the Sudan, by way of the Ivory Coast =
- Mr de Boysson an d Mr Ponomarev are never sentimental. The Yugoslav socialist
half-sister knows it very well, from experience.
"Approached for a loan" (in August 1978) by the "National Fund for Agricultural z
Credit of Yugoslavia," which also appro ached the Kredjetbank and the Provincial
Bank of Canada in Montreal, the BCEN "withdrew from the operation": The mar-
gin "was lowered to 1 percent." It is not tempted by meager profits.
The Privredna Banka Sarajevo, which is also Yugoslav, would offer a"discount `
rate af 9-1/2 percent." "The BCEN...counterproposed a discount rate nf
- 10-1/4 percent."
- "An affair not to be repeated," curtly concludes its reporter, irritated that .
the Serbian conrades had finally chosen an American bank which was not very
proletarian, but less greedy.
Of course, one is sometimes inclined to pity these bankers, so clear-headed,
deceived by the Koreans--the Koreans praiseu to the skies by L'HUMANITE.
Sadness drips from the pen of the foreign relations secretary when he informs
Mr Ponomarev on 13 November 1978, in connection with the "Korean credits,"
- thai: "the second fixed-asset maturity date of 16 October has not been met.
Our share: 268,643.75 deutsche marks."
The regret becomes insupportable when he adds: "Within the framework of the -
- London Anzbank moratorium , signed on 23 ~:arch 1977, we are informed by the
agent that the Koreans do not envisage on-time settlement of the first re- -
demption before 15 November 1978. Or 12,551,608.69 deutsche marks. Our -
share: 390,840.40 deutsche marks--27,982,629.60 Swiss f.rancs. Our share:
440,277.33 Swiss francs." =
- *Moratorium: "legal. provision suspending the maturity of credits, the course
, of cr~uxt actions." (Author's note) -
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As usual, we learn �rom the bankers what L'HUMANITE is keeping from its read-
ers: North Korean is in "moratorium" and, even more serious, it is not even
honoring its credits. Its m~ney goes to buy publicity in the French capital-
ist press for its "great leader" Kim I1 Sung.
Tiny as it was, the Korean incident made the BC~N more suspicious than evcr.
, Its leaders redouble the precautions in their approach to customers and po-
tential partners. Reports of the BCEN services are sometimes fanny, because "
they are candid.
'I'he assistant manager of the BCEN, Paul Rey, summarizes his talks with
Mr Esnault-Pelterie, who is in charge of the African sector of the Bankexs
Trust, in several lapidary words: hi;; "relations with Arab and Franco-Arab -
banks in Paris are warm on the human level, but platonic on the business
level." Being unable to make use of this too-sentimental mediator,
h1r Ponomarev turns toward the Ivory Coast, where there are fewer philosophers
and more banks:
- "There are at present in the Ivory Coast:
"Five development banks (Ivorian Industi~ial Development Bank--BIUI; Nat- -
ional Bank for Agricultural Development--BNDA; National Savings and Loan
nank--BNEC; Ivory Coast Credit--CREDICODI; Auto~iomous Sinking Fund--CAA).
"Fourteen commercial banks, including:
5 with l~eadquarters in the Ivory Coast
9 branches o~ foreign banks (against 3 in April 1977)
12 financial establishments."
The Soviet bankers have already made fruitful contacts; the Ivory Coast is
their preferred financial bridgehead in Africa. Which literally fascinates
them.
By frequenting the "Chemical Credit" Soulerot and de Regard obtain very ser- -
ious information.
On 27 Octobe.r, 1978 they inform ria Boysson and Ponomarev that they "have
rendered a positive judgment on Guinea...and the Sudan (recent oil discover-
ies kept secret for reasons of political opportunity)." :
There is a secret that has ceased to be one; I w3nted others to profit from
it, besides the Soviet bankers alone.
.Four Hundred Billion--That Will go Through the BCEN -
_ No less useful are the figures concerning our economic relations with the
- USSR. 'fhe BCEN reports as follows on 3 November 197~:
: (
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~ ~ ~ . ~
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_ Large f~ran~o-5oviet I~rujects
3ctu~lized by the Grand Commission at the time of the ~r~nco-Soviet
(:h~mber of Commerce mission (October 1978)
1. Creusot Loire (HU~)
Iixtrudc:d tubes (CL'I~ILAC ~expaiisinn unknown],
f~rench-German eyuipment. f~rench sh~re
5U pcrcent and/ar 300,U00~000 frdncs
Silicon dynamo plate plant 300,000,000 francs
5P~IClflhf [expansion unknown] (aUC and
Gen~ral Company)
' P~~osa.lon~ unit (insecticides. Rhone-poulenc
fra~nework ~ontract ~50,000,000 francs
3. LMI' (Credit Lyonnais)
'I'elephone exchanges--a very old plan, many
, times presented and modified 800,000,000 francs
4. ~'I'PM [ext~ansior. unknownJ (Credit Lyonnais)
gakou plat.`.orms 900,000~000 francs
~
S. PUK [l~echiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann Company] II
- Aluminum (Credit Lyonnais)
Valve a) anode plant
Valves b) fluorine products and
- c) electrolysis
dealing with approximately 3,A00,000,000 francs
- require long technical discussions (Soviet de-
lay of construction of hydroelectric dam on
location of installation (Salienski) '
and trade relations (Kaiser Aluminwn,
Alcoa Group). fiowever, at the end of
t}ie Granei Commission: political desire
affirmed by Mr Kirilline for the Soviet
choice in favor of the French partner 300,000,000 francs
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6. V~rious light products
Including pipes (V~llourec--Pont-a-Mousson)
~nd machine tools 1,000,000,000 francs
All of the I~relich c~ntr~ct signed in roid-Oc:tober
1978 ~re ~rdund 2,G00,000,000 francs (in~luding
7'~CI{NIP G~s Lift)
'I'otal df large projects 3~OOO,UdU,000 fr~ncs
~lus sundry light products 1,000,0OO,OnO fr~nc:s
" 'fhe total figure of 10,000,000,000 francs declared in November 1977 is ex-
_ tended--for the 5oviet part--over the time period
July 1977 (desdline for p~yment of interest before renew~l)
~nd of 1979 Protocol deadline
Also tn be described: -
~rench commitment concerning additie�,~11 purchases of gas and oil
~renc}~ intention to increase 5oviet sales of equipwent goods
Plan to cooperate in the hydroelectric field in Colombia, Argentina,
Brazil and Greece.
It should be noted that the question of formal interest (7.55 percent anci
7.20 percent, deadline end of D~:cember 1978) was not mentioned.
Those 400,000,000,000 centimes will go through the Soviet bank in Paris.
liow much will remain in its coffers as profit?
$13,189,000 for Peru
5outh America also arouses the BCEN's curiosity and cupidity. Patrick Ueloziere
had a clear conscience when he took note on 24 October 1978 of the meeting
I~eld by the ADRAL (Association for the Development of Relations with Latin
America). _
, liere is his presentation concerning 10 countries where the BCEN is present in
one way or another: -
~
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"1~ Mexico
~ "Frenrh ~dministration's p~sition "norm~l" (less open tnward this coun-
try th~n tow~rd Venezuela).
"However, we note that ~rance do~s not h~vc many transaCtions with
this country, except Yor Metro matters.
"It is regrettable that the recent steel negotiation, exceeding sev-
_ eral billion francs, enabled Erance to pick up only a few 'crumbs'.
"2. Central America
"Nicaragua: positi.on guarded.
"Guatemal~: fairly open, but France has little business there.
"Cost~ Rica: quite open,. A telephone operation supplied with an
eight-year credit was recently financed by Prance.
_ "5alvador: some openness. Following recent meetings at governmental
level, a financing protocol was signed, primarily intended for pro-
jects of a port installation nature, as well as one to build a power
- plant.
"Nonduras-Panama: France is to all intents and purposes absent.
"3. South America
"Colombia: position normal and comparable to that in Mexico. The
only business recorded recently concerns telecommunications.
~ "Venezuela: very open. This is the best-rated country. Industrial-
ists are strongly encouraged to work with this country.
"Ecuador: position restrictive, linked to a difficult financial situ-
ation an~. the memory of a dispute that encwnbers relations with
Ecuador.
� "Peru: present attitude totally negative. Confirmation that a meet-
ing of the Paris Club is to be t?eld in November for the purpose of
establishing a cansolidation of the Peruvian debt."
The attitudP of the new Peruvian government, less under the thumb of the left
than its predecessors, does indeed worry the Soviet bankers. The BCEN intro-
duces it in the "Restructuring of the Foreign Debt of Peru--Request Addressed
by Telex of 21 September 1978 to the Steering Committee" (having to do with
the mere bagatelle of $1,342,000, spread out over several pay periods) and
lent ttiis country $13,189,000 dollars. Thank God! Tied up and thoroughly
tied up; the BCEN has the guarantee that on 3 January 1979 it will be paid the
$974,000 dollars in related interest. It was with a sigh of relief. that the
writer of the report alluded to the deal. -
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H'OIt nI~F'ICIAL US~ nNI.Y -
A"5igning Ceremony" with the Algerians
'1'ha c:urlosity o~ thc I3CGN lc~ders is univcrsal. Mr Uclozierc hustc;ns to In-
form Mr I~wiomar~v on 27 October 1978 that "ut thc c:or.ktail purty giv~n on
26 October 1978 (t}iat is, tho day before) by Procofrance, on the occ~sion of -
the Cameroon cnntract (Victoria refinery), we learn that this cantrnct for
800,000,000 francs has given rise to double financing." ~
= Cle~r the decks for nctionl Might one not take a h~nd in it?
Yes, th~ bosses of tihe 5oviet bank are fond of cocktails, world meetings ~nd
- signings. Their electronic memory enables them to record for Mr Ponomarev
the essential point of the conversations they engaged in ?~ith the Credit
Lyonnais and the Algerian national company, 50NATRACN.
h1r Boehm and Mr Lasfargues attended the "signing ceremony" on 30 November 1978:
"Signing the loan for $210,000,000 granted to 50NATRACI~ (oux share
$3,000,000, of which $2,000,000 is subcontracted).
"At the ceremony, which was presided over by Mr Pierre-Brossolette, an
_ important delegation from Credit Lyonnais participnted, and on the Alger-
ian side, Mr Boudjakdi, Mr 5mara, Mr Ali Kara Mustapha. -
- "On this occasion Mr Lasfargues was able to talk with:
"Mr Carlo Arcari, Paris representative ~f the Bank of Napoli, who
brought up its request for approval to open an office in Moscow and
~ hopes we will support his bank in this plan.
"Mr Esnault-Pelterie, assistant vice president of Bankers Trust Com-
pany, Paris, who indicatcs his company is very much interested in
short-term operations having merchandise support (prepayments, bar-
ter, etc.) in socialist countries and is also open to Francophone
African countries.
From a talk wizh Mr Deflassieux, we learn of the approaching depart-
ure (1 February 1979) of Mr Anstett, who is to become the European
, representative of the Banco Intercambio (the top-ranking private bank
iri Argentina)
liowever, the gentlemen from the BCEN do not like to waste their time on tri-
fles, even with their principal customers. On 8 December 1978 the Board of
the Foreign Trade Department tells objectively uf a demonstrdtion organized by:
"Arab Prospects
"Monthly meeting of that association, which we attended for the first time
as invited guests.
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"Our host, [toger Murutet, mentioned varioixs purch~sing probl~ms concern- 1
it~g ~gypt, Algeria ~nd Morocco. The c~unstions dealt witli wcrc~ more po-
litical and anecdot~l than economic or financiul.
"'I'h~ Alg~rian ambassador, Mr gedjaoui...answered questions about ~ssis-
tnnce. -
~ "'I'liis kind of demonstr~tion enjoys a certain mass success..., but, in
vicw of our lack of inter~st in the subjects dealt with, our presence _
th~re is not automatically necessary." _
Those "mass successc:s" t~aC are so "uninteresting" do not attract the 5oviet
bankers at ~11. 'The masses they leave in the good hands of the PCF and the
CGT; de Buysson, Punomarev, Boehm, Rey, Krivocheev, Soudakov or Lasfaxgtacs do
not frequent the halls of those unions and red c~~y adr~inistrations that cor~-
tribute money to them. They prefer to conspire in small committees and re- _
joice in palaces. Ttiat is where they meet, for whatever purpose it muy servc,
t}ie highest-ranking personages of the French employers' class and the leadcY~s
of the hypercapitalistic firms that Marchais and Mitterrand promised to nat- _
ionalize. '
'I'omorrow, China
On 24 November 1978 the BCEN is represented at a meeti~?g of the National ~rench
Employers' Committee (CNPF.
Its envoy sends hfr Ponomarev an extremely detailed report:
"CNPF (AS [expansion unknownJ)
"Meeting of 24 November 1978, organized within the framework of the
~xpansion Abroad Commission. -
"To retain its program of activities, organizing in 1979 to have the fol-
lowing priorities: _
E~C countries FRG
Europe Spain
Industrialized countries USA, Japan
~ Asia lndia
Middle East Saudi Arabia and Gulf
countries
Africa Nigeria and Anglophone
AfrYCa ~
Latin America Argentina and Brazil
" "Concern?ng China, it was indicated that in 1978 about 50 Chinese sectoral
missions c2~me to France. In that context, a strengthening of ~he structure
' of the France/China Committee of the CNPF is anticipated. Also, opening a
CNPF office in Peking is envisaged."
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,
~oh n~rrcrnr, us~ ot~.Y
' The L3CCN, spurned by the Chi~te,~e as ~ 5nviet institutinn, will try, in con-
clusion, to slip into Chin~ M~CB.ring the colors of the ~rencl~ emplnyers. On
- 23 October 1978 a meeting o� ~~robank's Studies and norum~~~,ation Depurtment
nlre~dy examined the "ratings" achieved withxn the fr.a~,~awork of "work for the ~
sh~rc}iolders (/Soviet/) and the general manaF;ement," They deul with "t}~c
princip~l data concerning the Chinese economy"; "Chin~3's foreign ecor~omic ~uid
fin3nciul rcl~tions." =
,
Marchais' ~nd 5eguy's bankers in fact dream only of ft?rming an ~lliance in
this sector, ns in all the others, with our lords of i.ndustry: "Mr Lasfargues -
= nnd Mr Itosa participated in the cere?nony thnt accompanied the signing of the -
- loun contract (between Cuba and the ~UE) on 24 October~ 1978."
Mr Lasfargues then made the acquaintance vf Andre J.P. Perrier, export sales
manager at Creusot-Loire Enterprises. On that occasion Mr Ros~ was able to
- have ~ talk with Mr Gien, assistant financinl manager of Creusot-Loire Entcr-
prises. To learn that the latter anticipates that neg~~tiations with Cuba will
be opened in 1979 for fertilizer business of approxima~tely 1,000,000,000 francs. -
The person we spoke with asked us how we felt about an accompanying financial ~
credit.
Our feeling tends toward passionl
Creusot-Loire is undoubtedly the ~C~N's cherished partr~er; th~ ~CGN is proud
of being welcom~d into the wake of this super-giant of Frenci; capita,lism.
We let Mr Deloziere tell of his
"Talk with Mr Mijeon of the Creusot-Loire financial management...lle com- ~
� mented on our participation in the recQnt financial credits in favor
- of Creusot-Loire. This is also the sector which, in connection with the
Finex and the BU~ is introducing the aCCN into most of t}ie pools made up
- for financing with the USSR and the socialist countries."
Perfect..
Andrieu, Leroy, Marchais, Salini, Wurmser, Clleinstein and Company will no
longer dare to deny that PCF and CGf money is used for financial credits for
Creusot-Loire.
The French Communists are also money-lenders of funds i:or "monopolistic and
multinational capitalism."
'The Grand Strategy: Drag the Capitalists Into Blending Their Interests with
Those of the "Socialist World" s-
- At first sig}it this statement may seem surprising. All it does is express a
paradoxical reality concerning the ~CCN's conduct, which is full of apparent
contradictzons.
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Witt~ tho help nf a busic riocumCnt I will sl~ow the perfec:i; intcrnul logic of
the dunl c~pit~list-anticapitalist step by which tho 5ovi~t bnnk drugs ~long
its customers und communist proteges and CGT momber5.
I7irst it must Uo roculYed that tlic ideologic, politic:ul, psycliological~ ec;n-
Il0II11C rivalry Uetween capit~iism und communism--in parriculur, batwnon tl?c
. two mujor powers in each camp, the USSR und tlie United 5tates--is tiI1C fundu-
mental given of our time. Their pitiless struggle includes--and without it
would have already caused the planet to explode--accommodations to circum-
stances and a genoral modus vivendi. The cynical division of t}~e world into -
_ zones of in�luerice negotiated at the end of the 5econd World War is too well- -
known to noed ~nentioning here; it is behi~id ambiguous, disconcerting situa-
a tions so difficult for the uninitiated to penetrate.
= The U55R and the Communists, pr~pelled by a mixture of inessiu~nic faitli and
imperialism, seek to conquer the planet. Their recent gains are impressive: `
Vietn ~n, Angola, ~thiopia, Afghanistan. So many counzries in which "socinl-
ism" is implanted, presented as the negation and refutation of c~pitalism.
~ Facing the communist Uloc, the�United States, eroded by a profound mor~l and
intellectual crisis, are doing their best to keep their economic leadership. _
In America's wake, and disputing its position, bustle the f'ormer, present uiid _
future capitalist parent states: Great gritain, France, Federal Germany,
Japan, Canada, Brazil, South Africa, the oi.l states. _
_ Far from being impervious, the socialist and capitalist worlds are interdepen-
dent. Dominated in all fields, the USSR understood that without capitalism's
money and tecl~nology its own economy would collapse. It had the genius to
drag c;apitalist managers into blending their interests with those of the "so- -
cialist world."
The attraction was so strong that the capitalist crow fell intc the trap set
by the socialist fox.
The whole politica~, financial and business world is aware today--too late--
of that swindle. The socialist bloc's indebtedness has become one of their
big worries.
That means that wlien communist countries buy in the West, for cash or on cred- _
it, they are paying us with our own money. But to gronounce the USSR and its
satellites bankrupt would }~ave ill-fated, even dramatic repercussions for
the Western economy, which is so involved in trade with the so-cailed "so- -
cialist" countries.
The opposite is no less true.
By an irony of history the communist bloc is more than ever a tributary of
capitalism. A disintegration of the American and European economy would drag
the USSR and its allies into a similar catastrophe. The Kremlin is in a po-
, ~~ition to eat into the capitalist powers' positions here and thexe; it cannot
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f'oment n world revolution wit}~out succumbing to tho apocalypsn 3t would un-
le~sh.
'1'o compete with Gapitalism, moreover, the 5oviet Union hns copied its methods.
This mimicry lias earnod it rebuffs in many Third World countries that ,are r.at
muc}~ disposed to exchange one imperialism for anothor.
~ In short, outside of ideologic questions, what is involved is a competition
betweeri two ga,ant capitalistic systems--one of which, the Soviet, wants to
_ replace the other, the American, which it is eager to swallow up and infil-
trate, but w}iich is still infinitely stronger.
In this battle the BCEN, the head in the West of a vast Soviet multinational,
hns its role to play. -
A dual role.
Dollar: Provided Mr Carter "Continues to Show Some Authority"
By supporting 5oviet foreign policy while attacking the French political sys-
tem, our communists are fulfilling the Krenlin's desires. When the Soviet
bank in Paris, the BCEN/Eurobank, administ~,rs and manipulates the property of
the PCF and the CG'~, it serves first the L'SSR. All the ~ore so bocause the
simple knowledge of the internal life of such an important political force
would in itself justify the granting of facilities and loans that the BCEN
provides for its communist customers.
That is the "revolutionary" French anticapitalist side of its activity. In
that, it is not a bank like the others.
When it executes, undisguisedly, on behalf of the USSR classic commercial
; and financial operations, without being, properly speaking, either a state-
owned bank or an issuing institution, it serves Soviet interests; in that, it
is not a bank like the others. -
When it seeks to worm its way in everywhere in the world, and when it extends
its network from Iran to Jamaica, from Mali to Brazil, from Zaire to Chile,
it serves Soviet interests.
In that, too, it is a bank unlike the others.
The general interests of the Soviet state do not always coincide with the
' special interests of the French Communists; so by the force of circumstances
, it puts them in the background.
Dragged in the w,ike of the Soviet bankers, our communists thus become the
"objective" allies--an expression dear to the Marxists--of American imperial-
~sm. Every time the U~SR needs or thinks it would be useful to take up with
it.
liere is the irrefutable proof. -
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ro~ or~~ tr,rnr, t~si; oNt,Y
U?1 13 November 1J78 th~ l3CUN/l:urobank's "Stuclies unJ Uocwuc:i~tutioi~ U~t~urt-
me:nt" sends to de lioysson and l~o�omarev, who apt~rov~ it without objection, u
seveii~page study on the "Prospects for the doll~r, tlio Interest It~te ut~d Gold." ~
'I'ho report, done by Mr J.5. a~id Mr C.R., would be worthy of being reproduced
in its entirety, because of its lucidity. I will quote one pnss~ge from the
first part, relntivr to tlic "Dollar Aftcr thc Itectific~tion ~'laii o~
~ 1 November 1978,"
On ttiat day President Carter, drivc:n by the oUligation to check the fall of
the American currency, had ~nnounced, as told by tl~e BC~N leaders, "tlie -
tstablishiiig of a line of defense for thc dollar of a tatal amc~unt CI1~)BbiC
of reaching $30,000,000,000." After det~iiled study of the modalities, wc~k-
nesses and d~ngers of tlie plan, in langu~ge not in the least resembling that
of L'kiUM~WI'CEi, and totally contradicting conununist propaganda, the le~ders of -
the 5oviet bank conclude, in connection with the measures taken by Mr Carter, _
"5uch realism has made a favorable impression." But, going still farthcr and
vetituring fearlessly onto political terrain, they sum up in tl~ese words, with
brutal frankness, their tiope of seeing America--save tlie dollar:
"What remains to be measured is the /degree of determination of the
Americans themselves/. Can t}ie demonstration nf willingness and author-
ity of 1 November manage not to yield shortly afterwards to the indecis- `
ion and tiegligence that up to now have characterized President Cttrter's
policy in this area? This is not certain, for--on tlle one hand, /nor~-
' A~~iericans will put on the pressure/ for the way outlined on 1 Novembe,r to
be maintairied (if necessary by making use of the "threat" of the future
European monetary system, technical details of which are not yet decreed)--
on ti~e other hand, the /international consequences/ of an American relaxa-
_ tion would be /serious/, not only for the dollar, but for the credibility
of the United States, for that country's leadership, and for Western co- _
}iesiveness. In another connection, the most difficult step for President
Carter was hurdled on 1 November. The legislative elections took place.
Tt~e President can continue to show authority. Will he do it? One can
only hope...."
_ "One can only hope"; that is unequivocally clear. While L'HUMANITE and the
French Communists are proclaiming the bankruptcy of the dollar, the decep-
tions of the Carter Plan and the dangers it will cause to be run by peoples
exploited by inflationist imperialism, their Soviet bankers are hoping that
, the American President "shows authority," that the dollar recovers and that
the economic system whose driving force it is recovers its stability.
5uch an attitude, totally contrary to commw~ist slogans, has a consist�ent and
rational explanation. The dollar crisis, if it were amplified and became
aniversal, would hit--by ricochet, but hard--the Soviet Union and its bank
first of all. This very BCEN/Eurobank which is the creator of the Eurodollar,
?ahich has made its fortune. It would suffer, would even be in danger of bank-
ruptcy, if its holdings and enormous investments (drawn up for the most part -
in dollars) were devalued, rendered anemic, reduced to subsistence level by a
lasting disintegration of the American currency.
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Why Chc I'CF~ un~, thc CG"1' C~nnot Leuve the 5ov3et t3enk
'Che U55R ~itd Am~ric~ ~re bohaving themselves. Their war of ~ttrition hus very
strict luws thnt prohibit t1~~ K.O. of ono of the partners, lest it simult~n-
cously suffer tlie swne fnte, The future dostruction o~ cupitalism by cor~nun-
ism Soviet-style involves first penet.rating.und infiltruting it, We are in
thc preliminaxy phase of that. Which explains the duality, once more appar-
ent, nf thQ Soviet b~.nk fn Pnris--a bank at the samo time revolutionary and-- ~
c~pitalist.
When i~rench Conwunists place their funds in it, they are entrusting them to a
revolution~ry institution which in its turn helps them to fight French ~nd
Western communism; when the Soviet bankers handle those billions, they are
thinking only of the advantuges to be drawn from them by their own capit~l-
ism, their own imperialism.
The revolution is known to make use of roundabout wa~?s. One of them conducts
the money of the workers of the CGT, of Rene Andrieu, of inembers of Parlia-
ment und Communist rank and file int�o the funds that will nourish the activ0
ities of large monopolistic ~rench firms, Creusot-Loire, Elf, Chausson, etc.
Capitalism for capitalism, the French communists would have to go to the -
Crench bankcrs.
~ If they do not do it because they cannot, it is because Soviet capitalism
is barring their way; if they do not do it because they do not want to, it
is because they have chosen the foreigner. ~
1 might continue for much longer my promenade inside this bank ~rith its so-
exciting secrets. But the time has come to leave it, at least temporarily, _
and to go on to the conclusions resulting from this study.
llowever, I could not take leave of Mr de Boysson without communicating to my _
_ readers one last document that more than any other swnmarizes the Soviet bank-
ers' opinion on the condition, situation and prospects of their own bank, at
the dawn of 1979. -
M"Information Memorandum" signed by the "General Management of Eurobank"
a!~d sent to its high-ranking officers on 13 December 1s~78 by de Boysson and
Strauss, establishes a balance sheet of indisputable objectivity:
"Our general expenses," de Boysson writes, "have continued to increase and
in 1978 about 15 percent over 1977. That is, short of conducting ourselves
irresponsibly, which our sharehol.ders (/the Soviets/) and, in the last
analysis the personnel, might justifiably object to, we cannot adopt a
~ policy of accommodation, as far as hiring is concerned, as well as salar-
ies."
That means in other words that despite its profits, which are altogether con-
siderable, the BCEN, like the other banks, will in 1979 follow an austerity
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~oK o~ r ccr~r., us~ oaLY
- lino clos~;r to Mr 13arre's advicQ thun to the domagogic ord~rs of March~is
anJ 5eguy,
In the meantime the BCEN lias con~inued to prosper; any worry abou~ its futurt~
is inconcQi.vable.
~ -
"In 1978 Oi~r Bank's Reputation 1~as Remained Always Unquestioned"
Mr de [3oysson said that extremely well in cliscussing the "fiscal year 1978
- at ~uroUank":
"Like the bottle which--according to the pnint of view--is half full or
- half empty, it is iiot easy to catalog 1978, which presents both positive
aspects and others that we call less positive.
"On the positivs side may be noted:
"In the first place, that the difficulties we may encounter in management
have now become basically objective. That is, they arise out of the eco-
nomic and monetary crisis being experienced by international trade rela-
tions, a crisis that is driving us to voluntary and necessary restriction _
of our activities for obvious security reasons.
"The subjective: obstacles we ran into during the second half of 1976 and '
throughout 1977, resulting from difficulties encountered by some of our
sist~er banks, are no longer a serious problem for our management. We must
be grateful to our shareholders (/the Soviets/) for that; there they gave
- us a show o� confidence. We will hope that the control currently in pro-
gress w:tll enable them to conclude that their confidence was well.-placed."
Mr de Boysson is not mistaken; several days before my work came out, ttie
Muscovite authorities assured him of their satisfaction.
Because on the subject of results, as de Boysson writes, anticipating the end
of the fiscal year:
"Wiiat can be pxedicteu on this date is that the net banking income (the
diffe.rence between the banking income and additional income on the one
hand and banking expenditures on the other hand which apgear under the ~
heading of development) will probably be a little higher than in 1977...
And we also hope the net profit will be a little higher than in 1977,
but there, too, in "current" francs and not in "constan~" francs. This
is progress over last year, for which the results in current francs were
_ lower than in 1976."
This "progress", as we have seen, scarcely pxompted the BCEN to practise hir-
- ing or to increase social adv~ntages.
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~
Mr do ~oysson goes on:
_ "The reasons fnr this situution, which is obviously not ideul ~nd whic:ii -
does affect us on the neAative sido, are numerous and well-known: besides
_ the b~sic factor, whi.ch is the crisis already mentioned, one may cite the
narrowing of the margins for internntional finaticing, the weakness of tl~e
dollar during a large part of the year, /while the majority of our opera-
tions are frFUned in that cuxrency/*, ns well as limits placed by our -
~utliorities (/Soviet/) on.our ability to co?ivert it."
In one burst de Boyssons has just shot down all the arguments put forward by
capitalist bankers. Including the most eloquent, who confirm the analysis I
just made (see above, p 209) of the objective alliance, beyond their iceen com-
_ petition, between Soviet and American bankers: the majority of the operations
of Mar.chais' and Seguy's bank are drawn up in dollars, a weak and disputed
_ currency. As good as saying that the francs of the PCF and the CGT are being
used to fortify in some way the American currency.
I~Ir de Boysson, who is obviously sorry about the "Yankee" currency's misad- -
ventures, hastens to add that
"So as not to end these considerations on a too-pessimistic note, we may
conclude that fiscal 1978, despite the real difficulties /which ~re the
. lot of all businesses at the present time/, has unfolded rather better -
than anticipated and that our working tool, our bank's reputation, has
always remained unquestioned."
_ Will it still be unquestioned tomorrow?
Mr de Boysson was sure o� it when he rewarded his intimate associates with
these kind final words:
"In conclusion, we wish you happy holidays and we send yau quite sincerely
our wishes for a good year 1979 for you and yours, and for our bank."
- Md with all my good wishes for. the next trip to Moscow (19-23 February) of
Guy de Boysson and Ponomarev:
"Attention hir Tchernyssov
Chief, Departraent of International Relations. Referring to telegram of
5 January to Eurobank from President Alkhimov we inform you that
Guy de Boysson and Vladimir Ponomarev will arrive in Moscow on Monday _
19 February in the afternoon to visit Gosbank-Vneshtorgbank MBS and
- MIB [expansions unknown].
"Kind regards
"Eurobank
- *Author's note: my italics.
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That Telex of 11 Januaxy 1979 did not announce ~l~at de aoysson and Ponomarev
would bring with them the first two copies of this book, which had come out =
several days earlier, on the secrets of theix bank. They will have to add
_ it to their report of activities for 1978. And if this work does not please
their "/authorities/", they cr~n always offer it on their next visit to the USA
(late April 1979), Basel (11 JuneO, Frankfurt (12 March) or Abidjan (end of
May) .
Present but invisible, I will be pleased to accompany them on "other visits
to certain socialist or WQStern countries" which, according to the "1979 `
travel plan for members of the General Management (reference GB/SM-24/1979),
may Ue envisaged as circumstances dictate." -
COPYRIGHT: Editions Albin Michel, 1979
8946 E~ -
CSO: 8019/1071 =
.
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