JPRS ID: 8673 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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JPRS L/86~3 `
- 21 September 1979
/ th Africa Re ort
_ Near Ec~st N~r p
CFOUO 36/79) -
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JPRS L/8673
2l September 1979
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
(FOUO 36 j 79 ) ~ ~ ( ~
CONTENTS PAGE
NORTH AFRICAN A~'F'A]RS
Morocco Said To Have Regained Initiative in Sahara
(Jean-Louis Buchet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Aug 79) 1
Mauritania Trying To Maintain Equilibrium Betw~en Algeria- _
Morocco
(~ancisco Vergara; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Aug 79) 3 _
AI,GERIA
Nicaragua Delegation Terms Contacts in Algeria 'Fruitf.~ l'
7 Sep 79)
~ DGYFT
Instability, Confessional Strife Said Due to Sad.at's Policies _
(aL-waTa~v ~-t~z, 26 Jui 79) 5
~
Bakhtiar Compares Khomeyni to Hitler
( Sha.hpur Bakhtiar Interview; PARIS MATCH, 24 Aug 7;~ 9
MOROCCO ~
Moroccan Officials Discuss Sahara War, Friction With Algeria
(Guy Sitbon; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 3-9 Sep 79) 17
- a - [ISI - NE & A - i2i FOUO] .
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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
MOROCCO SAID TO HAVE REGAINED INITIATIVE IN SAHARA
Paris jEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Aug 79 pp 12, 13
[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet: "The Hour of Truth"]
[Text] Morocco has regained the initiati~re in the Sahara, thanks to the
defection of its riauritanian ally.
In breaking the a1l~ance that was mad~ with Morocco in No~vember 1975, did
~ not Mauritania serve the interests of the Moroccan kingdom? In any case,
the"definitive peace" agreement�that was signed on 5 August with the ~
Polisario supplied Hassan II with an unexpected opportunity to resume s
long-lost initiative. To be sure, Morocco is still isolated. But it no
longer has to endure a bothersome ally and it occupies all of Western ~
Sahara.
Could one imagine for a moment that the Moroccans would allow the Polisario
to settle in Tiris el Gharbia? Their position doubtless would have been -
more difficult if, for example, Mauritania had declared that it would hand
over the territory to the 0AU [Organization of African Unity], so that the
referendum advocated this past July by the Monrovia summit could be
organized.
By occupying the former Mauritanian Sahara (re-baptized Oued-Eddahab) with
a great deal of publicity and solemn statemez~ts, Hassan II is carrying out
a paying operation on the domestic front. In the eyes of the public, the .
king has proved that he is capable of counterattacking--at little cost.
- Of course, there was the battle of Biranzaren which the Morocanns are
striving hard to present as a victory, even though they admit enorm~~us
losses and the absence of prisoners or hostile victims.
These rigorous en~agements indicate that there will be a protracted war,
that it will be cosstly, and that a milit~ry defeat of the Polisario is
quite unlikely. But the Moroccan troops have been ~einforced throughout
the Sahara and, in spite of certain shortages of materiel, they will not
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~~y~
ruK urrl~ltw u~'y u~vLz
be easily ousted. As long as the Americans grant the weapons that were
requested of them, Morocco should not change its policy at a11, in spite
of its isolation. In answer to a question from our special correspondent,
Moha~aed Selhami (see article below), Hassan II, at the time of his press
conference on 19 August, treated the OAU with scorn ("tom-tom conferences,
where one distributes checks...").
Ha~ing said that, nothing is now settled. The ~ar wi11 continue and in a
few weeks Morocco will no longer have any iilitiativc: not on the military
plane where, because of the fatality of things, it is in the hands of
. Saharan guerrillas who continue to receive reinforcements; an.d not on the
diplomatic plane where, in the aftermath of the Dakhla ceremonies, the
Moroccans will always have as their main argument their intimate convic~ion
of the Moroccan character of the Sahara. ~
In the face of this, the Polisario Front and its patron, Algeria, will
pursue that sloa and tireless daily work that has made it possible for
the~m to accumulate points since 1975. Tomorrow, Morocco will be on the
~ bench of the accused at the summit of the nonaligned in Havana; then in
the UN; or at some other international tribunes. The men of the Polisario _
know that a military victory is beyond their reach and make no secret of
it. But they also know that, day by day, in Africa and throughout the
world, they are winning bits of recognition which, little,by little, '
could create new Palestiniana-- so that it will no longer be possible to
dispense with them in any attempt at a solution--a scenario that seems -
inevitable, unless Algeria ceases to support the Polisario. This is a
hypothesis that one could still envisage, but one does not see why
President Chadli's government would abandon his proteges. In this co,nnec-
tion,HaSs1n II, who has proved to be particularly conciliatory with regard
to Algiers in his 19 August press conference, let it be understood that
the 1972 agreement concarning the borders between the two countries, which
establishes the se~ereignty of Algeria over Tindouf, could be confirmed _
in a more favorable context--a context that one would see is well marked
by a change in the attitude of the Polisario fighters, characterized as
"Mauritanian" and called upon to take over Nouakchott's authority! In
plain language, does that not mean exchanging Moroccan sovereignty ov~r
Western Sahara for a Mauritania under Algerian influence?--a "deal," to _
speak bluntly, that would be accegtable only by a very weakened Algeria.
Finally, it is Msuritania, whose behavior we are trying to analyze b~low
(see Francisco Vergara's blocked-off article], which appears as the biggest
loser in the affair. ireated with a certain scorn by Hassan II, it risks
continuing to bear the cost o'~ the war and of the traditional Moroccan-
_ Algerian rivalry in the region--a situation that will not fail to preoccupy
other neighbors, beginning with Senegal. Exhausted, tossed about, threatened
with bursting apart, having played its last cards poo~rly, Mauritania today,
more than ever, seems to have a precarious future.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1979
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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS _
MAURITANIA TRYING TO MAINTAIN EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN ALGERIA-MOROCCO
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Aug 79 p 13
. [Article by Francisco Vergara: "Mauritania: The Narrow Door"]
[Text] Will Mauritania succeed in withdrawing from the Saharan war,
without Morocco and Algeria agreeing on an overall solution of the
problem? Two years ago, such an idea was inconceivable to most Mauri-
tanians. The army at that time was greatly divided over the policy to be
followed. Twelve thousand Moroccan soldiers were stationed in Mauritania;
Morocco'was far from being isolated diplomatically; and there was no
apparent~split in national purpose. Today the facts of the matter are
compleCely different.
The signing of the "definitive peace" with the Polisario on 5 August in
Algiers was received by the people of Nouakchott with a certain amount of
~ relief, but ~aithout enthusiasm. In spite of the establishment in Rabat
of a"Committee of Free Officers for tlie Defense of the Mauritanian
_ Fatherland," unity among the corps of officers does not seem impressive.
The fear of a coup d'etat supported by the Moroccan army--a hypothesis that
was feared in 1977 and in 1978--has been dispelled. On the other hand, it
is almost a certainty that the war will continue for some time even on
Mauritania.n territory. Mauritania will not then be able either to counter
the atta~ks launched by the Polisario from its territory or the pursuit
operations of Morocco. .
Under these circumstances, will Mauritania be able to keep from slipping
into full alignment with Algeria? This is the fear that was manifested by
the Mauritanians who were in opposition to the 5 August agreements. The
Mauritanian military henceforth hope to maintain complete equilibrium
between ~:lgeria and Morocco. It is a difficult bet: militiary tension with
- one of its neighbors, they believe, would render impossible the policy of
austerity and of reform that Mauritania wants to pursue.
, COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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ALGERIA
NICARAGUA DELEGATION TERMS CONTACTS IN ALGERIA 'FRUITFUL'
Havana PRELA in Spanish 1530 GMT 7 Sep 79 PA
- [Text] Algiers, 7 Sep (PL)--Nicaraguan Defense Minister Bernardino Larios _
Mentel today described here his meetings with ranking Algerian and Libyan ~
commands as very fruitful.
Larios Mentel left Algiers this morning heading a delegation of the ~unta �
of the government of national reconstruction, which also includes Defense
Deputy Minister Jose Valdivia Hidalgo.
, In statements for this agency, both the defense minister and deputy min-
~ ister affirmed that the Algerian and Libyan governments had been highly
recep~tive to their country's urgent need for aid.
A Nicaraguan delegation will come to Algeria shortly, the Nicaraguan leaders
announced in commenting on the results of their meetings yesterday with Col ~
- Kasdi Merbah, defense ministry secretary general and member of the national
liberation front's political bureau.
~ Larios and Valdiva said Nicaragua needs the nonalined countries' active
solidarity to organize the defenae of its revolution. Regarding this, they
added, it is hoped that the Arab governments contacted will provide sid.
They also referred to Israel's military aid to Anastasio Somaza's regime
and denounced the fact that Te1 Aviv continues to send weapons to Central ~
America.
It is no ~ecret, they stressed, that E1 Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala
provided refuge to more than 3,000 Somozist guardsmen, who escaped with
all their weapons. '
~ The danger of an attack exists, but the Nicaraguan people are sure any
invader who manages to come into our country will not be able to leave."
they added. The Nicaraguan delegation., which began its tour of Notth Africa ~
and Europe 10 days ago, was seen off by the chief commander of the Algerian
general staff.
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EGYPT
INSTABILITY, CONFESSIONAL STRIFE SAID DUE TO SADAT'S POLICIES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 26 Jul 79 pp 24-25 ~
[Article: "Egypt: Pope of Copts Vies With al-Sadat's 'Shaykhs' in Normali-
zar,ion of Relations With Israel"]
[Text] While "economic stability" has imposed the austere regime of al-Sadat
on Fgyptians, they have become a people who do not trade in meat. Family
and cunfessional struggles indicate intense anxiety about the consequences
of the "political stability" which the Egyptian president says he has provided
for his people.
The so-called pan-Arab press has focused in particular on an issue about which
it wants to convince public opinion, namely that Egypt is the country of
stability and that the other Arab countries are dominated by instability.
What the official press means by the word "stability" is another matter, be-
cause even if we rely on the news and articles published in Egyptian news-
papers themselves, the picture in fact shows undercurrents which are concealed
through heroic effort. They are currents which have no connection, either .
intimate or remote, with the concept of stability, discussed by President
= Anwar'al-Sadat in his speech inaugurating the People's Assembly.
There is no space here to elaborate on the real economic situdtion, because
the contributing factors of the slump are greater than any attempt being made
to conceal them. Perhaps it is sufficient to point to the appeal for help _
which the government of Egypt made to the summit conference of industrial
_ ~ nati.ons in Tokyo, asking for $3 billion annually to compensate for the aid
and support which the Arab nations formerly gave.
r ,
However, the danger in this is that the ordinary citizen has begun to rid =
himself of the illusion of prosperity associated with the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty. For example, the price of a kilo of beef recently ~umped to
2.5 pounds. In other words, the citizen who receives the n~inimum wage (40
piasters per day) must work 6 days a week in order to buy 1 kilogram of ineat.
Perhaps it may be said that the matter of not eating meat is not problem for
the`?;reat majority of low-level employees, office workers, laborers and
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farmers, because, as is said in Egypt, "They do not trade in meat." This
is L-rue, but the new, violent wave of inflation can by no means indicate
the beginning of any stability. Perhaps the contrary is true, for the
_ simple reason that millionaires in Egypt are sprouting up like "mushrooms
in the forest," to use the well-known European metaphor. They are making
their miliions during difficult times, far.from production sites. Conse-
quently they do not add any real value to the nazional economy.
We will leave the economic situation, with all its components which warn of
total instability in the future, to pose this question: Is there a sem-
blat~ce of stability on the political level as such?
Let us begin with the ruling party itself.
Through elections, the results of which were determined in advance with his
minister of interior, President al-Sadat aimed at getting rid of the head-
ache of rea]. opposition in the People's Assembly. However, stripping the
- elections by force of law of,'any political content has stirred up all the
latent depths of group and family strife and created intense fragmentation
in ehe countryside. This has had reverberations on the ruling party itself,
exacerbating conflicts within its ranks and between it and the official
opposition represented by the Socialist Action Party. The magazine AL-SIYASI
� was thus prompted to ask, "Is there a crisis in the Action Party?" The fact
is t:hat the crisis is deep-rooted in the Action Party for reasons having to
do with National Party practices against it in the elections, since an
entire wing in it, the former Masr al-Fatah, was toppled.
On the ozher hand, because of the practices of the ruling party in normaliz-
ing relations with Israel in a hasty manner, and because of increasing cor-
ruption in the eovernment apparatus, the Action Party has been cornered.
This makes the Action Party deviate occasic,nally from the line of "noble" ,
or "canned" opposition.
Deterring Official Opposition
~ President al-Sadat has learned from experience and realized that the "game
of democracy" and the game of multiplicity [of parties] are burdensome and
oppr.essive. Thus he has begun to think of ways to ensure "deterring" the
official opposition, if it oversteps its bounds. When the Action Party
obtained 34 seats in the People's Assembly, a number which could be in-
fluential and troublesome in certain circumstances, he began to deal with
the Action Party in a manner devised by Mamduh Salim, president of the
former Egypt Party. It can be summarized as "snatching deputies" or
stripping the opposing party of its deputies.
The former prime minister used this method with the Independents' Party
which began in the former Assembly with 22 deputies and ended up with only
three. When Ibrahim Sukri noticed that the snatching procedure was going
to be used once aga~.n, he became infuriated. He promptly sent a fiery
article to the newspapers in which he threatened to halt these methods by
' any means, including resorting to justice.
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However, it seems that the rancor which the elections left between the .
rull.ng party and the Action Party was so intense and deep that the vice
president of the ruling party, Fakri Makram 'Abid, was obliged to raise
the slogan of "national conciliation and dressing wounds from the electiona."
Observers feel, however, that this is unattainable.
What about the ruling party itself?
The real ordeal facing this party is that despite its effort to make the -
election battle devoid of any political meaning, the measures associated
with suppressing the opposition and falsifying the elections brought about
the opposite result which was the "politicization" of the masses who lived
under the delusion of slogans having to do with democracy and the sovereign-
ty of .law. This delusion has been abolished to a great extent. "
Has the ability of the party's deputies to make use of street politics
declined in places and vanished altogether in other places? What does the
authority rely on to impose stability? On increasing the role of the appar-
atus more and more? In the aftermath of the elections, the process called `
"rebuilding the National Party from bottom to top began. But who was en-
trusted with carrying out this process? It was Vice President Husni Mubarak.
As.we know that Husni Mubarak, diay to his military past, is not the right e
man to carry out this procedure, and if we add that his political job is to
supervise the security apparatus~; we can forecast the results of the re-
building of the National Party~': It will be done on the basis of inerger
with the apparatus of the state, including its wing for security and re-
pression, However, will this lead to more "stability"?
The answer is all tn obvious.
Another matter has to do with the elements of national unity within the
country. It is the issue of relations between Moslems and Copts. It is
an indisputable fact that there is a single people ir~Egypt, since the
difference in religious doctrine does not constituta``~ny basis for discrim-
ination, division or separation. However, isn't it we11 known historically
that all hostile forces have played on the doctrinal difference between
~ Egypt's Moslems and Copts? In addition to the periods of British domination,
Israel and world Zionism have .joined forces to play this game throughout the
Arab homeland, especially in the Last. Here the question arises about the
extent to which one can say the authority in Egypt has enhanced stability �
in connection with the two elements of the nation.
After the July revolution and during the 18'years of 'Abd al-Nasir's rule,
manifestations of confessional friction disappeared to a great extent, but
they have certainly reappeared in more intense form under the rule of
President al-Sadat. If we assume for the sake of argument that al-Sadat's
policy has had no role in the kindling of confessional friction and strife,
we see that the president's American and Israeli allies are playing their
game in Egypt with complete freedom. An example once again is what
happened in the recent elections. .
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Pop e Shanudih III, head of the Orthodox Coptic Church, issued his directives
to priests with the help of candidates of the ruling party. This was an
initiative without precedent in the history of the Coptic Church, whose
leaders were anxious not to involve the church in the turmoi.l of party
politics and ideological conflicts. This course has alarmed many Copts, but
Pope Shanudih and his followers ~ustify their position as follows:
President al-Sadat has solved the dispute between.Moslem Egypt and Jewish
Israel. It is common knowledge that Moslems consider Jews to be "most
violently hostile toward them." If this problem were "solved," and wi~h
an increased American presence in Egypt and the region, it would all lead
toward an improved position for Egyptian Christians. ('1'hat is not to mention
the World Council of Churches which is directed in part by the CIA. It has
succeeded for many years in penetrating the Coptic Church, whose cultural
and financial relations with American circles have been increasing.)~
- Nevertheless, this question remains: Will this lead toward stability in
re]_ations on a sound basis between the two elements of the country?
What Pope Shanudih Forgets
This seems highly uncertairi:because Pope Shanudih, head of the Coptic Church,
forgets certain basic features in the history of Egypt, namely that the
causes of confessional and racial friction disappear as the struggle of the
Egyptian people grows, on the one hand against imperialism and Zionism, and
on the other hand for the cause of joining forces with the rest of the Arab
nat ion. He forgets that stability in Egypt as a whole is dependent on
stability in its relations with its Arab nation. He forgets ultimately
that Zionism is not the enemy of Moslems alone, but of all Arabs of all
faiths and minorities.
As a result, the attempt by leaders of the Coptic Church to join th~ Coptic
movement o.f Egypt to the movement of the suling party will bring down on
millions of ordinary Coptic citizens the consequences of the path followed
~ by this party on bofh pan-Arab and national levels, and this will fuel
= discrimination against them.
A f inal observation remains. The ruling party is actually incapable of
building real unity transcending any confessional differences or disputes :
between Moslems and Copts. Proof of this is the fact that despite broad
claims about the popularity of the National Party, it was unable through
the electoral battle to solve the problem of the arrival of Coptic deputies
by way of direct election. As for Fakri Makram 'Abid, first he was shut
out, then they said he had won 100 percent of ~the votes, and then President
al- Sadat was forced to "appoint" 10 Coptic deputies to the Assembly after
the election results appeared.
Observers think that the authority's exaggerated demonstration of the in-
stability of the Arab world actually reflects the au~hority's desire to
hide instability within Egypt itself.
,
COPYRIGHT: A1-Watan al-'Arabi 1979
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IRAN
BAKHTIAR COMPARES KHOMEYNI TO HITLER.
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 24 Aug 79 PP 53-55
[Ir.terview with former Prime Minister Shahpur Balchtiar by Vick Vance in
Paris: "Bakhtiar--'Khomeyni Is Lost..The People Wi11 Sweep Him Away'"; date
not given]
[Text] The shah's last days in Tehran, Khomeyni's seizure
of power, the corruption of the mullahs, the lamentable
state and economic ruin of the Islamic Republic: Shahpur
Bakhtiar, the shah's last prime minister, received Vick
Vance in his Paris retreat. He thinks that the ayatollah
will fall by himself, without even a counterrevolution.
And he does not rule out a return of the monarchy.
_ [Question] How do you see the future of the Iranian revolution?
[Answer] It is not a revolution, properly speaking. It is a gigantic muddle.
For me, the leaders of a revolution--if a revolution is.still possible in
this second half of the 20th Century--must have general ideas on the e~onott~y
and social questions. One cannot, like Khomeyni, content oneself with saying:
. I want to do something :Cslamic, pure and rigorous. Because truly, if Iran
has never had the occasion to be Islamized in 1,400 years, it never will be.
But what I can assure you is that Islam will lose far more than Ira.n. This
_ ,is the essential point. Iran, for its part, will get back on its feet sooner
or later.
[Question] What pushes l~yatollah Khomeyni--ambition or fanaticism?
[Answer] The social and political questions; and even the religious appli-
, cation of things, in a modern state, demand what I call. a preparation. It
is not at age 65 that one begins to get into politics. It is only that Kho-
meyni has made his political debut very late. During his 15 years of exile,
he perhaps had a chance to study the problems with a little more diligence
and insight. But he ca.me back with completely narrow-minded, archaic and
sterile concepts.
[Question] And have you ever met him?
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[l~nswer] Never. As a matter of principle, religious leaders in all coun-
tries, including the Catholic ones, have a sort of senseless pride. Wheri ~
Khomeyni returned to Tehran, the people believed it was a light falling frcim
heaven. And it made his head spin, if I maf put i~; that way. I tried to
make contact with him when he was in Paris, so the,t no one could bleme me
for not having done anything. I am ver�v ;~appy to have taken this step and
not to ha~ve succeeded. For even if confirmed by him, I would have been able
to s�~,,y at my post for exactly 24 hours.
Not being able to find anything, either in my political past or elsewhere,
he said: he's an assassin. When I left the prime ministership, there were ,
six persons in prison. I mean political prisoners. Two of them had not yet
~ been tried, and two were sick and in the hospital. Two others were spies.
All the rest--that is, hundreds and hundreds--had been freed. SAVAK had
been abolished. The Pahlavi Foundation had been placed in state ownership.
The imperial commission charged to carry out investigations on anything what-
soever had been dissolved.
[Question] What, in your opinion, are the biggest mistakes he has made since ~
his return?
[Answer] Khomeyni has made nothing but mistakes. Nationalizing the benks,
- for example, was a heavy financial misdeed. All those banks are in bank-
ruptcy today. In reality, he is not at all prepared to run a country. What
is more, there is his contempt. It reminds me a bit of the contempt Hitler
could have--with due allowance for the differences--towards the policy of
I3ismarck. Not being able to equal Bismarck, Hitler wanted to give himself
his own completely individual manner. We have seen the result. At present,
I am sad because my predictions have unfortunately been confirmed with great
speed. .
[Question] How to get out of this impasse? By a military coup d'etat? An '
action by the exiles, by the opposition? r
~
[Answer] For my part, I will keep up the fight. Thousands of people have
left Iran. They were not all corrupt persons or thieves. There were intel- .
lectuals among them, university professors, students who.had the illusion cf
finding Iran free and democratic again. All these people were undeceived,
disappointed. What they cannot understa.nd is that there has been no revolu- .
tion but rather an upheaval, which is not at a11 the same thing. For even
Castro, Nasir, or any of those gentlemen at least had ideas about what the
future society could be. -
[Question) How do you explain the bad feelings towaxd you on the part of
Tay opponents, such as Sanjabi and others?
[Answer] The great trouble with the National Front has been that its leaders
were the most incapable. The most incapable never take a firm position in
the face of events. This is why Sanjabi~ who--and this is of great import- ~
ance--had no mandate to negotiate with Khomeyni, made a sort of pledge of
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al].egiance and why he wasted his time with it. He was received with a con-
tempt, a scorn.... He himself wanted to latch onto the mullahs, and here is ~
the result. I knew in advance that the soldiers' sword thrust or the mullah's
executioner amounted to the same thing. What comforts me is that in the
_ last r~onth certain Ira.nian newspapers have begun to mention t?~y name or put
rr~y picture in the paper. In Iran, there are people who say: we have come '
out of a corrupt dictatorship only to fa11 into an aggressive dictatorship.
The old one was abrasive, the new one is turbulent.
[Questi~n] And very negativp? '
[Answer] Very negative, yes. At present, they are having a poor prostitute
and some homosexuals shot. One does not govern a country wzth nonsense of
th at kind.
[Question] Do you see a way out for Iran?
[Answer] I don't know. In any case, I believe that Khome,yni, by the method
that he has chosen--ii one can speak of a method--by the muddle that he has
cre~,ted, is doing the job himself. It is not so much the trouble I take to
plot against his regime. Popular discontent can on~y go on growing. You
see the number of unemploved constantly increasing, industrial production
down by half.
In the life of a man, of any social condition whatsoever, there are two es-
sential things. First of all, freedom to think, to take positions. Sec-
ondly, trying to understand. When Khomeyni declares that he w~,nts an Islamic
republic, does he know exactly what he wants? I do not think so. In any
case, Bazargan, who is a religious, honest man, it must be recognized, but
incapable of running even a sma11 second-rate factory- well, this dear man
himself declares that he does not understand exactly what "Islamic republ3.c"
signifies. And so you see the result. And Bazargan declares every day: "I
am not up to date." He knows nothing. And one administrates this way?
- "Wait, I read it in the newspapers, my good man~...."' This is absolutely in-
supportable. Despite all our old friendship with Bazargan, I cannot accept
this. If a man is responsible, let him do the ,job. If he cannot, let him
admit it.
[Question] The Hoveyda case, as a matter of fact--what do you think of it?
[Answer] The way he was tried is ignoble. He said he was innocent. But he
should have said to the shah: "I don't agree with that, I don't want to
do such and such. I'm leaving." Therefore it cannot be said that Hoveyda
was not responsible. After all, he did remain prime minister for 13 years:
[Qu.estion] But he never. profited from it himself.
[Answer] That is even worse. If he did not profit from it, why did he let
all that corruption develop around him? An example: Tuhani, who was minister
of electricity, then minister of agriculture, was a multimillionaire. He
brought agriculture to its knees.
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But to return to this question of the prime minister and the shah's ministers,
I fi.nd, for my part, that they were responsible. They should be tried. It
_ is for this reason that I got the Parliament to pass a law which condemns
them in accordance with Article 80 of the Constitution, according to their
responsibilities, but in the presence of a~ury and not in the filthy cir-
cumstances in which those other people have been put to death. With sentenc-
ing to death, I don't agree. But to say that Hoveyda and his clique are in-
nocent is false.
[Question] The shah considered that during the 13 years that Hoveyda spent ,
in power, he had not revealed the truth to him, that he had put up a sort of
barrier and screen between him and his people. ,
[Answer] I believe this is false. The king had 3ust as much responsibility
as Hoveyda. And besides, Hoveyda could in any case have quit his ~ob. One
does not shoot a man who refla.ses to be prime minister. For the king to say
"I knew nothing" is not supportable. Moreover, it was not through Hoveyda
that he was informed. He had his commissions, his inspectors, his system of
military and civilian espionage, SAVAK, etc. On the supposition that this
asaertion by the king is a true one, it should not be forgotten that several -
persons, including ~yself, had sent to him, 2 years and 2 months before that,
a famous letter that said: "The country is lost." We sent this letter di-
rectly to the king. We gave him to understand that if he did not apply the
C~nstitution, he was not a constitutional lcing.
~Question] Who signed this letter along with you?
[Answer] Sand,jabi and another.
[Question] What was the king's reaction? Did he have a reply?
[Answer] When he asked to see me, things we�re alreac~y nearly lost. I was
called the "Kerensky of Iran." Kerensky was Nicholas II's last prime min-
, ister. He was a very honest man and very brilliant. Except that when he
was called, it was already too late. Lenin was already in Kronstadt.
[Question] What did the shah say to you?
[Answer] He said to me: "The country is in a state of breakdown...." There-
fore the king may not say that he was not up to date on anything. We had
writ~ten to him, and on several occasions had given him to understand that
things were going catastrophically. He did not want to hear this. All the
poli.�tical parties, a11 the democratic political personalities, the national-
ists of all shades, alerted him. But he had ended by having an opinion of ~
himself not ~ustified by anything.
[Question] It was said that he had changed much in the last years, that he
had notions of grandeur....
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[Answer] In the last 3 or 4 years, he had become more and more proud of him-
self', whereas I repeat, 2 years and 2 months eerlier we had written him a
letter that spelled everything out clearly. And he said, it appe~rs: "But
who are these people? They are failures, good-for-nothings. They don't know
how to do anything," etc. Therefore neither the king nor Hoveyde, can pre-
tend that they are innocent. Likewise, it is not I, nor even that mediocre
Sand,jabi, who governed the country for 25 years.
[Question] What did the shah say to you before leaving Tehran?
[Answer] He asked me to follow him in a small plane of the royal fleet. We ~
had a conversation. Generalities. Nothing special. He asked me to allow
several of his favorites to leave. For two or three, I agreed, for I found
therra unimportant. For others--who are locked up at present--I refused even
though he insisted.
[Question] And if Khomeyni were to die. He is 79, after all.
~ [Answer] 2, for my part, would not die of grief if he did. In a sense it
is a good thing that he has come back, for the Khomeyni ~yth.has popped like
ba.lloon. In the last analysis, rr~y whole strategy has been to accept his
returning while at the same time convinced that he would do nothing good. If
we had prevented him from returning, all the people would still be howling.
At present the country is producing nothing. The income from oil is going
to people who are braying like donkeys the whole day long.
~
[Question] You know that officially, there is talk of the corruption of
_ I4zom.eyni's son and son-in-law.
[Answer], There are not only the son and son-in-law, but all the mullahs.
More or less all of them, in a word. A great number of mullahs are corrupt.
The proof.... I know exactly how much one has to pay to leave Iran, I do
not speak for myself. I paid nothing. But I know people who have left Iran
by way of the south and the west in the last 6 months. They paid between
S,OAO and 100,000 tomans, or about 3 or million centimes.
[Question] Do you believe in a possible return of the shah or of the mon-
archy with his son?
[Answer] A return of tlie shah, no, I do not think so. As regards the mon- .
archy, that depends on a lot of contingencies, and especially on the desire
_ of the Iranians themselves. In the meantime, I cannot accept either the
way the shah governed or the wa~~~ Khomeyni wants to govern. I am against both.
[Question] Officially, what is the shah's status? The Islamic Republic has
been decreed, but the end of the monarchy has never been decreed. Officially,
Khomeyni has never dethroned the shah.
[Answer] It has been declared that since we have had an Islamic Republic,
the monarchy has automatically been abolished. This is the reasoning of ~
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~
~ome ~~POple. ln r~~,lity, it was necessary to convoke a constituent assembly,
whi~:r? ~.lone could depose the king, abolish the monarchy and establish a re-
, public. Khomeyni is a creature, a reaction to the shah's 25-year regime.
- Without this regime, without this corruption, without this mess, without
~;hese torture~, IQ~?omeyni would have nothing in particular to say. When he
a.rrived, he could have, if he had been up to his task, set up a strong demo-
cratic state by carrying out extremely bold--in the economic sense of the
term--reforms. And those who are proletarians--let us say, people without
wealth but who hav~ not profited: he could have pushed them forward and
stopped the land speculators. All this could have been done.
[Question] Then why didn't he do it? ~
[Answer] He did not understand it. One cannot, at the end of the 20th Cen-
tury, govern a country if one does not know how to read a map. It would be ~
very difficult!
[auf:stion] It has even been said that it isn't the real Khomeyni there, that
puppet has replaced him.
[An~wer] Puppet or not, it is he who makes the decisions. I{owever, it isn't
Lhni; l~iome,yni' s entourage has onl,y imbeciles in it : ~hari' atmadari, for ex-
ample, is a competent type, well-informed, far more level-headed, more bal-
anced, more modern than he. I have permitted myself to say that on the �
strictly religious level, he is well out in front nf Khome,yni. And the Iran-
ian and foreign journalists who have met with him--I myself have met him two
or three times--say that he is far better versed in the economic, social and
political questions of Iran and of the world. Khomeyni once said: "The king
must go." And the rest of his speeches were blah-blah-blah, repeated ad
nauseam. The king went. On that day, he should either have shut up or set
out a political program. He could have said: "Bravo, Bakhtiar, you have been
very effective in any case, you got the king to go without the spilling of
blood." But this is a man so infatuated with himself, so narrow-minded,
that he could not reason that wa.y.
[Rue~tion] What exactly do you blame him for? He wants to arrest ;you and
try you. Why?
[Answer] This man wanted me to bow and scrape to him. I said no, and no
again: When million people were howling, I said no: That's what I did ~
during the war. I was a young student. When someone would say to me, "Hitler
will take the world," I said, "no, he will not." I said, "I will fight."
I fought Hitler. So Khomeyni for me is a trifle.
[Question~ When you left your office on 11 February, did you really feel
your life was in danger? ~
[Answer] Certainl,y. If only from the p~pulace. I hid for a time with some
_ ver,y s,ympathetic~people, Iranians, and then I left Iran in circumstances which
I cannot ~ell you about.
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[Question] Will you tell one day the story of your departure from Iran?
[ Answer ] Two or 3 years from now, perhaps . Not for rqy s ake , but for the
people who sheltered me, who facilitated rr~y departure. I didn't pay a cent.
[Question] What do you think of the appeal by the shah's sister to Iranian
women ?
[Answer] I11-timed.
[Question] Do you think he himself should say something?
[Answer] No, the less the better. As for her, the shahbanu, yes.
[Question] And on the subject of the dismantling of the arn~y?
[Answer] It is a gross error, which I have formally condemned. Furthermore,
I have ,just sent a cassette recording to Iran. Obviously, there were s~me
scum, s~me corrupt persons, who had to be isolated. But the dismantling of
the nrmy is going to lead to certain disaster. I have encouraged the sol-
ciiers, the officers and the noncommissioned officers, to take heari;. T have
promised them all my s~upport, ta the extent, obviously, to which I can help
them.
[Question] What do you think about the arrr~y? Do you think there is the
risk of a coup d'etat?
[Answer] At present, I do not see it. But if things deteriorate as they
are :in the process of doing....
[auestion] Are there men capable of carrying out a military coup d'etat?
[Answer] There will certainly be some.
~ [(~uestion] Do you believe that the exiles can do something from the outside?
[Answer] They can organize, yes.
[Question] Why don't you try to meet with these exiles?
[Answer] Many of them are in touch ~,rith me--~not directly, because they do
not know my telephone number. They know now that I am in Paris. Moreover,
I intend to set up, in about 10 days from now, a secreta,riat to establish
. contact between me and the opponents.
[Question] Don't you find that the world press has somewhat stimulated the
upheaval, not to sa,y the revolution?
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[/~i:~wer] '1'he press was sometimes poorly informed. The essential point is
that no one, except for a very small number, of whom I am proud to be one,
knew in advance that this could not lead to anything positive. What do you
� expect when a Sanjabi, at age 75, does not understand that alliance with and
alle~riance to Khomeyni cannot be fruitful, and how can you expect that a
,journalist, for example, even if he knew Iran, could discern the country's
~ future more clearl,y? No one thought that Khomeyni would do what he has done,
and I tell you frankly that I believed he would be distinctly better tha.n
what he presently is, that he would not lead the country to total disinte-
gration. Moreover, he is a bloodthirsty man, there is no doubt about it. '
COPYRIGHT: L197~ pax Cogedipresse S.A.
11267
CSO: ~900
�
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~
- rux urri~le~ u~~ VLVLI
MOROCCO
1~
i~! .
~i,
MOROCCAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS SAHARA WAR, FRICTION WITH ALGERIA
- Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 3-9 Sep 79 pp 32-33 LD
[Interview with unnamed Moroccan "political and military leadera" by Guy
Sitbon: "The Truth About the Deser~t War"--date and place not specified] -
[Text] In order to find out why Morocco suffers so many defeats in the
Sahara I met with Moroccan political and military leaders whom journalists
and diplomats are not usually allowed to question.` A dialog emerged from -
- thdse interviews and I am publishing it here. Since my interlocutors spoke
to me openly--so they assured me--they did not authorize me to disclose
their names. I agreed. Was I wrong to do so?
[Questian] The Moroccan Army seems to be coming off worst....
[Answer]. You cannot always deal the blows in a fight. Sometimes you have
to take them.
[Question] A few days ago you were beaten at Bir Anzaran, ~w it's Lebouirate.
That is a lot.
[Answer.] We won at Bir Anzaran. Our garrison stood firm although it had
fewer men and was less well armed than the assailar~ts.
[Question] You suffered heavy losses that day.
[Answer] So did the enemy. They had to withdraw to their base although
their aim was obviously to occupy the territory.
[Question] As regards the Lebauirate battle you have gone so far as to
condemn your own officers. You seem to have been routed.
[Answer] That was an entirely different case. We forestalled the enemy
at Dakhla. They failed to carry their offensive through at Bir Anzaran
_ and so they mounted an even larger-scale operation on Lebouirate. They
arrived in three columns from three different directions and were commanded
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_.._.r.
~i
by their most famous off3cers. Our commander had relatively few men--al- ~
most 600. He felt he was outnumbered and decided to evacuate. The decision
could have been justified if he had withdrawn in an orderly fashion. How- _
ever, he left equipment--mainly jeeps--for the enemy and evacuated the post
in such a way that our losses were heavy--some 50 men. The leaders of this
garrison will be courtmartialed. Nonetheless while on the sub~ect of
Lebouirate we can tell you that the enemy had to flee when one of our
neighboring garrisons intervened.
[Question] We are told that the Moroccan Army is incredibly powerful and
is capable of intervening anywhere in Africa but it is nevertheless coming
� off worst....
[Answer] Our army was a conventional army. Hitherto little money was spent
on defense. We were neither equipped nor trained for this type of battle.
[Question] What about the enemy?
[Answer] Algeria rounded up Spain's Saharan troops for the Polisario--a
transfer which was carried out on the ''~panish Government's orders. Those
troops have only ever lived and fought on this terrain and they know it
extremely well.
[Question] The Polisario has barely 6,000 men. You have 20 times that
number.
[AnswerJ The West Sahara covers 250,000 square l~--one half the size of
France. We are installed throughout the territory. That is the important
~ point.
[Question] You can follow t}ia.movement of the columns arriving from Algeria
or Mauritania. Why does your air force not attack them before they attack
you?
[Answer] It is not as simple as that. First they do not advance in columns
like a parade on the Champs Elysees. The vehicles meet close to the ob-
jective. Also the Sahara does not consist of the smooth dunes you see at
_ the cinema. It consists of cliffs and deep gorges. It is impossible to
locate~the vehicles unless you have sophisticated electronic equipment.
[Question] Why do you have have such equipment?
[Answer] Because our U.S. suppliers refuse to sell it to us.
[Question] Your are joking....
[Answer] Not at all. We have asked them but they refuse because they _
place a whole series of restrictions on the use of the equipment: They do
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not mind what our enemies do with the equipment wh.~ch they sell them. It is
worth noting that the Soviets are prepared to aell us a11 the equipment
they have, provided they are paid in cash.
[Question] Why do you not buy their equipment?
[Answer] Because they send technicians as well as weapons. `
~Question] The Polisario is said to be better equ3pped than you.
[Answer] For this type of war they are. And tha~ is not because the Ameri-
cans do not want t4 sell us the equipment we need. It is simply because the
guerrilla weapons manufactured by the West are of much lower quality than
the Soviet weapons. Very much lower. You can only.obtain rubbish on the
Western market for this type of war.
[Question] The onl.y thing which the Moroccan .Army in the Sahara seems to
do is~to wait to be attacked,
. . i, r
[Answer] We are defending built-up areas and strategic positions. To pre-
vent these poeitiona being bombarded by '~Stalin organs," we have to set up
a circle of defense around the cities wiCh a radius equal to the range of the
guns. In other words 23 lan. That requires a very large number of inen.
[Question] To no avail since they manage~to penetr.ate your defenses.
[Answer] They have never broken through to a city. However other types_of
defense could be en~isaged which would free some troops and make us more`'
~ mobile. Our soldiers would prefer to be on the move. Strategic defense
is not in our nature.
[Question] These positions have to be kept supplied. Your supply columns
of ten seem to be ambushed?
[Answer] They were often ambushed. We have now found the answer.
[Question] What are they tr.ying to do now?
[Answer] They are trying to~; round up the inhabitants of the southern
Sahara [as published] and dt:port them to refugee camps in Algeria. ~
[Question] You mean that they are doing this in the West Sahara? Why
are you not stopping them?
[answer] We are afriad of killing civilians, civilians in Aousert and
Tichla . ,~i~~ ~
[Question] So you do not occupy the whole West Sahara as everybody claims.
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[Answer] The Mauritanians hold some positions together withitrhe Polisario.
~ Especially La Guerra opposite Nouadhibou. They are also laying ambushea for
our troops withdrawing from Mauritania. We are aware of this and will not
be caught by surprise.
[Question] Would you be prepared to compromise and leave these Saharan
villages to the Polisario since they are already there?
[Answerj Out of the question. The general staff is studying the problem.
We intend to occupy those positions as all our Sahara. The only base they
will have w:i11 be in their Algerian sector.
[Question] You are continually issuing threats such as: "Beware, we are
going to exercise our right of pursuit, written orders have been given,
next time we are attacked we will strike into Algeria..." These solemn
thredts which are never carried out are frankly becoming ridiculous.
[Answer] Originally we did not want to ~ eopardize rhe secret negotiations
with Algeria. Then Boumediene fell ill and died. We have to await Chadli
Bendjedid's appointment'and his is supposed to have favorable intentions.
His ma~esty does not want an escalation. He prefers to find some ground ~
for understanding.
[Question] Can the Western Sahara be negotiated?
[Answer] People must realize that we are in the Sahara and will not leave.
[Question] Ought you not to realize that your adversaries also want some-
thing? That they will continue to harrass you? That your cumbersome army
wi11 tire before they do?
[Answer] His majesty is prepared to grant Algeria major concessions..
[Question] The irf~oroccan proposals did not interest the Algerians very
much.
[Answer] If they persist in re~ecting dialog they will be ~?aking a mistake
for Morocco will be forced to reconsider the whole affair.
[Question] Whar does that mean?
[Answer] It means that we will have to make some calculations. Are 5 years
of war of attrition more or less costly than a few days of all-out war?
That is a calculation which must be made. They ought to make the same
evaluation too and calculate what it will cost them.
[Question] Are you not rather presumptious? And what if you were to lose
the war after a few days of fighting? What if your territory were occupied
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by Algeria? If your army.were crushed? Would people as certain of their
strength and of right being on their side as you are not then in a way find
themsleves on the brink of suicide? .
[Answer] Morocco will make a decision only after insuring that it is likely
to succeed. We have alreadq shown that we are able to conceive, plan and
successfully carry out an operation. Our "green march," which took place
with banners flying in the name of the Koran, could be repeated even if
different methods are used. A people's war could le_a_d to many unforeseen
events.
[Question] In your view, how good is the Algerian Army?
[Answer) It is overequipped.
[QiiestionJ This is r.o shortcoming. It has been said that it has three times
as many aircraft and twice as many tanks as you. In a desert war this equip-
ment would be of 3ecisive importance.
[Answer] These figures are accurate. This is more or less the prevailing
ratio. We believe, however, Chat the quality of their Soviet-made equip-
ment is inferior to the Western materiel which we have (the opposite is true
as far as light equipment is concerned). Above all, you must be abl~~ to
use this equipment. It is difficult.
[Question) The Algerians are capable people. They have more graduates and
engineers than you. They are the army technicians. You are running the
risk of coming a cropper....
[Answer] We do not underestimate the enemy, but we also have confidence in
our arms. However, the reason for fighting is the main thing. In our coun-
try, mothers would send their children into battle feeling sure that right
is on their side. This does not apply to the other side. On the contrary,
many Algerians realize that we have already ceded a large part of our Sahara
to them. For them, war would be unjustified.
[Question] You Moroccans are so sure that you are right that you are unable '
to understand your adversary. If I were your neighbor I would feel appre-
hensive. Over a 3-year period you have twice extended your territory. And
you have not even stated that you will not go any further. This is dis-
turbing. Can you not undersi~nd this?
[Answer] Morocco is a country which is in the process of finalizing its
decolonization. Our neighbors are aware of this. They only pretend that
they cannot understand it. This is even more alarming, do you not think so? _
We helped--and how!--Algeria to achieve decolonization. We hope for
Maghreb unity and this is what has happened.
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[Question] Was this not unavoidable? Are two countries of similar atrength
not baund to be enemies?
- [Answer] Why sYiould leasons not be learned from the past? Why ahould we
not avoid all that Europe had to auf~er before it achieved a balance? This
would be to everybody's advantage.
[Question] Would war not suit everybody, I mean all states, better? Look:
I~Iever before have ,you been so united in Morocco; your monarchy has never been ~
atronger. Similarly, Algeria is trying to achieve national unity through
hatred direc:ted against Morocco. The possibility of war has enabled it to
cr~ate a strong army. You are young countries. Perhaps you need th1.s, per-
haps you need to cut your teeth....
[Answer] What you are saying is true as far as Algeria is c~ncerned since
it has neve: been united as a state, but it does nvt apply to us. We are a
very ancient nation, a very ancient state. We need no war to become
MoY~occana. We are Moroccans already. Please believe me.
- [QuestionJ The French peaple will never be able to understand tha:. anyone
should die for a desert which does not even conceal any treasure.
[Answer] Mont Blanc is more barren and desolate than the Sahara. Would
you give it up?
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