JPRS ID: 8696 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100005-4
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8696
1 Octaber 1979 -
Latin Ar~nerica Re ort
p
CFOUO 1~0/79)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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, a: va? Vi r y`,i~L U?7L'r VLVL.L
JPR5 L/8696
1 October 1979
~ LATIN AMERICA REPORT
(F.ouo io/~~)
CONTF.,NTS PP,~E
ARGENTINA
Araujo on Factors Affecting Nation's Foreign Issues
(Estela Araujo; LA OPINION, 22 Aug 79) ~
1 _
,
, CUBA .
'L'EXPRESS' Publishes Feature Articles on Cuba
(L'EXPRESS, 1 Sep 79) 3
J
~ao Cuban Myths Collapse, by Jean-Francois Revel
Current Economic, Political Situation, by Hugh
Thoma.s
Everyday Life in Cuba, by Liliane Sichler
Conference of Nonalined Countries, by Branko Lazitch
Cuban Presence in Africa
Barbarous Treatment of Political Prisoners, by Arrabal
- a ' [III - LA - 144 FOUO]
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ARGENTINA
AAAUJO ON FACTORS AFF~CTING NATION'S FOREIGN ISSUES
Buenos Ai.res LA OPINION in Spanish 22 Aug 79 p 11 _
[Article by Estela Arau~o]
[Text] In recent months Argentine diplomacy aeems to have encountered new
setbacks with respect to problems which were thought to have been overcome:
- Difficulties with regard to Yacyre~a-Apipe, whose .appearance signifies
a threat to the confidence placed in the agreements at a time when the
parties are experiencing various changes.
~
- The rapprochement between Brasilia and Caracas, which casts a shadow on
the course of efforts to establish more meaningful relations between
Argentina and Venezuela.
- The Law of the Sea C~nferenoe, which could turn into a kind of boomerang:
at the diplomatic level support is being obtained for the Argentine position
with respect to the right of the state to exercise full sovereignty over
12 miles and with respect to rights over the entire continental shelf;
however, at the U.S. Government level, jurisdiction is recognized over only
3 miles.
- The pressure exercised by Brazil for the construction of the dams in
Upper Uruguay, and especially Garabi, in place of the stalled subject of
Corpus and the settled sub,ject of Yacyreta.
- The papal mediation, which seems to be taking longer than expected, and
which is keeping open the matter of the southern dispute and everything
relating to it.
- The difference in styles between the Foreign Ministry and the economic
team, which seems to operate on the basis of economic agreements rather ~
than for geopolitical reasons.
- The confusing episode involving British Undersecretary of State for
Foreign Affairs Nicholas Ridley and his ~~regretful~~ disclaimers concerning
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opinions on Argentine internal affairs. Despite all thi~s, no progress has
yet been made on the matter at issue: the Malvinas Islands.
In contrast to this somewhat discouraging picture, it is worthwhile to take
note of some good things and some favorable prospects:
- In its editorial a few days ago, the Montevideo papor EL PAIS said:
~~Under circumstances ~nvolving unquestionable difficulties of vari~us kinds,
the countries on either side of the River Plate are offering the world a
great example of determination to build, in a spirit of solidarity, a better
and happier future f or their peaples.~~ The editorial cited some comments
made by Argentine Ambassador Guillermo de la Flaza: "This is a perfect
example of how two peoples can unite without losin~ their respective `
sovereignty, their autonomy and their independence. We have acted, and
will continue to act in a fraternal spirit, and this serves as an example
to a world currently at conflict. It is what on various occasions I have
called the River Plate doctrine.~~
Relations between Argentins and Uruguay have been marked by success. This
involves a coherent policy which has made it possible to implement a
diplomacy which is not limited to words, but rather is translated into
deeds: the inaugur~tion of the first turbine operating at the Salto Grande,
the forthcoming railroad links, the bridges. These are concrete signs of
a well thought out integration; they can serve as a model to be developed
so that the precarious balance of the overall picture can be translated
into other efforts at bilateral integration capable of being incorporated
into regional frameworks which are more difficult to bring into harmony.
In the case of the River Plate Basin, this model can only be adopted in
connection with Bolivia by means of specific deeds (binational projects)
and should be adopted before there are ne~ losses to mourn.
COPYRIGHT: La Opinion, 1979
9494
CSO: 3010
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- CUBA -
'L~EXPRESS'PUBLISHES FEATURE ARTICLES ON CUBA
Two Cuban Myths Collapse
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 1 Sep 79 pp 36-37 ~
[Article by Jean-Francois Revel: "Cuba: End of the Myth"]
[TextJ Cuba is one nf the contemporary world's key countries. It first
became such as a revv3utionary hoPe. When this hope dismally failed to
materialize, Cuba then assumed its present key status as a strategic spring-
board from which are launched soldiers and offensives, "advisers" and commandos
dispatched to Latin America, Africa, and now, even Asia. Where does Cuba ,
stand today? What does Cuba want? What can Cuba do? Wi.thout Moscow, it
cannot do much. With Moscow, it can do a great deal. In any case, Cuban
military expansion is one of the major developments of the past 4 years. How .
. long will this expansion last? How far will it go?
This year, Cuba is celebrating the 20th anniversary of its Rev~lution and,
at the samP time, is host to the Si~eth Conference of I3onalined Countries.
Thia conference is to convene in Havana in early September and bring together
some 100 chiefs of state and heads of government from all the continents.
Hente we have a twofold reason for assessing the accomplishments and failures
of the Cuban regime from both an internal and external standpoint.
It has never been easy to make a dispassionate judgffient of Cuba. It took 10
years before observers dared to start--about 1970--to ~uggest that Cuban
economic failures were not all due to the American block!~de and that, propor-
tionate to population, the Caribbean Gulag was comparable to its Soviet big
brother's Gulag and larger than those in many of the rightist dictatorships
elsewhere in Latin Atuerica. It wouls3 be easy and cruel to recall some of the
more idiotic dithyr3mbs written about Cuba's agricu~tural feats, its "direct
democracy," and its advancement of human rights.
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I~'rance was especially prolific of spontaneous ~r less spontaneous missionaries
_ of the Castroite faith. At Havana's January 1968 International Cultural
� Congress, the largest delegation,,among some 500 guests overwhelmed by the
regime's hospitality, was the French delegation. It numbered 70 persons while
the Soviet delegation had only six. Admittedly shortly thereafter the Castroite
myth suffered quite a severe blow ~when Castro applauded the Red Army's invasion
of Czechoslovakia. From that time onwards, connivance became less supercilious.
There was less systematic suppression of news about police repression against -
the opposition or against apathetic persons called "delinquents."
In fact, Casfiro recently deplored the fact that Cuban prisons and camps are-- _
I simply quote*--"a veritable paradise for delinquents."
Observers also began to expose the bureaucracy~s stifling of the economy, the
decline in productivity, shortages, the black market, corruption, and privi-
leges. Castro himself has gone further than anyone in denouncing these con-
~ ditions. In a speech to the National Assembly of People's Power last July, he
wondered "why discipline has disappeared in the railroads, why discipline was _
better maintained under capitalism, and why a complete air crew can possibly
not be present at the time an aircraft is scheduled to take off." And the
commander-in-chief concluded: "We must put an end to slovenliness, cronyism,
and indulgence in the government service at the national level and in the
people's power, provinces, and municipalities." (GRANMA, op. cit.)
Thus the Cuban myth has eroded little by little. This does not mean, however,
that Castro has completely ceased being protected by a sort of taboo. His
noncommunist devotees have become silent or more circumspect. But while they
no longer shower the dictator ~ith fulsome praise or flattery as enthusiastically
as they did 10 years ago, their unrestrained criticism of him has not increased. -
Althaugh there is no~~ an extensive literature of Cuban dissidence, there are ao
many filters that continue to muffle its voice! The press, even the independent
press, the media in both America and Europe, and even Amnesty International, all
continue to co~zFound impartiality and credulity on the subject of Cuba. In
rhis cor~nection, one should read Pierre Golendorf's slashing but meticulous
analytical introduction to his translation of the poems of Armando Valladares,
esp~cially his ~nalyis of the television reporting and hypocritically compli-
� mentary or prudent articles inspired by the 1978 Youth Festival in Cuba.**
This analysis shows that the myth is still holding its own rather well. But it _
- certainly no longer has the strength it had in the past.
*G'ANMA, the main organ of the Cut~an Communist Party, 15 Ju1y 1979. _
**Armando Y~lladares. "Prisonnier de Castro," introduction by Pierre Golendorf,
postscript by Leonid Pliouchtch, Grasset, 1979, 222 pages.
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This decline of the revolutionary myth coincided with the rise of Cuban military
power. Like the Soviets, Castro offsets his internal failure by external
aggressiveness. In the afarementioned speech, after having denounced worker
abaenteeism and.corruption--"the taxi driver who rigs hie neter, the one who
bribes the mechanic, the one who unlawfully buys a part from somebody who
stole it from a workshop"--Castro exclaimed: "There are hundreds o� thousands
of persons who want to go to Angola, who want to go to Ethiopia, who want to
go anywhere. But there is no apparent conscientious approach to everyday
work."
For a:large part of the population, the African wars thus definitely appear to
be a way of fleeing the society of shortages and corruption entrenched on the
island. These wars meet an internal need. But on an international scale, they
also meet Moscow's need. In the Cuban army, now being increasingly spelled
by the East German army, the USSR has found an intervention force enabling it
to solve a problem it had long been unable to solve, namely to take military
action in countries with which it has no common border, and to do so without
having to dispatch its own troops.
- The main question, therefore, is whether Cuba now meets the conditions required
to still be included among the nonalined countries, and a fortiori, to assume
le.adership of those countries. Are we not currently witnessing a bid to take
over and divert an international movement, an act of political piracy? Let us
hope that the Third World chiefs of state very clearly ask themselves that
question when they land in Havana and get into a braizd-new Mercedes, dozens ~
of which Castro bought--specifically for this occasion--in the Federal Republic
of Germany, for apparently he does not have as much confidence in the Soviet
Union's automobile industry as he does in its armament industry.
The argument that Castro's overseas wars are for the purpose of helping
national liberation movements is inadmissible. Admittedly Cubans frequently
use authentic nationalist movements as a means of subsequently imposing pro-
Soviet leaders by eliminating all other political movements. But it is equally
true that the Cubans have also fought alongside the Ethiopians against the
Somali who had revolted for their independence. The Cubans also had "advised"
the dictator of Equatorial Guinea--recently overthrown--that bloody butcher who
executed 50,000 opponents out of a population of some 350,000 persons. In
such cases, there is no longer any attempt to keep up even the appearances
of progressivism. In addition, the Cuban presence in Africa resembles the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, in other words it is a type of colonialism
that operates all the more ruthlessly, and with impunity, in that it mas-
querades under Third World and socialist pretenses.
Not one but two Cuban myths have collapsed in the past few years. First, the
myth of a socialist Cuba, a myth that merely accompanied the myth of all nther
socialist paradises into the grave. Secondly, the myth of Cuba as a center
for the spread of freedom. Castro spreads subversion, agreed, oL~t not freedom.
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Current Economic, Political Situation
_ Paris L'EXPRF;SS in Freach 1 Sep 79 pp 38-41
_ [Article by Hugh Thomas: "naenty Years After"]
- [Text] Hugh Thomas is a specialist in Hispanic affairs~
He spent 10 years studying Cuba in preparation for his
~ book "Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom," published in 1971.
In this ~article, he draws up the economic and political
balance sheet of 20 years of Castroism.
~ [Text] The Cuban Revolution is 20 years old. On the last day of 1958,
Batista fled into a golden exile he had been preparing for a long time. In
January 1959, Castro entered the capital surrounded by a troop of bearded
idealists, a highly fascinating s~.ght at first glance. It is difficult to
' believe that 20 years have alr~ady elapsed since then!
Inasmuch as Castro is so desirous of expo.rting the lessons of his achieve-
ments beyond the seas, it would be interesting to tak~ a close look at what
his revolutionary accomplishments are really like. The first question any
serious investigator must ask himself is: To what extent are those accomplish-
men~s revolutionary?
I have no wish to echo Tocqueville who re~ected the generally accepted view on
the significance of the French Revolution. I do, however, simply recognize
the fact that the major characteristics of the Cuban economy have not changed
sincz the 1950`s. Of course, as in all communist countries, the state does
play a determining role in the economy. But sugar continues to govern the
Cuban economy today as it did in 1957. And if something has changed, it is
rather in the direction of an expansion of that monoculture. In 1957, Cuba
- exported goods with a total value of 818 million dollars. Sugar alone accoun~ed
for 654 million dollars or nearly 80 percent of that total. In 1976--the
latest year for which I have accurate figures--exports totaled 2.925 billion
= doltars, with sugar accounting for 2.59 billion dollars or more than 86 percent.
The estimate for 1977 is 83 percent.
Early in the regime's history there was much talk about diversifying agriculture.
But since 1968, perhaps under Soviet pressure, sugar has received priority
, attention and the bulk of all capital~investment. Nevertheless, there has been
no lsrge increase in the amount produced. During these past few years, pro-
d~~.ction has been about 6 million tons. This is a slignt increase over
- a~~r,ge production in the 1950's. But Cuba was producing 7 million tons in
1952 and 5 million tons as of 1925. Modern technology has improved the yield
from the some 1.2 million hectares that, today as in the 1950's, are planted
with sugar cane. Inasmuch as labor unions have become an integral part of
the government bureaucracy, the government has succeeded in introducing the use
= of cane-cutting machines. This is definitely beneficial to the economy, even
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though officials prefer not to mention this fact too much. There is absolutely
no doubt, however, that the Revolution has not only maintained but further
increased the country's dependence on the sugar monoculture. And for solely
that reason--not to even mention the. others--Cuba's foreign policy is ~ust as
~ subordinate to the Soviets as i!: :-:~ce was to the Americans.
In 1977, four-fifths of Cuba's foreign trade was with CEMA countries, and the
Soviet Union alone accounted for 60 percent. The CEMA countries currently
supply Cubans with almost all of their ferti;,izer, wheat, oil, and other vital
imports. It is estimated that Soviet economic aid to Cuba--excluding military
assistance--over the past 15 years amounts to 5 billion dollars (approximately
1 million dollars per day in 1970 dollars). Cuba has been a member of CEMA
s~ince 1972, and it must be recognized that orientation of the Cuban economy is
determined by what CEMA wants and not by what Cuba or the Cuban farmers would
like to produce under other circumstances.
Apart from the sugar industry, Cuba is still without any industry. The island's
economic development has been the slowest within the entire Caribbean area
since 1959. While admitting that it is difficult to compile accurate statistics,
it would appear that Cuba's average annual rate of growth has not been above
2.5 percent. Even the Dominican Republic has probably attained a rate of
6 percent.
It is true that a few new industri.al activities do enhance this rather dismal ~
picture: particularly steel, cement, and sulfuric acid production. Cuba is
now the world's fifth ranking producer of nickel. Half of its output is sold -
to CEMA countries. Yet even the "new man" cannot live on steel alone: the
modest food rations on which the average Cuban has to manage today are definitely
the sign of a decline in the eyes of a large number of persons who actuaily
had a much greater variety of food in the past.
Rationing obviously places Cuba very far behind the East European countries
that are veritable "lands of plenty" in comparison. East Europeans are the
first to recognize this. One of. them made a point of telling me su in the
1960's at a time when I could go to Cuba as I pleased. Going from Cuba to
Hungary, for example, as I did one year, is like going from a country where
people eat as they did during the worst days of World War II into an affluent
society.
In turning now to consideration of the political situation, we must not over-
look the fact that in place of the Batista regime, Castro fc~unded a st~te of
which he himself is the "great leader," and perhaps for life. The new Cuban
Communist Party differs little in its organization from parties in other
communist countries. 41ith the important exception of Castro himself, most of
the present leaders of that party are men who were conmuni~ts before 1959. It
is worth noting that this is especially true of the leaders who were directly
involved in Cuba's recent African ventures.
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_ The Cuban Communist Party is still to this day smaller in proportion to the
population than parties in other communist countries. The party controls
certain unusual organizations such as the Committees for Defense of the
Revolution. Thes~e were farmed initially as a sort of neighborhood zspionage
network with the task of verifying that persons leaving the country were tur~ning
their property over to the state, as prescribed by law, and not to friends.
The committees ultimately became promoters of civic aetion in behalf of.the party.
As for Castro himself, his style of leadership appears to be more lyrical than
that of his peers in other communist countries. He continues to have a cohort
of old loyal supporters who serve him as confidants or bodyguards. Most of
them are men without any ideology who fought alongside Castro during the civil
war against B,atista.
Beyond the establishment of a powerful state, what has really happened in
Cuba? First, the country has been transformed--we could say "with the knout"
--into a huge military camp. The military element in the regime's propaganda
--in which the leaders probably believe--is much more conspicuous than in any
other commui~ist country. Castro no doubt fully endorsed it when he declared
on 19 December 1976: "As long as there is one revolutionist with a rifle, no
cause will ever be lost."
I This military aspect of the regime has steadily gathered strength over the years,
despite the fact that the American threat is clearly a thing of the past, that
no country in North or South America could attempt to overthrow the Cuban
~ regime by force of arms, and that this regime has no armed enemy inside the
; country.
The Cuban anned forces--190,000 men, plus 90,000 reservists, 1G,000 men
assigned to "state security," 3,000 frontier guards, and 100,000 militiamen--
are by far the largest in the Caribbean region, with the exception of the
American forces. Of the Soviet Union's European satellites, only Poland has
larger iorces~ But Poland's population is four times larger than Cuba's.
N!ilitary dictai:orships such as those in Chile or Argentina have considerably
less men und~r arms than Cuba. This powerful army is also the nation's most
important institution. It has played a key role in the economy, for example,
, by furnishing additional manpower for the sugar cane harvest.
Military-related financial ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba are obviously
secret. But in practice, the Cuban armed forces and police are armed, equipped,
a~id trained by the USSR. In all likelihood, Cuba shares in these expenditures
. t~ only a very small extent.
"The more closely we examine this subject, Castro said on 1 December 1976,
"the more grateful we feel toward the Soviet Union who has furnished us these
remarkable weapons (applause)...and taught us how to use them...Thanks to
the extraordinary efforts of Soviet scientists, technicians, and ~~~rkers,
these weapons are constantly being improved."
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One obvious consequence is that the Cuban army is closely tied to the Red
Army. And anyone who might expect Cuba to have some freedom of action in
Africa or elsewhere, should remember this fact. There are even valid grounds
for thinking that the US3R built th~. Cuban army with the idea of using it
exactly as it has.
- There are, of course, certain benefits attached to living in a militarized
society. The regime's achievements in such f.ields as public health, social
services, and education must be viewed in this light. The Cuban government
has succeeded in accomplishing certain things in these fields that no other
Latin American government has accomplished. Cuba practically no longer has any
illiterates and access to education is universal. Whereas in the 1950's, one-
third of the population cou?d neither read nor write and only half of the school-
age children went to school. Most Cubans are near a doctor or a hospital. Such
a situation was unthinkable in the 1950's, at least in rur,~l areas.
But what are the purposes of these advances, these activities? In the past,
slave owners looked after the health of their manpower, j ust as landowners
attended to the efficient management of their properties. They did this for
obvious reasons. In Cuba pzople are educated and looked after in order to
serve the cause and carry the torch af the Revolution, to share in the "hero~c
caravansary" (to quote David Caute), and to go, shouldering their weapons,
wherever the "supreme armorer" orders them to go. Travelers visiting Cuba
are sometimes impressed with the morale of doctors and teachers they meet.
But such morale is the morale of a nation whose leaders have been able to
simulate a permanent war through the expedient of incitement to permanent
revolution.
There is one successful achievement of the Cuban revolution it would be very
hard to deny. I refer to its propaganda campaign aimed at those, in Europe
or elsewhere, who feel it necessary--for a multitude of reasens--to wave an
anti-American banner the moment they find one. There were numerous reasons
for the unpopularity of the United States, even before the Vietnam War:
~ealousy played a great part; resentment at the accession of the United
States to superpower status in place of Europe; fear of American technology;
and appreh~nsion at the prospec~ of a world state which the United States,
unfortunately perhaps, did not even try to establish.
Be that as it may, hatred of the United States led t_o an incredibly tolerant
attitude toward Castro. And this situation continues. There is no need to
look very'far for a few good examples of this attitude. For example, when
the British labor leader Cli~~e Jenkins was visiting Cuba in 1961, he asked a
militiaman whether he wanted elections. "He loolced at me and shook his
machine bun. 'We've got this,' he said. At this point in time," Jenkins
added, thus using an old cliche, "I found this a convincing reply."
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It is relatively easy to visit Cuba and conclude that the regime is popular.
But countless dictatorships in this century were able to give this same
impression. Will we never learn that the persons a traveler meets are most
careful not to criticize the sys~em in front of anyone who might either care-
lessly or purposely betray them? We should also always keep in mind that
~ during the period Cubans could leave their country, 640,000 of them did leave,
including some 16,000 persons who fied illegally and clandestinely by boat or
by swimming to the American Guantanamo base. The amazing Armandro Socorras
is a symbfllic hero of this route to exile ~uarked by ordeals ~.nd exploits. He
hid in the landing-gear well of a DC-8 airliner leaving for Spain and survived
- his 10-hour Atlantic crossing to te11 the story.
It is an easy matter to have a crowd simulate enthusiasm. Here again, we
should certainly realize today to what point crowds can be manipulated. The
number of independently minded Cubans who were adults before 1959 and who--
_ providing they can be contacted--ought to rightfully expect some international
assistance or at least moral support, is continuously declining. As for the
Cuban masses, the government may possibly have regained some popularity among
them in the wake of two short and victorious African wars against weak
adversarj.es. But how are families reacting to the news of the death of a
father or brother killed far from home in behalf of a foreign cause about
which they know nothing whatsoever?
I will reserve my judgment on this point.
To detect among Cubans themselves any vague criticism of their African ventures
would require an investigation resembling cryptography more than simple reading.
A good number of Cubans with fiery temperament undoubtedly have that same
sor~ of half-moral, half-religious enthusiasm about the regime that Germans
had for the Nazis. They are enchanted by Castro's oratorical talents,
bewitched by his cleverness, struck with admiration at his survivability,
proud of his "machismo" on the international scene, and pleased finally with
the thought that Cubans no longer charm the world with their cigars and music, ~
but on the contrary, frighten the world with the noise of their weapons.
Ir. short, they are pleased as some Italians were under ~fussolini.
Having said this, Cuba does, in fact, appear to me to represent, more than any
other. regime, the first fascist regime of the left. By this I mean a regime
with leftist totalitarian objectives defined and pursued by fascist methods. _
This fact should probably have been glaringly apparent to me when people who
had known Castro as a student recalled that he used to walk around with an
slnotated copy of "Mein Kampf" under his arm, or when otht:r witnesses recalled
rhat in the Sierra Maestra he used to read the works of Jose Antonio Primo
.
e Rivera.
At his 1923 trial following the Munich "Beer Hall Putsch," Hitler said: "You
may find me guilty a 1,000 times, but the goddess of history's eternal tribunal
will laugh at you and reduce to a 1,000 shreds the public prosecutor's case and _
the sentence of this court. For that goddess acquits us."
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At his 1953 trial, Castro concluded his first ina~or speech with a much
ahorter formula: "Convict me. History will absolve me."
Everyday Life in Cuba
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 1 Sep 79 pp 42-46
[Article by Lilian~ Sichler: "Day-to-Day Cuba"]. ~
- [Text] Visiting Cuba as an nrdinary tourist, Liliane Sichler
spent several days freely touring Havana. She was welcomed
_ into hc~mes, rode the buses, and shared the everyday life of
Cubans. The following is her account of this visit.
[Text] I had been waiting for a half hour, standing in line behind the
woman seated in front of ine. A young woman on my left stamped impatiently
- behind a small boy dozing with his head resting on the quick-lunch counter of
the "Tencent." The lai:':er was the name of a chain of American stores before
" Fidel Castro's revolution. The woman smilingly told me: "Be patient, you'll
see, you can eat cheaply here, and you don't have to use your ration card.
Everyone in Havana does this." She called out: "Hey there comrade!" The
waitress she had thus addressed did not turn a hair. The young woman tolerantly
explained: "It's 1430 and she's waiting to be relieved at 1445." The fan was
not working, so customers were fanning themselves with sheets of paper.
Finally the waitress brought the small sleeping boy a hot crepe which she
sprinkled with clear syrup. The boy gobbled it up in two bites, pla~ed
20 centa.vos in the metal plate n~::tt t~ his glass, got up and left. It was
then the young woman's turn to sit down. She ordered six 1-peso (50 centimes)
sandwiches, placed t~iem in a small bag, ai.d left. The waiting line moved one
step f~rward.
Outside, palm treeG and multiple-trunk trees provided some shade. From time
to time, an automobile went by. More often than not, they were old patched-
up American cars into which the driver proudly crowded his whole family. One
of the most common street diversio~ns is the breakdown: now and then, a car
~ hood raised as a distress si.gnal draws curious bystanders. All of them lean
over the rusty motor, study it, and then offer their diagnosis. The fact is
; that although the average Cuban has no car, he still strongly feels he ought
to have been a mecha.nic. In Cuba, the automobile is the big thing.
Even for Rosario, a tall, thin 35-year-old mestizo, an office worker in one
of the ministries and thz wife of a communist party member. After having talked
to me about the Revolution's benefits, Fidel's speeches, and those dreadful ~
capitalists who think only of money, Rosario--in the same enthusiastic tone--
told me the big news: "You know what? We're going to buy a car. That's
certainly going to change our way of living! And believe me I'm not
exaggerating. I live 10 minutes by car from my work, but to be sure to be
on time, I now have to leave the house one hour and a half early if I take
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the "guagua." The "guaguas" are those sort of prehistoric buses that rattle
down the streets of Havana like so much scrap iron. They are the pet aversion
of the residents of Havana.
"Fridge All.ocation"
Rooario's house is pink. Its brown shutters were closed and its small garden
was sun-drenched. Rosario and her~family live in Havana's fashionable Miramar
section. It has nothing in common with the crackled streets in the center of
the city full of children playing baseball with pieces of scrap lumber scav-
enged from some constiuc~ion site. Rosario's mother greeted us warmly. She
was hosing down the front entrance. The kitchen was equipped with a refrigera-
tor and washing machine. All these electrical appliances are officially
rationed. Rosario told me she had obtained them with her "merit points." -
These merit points are awarded in places of work by the labor union of each
enterprise. Every 6 months, each enterprise receives a"fridge allocation."
The labor union designates the recipient. There are, on an average, some 25
applicants for each fridge. Rosario explained: "You can get merit points in
different ways. If you go clean up your place of work on Sunday, if you
frequently do voluntary labor, if you prove that you are taking night courses...
you eventually are classified as an 'avant-garde' worker and are entitled to a
refrigerator."
To help furnish her kitchen, Rosario has planted potatoes, cut sugar cane,
cleaned her office, and for 2 years in a row, she has taken part in "the two .
weeks of Giron [Bay of Pigs~" i.n April. This involves spending 2 weeks in a
rural camp where she does farm work. A file is kept on each worker, and once
a year an assembly is held in the enterprise to designate the "avan~-garde"
workers. Everytihing in the enterprise is decided on the basis of this system
of inerit points, such as admission to the party and obtaining housing or a car.
Rosario seemed to consider this procedure normal.
"Wirh the American blockade and Cuba's difficulties, we must a11 unite and
help each other. Fidel made the revolution to teach us a new way of life."
I asked her: "But aren't you quite annoyed at having to do this 'voluntary'
work?"
"Now tihat I have everything I need," Rosario admitted, "I do less of it." _
So~eone slipped a sealed envelope under the door. "Look, it's the electric
bill," Rosario explained as she showed it to me. "It's 12 pesos per month, and
- that's because we have a large house." Water is free in Cuba. As :or rents,
the system varies as the case may be. In most cases, the state must be paid
10 percent of all wages received by the household.
.
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"We kept the same house we had before the revolution. Instead of paying rent
to the landlord who fled to the United States, we now simply pay it to the
state. Furthermore, the rent is cheaper."
In the dining room, Italian and Spanish knickknacks are a reminder of a fact-
finding trip her hu~band had made to Europe. "He stocked up on pants, and
shoes also," she laughingly told me.
Clothes, yard goods, and shoes are still tightly rationed in Cuba. Members of
each family have an annual individual ration 3ook containing coded coupons.
These codes are posted on the few shop windows: E18-50 shoes, I20-30 shirts, ~
etc. F::h man is entitled, on the average, to a pair of pants and two shirts
per year, plus a pair of sport shoes and a pair of dress ahoes. In Old Havana's
ahopping arcades, lines sometimes form in the morning at 1000, whereas stores
open only in the afternoon. When Lazaro, a young engineer, told us about his
search for a certain pair of E14 tennis-type shoes, last month, he lost all of
his revolutionary zeal. "After 1 had waited in line for 3 hours, the store
no longer had my size, ana I was told: 'Come back next year, Comrade.
At 1600, the streets belong to the children. Re.d, yellow, or blue uniforms,
depending on their grades. A triangular scarf worn around the neck indicatea
membership in the Pioneers, the communist children's organization. Nine ouC
of ten Cuban children are Pioneers. To tell the truth, after having discussed
rationing and shortages, this street scene was quite heartening. I noticed a
poster which read: "Nothing is more precious than a child." And indeed Cuba
has done much for its children. Their lot is idyllic in comparison with the
situation of children throughout Latin America: free meals are served ~
in c'i-~y care centers and schaols, 100 percent of the children attend school,
and racial discrimination has been eliminated. GRANMA, Havana's only daily
newspaper, carries pictures everyday of child beggars in the shantytowns of
Mexico or Colombia.
Marina will soon be 12. She listens to the Bee Gees on American radio statio:?a
and dreams of wearing T-shirts covered with disco badges. But on television,
she raatches variety s~ows that systematically deride the tall vicious cowboy
with a hideous horse by his side. Each night, she follows the adventures of
the "Red Mask," a serial about the prerevolutionary period in France. But,
in fact, her father has thoroughly explained to her that the French Revolution
was a"bourgeois" revolution. Mirana lives in a very unambiguous world with
all the "bad guys" on the same side.
In January, she too went to the countryside to perform her "voluntary" labor.
Each year, children over 11 are required to help in the harvest for 45 days.
Only those children with a medical excuse are exempt.
Parents are taken by special buses to join their children in the fields every
weekend. "I used to return with a pair of pants and a shirt to wash," her
mother sighed. "And also with lemons!" Marina protested. In the country they
have everything I like, fruits, vegetables..."
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"Cakes, Soup, Porridge"
Havana's grocery stores look more like warehouses. They are odorless and
colorless. Everything is sold in sealed boxes or small carefully-weighed
bags. Items purchased with a ration book include: sugar: 4 pounds per
person per month; rice: 5 pounds per person per month; coffee: 2 ounces
per person per week; and m31k: 1 liter every 2 days per family of five
members, with children under 7 being entitled to 1 liter per day. "Free-
purchase" or nonrationed foods include eggs, butter, Czechoslovak crackers, -
Poli,~h instant soups, and small bags of grain or flour. One mother told me:
"We m~~e a lot of cakes, soup, and porridge. My family likes milk, so I
exchange ,-.ice Fox it with some neighbors. We manage to get along."
Eugenio Balari is the president of the Institute of Domestic Consumption,
an agency established in 1976 and patterned after similar existing organiza-
tions in the people's democracies. He buttressed his statements to us with
- statistics, charts, and graphs. The 40-year-old Balari is an enthusiastic
jogger. Wearing a polo shirt, he spoke to us with a mini-calculator and
color slides within easy reach. "There is no longer any undernourishment
in this country. We have extricated ourselves from Latin America's under- -
development. We have doubled our number of doctors in 10 years. All medical
care is free. Unemployment is now virtually nonexistent. The entire popula-
tion has a minimum per capita intake of 2,200 calories per day, an amount
guaranteed them by ration card."
He then rose to explain, pencil in hand, a chart hanging on his office wall.
The population is divided into groups. For example, workers engaged in in-
tellectual pursuits require 2,625 calories per day, whereas sugar cane cutters
need an intake of 4,100 calories per day. "On certain work sites, we give
the workers milk and cheese," Balari explained.
Technicians of the Institute for pomestic Consumption prepare informational
and nublicity campaigns aimed at teaching Cubans to eat dry beans instead
of black or red beans, to like fish instead of the traditional pork and rice.
A young technician in charge of consumer surveys aggressively assured me:
"I swear we will fully implement the ]_976-1980 Five Year Plan. A total of
100,000 apartments have to be built per year in order to keep abreast of
the population explosion. We are going to double our production of textiles."
In the meantime, an official report has acknowledged that in Havana within
the space of 1 year more apartments have fallen into disrepair than have been
bu.lt. And each Cuban is still entitled to only 4 meters of fabric per year.
'Society Is Not Fair"
During the interview, Eugenio Balari's secretary twice served us coffee, even
though Balari had earlier explained to me that Cuban coffee had to be reserved
exclusively for export. "We must take advantage of the increase in world prices
to earn foreign currency." Privilege? He turned on his television set. It
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was a color set. Privilege? Balari smiled: "Th~ socialist society is not
fair, but it is fairer than capitalism. We are not an equalitarian society."
Wages in Cuba range from 85 pesos to 700 pesos per month. The prices of rationed
products have not changed since 1962 and represent 30 percent of total consump-
tion. The sale of nonrationed ("free-purchase") items at normal prices, and
the sale of such items as tobacc~ and alcohol, classed as "unnecessary," at
. very high prices, are an attempt to make the market show a profit.
, But the port of Havana with some 25. Soviet cargo ships always loading or
unloading, and the dignified and long-faced delegations of experts from the
East that soberly applaud the Tropicana C1ub's frenzied revue, are all indi- _
cations of the ''act that the Cuban economy is condemned to follow a one-way
street: 80 percent of its trade is with socialist countries, most of it in
rubles. "We are not in the hands of the Soviet Union," protested a Cuban
Communist Party member. "They are our true friends. They are not to blame for
~ the American blockade." Yet the young woman running the Paseo Marti newsstand
burst out laughing when I asked her whether the magazines--LA MUJER SOVIETICA
[The Soviet Woman]--piled up 3n front of her were Cuban. Other than the daily
~;RANMA and the organ of the Communist Youth Organization JUVENTUD REBELDE,
~:he only periodicals available on the newsstands are FOREIGN TRADE IN THE
USSR IN 1978, or in 1979.
Slogans can be seen again and again on walls: "We have been, we are, we shall
be optimistic." "What do sacrifices matter when the fate of a people is
, involved." Nowhere are there pictures of the "maximum leader," but those of
Jose Marti, and especially, of "Che," are everywhere.
Mambo of Nostalgia
Nights in Cuba are quiet and somewhat dull. They do not have the excitement of
the tropics. On Saturday nights, home-made flouncy dresses or lacy short-
sleeve shirts for men crowd the streets for a few hours until the 0200
"guagua." Only the Cubans from Miami continue carousing in the clubs for
tourists: chewing gum and wearing flowery hats, they spend their last few
dollars while dancing the mambo of nostalgia.
With ~astro's authorization, they have been coming to Cuba on charter flights
from the United States, for the past 6 months. The 10-day family package
tour:l cover air transportation, hotels, and access to special stores. The
lobb~ies of Havana's four deluxe hotels are the~scene of tearful reunions,
and fans bought with good U.S. dollars change hands. "These tours are not
simply a good-hearted gesture on Castro's part," a Frenchman living in Cuba
coramented derisively. "The 'Separated Families' program must have yielded
Cuba 100 millioti dollars."
During the week, Havana resembles a provincial city that is asleep by 2000.
A few persons drag their chairs out onto the sidewalk so as to enjoy the cool
o_~ the evening. There is no noise. A few youths pass by looking for cigarettes.
Everyone is well-mannered.
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An old communist gentleman proudly pointed out to me: "Look around you. Here
you will find none of Latin America's colorful beggars and prostitutes."
In a yard, a car raised on wooden blocks and ar. old man working on the motor; ~
on the wall behind him there was one of the very few pictures of Fidel I~aw
in Havana. Close by was La Bodequita del M~dio, Hemingway's old bar and a
former �avorite hangout of all leftist intellectuals. When i visited there,
it was full of laughter, embraces, and music. Alvarez, the owner before the _
RPVOlution, has be~ome the Bodequita's "public relations man." Government
off~.cials meet in this small cellar and continue to read and reread the graffiti
placed on its walls back in the days when men gathered here and dreamt of
revolution while drinking their "mojitos." "Now it's an accomplished fact,"
a woman told me with a tinge of nostalgia in her voice.
"We Have Only Our Conscience"
~ Uutside the Bodequita everything was quiet. Here, a former bank now closed;
there, a former brothel now converted into a CDR (Committee for the Defense
of the Revolution) office. On each street in Havana, lights burning brightly
and wide open doors indicate the block CDR. Unarmed men and women patrol the
streets every night. Each Cuban performs one night of guard duty per month.
Women take the 2300 to 0200 shift and men get the 0200 to 0500 duty.
"We have no weapons," emphasized David Duran, a member of the CDR`s national
directorate. We have only our eyes, our voice, and our conscience." Some
80 percent of all persons over 14 years of age are members of the CDR. Its
offices, decorated with ~uban flags, cover the entire country like a web:
One office per street in the cities and one per every eight houses in the
countryside. The CDR's perform all kinds of tasks. They handle preparations
for elections, distribute bags of cement for the repair of houses, administer
~accine, and organize blood donors for the hospitals. They also handle other
"matters," because when I asked a Cuban journalist whether the CDR system did
not inordinately hamper him, he told me: "Not significantly. For instance,
as~ume that I like to live with several women. The CDR on my street will
probably report it, but that will change nothing. It's not Frohibited."
He laughed and added: "Besides, my turn will come when it's r,iy night to pull
guard." Everyone checks and reports on everyone.
Yet those persons known here as "bandits," in other words those who have no
"conscience," also exist. To realize this, one need merely listen to Eduardo's
c~mplaint: "Before the Revolution, it was money that gave a person everything.
N~w, it's cronies and the party. If you have a good position, are in high
'3vor, you get cement, you get a house, if not..." He then told me stories
about bunches of bananas that are hung in the offices of supervisory personnel
in the factories, and about trucks loaded with contraband vegetables that
stop in front of fashionable homes. Yet, oddly enough, he concluded his
denunciation by assuring me that he, unlike others, was a true revolutionist
"and even the son of a martyr."
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Before leaving Cuba, I was able to visit the Lenin School. Its students are
indeed sons and d~ughters of Castroism. This school is only a short distance
outaidp Havana and resembles the most fashionable English achool anyone could
poseibly,imagine: lawns, fountains, awimming pools, airy classrooms, and
shade. Sonia Romero Alfan, the principal, described the scale model of her
school with all the pride of the head of a large firm: "Here we train future
revo,iutionists in behalf of the Revolution," she explained. The Lenin School
is a boarding school. Students wear a uniform consisting of a Pioneer scarf,
whiCe shirt, and blue pantsor skirt. They enter this secondary school at
age 11. To be admitted, a student must have an academic average of 90 to
95 percent and be rated as a"good Pioneer." A very neatly dressed you.r.g _
girl served as my guide though the school's museum of national history. Out-
. side the museum, a group of 12-year old guitarists were spiritly sin,ging
"Fidel came down from the mountain." In workshops attached to the sc~ool,
students assemble radio sets or operate sewing machines while others work in
the vegetable gardens surrounding the school.
Model Children
The principal explained that "students are required to do 2 hours and 15 minutes
of production work per day. At a general assembly held each month, they
f.amiliarize themselves with labor union organization and procedures and analyze _
the results of their work." The radio sets made at the Lenin School are sold
in Havana, the sports clothes produced there are worn by the students, and the
vegetables grown in the school gardens supply the school cafeteria. Every
Saturday, 39 shuttle buses take the 4,500 students back to Havana.
These model children will all eventually attend the University of Havana.
The latter is housed in a huge building in the center of the city. It is a
rather strange sight to anyone familiar with the variegated and loquacious
Western universities from Berkeley to Bologna: bare, dreary walls like those
surrounding a factory, not a single poster, and no graffiti whatever. Appar-
ently 20 years of age is not the age of revolt in this university.
Conference of Nonalined Countries
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 1 Sep 79 pp 46-47
[Article by Branko Lazitch: "Wolf in the Sheepfold"J
[Text] One of the many ironies of this waning decade is the fact that the
Sixth Conference of--so-callsd--Nonalined Countries is meeting in the capital
which--along with Hanoi--is no doubt the one most completely alined with
Moscow. I refer, of course, to Havana.
What exactly, in fact, are the nonalined countries supposed to be? The idea
of nonalinement emerged during the Cold War at a time when several countries
rejected having to side with either the American or Soviet bloc. The leaders
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of those countries included some of the period's strongest political per-
sonalities, Nehru, Sukarno, Nasir, Nkrumah, and Tito, all of whom are now dead `
except one. Since its foundation, the international movement of nonalined
countries has made considerable progress. It has'become larger as evidenced �
by the steady increase in the number of nations attending the movement's
succeasive conferences.
Crazy-Quilt Assemblage
There were 25 countries represented at the first conference in Belgrade in 1961,
47 couniries at the second conference in Cairo in 1964, 53 members and 9
observers at the third in Lusaka, 75 delegations and 23 observers at the
fourth in Algiers in 1973, and 86 full-fledged member countries plus 22
observers at the fifth conference in Colombo in August 1976. As for the
sixth conference about to open in Havana on 3 September, some 100 delegations -
are expected to attend, not to mention some 15 observers, including such
Western developed countries as Switzerland and Sweden. In addition, seven
countries are requesting admission to the movement: Pakistan, Iran, Surinam,
Grenada, D~ibouti, Bolivia, and since the end of Ju1y, Nicaragua.
- There is no denying that the nonalined movement has always been more anti-
Western than anti-Soviet. Most of its member countries are former colonies of
Western powers. Moreover, the main thruat of their economic development and
diplomacy is formulated through the interplay of their everyday relations
with those same powers. Hence, in reaction, the prominent role of such
pointedly Soviet sympathizers as Boumediene or Qadhdhafi, who b~came~the new
"stars" of the nonalined countries, after the two major Arab-Israeli wars
and the start of the oil crisis. Hence also tY?e increasingly pro-Soviet
shift that characterized Indira Gandhi's gover~~ment. Nevertheless, the
international movement of nonalined counLries, though quite a crazy quilt,
remained approximately true to its basic principle of not falling into a
state of unconditional allegiance to one of the two blocs, and of never swelling
the ranks of those countries that are mere satellites of the Soviet Union.
Tito Detects Danger
It is evident, however, that Cuba is no longer simply a neutral country having
special or preferentiai ties with the Soviet Union. Cuba is a genuine Soviet
satellite. In any case, there has no longer been any doubt about its satellite
staus since 1968 when Castro spectacularly took a position in favor of the
S~viet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia. Cuba is an economic and political
s3tellite (see Hugh Thomas' article [translated above]). Cuban intelligence
;encies and secret police are under the control of Soviet agencies, both with
respect to internal repression as well as foreign intelligence. Lastly, and _
above all, Cuba is also a Soviet military satellite. An alarming element has
been added to the international picture over the past 4 years by Cuba's warlike
military operations conducted on behalf of the USSR in Africa, and even in
South Yemen, and by the ~~ery recently reported presence in Cuba of a Soviet
jungle guerrilla-warfare training brigade.
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Cat's-Paw
If, after all this, Cuba continues to be conaidered nonalined, then the move- ~
ment of nonalined countries will henceforth have license to serve as cat's-paw
for Soviet exp~nsionism and the Soviet Union's spirit of conquest. This
prospect is especially dangerous in that the conference's host country retains,
as is customary, chairmanship o~ the movement until the next suumnit that will
not convene until 1982. Thus for the n~xt 3 years Castro will be able to con-
veniently shape and manipulate the movement of nonalined countries according
to the Soviet Union's global ob~ectives.
Tito detected this danger. Whenever it comes to sniffing an attempt to pack
a movement or conference in favor of Moscow, his sense of smell has been
- unerring for more than 30 years. Furthermore, he considers himself the
custodian of the legitimacy of the movement whose central figure hP was for
many years. As we mentioned earlier, th~e other "greats" of the nonalined
movsment are dead. Consequently Tito feels he is entrusted with the mission
of defending their legacy.
The old marshal, who is now over 87, took the matter in hand. He had himself _
appointed chairman of the Yugoslav committee charged with making preliminary
preparations and, therefore, with counting the votes of the countries that
will be present in Havana. He made two extensive trips to countries scheduled
to attend the conference. One trip was to the Middle East, the other in the
Mediterra~nean basin.
Both trips were successes in his offensive designed to counter Cas~tro's bid
for supremacy. Th~e leaders with whom Tito spoke were thereby put on guard
against the Cuban leader's intentions. On the other hand, when Marshal Tito
visited Moscow in an effort to dissuade Leonid Brezhnev from his intention
to manipulate Castro within the movement of nonalined countries, this
negotiation failed. Leonid Brezhnev refused to repudiate Fidel Castro and
curb his activities.
Castro, for his part, has not remained inactive. For several months now,
his emissaries Yiave been visiting the 87 countries that are currently members
of the nonalined movement.
- At the same time, delegations invited to Cuba are being received by Fidel
Castro and his lieutenants who tirelessly attempt to indoctrinate these
visitors.
The Cubans argue~th~t there is a division within the nonalined movement
between the "progressives"--a label Castroites bestow on themselves--and the
others, in other words, Tito and his friends. PRENSA LATINA, the official
Cuban press agency, has of late frequently stigmatized "certain theoreticians~~
who are attempting to set the nonalined countries against the socialist camp.
GRANMA, the official Castroite daily, has followed suit by, in turn denouncing
~ "certain theoreticians of the nonalined movement who are playing into the hands
of American imperialists."
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Situation Becomes Complicated
According to Castro, nonalined countries must determine their acti.on on the
basis of four criteria: anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, antineocolonial-
~ ism, and antiracism. These ~imgle principles ~ustify the indictment of one
superpower, �:he United States, tcao former c~lonial powers, Great Britain and
France, and three "agents of iMperialism and racism," Israel, Rhodesia,
and South Africa. This situation becomes complicated, however, due to the
fact that Cuba and its friends demand that communist China also be denounced.
And this confusion reaches its peak when the Havana government insists that
its own military interventions in Africa must be considered compatible with -
nonalinement, and likewise Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia.
At all events, one certainly does emerge from all this: the equivocation of a
"nonalined Castro," already transparent at the Colombo conference, is no longer
defensible today. Hence the Sixth Conference of Nonalined Countries is a
decisive turning point.
How many of these countries will accept Cuba's claim and chairmanship as a `
nonalined country? How many will re~ect this claim and chairmanship? Will
there be a split? The movement's very significance and its political future
will depend on the answer to these three questions.
Cuban Presence in Africa
Pari~ L'EXPRESS in French 1 Sep 79 pp 48-49
[Article: "Cubans in Africa"]
[Text] From the battle maps in his Havana headquarters, Fidel Castro followed
che advance of his troops in Angola. He had not slept for days. The expression
on his face betrayed his voiceless anxiety. The first contingents of "barbudos"
who had been airlifted to Angola 3 weeks earlier--11 November 1975--were now
supported by mechanized units. The "maximum leader" maintained permanent
communication with the Angolan high command. The smallest locality and slight-
est terrain irregularity in that part of Africa were known to him by heart.
Cuba had just exported its soldiexs for the first time.
It was in the secrecy of the Palace of the Revolution on 5 November 1975
that Castro made his decision, with Moscow's approval, to dispatch an
e}peditionary force to Luanda. This intervention was designated "Operation
C:~rlota," the name of a slave who led an uprising against the Spanish
c,:cupier in the 19th centur.y. Some 48 hours later, the first contingent
left Havana by air. The long-range Antonov transport aircraft made service
stops at Barbados in the Caribbean, in Guinea-Bissau, and in the Congo. At
the same time, cargo ships--their holds crammed with arms--transported Cuban
brigades to Angola in 3 weeks. The Colombian writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez
related how "on some days there were so many Cuban ships in the Bay of Luanda
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that President Agostinho Neto, upon counting them from his window, was ~
assailed by a feeling of shame and said to one of his friends, a government
official: 'It's not fair. At this rate, Cuba will�ruin itself!"'
It was the West, however, that was to suffer the losses. The United States,
par3lyzed by it3 presidentia? ~dmpaign and its Indochinese experience, could
only deplor~-with resignation-~-the formidable Soviet-Cuban bluff. China had
backed, with the "imperialists," the wxong side, the FNLA [National Front
for the Liberation of Angola], so--humiliated--it quietly withdrew. The
South African Army column, caught in the "bush," was mortified and retreated.
The field was now cleared, so Moscow and Havana occupied it and in the
upheaval raised a Marxist regime to power.
Henceforth nothing would be the same as before. The Angolan shoclc wave shook
the continent from Bizerte to Cape Town.
This victory was the fruit of 20 years of effort during which Cuba never
stopped patiently spinning its web. Who still remembers how Ctie Guevara
tirelessly trekked through Zaire and the Congo, a notebook in his pocket,
making a topographical survey of the territories he crossed? Africans had
nicknamed him "Armadillo" by analogy with that small toothless, tropical-
region mammal that can curl itself up into a ball to protect itself.
But the hero of the Sierra raaestra was to meet a tragic death in October 1968
while leading a Bolivian gue.rrilla band. His death dashed, for a time, the
hopes of a revolutionary upr.ising in Latin America, and also any reinforce-
ment of the armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies of Africa. It would
> take several more years befare Castro--"having seen all the harm capitalism,
colonialism, and imperialism have inflicted on a large part of mankind
started dreaming anew about transplanting his revolution.
"Operation Carlota would serve as a test. While moderate Africa cried wolf,
progressive Africa, in contrast, expressed sat3.sfaction, as Mozambique's
Samora Machel did at noting that "countries of the socialist bloc are showing
tt~eir solidarity with the anti-imperialist countries of the Third World."
Stony Ogaden Desert Region
As the Warsaw Pact`s spearhead and the Soviet Union's proxy from 1975 to 1979,
Cuba sealed new alliances, armed peoples in search of liberation, and ~
strengthened its already existing ties. Some 42,000 to 45,000 Cubans are
on the African continent at th,~ present time. At least 18 couztries--see
map below--have signed civil and military cooperation agreements with Havana.
Two of these countries--one on the South Atlantic (Angola), the other on the
Red Sea (Ethiopia)--profess to be the vanguard of an ideological dismember-
ment of the Black Continent. Cuba.was, nevertheless, obliged to pay a stiff
price for its 1975 and 1977 intervention in those two countries: hundreds of
dead and wounded in the Angolan swamps, and nearly as many in the stony
Ogaden desert region during the Somali-Ethiopian conflict.
~ 21
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How can a small country of 9.5 million people, subjected to the American
blockade since 7_961, possibly sustain such an "export" effort without some
gnashing of teeth? Soviet aid is not the complete answer.
'We naed volunteers determined to do their internationalist duty. Those who
agree to volunteer, raise your hand." Members of the CDR's--Committee for
the Defense of the Revolution--that cover villages and city neighborhoods like
a net, muster young men of military age at their places of work. The ''vol-
- unteers" fill out a 1-year enlistment form and undergo 10 we~ks of special
training. They are given absolutely no information about their overseas
destination. A Cuban deserter, Lieutenant Manuel de Quesada Caballero, 33,
admitted: "They never told me where I was going to fight, but I assumed it
was somewhere in Africa."
A person must have cogent reasons--illness, death of next of kin, large family--
to 3ustify his refusal to volunteer. Article 12 of the Cuban Constitution
categorically states: "Cuba is a socialist state that embraces the principles
of proletarian internationalism." Helping those peoples fighting for. their
liberation is a right. To be more exact, it is a duty.
Yet this has not prevented the Cubans--in the name of prol~tarian inter-
nationalism--from combating the Eritrean rebellion which only yesterday they
were supporting unreservedly. "Romanticism is quite out of place today,"
Somalia's Siad Barre told us in denouncing the Soviet-Cuban "conspiracy" in
Africa.
In any case, "Operation Carlota" has left deep traces behind it on the African
contintent, the new arena of East-West rivalry. "In my opinion," Fidel Castro
told the American reporter Barbara Walters, "all Africa will be socialist.
It will be so because there is no other alternative."
Almost every night--discretion so requires--activity quickens at Havana's
airport as "volunteers" depart to relieve their comrades in Ethiopia,
Anbola, Mozambique, Tanzania, or elsewhere. They are unaware of their
specific destination.
Key:
1. Guinea: 200 military advisers, 220 civilian technicians.
2. Mali: 6 civilian technicians
3. Algeria: 74 civilian technicians & military advisers
4. Libya: 243 civilian technicians & military advisers
S. Guinea-Bissau: 80 military advisers, 60 civilian technicians
6. Ethiopia: 15,000-17,000 soldiers, 1,000-1,200 civilian technicians
7. Cape Verde: 8 civilian technicians (doctors)
, 8. South Yemen: 5,000-6,000 soldiers
9. Sierra Leone: 150-200 military advisers
10. B u rundi: some 100 civilian technicians
11. Benin: 20 security advisers, 17 civilian technicians
22
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