JPRS ID: 8705 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100014-4
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• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORTS

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lA OCT06ER i9T9 CFOUO 27lT9) i OF i
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.1PRS L/8705
10 Octobar 1979
U SSR Re ort
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS -
. ~ cFOU~ 27~79~ ~ ~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8705
10 October 1979 ~
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 27/79) -
CONTENTS PAGE
Pamphlet on Nlilitary Discipline '
(VOINSKAYA DISTSIPLINA, 1977) 1 .
Party Organization in the MilitaY�y Collective .
(PARTTYNAYA ORGANIZATSIYA V VOINSKOM KOLLEKTIVE, 1977)....� 5
Soviet Comments on U.S. Air Force and Aircraft
(ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Apr 79) 20
Improved Airborne Command Posts, by B. Grigor'yev
Phantom Aj.rcraft Construction Program, by I. Alekseyev
Pilotless Aircraf t Capabilities, by I. Chistyakov
Soviet Courtnents on U.S. Laser Weapon Development 31
(B. Romanov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, May 79).���
Sov:Let Comments on Protection Against Neutron Weapons 36
(G. Ivanc~vy ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, r~y 79).....
Sov:tet CoII~ents on NA'PO Fighter-Bomber Tactics
(B. Khluxiovskiy; ZAFUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
May 79) 42
Sov:tet Comments on NATO Early Warning Aircraft 51
(V. Kirillov; 'LARUBE;ZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, May 79)...
_ a_ [III - US5 R- 4 FOUO]
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PAMPHLET ON MTLITARY DISCIPLINE
Moscow VOINSKAYA DISTSIPLINA (Military Discipline) in Russian 1977 signed
to press 22 Dec 77 pp l, 2, 3-6, ~+6-47, k8
[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction and Conclusion from the book
by A. I. Zarubin, Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF SSSR, k0,000 copies, ~+8 pages]
[Text] [Annotation] In a populax form and using vivid exampl.es the pamphlet
shows the role of discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces and its significance
for the combat readiness of the troops. . ~
The pamphlet is designed for preinduction youth and servicemen.
Contents
page
A Word to i;he Reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Discipline---The Basis of Militarf Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
You Will G~ To A Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Is This Di:~ficult? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11~
You and th~ Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
'?Yes Sir!" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
~Stea.dfastn~ss, Courage and Vigilance--The Manifestation of Discipline. 24
Honesty, Self-Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
There Are No Minor Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
~rOne for All..." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3~+
Prepare for Military Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Tempered Like Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A Letter to the Reader
Young friend! You at present are in scliool or working~ Tn the morning you
go off to school or a vocational-tecfinical school, to the ~lant or to the
fields. You 1.isten to your teachers, you work at the machine or drive a
tractor, plowir:~ the land for the future crop. ~n the evening you head with
1
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your comrades to the n;oviec, to the stadium or c1ub, you x~ad a book, you
watr.ki telEVision or study in a DOS,A,AF circle.
Along with millions of Soviet persons oP tfie older generations and your
coni'rers, you participate in the li~'e of our great sociali5t,motherland,
and you are build.ing a beau~l:if ul society which is unprec~dented in the
hisi;ory of mankind, communism.
And of course, in the flow of' various concerns, of lar~re and m~inor consider-
ations you certainly will rememh~r the day when you must leave for mili~tary
service. This necessity is dictated by ~he fact that our people must build
a communist s~ciety under the conditions of the surviving danger of mil.itary
attack from ti~~ imperialistso ~
Our party has steadfastly a;zd consistentl,y carried Ollt ~YlE policy o~' peace
proclai~ed by the great Lenin. We are creatin~ new plan~;s and factor~.es~
power plants and oil fields, nurseries and schools, we are buildin~ enor-
mous cities, we are draining swamps, laying roads and growing gardens in
order that the life of the people may become even richer and more beautiful.
But our enemies are inventing new weapons systems, t~,nd they are a11oc~,ting
fantastic amounts of money to equip and train their armies in order to d~-
stroy all of this.
~
The workers of the entire world look with pride and inspiration at our peopJe
as the pioneers of communism, they see in the Soviet nation the ~uture of
human soci~ty and draw strength and inspiration in our history Por ~ighting
for their :Liberation from the rule of capital. But~~h~ imperial.ists, in
fearing that the sparks of ~~ur revolutionary fire will ~ump to their roofs,
shok~er the country of Great October in a flood of lies and slander, and en-
deavor by ~ny means to dist~~rt and defame the very idea of corranunism and to
maintain the degrading system of exploitation.
The imperic~,lists have endeavored by fire an3 sword to return our nat~.on tr~
the camp o:� imperialism. They sent hordes of interventionists armed ~to the
teeth to st,ifle Soviet power during the first days oY i.ts establis~ment.
They repeatedly endeavored to instigate military actions against the Soviet
nation during the years of the.fir~t five-year plans, but always received
a proper rebuff from our valorous.Armed Forces. On 22 June 191+1, tY~e German
fascists committed a treacherous attack on the Soviet country, in aiming at
destroying and enslaving our people. The most rabid antico~nunists at pres-
ent would do this with great satisfaction i~ they did r~ot f~ar that tlie war
instigated by them would end as the previous one did, and.would not be the '
last page :in the bloody.hist,ory oF imperialism.
The Soviet Army and Navy axe a powerful factor for ensuring th~ peace and
security of our motherland, the creative labor of the Soviet people, and ~
a,re a guarantee for peace on the earth. '
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The military mi~ht and invincibility o~' ow^ Armed Forces are based upon
people, th~� Sovi.~t soldiers whom our people haye ax~med with ~'i.rst rate
wea~~ons anr3 equipment, they halre provided all the conditions for training
and labor, and Y~ave provided all that is necessary ~'or successfully carry-
, ing out th~ responsible tasks.confronting them. One of the greatest pat-
terr,s in tize orga:~izational development of the Soviet Army and Navy has
beer. the periodic replacement of their personnel. While the officers and
warr�ant off~cers ["praporshchik," "michman"] serve an extended time in the ~
army, the basic mass of servicemen, the youth, serve only 2-3 years. Having
serv~ed the time stipulated for them under the Law Governing Universal
Military Service, they return to peaceful labor. And their place is taken
by other yc~ung men . ~
In f'ollowitig this pattern your turn will come to serve in the Armed Forces,
and to defend your motherland with weapons in hand. "To defend the father-
land," stat~s Article 133 of the Soviet Constitution, "is the sacred duty '
of each So~riet citizen."
The interests of successful communist construction demand that you serve
honestly and conscientiously, and be constantly ready to engage the aggres-
sors and c7�ush them. In order to meet these requirements, you must ~how a
feeling of profound respons:~bility for military duties, understand all the
importance of a soldier's duty, you must have a perfect knowledge and ex-
pertly coni~rol the wea~pons and military equipment assigned to you, and be
flawlessly disciplined and organized. And you must always remember that
while on m:ilitary service you are personally responsible for the fate of the
motherland,
The Soviet military, like the previous generations of the defenders of the
motherland, night and day, in the surmner heat and winter cold, vigilantly
and constaritly stand the difficult and responsible service of the defenders
of the peac:e and happi:~ess of their people, and are constantly ready to
thwart the evil plans of the enemies. Many of the soldiers are outstanding
men, class specialists and masters of their job. With a feeling of profound
responsibi~.ity, as true Soviet patriots they spare neither their forces nor
their time in masterin~ the complex art of modern combat. And precisely
such soldiF~rs--the outstandi.ng men and class specialists--comprise the might
of ou~ army and are th~ trut continuers of the heroic traditions of the
Soviet ArmF:d Forces.
You in your~ time will replace them and will carry out their duties. ~'or
this reason even now i~t would be good for you to know more about the army
and of the proce3ures :instituted in it.
From the pamphle~t offered here you will learn of Soviet military discipline
and of the dema.nds�which it places on servicemen.
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[ Con.cludint; Word. ]
You have tlie good.fortune to live 3n si~nificant times~ Under the 'leadex-
shig of th~~ Leninist C~mznuni.st Party, the 5oviet people are success~ully
building a covunur.ist soc;ie~y. ~ Our. nation is becom,ing ever richer and more
powerful, +~.nd it~ ini;~rnstional pr~sti~e is ever higher. It has become tlie
social vanE;uarci ox, nt~,nYind and the bulwark o.f liberty and peace on the
earth. ~
The peace-loving policy of our part,y and tlie Soviet government has won re-
markable vic~;ories over tlle imp~rialist reac~;ion. The carrying out of the
historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress will raise our motherland to
new heig~its o.f. ma~terial and social progress, and will make the life of our
people even better, inore b~auti~l..and happier.
In buildin~ communism, we, i~owever, shouid not forget that in the imperic~.7.ist
camp there still are active r~.nd inPluential forces which find our successes
not to their lik.ing.. Blinded by hate for coiranunism, they do not see and do .
not want to see the re~,l~?t3es of the modern world. These forces are doing
everything to impede the process of the normalization of relatiions between
the two world system5, and to attempt to halt ~:he historically irreversible
socialist transformation of human soci.ety. Precisely they inspire and sup-
port world counterrevolution, by various methods �t,hey endeavor to undermine
progressive movements, they are i:ncreasing the military budgets and are con-
tinuing the arms race wliich is onerous for the peoples.
No one can be certain that at some ~nom~nt these aggressive forces will not
endeavor tc~ put the weapons to use and turn back the wheel of history. Their
weapons exzst, and in.large amounts. And as yet they do not wish to abandon
their production but on th~ contrary allocate enormous amounts of money for
this.
Our Armed Forces are de~ending tTi~ peace and security of pcoples. This is
now their noble mission and their purpose. Tn order that they can success-
fully carr~r out this mission, each 5oviet soldier must profoundly understand
his calling, his duty ~to the motherland and all working mankind.
You are a f.utu.re soldier! ~1nd when you wi11 be called into the army, try ~
as quickly as possible to b~come a skillful, courageous fighter who terri- ~
fies the enemy. Let your filial love fbr the Soviet fatherland, your un- ,
flinching Ioyalty to our coiarnunist ideas, your personal unswerving loyalty
to the military oath be for you a sout~ce of inspiration in your glorious
military servicel ~
COPYRIGHT: TZDATEL'STJO DOSAA'F SSSP~, 1977
10272 ~ �
CSO: 1801
~
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pARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE MILITARY COLLECTIVE
Moscow PARTIYNAYA ORGANIZATSIYA V VOINSKOM KOLLEK'fIVE (The
Yarty Organization in the Military Collective) in Russian 1977
signed to press 9 Aug 77 pp~1, 49-50, 51, 113-114, 115,
163-164, 165, 237-238, 239, 270-271, 272, 303, 304, 343-344,
345-347 ;
:
[Annotation, table of contents, introduction, conclusion
and excerpts from chapters 1-7 of book by LtGen M. G. Sobolev,
Voyenizdat, 35,000 copies, 349 pages; 2nd Rev and Exp Ed]
L~'ext~ Based on concrete examples, the author reveals
the substance, forms and methods of the work of Armed Forces
party organizations; he acquaints us with their special
features and shows the role of communists in mobilizing all
personnel to accomplish tf~e decisions of the 25th CPSU
Congress and the requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense
on increasing the combat readiness of elements, units and
ships in every way possible.
The book is intended for.a broad group of active~party
members among commander.s, political officers, students
and officer trainees of Armed Forces educational institutions.
Contents Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 1. The Party's Combat Detaehment 7
1.1. The CPSU's Leadership is the Alpha and~Omega 9
1.2. A Little History , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 16
1.3. In the Spirit of.the~Requirements of the
CPSU Manual . . , . . . . , , , . , , , , . . . 30
1.4. Along with the One-Man Commander 40
Chapter 2. In the Party's Formation . . . . . , . , . . S1
2.1. Firm Discipline and Widespread�Democracy 52
2.2. Unanimity in Opinion and Action , . . . , . , , . 61
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rox o~~lcxa~~ us~ ornY '
2.3. The Part,v Opens its Doors to the WorChy 68
2.4. Tempering in Practical Work . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.5. The School of Political Education 90
2.6. Setting Fiigh Standards and Mutual Snsistence
on Standar3s ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2. 7 ~ Decided--Done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Chapter 3. The NucZeus of the Military Collective 115
3.1. ~dith the Men, in Their vanguard . . . . . . . . . 116
3.2. Communists in t:he Company . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.3. The CoZlective Begins with Discipline 134
3.4. Based on th.e I,aws of the New Morali~y 141
3.5. Indoctrination in the Process of Military Labor . 151
� 3.6. The Organizer:: of Socialist Competition Z55
Chapter 4. Under Various Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.1. With the Missilemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.2. In the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.3. At Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.4. In the Air and on the Ground 194
4. S . On Alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Q1
4.6. In the Headquarters and Directorates 210
4.7. Where Regular Servicemen are Forged 217
4.8. In the Interest of Scientific and Technological
Progress in Militar~~ Affairs . . . . . . . . . . 223
4.9. At Military Enterprises and Construction Sites. . 228
Chapter 5. On the Ide~logical Front . . . . . . . . . . . 239 ~
5.1. The Most ImpoT-tant Party Job . . . . . . . . . . 240
5.2. Ideological Steeling of Communists 249
5.3. Promoting the Ideas of Communism 258
5.4. A Comprehensive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Chapter 6. The Party Organization and the Komsomol. ~ 272
6.1. The Strength of the Komsomol is in Party
Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
6.2. The Central Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'l86
6.3. A High Level of Efficiency in Komsomol Work 293
Chapter 7. At the Head of Party Organizations 304
7.1. Efficiently, Concretely~ with a Knowledge
of the Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
7.2. Collective Leadership,�Personal Responsibility. . 316
7.3. The Political Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
7.4. Along with the Party Organization 332
7.5. The Political Department and the Party
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345.
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Introduc~ion
The 25th CPSU Congress was a prominent politica'L event in modern
times. As the Soviet c:itizen conducts an in-depth study of the
decision~ of the Congress, and primarily the report of L. I.
Brezhn~v, general secretary of the party Central Committee,
"Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's
Immediate Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy"--all party
organizations use the principles and conclusions of this
report as a guide in their work on a daily basis--he becomes
more clearly aware of the ma~estic program of communist
construction which was adopted at the forum of Soviet
communists.
The successful realization of the task planned by the party
congress in the area of foreign policy, the economic, social
and cultural development of our society, the communist indoc-
trination of the Soviet people and strengthening the nation's
defense capability is inseparably linked to the future
strengthening of the CPSU and to an increase in the level
of activity and independent action of the party organizations.
= The new USSR constitution, which was developed under the
leadership of the CPSU and its Central Committee, reflects
the historic accomplishments of the Soviet people during
the years of Soviet rule; it provides a detailed description
of the rnle and place of the CPSU in our nation; the CPSU
is the leading and directing force in Soviet society, the
nucleus c~f its political system and al~ governmental and
public o.rganizations.
The CPSU is fihe proven collective leader of our nation, the
inspirat:ton and organizer of all its victories. No matter
where the Soviet peopl~: are located, they always feel its
wise leaciership and its benefieial, educational influence
everywhe~re. Based on the decisions, plans and appeals of
the CPSU, the material basis for communism is being
created, socialist social attitudes are being developed
and improved and a new man is being molded and educated.
The party is directly organizing these creative processes
an.d it is guiding them both on a country-wide scale and
in all sectors where the new society is being created, right
down to the smallest industrial labor collectives and mili-
tary collectives.
Therefore, the large role that the primary party orgs:nizations,
which make up the foundation of the CPSU, play is understandable.
Their widespread network ericompasses practically.all the elements
of Soviet society. Our party presently includes~ more than 390,000
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primary ~~rganizations, over 400,000 shop organizations and
approximately 530,Od0 party groups. This j.s an enormous
force wh~tch the party r_ontinually relies on. The primary
party or~anizations inf~uence a11 apsects of the Soviet
people's lives and activities; they reach each person. It is
p�recisely through them tr.at the party carries out its policies
and decisions in localities, ensures that soclal and industrial
processes develop in the direction required, ensures the
approva.l of positive events and the elimination of negative
ones and educates and leads the masses forward.
As our suciety advances toward communism, the party's leading,
organizii7g ancl ideoiogical indoctrination role steadily increases;
this means that the requirements on its primary organizations
also increase. "Tne degree of party leadership," Comrade
L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in tihe CPSU Centrai Committee's
keynote address to the 25th Part_y Congress, "is directly
dependent upon how aggressively and independently the primary
party organizations operate--the organizations which make up
the foundation of our party.
"The primary party organizations are on the cutting edge of
economic and cultural development; they operate in the very
midst of the people. All their work actively promotes the
unity between the party's policy and the rich creai�ivity of
the masses and i~. promotes successful accomplishment of
economic, political and ideological indoctrination tasks."*
All of this completely applies to tne Armed Forces pa�rty
organiaations whi.ch make up the CPSU's combat detachment.
Through them, the party i5 firmly linked with themasses
of servicemen; through them, it indoctrinates, unites,
organizes and mobilizes Armed Forces personnel to successfully
accomplish combat and political training missions, to stand
duty in an exemplary manner, to maintain prescribed order
firmly, to steadily inc.rease force combat readiness and
combat capabilities and to strengthen our motherland's defense
capabilities. It is natural that, as the Soviet nation
moves toward communism, the development of the scientific
and tech~zological revo:lution--and the fundamental, qualitative
changes connected with it in ~ersonnel, weapons, organization,
combat t~raining methods, indactrination and a11 the Armed
Forces activities--increases the demands on primary party
organizations in the military collectives of elements, units
and ships, headquarters and directorates and various USSR
Ministry of Defense mi'litary establishments, educational
institutions, construction sites and enterprises. While
working under the leadership of polit~cal agencies, the
party organizations are called upon--together with the one-man
*"Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1976, p 67.
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com~nander�s--to actively promote timely and complete accomplish-
ment of the missioiis assigned to the Armed ForcE:s by the
CPS~U and the Soviet government.
The party vie~as the further ideological and organizational
str~ngthening of its organizations in the Armed Forces and
a f~irther inerease in-_their aggressiveness and militancy as
one of the criicial conditions for successful organizational
dev~lopment of the Soviet military, for maintaining a continuing,
hig:n level of combat readiness in the armed forces and for
, ensuring a durable peace and security for the Soviet people--
the builders of communism. As is well known, this was
reinforced in the party's prorram. "The CPSU's leadership
of the Armed Forces and the increased role and influence of
party organizations in the Armed Forces," it was written
in the program, "are the alpha and omega of mili.tary ~rgani-
zat:ional development."*
The CPSU Centr.al Committee again directed attention to this
in its Welcome to the Fifth Armed Forces Conference of
Party Organization Secretaries (1973). "...An increase in
the militancy of p~~rty organi2ations and in the aggressiveness
of ;311 communists is of special importance," this document
staLes." For this purpose, it is important that each party
organization is cotistancly concerned about increasing its
idealogical w~rk, steps forward as a supporter of everything
nPw and advanced, has an irrecuacilable attitude toward
def:iciencies and initiates socialist competition for outstanding
mastery of equipment and accomplishment of combat and political
missions."
The Armed Forces party organizations are firmly and persistently
implementin~ the party's policy and decisions. They are
ste;3dfastly increa~ing their aggressiveness and militancy.
The:ir activities ar.e based on the general principles of party
organization developed by V. I. Lenin and on the standards
and principles incl.uded in the CPSU Program and Manual. Every-
thing that the communist-servicem~�n do and everything they live
by :Ls inseparably, implicitly linked with the party's life and
with its revolutioriary activities, iraditions and future develop-
ment_.
At the same time, it must be taken into account that the party
org:iniaations in military collectives function under specific
conditions in the socialist state's Armed Forces which are called
*"KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh c"yezdov, konferentsii i
plenumov TSK" (The CPSU in Congress Resolutions and Decisions and
Central Committee Conferences and Plenums) (hereafter, "The CPSU
in..."), vol 8, Moscow, 1972, p~282.
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FOP. Or^Fl'CIAL US~, Oi~1Z~Y
I
upon to vf.gilantly protect and firmly defend the accomplishments ;
of Great OcCober, the honor, freedom and independence of the !
- Soviet motherland and USSR nationa7. interests. This explains ~
certain special features in the organ�izational strucLure of !
Armed Forces party organizations, the missicns ~.tacin~ them i
and their work methods and patC~rns. The special features .
under discussion were reflected :ta the Regulations on Political ;
Agencies and Instructions for CPSU Urganizations in the Soviet .
Armed Forces, which wer.e aporoved by the CPSU Central Committee.
These documents are of primary importance to Soviet Armed ;
Forces commanders, political agencies and party organizations. ~
How are thP party organizations set up in milit~ry collectives? ;
How do they live and work? What are the special features in
the structure of these party organizations and how do they ;
manifest themselves? What are the specific patterns and
methods of their activiti~s under various conditi,ons? How
do Armed Forces party organizations--under the Ieadership of ~ !
political agencies and in c.l-ose harmony with the one-man ;
commander--accomplish the missions assigned to the USSR Armed ~
Forces by the party and government? This book is devoted to l
these questions. ;
~
CHAFrER 1. TEE PARTY' S COMBAT DETACffi~IENT ;
~
~ExcerptJ The CPSU is the proven leader of o~zr nation. Its wise leader- ~
ship determines the success of the Soviet people in building ;
communism and strengthening our. motherland's foreign policy ~
positions. "The party's leading, mobilizing role," it was ~
pointed aut in the CPSi1 Central Committee's keynote address i
to the 2`ith Congress, "is not an abstract concept. It is ;
life itself; it is all our daily, practical experience."* ~
;
The CPSU leadership is the primary source of the Soviet Armed
Forces strength and military power. All issues of defense ~
of the socialist fatherland, of military organizational ;
development and of mili_tary theory and pr.actice are resolved !
in our country in compliance with the party's policy and
based on its instructions. Soviet ser.vicemen respond to ~
the party's steadfast concern for the development of the Armed ~
Forces with fervid, filial love for the CPSU anc3 its Leninist Central !
Committee. The most important mission for commanders, political i
agencies and party organizations is to further unite all ~
servicemen around the CPSU, indoctrinate them in a spirit of
endless cievotion to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and indoc- ~ j
trinate them in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist
internationalism. '
tk "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," pp 67-68. i
~
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The communists in the Armed Forces are our party's combat
detachme~it. The widespread network of party organizations--
which are organized in accordance with general party principles
and consideri.ng the special features of the mil:itary--ensures
their continual political influence in all military collectives.
However, the structure of party organizations and the administra-
tive and political patterns of their activities cannot be viewed
as something set down in concrete. On a daily basis, all Armed
Forces supervisory party agencies focus their attention on
developing and improving party organizations in accordance
- with the development of the party itself and in accordance
with the changes taking place in military organizational _
development and Armed Forces organization.
In close harmony with the one-man commander--in whose hands all
truop command functions are concentrated--political agencies and
pai~ty organizations organize their practical activities in
bu~.lding political cohesiveness among personnel and in indoc-
trinating servicemen in a spirit of endless devotion to the
motherland ar.d in a spirit of being ready to defend its
interests with. weapons in hand. Strengthening unity of command
in every way possible on a party basis and increasing the
inf'luence of politic~l agencies and party organizations--which
implement the party's policies in the Armed Forces along with
commanders--is a single process which ensures that personnel
of units and ships are trained at a level which meets con-
temporary requirements.
CHAPTII~ 2. IN THE PARTY'S FORMATION
i~
~xcerpt~ Exp~rience witri party organization activities within t he
_
Soviet A~rmed Forces testifies to the fact that the CPSU
is steadfastly conducting a policy to democratize party
organization intraparty affairs. Only in exceptional circum-
stances and during wartime has the party restricted intraparty
democracy in Armed Forces party organizations.
Military party organizations are called upon to continue
improvin~ intraparty relations. The problem is one of
freely discussing the tirgent problems of party policies and
practice, delegation and accountability of party agencies,
expandin~ the collective basis of party work and improving -
party information. "Ttie persistent development of intra-
party democracy and an increase in the standards levied on
each party member are Leninist principles," the CPSU Central
Committee's keynote address to the 25th party congress states,
"not a passing phase. They are the basis of party development
todaq."*
~ Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," Pp 64-65
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. _ '
The purity and strength of party organization ranks are very i
im~~ortant conditions for their combat capabilities. The
mi:;sion of Ar.med Forces political agencies and party organi- ~
zat:ions is to carry out the party's requiremex:.ts regulating I
replacements even more persistently and insistently. The
prc~blem is one of strictly ob~erving the principle of indivi- ;
dual selection and of accepting the best servicemen of the
leading professions into CPSU ranks--serviemen who occupy key
positions in carrying out the mis~ions of unit and ship combat i
readiness and who spare no efforts in selflessly accomplishing (
their military duties. At the same time, it is important to
systematically draw all communists into active party affairs ;
and to increase the role of various means of party influence ;
in this respect--individual and collective mean.s of influence, . ~
primarily party meetings--and it is important to make bxoader i
use of the proven indoctrination method of criticism and self- ;
criticism.
. ~
Persistent observance of the principles of democratic centraliam
and strict.compliance with the Leninist standards of party life
and the principles of party leadership are very important
directions for improving the party organization in the Armed '
Forces and they are powerful factors in increasing the initiative :
and creative activity of communist servicemen and the combat ~
capabilities of party or~anizations. ~
i
CHAFI.'ER 3. THE NUCLEUS OF THE MILITARY COLLECTIVE ,
~Ex.cerpts~ As already noted, party work in military collectives has certain ,
. _ _ . . . _ -
special l:eatures. However, this does not reduce the party
organizai:ions' role ancl responsibility for increasing the
quality and efficiency of party work and it does not limit
their in:ttiative and cr.eativity in the struggle to increase
the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. While working ;
in close harmony with commanders and their political ~
deputies, the party organizations are called upon to have ~
an active influence on all aspects of the life, combat train- :
ing and service vf personnel and to mobilize communists,
Komsomol members and all servicemen to accomplish the combat
training missions facing elements, units and ships.
Each party organization of an element, unit or ship becomes
strong by relying on the masses, uniting and indoctrinating :
them and developing their responsibility for the group's '
success. *:on-party activists are united around the party
organization. The more assistants the party organization i
has, the more successful its work will be and the more notice- '
able its influence will be on personnel in all the primary
areas of unit and ship life--combat and political training,
socialist competition and strengthening military discipline. ,
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WiCh the methods inherent in iC, the primary party organization
is called upon to achieve a situation where the communists and
all. members of the military collective work in harmony and
ste.adf.astly strive for the common goal.
Whe.n organizing party work in military collectives under modern
cor~ditons, it musC be remebered that educated and comprehensively
trained young adults are now coming into the Armed Forces. Part
of the young people are being drafted into the Armed Forces
. .
~ directly from schools and it is not easy for them to surmount
the difficulties of military service which has become a great
deal more complex. Naturally, the political and military
indoctrination of these replacements require higher skills
and more flexible forms of parCy intluence on personnel from
commanders and political officers. ~:i
While creatively usin~ the proven means of mass political
work and individua]_ work directed at molding and strengthening
- each military collective, party organizations are daily
achieving a situation where all servicemen, without exception,
are steadfastly implementing the historic decisions of the
~ 25th CPSU Congress, are selflessly carrying out their patriotic
and international duties, ar.e strictly observing the USSR
Constitution~ the requirements of Soviet laws and military
regulations and the standards of communist morality and
have a clear awareness that they have been assigned a respon-
sihle mission--defending the historic accomplishments of
Great October.
CHA.PTER . UND}~~t VAR TOUS CONDITIONS
~Ex~~erpt~ Party organizations are actively and produc~L:ively functioning
in all sectors and areas of Soviet military organizational
development. Their efforts are concentrated on accomplishing
the missions assigned to the USSR Armed Forces by the CPSU,
missions which, as is well known, are expanding in accordance
with the requirements of daily affairs: their scope is expanding
and the subject matter is becoming more complex. This means
that party organizations wi11 have to tirelessly increase
the quality and efficiency of their activities and they will
have to take a comprehpnsive approach to the ideological, poli-
tical, military, labor and moral indoctrination of .communists,
all servicemen and all Armed Forces blue and white collar ,
workers.
It is well known that work goes well when its purpose and
significance are clear to people. The better understanding
communists and all servicemen have of the importance and
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requirements for their work within the overall system of
en;suring superior combat capabilities and combat readiness
foi~ the Armed Forces, the greater their energy and aggressiveness
in accomplishing combat training missions. This is precisely :
whFit party organizations are called upon to achieve using the
methods inherent to them. .
In a regiment or on board ship, in a headquarters or ia a
dir.ectorate,in a military academy or in a military"school,
at a scientific research institute or in a medicaY institute, .
aC a construction site or at an enterprise--everywhere, by ~
pez~sonal example and in-depth explanatory work, communists are
called upon to continue to mobilize servicemen and blue and
whj.te collar workers to accompltsh the duties assigned to them
in an irreproachable manner, to work self]:essly with a high
degree of organization and di3cipline and to courageously
ovErcome the difficulties and obstacles on the path to achieving.
their goal.
ThE: affairs and activities of the party organizations in
mi2itary collectiv~es of the various services and branch arms ~
of the Armed Forces have their own special features. It is
not necessary to list them since they were discussed above.
It is only important to emphasize that party work has the
mo:~t noticeable results when it is organized with due reeard
fot- these special features and when it is based on an in-depth knowledge
of Armed Forces life, the missions being accomplished and
personnel needs and requirements. Moreover, it must be
remembered that these special features change and they are frequently ~
tr~insient in naC~ure. There~fore, a creative approach is
required in studying vital processes and ~vents, in organizing
par.ty work and in struggling to improve its quality and
efficiency.
In their multi-faceted activities, party organizations con-
sider the requirements of modern warfare and strive to achieve .
a situations where all commanders and chiefs organize personnel
trlining and indoctrination and have a clear understanding
of the enormous moral, physical and psychological trials which
the Soviet serviceman will encounter in modern combat and have
a clear understanding that it is necessary to prepare him to '
defend the Soviet motherland with a surfeit of endurance--
ideological, combat and moral. ~
The creative work o� communist servicemen and of everybody they
indoctrinate, organize aild lead stimulates new successes in
improving elements, units, ships and the Armed Forces as a whole
for combat. Like streams, t~ese successes flow into the mighty ,
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river of the achievements of the SoyieC people---the builde~s ~
of commuriism. Popular wisdom says that a drop is nothir.g--;
the wind blows ~.t away easily, the sun dries it out and thr-_
ground at,sorbs it. But, after combining .with a large number
~ of other drops, it becomes a sea and"there is no longer any
force which can destroy it. Thus, the military labor of
Soviet servicemen, labor which is directed at strengthening ~
the defense capability of the Soviet nation, flows 3.nto the
enormous stream of successes in building communism, successes
t~hich are being achieved by our people under the leadership of
the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee.
CHAPTER 5. ON THE IDEOLOGICAL FRONT
~Excerpt~ The goal of ideological work in the Armed Forces is to form
a scientific, Marxist-Leninist outlook in personnel and to
inculcatc~ in each serviceman: communist insight; unlimited -
devotion to the party, people and the Soviet motherland; a
feeling of friendship xor the people and socialist international-
ism; intelligent discipline and superior vigilance; an ability
to trans.ferm the political knowledge obtained into an active
life position to successfully carry out his military duties;
a readiness and ability to carry out his patriotic and inter-
national duty at any txme in a worthy manner~and to defend
Che historic accomplishments of socialism.
Party organizations are called upon to organize their indoc-
trination work so that each CPSU member and candidate member-- .
, no matter what post he occupies or where he is located--is ,
a messenger of the omnipotent Marxist-Leninist ideas and an
avid cha~pion of their impleme.ntation. The CPSU Manual
requires the communists to conduct an in-depth study of the
great teachings of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin and
CPSU pol:tcies and deci~ions, explain them to the toiling
masses and always set the�.example in implementing party ideals.
Based on his position and calling, the communist can never
waiver a single iota anywhere in his Marxist-Leninist ideological
conviction and party principles. He must decisively fight
any manifestation of bourgeois and revisionist ideology,
moralities which are alien to us and survivals of the past
in the consciousness ~nd deeds of backward members of society.
A communist does not have the right to pass by disloyal discussions.
The person who is mistaken must be corrected, disuaded and helped
to investigate the essen'ce of the matter; the public.enemy,
the narrow-minded perso'n who spreads another person's slander
and who intentionally distorts vital events and facts,is publicly
dealt a principled blow.
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The ideological struggle does not accept~'or tolerate any
compromise or appeasement. The strength of Marxist-Leriinist
ideas li~s in their great, vital truth, reliability, scientific '
nature and militancy and in their principled and class
irY�econcilability to everything that is outmoded, reactionary
or harmful. The ideas of communism inspire and unite the toiling
masses; they mobilize enormous creative energy in t'hem to
successfully build the material basis for communism, to improve ~
socialist social relations and to mold a new man. In the situation
of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marxist-Leninist ideas, which have been '
mastered by the majority of the servicemen~are reflected in
their superior military expertise, intelligent discipline, '
endurance, determination, courage, revolutionary vigilance
and constant readiness fio deliver a crus�hing defeat to any ;
aggressor. ~
CHAPTER 6. TAE PARTY ORGANIZATION AND THE KOM,SOMOL ,
~EScce-rpt] The communist indoctrination of young adults and the leadership
_ .
of Romsomolp,rganizations are important and responsible areas ;
of party work. This makes it mandatory for party organizations '
to conduct an in-depth analysis of the affairs of Komsomol
collectives, to direct the work of committees and bureaus on ;
a daily basis, to transfer their knowledge and experience to ~
them and to teach young activists how to overcome difficulties, '
i.e., it makes it mandatory for them to achieve a situation
where Komsomol organizations assist commanders on a daily
basis in indoctrinating ideolagically convinced, intelligent
servicemen who are patri~ots and internationalists, who are
firm, skillful and courageous defenders of the socialist ,
~ fatherland and who are mastering modern weapons and hardware
to a tee. ~
. ~
One of the important missions of the party organizaGions is
to assign young party members and candidate members to Komsomol
work and to increase their sense of responsibility for th�e '
quality and efficiency of communist indoctrination for Komsomol :
members and young adults and for all the activities of Armed .
Forces Komsomol organizations. ' ~
~ ,
~ ;
,
4
' ,
G ~
F.
i
]b ~
;
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CH~`..PTER 7. AT THE HEAD OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
~Excerpts,~ The large and responsible missions facing Armed Fo:rces party
organizations stimulate them~to constantly improve the level
of party work and to imprs~ve their ideological and organizational
activities among se�rvicemen.
- The: quality and efficiency of party work is directly dependent
upon the qualifications of party workers, their level of
ideological and political training and practical experience,
their ability to rely on active members and to make the great-
est possible use of the creative forces of the entire communist
collective. The following are important missions for political
agencies and for unit and ship political deputies: carefully
selecting party leaders, systematically improving their
theoretical edge and inculcating in party organization
secretaries and activists a high standard of party principles,
the ability to objectively evaluate the results of their work
and to compare them with general party and national interests
and the ability to eliminate deficiencies in their work in a
timely manner.
When the party staff conducts an in-d~pth analysis of the affairs
of party collectives in all their diversity and when they have
an objective influence on the qualitative development of these
affairs, the daily leadership of party organizations by poli-
tical agencies will be more noticeable. .Political agencies,
primaril,y formation political~departments which are directly
exE:rcising their leadership of party organizations, must not
devote tlleir attention to superficial facts but to the entire
range of the processes and phenomena in party reality.
A further improvement :~n the leadership of party organizations
by super:ior~party agencies cannot be achieved by any one-time
action o~r by using any single work method. Success in this matter
lies in.a comprehensive approach and in developing and imple-
menting measures which will have the greatest effect on an overall
increase in the work of Armed Forces party organizations by having
an effect ~n the primary areas of party life, the selection,
ideological tempering and trair_~ng of party activists and
arming them with advanced techniques.
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CONCLUSION
~ext] The duties of tne primaxy party organization are broad and .
multi-faceted. It has large and responsible missions. Every-
thing that the military collective does and everything that it
lives by are directly and immediately included within the interests
and concerns of the party organization. It is responsible for
everythiiig. Moreover, when the communists are welded closely
together by the unity of their thoughts, will and actions and
when they raise, discuss and resolve ~irgent problems�in a
~ principled manner, the Gtrength of the party organization's
influence on the masses is greater and more profound. _
/
Closely united under a Leninist banner around the Party's
Central CommitCee and armed with the historic decisions of
the 25th CPSU Congress, the Armed Forces party organizations
are actively operating in oae of the primary, most important
and respunsible areas of national development. Ur.der ~the
leadership of political agencies and together with the one-man ;
commanders and their politic3l deputies, the, party has entrusted
the party organizations to strengthen and raise, in every way
possible, the combat capabilities and combat readiness of the ~
USSR Armed Forces,which are called upon to vigilantly protect .
and., in the event of an enemy attack, steadfastly defend the
Soviet motherland and tts national interests. A deep under-
sta.nding of the importance and responsibilityof this mission
stimulates enormous crzative energy in cammunist servicemen.
Eac.h of them is aware that by successfully accomplishing his
party and military duties and by increasing the combat readi-
ness of .his element, unit or ship, he is thereby contributing
to a common party and national cause and directly participating ~
in the construct~,on of communism.
Under the leadership of the CPSU, our Soviet nation is confidently ,
proceeding toward communism. It is not afraid of the storms
and tempests which are raging in the modern world. No .attempts
by international imperialism~and its underlings--b.ourgeois
ideologists, revisionists and renegades' of var3ous stripes-- .
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are able ,:o divert it from its straight and narrow course, nor are they able to
restrain its firm pace. The Soviet people are armed with a
true compass--the omnipotent doctrine of Marxism-Leninism.
An experienced helmsman--the CPSU--is steering them to their
go~l. Thie arouaes a legitimate pride in communists, and
at the same time, it increases their responaibility for
their personal success~s and for the state of affairs in
their collectives and in the country as a whole. They are
conscientiously working in the areas entrusted to them;
they are devoting all their strength, capabilities, knowledge
- and experience to the common cause. This is precisely what
ensures high prestige for the party organizations.
The Soviet servicemen are rallying more closely around the
communists; they are following them and they are not sparing
any effort or time in further increasing the combat capa-
bilities and combat readiness of the Armed Forces andin
strengthening ~he defense capability of the USSR and all the
fraternal countries of the socialist camp. Soldiers and
sailors, sergeants and�petty officers, warrant officers,
officers, generals and admirals, blue and white collar
workers of the Soviet Armed Forces see tY?eir party organ~za-
tions as their closest leaders, mentors and educators,
organizerG and instigators of collective labor and as the
creative force which al~oays entices and allures them to
good deeds and inspires them to renewed success in combat
and political training. This is the pledge that our Armed
Forces are honorably handling and they will honorably handle
the large and responsible missions assigned to them by the
CPSU.
The enor~nous po:.itical.and labor enthusiasm of the Soviet
people arid our servicemen--enthusiasm which was evoked by
the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the glorious
anniversary of Great October--reached new heights due to
the natiunal discussion and unanimous approval of the USSR
Consititution. The hearts of our people were filled with
pride for the successe~ achieved. The unshakable confidence
and conviction in the c:orrectness of Lenin's ideas, the wise
leadersh:tp of the CPSU and the prominent victories in con-
structing communism st~_mulate new energy in us and arouse us
to selflt~ssly ~vork on behalf of the further strengthening of
the SoviF~t fatherland's economic and defensive might.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1977
9001
CSO: 1801
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r.~
SOVIET COMMENTS ON U.S . AIR FORCE AND AIRCRAI+'T
Improved Airborne Command Posts
Nos~;ow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4~ Apr 7~ signed to
~rress 6 Apr 79 AP ~5-~7 ~
[Ar�~icle by Lt Col B. Grigor'yevs "Improved Airborne Comtna,nd Posta of the
USA"~ '
[Te:ct] In the global system for operational control oi' the U.S. az~ed
forc;es, an impor�tant place is assigned to airborne commar~d posts (ACP) which~
in ~:he estimation of i:he American command~ are less tied down in conducting
~en~:ral nuclear war. It is emphasized in the foreign pr~ss that the primary
job of an ACP consists of providing stable and reliable control of the armed
i'orc:es in the event of a breakdown of ground-based command posts .
Sinc:e 19~2~ specially equipped EC-135 airplanes of various modifications (in
- all~ more than 40 aircraf't) have been used in the U.S.A. as ACPs. At the
beg~.nnin~ flf the sever.~ties, the military and political leadership of the
U.S.A. came to t.he cor.clusion that the existing EC-135 airplanes in operatian
do riot satisfy the demands made of thems they were not designed for an ex-
tencled per:iod in the air; they have insufficient work axea space; they axe
fitted with obsolete communications~ automated processing and data displays;
and they a.re poarly shielded from the harmful elements of a nuclear explosion.
In i:his oonnection, a program for developing improved JCS [Joint Chiefs of
Staff] and SAC [Strategic Air,Command] ACPs was approved in 1973 and is ~x-
pect:ed before 1983�
ACP compos:Ltion, function and deployment. Currently, there are three E-4A
airplanes in the First JCS ACP Squa.dron which were developed based on the
Boei.ng 747 wide-bodied aircraft. According to'American press ~eports~ the
JC5 ACP is the alternate point for controllin~ the armed forces during the
outage o.f �the ma.in command center in the Pentagon and the alternate at Ft.
Ritchie (9a-95 km northwest of Washington~. In the event of a state of emer-
gency~ it is intended for the accommodation of the U.5. Fresident and a~roup
of accompanying persons. It ~s not ruled out that the Secretary of Defense
or Chairman of the JCS may be with the Fresident or at the head of a separate
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groiip in the ACI'. In accordance with the adopted pr.o~,ram, the First JCS ACP
Squ~Ldron was re~leployed in the secoiZd half o~' 1977 from ~',.ncirews airbase (state
of Plaxyland~ to Offut airbase (Nebraska~ at which the ACI' aircraft of the
SAC commander i~ also basec~.
Tr~e joint basin~; and mairiten~.nce of the JCS and SAC AC~'s~ in the estimation
of' ~.he American command, will provide si~nificant savings of resources which
are expended on their maintenance and servicing. Additionally, after the SAC
commanu~i's E~bB ACP goes into operation, it will make it possible to realize
an interchangeability of the JCS and SAC ACPs ~which will significantly in-
crease their operational use potential.
In order to carxy out the tasks of alternate control point of the U.S.A.'s
supreme militaxy-political J.eader~hip~ one of the JCS airborne command post
aircraPt will be constantly on combat alert at Anclrews airbase in preparation
to receive the President and accompanying perscns aboaxd at a.ny time.
Accordin~ to foreign press reports9 until the redeployment of the JCS ACP to
Offut airbase, one of its aircraft on the ground was on constant 15-minute
combat readiness while periodically performin~ training flights. The flight
norm was 25 hours per month. Combat alert in the ai.rcraf t was provided by
f,i ve crews .
ACP character~.stics. The total,useable sp~.ce in the E-4A aircraf't is 429.2
~qua.re me-ters . Located on ' ts upFier deck is the crew cabin, navigation
equipment, and the crewmernber.s' -rest accommodations. On the middle deck are
the work accommodations for the supreme militaxy-political leadership and
operational staff and their rest area as well as stowage for a nortion of
the equipment. On the lowe-r deck is the rad.~.oelectronic and communications
equipment a.nd auxiliaxy accammodations.
The ~~rork as~ea of the middle deck is divided into compartments. Located in
them specif'icall,y is the conference room of' the supreme military~political
lea,rJ.,srship wi~Lh nine workin~; positions; a pro jection compartment; accommoda-
tions for conductin~; conferences; the working room of the operations ~,roup
with 29 woz~k positions; a di.splay console for data on eme.rgency situations;
and ~the technical cont~,ol f~.,cility for operatin~ the comm~znicati_ons subsystems.
Installed in the supreme mi]..itary-political leadership's compartment are three
display screens i'or incomin~ data, the president's control panel and three
tele:ohones (f.our accorcling �t.o several foreign pres~ reports~ . ~ne is known
by the designation "the red telephone" (it has an automa�tic encoding system~
and is intended j'or cor.imunications with the cor~urvand posts of the strategie
for.c~~s. The secand is in-tended for commtznicati~.,n with all the command posts
of the ~rmed forc;es of the U,S.A. The third is fox communicating with the
NATO headquarters :;ta~'i',
Zn all, as many as ~5 people may be on the E-~A air.craft, including 27 fli~ht
and en~ineering and technical personnel, and the operations group of 39 people
(18 0~� them officers~ .
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Imp.rovin~ the ACP. American military srPcialists consider that the operatinn
of the E-~A aircraft as ACPs will make it possible to accumulate and correlate
the experience received and use ~t in developing an improv~;d ACP (the E-4B
aircra.ft) which will be distinguished by more modern equi~,ment~ primarily
communications ~'acilities and automated data processing ~ind display.
Accarding to for.ei~n press reports, the E-4~B aircraft has the f'ollowing
cha:�acteristics: a maximum take-off weight of 363 tons; length, 70.5 m; wing
spati~ 59.6m; maximum spaed~ 980 kph (at 9~000 m altitude and 272 tons loaded
weight); service ceiling~ 14~,000 m; 12 hours flight endurance without
refueling .
Installed in the aircraft axe F 103-GE-100 turbofan engiries (static thrust of
each~ 23.8 tons), an inflight refuelling system which provides continuous
72-hour airborne watch, and a new 1~200 rVA electric power system for the
radioelectronic and communications equipment.
The forei~n press notes tr~at the airborne comma,nd post irA the E-4B aircraft
will be fitted with mo dern radioelectronic equipment and communications facil- '
ities which will make it possibie under any conditions, t~o maintain reliable
communications with all the control points of the global operational control
system of the U.S. armed forces. In so doing~ great attEntion is being cen-
tered on protecting the fuselage and individual components of the equipment
from the effect of a nuclear explosion's electromagnetic pulse.
A.ccording to foreign press data, the E-4B ACP is planned to have 13 individual
communications subsystems, the main ones of which axe:
--A communications subsystem via the DSCS-2 eaxth sA~tellite system. It is
considered that its band (7,250-8,400 MHz~ will provide the ACP with reliable
communications during the employment of nuclear weapons and active and pas-
sive jamming.
--A communications subsystem operating in the AFSATCOM satellite communica-
tions systEam in the V~+' ba.nci. By this means, the supreme military-pol3tical
leadership plans to es tablish teletype communications directly with the ICBM
and strategic bomber launch control points.
--An HF anci Vl-~. commun:icatians subsystem~ the ~vmposition of which will be six
1 KW-power trans:nitters and seven receivers. They will provide operations on
75 telephorie and telegcaph c;hannels and can oe used in the air-~round and
ground-air networks simultaneously in various combinations.
--A lon~;- and ultra-lo n~ wave communications subsystem (considexed the most
durable duz~in~ a nuclear explosion~ which operates in the 1~~-60 KHz band.
It is interded for ca~ ying the instructions of the supreme military~political
leadership to the strategic forces (ICBMs, SCB?d~ and bombers~. A new, hi~h-
power transmitter is install.ed aboard the ACP with an antenna (about eight km
lon~; and 1.5 cm in diazleter~ which is let out through a narrow hatch in the
fuselage.
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Als~~ mouni,ed in the ACP is an internal teleph~ne communications sy~tem which
wil:L Ue al:~le ~.o acconu,lodatc: 150 tElephone units (it's pl;:~,nned Y:o increase the
nurnber to 225 ) .
By 19~i3, t.he American rnilitary command envisions buyin~; :~ix L-1~B aircraft~
thr;~e of which will bp used as JCS ACPs and three as SAC ACPs. Accordin~
to o�reigra press data, the cost for developing and testing the aircraft and
eqti:tP~nent will be $353.2 million by the end of 1981. In additi_on, $~99.5
mil:lion axe eax-marIced for servicing and technical maint~nance, and ~28.1
mil:lion for establishin~ auxiliary maintenance buildinp,s. Thus~ the total
swn o.f' the expenditures will be ~880.8 million.
The f'irst E-4B aircraft is planned to be fully filled out wi~tlz all the neces-
sary equipment and delivered for SAC ACP operation in mid-1979 and the sub- -
sequent two during 198~-1981. In 198i-83, the three E-4~A aircraf t currently
used as JCS ACPs are expected to be converted to improved E-~DB ACPs.
In the opinion of America.n militaxy specialists~ the introductioz~ of. the new
F-4~B aircraf. t into the airborne command post service of the JCS and ~tAC will
enable the supreme military-political leadership to receive a more precise
mean~ of control of the strategic oifensive forces to which a main role is
allotted in the a~gressive intentions of American imperialism.
COFYRIGHT: "Garubezhnoye Voyennoye ~bozreniye", 1979
Phantom Aircraft Construction_Erogram
moscow ZARLIBEZHN~~YL V~YENNOYE OBOZRENIY~ in Russian No ~b Apr 79 signed to
pres., f~ Apr. 79 FP t~$-S1
[Article bt~ Fngr-It Col (Res~ I. Alekseyevs "The Phantom Tactical Fi~hter"~
[Text] In mid-19?8~ a number of articles appeaxed in the American rnilitar.y
pres:~ whicYi were devot~d to the production of tYie 5, OOOth fighter-bomber of
the f~'-~~ Ph~tintom series. The authors of the publications emphasized tha~t
these air.cr.~a:~�t hold fi.rs~ pla.ce in the U.S.A., both in duration of serial
production (the -f.irs~t test :flight of' an experimental model was conducted 27
I'~tay 195~) and in scale of production.
The F'hantom is conside:ced tcie most common tactical fighter in the air. forces
of tne Nt1TC~ member cotultries. In addition to the USAF and U~PJ, these air-
cra.ft have been adopteci by t:he air forces of Great Bri~tain, the F:~G, Greece
and '1tl.r.key, as w~ll as IsraEl, Spain~ Iran, Japan and Sou~th Korea. They are
~ive:i a si~~nifica.nt pl~~.ce in the aggressive plans of the ;nilitarisl; circles
of the U.n.A. Tlze~ coiltinue, as before~ to be sent to thc~ troops. By its
combat c~.pa.bilit'~es it will, in the opinion of American military specialists,
mee~t modern requirements up to the beginning of the eighties.
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During 2~ yeaxs of. operatian, the McDonnell Douglas F4 ha.s been produced in
morc than 20 va~~ious n~odifications and va.r.iants. Accordi.n~ to foreign press
dat~., by 1971~~ t,he firr~~ had orders for the production of 4~97~ fi~hterss
3~9i'~ of them fGr the Penta~roni 998 planes for expoxt. The total cost of the
production pro~s~am for the U.S, Defen~e Department was $10~491 mi111on. The
avera~e co;.t for a sinC,le series-produced model is ~2.64 million.
The dirty war unleashed in Southeast Asia by the American imperialists ex-
erted ~reat influence on the scale and pace of F-4 fighter production. Thus~
iti the period 1966-68, ~~he production rate was ~0 planes a month on an aver-
a;e~ and reached the maximum in the be~;innin~ of 1967 (70 planes).
The I'-~ Ptiantom fighters of the vaxious modifications and vaxiants are basic-
a.lly identical in their aerodynamic arrangement. In the process of operation,
the aircraft have been continually modernized with the aim of increasin~ com-
ba.t eff~~ctiveness, primasily by fittirig them with more pawerful en~ines~ im-
pro~~ed wea~ons systems, and on-board radioelectronic equipment. With the ex-
cept.ion of the fighers purchased by Great Britain~ all these have been equip-
ped W~tkl J 79 turbojet engines from the American firm~ General Electric. ~
Brief data on the funda.mental modifications of the F-4 fighter~ taken from
the for.eign press~ axe cited below. �
The C'-4~A (i.n all~ 47 aircraf:t were manufactured for naval aviation~ is a
two-place, supersonic~ all~weather~ long-range, tactical fighter intended for
intercept af a~.rborne targe+,s at high altitude using air-to-air guided mis-
siles; assaultin~ grou:zd, shore and marine targets; and for direct air suP-
port of graund forces using conventional and nuclear bombs, air-to-surface
guided missiles, un~ui~ied rockets and other types of weapons. The typical
external ir~dicators ~ses a low, swept wing (the sweep is 45 de~rees alon~
the leadin~; edge) with some positive dihedra.l; a slab stabilizer with nega-
tive dihedz�al; and a sin~le vertical stabilizer empenna~e. Based on the
peculiaxities of operating a fighter aboaxd an aircraft carrier~ the outer
wing is mac~.e to iold. A brake hook is located undernea,th the tail section
of the fus~:lage, by which, during the fighter's landing on the aircraft car-
rier deck~ braking is accomplished by means of engagin~ one of four a.~-res~ting
~ear cables.
The aircraf t fuselage is all-metal~ semi-monocoque construction. The landin~
~;eax is tricycle. The power plant consists of two J79-GE-2 turbojet engines
with maximum thrust of 7,300 kg in af terburner. Fuel (7,570 liters~ is
stowed in t.wo wing- and six fuselage tanks. In addition~ a 2,270 liter capa-
city fuel tank can be suspended beneath the fuselage and two tarus with a
capa.city of 1,36> liters suspended on wing pylons. The f~ghter is fitted
witY~ an airborne refue].ling system~ the receiving probe of which is found
in t}ie lef.t side. In f'light it is retracted flush with the fuselage ~
surf ace .
Aircraft armament: six Sparrow-3 air-to-air ~uided missiles, four of which
are suspended beneath the fuselage in a semi-flush position, and two on wing
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pyluns . The f i.~�ht.er can carry conventional or nuclnar ~mbs . The AN~APlZ-'j2
weal~ons control radar system is mounted in the nose section of the fusel~,ge.
The I~'-4~3 was produced only to the order of the USN commax~d ( in all ~ 6~~y air-
Plaries wer~ bui.l.t~ . The first series of fighter.~ (~~0 planes~ were equipped
w11.r~ J70-C;~;-2 en~;ines. Tn the rest, J79-G1:��8 tt~bojet en~;irio~ (with 7,700 kp;
maxJ.nium t.hr.ust in a.C~;Nrburnor) we~e in;st~.alled. The;;e aircrr~{'~t tirzvc: rnore im-
Frroved on-boaxd radioelectronic equipment~ AN~APQ-72 radar; A~A 24G cornputer
for producin~ flight parameters; ASA-32 autopilot; AN~ASC~-19 communications~
navigation, and TFF system; AN~AJB-3A aircraft position di~play and bombin~
system; AAA-4~ infrared sight~ etc. Aireraft axmament was also increa..sed.
Added are: six Sparrow-~ guided missiles or four Spaxrow-3 and four Side-
winder air-to-air guided missiles, the Bullpup air-to-ground guided missile~
unguid.ed rockets~ conventional bombs of vasied desi~nation arid size~ nucle~.r
bombs, and other munitions. The maximum weapons load is 7,250 Ic~. Armaanent
is located on four fusela~e and five [sic] wing attachment points.
The F-1~C w~,s serially produced from 1963 to 1966 and supplied to the USAF.
In ~.11, 583 aircraft were m~.nufactured~ of which 36 were purchased by ~pain.
The powerplant consists of two tur~bo jet J 79-GE-1.5s with a maximum thrust of.
7?7G0 kg in afterburner. On-board radioelectronic equipment are: APt~APG~-100
radar, A1v~AJ3-7 l~ombing system, AN~ASN-4$ inertial navigation system,
AN~APN-155 low altitude radio altimeter~ AN~ASN-4~6 naviga.tional computer, and
rad~.o communicat�ions equipment. A paxt of the U5AF F-4C fi.~hters (two squad-
ron~) were fitted with special equipment intended for jaanmin~ an enemy's air
defe.nses. They were equippsd with reconnaissance receivers, jamming trans-
mitt,ers, dc~vices for e jecti:zg dipole reflectors and carri.ed anti-radar
~uided misailes.
The F-4~D w~~,s supplied to th~ USAF (757 aircraft~ and was purchased by Iran
(32~ and South Kore~. (36). In comparison with the previous modifications, a
port�ion of. its radioelectronic equipment was more improved. In pa,rticulax~
it ~,as fit�ted with the AN~AFG~-109 radas, AId~ASN-63A inertial riavi~ational
syst�em, ASC,-22 gun sight, and Ai1T~ASQ-91 weapons control electronic computer
syst.em .
The I~'-4F bF~gan to enter USA~' line units in 19~7 � Accorcli.n~ to the estimation
of American specialists, by virtue of its tactical and technical character-
istics, armament, and on-boasd equipment~ it is the most improved of. the
Fhantom se;~ies of airplanes, The F-4E is widely employed not only in the
i1.S ,A .(809 aircraf t were pizrchased~ , but also in the air forces of other
cour,tries: Australia (24~~ Greece (56), Israel (204~, Iran (177~, Turkey
('~2), FRG I10~, ;;outh Korea (19~ and Japan (13~. The fighter is fitted with
two ~r7y-.r,E�-17 turbo jets (ma~cimum thrust with afterburner, 8,120 kg; without
afterburne::, 5,400 k~). The new AN~APQ-1?_0 radar is included in the weapons
cont.rol system. Distinct from f ighters of other modifications, a built-in
20mm, six Uarrel f~1~1A1 Vulcan cannon (640 rounds of ammunition~ is installed
in the aircraf t and is intended primarily for destroying taxgets at short
distances during aerial combat. In addition, its maneuverability was
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improved ry the insta~latiun of controllable win~ slats oii the leading edge
of the w3.n~;. T}iey occupy '~Q;~ of the span of each wing arid assure the per-
_ for~nance of a 1(30 de~~ee tttrn within 15.5 seconds (at ab