JPRS ID: 8661 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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I~tllt t?I~I~It'I ~t l i!;t~' t1N1.1 -
= JPRS L/8~61
- 17 September 1979
I'~!lear East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 34/ r9)
v
FB~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FnR OFNIC1,11. USF: ON1,1'
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NOT~
JPR5 publicatidns conC~in infdrmation primarily from for~ign
newsp~pers, perindic~ls snd books, buC ulgo From n~ws ng~ncy -
transmissions ~nd bro~dc~;~Cs. M~eeri~lg frnm fdr~ign-l~ngu~ge
sourc~s ar~ tr~ttgl~Ced; rhos~ from English-l~ngu~ge sources
~r~ er~nscribed or reprin~ed, with the ortgin~l phrasing ~ttd
other characCeristics ree~ined.
Headlines, ediCorial reporCs, ~~nd materi~l enclosed in bracicets
are supplied by JPIt5. processing ittdic~Cors such as [TexCj
or [~xcerpC) in Che firsC line of e~ch item, or following the -
last line of a b~ief, indicate how the origin~l information was
processed. Where no processing indicaCor is given, the infor-
= mation wa~ summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar n~mes rendered phonetically or Cransliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parenCheses were noC clear in Che
_ nriginal but have been supplied as appropriate in conCexC.
- Other unattributed parenrlietical notes wiet~in the body of an
item originate with Che source. Times within iCems are as
- given by source.
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cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
For ft~rther infnrmation on report content
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r~Oft OI"T'ICrAL Us~ otvL,x
JPR5 L/8661 -
17 Septemb~r 1979
NEAR ~AST/NORTH ~IFRICA REPORT ~
(FOUO 34/79) -
CON7ENTS PAG~
Lr~rr:K-,~~;r~~i AFC!1IR5
ir,i~l ltestares Ublign~~on to Neighbors, Releases Aid ~igures -
(AL-~dATAN AL-'ARABI, 17-23 Aug 79) 1
' NOft'TII AI~CtICAN AI~I~AIRS
- ~x~icerbation of National Antagonisms in Maghreb becried
(Met~di Malek; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jul 79) 2
- ~LCf:IZIA
Poli~iral Bearings of Kidnapping Dalila Maschino Discussed
- (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 3-9 Aug 79) 7
_ Second Gas Pipeline to Italy Planned
(MAKCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANE~NS, 20 Jul 79)....... 14
Report on BEA and Its Activities
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITE~tRAN~ENS, 13 Jul 79)....... 16
Scientific Rf:search Meetings Held
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET rff:DITERRANEgNS, 20 Jul 79)...... Zp
Briefs
Cooperation Idith Tunisia 21
Contract for Compressor Plant at Ain Smara Z1
Oil Exploration Permit 22
New Nomenclature for ~Iedicines 22
Priority to Airpor-s 22
- ~ ' (III - r1E & A - 121 FOUOJ
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_ ~~ox or~icr~ usc oNLY
' CONTENT5 (ConCinued) pa$~
- T FAN
. bissident Leader ~v~luat~s Khomeyni's Position
- (A1i Asghar Ha~-Seyyed-Javadi Interview;
L'~UROPEO, 23 Aug 79) 23
_ MAUI~ITANIA
Briefs
Finuncing of Gorgol Pro~ect 2,5 ~
USSR Cooper~tion 25
_ FRG Loan 25
S~anish-MauriCanian Fishing Talks 26
R~ole of Commissariat for Food Aid 26
Inl�ernaCionxl Drought Relief 2g
KOK Gif t 27
PCOPLE' S DEMOCRA'TIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
Sriefs
Ethiopians in 1'raining 28
- b -
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INT~R-ARAB A~I~AIItS �
IRAQ !t)s'S'CATL5 OBLIGATTON TO NEIGH.BORS, REL~ASE9 AID FIGURES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 17-23 Aug 79 p 13
LText/ Baghdad--Responsible Iraqi sources in Baghdad affirmed that whnt -
has been said about Che ploCters' relations with a certain Arab front will
not at all affect Iraq's attitude tcward the reso].utions of the last Arab
- summit conference held in Baghdad. These sources sCated that Traq considers
itself. cumpletely obligared to abide by the coci.ference's resolutions and
that it is most eager to carry out all its commitments which were determined
at this conference. -
It has been learned that wiChin the scope of its commiCments, Iraq as of ~
now has paid out 346,666,664 US dollars from a total of 520 million dollars
which the last Baghdad summit conference agreed upon. As of now, Syria
has received 183,237,000 dollars, Jordan 123,808,532 dollars, the Palestine
Liberation Organization 14,857,555 dollars and the special fund to support
the Arab people in the occupied territory--which fund is maintained at _
Jordanian Central Bank--9,905,432 dollars.
~ These sources affirm that Iraq will pay the last installment of its patriotic
commitment on time. These Traqi circles have noted Chat great efforts are _
being made in a number of capitals to cause peripheral fights between Iraq
and eome of its Arab sistr~r countries. They comment that Iraq has chosen
- to lick its wounds at thi~ time and not tu allow provocations to drag it
into marginal contradictions unless these capitals themselves want to concoct _
some open battles.
Observers here fear that the attempted attack upon Iraqi ambassador 'Abdallah
al-Hasan in London falls within the realm of provocative attempts to cause
contradictions among the Arabs.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
CSO: 4802
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~~nk c~rt~~~:c;rAL U41: arrt,Y
~
NOn'TFl ArnICAN AN'I~AIftS
l,:cnct?[2IiA'I'iQN OT' NATtONAL ANTAGCNISMS IN r1AGHRCB DECRI~n =
I':iri~; Ji.LfN~ AI~RIQUC in Crenr_h 18 Jul 79 pp G4-46
- [Artic:le by ~tehdi Malelc: "The Maghreb I11-used"; passage enclosed in
:;l.~titliurs puhlt5hed in italics]
~'I'ext ~ 13c[w~~E'Il ,1une 7~~nd 10, the furopeans voted Eor the election by
univer;;~i1 ,uEfragc~ oC I:uropean Assembly. This election saw the partici-
pr~tton {n tt~e ballottng, the same week, of electors of nine different
nationalities. There w~~~s already a Consuleative Assembly, but it wtts only
rlic. emana~ton of t}ie various national parliaments w}~j.ch nominated its
- member.s. Tl~e assembly that will meet at Strasbourg will be one directlv
elected by the peoples of Curope and will have powers o� a different nature
Crom tl~ose of tl~e preceding one.
There was a1l-eady a European administration 4E 15,000 officials at Brussels,
in5tances of concerted executive action at all levels; periodic meetings
of I~eads of govert~ments, of ministers of foreign affairs, indus~ry, finance,
ecc. The Europe which is a reality today, in a way, finished its construc- -
t i ~ii on June 10 .
_ For u5 citizen~ of the P4aghreb, Europe has been a reality for a long -
ti.me, since C}~e ma~or economic questions which we were still negotiating
separately 10 years ago with France, Italy or the Federal Republic of ~
Cermany are today the object of common policies worked out in Brussels,
which has become the place where our economic relations with the various �
countries of tl~e Community are being negotiated. ~de should reall at this ~
- juncture that 1979 is the 21st year since the qualified representatives
- of ti~e t}~ree north Afric3n countries met at Tangiers to proclaim ttie _
principles ca}iich were to lead these r_ountries where the Treaty of Rome led
ti~e countries of Europe. Where are we 21 years later? r
At t}ie same point, the optimists will say. ~Iaghreb, the realists will say,
instead of going Eorward, has ~~.ly ~one backward. As to the pessimists, -
tl~ey will answer you ttiat the Maghreb will never see the light of day.
' Who i.s right? Probably all c;ree aC the same time. ~
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Ar Tangiers
' I3ur t~ow did we get there? It is Algeria's tau1C, stated Ali YaCa, an officer
of the Mox~ccan Communist Party, dr the end of April during a meeting at
Cusablanca on Arab uniry. In a Mxghrebian profession of fateh~ such as =
was tienrd several rimes per year 25 years ago, he pointed, with his habitugl -
ardor, to those responsible for the failure of the Maghreb: ~he Algerians,
whose desires for hegemony plead in favor of the Maghreb only if it is
entirely under their influence. This rhesis, which is legal tender in -
Morocco, not only among the communisCs, but also outside of Morocco, contains,
_ for many, a large portion of truth.
In my optnion, despite everything, the responsibilities for this enormous -
failure are rather to be sought elsewhere. But befo're this, it might perhaps
be useful to recall the contents of the Tangiers declaration.
The congress for the unification of Che Maghreb was held at Tangiers from
April 21 to 30, 1958. It brought Cogether representatives of Morocco, ~
- Tunisia and Algeria (which had noC yet regained its independence). The
Tunisian delegation was presided over by Bahi Ladgham, then President
- Bourguiba's right arm. It included Abdelmua~id Chaker, leader of the party,
Abdallah Farhat, director of the presidential cabinet, Taieb Mehiri,
Minister of the Interior, Ali Belhaouane, Mayor of Tunis, and Ahmed -
Tlili for the UGTT (Tunisian General FederaCion of Labor). The Algerian
delegaticn consisted of Ferhat Abbas, Ahmed Boumend3el, Abdelhamid Boussouf,
Abdelhamid Mehri, Ahmed Francis and Rachid Kaid. The Moroccans were repre-
sented by Allal el-Fassi, Ahmed Balafrej, Mehdi Ben Barka, Mah3oub Ben
Seddik, Fekih Basri and Abderrahim Bouabid.
A reading of these names shows how representative these delegations were -
of the political forces dominating the Maghrebian scene in 1958.
As a result of their efforts, several resolutions were passed on the
Algerian war of independence, Western aid to France for continuation of
the Algerian war, the liquidation of the after-effects of colonialism in
- the Arab Maghreb.,.and two resolutions of interest to our sub~ect: one
on Maghrebian unitv and the other on the permauent secretariat of the -
congress for the unity of the Maghreb. -
~o Resolutions
It is useful to reread them 21 years afterward: /"The congress...decides...
_ "That the time has come to translate the unanimous will for unity of the
peoples of the Maghreb into common institutions which will enable these
peoples to play their part on the international scene;
"To work toward the achievement of this union which will take the form of
a federation, which is most suited to the realities in the countries
- participating in this congress. And in view of this objective, the congress
recommends: "That, on a temporary basis, an Arab Maghreb advisory council
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t~U~t ct~~ l~ t r. ~~~I, u;;~; uN~.1~ -
, b~ set u~~ whic:li would be tl~~ emanution ot Che natiionAl parliAments of 'Tunisia
~in~i ~torc~cco, nnd Eor A1g~~ria, uf the N~tion~l Council nf Che Al~erian Revolu-
t:Lon, wfiich ~oill h~~ commis~i~ned to sCudy queytiuns o� cottnnon interes?". and to
~~res~nt :econttnendations to the n~~tionul executive; _
_ "SCresses ~he necd f~r pcriodic conCacCs on a regul~r b~sis and whenever Che -
, need ~~rises belween the narional luthoriCies in tihe thre~ countries in order
tor ~hem to work L-uk~~~t~er on rtie problenis of the Ar~b M~ghreb and on the
study of w~~ys of execu~i~ig the recommendations issued by rhe Arab Maghreb =
;:~~vi~ory cuunc.i.1; "Cst~lblishes A permanenC secretariat of six persons (two
per country) who wi11 oversee the execurion of the recommendations of the
conbress,"/
'Cl~e Itul.er o.t' 'Abd-al-Nasir -
Suct? w~rr~ ~h.r. Tangiers rc~commendaCions. Simple but universal. -
~ Wh} h~ive tiiey r~ma.ined 1 dead J.etter? ExCernal factors have worked strongly
agaius~ rize Idc~a of r_he rlaghreb. Nevertheless, and this is the essential
reclson, many internal facCors have not been able to work in favor of this
unity.
_ hfany ~u~side ut Che Maghreb did not view favorably Che setCing up, sourh of
rt~e rtediterranean, of a Maghrebian bloc of 40 million inhabitants (50 mil-
l.ion tociay) . I3~it the m~n wt~o worked most power.fully to set the Maghrebians ~
= against one anoLller was Nasir. All Nasir's propaganda presented Maghrebian `
- uni.ty as an imperialisL maneuver to put a stop to universal Arab unity, whose
- tierald he made himse].f. The Voice of the Arabs, Hasanayn Haykal, Nasir him- -
self, were nev~r able to a~lmi~ that the Maghrebian were united and pleaded
caithout respite against htaghrebian unit- presented as contrary to the dream
of Arab unity.
- Against Bourguiba, Nasir carried on an implacable struggle, which never truly
abated. Against Ferhat Abbas, he chose Ahmed Ben Bella who, through his �
central position in the ~taghreb, was to be his intermediary and the main-
_ spring of that Arab unity which Ben Bella prayed for in preference to a
M~ighrebian policy deemed as limiting his field of action. You may recall
his single speech at Tunis, limited to one sentence repeated three times:
_ "We are Arabs."
Crisis and War
OTi Egypt's frontier, Libya, then governed by the Sanusis, increasingly looked
_ toward the riaghreb, but did not advance a step except in preparation for the
_ following step bac~kward. The replacemert of the Tangiers Algerians by others
who allied themselves with the o; ~onents of the Tunisian and Moroccan regimes,
direct intervention in the intern~~l affairs of brother states in the name of
_ Arab unity were to exacerbate nationalisms and lead to the Algerian-Moroccan
- war regarding Tindouf and to the interminable discussions between Tunisia
and Algeril on the marking out of the frontier north of the small E1-Borma
- oil�ield.
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Ay n re~u1C o~ xll Chis, inqCead of the concerCed action called for at
_ Tnnglera, there wa~ an exacexb~tion of antagonisms which was not dis-
= pLeASing to Cairo and especially noC to Paris. Let us point ouC, to be
complete, the crisis between Tunis and Rabat on the occasion of Mauritanian
~ independence, the birrh at Tripoli of a regime which, after having adopted
- Nasser's arguments on Che Maghreb, occasionally moderated its pretensions,
but like Nasser still considers that political assassination is the shortest
roure to achieving Arab unity, and lastly the lamentable war between
Algeria and Ctie POLISARIO Front on the one hand and betwePn Morocco and ~
hiauritania on Che oCher, Co top off this immense failure.
LACk of rreedams
But having reached this point, Lhe fact is that in all these events, the
peoples have rarely liad anything to say--these peoples who, today independent,
have many fewer opportunities to meet than at the time they were colonized
by France. They do noC have anything to say because the political parties
are strictly regulated, If Europe has made itself, it is in spite of the
_ states, whose natural and normal function is to be opposed to any attack -
_ on national sovereignty. Nor is it popular pressure that has imposed
Europe on the European governments, but Che presence of different political
_ parties who discussed it in their congresses, the freedom of association
which authorized the setting up of ineeting points between different men,
the freedom of the pre~ss which made it possible to discuss it in books and
newspapers, on radio ac~d television.
One statp will never be able Co impose the Maghreb on the others. And if
- thar. were so one day, such a Maghreb would be stillborn, because it would
be fought against by all free men. The peoples of the Maghreb, who desire
the Maghreb of Tan~iers, will they be able to impose it on their leaders!
Yes, the day they will be able to meet to ui~^uss it, to write on the ~
sub~ect without risk, to oppose their governors without being treated as
traitors. No, Mr Ali Yata, despite appearances, the failure of the Maghreb
is not the fault of Algeria alone. It is the result of the lack of democraeic
freedoms that would have prevented the governments from setting out on the
slope of exacerbated nationalisms.
_ Whatever Europe has done, it is not Jean Monnet nor Robert Schuman, but the
democratic regimes in power in the countries of Europe that have made it
possible to achieve in less than 20 years the election of a European Assembly
by universal suffrage. It is the lack of democracy that has prevented the
construction of the Maghreb. -
- Now, the developments that have been taking place for the Iast 4 years in
_ the Maghreb seem to be favorable to a resumption of the discussion outside
- governmental spheres. The press is becoming less and less monolithic; -
new newspapers are seeing the light of day, not all of which are officia:.
spokesmen of the governments. A modus vivendi has been established
- with opposition poliCicians, who can today publicly express their points -
of view within limits that they can certainly find narrow, but which did
not exist 4 years ago. S
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Concerted Action
On the other hand~ the increasingly insidious protecCionism of ~urope with -
rt~gard to the Maghreb, the increasingly narrow margin that will be left ,
�or Mag}irebian exports by Che adhesion o� Spain, Portugal and Greece to the
European Economic Community, the reopening to question by France of the -
labor agreements, all the incitements to departure at which the police are _
not the leasC effective, all this calls for concerted action. But if the
political parties, the Crade unions, the press, the university become
involved, this collaboration can go beyond its defens.ive character and lead -
to constructive acCions. Moreover, there must be an end Co the absurd,
_ fratricidal war in Che Sahara, which profite only the armaments pruveyors. _
Libya, too, must stop behaving, with regard Co the Maghreb, the way that,
- �or a long time, Great Britain did with regard to ehe CEF [expansion
unknown]. -
~ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
9434
CSO: 4400
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" ALGERIA
- PbLITICAL BEARINGS OF KIDNAPPING DALILA MASCHINO DISCUSSED
Parie AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 3-9 Aug 79 pp 32, 33
[Article: "The Political Bearings of the Story of Dalila Zeghar Preoccupies
- Chadli Bend~edid's Algeria; Romance and Revenge; Che French Huaband Asks
That His Wife B~ Returned Co Him; the New Regime Aska for the Return of the
People's Funds"J -
['fext] AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI rerurns to the story of Dalila Zeghar to relate
_ the political bearings of a passionate, political question. Its purpose in ~
doing so is not to undermine the prestige of the late President Houari -
f3oumediene whom it loves and respecta and whose battles and positions on -
- behalf of his country iC appreci.ates. Its purpose is not to antagonize a
_ powerful man likp Messaoud Zeghar who derives his power from his influence
and his fortune which is in the millions. Nor is its purpose of AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI in returnin~; to this story is to serve the truth; to serve the
question of truth in the homeland; aud to demonstrate to the rulers as well
as their subjects rhat in the absence of democracy, freedom, a[free] press
and genuine popular constitutional organizations, abuses, exploitation and =
corruption may occur despite the track record men had establiahed and despite
the slogans they may proclaim.
- If AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI chooses to pursue a rigorous course in the ques tion `
- of Dalila Zeghar, it does pledge to accept any corrections or comments made
by any parties who may be closely or remotely involved in the matter.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will accept such comments with an open mind and will also
provide space on its pages for these comments. _
= The time: Dawn, 25 April 1978 -
~ The place: Dorval Airport in Montreal, Canada. ~
The incident: A young woman, seated in a wheelchair and almost unconscious,
' is pushed past the police barricadP withcut arousinr~ anybody's attention and
is taken into a private DC-8 airp; ne.
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, 'Phis was how the f~mous case began which later became known as the case of -
Dalil~ Maschino and her broCher, Algerian businesaman Messaoud 2eghar, known
- as Rachid Casa. On that day more than a year ago Messaoud kidnapped his
~ sister Dalila from the home o� her French husband Denis. He used cunning ro -
- bring her back to the remote Algerian village of E1 Evlma w~lich is located
in the province of Setif [about] 250 kilometera from the capital.
At that time this incident created a far-reaching uproar in the Weatern media. _
- Today, it has become the common sub~ecC of conversation in Algeria especially
afCer the [return c~f aJ c1lmaCe of freedom and openness that the new regime
, is trying to establish. Dalila's story became the sub~ect of conversation
after the first signs of change appeared with the release of former Algerian
President Ahmed Ben Bella.
Contrary to what was written in the Western press at that time, this case is
~ not only that of a family, a Cribe or of passion, but it is also a political
case.
What is the true story? Who is Messaoud Zeg,har? What were the political -
bearings of this case?
= The Story From the Beginnir~g
The story began in 1974 when Dalila Zeghar met her colleague at the univer-
sity, Denis Maschino. The relationship between the two developed into a _
romance, and they wanted to get married. But Messaoud, Dalila's older broth- -
er, refused this matter and objected strongly to it because he was considered =
the final authority on everything that pertained to family affairs. He had
chosen the bridegrooms for all his sisters.
- In September of the same year Dalila feigned ill health and claimed that it
was necessary to travel to Switzerland to consult with a specialist. From
there she moved to Paris where she met her betrothed, and they were married
in the French capital in the spring of 1975.
- Naturally, Messaoud did not brook what he considered an insult to him and to
= his family, but the marriage did continue for 3 years with no disturbances. _
But then the couple decided to settle in Canada so they can stay away from
problems, continue their studies and establish a new life.
But it turned out afterwards that the watchful eyes of Brother Messaoud had
= never stopped following them and that he was even able to obtain a photiograph =
of them as they were leaving Orly Airport in France on their way to Canada.
Ever since that time Messaoud's principal concern became how to kidnap his
- sister and make her submit to his authority. He caught up with her several
; times in Montreal and tried to coax her to return to Algeria. But on the
first of September 1976 Dalila decided not to see him again.
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A yefir later, that ig, iti 5c~ptember of 1~77 Meg~~dud g~nt dne d� hi~ r~cently ~
m~~rricd daughtery l�o ~ettle in Cc~nadu, 5h~ ~~ttted in a community negr the
_ nne in which Mes~aaoud'y g~.gCc?C lived with her husbgttd, In April 1978 Me~gaoud
;+ent the re~t of his y~~tet'9 f~nd their children. 'Thc re~ntiveg u~pd to vigit
D~i111~i'y ht~uye, ~~nd ehey uyed Ca invite her fnr dinner in thc reeCaurants bf
htotitre~nl.. '
~ Uut wheci Ualila went out wiel~ them on the evening of 24 A~,: ~1 t:ithoue her hu~-
~,+~l~f wl,o wa5 prec~cCUpic~d with prepar~tidns for his exnminations, sh~ did nnt
reeurn. It t~~rned out 1~ter that her yi~ters had drugged her fo~d gnd had
c,~rried out the r.~rt~ful plan ChttC Megs~nud hgd devi~ed ~o bring his gi~ter -
har_k ( to Algeri~~ J, tie h~~d prc~pc~red ~ passport for her t~nd [hgd m~de grrange-
, r~ent;~ forJ priv~te ~nirpl~n~ nnd speci~l eS~orCS [fnr the trip].
- balila regaitted cottsciou3nesg in the airplnne 3 hours (after the plane tnnk
uffJ, tt w,~s ~ private plane owned by her brother x.nd piloted by a 65-year
old Americatt pilot, Louiy Furlong. 'The shocking renllznCton of what had
h~ippened an~i th~~ looks of f~mily members whn surro~nded her sent Daliln b~ck
to unconscinusne3s awaiCing the u.tkt?own.
~1 New Husb~nd
. The story goes on that as soon ns hiy si~ter returned, he married her off to
a member of ehe tribe who had been prep~red [for this rolej in ndvance nnd
who hau bectt promised this marri~ge years ago.
beni~ quickly notified the authorities Chat }~is wife had disappear~d, and
they hegan se~ltching for her.
Naturally, the press in Canada, and especially the press in France, clamored
for new~ abaut the incident. A stream of official protests poured onto the
rllgerian government, and Algerian women demonstrated in Paris and formed a
committee to defend Dalila and to defend women's rights.
E3ut news of Dalila broke off ever since that time. Only one letter that w~s
extremely moving was leaked. She had bean able Co smuggle that letter from
lier prison to her husband. Dalila revealed in her lettcr, which was written
in English, the circumsCances of her kidnapping; the role thaC every nne of -
his sisters played in carrying out the plan of Che older brother; and the
~ miseraole circumstances under which she was living. AccordinQ to her letter
- st~e was being guarded by armed men and vicious dogs.
Ae this e~id in tl~i; letter Dalila clearly indicated thaC if she would not be able
_ to escape soon from the gang that was detaining her, her only rec~urse was to
commi[ suicide.
Who Is Denis rL~schino?
- This is the emotional and tribal f ramework of the story on which th.~ press
focused at that time.
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~~oK c~r?~ ~rIAL U~~ UNLY
gue th~ prnbl~m h~~ andeh~r ~gp~ct o~ g pnllti~ttl n~tiur~~ it ig thi~ ~~p~et
whiCh ie r~CUrning td ehe n~w~. Z'he p~liti~~1 n~tiur~ df ehe gedry i~ perh~p~
be~e ~expl~in~d by ~xplnining thp ideneiCy of her ftr~e hu~band ~nd tih~e of
her brdth~r Me~a~~ud zpgh~r.
benis Maschino i~ th~ gon of t~uric~ M~~chino whd~e ~e~ry i~ w~ll-known. H~
wg~ one of Gh~ fir~ti ~renchmen tn r~b~l ag~in~t th~ [I~r~n~h~ ~rmy durin~ th~
_ Algerinn Wgr ~..id to r~fus~ ed fi~ht g~gingC Ch~ A1g~rian~~ Mg~ri~~ bp~~m~
_ �he 1~gd~r ~f thp Fr~n~h whd ~i1i~d eh~mgpive~ w~th th~ Lib~r~eion Front ~nd
_ wirh eha~e wiehin i~~ r~nk~ who w~r~ fighring for ~he Al~~ri~n e~u~e.
- After Alg~rig won ieg independ~nce Maurtr~ ad~pe~d Ig~.~m ~nd ~~11~d himg~lf -
'~~riq. Ke m~rri~d th~ weii-kn~wn Aig~rian writ~r F~dil~h Mur.gbit. In 1965,
how~v~r, ~ft~r Baumedien~ g~~um~d Ch~ reing of pow~r tn Alg~ria, th~ coupl~
pr~ferr~d to mov~ td ~rgn~~. Afterw~rdg, eh~y pubii~h~d ~~ver~1 book~ crit=
icizing th~ new condieion~ in Alg~ri~. Th~y eo-~uehored ~ bonk ~ntiel~d
"Jgz~~'Ir ~1-Awhgn?" ~~h4 I11ug~ry Algeri~j in whieh they ~ri~ieiz~d ~xigting
politic~l ~nd snci~l cdnditidng. ~gdiigh ~1~o b~e~me ae11-known b~~~u~e ~f
twd bookg sh~ wrot~ gbout ehp gtgeug df women in Algerig. ~adilah ~nd
MauriCe thug ~gme tn be con~ider~d pnemiee af th~ r~gim~ of th~ l~te Pr~~i-
dent Hougri Boum~dien~, ~nd thig had ~ negative ~ffece on D~nie M~gchino,
ehe ~an df Mgurice from his fir~t ~rench wife.
Megsanud Zeghar, the Algerian Kh~ghoggi
'rhe story of M~~g~oud Zeghar is good mae~ri~l fdr a thrilling detective
movie. Mesgaoud, who ig known ng the Algeri~n 'Adn~n Kha~hoggi, ig consid-
erpd tnd~y on~ of th~ wealthiest people in thp aorld. A fQw monthe befor~
he ki.dnapped h:s sist~r, h~ ~tag~d a c~lebration in Ceneva that Wa~ fit for
a king tn mark the f~ct thgt his fnrtunp had gnwunted to--ar~ you r~gdy fnr
this7--one billion dollarg!
.
How did Measaoud amasa t~is fortune? HoW did he get ell his poarer and his
inf luence? How can a per$on ~:zcome a millionaire in a gocialist country?
Z~ghar begun hig r~reer ~s a vegetable merchant at th~ Casablanca~mark�t in
Morocco. His m~ternal uncl~, Embnrek Ujilani, Was the treagurer of a pnlit-
_ ical movement. But Mes~~dud, Who ac that time gdopted the name Rachid Cag~,
aas very close to Abdelh~fid Boug~ouf, minister of public conmunicationg ~nd
transportation in the provisional Algerian government. Hp hgd been charged
With carrying out "special migsionB."
Zeghar joined the Oujda Croup Which rallied ground Boum~di~ne; the group also
included Bouteflika. It Was from that time that Zeghar b~gan making hi~ con-
tacts with ara~a suppliers and especially With tho~e in Negc Germany. xeghar
Was responsible for the azms deals that aere made ~to procure Weapott~~ for
[he "frontier army."
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~OR 0~'~tCIAL U5~ ONt,Y
Atter itt~~pettden~e~ thrnug}~out ~t~e adtninigtr~tion ~f t~resident n~n 13e11~,
7.egh.lr bec~ne preoccupied with some of hi~ private ~ffuirs. gut goon ttg
t~re~iclent Houmediene aygumed power, Mes~~dud begnn Co ~ppegr prnminenCly in
_ event~ (oE Che day), it wn~ learned ~frerw~rd~ thgt h~d ehe ~d~p ~'~iled, he -
wduld hnve bpetr re~pon~ible Edr ~numedi~tte'~ egCgp~ tn SwiCzerlgnd or Cn
5pain~ ~le wn~ also the real founder of th~ mili~t~ry ittte113~EnCe nrggni~~-
tion 1n Al.geri~t wh~.cl~ unkil recett~ly was enn~idered rhe only re~1 authdrity -
3n the cout~tr~+,
~e~nar ~chieved tl~e pittn~cle of iiis gldry during tl~e admini~er~tion df Bau-
mediene. He coas conyidered a mittiyter extranrdinary. In gpiee of the fnet
that he st~yed away from all official fun~tinns, he did underCgke gpecinl
attd gensitive missidng. tie t~ad an ~mporCenC pogitinn in the milltnry intel-
ligence org~niz~?~ion, but t~e was not yub,jec~ en the superitttendenC gen~r~l
tlils agency ~ir Kas~1i M~rba}i (l~is real tt~rne ig Abdall~h Kh~1~f). Mr
~ feCL alt i~ame ro~e to protnittence during president $o~tnediene' g tllnegs ,~nd
today he hzs a leadership position in fhe national army, zeghar tnaintained
r.onstant, dltr_rt conta~t with presidettt goumediene. .
A Middlemat~ cind Commtssions
With reg~~rcf to heco zeghar amagsed his furtutte, it is kttown th~t he was g
Middleman ici alI the oil and gas de~~is that W~re con~luded betwe+~n the United
Sra[es anc! Algeria durin~ the past years. !ie Was also the middletnnn in oChec
huge deals such as those that were concluded Wtth the 5p~in br~nch of the ITT
Corporati~n or with the Iioeing Aircraft Corpor~y%ton.
`~tur~~lly, hc receiv~d tremendoua conmis~ion~. Ile wag ~1~~ respan~ibl~ far -
funds deposited abroad and beldnging tu some settior officigls. The~e w~re
fund~ th~t ~rere transferred through him to tt.S. bankg on ~~peci~l b~gi~. It
is knotm that zeghar is a close fri~nd of ;ir bavid Rockef~3ler, the preaident
= o: the well-knoWn Ghase Manhat[an Bank. zeghar invested millions of dollacg
in the United States, in SWitaerland~ in France