JPRS ID: 8640 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080041-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 41
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~OR O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
~PRS L/8640
30 August 1979 ~
West E u ro e Re ort
p p ~
CFOUO 48/79~
FB~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OF'F[CiAL USE ONI.Y
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FOR t7F~'~CIAL USE ONLY J1~RS L/8640
30 Auguat 1.979
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(F.OUO 48/79)
CONT~NTS PAGE~
COUNrRY SEGTTON
~ANC~
. Air F`ra.nce's 1979-~983 P1.ans Reviewed
(AII2 & COSMOS, 30 Jun 79) Z _
First Nucleax Attack Submarine Iaunched
(Pierre Langereux; A~t & COSMOS, 1~+ Jul ?9) 6
Three Mirage F-1 Squadrons for 12th Fighter Wing
(AIR & COSMOS, 30 Jun 79) 8
Technical Competence of Navy ~escribed
( Guy de Chauliac; AFtNIEES D~ AUJOTk~D~ HUI, Jun 79 10
Division Ordnance Commander Explain F~nctions
( C1.a,ude Chabaux; ARMEES D~ AUJOtIRD' HUI, Jun 79 16
Armored Diviaion Tactics E~cpla,ined
( Clement .de la Ruelle; ARN~ES D~ AUJOik~D~ HUI, Jun 79 21
BriePs
Ariane Motors Tested ~7
NETHERLANDS
&~ttexdam 'Spot' Oil Maxk,et Does Thriving Busineas
(Herbert Uniewski; STgtN, 21 Jun 79) 28
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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COUNI'RY B~CTION FRANCE
- AIR ~'RANCE~S 1979-1983 PLANS REVIEWED
Parie AIR 8 COSMOS in French 30 Jun 79 pp 46-47, 64
[Text] Air France hae ,just released the eecond edition of its progren,
following the first pert published in 1976. The ob~ect wes, et thet time,
to proceed with nn initiel, overell synthesie of the net~onal enterprise's
, situation within ite envirorxnent, end to outline both s coherent generel
view of the enterprise'e ections~ ae well ae an intermediete-renge develop-
ment end menagement policy. Air Fre~ce hed to deley the publication oP this
plen, because it was uneble to cerry out ite pro,~ected Boeing 737-200 ordet~.
The docunent now releeeed has been prepered et the end of a favoreble yeer
(1976 has left Air Fracice with e profit of 197.5 million). But 1979 began
with a renewal of the oil criais and a cheotic fers.situetion. Thia re-
quires great flexibility on the pert of the treneportetio~ se~tor.
Diegnosis
The plan's introduction analyses Air Frence'e role end poeition within the
netional and world context. An anelysie of the situetion follows. After
the results of Air France end thoee of the campetition are compared~ the
progran esteblishes e diegnosis, where it ie recalled that the netionel
company's initial hendicep was worsened by the aocial conflicts of 1974.
The situation only begen to be corrected in 1976 with compensetions granted
by the stete, but also with improved enterpriee productivity (ground end
technical flight persor~nel~ rotation of eircreft, maintenance coets). But
profitability of th~ intermediate network remeine a point of concern.
For the total syatem~ the improvement noted in 1977 Was confirmed in 1978 with
a subaonic operation proPit of 232.5 million frencs. But recent oil increases
and the threet of coming acarcity show hau vulner~le the enterprise remains,
in en extremely unatable envirorment with the prospect of increased compe-
~ tition from Americen compenies in the North Atlantic, eoon to be follo~d ~
by d few ma~or asietic companies. Nevertheless, it remains true thet the
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reorgenizetion m~eaures taken in recent years (ellminetion of the Boeing 707-A,
qredual withdrew~l of the Corevelle~ cancelletion of unprofiteble lines)~ to-
gether with recently echieved productivity improvements~ have contributed to
o f~vorable development of the enterpriae's resulte.
Stretegy
The second pert~of the plan defines stretegic directions. After e reminder
of Air France's vulnerahility~ the authors poin't out thet "Air France's
ePforts would be inedequete if not fruitleas, if cerried out in the setting
~ of a national air treneportation policy lecking in coherence and too remote
from the warldwide economic context." 7he plen specifies thet etretegic
orientetione ere based on the following fectore:
A sociel policy of cortmunicetion and dielogue concerning the various espects
of campany policy, especially with respect to the crucial and related factors
of competitiveness end development; this ia the only type of policy likely to
ettrect widespread support from personnel. -
A fleet policy allowing the enterpris~ to make use of planes with the highest
peformance end lowest fuel consumption per trensported trafPic unit in e given
module. On this point, the mein cherecterietice of Air France policy ere ae -
follows:
Orient~tion toward equipment composed of French or Frenco-Europpan plenes~
ex~ept for long-distence intercontinentel rune where the 8oeing-747 seems
destined to meintained prolonged exclusivity;
Deliberate adoption of a policy of intenaive use of large cerriers~ both for
long runs (8oeing-747) end for intermediete end short runa (Airbua 8-2 end
Super 8-4);
Use of complementery 160-seat to 200-seet planee.
Figures indicated far 1988 would lead to a totel fleet of the order of 115
pasgenger planes ~with the probeble eddition of eight B 727-200'e or Jet 2's
operated by ACI) and 13 cargo planea. Such development will of course be
possible only if the natianal canpeny's financial recovery is conaolidated
and confirmed.
A cmnmerciel policy using a sophisticated marketing approech, making it
possible tn offer the servicea which ere beat edepted to both the pesaenger
and the freight segments of the merket.
Revision of the compeny's merketing policy calls for an answer to the
following question: how to adapt services and dev~lopment to thet portion
of clientele whose essential criterion is a cost criterion; in other Words~
how to render air transportetion democretic, deeling with low-fare servicee
in terms of profitability while preserving high incane producing trafPic,
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compoaed pertly of bueinees treff9.c~.and which accounte for epproximetely 60
percen~ of our rece~.pts7 GJith long distence runs~ the plen foreseee the need
for meesures beyond the preeent Air Frence~Vec~~ion experimQnt which ia to be
tried out in perte of the Boeing-747 economy clees Wi.th mixed equipm~nt. qn e
Europeen scale~ the formule mey be generelly extended~ or limi'ted to certein
epecific connectiona, depending on merket etudies, the profitebility oP each
line~ reletiona with eseociated eir lines, end possible fere acele ed,juatmente.
A renewed pureuit of compeny imege~ edepted to the commerciel ob~ectives
eought. This is not to belittle the dietinction end style which have notably
contributed to the success of Air France; but it ie importent for the compeny
to promote a pleaeenter end more humanized imege of air trevel~ with the moet
widely eveilable cenge of'services; to seek a renewed and wermer atmaephere;
to adopt e more receptive and underetanding ettitude towerd patrons' neede
end expectetions; to menifest the universelity of Frence~ which the company
represente; end above ell, to act so thet the public has en i:mege of eir
~ trevel es a sefe, reliable, end punctual meens of treneportetion. Stud3es
are under way to identify the expectations of new petrons, the possible re-
, actions of traditional patrons to these changes~ and the potential impect
of theae innovetions on the company's public imege.
Finelly~ a comnon policy providing meximum coherence between the ob,jectives
of the parent company and those of subaidiaries.
Operations Plan
The third part of Air France's progran cc~taine the operetions plan for the
1980-1983 period.
While passenger traffic is scheduled to develop et a rate of 9.3 percent per
year, and shipping traffic et 11.3 percent, passenger sollici~ation will in-
crease only by B.3 percent, with the spread of the holidey formula expected
to provide a new progression of over two pointa in occupation coefficienta.
Technical st~ndardization of the fleet will be particulerly responsive; in
order to successfully implement the policy of edepting services to the spe-
cif ic requirements of various categories of patrons, cortmercial utilizetion
will be kept flexfble by a tailoring of cabin equipment and neceasary veri-
acions. For exanple, the 8oeing-747 will be used in five different vari-
ations, and there will be three Airhus models, with the addition of the new
A-310 model in 1983~ while that summer the Air France and ACI 727 fleet will
reach 36 ships. The Caravelle will be dropped in 1981 and the 707 by 1983.
The plan devotes a v~ry important section to action pror~rens 'according to
functions; it then presents the range of services proposed by Air France
(first class, business class~ econany class, Air France~ vacation), end the ~
distribution of this range of services over the networks~ as well as the
resulting personnel training policy.
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Increesed Difficulties in Yeers to Come
Th~ plen next pxesente pro,jected operetione budgets. In view di the Concorde
deficit~ 1~lkely to b~ permenent es e result of oi1 priae increese~ Air France
fe~ls thet it ie imperative to review the terms of the egreemente linking it
to the atete. Concerning subsonic operetions, the plen outlines the following
ma,jor directions:
In the present state of eir treneportation~ f.t is atill poesible to eseume
rapid merket expeneion, es lang es dynemic commercial ection cen be eupported
by efficient service policy. Cnmpletion of fleet modernizetSon end increaeed
' productivity are essential fectors in eneuring intermediate renge development
on solid foundations.
From 1977 to 1983~ the grosa operetions surplus (grose mergin with coverege
of investmenta cost) for eubeonic ectivity will go from 940 million Francs
to 2,450 france or e yeerly grawth rete of 17.3 percent~ egeinst which there
is en equally rapid increese of finenciel chergea and depreciation ellowencea
(from 898 to 2,190 million frenca or 16 percent per year) in connection with
equipment activities. On the other hend it should be noted the1; the yeera
- 1980 to 1982 will be affected by the cost of the Roisey.2 instellation end
by ad~ustments mede in the surrounding network structure to compeneete the
lack oF 100-seet planes, while expenses in connection with the presence of
new planes will increase notic~ebly.
7herefore the next three years look more difficult~ e priori~ then the pre-
ceeding ones. ?he comper~y's economic situation will not become less
vulnerable until the end of the plan~ when the new'terminal is fully in
operetion end when the spread of the Airbus A-310~ by then acquired by most
neighboring countries, eneblea Air France to compete on equel terms on its
surrounding network. Oil prices rertiein ae the me~or unknown fector, with
its impact on the ability of weetern economiee to meintein steedy growth,
as well as its impact on the relative cost of air trenaportetion.
Over 14 8111fon in Investments
Under these conditions, total operetiona budgete will still belence with e
surplus, but with a net profit which, dropping from 120'million frencs in 1979
to 90 million Franca in 1980 end 80 million francs in 1981, will then improve~
reaching 160 million francs in 1982 and 210 million francs in 1983.
From 1979 to 1983~ Air Frence must finance large inveetments to purchase 14
8neing-747's, 17 Airhuses, and 11 8oeing-727as, thus increasing cep~city
a~id renewing the obsolete Ceravelle and 8oeing-707 fleets~ es well es com-
pleting the Roisay 2 terminal installation. In addition to the 11,615
million franc requirements represented by these investments, there will be
_ loan reimbursements (2,280 million fr~ce) and miecelleneous expenses
bringing investment requirements to a totr,l oP 14,335 million francs~ 47
percent of which will be self-financed, ~.8 percent Pinenced through
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capitol investment, 47.5 percent through increesed net debt~ end 1.5 aerc~nt
through various eourcea. The retio of long term debta to compeny funde Will
qo from 2.9 percent in 1979 to 3.06 percent at the end of 1983.
Completion of Firet Phase
In the plen's conclueion, Air France notes thet en initiel pheee is ending:
it has been marked by productivity ~fforte~ eccelereted fleet modernizetion~
network reorganizetion, an efficient commerciel policy of cepacity booking
end receipte~ end settlement af prablems with the stete. It hes seen the ,
_ eddition of the Concorde to the line. In 1976 this period culrninated in the
netional compsny's return to competitivenesa in long dietence runs; in sti11
very fnsufficient improvement of intermediate run results; in the enterprise's
finencial recovery, end in vigorous development whicSi has further improved
Air France's first-rank status in internationel eir tra~sportation. The
same eff~rts were made with compereble reeults where subaidieries are
concerned.
Beginning of New Phase
The new phese of the 1980's is beginning~ filled with difficulties es well
- as promise. It hes already atarted with increased competit~on, due in per-
tic~cler to the rise of compenies from developing countries~ and to thie regu-
lation of air trensportation. The coming decade will elso bring in the ege
of mass trensportation: masses of business trevellers from directors to
specialized workers~ and the masses of all those Wf1D W~9fl t0 travel for per-
sonal pleasure and convenience, for holideys~ touriam, and fanily travel,
and who expect low fares aboue all.
For this new challenge, Ai: France has chosen to face the entire market, by
pursuing technical and commerciel efficiency; by adapting its neto~ork which,
in ~he absence of lesser modules~ will more than ever be oriented toward
development of essentiel axes~ evoiding any diepersion to merginal or erti-
ficial destinations; and by resolute arient~tion of the fleet to the most
modern end best performing large carriers, which are the ideel vehicles for
mass transportation and the only ~nes likely to contribute to lower costa,
by energetic innovation aimed at producing the services whicn ere best suited
to the new markets beginning to emerge.
It is this orientation, "highly consona~t with the national interest end the
company's embitions," which characterizes Air France's 1980-1983 progrem.
COPYRIGKT: Air & Cosmos~ Paris, 1979
11,023
CSO: 3100
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COUNrRY BECTZON FRANCE .
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FIRST NUCLEAR ATTAGK SL~MARINE LAUNCHED . ,
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Peris AIR 8 COSM05 in French 14 Jul '19 p 43
' [l~rticle by Pierre Lengereux]
[Text] The leunching of the "Provence~" the first French nuclee.r etteck
submerine, took place without ofPiciel ceremonies et the Cherbourg ersenel
on 7 July instead of 2~ Mey. Thie six week deley Wes due to personnel etrikee
which took plece during thet period (aee AIR & Cl7SMOS No 768).
The Provence ie the prototype of the new SNA-72 French nucleer etteck aub- _
marines whose construction wes decided et a seesion of the Defense Council
in ~une 1975, and whose first unit Wea ordered in March 1976. This ~ir~~.+~
SNA will be officially o~:een~tested during the firet quert2r of 1961 (in-
steed of October 1980) in order to go into ective eervice in eerly 1982. ~
After the teste, it will go to Toul~n, where~ together.with the two other
ships of this type, it will form the firet French nuclear ettack eubmerine
squadron (as part of the Mediterreneen squedron). Two other SIVA'e will
follow: the "Bretegne," alreedy under.construction in Cherbourg, end the
"8ourgogne" which will be docked in plece of the Provence. The 4th Militery
Prrgrartming l.aw (1977-'1982) provides for building only five SNA's. This
first series of French SNA's will be volunterily limited to five units be-
ca~se a second generation SNA design is acheduled by 1985, to replece the
Giesel attack submarinee in the eerly 1990'e. It ehould be remembered that
Englend plans to have 12 SNA's, the US plens n~~ 93, ena.the USSR on 86, all
of which will heve heevier tonnege then the French ahips whose size end
' performence were limited, partly for budgetery coneideretione..
Tr~e French first generetion SNA'^, led by the Provence, ere vessels of 2~670
t ms eubmerged end 2~385 tons surfeced~ meeeuring 72.1 m in length~ 7.6 m
in width, end 6.4 m in height. They ere equipped with 48 NW thermel nuclear
engines~ with en auxiliery diesel unit. They ere very inconspicuous end cen �
.dive to a depth of over 300 m, but their submerged epeed is limited~to only
25 knots (Whereas most foreign SNA's reach 30 knots or more). Initielly~
the French SNA's will have the seme Weapons syetem ea the 1,200 ton di~.:sel. .
"Agosta" ti/pe etteck aubmarines: four 533 guided torpedo leunchers,
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with 14 torpedoea eboerd. Letear~ they will be equipped with the new~ 50 km
renge Exocet 5M 39 mi~eiles which ere preeently being perfected by the
Aeroapa~iale. Theae environment-edepteble underweter/eurface mieeilea wi11 ~
alea equip the French mieaile-leunch nuclear eubmerinee (SNLE'8). ~
The SNA-72's heve 66-man crews who will eerve 135-dey meximum see petrols.
The crewa wi11 be roteted eo thet the SNA'8 cen petrol for 1B0 dey~. SIVA
miseions ere es folloWS:
Security end operetional or technicel inf~rmetion gethering mie~ione (eeerch
end contect mei~tenence with vees~ls declered es threetening, beyond our
meritime zones); ~ ,
Observation end deterrence miseiona on the high aeae (which mey 1~ed ~o :
oFfeneive ection egainat eurfece veesels end unfriendly submerinee); ~
Support miseione for neval forces; E
"Speciel" miasiona (mine plenting, boerding or landing of egents)~ which
require great diecretian;
Peecetime missione (treining ebove misaions~ crew treining including SIVI.E
crews, enti-aubmarine werPere treining for eero-c~evel forcee).
COPYRIGH';; Air & Cosmos, Parfs, 1979
11, 023
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COUNTRY SECT~ON FRAIVCE
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THREE MIRAGE F-1 SQUADRONS F'OR 12TH FIGHTER WING ~
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Peris AIR & COSMOS in French 30 Jun 79 p 45 .
[Text] Lest week~ the 19th Tiger Meet wes held et Air 8ese 103 in Cembrei~
commended for the peat yeer by Col Olivier Brylineki. This~ie e~ en~uel
event which, eince 1961, hes brought together e11 the eir force squedrone of
the western countriee ~hose emblem is e~ Tiger; on this occesion~ the pilote ' _
and mechanics of these squedrons perticipete ,jointly in e PruitPul operetional
ectivity which contributes to reefPirming their friendship. ~
Thie year, the Tiger Meet participents Were hosted by ~he C~nbreeie 1/12
Squedron (Commander Cc~cault) of the.12th Fighter Wing (Lieutenent-Colonel
~
Peges), equipped.with Mirege F-1's. PerticiQating were the Super Etenderd of 4"':'.~`
the 11th Fleet of the Aeronevele; Greek, Itelien, end 8elgien F-104'e; Germen x..`~
RF-4's and RF~-104's; Portuguese end Germeci G-91's; NorWegi~n F-5'e; et~d Royel
Air Force ~um~ end Royal Navy See King helicoptera.~
This in~ernatianal event included en aeriel meet feeturing the participation
of the PatrouilZe de France.~ Various types of plenes~ueed by the Air Force
gathered for,this meet et the Canbrai air bese: ~Cep-10 end Cep-20, T-33~
Jeguer, Mirage III-C, Mirage III-E, end of course the Mirage F-1.
r~.
The closing day of the 19th Tiger Meet saia the 25th enniveraery celebretion�
of the Cornouaille Squadron (112,000 flight houra), in the preeence oP Air
Corps Generel Philippe Archembeaud,.Air Defenee connaender. On Seturdey 23
June, Conma~der Leporte of the Cornnuaille 5quedron aleo completed hie 1000 j~.~~
flight hours With the Mirege F-1, the second Air Force pilot to do eo. Y~�'-#%;
.'y�
Or, 1 June 1979, e decision oP the Air Force Chief of StaPf reassigned the ,
original 3/12 deslgnetion to the Cornoueille Squedron (Which hed been >~x~
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deaignated 2/12 eince the disaolution of the Picerdie Squedron). The �
decision also providee For the estebliehment~ in 1980, of e third Mirege F-1 :
squadron, to be celled the Picerdte 2/12 Fighter Squedron~ within the 12th
Fighter Wing.
COPYRIGHT: A3r 8o Cosmos~ Parie, 1979
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COUNTRY 3ECTION FRANCE ;
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'CECNNtCAL COMPETENC~ 0~' NAVY DESCRIBED
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Paris ARMEE5 D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 27-28 ~
[Article by Lt Com Guy de Chauliac: "3pecialties of Fleet Crewe")
[Text] Lt Com de Chauli~c entered the navat academy in
ig60 and commanded a group of P.757-P.760 vesaeis in 1967. ~
Earning his detection certificate in 1968, he became '
detection officer oE the fast escort vesael Bearnais~ and ~
then rhe heticopter-carrier Jeanne d'Arc. Later he '
commanded the patrol boat Pampolaise. After graduating ~
Erom the Nigher Naval War School~ he accepted his present
post as head oE thp personnel section of the organiza-
tional office of the naval general staff plenning
division. ,
"Let each do his job and the cows will be well guarded~" a popular proverb ' i
seys. TransEerred from the level of cattle co the bridge oE a military -
vessel, this adage retains its full value and its truth ia borne out with .
every passing dsy as modern techniques develop.
But the need Eor crew specialization has ~sde itsflf felt on shipboard since
cae most ancient times, and the sailing crews of antiquity already had many ~
spectalties in their midst. And where we are concerned~ it can be said ~
that the speciatties are as ancient as the navy itselE
A Veritable Microcosm .
Since the beginning then, the difEerentiation of specialties has developed
on the basis of the tasks to be carried out and the equipment to be main-
tained or serviced on board combat vessels. The most obvious characteristic
of a war ship has always been that in itself it constitutes a microcosm~ ~
serving simultaneously as a combat tool, a vehicle for transport and the ,
framework for daity life, which means tha[ all of the capabilities necessary
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�or th~ ~x~eution of eh~ variou~ function~ which come into ies operaeion
mugr be found wiehin eh~ cr~w, and ehig ~lso m~~n,~ that, gpace being limit~d
' on board ship end B~f1CE ~~ch must have ~ comb~t station, Ch~C in a giv~n
indlvidual there muet eoexist the c~pecity to operate equipmene and Co main-
tain ~nd repair ie~ The burden of these requirements leads neceasarily to r
the f~ct ehat for e~eh individual, th~ are~ in whieh th~y oper~te is limited~ ~
and thie ia doubtless why the sailor, still more than other military per- t
sonnel, needs to be ~ speci~list. Born of ehe n~c~~~iei~a of life on bo~rd ~
ship~ epecialization h~s eaken on ~ npw aspece with ehe develnpm~nt oE naval
avi~tion, which has diff~rent need~~ Far aircraft, in fact, the maincenance,
~quipment repair, ~nd erew ~upport nperaeion~ ~re bagically eerried out ae
times dthpr than when th~ plan~ is engaged in ~ miasion and by peraonnel ~
diEEerent frnm ehat to which the mission i~ entrusted. Maintenance and U9@~
unlike the case wfth warships~ c~nnot be simuleaneous and are no longer in
th~ handg oE the same people. The complexity of ehe tasks and equipment, j.
mar~dver, dem~nd narrow specializetion, even if of different typea. ~
:
View nf the Complex of Sperialty ;
Thp current tiat oE speeialties, with a Eew exceptiona, clearly reElecCS '
th~se origins, in the land unics ~s we11. Those specialtiea developed else-
wher~ than on ships or aircrxiEt are in fact rare end it has always been
implicitly presumed that the range of capabilitieg necessary to man combat
means fully cover the needs pertaining to impiementation of the tasks on
land.
A view of the complex oE ~pecialties in whic.h fleet crews ~re treined is ~
given in the adjecenc di~gram which represents persQnn~l proportionally by
category. It does not take inta account ~he stationary peraonnel nor the
concingents with which this article does not deal, their situation being
rather different.
There can be no question of providing a descriptian of thc tasks invotved
in each nf these specialtips here, but their names are rather explicit. It
should, however, be made clear thac like any diagram, that offered here is
fn Eact a simplification nf the real situation. In fact, the growing
sophistic~tion of equipment and the multiplicatiori oE tasks have lead to ;
the development of a very large number of special qualifications which, '
added to the original specialties, noa constitute veritable subspecialties
in some cases. This trend is not likely to weaken in the years to come,
despite the reorganization efEorts which have been undertaken to prevent ~
the distortion of the system in the direction oE paralyzing complexity. As ,
the situation appears taday, it still aliows the generai staEf and the per-
sonnel in command, where each is concerned, to administer the troops and
personnel without too much difficulcy. 8uc che time had doubtless come ,
when the development of computer technology made ic possible for the navy ,
to deal ratronaliy and methodically with the problems of use and develop- �
ment of a complex the structure of which had previously been mainly the
resuit oE gradual and sometimes tardy adaptation to new situations. _ ~
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Prudence, however, coneinue~ eo prevail where reform is concern~d. The
structure the apecialties make up is th~ r~eu1C of a slow ~nd pr~gmatic �
efEort, bur o~ie tailored to rhe exact measures of th~ npeds, ies adeptaeion ~
being endorsed by ~xp~ri~nc~. B~fdre und~rtak~ng itg alteration, it is .
n~cessary to obtain the largeat po~~ible number of guaraneees ag to the con-
gi~teney ~nd suieability of rh~ Euture atructure.
Tr~ining by the Brannh '
Th~ large number of occupations in which seilorg engage creates a problem ~
in their training. The navy has choaen to provide~this training itself~ up ~
to ehe highest lpvel. This choice, the justiEication of which is not
obvious, h~a to do with the specificity of the maritime end military environ- ~
ment in which the capabilities l~~rned by thege individual~ muat be used. ~
This choice.mor~over dates back a long time, ~nd became neceasary following
experimenrs in other direceions which proved relatively unproductive. In
1856, Adm Hamelin, the naval minister, wrote: "The composirion of the fleet
crews allows occupational spenialization, but only specialization by sailors.
Th~ experiment with diEferent bodies contributing to the training of crews~ '
it seems to me, should not be repeated." This view of things hea not been
challenged since, and it does not appear that it should be under the preaent
circumstances, although of course there is no assurance of irs eternal
vaiidiry.
The major stages in this training~ of which there are three~ lead to the
award oE the elementAry certificate, the certificate of technical aptitude ~
and the higher certificate. Ainong chese stages others can be interspersed
for the purpose of acquiring a particular akill, leading to the award of a
3
certificace or endorsement thereof. The following chart shows the path
usually pursued by an individual in the course of a full career in the navy. S i
It will be seen that this diagram shows the concept of the "fourth level~~ �
with a question mark. The need has in fact developed in a number of
~pecialties for a supplementary training stage, whether it be for a more '
profound specialization and raising the level of the technicisn's knowledge '
or, on the contrary~ broadening the qualifications of the individual to
enable him to assume responsibility for a larger whole~ for example, a. ~
weapons system. The Eorm to be given this new phase has not yet been fully '
defined, but the existeRCe thereof can already be seen in fact with the
recent establishmene oE the "petty officer first class for systems" certifi-
cates Ebr a number of specialties.
~
Employment and Administration . ~
One can readily imagine, in the light of what has just been said, that the .
employment and administration of naval personnel is a complex business. In ~
order to clarify matters, it has been necesssry to consider the specialties
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from tw~ c~iff~r~nr pdints nE vipwt th~t nf th~ equipmene ~nd ~dminiser~Cive
_ lev@l~, on thE one h~nd, and th~t nf ehp ~dvt~ncement level, nn the other~
- ,
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1. 4th levcl? 8. Certificate of technical aptitude
2. Senior chief petty officer, 9. Seaman and leading seaman
then vice chief
3. Certificates iQ~ Elementary certiEicate
4. Chief petCy oEficer 11. CertiEicate
5. Higher c~rtificate
6. Petty officer Eirst class 12~ Years
~ 7. Petty ofEicer second class 13. Rank
The equipment level specialties are identical and the:.one~-sQCYeS:tQ~desCtfbe
thc positions to be filled and the other to select individuals for the
purpose. Putting all the spccialties on the equipment level together, we
obtain the total of needs [o ba met in the administrative specialties.
~i.,�,
The advancement specialty, wi~ich derives in Eact from the first two, deEines
the personnel within which advancement occurs. The total personnel must be
a large enough and sufficiently characteristic body in order to be able
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eo make valid comparisona between indivi~luEils, which is necegg~ry to enaure
equitablp advnncemenre on the basis of ehe merit and the seniority of each
individugl. Ie ia not always accurate enough ro deEinp the specific require-
ments of ~ given post and Che qualifications n~cessary to fill ie. In gUCh
a case, certain certificates or endorsemente are needed as a supplement and
this gives rige eo numerous adminiatrative and equipmene level ~pecieltiea.
For ~xample, rhe gdvancement speci~lCy for "electricians" alnne gives rise
to two administrativp (and equipment level) specialties: "electriciens" and
"gyrncompass elecrriciens." ~
Whnt About rhe Future? '
4
After a gl~nce at the situation regarding fleet crew specialties in the past
and present, one might wish to engage in speculation about the future. The
current system, which is still closely linked with its old rnots~ relies in `
large part on the aptitude of each individual to carry out his functions at
sea as well as on land, and on a complex of specialties deriving directly i
from the tasks to be carried out on board a warship. The development as it
is occurring seems likely ro lead to a ma,jor change, influenced in parCicular ~
by g certain number oE ne~~ elen~ents. The increasing automation of equipment ,
and weapons systems carried by these vessels points toward the planning oE
a reduction in crews, with the lodging space thua released making it
possible to increase the amount of equipment and thus military efficiency.
The concern for the best possible management of Che use of vessels with a
view in particular to carrying out the multiplipd number of peacetime
missions dictates that they shouid spend as many days as possible at sea~ '
with a resultant reduction in the time devoted to the most urgent main- ~
tenance, with the counterpart that this must be done with extreme effi-
ciency and without delay. This will probably not be possible except at the t'
cost of a clearer division of the capacities of the operators and the t�
technicians, and there will probably be movement in the direction of a t,,+
parcial extensio~ to the rest of the navy of the situation already existing
in naval aviation, that is to say a distinction between two categories of r~~~
personnel, the navigation crews and the maintenance crews which remain on ~
tt~e ground. Both remain and will remain specialists, since the complexity
of the tactics and the equi.pment so requires~ but one can clearly see that
the content of the specialties, linked more closely in the future either to
the operational or the maintenance aspect, could well gradually become
rather different from what it is today. It is the nature of this difference ~
which, without a doubt, constitutes the new factor.
ke would wager that the navy, which has been able to develop from propulsion
~y nars to jet propulsion, passing through the sailing, steam, diesel and
asoline engine phases, will be able to adapt to a development which will ~
, ; .
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hnve to mgineeifl, whatever happena, the napacity of our veasels to carry f
nuC eheir primary misaion--remaining at sea for long perioda~ often �ar
Erom Cheir bases~ in a combaC-ready condiCion. ~
l:
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"Armeea d'Au~ourd'hui" i'.
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE ~ .
DIVISION ORDNANCE COMMANDER EXPLAINS FUNCTIONS
Paris ARI9EES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 34-35
[Article by Col Claude Chabauxs "The bivision Ordnance Commander"]
[Text] Col Claude Chabaux entered Saint-Cyr in 1951
Marshal de Lattre graduating class), and began his career
in the artillery. He has served in ordnance since 1964.
He has served as assistant technical director for the
ordnance office of Che Sixth Military Region (RM) director
of the Metz ERM [Regional Ordnance Establishment], and
then ordnance commander of the Fourth DivisiAn. Since
1977, he has been in command of ordnance for the EOCA ~
[organic army corps elements] of the First Army Corps.
He has the higher miliCary education certificate (81st
graduating class) and the technical certificate.
For the land army, as Eor any mechanized branch, maintenance of equipment
in proper condition, along with personnel training, is one of the basic
parameters of the operational capacity of the troops. A true combat action,
this is guaranteed jointly by the regimental bodies, with regard to main-
t:nance, and by the ordnance bodies, where st+pport, that is to say major ;
repairs and the supply of exchange parts, is involved.
The ordnance branch, which serves at the same time as a supply service, r
thus assumes a preponderant role in the logistics of war materiel, eo which � :
purpose it puts all its means to work, whether it be infrastructure establish- '
- ments or exclusively military formation. However, unity of command and '
:esponsibility when it comes to maintenance is made possible thanks to the ' S~
~ssignment of the support means they require to large units--logistic r~
divisions and brigades. These ordnance bodies, while retaining operational =
relations with the "logistic chain," come under the suthority of the inter-
branch command. :
;
The 1977 division thus includes a command unit, the "division ordnance
command," and a support formation, the repair group (GRDB [armored division
repair group] or GRDI [infantry division repair group]). .
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Why a Division Ordnance Command?
This in.�act is a quegtion dtt~ can ask on seeing that the 77eh division has ~
bur a aingle ordnance group, instead oE the Eour companiea which the 67th 1-
division has, ,~ustifying the existence at the divisinn PC [command post] oE p
a district ordnance sta�f (the counterpart of the preaent ordnance command). ~
;
In fact, if one were to adhere to the traditional role which has fallen to ~
the :nmma�cl of a support branch in operations, i.e. advising the GU [large
unit] commander on the deployment and directing the use of the means of the
branch, one could envisage entrusting this role to the commander oE Che
repair group.
But the responsibilities of the COMaC (ordnance commander) are not so limited,
and they are exercised in peacetime as well. A speci~list in maintenance, f
because he belongs to a branch the mission of which is maintenance, and a ~
member of the division PC, he is very oEten assigned supplementary responsi- ~
bilities by the general in command of the division, which he no longer ~
assumes in that capacity, but by delegation. Thus his field of action ~
exceeds the framework of support to include in fact Che whole of the main- `
tenance operation, including repairs. This role, close to that of a"main- ~
tenance assistant," is hard to reconcile with the functions of rhe commander .
of an executory group. ;
Triple Function of the Division Ordnance Commander ~
. ~
The actual responsibilities of the COMat cannot obviously be classified ~
precisely, much less exhaustively, because they are the result in large part ~
of assignments given by each division commander. However, they are to some
extent established by tradition and it is possible to group them under three ,
major categories: ~
- an "assistance and advisory" function; ~
- a"technical directi~n of maintenance" function; and
- a "command" function. '
. `
The Assistance and Advisory Function ;
Under this term, borrowed from the management vocabulary, one can i~.~clude ~
the role and activities in which the COMat engages as a technical adviser :
in the realm oE maintaining equipment in condition. ;
In relation to the general in command of the division and his general staff, ~
he plays the role of the true maintenance assistant. For example, he pro-
poses all the steps he deems useful concerning the organization of regimental .
maintenanc~, the urgent needs and priorities to be given them in connection x
with repairs and supply. '
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' Link~ with Che "Ordnanc~ Chain" in Pe~cetimn ~
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1. Logistic brigade 13. Lateral liason ~
2. Regional ordnance commander 14. Subordinate in wartime
and director to the logistic brigade '
3. Ordnance commander for and head of the maintenance
organic army corps elements chain !
4. Division command post 15. Regional ordnance commander
5. General staff and director ~
6. Ordnance commander 16. Ordnance commander of '
7. Army corps ordnance groups o'rganic army corps
8. Ordnance establishments elements ~
9. Command and support regiment 17. Command 'and support ~
10. Division repair group . r.~giment ~
11. Hierarchical line 18. Division repair group
12. Technical subordination '
r
i
On maneuvers and during operations, he participates in the planning of the
logistic maneuvers of the division and in particular~, the drafting of ord-
nance orders. Familiar with the means, resources and potential of the '
~rdnance bodies outside the division--EOCA and establishments--he is in a -
position, in case of need, in peacetime as well as in wartime, to suggest ;
r.he requisitions for reinforcement to be submitted to the army corps. Where ~
the whole of the maintenance oper~tion is concerned, he keeps himself in- ~
formed of the state and potential of the materiel of the division, and pro-
p~ses measures needed to improve the situation in case of need, . .
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In rel~Cion eo the regimental corps, ehe ordnance commander i~ ehQ p~rmanent '
adviser and he is gener~lly heeded not only by the corpa commnnders, but
also by Che personnel of the ~echnical services with whom he ig in Couch in
the courae of f.r~quent visie~. Knowing of eheir prnblems, he may ~ven f~el
, the ne~d tn nrg~nize information, or indeed trnining, courses Eor them, wieh
the assistance of the repair group.
,
The Technicel Uirection oE MainCenance Function
This involves all rhe responsibilities and acCivities pertaining to the
uCilizaCion of. Che equipmenC. This function is of primary importance because
it has to do in fgct with the search for the bese technical condition for
materiel, and ehus in the final analysis the operational capacity of the.
division. '
In the realm of support, which on the technical level comes under the juris-
diction of Che ordnance commander of the army corps, the COMat should
initiate and supervise the execution of the mission. In particular, on the
basis oE the orders of the general commanding the division and within the
framework of the army corps technical directives, he specifies for the group .
commander the targets to be reached. His supervisory action should enable
him to ensure the proper quality of support and, in peacetime, respecC Eor
Cechnical procedures and economic imperatives. .
In addition, he provides liason with the ordnance bodies, in particular the
infrastructure establishments which strengthen or supplement the activities
of. the repair group. ~
In the repair sector, his activities are carried out on the authority of. Che ~
division commander. It may involve either drafting technical directives ,
for the regiments or scheduled checks with a view to ensuring the proper ~
functioning of the technical units of the corps.
Ne may have reason to propose corrective measures if such are deemed
necessary to the corps commander or the general in command of the division.
The Cor~mand Function
The division repair group, a basic unit in the com~nand and support regiment
(RCS) does not come under the authority of the ordnance commander, to whom ~
it is subordinate only in the technical sector. However, the COMat, as
representative of the ordnance branch, plays an important role both in
relation to the corps commander and the division c~mmander where the adminis- .
tration of personnel, their guidance and technical training, are concerned. ~
Thus without infringing on the authority of the commander of the RCS, who is
responsible for the administration of personnel, he participates in the
classification of officers from the point of view of their technical quali-
fication. Similarly, he participates in the work of promoting commissioned
and noncommissioned officers.
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Zn nddieion, ha issues opinions on the ~pplicaCiong for candidacy nn the
various eenhnical training leveLs. `
Thus the actual responsibilities of ehe COMat caneiderably exceed the frame-
wnrk of support as such as and his role is not limited to Ch~C oE a mere
representaeive nf his branch. ~
Situated on a level synthesizing eechnology and deployment, the director of ~
maintenance and authoriey responsible for the rational and efficient ~.~se o�
the technical means of a large unit as a whole, the ordnance commandeti is,
within ehe division PC, one of the craftsmen o� the operational poCenCial
of. Che division and a guarantor of it. ,
CC~PYRIGHTs 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" ~
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
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ARMORED UIVISYON TACTICS EXPLAINEb '
~
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 68-69 i
[Article by Lt Col ClemenC de la Ituelle: "The Tank Regiment in the Armored ,
bivi,sion"~ ~
[Text] A Saint-Cyr graduate in the French Union graduaCing '
class (1952-54) who obtained his BEMS [certificate of '
higher military studies] in 1971, Lt Col C1emEnt de la
Ruelle commands the Second Calvary Qegiment, the tank ;
regiment of the Fourth Armored Divi~tiion. As a subordinant ;
o.`f.icer, he commanded various types of squadrons: infantry,
AMk 13 tanks and SS 11 tanks. Made g field offic~r in 1969, �
he se~ved successively in a reconna+,ssance r~~giment, with !
the EM ~~eneral staff] of the Seventh Military Region,
and at the Armored Weaponry and Cavalry School of Instruc- ,
tion, where he was in charge of tactical courses and
studies from 1976 to 1978.
In the current context, the tand threat to frontiers is characterized by a ~
crushing numerical superiority for the adversary (three to five against one),
the omnipresence of tanks and other armored vehicles capable of waging
~ mobile warfare using nuclear end chemical weaponry, and very substantial ;
classic fire support (artillery and aircraft).
The two tank regiments, the most powerful elements in the armored division, ~
are used to destroy the armored forces of the enemy and, whenever possible, '
to ensure the bold exploitation in depth of the weaknesses found in the r
enemy deployment or created by an attack with or without nuclear fire. ,
The regiment has combat, cormnand, mobility assistance and support vehicles ;
which provide it with considerable fire power, very great mobility and re- >
markable flexibility (see Figure Na 1.). ~
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08GA~G~AI~I~E SI~1Pll~l~ DU p~61MEN1 DE CHABS
4 Moy~N d~ � .
~ ONici~n r 42 4 5 ChMra : d4
~2l~IOftlcl~n r 138 6 Whloulw bltnd~~ a 26
~ 3 H.D.R. � A20 ~Z
~t ~ ViMc~dh � ?ouM ~ 180
i .
~ a
N~. ~ a mobilitb i~ ~ Mo,r~us ~ coMen,r
~ 12 E~cadron porti Eacadrona de chan ~'3
~ ~
13 ~ 13
.P~Ioto~ trca~naisa~ce g
IOrknt~ur)
� P~bton d~ plongau~s 10
(Aid~ au har~chiss~ment) ~
14 IU~oyans d. sout;.n
Y 1b~~~"""r0~ 80 ' (1i~ur~ n�1) '
Figure 1. Simplified Organic Chart of a Tank Regiment
Key: j
1. Commissioned o�ficers 8. Aids to mobility ,
2. Noncommissioned officers 9. Reconnaissance platoon (guidance) ~
3. Soldiers 10. Divers platoon (to aid in crossings)
4. Command vehicles 11. Combat vehicles
S. Tanks 12. Transport squadrons ~
6. Armored vahicles 13. Tank squadrons '
7. ti;heeled vehicles 14. Support vehicles ~
V,rtures Include Fire Power, Mobility and Flexibility
Tiianks to four tank squadrons each made up of 13 tanks organized in four
3-tank plaeoons, the regiment has considerable antitank and antipersonnel .
fire power. The AMX 30 tank is characterized by the efficiency of its main ,
weapon (105 mm gun firing a hollow charge shell which can penetrate the ~
armored vehicles in use with great accuracy at a range of 2500 meters), and .
the s~econdary weapon ~(automatic 20 mm gun, now being put to general use)
~nsuring the antiaircraft defense capacity of the units.
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This power is strengthened by the transporC squadron made up of 13 VTT AMX 10 ~
vehicles equipped with 20 mm automatic guns which can be used againat rargeta ~
on land or in the air. This modern equipmenC moves ~t the same epeed as Che
tanks. R
The quaternary structure of the squadron which transports and disembarks a ;
hundred soldiers well equipped to combat tanks and peraonnel enableg the
colonel ec use them along with squadrons, ar in groups, to hold a site or
to break ehrough relatively major resistance. -
~
Mobility is provided by the performance on all terrain of the AMX 30 and
the VTT AMX 10 tanks, the equipment they carry making it possible to pursue
the battle at night at a slower rate and with a,more limited poCeneial than
in the daytime. They have a capacity to penetrate certain sections of
terrain wiehout assistance; they have a long operational range (600 kilo-
meters); and they are armored against small caliber projecCiles, shell
bursCs'and Che eEfects of NBC [chemical and bioingical] weapons.
In addition to the intrinsic capacities of these vehicles the regimenC has ,
two specialized platoons to facilitate its movement:
- a reconnaissance platoon for guidance, equipped with ,jeeps which although ~
relatively unprote~ted are well adapted to the tasks of reconnaissance for
the purpose of planning routes and guiding friendly elements; and
,
- a platoon of divers to aid in crossings, with the mission of reconnoitering _
the banks and bottom of water courses and to deal with them. This platoon !r
enables the tanks to make use of their capacity to ford such obstacles or '
to submerge. ~
Finally, the flexibility is provided by the quaternary structure o~ the ~
regiment and squadrons as well as the wealth of command vehicles.
The four tank squadrons, whether reinforced or not by vehicl~e borne troops, ~
enables the colonel to change direction, attitude and formation, while re-
mafning on the alert to adapt to the combat developments or exploit any ~
favorable opportunity.
The extreme wealth of command vehicles in another positive element. Thanks `
to the AMX 10's and the command tanks, the colonel, like the captains, can ;
direct the battle from the vanguard. The commanders on all levels can ,
follow immediately behind the vanguard echelon to get a sense of the situa- .
tion and turn it to advantage speedily. ~
There Are Weaknesses As Well ~
Despite their virtues, these vehicles do not enable the regiment to do �
everything. It has limited capacity in the following ways: '
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-'~he numb~r of foot goldierg ia in~d~quat~ eo op~n ~ p~99 far ~h~ tank~ on .
v~ry difficule t~rrain or to ~eeompany them in built-up ~rpag~
- There is ~ lack of shore-range wp~pons eo supplemene eh~ Eire power of
the long-r~nge w~apons on ehe tanks and VTT'~~
- The limited aneiaircr~fe cepacity for self-def~nae makeg ehe Qx~cution
of ~ miasion in open terr~in in daylight ~gainse an ~nemy which hae air '
sup~riority diEficult, without gp~cific coverage;
- Antitank weapons on the flank ~njoy ~ temporgry advant~ge which, as we
wi11 see shortly, makes a proper method of combat necessary.
,
In fact, the era of the hesvy tank (for exemple the French Sib u~ed in ~
1940), able to advance becauge it is impervious eo the ma,~ority of contemporary
entieank we~pans, is p~st, at 1@A8C for the time being.
-~inally, it ~hould b~ streased that the efficiency of the regiment de-
pends on the functioning of the logistic chain, in particular with regard '
co the supply of replacement fuel and ammunition~ once the initial supplies . '
have been usedf ~
- Also, the success of a mission against a numerous, mobile and powerFul ~
~rmored enemy requires that we derive the maximum benefit from the strength '
factors oE the regiment and that we offsee its shortcominga as well as
possible. : ,
~
; .
~inding the Wcak Point To Exploit ~
Fire power makes it possible to destroy the enemy at 2,000 meters~ and
mobility and flexibility enable us co ucilize the terrain to escape attack
and to concentrate or scacter fire rapidly. ~
. !
Provided logistics and the equipment follow, in other worda that maintenance ;
is effeciently carried out~ we have all that is necessary in order "to ~
maneuver, that is to say to providc fire in the right place at the proper ,
time."
Now maneuvering is necessery. In fact, against a powerful~ more numerous ~
and mobile enemy, it is necessary to seek out economical methods of combat
~nd to achieve numerical equality or superiority locally. "Our style can
thus not be that of a boxer, but rather that of the judo fighter who seeks
uut the weak point in his adversary in order to throw him off balance and
vanquish him."
Whenever possible, we should avoid attac:king the adversary Erontally, for
this means attacking his strong point, in the direction in which he is ~
ready instantly to maneuver and to bring alt his forces to bear. We should ,
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on the cantr~ry sy~tem~eic~lly se~k oue the enemy's we~k point, nev~r for- ~
geetin~ eh~e ch~ goal e~ b~ ~chiev~d is th~ deseruction ~E his ~rmored
for~~a which c~n be ~~hi~vpd dir~cely by putting hia e~nk~ ~nd ~uxillary
means out of combat, or indirecely, whenever poasible, by attacking hie r
"und~rbetly" in order ~e dese~oy eh~ command ~nd auppore vehicles and thua ~
ere~t~ ~~mpoit~tty di~ottg~nixetio~ to f~eilie~t~ th~ ~lir~ination oE the tankg
(ge~ Figure 2). J
. ~
This me~ns that we rt+use s~iz~ every opporeuniey eo infiltr~te in order to '
block, bypass and encompa~~ r~sist~nce and desrroy it, by wheeling on the !
enemy's fl~nk or rear. ~
,
We should reg~rd the frequent variation of the ax~s of action, if nor waging
the battle in two difEerent directions, as normal, since the terrain in ~
itself is not the objeceive (~lthough it remains of interest as an aid to ;
m~neuvering for t~king a pnsieion, firing, proeeeding with the advance, ~
etc.), and nothing is more important than focusing the weaponry on ehe
en~my's we~k point (Figure 3).
,
:
The achievement oE suCh a method of ~ction demands bold comm~nders who will ~
dare to penetrate the enemy's protective deployment tn exploit the error of
the adversary in depth, or p~rhaps turn it to advantage, in order to engage }
on an offensive basis in e generally defensive environment.
This style of action mean~ taking risks bur ehey are not a one-wey street. (
If our flenk is noc protecced, that of the enemy also will be exposed and j
th~ side which reacts first will be the wtnner. ~
~
Intelligence and Trickery ~
~
Moreover~ these risks r.an be reduced by seeking opportunities for surprise ~
and intelligence. !
:
This Eirst end is sought by a complex of ineasures, some oE them on the !
regimental level: radio silence prior to engagement, discretion in taking ~
up positions~ and speedy movement, while others are on che division levelt ;
choic~ of the proper moment and direction for engagement, cover action or ~
diversion. Surprise always entails a certain amount of trickery. ~
. y
'fhe second factor is essential to us as well. What is the weak point of ~
the enemy prior to engagement? What are the free intervals? What threats ;
develop in the course of action? A1l of these are questions of interest to
us and to which the squadron, adjacenc and division cortmanders must respond. ,
Finalty, as we have seen, the tank regiment cannot do everything alone. Zt
must thus wage battle in cooperation with other units. ;
In Eact, because oE the increase in the range and the number of antitank ~
weapons, tanks advancing alone or attempting to penetrate an organized ~
. . _ `
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d~ployment wiehoue ehe euppore and ~~siet~nee of oeher units ~r~ doomad '
eo deatruction~ + ,
We must then make ug~ of the fo~lowing, ~mong oth~r pl~me~t~i
,
- the ection of the mechanized regfinenta which prepare �or, facilieAte and :
follow up our engagementa; ~ ~
- fire power provid~d by the artillery, and possibly an antitank company~ ~
the combae h~licopt~r r~gimenes and the air force; and
- the support of the engineering end ordnence branches.
Thp heroic military charge had gone ouc of date by 1870. It is more an
ecroni~ric now. Furthermore, it is uselees with guns which have a range of ~
2500 m~terg. M~neuvering, maneuvering ag~in, alway8 maneuvering in order
to fire and thus engeging in combat resembling naval battles--this is the ~
Eighting style which must be adopted by armored regiments in order ro ~
destroy the enemy tanka. ~
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COPYRIGHTa 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" ,
5157 :
CSOs 3100 !
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a w~ sa rrr ~~r~ y~~r~
COUI~I'RY BECTrON FRANCE
B~RZEFS ~
ARIANE MOTORS TESTED--On 3 July, the SEP ~Europeen Propulsion Compeny)
\ succesefully conducted the itecond test of the Ariene leun~her's third
etege propulelon syetem~ in Plight pattern~ including the firat eimuletion
of the b~llietic phese. The .;~yo enic motor wae in operetion for 569 e~
which ie nominal duration. [Text~ [Parie AIR 8 COSMOS in ~rench 14 Jul ~9
p 43) 11023
cso: 3ioo
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CQUNTRY SBCTION NETHBRLAND9
ROTTBItDAM '3POT' OII. MARKET DOBS THRIVING BUSINS33 ~
K~mburg STERN in Qerman 21 Jun 79 pp 130-132
~ArCicle by Herbert Unievek~: "Tha Oil Roulette of Aotterdam--How Dealers,
' Brokers and Speculators Hagglr. With Qasoline and Fuel 031, Making Miiliona
or Going Bankrupt"~ !
(Text~ If the telephnne ringa after 1330 on a Friday afternooe, crude
~oil dealer Arie Roza from GorinchQm wiil no longer pick up the receivar. ~
"If sameone WaAta to order fuel oil or gaeoline aa late as that, he neads i
it and Will call agaie on Monday; aad then he will also be prepared �o pay
a few dollars more."
Arie Roza is a aly fox in the oil busineas. He has a firm employing 50
people. In his yard etand four tanks with a capaeity of 3 million litars
each. His maia customere are fuel oil dealers ;~.n the FRG. The bueine8s '
ie going so vell that Roza cen afford the long Weqkend. "Fridays we geaeral- `
ly go bovling." '
a
In his mid-fiftiea, he is one of about a hundred dea~~sra, telephone brokers ~
and speculators who, together ~i.th the oil multis, conatitute the famous-
infamous "Rotterdmn market." It is here that thoee S percent of free ,
("spot") oil are traded tahich do not come on the market at contractually fix-
ed, arid comparatively atill lo~~ OPEC pricQa but, as if at aa auction~
change o~mera according to the higheat bid. The hundred alick oil dealers '
in Rotterdam have been uader auapicion of ripping off the coneumers in the
induatrialized countriea by driving up prices ever aince the revolution in
Iren triggered a chain reaction: ~
--U.S. refineries, technologically geared to proceaeing lov-sulfur crude ,
oil from Iraaian sourcea, all of a audden vere no longer able to ~ork to ;
full capacity. Gaeoliae became ehort in eupply, and the Americans had to
buy the lackiag quantities on the free market in Rotterdam. .
;
--Iarael aad South Africa, eubjected to a total a�pply boycott by Aqatollah
Khomeyni and the other OPEC couatries, likewiae had to reeort to purchaaing ;
"free" oil suppliea, ahowing up in Rotterdam as cuatomers readq to pay 4
almoat aay price. ~
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--PresidenC Cartar and hi,e enaxQy aacrataxy, 3chlae~.nger~ by ~matauriah po- ,
li~ica made ~he poor oii ai~uation ~torse. Thoy announcad ehee in a~varai ~
at~g~� batva~n June 1979 a~nd Augu~t 1981 thay arbuid fra~ oil ~rice~, held
_ do~m artificially in tiha United 3tatee. Tha in~vitabie Yesultt 031 com-
panier, oii dealeYe and gas stetion dapota held back inaxpensively pur-
ch~sad fuel fn order to aaiti for highar pricee aad profiCa. 9upp11eA elowad
down.
, Ail thie catapulted ~he price in Rotterdam within a few weeko from 20 ~
doilara a barrel (159 liteYa) to an ~mprecndanted 38 doliars a b$rrei.
(Tha currenti OPEC price for str~ndard "Arabian light" is 14.55 dollars.) , ' i
Britiah oil axp~rt Mthony Sampson, author of a book.about the oii multis
("Th8 Seven SisCers") ~ound out that even.companiee like Taxaco, Mobil
and She11 hove bought free "apot aupplieg" for more than.30 doilara a
barrel. '
To the8e gianta, who get most of thair oil at OPSC pricea, it doas not
make any difference if they pay tWice as much for amailer shipmanta ia
Rotterda~a; they can then counter tha accusation of overchargieg th43r cu8-
romers for gasoline and fuel oil by pointing to the high purchaae prices
in RotCerdam. In actual fact, the Rotterdem pricea,~however, do not matter
to the multie in the overall calculation. ,
Havirg suffered loasea during the oil glut in the years 1973 to 1977, the
oil campaniee noW profit an atrerage of 1.3 pfenuias per litar--an amount '
which ia the caee of Eeao, for example, adde up to 3U millioa deutache ,
marks a year.
Partnera of the multia in the Rottardam oil roulette are half a dozen ~
independenC big dealera, like the fizms Tampimex, Mabanaft, Traasol, Bulk .
Oil or Vitol~ and two doze~ medi~a-aize trade enterprieea. Togethar~ these
'.iandle about 90 percent of all the Rotterdam oil buoinesa. Aaother approxi-
mately ~0 emall dealere aad brokers tz3? their hand withthe remaining 10 ~
~ercent. .
It ie preciaely these emall ones t~ho in.tthe past fea weeka have been chaaing
every ~on of gasoline or fuel oil in order to peddle it at a profit. Bven
amal~ quautities being offered or wanted make the price pendulum move.
. When a dealer 3 weeks ago in Rotterdam eoughC 2,000 tons of gas for a gaeo- .
line tanker which vas ahortly to esil for the United States, the price on
the market roae by 90 deutsche marks per ton within a fea~ hours. . ,
Quite often a ahipmeat, bought aad sold bq telephoue or tele~c, wandera
from one broker to another. "It can happan," saqs Gerhard-Johan Meder of
r
' the fi~,m ~iamro in Aotterdam, "that one and the aame merchandiee pasaea ~
through eix atatione, coming across our table two or three times." If ~
the price is upped in this wap, it is po4sible--aseuning all goes we11--
for 4 to S dautache marks' profit per ton to remai,a with each link in the
chain.
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In a eituaCion where money can be made ao quickly, ehe aetien~t is often made
to coma up with even more by way of tricks. "Zt can happen tha~ stixawmen
~r~ ~~n~ up to pugh up the price~" eays denler Arie Roxa. He sums ir up
1,ike thia: "In our ~ob, there is ao such tihing as friends; bu~ine~~ i~ too
tough for ~hat." While the parCiea occaeiona].ly meet i.n tihe Rotterdam `
Hotel ~tilanta or R9.che Bar to exchange atoriee about their buainess, they ~
try again tio get tihe better of nne another as soon ae Chey get back Co the `
telephone and telex. . _
In the speculation with the hot oil merchandiae~ great inveetments and riake ~
are involved. Roza: "With a Rhine tanker full of gas, you can make a ~
quick 12~000 dautsche marke, but you can also loae 20~000 marka or mare."
Indeed many dealera have not aurvi.ved the Rotterdam roulette in the past :
few years.
AC prasent, however, a gold bonanza atmoaphere prevails at the mouth of the
Rhine. "Never before has it been poeaible to make euch good deals in ,
RotCerdam," Gerhard-Johan Meder admita. With his partner, Wim Stolk,
Meder belonga to a small circle of brokers who need no more than a room with
a telephone and telex for their oil businese.
As late as 3 months ago both ~oere still employeea of the Olie Chemie com-
pany. When the firm went bankrupt~ they established their own businesa.
Their office is on the second floor at Kipstraat 37. There thay work wiCh
five telephones, type teletype meeeages, make their own coffee and turn over
between 3,000 and 10,000 tona of fuel oil and gasoline a month.
'Phey do not reveal how much they make in'the proceas. But they do admit ,
that even small dealera at present can reap "top profits." ~
Jan and Wim Onderdyk, owners of the firm Transol and residing in a faacy .
bungalow on the Slikkerveer Dike are lesa reluctant to talk about profita.
Employing 220 people, they turned over about 2 bi111on d~utsche marks last
year. At the end of May, for instance, the brothera made about 1.1 million
deutsche marks buying 100,000 tona of diesel fuel on a Monday and aelling
it on Tuesday. With auch trade margins, the Onderdyks can well afford
to chaxter a~et and fly together with their employeea to Morocco for a
weekend.
The biggest profit so far has been made by apeculatora who bought aeveral �
thousand tons cheaply before the crisis in Iran and atored them--for example,
Adriaan van Di~ke. A former bank director, he had reached the conclueion 3
years ago that the oil bus3ness "can be very interesting and lucrative."
He started with small "apot" amounts, bought on credit. Now the very portly .
gentleman ia playing a big role oa the market in Rotterdam. Every month ~
he buys from two aheikha, whom he kaawa peraonally, a couple of big tankers
of crude at pricea "a few dollars above the fixed OPEC price." In the pro-
cess, he benefita from his coatacts from his bank timea. "Without contacts,
you are nobody in Arabia," he says.
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The former bnnlcer passeg his merchandise parCly ro crude oil companies ~nd
part~y to refineries 3ndependent of combines. In tiurn, free refineries ~.n _
the Netherlanda, Ttaly, Spain and the Caribbean are the places where Eree
fuel deal~ra heve been buying their gaso~.ine~ diesel and fuel oil a~.nce tihe
time when rhey could no longer get aurplus supplies from:the crude oi1 con-
cerns. ~
Adriaan van Di~ke doea not alwayg right away get rid of a shipmene he has
bought. He says: "You have to have patience. "If I have to, I can wait
40 days." Lase November, when he purchased a Soviet tanlcer's load of gaso-
line in Lisbon, he waited even longer. For 6 months, the 50,000 eons of
gas lay in stor~ge tanks, which are rented to the highest bidder in
Rotterdem mainly by the firms of Palctank and Nieuwe Matex. Then, when ;
prices atopped cl3mbing at the end of May, Di~ke decided: "Lat's get rid ,
of the stuff." Hie busineas CacGica paid off. Tn the winter he had paid ,
230 dollars a eon; now he was able to cash in 395 dollars a ton.~. The ;
easy profit after deducting atorage costa: 12 mi111on deutache marks.
How much in all doea he make in the oil busineas? Adriaan van Di~ke, who '
conducts his affairs inconspicuously in a narrow merchant's houae in the ~
coastal town of Middleburg southweat of Rotterdam, leans back slowly in ;
his comfortable red leather chair and says: "Another couple of yeara, :
and I will have had enough." � i
The involved wheeling and dealing at the market in Rotterdam has given the .
brokers a reputation of "roUber barons." They ~hemaelvea rather cons~.der i
themaelvea regulators who see to it that there i~s an ~quilibriam on the ~
oil market. In the past they were even considered Co be inatrumental in ~
holding pricea down, because in the years of the oil glut they had to cal-
culate with extremely narrow margina and underbid the prices of the com-
bines. >
~
The efforts of some EEC countries, particularly the French, to regulate
the Rotterdam market through international controls and put the dealera on ;
a leash are noC instibling fear in the busineas. "In that case," says '
Arie Roza, "we will get a black market for the black gold." ;
~
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG&Co ~
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cso: 812o/i657 ~ F~
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