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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000'100'100026-'1 , , ~~~i'~~ ~ -~~5, es . . ~c s APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/8717 17 October 1979 - USSR Re ort p MILITARY AFFAIRS CFOUO 31 /79) Pilot and Contemporary Warfare CMoral-Political and Psycholo~ical Training of Flight Personnel) F~I$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign _ newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources - are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other charar_teristics retained. ~ Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets - are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text) ' or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfaniiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an - item originate with the source. Times within i.tems are as given by sour.ce. ` The contents of this publication in no way represen.t the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. G~vernment. For f:.irther information on report content call (703) 351-2938 (economic); 3468 (political, sociological, military}; 2726 (life sciences); 2725 (physical sciences). COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL tiSE ONI,Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPR5 L/8717 17 October 1979 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS (FOUO 31/79) - PILOT AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE ~MORAL-POLiTICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING OF FLIGHT PERSONNEL) Moscow LETCHIK I SOVREMENNAYA VOYNA (0 MORAL'NO-POLITICHESKOY I PSIKHOLOGICHESKOY PODGOTOVKE LETNOGO SO~TAVA) in Russian 1976 signed to press 28 Ma.y 76 pp 1-224 [Book by Col V. S., candidate of historical sciences; Col I. F. Vydrin, � candida.te of pedagogical sciences; Col B. A. Pikrovskiy, candidate of inedical sciences; l:ol A. K. Sul'yanov (hEad of the group of authors), Voyenizdat, 24,000 copies] CONTENTS PAGE Annotation 1 Chapter I. The Contemporary Stage of Development of the Soviet Air . Forces and the Training and Indoctrinating of Flight Personnel 2 - 1. Scientific and Technological Progress and the Growing Combat ` Capabilities of the Military Aviation............ .....4.,.. 2 . . The Powerful Advance of Soviet Military Aviation.......:. 3 Missile-Carrying, Supersonic, All-Weather 6 2. The Nature of Modern Aerial Combat and Demands Made of the - Conditioning of Flight Personnel 9 The Equipment is Altering Tactics 9 From Low Altitudes to t,he Upper Bounds of the Stratosphere . 13 Chapter II. General Aspects of Moral-Political and Psychological Training in the Air Force 21 1. The Place of Moral-Political and Psychological Training Within ~ the System of and Indoctrination for Flight Personnel 21 The Role of th~ Morale Factor,in Contemgorary Warfare (In the Air BattTe) 21 - a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO] ~ FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLX ,`,1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONTENTS (Continued) . Page 2. The Content, Fozms and Methods Qf Moral-Political Trai.ning for Fligh~ Personnel 25 Indoctri.nating Military Pilots in a Spirit of Soviet Patriotism and Internationalism 29 3. Basic Areas of Ps~ck~ological Training for Flight Personnel... 32 _ The Development of Psychic Functional Realiability in Pilots 33 Improving the Emotional-Volitional Stability of F~ight Personnel 37 Chapter III. Moral-Psychological Preparation for Flights in Adverse Weather and at Night 41 - 1. The Focus of Attention--On The Instrumen~s 41 Man In the New Situation 41 ~ T'he Pilot's Increased Pace of Action 42 2. ~ The Ground P.nd In The Ai.r 44 Practical Training in the Use of the Equipment--An Important Phase of Training 44 ; Flights In a D~sal-Control Trainer 46 _ Under Nighttime Conditions 47 - CZuds--A Major Test 48 Success Demands Confidence 53 DoeG a Pilot Exnerience Fear? 56 Illusions Must Be Resisted 58 Ghapter IV. Combat Training Flights and the Moral-Psychological Conditioning of Flight Personnel 63 1. Z'he Preflight Period .................................o....... 63 _ 2. During the Performance of Flight Assignments., 65 Missile Launchings, Firing and Bombing Practice. 65 - When the Target is on the Screen 70 ' Exercise~--A Serious Test 72 Chapter V. Moral-Psychological as a Flight Safety Factor. 76 1. Flight Service Regulations--A Law 76 ~ - 2. Psychological Analysis ~f Errors Committed by Flight Personnel on Flights 78 What Ys "Human Error"? 78 - Training In Focusing the Attention 81 Calmness Is Always Necessary 85 3. Flight Supervision and Psychology 87 ' Flight Supervision--Personnel Supervision '87 The Flight Operation Officer's Responsibility.......... 92 4. When a Special Situation Arises 96 ' The Effect of an Emergency Situation Upon the Pilot.... 96 The Development of Psychological Stability 101 -b- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ CO[~ITENTS (Continued) Paqe Chapter VI. The Moral-Psychological of Flight Personnel During Their Training in the Operation of New Equipment............~............ 107 . l. Retraining to Operate New Equipment--An Important Job........ 107 Motivating th.e Airn~en to Master New Equipment.......... 107 ~ ' General Psychological and Pedagogical Peculiarities of . the Retraining Process 109 2. In the Course of the Theoretical Training 113 The Izcreased RoZe of Theoretical Training.....a....... 113 - Pedagogics and Psychology Must Be Closely Linked....... 117 3. In the Practical Retraining Process 122 The New Equipment Is Necessitating Adjustments......... 122 _ Take the Individual's Psycholoaical Peculiarities Into Account 225 Learning the Aircraft Cockpit 127 . , Caution! Negativ~e Carryover of Habits 132 ' _ What Goes Into a Successful Solo Flight 137 Chapter VII. The Moral-Psychological Principles Underlying the r^ormation and the Work of Aviation Teams 143 1. Problems Involved in the Group Training of Crews Under , Mo~lern Conditions 143 The Crew Must Be Uni.ted 143 The Comprehensive Approach--A Dictate of the Times..... 144 2. Ways to Strengther. the Aviation Team 145 What is Psychological Compatibili.ty? 146 The Development of a Sense of Collectivity Among th,e Fighting Men 149 Chapter VIII. Certain Aspects of Moral-Psychological Training of Flight School Cadets . 153 1. Training and Indoctrination--A Single Prflcess 153 2.. Psychological Aspects o~ the Cadets` Training 157 The Instructor's Personality--An Important Factor in the Training and Indoctrination 157 On Initiation and Checkout Flights 159 When Working on Complex Flight Elements 162 � During the Solo Flight 165 -c- � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFF�ICIAL USE ONL`I PUBLICATION DATA English title . THE PILOT AND CONTEMPORAfiY WARFARE ~ (ON THE MORAL-POLITICAL AND PSYCHO- - LOGICAL TRAINING OF FLIGHT PERSONiVEL) Russian title . LETCHIK I SOVREMENNAYA VOYNA (0 MORAL'Ir0- POLITICHESKOY I PSIKHOLOGICHESKOY - PODGOTOVKE LETI~'OGO SOSTAVA) Author (s) . Colonel V. S. Bru2, Candidate of his- . torical sciences; Colonel I. F. Vydrin, Candidate of pedagogical sciences; Colonel B, A. Pokrovskiy, Candidate of inedical sciences; Colonel A. K. Sul'yanov (head of the group oi' authors ) Editor (s) . Colonel General of Aviation I. M. Moroz Publishing Hou~e , Voyenizdat Place of Publication . Moscow Date of Publication , 1976 Signed ~o press . 28 May 76 . ~ Copies , 24,000'' COPYRIGHT . VOYENIZDAT, 1976 _ _ - d - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ ~ F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ , ~ ~ AHId~TATICeI 2" book discusses problems pertaining to the moral~olitical and psycho- logical training of flight personnel of the air forces to enable them to perform under the conditions of contemporary combat. The main focus is on explaining ha~ a communist wor13 outlook~ ideological conviction, a feeling _ of Soviet patriotism and internationalism, good morale, fighting spirit and _ Qsychological qualities are developed in military pilots. 'xhe book was written for co~�nanders, political workers, flxght personnel, engineers and technicians of air units and subunits, as well as for i.nstruc- - tors, students and cadets ~t militar~r educational institutions. ~ ~ . 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � Chapter I. THE CONTEI~ORARY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET AIR FORC~S AND THE TRAINING AIQD INDOCTRINATING OF FLIGHT PERSONNEL 1. Scientific and Technological Progress and the Growing Combat Capabilities of the Miiitary Aviation Engaged in implementing the P.rogram for Peace advanced at the 24th CPSU Congress, the Communist Party and Soviet Governr,~ent have performed an enor- mous amount of work to create favorable foreign policy conditions for peace- ful cons~ruction in our nation and in the fraternalist socialist nations and to insure peace and security for all nations. Considerable progress has been made toward establishing peaceful ccex=stence among states with different social structures and mutually advantageous cooperation on an inter- national level, and toward the relaxation of t2nsions and the control of _ ~orces of war and aggression. Wllile conc~ucting a foreign policy of peace, our party and government are ~ not forgetting that the enemies of detente still have considerable resources ! and are active in diverse ways and various areas, and that the nature of imperialism remains the same, although its possibilities for active aggres- sion have now been considerably curtailed. In this situation our state has been forced to take essential steps to strengthen the Soviet Nation~s d~fense _ capability and improve the Armed Forces. The 25th CPSU Congress stressed the fact th at "our party will do everything possible to see that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union continue to have at their disposal every- thing necessary to fulfill their responsible task of guarding the peaceful _ labor of the Soviet oeople and serving as a bulwazk of universal peace."1 ~ The enormous scope of the scientific and technological revolution and our nation's great economic achi~vements have created the objective prerequisites for basic reforms in militazy affairs and in the development of the Soviet Anned Forces . These rePorms have primarily consisted in arming the army and navy with nuclear ~issiles, improving the capabilities of conventional weapons and improving methods of warfare, the organizational structure of `he army and navy and the process of training and indoctrinating the personnel. Basic reforms have also been carried out in t?'~e military air forces. They have affected all areas of aviation affairs, primarily the development of aircraft themselves,:;their armament with powerful weapons and modern navi- gational and piluting equipment and the improvement uf inethods of combat employment and servicing of the aircra.ft equipment. Since the war the m.ilitary aviation has taken an unprecedented leap in its development and - combat improvement. It has become a missile-carxying, supersonic, all~weather aviation, equipped with nuclear weapons and the latest missiles and guns. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � Zhe Powerful`Advance of Soviet Milita~y Aviation ~e pos~war develop~ent of the Soviet ai,r forces can be divided into three ~ main pzriods: period No. 1(1946-1953~, No. 2(1954-19591 and No. 3(since 1960). Each of them nas its o~m specific features, but they also have a common feature--the application of the latest achievements of science and technolc~qy in all areas of aviation affairs and a continuous buildup of the militaxy aviation's combat strenqth to meet the demands of the times. The first period was characterized by the rearming of the tactical, fighter - and bomber aviation with supersonic jet aircraft and an increase in the pro- portion of aviation in the Anned Forces. The accomplishment of tasks facing the militazy, aviation involved enormous difficulties of an economic and technological na~ture. Specifically, it was necessary to set up the produc- tion of materials for jet aircraft, to restructure the aircraft industry and re-equip existing airfields. This required enormous funds and considerable - t;~. It must not be forgotten that these difficult tasks were accomplished ia a situation of postwar rebuilcling and development of the national economy. Extensive scientific research projects were launched at~the instruction ot the party and government. Scientific-research and other organizations were � charged with special respor~sibility in this work. They made a large contri- bution to the elaboration of urgent problems pertaining to the future development of aircraft equipment and to the task of ~etting up the produc- tion of jet aircraft. A jet air force was rapidly created as a result of steps taken by the party and gov~ernment. The lirst Soviet produced jet aircraft was, of course, tested by G. Ya. _ Sakhchivandzhi, a graduate of the Orenburg Flight School, back in the sprinq of 1942. Ztao jet aircraft were flown in April 1946: a MiG-9 piloted by A. N. Grinchik and a Yak-15 flown by M. I. Ivanov. T'he La-15 jet aircraft was tested somewhat later. A group of j~t aircraft took part for the first ~ime in azi air shaw in Tushino on 18 August 1946. Test-pilot I. T. Ivashchenko exceeded the speed of sound in horizontal flight for the first time ir, thE world in a series-produced MiG-17 in February 1950. ' At the beginning of the fifties, A. I. Mikoyan's design office was assigned the task of creating a fighter capable of flying faster than the speed of - sound. Zhis assignment was successfully carried out: the Soviet mi.litary aviation received the supersonic MiG-19 fighter. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government also devoted a great deal of attention to rearmau~nt of the bomber aviation. The I1-28 jet bomber raas placed into series production in 1949. It flew twice as fast and had twice the range of the tactical piston-engine bombers and cnuld carry three times the bombload, and was armed with more powerful guns. ' ~ 3 . - FOR aFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � 2he aircraft was equipped with first-class navigational equipment, for that time, for r.ight flying and for bombing invisible targets in difficult weather. ~ At the beg~nninq of the fifties the Tu-16 jet bomber designed by A. N. Tupolev replaced the Tu-4 in the ~ong-range aviation. The naval aviation received jet aircraft. and the military transport aviation was re-equipped. Equipment of the military aviation with jet aircraft required a qualitatively new approach to the training and indoctrinational process and considerable psychological readjustment on the part of the personnel, first of all, a change of attitude taward the new aircraft and taward the mastery of inethods used for their comba~ ~mployment and servicing. Further improvement~of combat and political training and the training base in the line units and . subunits played a large role in the accomplishment of these tasks. First to master t.he jet aircraft were pilots I. P. P~lunin, P. Chupikov, I. D. Koshel', S. D. Gorelov, I~I. I. Khramov, A. I. Babayev, Ye. Ya. S avitskiy and others. They boldly ventured into unexpl:~red territory, revealed the secrets of flying at enormous speeds, achieved',~subtle control of the air- craft by means of the extremely complex equipment and found new methods of employing the equipment, which were later included in manuals and instructions. ~ Uti.lizing the experienc;e of the jet aviation pioneers, many military pilots - subsequentiy mastered the new military equipment with success. Hundreds of pilots, navigators, en.gineers and technicians were awarded orders and medals for their exemplazy mastery of the equipment and their great skill. Test- . pilots Col~nel M. I. Ivanov, Major I. T. Ivashchenko, General P.M. Stefanovskiy and Co1Qne1 I. Ye. Fe3orov were the first ever to be awarded the esteemed title Hero of the Soviet Union in peacetimee Military aviation personne]. began mastering night flying and flights in c~if- ficult saeather conditions in 1951. Introduction of the achievements of electronics, radar and computer equipment in the aviation was highly impor- tant with respect to this type of training. The outfitting of the aviation with new equipment required a higher level'of ' theoretical knawledge on the part of the personz~el. The personnel training � system at mi.litary educational institutions and in the line units was there- fore restructurad in 1951-1953. ~ During tF:,;ose years the party and government took steps to provide material and mora:~ iricentives for the pilots, navigators, engineering and technical personnel. ~ By the end of 1953 the Soviet military avia~ion had thus undergone consi.d- erable qualitative and quantitative changes and had made a great advance in 4 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 - FOR OEFICIAL USE ONLY � - its development. At the same time, the complicated international situation and the d~velopment of military air forces in the ax~ies of the imperialist states made it urgent to fuz~ther i~rove Soviet aviati.on equipment and methods of ea~loying them in combat. 'i'he adoption of nuclear weapons in the soviet Arnied Forces was the beginninq of the second period in the development of the military aviation. At that ~ time the Party Central CouQnittee and the Soviet Government were dewting primary attention to the creation and mass production of supersonic air- craft, aircraft aza~d with nuclear weapans and missile-carrying aircraft for the bomber a~i.ation. Productive work was perforcied by the design offioes of S. V. I1`yushin, A. I. Mikoyan, V. Ya. Klimov, A. M. Lyul'ka, P. O. Sukhoy, A. N. Tupolev, A. S. Yakovlev, 0. K. Antonov and others. The fighter aviation received supersonic aircraft equipped with~"air-to-air" missiles. Th~ fighter-bomber aviation was cre~ted. Lonq-range air uni.ts received heavy jet bombers with a large ~ Ioad capacity and flight range. Substantial changes also took place in - th~ mi.litary transport aviation's air fleet, permitting it to be made a separate branch of ttie Air Force. ~ Aircraft armament was successfully developing along with the creation and iaq~rovement of aircraft. "Air-to-air" guided mi.ssile systems with good per- formance features were rapidly created. Aerial bombs, missiles and atomic weapons of various caliber were i~roved. New sighting equipment was installed on the aircraft, ma.king it possib le to destroy targets from great altitudes, out of sight of land, as well as small and movinq targets. Describing tiZis period in. the development of the aviation,, well-known Soviet aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev wrote: "We had modern jet combat aircraft in large-series production in the fifties: the MiG-~9, a tactical fighter; _ the Yak-25, an a1l-weather, night fightex-interceptor; the I1-28, a tactical - bomber; and the Tu-16 long-range bomber. These aircraft formed the basis of the Soviet Union's air power until ':he end of the decade, when they were ~ replaced with new and modernized high-speed, hig?-. altitude jet ai.rcraft. "2 ~ i - Z'he third period of development of the Soviet mi.litazy aviation, which is still in progress, has been characterized mainly by its large -scale annament with new weapons--airborne missiles of ~~arious classes and for vari~aus ~ purposes and supersonic missile-carrying aircraft, and continued improvement . of the combat capabilities of aircraft equipment. The good aeronautical engineering features af modern aircraft have been convincingly demonstrated by world records for flight speed and altitude and rate.of climb set by Soviet pilots. Hero of the SoYiet Union A. V. F'edotov, honored test-pilot, for example, reached an altitude of 36,240 meters in a Ye-266, and Hero of - the Soviet Union P. M. Ostapenko, honored test-pilot, gained an~altitude of 30 km. in 3 minutes 9.7 seconds in the same ai.rcraft. , 5 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE OiYLY Missile-Carrying, Su~ersonic, All-Weather The military aviation of the sixties and seventies is an aviation unhampered - by weather conditions, capable o~ flying at supersonic and transonic speeds, at minimum and stratospheric altitudes, with large payloads and at great flight ranges. Today's combat aircraft are arn~ d with powerful, highly accu- rate weapons, mainly missiles of various classes and for various purposes. They are capable of destroying targets covered by a strong air defense on land and at sea, and air targets out of visible range. The realization of _ new designs in the creation of aircraft has considerably simplified the _ aviation's basin requirements. A sinqle aircraft or a small group of aircraft with conventional ammunition can naw~inflict the same damage as was achieved by forces several times greater the past war. With respect to the performance of combat mi.ssions by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, their superiority is hundreds of times. greater. The follaaing data confirm this. During the Great Patriotic War the range of fire at air t~rgets with Yak-3 and La-7 fighters equipped with cannons, - was ordinarily 150 to 2~J0 meters and the probability of destroying the enemy was 0,25-0.3. A modern fighter has incomparably greater combat capabilitie~ for destroying air targets. ~ During the last war bridges presented a very difficult target for bombezs. Dozens of aircraft had to be assigned to hit a b ridge with a bomb and destroy it. A missile-carrier can now put a bridge out of operation by launching ~ an "air-to-ground" missile several hw~dred kilometers away, that is, without approaching the target and entering the range of air defense caeapons providing ~ innnediate coverage of.the target. The situation is the same with respect to destroying ships at sea. . - Mention should be made of the enormous achievements made in the development of military transport and passenger planes and helicopters. Everyone has heard of the Soviet air giants, the "Antey," 11-62, I1-76, I1-86 and Tu-114 - and fiheir junior "brothers," the I1-18, Tu-104, Tu-134, Yak-40 and Tu-124 ~and others, as well as helicopters designed by M. L. Mil' and N. I. Kamov. They have increased hauling capabilities and transport materiel and personnel ' mare economically. They are also capable of flying long distances at ade- � quately high speeds with corresponding loads. ~ The development of the modern military aviation has been characterized by th~ creation of '~TOL aircraft as well as multipurpose, variable-sweep combat macnines. These are long-range aircraft, capable of developing speeds in excess of Mach 2-2.5. They have paaerful engines, good horizontal and v~rtical maneuverability and good takeoff and landing characteristics; they " ~an carry the most diverse systems of modern weapons and can be used to perform diverse combat ~r,issions. . 6 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040140100026-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The significant increase in flight speeds of modern aircraft, their improv~d takeoff and landing characteristics and maneuvPrability have been achieved primaril~� by means of fundamentally new pawer units, the various types of jet engines used in aviation. ~ The perfarmance data for these engines have been improved significantly in _ the past 10 to 12 years, and their designs have grown more complicated. ~ ~e increase~ complexity of de~ign and of the physical processes occurring in the en~ine's operation are related to changes in tlie basic parameters, such a. ~i.ncreased pressure in the compressors, increased turbine input gas - te~eratures; the employment of afterburners, adjustable compressors and input and outlet devices; the use af various automatic adjustment and control . equipment, and so fortFl. While in the past~ three to five automatic control devices of relativ~ely ~ simple operation and design, such as a pr~pellor regulator and a mixture and supercharging control device and several simple electric instruments for controiling the work of the engine, were installed on piston-engine air- craft of the 2`u-2, I1-10 and La-5 type, modern engines are equipped with a Zarge quantity of testing and measuring devic2s and regulating equipment of _ complicated design and operating principles. These complex devices include fuel-flaw regulators, speed regulators, automatic acceleration control - ~ devioes, automatic starting and booster fuel-control devices, automatic devices for the compressor, the xnput system and th~e exit nozzle, and so forth. The totally automated engine start-up system requires the use of comp lex airborne and ground energy units, electric and turbine starters. ~ Zhe ia~rovement of aeronautical engineering characteristics resulted in the rapid development of aircraft armament systems. The caliber and weight of the weapons and their firing rate and accuracy changed. 7."his led to ~ replacement of the simple collimator sights installed on the piston-engine aircraft with complex automatic sights consisting of electronic-optical- mechanical systems with computer devices, gyroscopic assemblies~ radar rangefinders, electrohydraulic drives and other assemblies. This is espe cially for the long-range bombers, which carry target detection radar sets with a large amount of complex electronic equipment. This makes it possible for flight personnel to perform the most difficult missians successfully. , _ Aircraft armament systems have developed into special complexes, which include elements of airborne equipment and the destructive devices themselves. Each of these elements consists of complex electrical-radar mechanical sys- ~ tems requiring a high level of engineering and technical servicing and operation. The quantity and comple~ity of radio and radar equipment are increasing rapidly in the development and improvement of aviation equipment, both , airborne and that designed for remote flight-control. By the end of the . Great P atriotic War airborne radio equipment consisted of communication and - 7 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 _ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY some radar equipment, whereds equipment for various purposes has naw been added: equipment for identifying and determin~ing the national origin of aircraft, jamming equipmen~~, equipment for warning of a danger of attack, _ and so forth. - As the number of radio units has increase d on aircraft, they have also become more compJ_ex. While there were only three radio units with 30 electric vacuum devices on the Tu-2, aircraft of this class now carry from 15 to 25 radio units with 2,000 or mc~re electric vacuum and semiconductor devices. T~:e number of such devices for edch radio unit has greatly increased. The increased complexity of airborne equipment has in turn resulted in a _ considerable increase in the number of controls and regulated parameters. . The preflight inspection of aircraft such as the I1-10, La-7 and Tu-2 involv~d checking five .to eight parameters, whereas there are 250 to 300 controls and parameters to be checked on a modern fighter. Basic changes have also been made in aircraft equipment. Modern combat _ aircraft co�tin such a large amount of equipment that its arrangement and a~.~e difficult. Suffice it to say that the combined power of a1T sources of E;lectric energy on certain modern aircraft amounts to 150-300 kw,,, compared wit:~ 0.3-3 kw, in 1945. ~ Totally new airc.raft equipment systems have come into being: automatic ex~gine control, ~ighting-navigation and instrumJntation, instrument landing and automatic aircraft control systems and systems insuring normal working ~ondi~ions for the crews. Complex airborne systems for obtaining and processing information are extensiv~ely used on nec~~ aircraft. The separate svstems are being integrated. 'The precision and reliability of the informa- ~ion presented by all of the aircraft instruments have been improved. The equipment of cockpits with various instruments and devices for remote- control cf the aircraft systems has considerably increased the sensory-motor load on the pilot during a flight. At the same time, the increased speeds, ~ the e~m anded range of flight altitudes and the increased number of 'essential , operations have resulted in a sharp reduction in t'~e amount of time available - to perform them and the shortage of time has increased. ~ The modern equipment and ~eaponry installed on aircraft have greatly increased their combat effectiveness. The equipment of fighter-bombers with special navigation~l equipment and means of detecting and des~r~ying ground targets, arld the employment of modern bombing techniques have greatly increased their combat capabilities. A�t tha same time, the complexity and the integrated natur.e of aircraft'equip- ment rec~uire great stability of aircraft flight-performance data and equip- ment characteristics, as well as precise interaction among all elements of control of aerial combat operations. 8 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY We knaw that fighter-interceptors perform their tasks in organic inter- action with ground-control stations. Fu~.-thermore, the characteristics of the sepaxate elements of the intercept systems are s~ric~ly coordinated and interrelated. Acceptable deviations lie within a. very narrow range. - If the�characteristics of any element deviate beyond the established limits, this ca.-~ reduce the system's effectiveness. Because of this, special impor- tance is attached to the precise f~ctioning of all elements of the intercept - system. In conclusion, it should be pointed out that as a result of.rapid scientific ~ and technological progress pertaining to the mastery of nuclear energy, pro- duction automation and mechanization, the introduction of rad.ioelectronic equipment, the creation of high-polymer chemistry and the exteasive use of jet and missile equipment~ aircraft equipment and armament are being con- ' tinuously improv~ed and becoming increasingly complex, e�fective and diverse. At the same time, the develop�.nent of equipment and its greatly improved combat efficiency do not mean t11at the equipment and weapons have now become a dominant and self-sufficient force, which under modern conditions would destroy the dialectical unity and interdependency between maa and the new equipment. Man has b~en and remains the crucial factor in the combat employ- - ment and servicing of the equipment. 2. The Nature of Modern Aerial Combat and Demands Made of the Conditioning of Flight Personnel - T'he Equipment Is Altering Tactics ~ The clevebpment of aviation equioment and the crea~ion of new aircraft with good aeronautical engineering features, modern equipment and armament have � increasefl the combat capabilities of aircraft and cnanged the tactics and nature of aerial combat. Modern aerial combat is characterized by great spatial scope, rapid changes in the situation, powerful counteraction by the enemy~s air~defense facili- ties and the employment of various types of b~mbs, missiles and guns. Interceptions in the clouds, day or night, bombing with comr~licated types of maneuvEring, "hunting freedom," combat action at extremely low altitudes . and in the stratosphere, lengthy bomber flights with aerial refuelings, penetration of the enemy's air defense and the delivery of strikes at enemy air, missile and naval groupings, the covering of ground troops, the conduct of aerial reconnaissance, airborne landing operations ~d other missions and types of flights all impart an extreinely decisive, sharply dynamic and fierce quality to the battle. in turn requires unlimi.ted courage, _ initiative and a steadfast will to win on the part of the crews, and con- siderable, frequently maximum, exertion of moral and fighting abilities and psychological qualities. "We knaw," writes three-time Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General of Aviation I. N.. Kozhedub, "that each air battle is~a great test of~the airmen's - 9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , will, politicalr moral and psychalogical tempering, courage, military and flight skill.... The winners have been those who have handled the aircraft and weapons with excellence, were first to attack the enemy, employed proper maneuvering and seized the initiative."3 Modern combat involves the use of various types of missiles of various ranges. This keeps the crews in a constant state of tension, because the enemy can launch missiles at a target without seeing it. The role of information, guidance and tactical control have increased greatly ~ in modem aerial combat. The crews now obtain information by means of a . special display from the radar observation and control system. This, in combination with the airborne el.ectronic equipment, permits them to "see" fu'rther and "see" more. And the earlier the pilot identifies an enemy, the more time he has to appraise the air situation and make immediate prepara- tions for the attacks, which, due to the great speeds and swiftness of the engagement in modern warfare, may be the only one. It will not always be - possib le to carxy out a second attack. While the task of vectoring was formerl~ a matter of guiding a fighter to within visual range of the enemy, in modern aerial combat, the main task is one of bringing the mis'sile carrier, a"flying battery," to within target detection range by means of airborne interception radar. In a3dition, there is frequently no need for abrupt maneuvering by the fighter for selecting the rlirection of attack. Missiles with homing heads supplement aircraft Radar countermeasures are extensively used in modern combat, which consid- erably complicates the crew�s ftmctions in working with the radar equipment and may make it ineffective for a certain time and jeopardize the combat _ _ mission. S uch a situation requires maximum concentration of volitional . capacities on the part of r'Iight personnel, as well as the ai~ility to with- ~ s~and stress and the ability to employ antijamming means with technical competence and use the stand-by systems with maximum effectiveness. The use of information obtained from instrument re~adings does not reduce the importance ~f caution and visual observation, especially in low-altitude flight.s, in a maneuvering air battle and when operating in the enemy's rear a�rea. Caution has been, is and will continue to be a reliable weapon for pilots. Airmen do not always give proper attention to caution, relying mainly on infarmation from ground and on their intuition, which can have.negative consequences. This is well illustrated by the account of two-time Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation P. Golovachev: "We flew out that day as an escort for bombers. We did not have to worry about courage or a desire to engage in battle with the enemy. Ideological conviction and hatred for fascism increased our strength tenfold. Enemy fighters attempted to attack the bombers over the front line. An ai:r battle ensued.... I 10 ~ FOR OFFICIAL.USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY rapidly found a'Messer` in my sight and pressed the button. The enemy air- craft burst into flames and plunged toward earth. I do not need to tell you what exultant joy filled my heart. This was my first battle victory. I had the ability to gain this victory but, unfortunately, my combat experience and caution proved inadequate in the subsequent action. I should not have ~ rela~ced my combat alertness. After all, a bat~le was undezway! When I saw the fascist vulture fall~ however, I forgot about everything else on earth and did not notice the leader fall behind and another Hitlerite take his place. I was brought to my senses by a fascist round of fire which slashed through the cockpit. I was seriously wounded in the arm and head. The air- craft began to roll. Seriously wo~ded, I'made it` back to our territory with great difficulty and made a'forced` landing."4 ~ Aerial combat of maneuv~er has undergone certain changess speeds and altitudes and the duration and degree of stress have increased. The pilot`s tactical skill and his ability to utilize the capabilities~of boosted engines and the combat machine's special equipment and armament are of paramount importance. Tn certain stages of the battle maneuvering will be carried out in maximum, near-critical regimes, and this requires a th~rough knowledge of aero6ynamics, superb piloting techniques and good psychological conditioning on the part of the pilot. Modern aerial combat may involve a single battle or a group of battles. While in the last war an air battle was begun by fighters as a group, it - frequentiy broke up into pairs during the fighting. Group coordination, an element of combat perfection, has now developed into combat maneuvering in pairs, flights and squar3rons. Combat maneuvering in a group makes it possible to carry out powerful, concentrated strikes against both ground targets and enemy planes and helicopters in the air. The nature and peculiarities of modern combat places great demands on the pilot, primarily the level of his piloting techniques. In such a battle, ii is important not simply to control the aircraft but also to execute combat maneuvers in order always to have superiority over the enemy, to be ready for immediate employment of all the aircraft missiles and guns and to be able to fly with various, even maximum, load factors, the range of which has expanded cansiderably. This permits the pilot to occupy the most advan- tageous position for the attack, to forestall the enemy and make full use of all the aircraft's capabilities. - Piloting practice develops in tha pilots skills in steering an aircraft along ~ ascending and descending flight paths with extreme changes in pitch anales, speeds, altitudes and load factors, develops in them such volitional quali- ties as determination, boldness, purposefulness, courage and initiativ~, and devel.ops emotional stability. - As a rule, modern aircraft are flown at transonic flight s~eeds, which are - characterized by certain aerodynamic peculiarities: speed and load ("pick- up") instability and unbalanced negative pitching. Bringing the aircr~ft - 11 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 ~ FOR OFFILIAL USE ONLY to near-critical and critical attack angles presents certain difficulties. In certain regiff~es, this approach can be deter.nined by a warning buffetinr,, the aircraft's rocking from wing to wing. There are certain conditions ~ under which an aircraft may reach critical attack angles without any special warning signals. A pilot with a good knowledge of flight dynamics and the _ nature of these phenomena can overcome them successfully while engaged in combat. When engaging in aerial combat with the enemy the pilot employs maneuvering - approaching the tolerance level, with the maximum possible stress factors. Othezwise he may find himself in a disadf~antage, which the enemy will imme- = diately seize upon. *Jtilizing the aircraft's good maneuvering and speed capabilities, in add.i- tion to switching on tYie afterburner and altering the sweep, the pilot must conduct a determined and vigorous battle and attack the enemy at long and short ranges, using missiles and guns in an attempt to destroy the enemy. Such a battle can be conducted by the individual who constantly develops his will, builds up determination and boldness and builds up reliable resis- tance to overloads by means of special physical exercises and systematic training flights, striving for thorough competence, proper psychological condi~ioning and a solid knowledge of aerodynamics. In the process of per- forming the exercises in piloting and aerial maneuvering combat, the cardio- vascular system is conditioned and the necessary breathing rhythm and emotional stability are developed. Like all flight work, it is dif~icult to imagine an air battle not invol.ving risk. One must be prepared at each moment for any sort of unexpected developments in the air, for which a pilot prepares himself, possibly throughout his entire life, and, employing the "one hundred and one" alter- natives latent in his consciousness, he emerges victorious from even the most severe test. Recklessness, a childi~n devil-may-care attitude, bravado and the desire to expose oneself to danger aimlessly are not signs of bravexy, courage or strong will on the part of a pilot. On the contrary, such actions ~ay be considered a lack of discipline and an inability to control oneself. It is difficult to imagine an air battle without dramatic situations involving combat losses. After losing a friend, pilots are frequently required to fly out again immediately; subjecting themselves to risk, to throw ~hemselves into the face of danger. And the individual who is in good control of himself - will not lose his head in the battle or permit his will to weaken. In such a situation, commanders an,d political workers must take advantage of breaks between flights to work on the morale of the pilots, to help create positive emotions and confidence in victory, preventing a psychological breakdown. The arming of modern aircraft with "air-to-air" missiles, the equipment of ground forces with "ground-to-air" guided mi.ssiles and the dynamic nature of modern aerial warfare have considerably changed the factor of surprise in an aerial contest. It helps to seize the initiative in a battle and to 1i 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ assume a more advantageous initial position for the attack. reduces the effects ~ enemy fire, makes the attack swift and overwhelming, and creates ' conditions for achieving superiority in the battle. Surprise is insured by timely and complete information on the enemy, concealment and proper, vigorous maneuvering, great approach speed and the ability to take advantaqe of the flight altitutde and weather conditions. Unexpected enemy missile and aircraft activities can, in turn, complicate the accomplishment of a mission and threaten the lives ~f the crew. Modern aerial combat contains dozens of hidden, unknawn factors, which may have a considerable aftect on the pilot. While in time of peace the individual exgeriences new flight conditians for which he has prepared in advance, as a rule, an ui~expectedly ~hange in the situation in a battle may take the individual unawares. A pilot's lack of psychological preparedness for unexpected changes in battle conditions results in a sharp increase in emotional tensiori and can lead to a psychological breakdown. Onforeseen obstacles arising in a battle and the newness of the situation _ ~nay demand of the individual not only enormous willpower and maximum mental concentration, but also drastic alteration of his dynamic stereotype. It is not always possi.ble to achieve the latter within a short period of time, havev~er~ since .a restructuring of the system of conditioned-reflex associa- ~tions and habits for adapting to a new type of activity is inconceivable without certain drills, which are repeated over and over, as a rule, or extremely difficult acts of willpower. This is why the conditioning of the will in tiu?e of peace is an intrinsic element of flights made in ~ situation of risk, in complicated ci'rcumstances approaching actual combat to the maximum possible degree, which helps to develop and improve such volitional qualities as courage, determination, boldness and initiative in fliqht personnel. From Low Altitudes to the Upper Bounds of the Stratosphere The development of radio-technical means of detecting and combating air- craft has forced pilots to make more extensive use of low, even minimum altitudes. In modern warfare low-altitude flights help to overcome tha enemy's air defense withoiat detection, to strike unexpectedly and leave the target rapidly. While only ractical fighters operated near the ground . in World War II, as a rule, all branches of aviation can now perform combat missions at law and minimum al~itudes. ~ Flights at transonic and supersonic speeds near the surface of the earth ~ , increase stress on the pilot's cardiovascular system and results in rapid tiring, weakening of the eyes and considerable emotional stress, since control of flight conditions, spatial orientation and aiming are carried out both visually and by instrument. We know that it requires at least ' 2 to 3 seconds to take the instrument readings properly after switching one�s eyes from the earth to the cockpit, during which time an aircraft . covers 56.0 to 840 meters, flying at a speed of 1,000 km. per hour. The pilot therefore keeps most of his attention free for observing the earth's surface. ~ ~ . 13 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ . . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ i FOR OF~ICIAL USE ONLY � ~ T'he increase in low-altitude flight speeds made it necessary to use auto- ~ matic control systems, which make it possible to accomplish the basic tasks ' involved in piloting, combat employment and navigation by automated means. _ Without them, it would be extremely difficult to fly certain types of air- craft at low and minimtun altitudes, at night and in the clouds, and prac- tically impossible in limited visibility. . The sensation of the earth's nearness~ the possibility of striking it i.f there is an error in piloting techniques and the extremely rapid pace of action resulting from the extraordinarily rapid switching of attention from th~ earth as it zooms by to the instruments, and vice versa--all of this ~ rei~~irts that the pilot be capable of suppressing a~desire to increase flight altitude, and good volitional qualities, so as not to lose self- control for a single second. ' In the summertime, law-altitude flights are characterized by air turbulence, which frequently creates continuous, changing stresses. This causes the pilot to tire considerably sooner, leads to premature fatigue and increases reaction time. Constant glimpses of the terrain zooming by during low-altitude flights distor.ts one's perception of altitude. Special flying skill acquired in the process of control flights in a"dual-control" trainer, as well as during independent exercises in this type of flights, with the difficulty gradually increased, is required for accurate determination of altitude. The circumstances surrounding the pilot's mental work during low-altitude flights have become more complexe In addition to the conventional processing of various types of information, it is necessary to program the subsequent ~ flight mentally;~because the conditions may change at any moment. Z'he pilot i.nvoluntarily attempts to see as far as possible in front of his aircraft, ~ in order to follow the proper course and reach the target precisely. Constant visual contact with the earth's surface speeding by beneath the.aircraft requires extraordinary exertion of the entire psychological system and mental calculation of flight time and distance to the target, because the use of radio-technical navigation systems is limitec~ at low altitudes. Anticipated enemy caunteraction with fighters, ground-to-air guided missiles and individually employPd homing missiles will contribute to the intensifica- tion of psychological tension. _ Special difficulty and psychological tension are created by law-altitude fligh~ts in clouds, out of sight of land, when the plane is piloted by means of instruments alone and the assigned alti~ude is maintained by means of clata provided by barometric and radio altimeters. The slightest error in their readings~or a piloting error can complicate the flight.drastically, and this is why the pilot exercises such self-discipline, why his will is totally activated and his sight strained to the maximum. ~ 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ In the conduct of their combat operations pilots not only fly in the clouds - at laa altitudes but also lacate air targets by means of aircraft radar sights, approach and attack them. Successful accomplishment of th~e assigned missions is insured to a considerable degree by the pilot's ability to make _ Aaximum use of the capabilities of the airborne radar equipment and to ~ ~ consider its functional features when flying near the earth's surface. � An attack on maneuvering targets is greatly complicated if the fighter pilot, - no~ knowing the direction of their maneuvering, belatedly begins to make turns or change altitude. This, in turn, c~n lead to failure to intercept tlie target, which creates additional mental stress because of the pilot's responsibility for tha mission. High-altitude flights and flights in the stratosphere (up to 30-35 km} are ~ also typical f~r the modern aviation. Such flights represent one of the most difficult types of flight and require great physical stamina, emotional and volitional stability and the ability to perfor.m in rarified air on the part of the pilots. ~ We know that barometric pressure, air density and temperature, and engine _ thrust are reduc~d with an increase in altitude, solar radiation, increases and visual observation is complicated considerably. The thought process slaws, memory, especially visual memory, deteriorates, and fluxing ` ("erosion"~ of attention flccurs during hig-altitude flights. . The problem of oxygen deficiency, occurring with depressurization of the cockpit (due to equipment failure, and under combat conditions, to penetra- tion by missile or shell fragments, and so forth) becomes especially acute in high alti.tucle and stratospheric flights. An oxygen deficiency produces a large number of disturbances of the psychophysiological functions, resulting from insufficient saturation of the blood with oxygen due to a reduction in its proportional pressure in the inhaled air (2-fold at an altitude of 5 km, and 4-fold at 10 km). This causes disturbances in the functioning of the cerebral cortex and the central nervous system. . ~ ~ . � An oxygen deficiency is dangerous in the fact that it does'~not become , apparent immediately but rather gradually, unnoticed by the individual, weakeninq his'will and disrupting the psychophysiological processes. This leads to deterioration of the ability to function and then to loss of ~ consciousness. - The pilot must prepare carefully for each high-altitude flight, thoroughly checking the oxygen and high-altitude equipment. Modern pressure suits reliably protect the individual against the adverse factors of altitude, but at the same time they create a number of inconveniences for the pilot: limited'mobility, a reduced field of vision of the air and the cockpit equipment, possible fogging of the faceplate, and so forth. The high- altitude equipment somewhat reduces reaction precision, especially complex and motor reactions, and increases reaction time. It is markedly more . 15 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFb'ICIAL USE ONLY ' difficult to breathe under the extra pressure inside a sealed helmet, and training is required on the ground to adjust to forces making it difficult - to exhale and to the concluct of radio communication under these conditions. It is considerably more difficult to perform various maneuvers at high altitudes, because of the aircraft's inertia an.d delayed reaction to rudder deflection, as well as to control the engine, as a result of a possible increase in temperature with the change in its operating conditions. A great deal of attention must be given to the degree of rudder deflection,. because even the slightest error can result in loss of altitude, rocking and winq stall. This forces the pilot to carefully monitor the aircraft's _ position relative to the horizon, wnich in turn qreatly increases his emo- tional stress, compared with that experienced in flights at tnedium altitudes. The great flight altitude, the enormous space, the considerable distance from the earth's surface and the reduced noise level can all create a feeling of aloneness on the part of the pilot and in pilots lacking the - special psychological ~raining, even a feeling of fear or terror. - Our pilots successfully master the art of flying at high altitudes and in - the stratosphere and perfozm confidently in the high-altitude equipment while bombing, conducting aerial combat, launching missiles and engaging in field firing practice. Before ascending to altitudes of many kilometers, however, they thoroughly prepare themselves for the performance of such responsi.ble and complex s.issions, the preparation including psychological training and developing in themselves the necessary emotional and volitional stability. '1"he development of aviation equipment has made it possible to increase the duration of flights fcr all types of aircraft. The long time spent in the same position, the monotony of the situation, the pressure exerted against cartain parts of the body by the special equipment and straps, the breathing of pure oxygen for many hours at a time, flights over the sea or over enemy- 1-ield territory and concern about the possibility of being hit by guided , missiles both from the gro~d and from the air all subject the crew membErs to severe psychological tests. As the duration of flights increase, espe- cially during the second half of the flights, the crew`s efficiency is reduced, reactions slow, volitianal activeness drops, keenness of vision and auditory and muscular sensitivity are reduced, coordination deteriorates, ~ memory "lapses" and drawsiness occur, the attention span narrows, and ~here , is an increasing number of errors in the control of the aircraFt and engines an~ in the use of the various equipment. Emotional and physiological fatigue . the airmen to become irritable and quick-tempered. During a prolonged flight great psychological stress occurs at the most responsible stages: during aerial refuelings, the repelling of fighter ~ attacks and missile launchings and b~mbings. 16 , ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ Considering the peculiarities of prolonged flights, commanders and political workers persistently develop good moral-political and psycho- logical qualities in the airmen and strive to see that throughuut the ~ flight each crev~ remains combat-ready and capable of performir.g the mission under the most clifficult conditions. A spiritual closeness, a feeling of comradeship, support an3 mutual assistance, a desire to help a camrade--these are solidly entrenched features of the Soviet pilot, his extra weapon in combat. Z'he increased flight speeds and altitudes, the ~iiversity and complexity of the tasks have sharply increased the stress on the airmen, creating considerable, sometimes maximum psychophysiological tension during certain phases of a flight. There are as many as 280 to 300 control, signal and monitoring elementsin the cockpit of a modern aircraft, and - this, combined with the supersonic speeds and the increased range of altiitudes, has greatly increased the individual's pace of work. He frequently fi.nds himself with a severe shortage of time, ~ahich demands extreme ooncentration of attention, memory~ and thought. ~e decisiveness and the dynamic nature of modern warfare demands great maneuverability of the aircraft. ~oa~bat mane~:vering is employed in piloting, during practice launchings of missiles at ground targets, bombing with chanqes in the flight path, and so forth. The maneuvering of an aircraft always invulves a change in speed per unit of time, that is, acceleration, which affects the individual~s psychophysiological functioning. The term �load factor" has frequently appeared in the literature, i.n the analysis of accelerations, a term which indicates how many times the force created by the acceleration exceeds the weight of the body. Z'he load factor is measured a.n units equaling multiples of body weight on the ground. When an individual experiences an overload in flight, certain of ~h~e . physiological functions affecting his efficiency undergo cnanges. An overload causes the pilot to experience a feeling of heaviness and a limitation of motor functioris, reduced keenness, and sometimes, pains in the area of the chest and stomach as well. The individual's auditory and speech abilities deteriorate~under prolonged 4- to 5-fold overloads, which may disrupt radio communication, lead to distortion of coIIanands, and so forth. Acceleration alters blood circulation and results in a buildup af blood . in vertain parts of the body (in the extremities ~.n the case of a positive load factor, and in the upper part of the body, with a negative load factor). The disturbance of circulation leads to a deterioration of vision. It - also becomes more difficult and take~ longer to read the various gauge's and instruments. Te~orary loss of sight is possible at 5- to 6-fold overloads, which is not restored for 15 to 20 ~econd. Z'his can result in premature disengagement from the battle and to loss of aircraft control. A disturbance o~ visual perception has a negative effect on the indi~vidual's . psychological state, causing overstress. ~ 17 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The effects of overloads depend upon their intensity and duration. A 2-fold ov~erload presses the pilot against the seat; i~t i~ difficult for him to make even small motions with the hand to control the aircraft in the case of 4- to 5-fold ov~erloads; and his breathing rhythm is disturbed, his breathing becomes shallow and there may be a temporary :ioss of consciousness with a 5- to 6-fold overload. A dark film cov~ers the eyes with a 5-fold positive ovetload, and the pulse rate increases to 120-180. With a 2-fold negative load factor the blood rushes to the head and the pilot experiences pain around the eyes and slight dizziness. It is important that each pilot know these things and bear them in mind during the performance of missions. Dur~nng a flight, the individual, sometimes without even being aware of it, - is constantly interacting with equipment, with dozens of instruments, buttons, levers, assemblies and systems, reacting to their signals, sometimes barely discernible, sometimes "screaming" and demanding special attention. . The stability of this contact is directly dependent on the depth of his knowledge and the degree to which he has developed his skills in working with the equip- ment. The individual with a good knowledge of the equipment ii*anediately makes the proper decision at the first, sometimes barely discernible, signal, without thinking about it for long, instantly manipulates the control ele- ments and carries;~out visual, audial and in~rument monitoring of the .func- tianing of systems' and units, fli5ht conditions and radio communication. A solid knawledge of the equipment frees the pilot's atten~ion in flight and greatly helps him to concentrate on what is most important, to react cor- rectly and rapidly to unexpected equipment failure~, to prevent the develop- me~t of a state of stress in emergency situations. - Modern aircraft with their large ntunber of rad.ioelectronic instruments, several hydraulic systems, oxygen equipment, automation, gi.~ns and missiles, require especially thorough checking and testing of the special equipment prior to a flight. During the last w:ar, after the engine was rewed up and checked and the functiuning of the panels was checked by a mechanic, the pi.lot inspected the aircraft, the propellor and tire pressure in the landing ge ar and tested the�rudde r deflection and the loading of the air- _ craft armament, which took 3 to 5 minutes. It takes longer and requires several special machines and a large number of specialists in various areas to che ck a modern missile-carrier. It is imp~ssible to check and test an aircraft prior to takeoff unless the , pilot and navigator have a good knowledge of the checking equipment and the basic technical characteristics .of the aircraft systems and control elements, since even a slight.deviation from the standard on the part of a singl~ parameter for a unit can result in failure to complete the mission and in a breakdown of flight safety. A s uperficial knowledge of the equipment and poor skills in working with the control elements create psychological incom- - petence and lead to bl.urring and uncertainty of volitional action and, naturally, make it unstable and short-lived. 18 FOR OFFICIAL.USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY During one ~f the fozmation flights, yo~g.pilot X.changed his bearing on the route and found himself in the wake of the lead plane. FeZing the aircraft shake, he decided to escape the wake by fal~.inq behind. Lackinq a thorough knawledge of and skills in working with the cockpit equipment on the aircraft, which vaas new to him, hawever, he mistakenly pressed the button for jettisoning the reserve tanks instead of :he air-brake button, which~would have increased his distance from the lead aircraft. Concentrating on retaininv~,his place in the formation, the pilot did not notice the d~parture of the~?jettisoned tanks or the signal lights burning on the instrimient panel, a:~d continued the flight, attempting to maintain strictly the prescri.bed distances and interval. The lieutenant paid the penalty for his poor technical gr~paration for the . assiqnment immediately, when the lead plane executed a turn toward the airfield and noticed the absence of the u�ider-wing tanks on the.wingman's aircraft. When he asked haa much fuel was left, the wingman answered with dismay: "The red light is on...." It was only then that he understood his error and lost his head completely. Attempting to reach the airfield as rapidly as possib~le, the pilot would increase his speed and catch the leadman, asking the commander each minute haw far it was to the airfield. His voice was strange and he moved the controls excessively and unevenly. The leadman understood his subordinate's mental state and did his best to ~ calm him, reporting in his ordinary calm voice now the distance to an alternate ai.rfield along the route, now the landing procedure, attempting to take the pilot's attention away from the signal light and the fuel gauge, _ on which the arrow was approaching the zero mark. And this helped the young _ pilot to come out of the difficult situation safely. ~ Z'he successful fu].fil]ment of assignments, both in a combat situation and under peacetime conditions, depends greatly on the physical conditioning . of flight personnel. This is due to the increased flight speeds and alti- _ tudes, the intensity of modern aerial combat and the ever-increasing stresses involved in pi loting an aircraft. . Tadar, a pilot performs the functions of an operator-monitor with ever- increasing frequency, integrating readings from the instruments and systems, and participatss less and less frequently in control involving great physical _ exertion. While on the first jet aircraft, the air brakes, landing gear " and Flaps were activated by means of manually operated, hydraulic valves which required a certain amount of physical effort, the landing elements and wing control devices on modern aircratt are activated by applying slight pressure to a button or switch. _ . It would seem that the pilot's physical stress would have decreased with the - introduction of automated aircraft control.. 7.'his was not the case, hawever, due to the increase in flight speeds and altitudes, and stress factors, the use of pressure suits and sealed helme.ts, the increased numbe r of flights performed at low and minimum altitudes and the large increase in the amount ~ - of information required. ~ 19 . _ FOR OFFICIAL iJSE ONLY . i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � ~ _ Following flights on mode~n aircraft, the pilots frequently experience nervous, emotional and physical fatigue and exhaus tion. The pilot~s courage, detesmination and stamina now depend to a considerable degree - ~n his physical endurance and conditioning. Systematic physical exercise helps flight personnel to develop ttie moral and combat qualities essential~ for the surcessful conduct of modern warfare. Regular exercises on a trampoline and on parallel and horizontal bars, jogging, sports, skiing and swimming develop resistance to stresses, motor coordination and good spatial orientation in the pilots. A modern air battle is thus not just a dusl between the technical capabilities of aircraft, their mi.ssiles, guns, bombs and radioelectronic weapons and tactical devices, but is primarily a.struggle between pilots and their moral- political, combat and psychological qualities. The winner of an air battle is the individsal who is ab le to impose his will resolutely upon the enemy, - to suppress his spi~t, to make him doubt his own capabilities, to create fear, de~peration, a feeling of futility and confusion in him. . ~ ~ zo FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C~ape,r II. (~NERAL ASPEC'PS OF MORAL-POLITICAL AND PSYC~iOLOGICAL TRAINING IN THE AIR FORCE - 1. The Place of Moral-Political and Psychological Training Within the System of Training and Indoctrination for Flight Personnel Zhe R+ole of the Morale Factor in Contemporary Warfare (In the Air Battle) Although the Communist Party and the Soviet Government firmly and consist- ently conduct a peace-loving Leninist foreign policy, they have not forgotten the fact that aggressive imperialist forces are still active on the planet, foroes which are stubbornly opposing detente and intensifying the arms race, and have not giv~en up their plans for armed aggression against the USSR and the other nations in the so cialist commonwealth. In this situation our party and government have been forced to take effective steps to strengthen the nation's defense capability, to build up the fighting strength of the Soviet Armed Forces and to avert a new world war and the military conflicts kindled by the imperialists against peace-loving peoples. A future world war, should the reactionary imperialist forces be successful i.n ~mleashing one, will, in political essence, be a decisiv~e military con- fro~tation between two opposite social systems--capitalism and socialism. This will result in a war of an acute class nature. and in extremely deter- mined actions by the belligerents. In order to achieve victory ov~er the enemy in a future war, the Air Force - is e~ected to play a large role alongside the other services of the Soviet Armed Forces. Zt will be used to repel enemy air raids, to deliver power- ful re~taliatory strikes against the enemy, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, to conduct joint operations with the Ground Forces and naval forces, to conduct aerial reconnaissance, to land troops and equip- ment and to perform other missions. ' , Taking the objective patterns of warfare and factors contributing to the achievement of victory, the ~ommunist Party proceeds from the assu~tion , that the decisive force in combat is manned, ideologically and physically strong, able to handle the combat equipment and weapons perfectly and pre- 1 pared to surmount all difficulties in order to defeat the enemy. In the Air Force it is primarily the flight pers~nnel, those~directly involved in ` employing the weapons in aerial combat. And the air fighter can perform a r combat mission alone or as p art of a small crew. He will not only perform as an active force but will also be the target of modern weapons. The successful performance of the combat mission will depend upon his moral- political and psychol~gical qualities and his fighting efficiency. Good morale helped Soviet pilots to emerge victorious from the difficult engagements of the Great Patriotic War. A clear understanding ~f party policy, of the objectives of war and the importance of completing each com- bat assignment gav~e them fortitude, valor and fearlessness in the struggle 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY with the enemy~ Our pilots demonstrated mass heroism in aerial combat, a - willingness to sacrifice themselves and a determination to fight on in the - air, even when their ammunition had been s~ent. - Appraising the role of morale in warfare, V. I. Lenin stated: "Victoxy in any war is ultimately deternuned by the morale of those masses who shed their blood on the field of battle."5 This fact is of enormous theoretical and practical significance: It accounts fox the accomplishment of many tasks involved in Soviet military organizational development and accotmts for the abjectives and the substance of moraI.-political and psychological training for personnel of the Armed Forces. The morale factor is manifested in a ' spirit of readiness and determination an the part of the fighting men to perform combat operations and in the'.r capacity to bear all the trials of war for the sake of achieving total vict~ry over the enemy. Our army's morale is a direct reflection and a part of the Soviet people`s a?orale. It cannot be separated from the state`s social system, its policy and its social and economic relations. The troops' ideological conviction as to the justice of their cause, their social feelings and psychological conditioning are merged into one in their morale. All of this is reflected in the good moral-poli~ical qualities and the fighting efficiency of the personnel, which are essential to the successful performance of their combat missi.ons . T'he morale factor is in essence a moral-political factorv since the main - indicator of its strength is the people's attitude toward the political abjectives of warfare. "...An awareness by the masses of the objectives and the reasons for a war," V. I. Lenin stressed, "is enormously important a~?d ensures victory."6 , At the same time, str~~cturally morale is an ideological-psychological fac- tor. The ideo~ogical and social-psychological aspects are i.ts main elements. They are closely unified and constantly i.nteract and influence each other. Z`he r~le of morale has increased many times over in contemporary warfare, i_n air battles and engagements. There is a large number of re asons for this. Thcse include, first and foremost, pol~itical reasons emerginq from the social essence of a possible war. Tha greatest class confrontation between opposite social systems in the history of man predestines it to be an uncompromi.sing war. Zt will make enormous demands of the morale and tremendous physical e3:ertion by personnel of the Armed Forces, by the entire nation. ~ fihE altered nature of weapons and combat equipment, primarily the develop- ann~ of nuclear mi.ssiles, is an important factor contributing to the _ increasing importance of morale in a future war. . Air Force personnel will have to conduct combat operations in an exceptionally complex ground and air situation, faced by the threat of the enemy's employment 22 ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' ' of nuclear we.apons, when the danger wi].l pursue not only flight crews in the air but also those s tiil at the airfield. Constant awareness of the nuclear threat will unquestionably have a great effect on the morale of the fliers, entaa.l an enormous exertion of their spiritual and physical strength and demand special psychological stability of them. One cari imagine the effect produced on the morale of the flight personnel of air units and subunits by the enemy's sudden employment of the latest weapons, by the creati.on of enormous areas of dev~statian and fires, by the uncertainty - of the situation due to the possibility of temporary loss of control. Excep- tionally good morale and great physical exertion will be required of. airmen - operating from an airfield located in a zone of radioactive contamination. This situation can depress personnel, especially those who are readying the aircraft for flights and providing flight suppo~~t. Changes in methods of conducting combat operations will have a gre3t effect ~on the morale of Air Force personnel. The dynam~.c z~ature of operations, the abrupt changes occurring in the situation, rapid switches from one type of � operations to another, arid the co~lexity of control will all increase the physical and morale pressure on the airmen considerably. _ The moral-psychological tension of flight per.sonnel is also increased by the fact that their combat missions involve the necessity of overcoming the ene- my's air defenses and the performance .of flights over great distances and at various altitudes. The incr.eased m7e of fihe morale factor in moder~ warfare, particularly in air battles and engagements, is making it necessary to raise the deinands made of the moral-political and psychol~gical conditioning of Air Force personnel an3 of the development of qualities and skills i.n them essential to the successful conduct of combat operations and to the achieve:nent of victory over the enemy. The Essence of Moral-Political and Psychological Conditioning of Military ~ Fliers,and the Tasks Involved The moral-political and psychological training of Soviet Air Force personnel refers to the aggregate of ineasures and act.ivities designed to develop in the airmen the good political, moral and psychological qualities essential to the exemplary pe rformance of their military duty in peacetime and in time of war. Moral-political and psychcloqical training is a single, inseparable - prvicess, the definitive basis of which is the moral-political conditioning of the fighting men. Moral-political and psychological training permeates all aspects of the train- ing and indoctrination of the personnel and is an extremely important factor contr.i~uting to the continuous imp rovement of the combat readiness of the troo~s and to their successful performance of the missions assigned them. Moral-political and psychological training have a single, common subject, the . � 23 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - fighting men., as well as a single, common objective, that of actively influ- encing the intellect an,d ps~chic makeup of the men to develop politically aware, ideolag.ically strong~ bold and courageous armed defenders of the Soviet homeland. ~ The importance of moral-politi~al and psycholoqical training in the overall process of training and indoctrination for personnel of the Air Force is steadily i.ncreasin.g in the contemporary situation. This is due to many ci.rcumstances, primarily the nature of warfare, air battles and engagements, . to the increased importance of the morale factor for achieving victory over the enemy, to intensification of the ideol~gic~l struggle in the international arena, the high level of development o~ aviation equipment and weapons, and ' the continuing i.mprovement of inethods of employing them in combat and~servicing them. . The process of moral-political and psychological training for Air Force per- sonnal involves dir,erse tasks, which can generally be broken down into three _ groups. The first group of tasks includes the development of a communist world outlook and ideological conviction in the airmen. A high level of - political awarenPSS rorms the basis of all of the personality features of - the fighting man, of his spiritual being. Ideolagical conditioning provides the motivating force behind the productive servi~e work of the airmen in peacetime ancl motivates the flying fighters to perform with determination and vigar in a combat situation. ~ The. second group of tasks includes the development of social and political feelings and qualities in Air Force personnel. Primary among these are Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, fraternity with the armies of nations in the soci~list commonwealth, avid hatred for thE enemies of socialism, peace and progress, loyalty to military duty, a readiness to make _ self-sacrificea, and the desire tirelessly to strengthen military friend- ship and to assist comrades in the training and in combat. Z'he third group of tasks covers t'~e development o� emotional qualities in the airmen necessary for them to perform successfully in peacetime and in ~ime of war. The main qualities in this category are emotional stability - i.n the face of modern weapons, psychological preparedness to engage in combat and to achieve victory over the enemy, psychnlogical compatibility, combat activeness, valor, boldness, self-control and performance efficiency. . The objective of all these tasks is to develop ideologically convinced Air Force fighters, devoted to the party, the government and the people, fighters able to utilize their spiritual strength and psychological quaiities to achieve victory over the enemy, to employ the weapons and combat equipment - effectivel.y and to ensure flight safety. Highly effective moral-political and psychological training of airmen is achieved by obsPrving a number of conditions. The following should be s~essed: 24 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a coinnunist orientation, party-mindedness, unity of ideological and psycho- logical influence upon the servicemen, and maximum application of scientific achiev~ments in the training and indoctrinational process. Instructions issued by the 25th CPSU Congress on the need to take a compre- hensive approach to the organization of the entire system of indoctrination and to close unity of ideological-political~ labor and moral indoc- trination, taking the specific characteristics of various groups of workers into account, are of prime importance tor improving the effectiveness of moral-political and psychological training for Air Force personnel.~ 2. The Content, Forms and Methods of MoraL-Political Training for Flight Personnel Moral-political,training envisages, first of all, developing in the airmen a coaenunist world outlook, ideological conviction, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and proper morals of behavior in peacetime and in a combat situation; arming the personnel with an understanding of state interests, the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, and the nature and objectives of wars fought in defense of the socialist homeland. Moral-political training is carried out as part of the overall system for trai.ning and the personnel, mainly in the area of ideological work, but it has its awn specific forms and methods. A scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook has an enormous function in , the practical work of fighting men in the Soviet Armed Forces, including airmen. It helps them to understand the laws of social development, to orient themselves in questions pertaining to the international situation and to life in our nation, and to gain an understanding of the natural - patterns of warfare, trends in the development of militaxy affairs and factors determining the fighting efficiency and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. . A Marxist-Leninist world outlook forms the basis of ideological conviction and caf;�the political awareness of Soviet fighting men. It helps them ta coxrec~ly appraise and understand the class essence of social development, to thczoughly comprehend the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, to praci~ely determine their place in the struggle to implement the demands mad~ of the Armed Forces by those bodies, to resist bourgeois ideology, and ~to successfully combat relics of the past in their thoughts and conduct. . A communist world outlook plays an important role in the accomplishment of ~ specific tasks involved in maintaining combat readiness and in the training and indoctrinatian. The ideological conviction of airmen is demonstrated in their daily actions and conduct, in the improvement of their combat skill and in the strengthening of discipline, order and organization� It was explained at the 25th CPSU Congress that "communist ideological principles are a combination of knowledge, conviction and practical action."8 25 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' The communist world outlook and the ideological conviction of airmen is - dev~eloped in i�he process of personnel training and in3octrination and in the performance of their assigned tasks. The plann.ed political training of officers, shr~re-based warrant officers, soldiers and sergeants, agita- tion and propaganda, cultural and educational work, and party education have a leading.role. Independent preparation by servicemen constitutes the main methc~d of expanding their ideological-theoretical prospective and giving it a more solid foundation. The thorough study of decisions coming out of the 25th party congress is . the main element in the political training for the personnel at the present time. Flight personnel study in Marxist-Leni.nist training groups. These groups are formed around a subject chosen voluntarily by the officers, based on their knowledge and on the sequence for studying the components of Marxism- Leninism. ' Subunit and unit commanders or their deputies for political affairs lead the Marxist-Leninist training groups for pilots. Z'he group leaders conduct seminars and schedule consultations, provide the officers with extensive assistance in the organization of their independent work, and work up and present lectures on topics of current interest. F~r _ example, the commanders of many air units lead lectures on the following subjects: "Specific features of the new stage in~the development of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the officers' tasks in the training and indoc- trination of the personnel"; "Fundamentals and principles of Soviet military organizational development"; and "Modern weapons and their effect on the course and outcome of a war." They relate each lecture to the life of the unit and subunit. The haightened interest of military cadres in Lenin's ideological and theo- xetical heritage and in decisions and materials of the 25th CPSU Congress is a distinctive feature of the officers` Marxist-Leninist training at the present time. In the propaganda and study of these, extensive use is made of lectures and reports, theoretical conferences and discussion of written papers on Lenin's works, party congress decisions and current theoretical issues . � '7t is the honored duty not only. of propagandists, lecturers and th~se de]iverir~g reports, but of all our party activists, to explain the concepts emerging from the congress to each communist, to each Soviet individual," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. 2. Brezhnev stressed in the Accountability Report at~the 25th party congress. "We must put all of our knowledge, all of our skills of conviction, all the powers of our minds into this w~rk."9 In the air imits and subunits a great deal of attention is devoted to the organization of the officers' independent work, to making the study of _ ' 26 ~ FOR OFFICIAL ~USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MarxisarLeninism more effective. Commanders, political workers and party _ orqanizations create conditions conduciv~e to this work, arrange oonsulta- tions, help the officers to select the readir.g material and to develop skills in studying it on ~heir own, sunanarize and disseminate progressive experience and arrange for monitoring of the studies. The officer's centers~ clubs and libraries are doing a great deal to improve the quality of the independent work. They have set up self-education rooms _ and methodological centers, which contain literature for Marxist-Leninist training, folders of militazy newspaper and magazine clippings on specific � subjects, and methodological guides for the independent work. Tt~ie libraries perform a great deal of bi.bliographic and reference work and help the lecturers, _ qroup leaders and students select the required literature. Of the forms and methods used to monitor the ~ndependent work o~ the officers, the following have proven themselves entirely on the practical level: indi- _ vidual discussions on the subjects studied and on the content of the recom- mendeci; making assignments to address militazy scientific conferences and theoretical seminars, to prepare papers on a current topic and to write articles for magazines and newspapers; group discussion of synopses written ~ by individual comrades; and the exchange of experience in work~ng with orig~- - nal sources. The discussion of these issues at party and Komsomol meetings and at committee ~ and bureau sessions contributes effectively to the vi.talization and improve- ment of the political studies of the airmen. Many Air Force officers study at the n~ght universities of Marxism-Leninism and party schools, and are correspondence students of higher military educa- tional institutions. Commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol orqanizations are doing everything possible to see that their studies are productive and have a constructive effect on their service activities. Agitation and propaganda work, in which many pilots, engineers, commanders and political workers take part, has a large role in the development of a - c~unist world ntitlook in the airmen. The concepts of Marxism-Leninism, the foreign and domestic policies of the CPSU and the advantages of the socialist system over capitalism are explained to the fightin~ men in the course of this work, and the social nature and the historical purpose of the Soviet Arm~ed Forces and their missions are clarified. In the performance of this work, the propagandists and agitators not only bring knawledge to the masses of fighting men but also have a good oppor- timity to study the moods and requests of the airmen and to enrich themselves from the experience of the latter, without which it would be impossi.ble for them to have an effective indoctrinational influence on the personnel. The mass media--the press, radio and television--as well as visual agitation, are the reliable assistants of the commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations in the ideological-political indoctrination of the airmen. . . 27 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~i . - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Cultural-educational work has a considerable role in the development of the airman's spiritual being. Officer's centers, officer's clubs, libraries, _ rooms of combat glory, Leninist rooms, film studios and schools of fine arts ~ (izostudii), literary associations, folk theaters, ensembles, orchestras and amateur art groups take an, active part in this work. By making extensiv~e use of the forans, me~hods and means of cultural- educational work, commanders, political workers and party organizations are actively contributing to the success of the personnel in their combat and political training, raising their political, military technical and cultural Ievels, and publicizing the experience of the best airmen and the results of socialist competition. The highly diverse possibilities of cultural-ed~.~cational work are applied irz a manner which promotes the " successful performance of combat and political training tasks and the improvement of combat readiness, and making it an effective means of producing a soldier and citizen possessing a well-balanced combination - of spiritual richness, moral purity and physical perfection. � Local party, soviet and Komsomol organizations~ military patron conanissions, creative unions, cultural and educational institutions, scientists and cultural figures provide the air units with active assistance in the con- duct of cultural and educational work. ~ A co~nunist world outlook and ideological conviction are developed in the ` airmen in the course of their combat training. Each class conducted as part of the ground trai.ning and all of the flight training are imbued with the communist ideological spirit and are designed to develop in the fighting men an aware attitude toward their assigned job, pride in the good combat qualities of Soviet aviation equipment and confidence in its dependability and effectiveness for performing combat and training tasks and for combating a powerful enemy. Commander, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations strive to see that the political, military and moral indoctrination process develops in the military airmen a vigorous outlook on life~and an aware attitude . toward their social duty, and that imity of word and action becomes the standard for their daily conduct. A high level of communist awareness is demonstrated by military airmen primarily i.n their steadfast implementation of requirempnts set by the party ' - and government with respect to further increasing the combat pawer of the military aviation in the persistent_'improvement of combat skill, the strength- ening of ciiscipline, order and organization, and in a constant readiness to perform their duty to the homeland of protecting its sacred air borders in an exemplary manner. 26 FOR OFFICIAL~USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FO1~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ Indoctrinating Military Pilots in a Spirit o� Soviet P atriotism and Internation.alism The work performed by commanders, political workers and party organizations to indoctrinate the airmen in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist ~ internationalism has specific, closely interlinked focuses, and constitutes a single process of developing social and patriotic feelings in the personnel. The patriotism and internationaI.ism of the fighting men is based on a high level of political awareness and a profound certainty of invincibility for E the great cause of communism. The stronger the individual's ideological conditioning, the more powerful are his patriotic feeli.ngs and the greater his activeness i.n the performance of his military duty. As stressed at the 25th CPSU Congress, the entrenchment in the minds of the workers, especially the younger generation, of the concepts of Soviet patri- otism and socialist internationalism, pride in the Soviet Nation, in our homeland, and a readiness to come to the defense of socialism's accomplish- ments has been and remains one of our most important tasks,l0 Propaganda of the advantages of the so~ialist system, of the great conquests of the Soviet people and its achievements in the building of communism has a large role in the patriotic indoctrination of the airmen. The i~ortance of the five-year plans in the building of socialism and communism in our nation is explained to the personnel~ the Communist Party's role in the accomplishment of social and political, economic and cultural reforms is demonstrated to them; and they are told about the successes achieved by the Soviet people in the implementation of plans, and the achievements of Union republics in the development of their economies and culture. Diverse forms and methods are employed in this work: lectures, reports, talks, ev~enings of discussion, the showing and discussion of movies, readers' con- ferences, trips to factories and plants, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and meetings with workers in the national economy and with representatives of local party, Komsomol and trade union organizations. The lecture film series "Know and Love Your Homeland," for example, is highly popular with the men in air unit "X." It includes filmed documentary chronicles on the Union republics and the nation's important econor.mic regions. As a rule, the films are preceded by presentations by propagan- dists, scientists and cultural figures, representatives of local organiza- , tions and outstanding workers in the production sphere. Such activiti~s make a deep impression on the airmen and help to make them patriotic. As they publicize the successes achieved by the Soviet people in the buil'ding of socialism and communism, commanders, political workers, propagandists and ~ agitators stress the international importance of our achievements and their role in the development of the world revolutionary process, which helps the ~ fighting men gai.n a thorough understanding of their international missions. - � 29 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The rev~luti~nary, combat and labor traditions of the CouIInunist Party, the - Soviet people and their Armed Forces are extensively employed in the patri~ otic indoctrination of the mi.litary ai.rnien. The courage and selflessness of the co~unist revolutionaries and the heroism demonstrated by the Soviet people in labor and in battle provide aur fiqhting men with a pawerful and inspiring example of sefless service for the homeland, an example of.irre- proachab3.e fulfillment of their duty to it. Zhe traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces and of the military aviation are becominq especially important in the indoctrinational work. The in:~~t impor- tant of these are infinite devotion to the cause of communism, t:o the Soviet homeland and the people; mass heroism, persistence and selflessness in the fulfillment of military duty; friendship and military comradeship; a persist- ent effort to improve combat skills; loyalty to international duty and combat fellowship with fighting men of the other socialist armies. As they publicize combat traditions~ the ca~anders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations strive to provide each airman with a good knowledge of the history Qf the Soviet Armed Forces and of the military aviation, the combat history of their unit and the feats performed by those who have served in their unit. This helps to make the ai.rmen proud to be members of the , glorious family of armed defenders of the homeland, proud of their unit and ' subunit. Meetings of the air.nen with Heroes of the Soviet Union, veterans of the Armed Forces and of the aviation, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and those who have demonstrated courage and 3~eroism in the performance of their military duty irc time of peace are a proven means of indoctrination in the fighting traditions. The development of patriotic feelings in the airmen is.advanced by military rituals and other ceremonial activities: presentations of govern- ment awaxds, meetings, parades by the personnel with the trooping of the unit fighting colors~ the taking of the military oath by the yotmg soldiers and the presentation of aircraft to their flight crews. Visits to monuments and the fraternal gra~ves of combat heroes, to sites of historic events and heroic battles of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War and to exhi.bits and museums are also of great indoctrinatianal ~~~:lue. The patriotic indoctrination of airmen is organically linked to the develop- ment of their sense of socialist internationalism. Its purpose is one of dev~loping a fighting man who can function with assurance in an atmosphere of intricate ideological struggle, in an unforeseen situation, who will stead- fastly clefend the interests of socialism at all times and wherever he may be. Strengthening our combat fraternity with personnel in the armies of the _ socialist states is an important integral part of the inte�rnational indoc- trination of Soviet fighting men. A number of areas can be singled out in the work of providing Soviet fighting mzn with an international indoctrination. Among tl:e most important are 30 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY thorough clarification of the essence af proletarian, secialist internation- alism and the combat fraternity of the socialist armies in the contemporary situation; publicizing the experience of patriots and internationalists of various nations in conducting ;oint comb~t operations against the co~non enemy; faaiiliarizing the airmen with the lives and the c~mbat work of armies of the socialist nations; indoctrinating the fighting men in a spirit of inter- natia�ialism in the course of joint exercises with arnues of the socialist states; and constant consideration for the conditions unrler which Soviet �ighting men serve in the fraternal natians in the performance of par~y- political work. Thos~ tmits temporarily located in the socialist states 'or s~ationed in - tary districts next to nations of the socialist com�nonwealth have accumulated ~ a gr~a't dea~ of experience in developing socialist internationalism in the _ personnel. The work includes extensive use of political information briefings on the achievements of the socialist nations and on the combat histories of their armed forces; meetings of Soviet fighting men with those of the fraternal armies; joint celebrations of revolutionary and national holidays (ceremonial meetings, demonstrations, mi.litary parades); joint evening discussions on special subjects and combat fraterr~ity gatherings; trips to plants and qoskhozes, visits to museums and exhibits, the sharing of movies and news- _ reels on the lives and combat training of the soldiers, and so forth. Joint unit and headquarter exercises conducted under a plan of the Unified Coaunand of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Nations play an important role _ in the strengthening of ties of friendship among the fraternal armies. Just . before such exercises are conducted our co~nanders, staffs and the political organs coordi.nate their plans with the commands of the fraternal armies, work , out problems of interaction and discuss conunon tasks and experience in con- ducting party-political work in exercises. Soviet pilots frequently perform shoulder to shoulder with those of the fra- ternal nations in these exercises. Cultural and eductional institutions, song and dance ensembles and amateur performing.groups work extensively during the exercises, and field friend- ship clubs function, organizing programs by concert groups for the troops _ and for the local citizens. The tactical exercises are followed by critiques, meetings and parades. The - critiques are attended by a broad group of commanders r.nd political workers . representing the armies of the sr~cialist nations. They help to analyze the joint operations and to publicize demonstrations of combat fraternity. In the forces located away i'rom home, international indoctrination of,the fighting men is promoted by a study of the differences involved in serving under these conditions. There is a tradition in units assigned to gr.oups of forces, for example, whereby personnel arriving to serve in these units are acquainted with the state structure of the sccialist nations, with their . 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' successes in ths building of socialism and with ther national customs and laws. Special attention is devoted to the study of ac3reements covering the legal skatus of Soviet troops te~orarily located in fraternal nations. - Posters, booklets, leaflets and books of graphic aids issued hy the political organs of Soviet forces are very useful in this work. Our German, Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian comrades address seminars, assemblies and conferences of c~nnmanders, politicaZ workers, propagandists and secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations, and do a great deal to familiarize our fighting men with the nation in which~they are located. 7.'he fervent love of the Soviet peopTe for their socialist homeland prompts another, opposite feeling--a burning hatred for its enemies, the imperialist aggressors. This organic timity of two opposite feelings is well illustrated by the words of the great patriot and humanist A.M.Gor'kiy: "Life is arranged in such a devilishly skillful manner that~it is impossible to love sincerely without being able to hate."11 Expnsure of the reactionary, misanthropic nature of contemporaxy imperialism is an im~ortant part of the work of developing hatred for the enemies of the .socialist homeland in the personnel. An understanding of the fact that imperialism cannot exist without exploiting the workers, without appropri- ating the product of their labor, evokes a politically acute attitude toward oppressors in the fighting me~1 and creates a feeling of solidarity with peoples struggling for liberation. Demonstrating imperialism's aggressive and pl~derous nature and demonstrating the disasters and sufferings which the wars it has ~leashed have brought and continue ~to bring to peoples occupies an important place in the exposure of i~erialism. Commanders~ political workers, propagandists and agitators = devote special attention to exposing the brutal charac~er of the imperialist military, who will resort to anything in order to achieve their criminal goals. ~ In or~er to steadily increase the fighting strength of the military aviation and to further improve the process of training and indoctrinating the personnel, - it is necessary to continuously improve forms and methods of moral-political training for the airmen and to seek new forms and methods of conducting modern warfare, air battles and engagements. The greater the political awareness ~ and the ideological conviction of the fighting men, the stronger will be their feeling of patriotism and internationalism and the more effective will be the results of their missions in the peacetime training or in a combat situation. 3. Ba~ic Areas of Psychological Training for Flight Personnel . Psychological trai.ning envisages the development of psychological qualities in the airmen, which permit them to function successfully in the dangerous and stressful~conditions of modern combat, to perform their assigned combat ~ missions in full accordance with their communist convictions and maral behav- ioral principles. 32 . ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Psychological training is not a sep~rate kind of.traininq for servicemen but comprises an intrinsic part of the entire system of combat training and troop . indoctrination. Such traininq was conducted in the past to some degree, but ' it did not hav~e a special name. The role of the moral factor in a war has no~w grawn to such an extent, hawever, that it has become necessary to .separate the cv~ncept and to take special steps to strengthen the psychological stability . of the personnel. The fact should also be stressed that tlze effective employ- ment of aviation equipment is naw increasingly determined by the individual's psychaphysiological capabilities, which fluctuate within a wide range even in the same pilot, depending upo~n his physi cal and mental state. Consideration of these states and the mabilization of all the individual's reserves hav~e - become an important condition for successful flight work and for ensuring flight safety. It is for this reason that another psychologica,l training task, the purpose of which is to promote th~ exemplary performance of flight assignments and to ensure the safety of every flight in peacetime, is being performed in the Soviet aviatian, along with that of prep aring the personnel to conduct combat operations under the conditions of modern warfare. Naturally, the isolation of these ~asks is extremely conditional, for they are closely interrelated and closely linked to the moral-political training. Nonetheless, it con- tri.butes to a more accurate tmderstanding of the role of psycholoqical train- ing within the system of training and indoctrination for flight personnel and to the determinati.on of practical measures to be carried out in this area. The Development of Psychic F~cti~nal Re liability in Pilots The development of psychic functional reliability in fliqht personnel covers a broad range of tasks. Important among them are the development of self- confid~ence, a positive attitude toward flights, a good work cagacity and other qualities and skills in the pilots~ which contribute to the successful perfoxmance of the assiqned missions. Air battles which have been fought and the routine flight work have convincingly clemonstrated the fact that their effectiveness depends to a considerable degree on the pilots' self-confidence and their ability successfully to cope with any assignment, with any complication of flight conditions. Since this matter will be discussed in detail in the following chapt2r~ we shall limit ourselves at this point to general aspects of the problem. . ~ In order to successfully develop such confidence, it is important that the _ ~ flight work be thoroughly conceived and scientifically planned. Proper deter- minati.on of the number of flights and their sequence, a gradual progression from the $imnle to the complex, and a rational build-up of the workload all contribute to successful flight work and~ cansequently, create se lf-confidence in the individual and a desire to attain even more. On the othe r hand, assigning the pilot work whicl~l is beyond his capabilities and which are not commensurate with his experience and abilities retards the improv~ement of his combat skills, ~dermines his confidence in his abilities, and may even ]3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY instill a fear of flying in Y~im. In other words, it may create a so-called psychological barrier, which will then be difficult tA overoome. It is important to utilize both the positive and the negative from the ~ f~iqht work for developing confidence. By the positive aspects of a pilot`s actions and him for his successes, one promotes a growth of confidence, while stressing only the shortcomings may unsettle and confuse the pilot and then cause him to lose confidence in himself, in his abilities. In other words, the development of confidence ' in flight personnel should be based on positive examples, while the negative aspects of the pilot's actions should be emplo~ed as auxiliary material and 3hould be presented with great care and tact. Naturally, every pilot error should be carefully analyzed to eliminate the possibility of a repetition. At the same time, one should not forget the fact that an tuzsuccessful f~.ight, an unpleasant situation, causes the pilot - to suffer deeply and that at such moments he needs support and sy~athy more than at any other time. The best way of mobilizing the pilot`s will, his emotions and thoughts for achieving the goal is to rev~eal the true cause of the error, to indicate ways of correcting it, to give the pilot support and encouragPment, to express abso~ute confidence in the fact that he will Cope . with the assigned missions. ~ The pilot's preparedness to withstand the great pressures experienced~in the ai.r depends to a great degree upon his psychological state prior to a flight, . _ upon his self-control, his morale and step-up mental activity, that which is referred to in psych~logy as preflight or comb at excitation. A special ~ ritua]. marking the beginning of the flight day or night contributes to the ; creation and develoo~nt of this sort of preparedriess: a mustering of person- , nel and the cbservance of a formal moment of silence at the airfield; precise ' couQnands, a report from the meteorologist, a weather reconnaissance report, ; instructions from the navigator and the flight operation officer, and the - raising of the Air Force flag. This unites and rallies the team for the i _ successful, performance of the assigned missions, creates enthusiasm i.n tkie personnel and helps them to put negative thoughts out of their minds. ~ The fact must be emphasized that negative thoughts frequently have a great I ' effect on the course and outcome of a flight. One pilot, for example, told ~ haw he continued to think anout an unpleasant conversation with his wife ~ during an entire xound-robin flight and did not notice.a dangerous lo~s of ~ altitude until he was descending, onl~y with effort forc~ng himself to con- centrate on piloting the aircraft. Another pilot was so engrossed with a which had occurred at work the evening before that he did not notice in time that he was straying off course, did not hear commands issued by the flight operation director and was land at a neigh- baring airfield. . ' Unexpected changes in the flight schedule, inadequately organized ~ervicing of the aircraft equipment, crudeness and harsh comments from superiors during 34 � ~ b'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' - the flight day and long wai.ts for takeoff can make airaien less calm and result in deterioration of their psyctiological readi.ness for a flight. A great deal depends upon the flying experience and general background of _ tY~e pilots. The young p:_ ~c~ts are ordinarily the more keyed-up and impatient. The individua~l's specific psychological traits also play a role, a fact which cannot be ignored when the flight schedules are compiled. Prior to each takeoff a pilot should have time to prepare himself psycho- logically for the specific ~coming flight, to collect his thoughts and to go over the flight plan and the sequence of the actions inv~olved. A lack of or acceI.eration of the usual pace of takeoff preparations can result in the omission of or mistakes in certain ope rations and to excessive emotional tension. The suecessful development of a positive frame of mind for flying depends to a great extent upon how thoroughly the indivi~ual psychological qualities _ of the pilots are taken into account. These~qualities may be quite specific ~or various people. A bad mood or difficulties may have little effect on the work of some pilots, for example, and they are ab le to divorce them- selves from problems experienced on the growtd once they ~are in the air. Similar situations may markedly affect the efficiency of others and cause - them to make mis~akes. Some pilots react calmly and correctly to complica- tions in flight; others may become excessively excitecl, hasty and nervous, while yet a third group may experience a retardation of attention and the thcught processes, motoric constraint and sluggishness in making decisions. It ~hould be noted that the manner in which pilots react to complicated situations on the ground and in the air is fairly constant for each individual. It is important to ~derstand this and to take it into accotmt in the train- ing and indoctrination of pilots. . A special study has shown that following a safe outcome�of an emergency ~ situation, approximately half o~ the pilots have increased confidence in t~-ieir abilities, in the fac~ that they can always find a way out of any complication, which has sometimes resulted in an exaggerated conc~pt of their capabilities, in overconfidence. Others have begun preparing more thoroughly for flights following such incidents, to study~ more carefully - what is to be done in emergency situations. Yet other pilots have lost confidence in the equipment, in their abilxties and capabilities, a loss which can only be restored with great effort. . A].1 of this demonstrates the fac~ that there are no re~.~dy solutions in such ~ cases. inclividaal traits ar~ called just that becau.~e they differ from one individual to another and an individual approach i~ required in every case. Proper evaluation of these characteristics and t]-4e skillful development of personat qual.ities depend upon tYie pedagogical skill of the commander and w~on his.under~tanding of the psycho].ogical essence of the phenomena being studied. 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - A pilot's psychological stability and his reserve strengths can be reduced by fatigue during an assign~ent--a temporary drop in efficiency. T.t is manifested in a deterioration in the pxecision with which he maintains the pz~escribed flight parameters, in errors and in reduced efficiency in the _ combat employment of the aircraft. ~ - Organizing flights properly--providing a precise daily schedule, observing flight-load standards, scheduling breaks between flights, minim:~zing the - amount of time spent waiting for takeoff, and so forth--is highly important for preventing fatigue. The. nature of flight work is such, however, that fatigue may b uild up even when it is properly organized, which means that additional s teps must be taken. For exa,mple, it is recommended that the pilots' load be gradually increased ov~er a period of 1 or 2 weeks following - a leave, that it then be mainta.ined at a hign level for 5 to 6 months and then reduced somewhat, permitting the pilots to rest up at health centers. ~ Zn efforts to prevent fatique it is also important to take into account the positive emotions produced by the flight work itself. The sensation of great speed of flight, for exam~le, the extraordinary beauty of the clouds, the - enormity of the he avens and a feeling of satisfaction from subordinating the awesome machine tc man's will and satisfaction with a successful assignment, all create vigor, uplift the mood and reduce fatigue. This does not occur on flightless days or when the workday continues after the flights have been complated. Some pilots ev~en say that they become more tired on days when they do not fly than when they do. � 2'here are periods in the life and work of pilots, during which they have greater loac3s and consequently become very tired (in exercises, for example). A clear und~erstanding of the need for the increased loads, however, and a heightened sense of duty and responsibility motivate a.pilot and stimulate his mind to the extent that fatigue does not affect his performanc~. There havz been cases during exercises, however, when this has necessitated a reduction in the number and intensity of flights, a shortening of the work- day, and so forth. Studies have shawn that flight personnel fatigue is related to the great nervuus and emotional stress and to inadequate physical activity. This means that their strength can best be restore d most rapidly with ac~ive relaxation: daily calisthenics, walks, tourist excursions and sports. In addition to increasing the pilots' physical strength and stamina, sports ~ training makes it possible to develop a large number cf psychophysiological and psychic qualities: the ability to distribute their attention, the ability to make decisions rapidly and to act with precision, spatial orien- tation, a preparedness for unexpected e vents, the ability to work under nervous stress, boldness and decisiveness, determination and self-control, , persistence and tenacity. 36 � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - The effectiv~e development of psychic functional reliability in flight personnel ~iepends not only upon the commanders, political workers and aviation doctors, but also upon the pilots themselves. Constant attention to this matter on the part of all is one of the i~ortant conditions for productive flight work. Improving the Emotional-Volitional Stability of Fliqht Personnel The qreat nervous and emotional stress characteristic of flight work plays a double role. On the one hand, it is necessary to stimulate the psyche and to ensure that all of the inclividual's reserves and capabilities are applied toward the successful performance of the flight assignment and for the develop- _ ment of stamina and Qreparedness to tolerate large overloads, which is excep- . tianally important for preparing a pilot to operate in a combat situati.on. , ~ On the other hand, great nervous and emotional stress can cause errors, con- tribute to fatigue and sometimes even result in diseases of the nervous system. From the standpoint of ensuring flight safety, maintaining good efficiency on the part of the fligh't personnel and prolonging their ability to provide flight work to the maximum, it is therefore important that th~ mental stress on a flight conform fully to the complexity of the mission being performed and to the crew's capabilities. Good emotional-volitional stability is one of the cac?ditions of such conformity. The development of good emotional-volitional stability in flight personnel is a complex and painstaking process which requires a certain knowledge of psychology an the part of the commander, the political worker and the aviation doctor. Let us consider a few of the specific features of this process. As we have previously mentioned~ when an individual finds himself in a com- plicated situation he experiences a state of special psychic tension, which stimulates all of his systems and has a pawerful effect on the individual's behavior and efficiency. The dependency between the degree of this tension and the individual`s functional efficiency can be depicted in the form of a parai~ola. As the tension mounts the individual's efficiency :and capabilities . increase in comparison with a state of calm (his reactions become more rapid and precise) until they reach a peak, and then begin to.drop. Individual _ operations begin to be omitted and there is a tendency to switch to more - simple actions, those solidly reinforced in previous practice, the attention span narraws and it becomes more difficult to distribute and switch one's attention, the sense of time is disturbed, errors of perception and lapses ~ of inemory occur, there is a feeli~g of bewilderment, and so forth, Building up emotional-volitional stability makes it possible considerably tc; increase psychic capabilities and to prevent a drop in efficiency. A pilot's good emotional-volitional stability is based primarily on h~s ideological conviction, his worid outlook and interests, on the main purpose - - of his life and his flying. It is also influenced by the individual's personal characteristics (mainly the temperament) and his psychological preparedness to withstand great stresses in flight. The development of this 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY preparedness requires first o~ all that the decisions and actions.required in any possi.ble situation be worked ou~ in advance, before leaving the ground. � ~i.s a.s achieved by means of various types of classes and ~drills, by mentally _ - "zunning through" the circumstances which could be encountered on a flight, and so forth. Preparing the pilots to deal with the unexpected is especially important in the de~velopment of emotional-volitional stability. No matter how well con- - ceived and thorough are the preparations for a flight~ it is impossible to . foresee all of the possible situations, especially in a combat situation. A pilot's ability rapidly to appraise an unexpected situation and to find the correct way out of it, that is, his mental alacrity and efficiency, is tlze decisive factor. The i~ortance of inental alacrity and efficiency has risen sharply in the flight work of today. This is a result of the increased combat capabilities of tY;e aviation~ the continued development of air tacti.cs, the increased comp lexity of aviation equipment and weapons, the improved control of fl.ights and comb at operations, and the increased importance of independence of action and initiative on the part of the crew or group i.n the performance of combat training missions. _ The creation and development of inental alacrity and efficiency in pi.lots is accomplished through a diversified process of training and indoctrination. The assigning of unexpected problems to the trainees during classes, pre- liminary and preflight preparation, flight critiques, the extensive employ- trent of hypothetical problems in drills performed with special equipment and in the aircraft cockpit, the assigning of individual assignments to the pilots in, the more complicated aspects of the piloting and combat employ- m~nt of the equipment.helps to develop in the pilots flexibility of mind, ' _ mental alacrity and efficiency, independence in making decisions and speed _ of implementation. ~ It is especially important to_ provide pilots with the ability to function ~ on the basis of lir-~_ted or contradictory information and with a shortage of ti~. Trai.ners cen be of invaluable assistance. They make it possible to simulate a complex ilight situation, contradictory instrument readings when one of them breaks down, false emergency signals on the panel from a mal- ftmctioning system or unit, fluctuations of needles and other indicators which may be taken as a breakdown or unstable functioning of indicators, false ins~ructions, loss of contact with the flight operation officer, and ~ so forth. It is especially important to work out in trainers questions arising in actual flights~ exercises and combat operations. As a result of such training during exercises and drills on the ground, the pilot i.s able to accept a sudden change, an unexpected or critical situation aLnost as an ordinary, normal development, thereby providing for the acti- _ vation of additional psychic reserves. 38 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ . r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' It should be pointed out at the same tiate that extreme care must be taken ~ to the gerformance of such drills in the air, ensuring absolute flight � safety. It is important to protect the pilot in such a way that he is not ~ awara of the fact. In actual practice, however~ an instructor will some- times warn a pilot as to what sort of malfunction is to be simulated, thereby making it easier for him to perform the complex actions. Such a practice creates passivity and does not sharpen the trainee`s mental alacrity and efficiency. Alorig with simulating malf~ctions, the experienced couIInanders and instructors also achieve the same purpose by altering the procedure desig:::ated for performing flight patterns, require piloting at an."evolutive" speed, by delaying the removal of the cover from the cockpit hood when coming in for a landing~ and so forth. � Gradually increasinq the complexity of flight conditions, bringing them into ~ maximum conformity with an actual combat situation, is an effectiv~e means of i.mproving the emotional-velitional stability of pilots. Naturally, all of this should be done in a carefully conceived manner, using the proper methods and taking into accoiuzt flight safety requirements and the individual qualities of the pilots. ` . Experience has shown that conditions approaching a combat situation to the maximinn possible degree, not to speak of actual combat, have a powerful effect on any individual and alter his psychic state. This state is deter- mined to a great deqree by the correctness of the individual~s perception . and thinking, by the degree of volitional stress and by the nature of his ~ actions. Under certain conditions a complex and dange.rous situation will inhibit functioning in the cortex of the large cerebral hemi.spheres. This can disturb th~ normal flow of the psychic processes, reduce conscious control over actions and increase the role of biological and physiological factors _ - in the adoption and implementation of decisions in a difficult situation. I. P. Pavlov stressed the fact that man first experiences reality through direct perception by the sensory organs arid only then. with the acquisition of experience, does he become the master of reality. As one remains i.n a - - stress situation, the nature of its effect on the psyche gradually changes.. _ One ceases to react to the unusual nature of the situation and the psycho- ~ physiological mechanisms readjust, adapting the organism to function under the new conditions. The complex situation changes from an inhibiting to a stimulating factor and cr~ates a state of militant excitation, a surge of strength, mental acuteness and firmness of will. ~ Some elements of a combat situation, serving as powerful irritants, produce ~ an involuntary orientational reflex in the ir_dividual, which inhibits his reguZar fimctioning, foc+~sing his attention on the irr,itant itself (devasta- ~ tion, fires or an atomic blast, for example). The.force of the orienta- - tional reflex weakens as the individual becomes familiar with them, which permits him to concentrate again on the performance of his assigned task. . ~ 39 � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ Ewercises, field firing practice, bombings and missile launchings provide a good opportunity for creating conditions approaching actual combat. Being present in ~ense situations, the independent adoption of i~ortant decisions, continuous alteration of the situation, the employment of real ~~eapons, simulation of the external factors of combat effects, and so forth, provide the b~st possible psychological condi~ioning. Routine, simplifica~ion and indulgence, on the other hand, do not provide the required psychic condi- tioning and retard the improvement of combat�skills. Yt is important to note that computations and actions involved in the per- formance of combat training missions--camera-gun firing~ camera-bombing, a simulated missile launching or the dropping of airborne landing equipment-- may be identical to those performed in actual firing, bombing and missile laimchings, but are entirely different things from the psychologi~al stand- ~ point. There have been many.instances i.n which a pilot with a good theo- background and well drilled in training flights has permitted major errors in the performance of a combat training mi.ssion. The psychological conditioning of the personnel should therefore be basec~ on many factors and specific features characteristic of flight work and on the individual traits of the pilots. In conclusion, it should be noted that the above list of general tasks and specific features of moral-political and psychological training does not cover the Entire diversity of problems characteristic for this type of t�rai.ning. They only serve as a methodologica? basis for our revi~w in subsequent chapters of specific probl.ems involved in the development of good moral-political. and psychological qualities in the pilots in the process of their combat training. 40 FOR OFFICIAL.USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Chapter III. MORAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION FOR FLIC~iTS IN ADVERSE WEATHER - APID AT NIQiT 1. The Focus of Attention--On The Instrim~ents ~ ,lari In The New Situation Flic~hts in adverse weather conditions and at night are an important part of the a~viatfon's combat training system. They acco~t for a constantly i.ncreas- ing portion of the flight training. This is a result of the broader range of tasks to be performed, by the growing combat capabilities of the aviaticn and by,the improvements being made in airborne and ground control equipment. Such flights involye considerable difficulties, created in large part by the fact that the human body is functioning in a situation ne~a to it. We knaw that under ordinary ground conditions the individual assesses and ~ evaluates his position relative to his surroundings by means of an orienta- t.ion system based on the earth's gravity and the gravitational field. The functioning of his visual, vestibular and muscular (motor) analyzers makes it possible for him to perceive the position of his body under the effects of the earth's pull and to orient himself in a coordinated manner. On earth man can move, sit, lie, turn and perform si~le acts with his eyes closed. , When flying in the clouds or at night, however, it is very difficult and frequently impossible to assess one's position in space without visual - contact with ~he horizon or.with instrument readi.ngs. When flying "blind" the 3.nstrument readings are the main source of information on the aircraft's ' positi.on in space, its speed and altitude, and so forth. As altitude increases, the gravitational field,is altered, the effect of the earth's gravity is weakened, and new forces begin to affect the individual-- acceleration, overload and others. The existing system of coordinated perception of the position of the individual's body in space undergoes certain changes as a result. He has an increased sensation of pressure produced by centripetal and centrifugal forces during the performance of flight maneuvers, when altering linear flight, and so forth. The absence of a solid'four~dation beneath his feet gives rise to new sensations, those experienced on earth, which affect man`s psyche. Somethin~g like a"revaluation of values" occurs--the functioning of the eyes ~ is altered: they become the main analytical agent for ~etermining the body`s position in space. Averaging the instrument readings in flight, the indi- ~ vidual ttien turns to data provided by his main source of information, his visual analyzer. As he takes the instrument readings, the pilot not only assesses his position in the ai.r at the exact moment, but also notices a changing trend in flight condi~ions, especially of the aircraft's position ~ in space. The gyro-horizon still shaws the aircraft to be flying in a straight line, but the needle of the rate-of-climb indicator is slowly dropping. And pul.ling the lever slightly taward tiimself, the pilot controls the degree of change in flight conditions by the readings on other naviga- . tional instruments. 41 � FOR OFFICIAT. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 . FOR OFFICIAL iFSE ONLY ' ~ When a well-trained pilot flies by instrument, his entire body senses any ' chang~e in the vartical plane, as well as acceleration, overload or turning simultaneously, and he almost instantaneously glances at the rate-of-climb indicator, the altimeter and the gyro-horizon or at the sideslip indicator in drder to verify the signals received by his brain. Where do the signals come from7 From his muscles. Muscular sensations are extremely perceptible, bt~t they are "blind" and must therefore be continuously checked. As soon as the visual analyzer has confirmed the change in flight conditions, signals fxom the muscles first grow weaker and then disappear imtil there is another change in flight conditions. It has been determined that while a reaction to a light stimulus lasts 1.5-3 seconds, muscular sensations make themselves felt 10 times as rapidly. This does not mean~ of course, that man's muscular sensations are the main source of information in "blind" flight. Both muscular signals (they . - arrive more rapidly~ and visual signals should be used for determining the aircraft's position in space rapidly and accurately, with preference given - to the latter. During night flights the pilot can monitor his position in space both visu- ally,by observing the horizon, and by instrument. As a.rule, the horizon is clearly visible ori a dark night, a fact which considerably simplifies navigation and eliminates a great deal of psychophysiological stress. In order to monitor his position in space the pilot periodically checks his awn impressions against the instrument readings. Should an entire night flight be performed by instrument readings alone? Hardly. Prolonged "fixing" of the eyes upon the instruments rapidly p roduces fatigue. It is best to rely upon both visual observation and instruments for flying at night, when the natural horizon is visible. ~n daytime flights~ when weather conditions are good, the pilot focuses attention mainly on the functioning of the engine and the different systems, on visual orientation, maintaining his posit~on within the zone, and so forth, only periodically making a visual check on the aircraft`s position in space. During instrument flights, on the other hand, it is of prime import3nce contiriuously to monitor the aircraft`s position in space by rapidly reading the navigational instruments, only infrequently checking on the performance of the engine and the various systems. The Pilot's Increased Pace of Action - The number of instruments in an aircraft cockpit has increased 30-fold over tt:e past 30 years, and the time available to perform each of the operations involved in controlling the aircraft, the engine arid other equipment has - been reduced 6- to 7-fold due to the increased flight speeds and to changes occurring in the operation conditions of the equipment. This has compli- 'cated the functioning of man`s signaling systems for determining his position in space when flying in adv~erse weather conditions, in the stratosphere and beyond, and has placed greater demands up~n him with respect to his knowledge of the equipment design and methods of operating it. 42 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 I � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY r When pilotinq an aircraft by instr~nent one�s eyes are constantly fixed ~ upon dials, needles and indicators, the individual�s main external signalinq devioes, while his mental activity is focused upon processing ccntinuously chanqinq information on flight con3itions. Even before takeoff the pilot must knaw hundreds of various parameters--specifically, those pertainin~ to take off, climbr route, target approach, bombing and i.nterceptio~n and the functioning of the enqine and other systen~s--and to remember nwnerous paraqraphs of instructions and manuals~ and other information. Al1 of this abundance of 3ata goes into action in flight, interweaving in the individual's mind and. combined with the flaw of information from the~ground and from other crews, creates corisiderable stress in the work. In ord,er to fly in adverse weather conditions and at night, a pilot must also possess considerable physical. stamina, a qood visual and motor memory, the ability to perform complex coordinated actions and the ability to main- - tain his spatial orientation without being able to see the earth or the natural horizon. Wearing pressure suits and airtight helmets for lengthy periods, staying in one position and breathinq under the extra pressure, in ~ . turn, create additional difficulties. Even the small physical force repeat- edly applied to the co~trol elements tires the hands and leqs and reduces ~ their sensitivi.ty, which is so necessary for operating a modern high-speed aircraft. The pilot is also affected by accelerations and changing load- factors, powerful vibrations and loud noises, changes in pressure and so forth. - When pilots fly in the clouds at night, they frequently encounter the phe- �nomenon of flashes produced when the cockpit blister, which is made of organic glass, comes into contact w'ith dense, electrically charged clouds. Th~ flashes are sometimes so powerful that they light up ~he coclcpit. Patches of light reflect off tne glass covering the instruments, making it ~ difficult to read them. Pilots, especially those encountering the phenome- _ non for the first time, automatically hav~e the urge to look at the flashes, and a great deal of willpower is required to withstand the temptation and keep one's eyes upon the instruments. A powerful flash can blind a pilot for a moment, and a certain amo~t of time elapses before his keenness of visioal is restored. Any sort of distraction which takPS the attention off the instruments can result in erroneous readings and in a breakdawn of the sequence for distributing one's ~ttention. As pilots acquire experience in flyi~g in the clouds at night~ the flashes do~not have the same effect as they do on the first such flights, but this do~s not eliminate the need for . willpower to carry out the assignment successfully and to ensure f]ight safety. ' The peculiarities of flying in the clouds at night,~the abundance of various information dealt with and the need to perform numerous complex operations with the control elements for the aircraft, the engine and the special equip- ment thus force the pilot to operate at a rapid pace and with maximum exertion of effort. 43 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ 2. On The Ground And In The Air Gro~d preparations for flying in adverse weather conditions and at night include a broad group of ineasures. The study by flight personnel of the nature of the planned exercises and the specific features involved in per- forming~them and of the requirements contained in regulations, manuals and - inatructions, training sessions with special equipment and in the cockpit, ' and discussions with veteran pilots on the peculiarities of flying under such conditions are of primary importance among these measures. From the standpoint of psychology, each of the measures helps to form and dev~elop in the pilots the various qualities and skills essential to the successful accomplishment of the assigned missioris. Experience has shown that it is exceptionally important when studying the ~ nature of the exercises and the r.equired guides and when organizing the exchange of flight experience to instill i.n the pilots confidence in the ~ fact that they will successfully master the performance of flights in adverse weather conditions and at night, and a readiness persistently to overcome difficulties in the path of acquiring combat proficiency. The experienced coaananders also attempt to see that each pilot is capable of objectively evaluating his training results, taking advantage of the experience of others and demonstrating a sense of responsi.bility in matters both large and small. This, combined thorough military technical erudition and a desire to understand all of the fine points of aviation work, is precisely wh at pro- duaes comb at proficiency and, along with it, confidence that the flight ski2ls will be successfully mastered. Practical Training in the Use of the Equipment--An Important Phase of Training Practical training sessions with special equipment and in an aircraft cock- ~ pit makes it possible to closely duplicate actual flight conditions for a pilot and to thoroughly study the individual's personal traits, to objectively evaluate his successes and deficiencies and to form and develop in the trainees not only flight proficiency but good psychological qualities as well. The first instxument "�lights" in the cockpit of a trainer ordinarily present no'difficulties for the pilots, sin ce they usually involve a horizontal flight, turns with a bank of less than 30 degrees, descents at low vertical speeds, and so forth. Setbacks may occur, however, when the assignments become more co~licated: when they involve turns with a bank of 45-60 degrees, for _ Pxample, zoominq maneuvers and descents at angles of 20-30 degrees, turns onto prescribed courses while climbing or gliding, descents and landing approaches. It is the instructor's duty to do everything possible to see that the failures do not discourage but motivate the pilot and make him even more determined. Proper use of the radio by the instructor for making comments and instructions . is one of the means of achieving the proper frame of mind in a pilot working ~ ~ 44 ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY in a trainer. It is important for such conanents and suggestions to be made in a calm and comforting manner, for them to produce positive reactions in the trainee. Harsh comments, yelling ancl irritability traumatize the pilot and result in deterioration of his performance. Sometimes, in the process of working out a complex element of flight on a trainer, a situation develops in which an error by the traanee creates a threat to "flight" safety and the desired results are not produced by repeatedly reminding him of his error by radio. In such a case the instructor should issue an order to rectify the error in a more determuied manner, in a firm and insistent voice, or break off thE."flight." The good thing about working with a trainer is the fact that the assignment can be halted at any minute, the errors thoroughly analyzed and suggestions made for correcting them. ~ A typical error made by pilots learning to "fly" on a trainer is failure to maintain th.e required altitude, speed or banking angle. This ordinarily occurs when the trainee is practicing descents and landing approaches in clouds, when exceptionally pr~cise distri.bution of attention and prompt reactions to the instrument readings are required. Experience has shown that after "flyingn several times in the clouds in 'a train,er, a pilot requires less time to take the instrument readings, his deteimination of altitude, speed and descent parameters is more accurate, ~ and he develops and reinforces his ability to distribute his attention and - to determine the situation "at a glance," based on r~adings of navigational and other instruments. As a rule, at the end of the trainer "flight" program, - the trainee's actions become more confident, prompt and precise--he has devel- oped a dynamic stereotype, which makes flying in the clouds and at night considerably easier. ~ , Training sessions in the cockpit of an airplane {or helicopter) have a large role in the pilot`s professional and psychological training. The arrange- ment of the instruments, the colors and markings of buttons, levers and signal lights and the play in the controls are exactly the same as those - which the trainee will encounter actual flight. Performing the exer- , cises once only is not enough to make the trainee comfortable in a cockpit at night. When the electric power is turned on and the cockpit lights up it is sometimes difficult to determine the location of this or that piece - of equipment or button or to read the numerous instruments. Practical training in the use of the equipment at night therefore helps to develop precise, cognative, automatic actions in a cocJc~iit, stable skills in dis- tributing one's attention and the ability unerringly to the over- all situation on an actual night flight. - It is important for the practical training acquired in a cockpit to include _ only cognative actions with the aircraft and engine control elements and know purely mechanical "turn�-on--turn-off" procedures, because the greater the degree of awareness on the part of the trainee in the performance of a certain operation, the greater will be his success.. 45 ~ . - � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Tr~1i17t1g sessions in an aircraft cockpi,t on a runway illuminated by search- lights and with the nosewheel in landing position hav~e proven themselves to be effective prior to initiatory night flights. This permits the trainees to master more rapidly the technique. of landing at night. ~ Fliqhts In a Dual-Control Trainer ~ ~ In a dual-control combat training aircraft the pilot can check the level and quality of the skills acquired by the pilot while training on the ground, the most important of which are his ability to operate the cockpit equipment, to take the instrum~nt readings, to maintain the required parameters for gaining altitude, entering the zone and approaching the landing airfield, and can observe the ~.rainee, checking his mental activity i.n the resolution of hypothetical problems, the stability of his psychological functioning, . his reaction time, peculiarities in the coordination of his motor processes, his flight skills and so forth. Flights i.n a dual-control trainer with blinds closed~ combined with training sessions on the ground, not only improve the psychological functioning of the trainees and increase their speed of response to external stimuli, but also contribute~to tha formation of new new qualities and skills. Special among tlZem is the ability to coordinate the reading of the various instru- ments in a relatively dark cockpit and to fly under night conditions, when the ai,rcraft's position in space is monitored by means of instruments and by observing the horizon. ~ Experience has shawn that it is expedient to combine flights in a dual-control trainer in. adverse weather conditions and at night with practical training _ sessions in the continuous and prolonged reading of the instruments under ordimary conditions: en route to the flight training zone or a range, on an air route, when descending at a landing airfield, and so forth. The pilot observes both the i.nstruments and the gr.ound and compares the results of the abservations, thereby improving his skills in deternu.ning the aircraft's location. We shauld stress tha fact that the process of developing skills proceeds rapidly and successfully at first, but that it later slows dokm and the quality deteriorates somewhat: This occurs because the larq~r deficiencies in piloting tecFiniques and in working with the cockpit equi~:;,~nt are elimi- nated in the beginning, and then b arely perceptible, deeply rooted defi- - - ciencies, which can only be eliminated with a considerable amount of work. The length of time required to develop skills and how well they are developed depend to a grea~ degree upon the pilot's personal characte ristics: his~level of knawledge, personality, reaction spesd, degree of physical development, . psychological state, and so forth': Systematic training is to retain skills already formed. Lengthy breaks in flying, especially in the i.nitial stage, can result in temporary ~ 46 ~ ~ ' . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY deterioration of skills and to a loss of linkage between~them. This process occurs more rapidly in yo~g pilots than in the veterans. A breakdown of skills and of the dynamic stereotypes is ordinarily manifested in uncoordi- nated actions~ in reduced acuteness of perception with respect to spatial orientation and instrument reading, in a loss of the "feel of the aircraft," and sa forth. . The t~erm "harmful carry-over of habits" is frequently encountered in the work. What does this mean? If a pilot has flown a sinqle type of aircraft for some time, he has developed certain conditi.onal rQflexes and formed speci.fic habits in his handling of the control elements, and has acquired muscular adaptation to the.specific f~ctional loads. When he undergoes retraining to fly a different type of aircraft or when he advances from a dual-control trainer to a combat aircraft with a somewhat different arrange- ment of instruments, buttons~ toggle switches and signaling devices, the ~rainee encounters difficulty in reading the instruments and operating the control elements. Habits carried over will influence the pilot for a certain .period of time, which sometimes results in errors in determining flight speeds and altitudes, in tardy extension and retraction of flaps, and so forth. Sefore beginning solo flights in adv~erse weather conditions and at night it is important thoroughly to work out all of the complicated actions involved in flying the aircraft, operating the control elements and reading the instru- ments in trainers, in an aircraft cockpit on the ground and in flights in a . dual-control trainer with the blinds drawn~ in order to prevent the harmful carry-over of habits. Under Nighttime Conditions Piloting by instrument, the specific kind of lighting in the cockpit and the complexities of visual orientation--all of these speci�ic features of flying at night make exceptionally large demands of the pilot`s vision. It must successfully perform its functions in re duced illumination and in situations of abrupt change from radiant light to darkness and vice versa. We knaw that when an individual remains a long time in a brightly lighted area, his eyPS become accustomed to the situa.tion and function in accordance with it. It takes considerable time (20-25 mi.nutes) , however, to adapt to sudden darkness. It is important to bear this:in mind when preparing for and during the course of night flights. It helps to take one~s position in � the cockpit 15 to 20 minutes before starting up the engine before a flight, for example, and 5 to 7 minutes before turning on the lights in the cocl.pit, ~ giving the eyes an opportw~ity to adjust to the reduced illumination. The eyes also have to adapt when going from darkness into brilliant light: _ Othezwise, there is a possibility of temporary blindness or even damage to - the eyes~ since the pupils of. the eyes e xpand (the area of the pupil increas- ing as much as 16-fold) in dim lighting and visual sensitivity i~ extremely great. . - 47 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~ FaA OFFICIAL USE ONLY Somethinq similar occ;irs in the case o~ visual orientation when local - objects are poorly illumi.nated. Z`he piiot strains his eyes in determining his position an3 seeking out reference points for navigati.onal or bombing purposes and then encounters difficulties when he subsequently goes back to reading the instruments: his eyes require a certain amount of time to adapt to the cockpit lighting. _ On a night flight the cockpit lighting greatly affects the pilot's work anci his mental and emotional state. Vezy bright or very dim lighting forces him to strain his eyes, tiring 'chem. The lighting in the cockpit should be adjusted so that it is possible to read the instruments accurately, to see all of the main control elements and to switch from observing the radar screen for aiming to monitoring the instruments, and vice versa, without ' strain. A pilot will sometimes greatly increase the brightness of the radar sighting screen in order to�make out the target blip among the interference or local objects reflected there, which makes it difficult to monitor the instruments. The light filters used in operating the sight on night flights and flights in clouds help the pilot overcome this difficulty. . Tt soa?etimes happens that an aircraft will enter the beam from a runway - floodlight when starting on the second circle at a law altitude, because of an inaccurate landing computation on the part of the crew, which temporarily - blinds the crew members. In such a situation the pilot should look only at the instruments and although it will be difficult to read them for a certain period of time, the flight should be perfor~d in a straight line, without maneu~ring and cl~mbing to a higher altitude until.full vision has been restored. Only after full restoration of vision should the pilot return to visual observation of the natural horizon and ground orientation lights. A feeling of alorieness and impotence may develop and a drop in 'activity may occur on long night flights, when there is a starry sky overhead and black- ness and no visible reference poi.nts belaa. Such feelings are experienced ~ not only by the beginners but by veteran pilots as well, individuals who have deveI.oped their skills in distri.buting their attention and orienting thems~lves to the point of automation and who have developed a"flair" for flying. In such a case, it is advisable to force onese lf to increase the pace in monitoring the instruments~ to make contact with the flight operation _ officer or the officer manning the command post and to stretch and relax 4 the arm, leg and stomach muscles several times. Ciouds--A Major Test ' , When perfoxming assignments in the clouds the pilot's work~is performed in a situation which not only requi.res a.high level of proficiency but also involves great physieal and emotional stress. His "world" has been r~duced to the extreme~ limited to the.cockpit and the multitude of various instru- ments by means of which he controls the~aircra�t. All of his visual links ~ with the earth's surface, the sky and the natural horizon have been broken. ' _ . 48 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' Like every new type of flight training~ training for flying in the clouds begins with training classes~ training sessions with special equiF� ~ and in an aircraft cockpit and with check flights and initiatory f1igY z a cOmbat tr~~ n~ ng aircraft. = The first difficulty ordinarily encountered by the trainees is delayed - reaction to the instrument readings because of imprecise distribution of - attention and inability to appraise the overall flight situation instanta- neously~ "at a glance," so to speak. The pilnt`s main object of attention - is the gyro-horizon, which makes it possi.ble to determine the aircraft's - , location~ which an individual without visual contact with the earth or the - natural horizon cannot do on his own. Almost half the ~ime a pilot spends monitoring the instruir:ents his focus is upon precisely t~is one, leaving little tiine for the others. This gives rise to errors in the distribution of attention among the i.nstruments and to delays in reacting ico their readings. ~ Approacning for a landing and descending in the clouds presents a certain amount of difficulty in learning to fly in adverse we ather condit,ions. Due _ to the xapidly changing situation and the nearness to the earth in this phase ~ of a flight, there is a certain deterioration of the ai.rcraft's aerodynamic qualities (the lowering of the landing gear and flaps, and so forth), and the amount of time~available to read the instruments and to assess the situa- tion in general is greatly reduced. The pilot's work pace increases. Under these conditions young pilots may experience~stress, which is manifested in ~ a deterioration in manipulation of the controls, "suppression of control," an increase in the amount of time required to read the instruments, mental ~ inertia or sluggishness~ a breakdown in radio communication, dullness of hearing, general constraint, and so forth. ~ , An overly demanding instructor someti~mes demands precise and prompt actions aaZd strict adherence to all flight para~ters from a trainee on his second or third flight in adverse weather conditions. But not every individual is capable of rapidly mastering piloting techniques with the natural horizon ~ not visibler and all the more, of demonstrating good psychological stability, stamina and self-control in a situation which seems very complicated toinim. Beratement and lack of objectivity in appraising the young pilot`s actions _ are especially harmful in such a situation. Pedagogical tact, respect and a desire to help the trainee le arn the causes of his errors and ways to elim- inate them--these are far from all of the useful factors for indoctrinating those who have not yet acquired stable skills in piloting aircraft in the clauds, in whom the mental and emoti~nal qualities essential for such flights have not yet fully developed. Z'he results of man's practical work, of course, depend~greatly upon his mental state. When. he notices low clouds prior to takeoff, the pilot who is given to = worrying, especially who lacks experience, becomes agitated, requests a weather forecast more frequently than the others~ is overly cautious and pays too much attention to what others have to s ay. After takeoff, as a rule,. the attention of such a pilc"_ is focused on strictly maintaining each degree of bank and 49 � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 I - FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY each meter of altitu3e, and should an instrument malfunction or something happen to the engine at such a time, he may experience stress and then ~egin committing gross errors. Over-anxiousness is to some degree an inborn trait, and although it is there- fore probably not reasonable to speak of overcoming it completely, we should discuss preventive measures which can cure a depression. It is not desirable to leave the overly anxious pilot alone for a long period of time. It helps to engage him in conversations about subjects of interest to him, to play chess, to involve him in some volunteer activity. In other words, it is i.mpartant that he always be in the group, that he share its plans and activ- ities. This has a positive effect an his mood and makes him less anxious. As flying experience is acquired the anxiousness fades somewhat, but this does not mean that the comma.nder, the political worker and the doctor can forget about it entirely. In the process of training in an aircraft cocicpit and "flying'� on a trainer, it is advisable gradually to increase the complex- ~ ity of the hypothetical problems, to simulate sudden "breakdowns" of the engine, other systems and instruments more frequently. One sometimes hears it said that the circtnnstances of an assignment should becom~e increasingly more complicated as they develop. This ostensibly helps ~ to prepare the pilots mentally and emotionally for more difficult flights. - We feel that such an orientation does not stimulate the development of the required mental and emotional qualities but, on the contrary, contributes to th,e develapment of a state of tense anticipation of extremely difficult - flight elements, which has a negative effect on the pilot's performance. Sxperience has shown that it is best gradually to complicate the assignments , anc3 to arrange for more frequent exchanges of experiencz among the best crews, taking the individual's persnnal features into account. It is impor- ta.nt to stress the fact that the pilot has all of the abi].ities necessary to perform the mi.ssion successfully. This helps to develop a positive frame of mind in the ir.dividual and confidence in his abilities and in the equipment which he operates. It is no less important, of course, to direct attention to t,~e i.nadmissibility of overestimatin g one`s strengths and abilities and of complacency an~ self-satisfaction. Experience has shown that a pilot undergoes extensive psychological stress during the transition from visual flight to flying in clouds, during which time hi.s psyche and his visual analysis mechanism undergo a reorganization - pracess with respect to spatial orientation by instrument. A flight in good ; weather conditions, in which the horizor. is clearly visible and the pilot dc~s not need to "fix" his sight constantly upon it, does not produce com- plicat~d psychological situations. When, however, following takeoff or when ~ coming in for a straight-end landing, it is ner_essary to enter the clouds and to climb for a lengthy period, to come out onto a prescribed course, to set out on an intercept mi.ssion or descend for a landing, the pilot undergces considerable mental and emotional stress. The stress is especially great 50 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - when descending in clouds imomediately above the.groundr making course cor- rection turns or altering flight conditions (altitude, fonaard or vertical speeds~, when flying in dense clouds and when it becomes dim inside the cockpit. k'~a knav that good landings are ordinarily preceded by good approaches and - that an inaccurate approach, on tYie other hand, ordinarily results in a poor landing. These two constituents of a flight are closely interlinked,~because _ adjusting an approach involves a change in the course, which, in turn, involv~es a more complicated�maneuver--a descending turn. The pilot focuses attention _ upon maintaining vnrtical speed and the prescribed bank on the turn and upon determining the mome.nt for pulling out of the turn, and there is not always enough time or sufficient altitude for him to prepare for and execute the lancling. And since the landing is made~in sight of the flight operation officer and other personnel~ the pilot~wants very much to make it an excel- lent one. By trying too hard, however, he frequently achieves exactly the opposite. This is why veteran instructors frequently remind th~ trainees of the ~written rule: "Prepare for a landing on the last turn." The approach of the earth makes some pilots want to look ahead and spot the~, airfield as rapidly as possible, which can result in premature loss of alti- tude and speed. In such a situation it is extremely i~ortant for the pilot ~ to have the willpower to keep his eyes on the instruments. A certain degree ~ of relaxation~ which ordinarily folla~rs complete emergence from the clouds and sight of the approaches to the airfield and of the runway, is a result , of the piiot's complete confidence that the clouds are behind and the airfield is nearby and that he can now switch to visual flight. This is especially typical when the bottom edge of the clouds is not distinctly outlined~ when - the earth begins to flash by beneath the wings and the pilot experier.ces an. increasingly persistent urge to see it, if only out of the corner of.his eye. This is where his willpower, self-discipline and psychological stability are most essential. ~ ~ - Sometimes, when flying in the clouds, tha same individual. will not be con- sistent in his piloting technique: on one flight he will perform the assign- ment precisely, strictly maintaining the required parameters, while all~owing the aircraft to list constantly in one direction in the horizontal phase of ` another flight. The error surprises him: he has apparently done everything ~ correctly, but the instructor has frequently reminded him that the aircraft is listing. _ , Such deflections of the aircraft are ordinarily caused by the pilot's position in the cockpit, position frequently perception. A movement of - the body out of its usual position (along the aircraft`s axial line anti the ~ instrument panel) gives him a feeling of awkwardness and cU~.scomfort, and the pilot involuntarily adjusts the control stick in an attempt to align it with his body, thereby causing the aircraft to list. The pilot gradually finds ~ the proper position for his body withir~ the cockpit relative to the longitu- ~ dinal line of the aircraft and the center of the instrument panel, e wlving a certain familiar position, and any changes in that position can lead to piloting errors. I 51 FOR OFFICIAL, USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' ~ The first solo flights in clouds create great nervous and emotional tension in pilots. Sotn~ of them, especial:.y those with inadequa~e expexience, may have a pulse rate as high as 140-150 after a landing. It is not difficult to imaqine the stress to which the heart and the nervoi~s system are subjected the first time a pilot takes off on his awn and the first time he flies into clouds. This is why it is important when scheduling flight~ in adverse weather to carefully observe pilots taking off for the first time and the inexperienced ones, to help them develop inanunity to danger, to excessive caution upon encountering clouds, and the ability to control themselves in any situation. It is sometimes best not to react negatively to the fact that ~ young pilot, upon returning from a flight, shares his impressions _ excitedlyo gestures widly and speaks with an altered, cracked voice--let him get his emotions out of his system. Later, however, when he has "cooled off," it is good to congratulate him on his first solo flight in the clouds, a major victory. Officer N. Zhukov, military pilot first class~ eloquently described what pilots go through in the performance of assignments in adverse conditions: "Pilots are extremely painstaking in thei.r preparations for such flights. - They carefully study the makeup of the assignments and the methods to be used in performing them, and the requirements contai.ned in guiding documents, work diligently in~a trainerr repeatedly run through what is to be done in special c~.rcumstances, and pay close the weather report. They are supercritical about accepting the aircraft from the technicians. All those who have ever flown in e xtremely adverse conditions vividly picture the danger inherent in such flights. There is apprehension, and perhaps _ even fear, of the unknown. None ~of the pilots hides his mental and emotional state, but th~y are all typically calm on the outside. They are only slightly more taciturn and smoke more frequently. This outward calm is nothing other than the ability to keep their emotidns in check, an ability which takes years to develop. "In their preflight conversations with comrades one frequently hears detailed accounts of flights made in adverse weather, of how they feel in the air. r Th~y answer questions with `Nothing unusual.' Or `Yes, it was a little on the difficult side." That is all.. And it is only during the critique that everyone learns exactly what those flights were like. Each pilot recalls haw he constantly worked to maintain his orientation in the clouds, care- fully monitored fuel consumption and the functioning of the engine, care- fully maintained the prescribed flight conditions...." ~ Crews making long flights in clouds are in an especially tense and compli- cated situation. The constant of attention from one object in the cockpit to another, constant monitoring of the navigati4nal instruments to anticipate changes in flight conditions in good time and to maintain flight s~fety, the monotony and uniformity of the situation all produce _ fatigue in the crew. It ordinarily takes the form of deteriorated accuracy ~ in reading the instruments, slowed mental processing of information, a feeling of sluggishnes and drowsiness, and so forth. . ~ 52 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ I. P. Pavlov pointed out that for man, especially his brain, to fimction normally, he requires external stimuli, because a constantly uniform, monotonous situation ("sensory starvation") lowers the tone of the cerebral cortex, which can produce ~desirable changes in the psychophysioloqical area. At the appearance of fatiqu~e, sluggishness and drawsi.ness, it is reconQnended that the individual move his head smoothly in various directions, tense and relax his muscles, and move his arms and legs, that is, engage in physical exerc~ses for a brief period. Naturally, while he is thus enqaged he must continue to monitor the instrim~ents, control the ai.rcraft and ~ strictly maintain the prescribed flight parameters. Success Demands Confidence Amonq other factors affecting the development of posi~ive feelings and the _ proper fraaie of mind for a flight in the pilots, it is important to give them confidence in their abilities, in the aircraft equipment and ground flight support systems. Confidence helps to raise the i.ndividual's fighting spirit and gives him strength, cal.mness and persistence. Faith in the reli- able functioning of the aircraft equipment in the air and in the ability of personnel manning the command posts, the flight supervision group and the' lancling and navigational systems to correctly appraise the situation and to ~ guide the aircra�t precisely to air and ground targets, and�confidence in the fact that the grourid service specialists will always come to their assist- ance in a time of difficul~ty all have a great deal to do with the pilots` success in the performance of their assignments. Such confidence is developed in flight personnel by various ways and methods. _ Important among them are classes conducted with the equi.pment, meetings and talks with the serviceme,n who man co~nand posts and landing systems and thase o� other service subunits, joint practical training sessions with them~ other k.i.nds of classes, periods of training for pilots at command posts, tactical and technical conferences, and so forth. The autosuggestion practiced by many pilots prior to their first flights in adverse weather conditions has proved itself unquestionably. Autosuggestion is a process whereby the individual tells himself things like "I can and will learn to fly in clouds!" And '~I must always concentrate on the instru- ments! The most important things are the aircraft's position, speed and altitude!" Autosuggestion produces a feeling of confidence in or~e's abilities, . tmfetters the attention and the muscles and gives the individual a feeling of ' being in complete control of the aircraft. When to fly by instrument, a pilot frequently experiences setbacks, which are most frequently caused by his inability to control his attention and to concentrate his efforts on that group of tasks are.of prime importance. As a rule, his lagging attention results in a breakdown of the sequence for monitoring the instruments. This occurs most frequently during turns in the clouds, when entering the landing course and when simultanaously descending and changing directions. , ~ ~ ~ ~ 53 . ~ FOR OFFICI~,I. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY If the individual's i.nstrument piloting skill has not improved after repeated practice on the ground and in the air, then the so-called zigzag is recommended: altering the attention distribution procedure, the height of the cockpit seat, the volume of the radio set and the aircraft intercom system (SPU) , and so forth. Failua~es encountered in learning to fly in adverse weather conditions some- times cause a pilot to become inattentive, reserved and letYiargic, and he ~s~metimes loses his desire to move foraard~ to improve himself. In such cases it is the duty of the commander, the political worker and the party organization to come promptly to the individual's assistance, to give.him confidence in his abilitiea. This is precisely what once happened to officer B. In the beqinning, he was training to fly a missile carrier, he proved himself to be a capable, diligent and persistent pilot. It appeared that the officer would success- . fully complete the retraining program. It was soon revealed, however, that he was making major errors in the interception of air targets: there was no spirit or vigor in his attacks and he iaould err extensively in "fire" _ as a result of which he was not completing the operations within the estab- lished time limits. Pilot B, tried to explain that the problems in his intercepts were caused by inconsistent functioning of the radar sight, by errors on the part of the aircraft controller or ev~en by,the fact that "the target was not moving as it should have." A detailed analysis of his performance in the air and on the ground and some frank discussions revealed the fact that his failures - resulted from a loss of confidence in his abilities and in the reliability of the equipment, The commander, the political worker and the veteran pilots had to work hard to help officer B. acquire the confidence, the qualities and skills essential to productive flight work. Training sessions wi~h . special equipment and in an aircraft cockpit, talks with veteran pilots, individual assignments and practical training at the command post and as a member of a landing crew we re employed for this purpose. As a result of all - this, pilot B, caught up rapidly and achieved considerable success in his combat development. In the process of instilling confidence in�a pilot it is important for the _ commander and poli.tical worker to be especially careful and objective in evaluating the results of the individual's combat training. It is useful � for them to praise him and sometimes to express their gr~titude for his successes, thereby giving him the inspiration to.perform more difficult tasks. When his efforts meet with failure the pilot should be encouraged and helped to correctly analyze the causes of his errors, and should not be permitted to lose his self-confidence. It is not always justifiable from the psychological standpoint to discuss a pilot~s performance publicly. When a pilot's errors are mentioned repeatedly in the flight critiques, for example, he may become resentful and withdrawn and may lose confidence in 54 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY his awn stx+engths and abilities, which frequently en~tails new errors. It is also dangerous to go to the other extreme--praising a pilot excessively, stressing his natural gift for flight work and his good innate reaction � speed, and so forth. 'I"his may cause him to become overconfident, which frequently produces conceit and results in poor relationships with his service comrades. Fl.iqhts i.n adverse conditions ordinarily ~timulate the individual's voli- tional capacities, sharpen his ability to focus his attention and heighten his capability for physical activity. That is, they help to place the individual in the highest state of readiness to perform the assigned tasks. In this state the individual is capable of maximum concentration and maxi- mum performance; he does not feel fatigue and his emotional state reaches its hiqhest lev~el. It has been noted that the handshake of pilots preparing for flights in adverse conditions is more forceful and their arm and leg - movements more dynamic. This is explained by the fact that the pulses emitted by the central nervous system stimulate the secretion of adrenalin, which intensifies the body's vi.tal processes and heightens the capabilities of the muscles. Z'he external manifestations are a stepped-up hearbeat, a - flushing of the face, an unusual brightness of the eyes, increased activity, excessive talkativeness, and so forth. The positive emotions are reflected i.n improved coordination of mov~ements, in the ability to switch one`s atten- tion more rapidly and in quicker reaction to the instrument readings and to groimd instructions. That is, it takes considerably less time for i~ulses to travel from a stimulus and ewke a motor response in the muscles. In other words, the individual's psychic capacity is mobilized to the maximum. ~ Zhe first flights in adverse weather conditions, with a certain weather minimum and involving interceptions and bombings in the clouds, are highly importar~t for developing good professional and psychological qualities and skills in flight personnel. Sometimes, because of the great.tension expe- rienced by pilots on suc_h flights, certain aspects of the flights are not performed with great precision. This should not discourage or unsettle the trainees,~however. Such a deficiency results not so much from poor professional training as from inadequate psychological conditioning, the development of which~~ordinarily lags somewhat behind the forn~er. And we know that a pilot may lose self-confidence when tYie difficulty of a flight ~ assignment is increased abruptly, when the planning includes considerable - skipping from one exercise to another and when the pilot finds himself i.n a dangerous and unfamiliar situation. � Experience and many years of observation have provided us with the basis for concluding that many factors are responsible for a pilot's confidence. Important among them are a solid knawledge of the aircraft equipment and ~ the theory of flying, careful preparation of the aircraft for flights, continuous improvement of flight skills, without"lengthy interruptions, ' goocl flight control, the confident functioning of crews manning command posts, controT stations, landing systems and so forth, thorough analysis ~ . 55 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY u APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 , FOR OFFICIAL TJSE ONLY of the weather situation, excellent maintenance of the airborne rescue ` facilities, a well-organized rescue sexvice, constant concern for the living, rest and recreation conditions for flight personnel, and development of tlie proper moral and aggressive frame of mind in them. Confidence is also closely linked with self-control. The latter manifests itself in the ability to appraise the situation calmly, correctly and rapidly ` and make decisions, to avoid losing one's composure in a difficult situation and to perform boldly, resolutely and vigorously. A pilot needs self-control not only in combat, but in the peacetime training as well, especially during the perform~nce of flights in adverse conditions. ~A pilot has to perform a large number of operations per unit of time, for example, on flights involving interceptions, bombing and launching missiles in clouds, and during refuelings. Should the equipment fai.l or some other unusual situation occur in the performance of such missions, nervous and emotional tension may reach a maxi.mum bordering upon extreme stress. It is not surprising, therefore, that many nations are actively engaged in further automating the aircraft control process, particularly during the performance of assignments in adv~erse conditions. It would be incorrect t~ say that in order to prepare himself for possible ~ complications during flights at night or in clouds he spend his time antici- pating them. In the air his attention is occupied mai.nly with piloting the aircraft, and the expectation of possible complications is not a determining ~ (deci.sive) factor. The most important thing in a pilot`s work, na~urally, is to perform the assigned mission successfully, whether it be a flight along a certain route, a bombing or intercept mission, the delivery of an airborne 7.anding group or a refueling. Does a Pilot Experience Fear? We have already mentioned the fact that critical situations may develop when in adverse conditions, situations requiring that flight personnel exert their maximum effort and mobilize all their capabilities for the successful performance of the assigned mission. Temporary confusion or even fear is not ruled out in such a situation. This is haw the well-knawn French writer and pilot Saint-Exuperi described ~ his awn state when the plane he was flying went into a spin: "I looked dawn ~ with some amazement at the fields below, onto which I was,going to fall and be dashed to pieces. This was something new I cpuld feel myself growing pale and cold from fear, fear which penetrated my ver.y bones. There was nothing humiliating about that fear, however. It was more like some sort of new a:id inexpressible understanding."12 Exuperi deliberately stresses the fact that there is nothing humiliating about such feelings in an individual who finds himself in an extremely dangerous situation. It is another matter _ when an individual is afraid to go from a lighted room into the dark or is frightened by a black cat crossing his path. 56 . ~ . FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Someane once expresse3 the opinion that a Soviet pilot should not experience _ _ fear, no matter hvw difficult his situation in the air. This opinion is groundless and erroneous, haaever. Read the testimony of officer V. Agafonov, pilot first-class: "The squadron commander and I were flying as a team for - purposes of developing our skill in formation flying. We were to perform a dive and then pull out of it. At the leader"s command, I accelerated and took the aircraft into a dive. A few seconds later, I heard the command to pull out of the dive, but just at that point I sensed that the aircraft was . no longer responding to the controls. It went into a'spin.' And not the kind of spin which the instructor had demonstrated for me when I was learning to fly a jet aircraft, but a very real one. 'Is this really the end?' the ~ thouqht flashed through my mind, but I iu~nediately dispelled it. I had to _ do something--and imm~c'.iately. The aircraft was rushing toward the earth at a vezy steep angle, spinning around~a longitudinal axis. I tried to remain calm and did evezything required i.n such situations: I~pulled the engine control stick toward me ancl lowered the flaps. Nothing helped, hawever. The aircraft continued to spin, and the altitude was melting away wi;h the passage or each fraction of a second. "Fear was again treacherously me. I exerted my willpower and dispelled it again, forcing myself to think and act. I decided to lower the landing gear, and a feeling of calmness immediately came over me. My hand moved automatically to the valve. Why hadn.'t I thought of this before?! A drastic change in the aerodynamic flight conditions might save the situation. As soon as I had lawered the landing gear, I felt a braking force, the speed - dropped instantaneously, and I brought the aircraft into horizorial flight." Officer V. Boqdanovich, military pilot first-class, told us the following: "Once, on a night flight, I was flying through tY~.e field of a searchlight ' when I carelessly shifted my eyes from the instruments to the bright beam of the searchlight, which was incli.ned toward the horizon. An illusion of banking was immediately created, and I turned the fighter.upside dawn in an attempt to eliminate it. This confused me for an instant. I tried to right the aircraft but was unab le to take my eyes off the be am the light. 'Remove the light!' I yelled over tYie radio, noticing that my aircraft was in a banking dive and that there was lit~le altitude left in which to maneuver. Fear literally petrified my entire body for a certain period of time. It was as though an octopus had enveloped me., gripping my arms and legs. Once more~� with an effort of will, I forced myself to pull vigorously on the control stick. ~n the darluiess, it seemed that the aircraft would crash into the ' earth at any moment, and I'automatically closed my eyes in anticipation of the impact, while continuing to pull the fighter out of the dive with both - hands. I succeeded in doing so just above the earth," � � To be ab le to overcome fear one~must understand the nature of fear and how to combat it. Fear is that state experienced by an individual who has temporarily lost his self-control in an adverse situation. From the psychological standpoint, - ~ 57 ~ FOR nFFICTAT TTCF. ~N7.Y . , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - this state is not inborn but is acquired as one goes through life and is essentially a natural extension of the body's protective mechanism, which comes out when the individual is scared. There are cases, as an example, in which pilots, primarily the inexperienced ones, having once experienced fear in a difficult situation, are for a long time afraid to perform that speci�ic flight maneuver which they were performing when the fear arose. Havinq once encountered fear during the performance of a turn in the clouds, which developed into a spiral because of too great a bank, for example, the individual wi~l long feel excessive caution when working on instrument turns in t~ie clouds. As a rule,~his attention is automatically focused on strictly maintaining the required bank, an increase which could result in a steep spiral. It is sometimes said that a person can be taught to fly but that he cannot be taught courage or daring~ that these qualities are contained in the individ- ual's genes, in his heredity. Experience in the field of flying has com- pletely disproven such opinions. We could give many examples in which timid and extremely cautious cadets~ who are afraid to perform even simple piloting techniques on their first flights, zurn into fearless and bold warriors of the air, perforniing all kinds of assignments in the most.difficult cbnditions. Fear is not man's normal state, of course. There is an apt folk saying that "Fear magnifies everything." This means that when an individual in a dif- ficult situation loses control of tiis actions and fails to analyze the cir- cumstances he may make serious errors, errors which it is far from always possi.ble to correct. This is why the development of good moral-political, aggressive and psychological qualities in the youny fliers also calls for the formation of such qualities as fearlessness, determination, self-control and the ability to hold out in a difficult situation and to conquer momentaxy confusion. ` There is no person alive who can remai,n indifferent when his life is endan- gered. It is just a matter of how the individual reacts to danger: one person will be stimulated to action, overcoming his growing concern with an effort of will and performing the mission, while another individual faced with a difficult situation will tr~ to avoid confronting it, look for assist- ance from others, waste valuable seconds and suffer failure. The ability to keep oneself in hand, to stave off panic and avoid vacillation and doubts, remaining calm and determined--these are the moral-volitional qualities of a daring and courageous individual, qualities which depend entirely upon the individual himself and which are developed in the process of intense military ' work. It is never easy to conquer oneself. Victozy goes nnly to those who strive fervently to achieve it, follawing the dictates of their heart, boldly surmounting barriers and their own hesitations and doubts. Illusions Must Be Resisted Illusions, false impressions of the aircraft's position relative to the natural horizon, constitute one of the factors complicating the performance of flight assignments in the clouds and at night. It is not difficult, of course, to ~ 58 FUR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ the aircraft's position when the earth and the horizon are visible. A pilot flying in such conditions and affected by acceleration forces some- times has a distorted concept of his position. There are illusians of banking and sp~nning~ of flying upside down~ illusions of descending and of tail heaviness, and visual illusions. Illusions of banking, descending and tail - heaviness are those most frequently encountered. As a rule, illusions occur during those phases of a flight in which the pilot's attention is dive.rted from the instrument~ and there'is a lack of information. Under the influence of an illusion, the inexperienced pilot or one who has not flown for a long time, will attempt to "return" the aircraft to what his sen- sations tell him is normal flight.. He will bank the aircraft or cause it to descend~ and someti.mes turn it upside dawn, frequently creating a co~licated situation which can lead to disaster. Illusions occur most frequently in the case of pilots with insufficient expe- rience in flying in clouds and are not well conditioned psychologically, th.ose who cease to be.lieve the instrument readings and rely exclusively upon their own perceptions. Any delay in a dangerous.situation, any hesitation or doubt . can e~cacerbate a difficult situation, and it is therefore i~ortant promptly to detect an error and to correct it resolutely. By integrating the readings of the gyro horizon, the rate-of-climb indicator, the altimeter, the compass and other navigational instruments, the pilot must be able to retain a true concept of the aircra�t`s position at all times when flyinq in the clouds. Illusions occurring when the clouds ordinarily last only a few seconds, creating nervous and emotic~nal tension in the pilot. They sometimes last longer, and this can re~ult in total loss of spatial orientation. Z'he illusion in`this case is caused by the prolonged diversion of the pilot's attention from the gyrocompass, the altimeter, the rate-of-climb indicator and the resulting lack of conformity between the individual's perceptions and his concepts of th~ aircraft's location, which are fornied by his visual anal- - . ysis mechanism from the navigational instrument readings. ' , The discontinuity of visual information has a considerable~effect on deter- mination af the aircraft's location. FTnen flying in an uncomplicated situa- tion the nilot receives continuous information on the natural horizon and therefore illusions do not occur. In adverse weather conditions, however, the pilot i5 sometimes forced to take his attention away from the navigational instruments (when operating a radar sight, adjusting the radiocompass fre- � quency, and so forth), and incoming information on flight parameter~:`is there-_ fore not continuous but segmented. The shorter the intervals between the receipt of information, the stronger will be the continuity within the "instru-~ ment-man-control" system. ~ No matter what the,pilot is doing with the control elements, it is important that he concentrate mainly on being precisely aware of flight conditions when flying in clouds. If it becomes necessary to check the positi~n of levers, . 59 . . FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY buttans or toggle switches, he should not take his eyes off the navigational instruments for more than a fraction of a second. All of his actions i.n the cockpit, including the distribution of his attention, should be performed without needless fuss or excitement but without any pauses between the indi- vidual constituents of the actions. In other words, they should be guided by the saying well known in aviation: "Don't rush, but don't delay." Steps have recently been taken in a number of nations to make it possi.ble to depict instrument information on the cockpit windshield, which helps to reduoe pilot fatigue from switching attention while flying in the clouds. - '.rhe pilot will ordinarily not have to shift the focus of his eyes for observ- 'ing the situation outside the cockpit and reading the instruments. Only thoye parameters are depicted on the windshield which are essential in a given phase of the flight, which makes it possible to appraise the overall situation thoroughly and rapi.dly and to make decisions with respect to altering altitude, vertical speed, course and so forth. Sometimes, a pilot just returned from a flight will frankly discuss his experience in the air with his corsades and, unfortunately, frequently becomes a special subject of discussion at the flight critique, sometimes even being temporarily grounded as punishment. Instead of thoroughly analyzing the reason for the illusions, some individuals will be quick to ~ accuse the pilot of not being prepared for the flight, of not getting ~nough rest or in failing to follow certain instructions. Paradoxically, the ~ilot is harmed by his frankness. Should he remain silent and conceal his , doubts and alarm, however, no one wauld know about what happened and the pilot ~might find himself in an even more difficult situation on the next flight. Careful concern for each individual leaving an aircraft cockpit follaving a flight is an essential c~ndition for creating a good frame of nind, for successful combat development and for strengthening the aviation ' tieam. Irritation,. faultfinding and attempts to resolve problems arising in ~ the flight training on the spot or taking a suspicious attitude toward an individual who has not been afraid to bring up his illusions can cause seriaus paycholoqical harm to the pilot, damage which is not easily repaired. , How can one combat illusions? In the past, any pilot who mentioned this ~ wnusual sens ation was temporarily grounded and subjected to careful medical exami.nation. Experience has shown that such actions do not serve.their purpose: they frequently disturb the pilots and harm them emotionally. ' - More effectiv~e and objective methods began to be employed after it was ' discovered that illusions are not a pathological st~te but a brief distur- bance of the individual's vesti.bular mechanism and of his nervous and _ emotional system. Whst should a pilot do if he begins to experience illusions? In the first place, he shnuld force himself to concentrate on the navigational instru- ments, especially the gyrocompass,and if he begins to doubt the gyrocompass readings ne should compare them with the readings of other instruments (the rate-of-climb indicator, the tachometer, the altimeter, and so forth). 60 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI~Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - - Avoiding abrupt movements of the control levers, he should brinq the air~ craft into horizontal flight and keep his body in the same position for a curtai.m period of time. Without taking his attention off the instruments, he should then bend his head with a smooth and even motion, move his legs, tease and relax his arm, bac.k and stomac,h muscles sev~eral times, and inhale and exhale deeply. Pis soon as he frees hims~.lf of the illusion, he should return the aircraft smootY~ly to the prescri.bed flight mode. S~metimes, follawinq takeoff, especially when the bottom edge of the cloud oover is not far above the ground, a pilot who has not prepared himself to navigate by instrument will take the aircraft into a sharp turn onto a aew course, only focusing attention upon the instruments after he has entered the cloudis. It may suddenly seem to him that the aircraft is banking in the - apposite direction, although the gyrocompass indicates a turn onto the required course. The pilot must immediately verify the compass readings, and if they correspond to the gyrocompass readings (right turn--increased heading) he must force himself to believe the instruments and ~take the aircraft out of the bank. Many years of experience in flying in clouds and at night, and the observations and impressions of pilots have convincingly shown that after taking off, retrac- ting the landing gear and flaps and setting the prescri.bed mode for gaining altitude prior to entering clouds, it is important immediately to concentrate on the navigational instruments, thereby preparing oneself inentally and emo- ti.onally for flying in. clouds. It is advisable to turri onto new courses only after achieving stable navigation by instrument in the clouds. Ice crystals sometimes form in extreme cold with a high relative humidity, which, at night, create a"screen"--visual illusions, which produce an i.ncor- rect pereeption of the distance to the runway: the approach lights and other illumi.nation facilities of the night landing system appear nearer or farther away than they actually are. This phenomenon occurs most frequently in the northern latitudes. In such cases the pilot should switch immediately to instrument flight, report this to the runway control station and continue the flight by the instr~ument readi.ngs and i.nstructions from the landing system ~ operator or th~ flig.'~t operation officer. Brilliant stars in f.he dark background of the heavens are sometimes taken by ~ a pilot as navigation lights (BANO) of a nearby aircraft. A pilot on a night- time visual intercept mission once noticed such lights directly ahead. Taking them for the target, he began approaching for the attack. Increasing his ' speed to the maxi.mum, the pilot flew for a long time without approaching to within firing range of the target. Only then did he realize that he was attadcing not a target but a distant star. In order to avoid such errors, one should look a little longer at a lighted object and try to determine its relative speed, which will be zero ~ if it is a star ahead of the pilot. When attempting to catch up with the object at a low angle of approach, there will be no noticeable convergence: . . 61 ~ ~ FOR OFI~'ICIAL USE ONLY � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the object will appear to be constantly retreating instead of approaching. In order to determine the nature of a lighted object when flying in forma- tior~, one should contact an adjacent crew by radio and request them to blink navigation lights. This will dispel once and for all any doubts con- o2rning the origin of the other lights. Sometimes, when flying at night over bodies of water during ~ period of high htunidity, the reflection of the moon and the stars immediately beneath the ~ aircraf.t will form what the pilots call a"second" moon. The sky seems to have turned upside down, replacing the surface of the land (or water) in spots. In such a case one should switch immediately to instr~nent flying and fly for 3 or 5 minutes by the mode set, with attention focused con- stantly upon the instruments. If, after this, the "lunar apparition" has not disappeared, the flight should be contir;sed strictly by instrument. . Such phenomena sometimes ~ast a long time, sometimes even throughout an entire nightshift. Pilots flying under these conditions experience consid- erable mental and emotional tension and must apply considerable willpower to - keep their attention focused upon the instruments and to overcome the desire to look outside the cockpit and see the carpet of stars beneath the wings. . . . 62 ~ FOR GFFICIAL U8E ON'LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040140100026-1 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Chapter IV. COt~AT TRAINING FLIQiTS AI~ID Tf~ MORAL-PSYC~iOIAGICAL CCf~IDITIONING OF FLIGHT PERSONNEL 1. The Preflight Period Flights performed for combat training purposes--missile launchings, firing, bombing, interceptions of air targets and other types of training--constitute - an exceptionally important phase of the pilot's training and of his dev~elop- ment as an air fighter. Such flights provide flight persoru~.el with the best possible opportunity to acquire skills in the employment of weapons in combat " and for the dev~elopment of daring~ determination~ courage, initiative, psycho- - I.ogical stability and other qualities essential to the successful conduct af modern warfare. _ The well-organized and quality performance of combat training flights depends prima.rily upon the preparations made for them, and moral-psychological con- - ditioning is an inseparable part of surh preparations. It is begun long _ before ~takeoff and from the moment the mission is assigned it acquires con- crete focus in con�ormity with the specific nature of the assignments to be performed. The emotional state of flight personnel undergoes considerable change when they receive :heir flight assignments. This is due to the fact that flights involving the employment o~ weapons (bombs, missiles or shells) increase xesponsibility with respect to the quality with which the mi.ssion is per- formed and to flight safety. It is one thing for a pilot to err in making calculations for a landing or when piloting in the zone, but it is another matter when firing at ground targets, bombing, intercepting a target, con- _ ductinq a reconnaissance fligh~ or dropping a landing group or cargo. An error a landing could produce the preconditions for a flight inci- r dent or even damage to the aircraft. An error during a firing or bombing, however, or during the landing of an airborne group, could have even more serious consequences. External and internal factors raise the pilot's activity "level during pre- parations for combat training flights. He experiences prebattle excitement and a desire to thoroughly unde rstan.d the assignment and the pro~edure for operating the cr~ckpit equipment in the various flight phases. A strong- willed individual will su~press temporary apprehensions, indecision, lack ~ of confidence and other negative developments of his mental and emotional state. After receiving their bombing, firing, interception or other missions, the pilots compile a flight plan, sketch the target situation and indicating - the best sectors for approaching the target without detection, prepare flight maps, enter the frequencies of homing stations and the call signs of a'_ternate 63 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY airfields on plctting boards, study the probable "enemy," and outline tactical maneuv~rs for overcoming air defenses along the route, above the _ target and on the return flight. During this time, some pilots may develop tension due to the increased responsibility for completion of the flight assigrunent, some lack of confidence and constraint. Some young pilots become fidgety and attempt to perform several tasks at the same time (making notes in their workbook, making diagrams~ preparing flight sheets . and maps, and so forth), and are excessively talkative. In such cases, ~ more than at any other time, it is appropriate for the commanders, political - workers and veteran pilots to give the young pilots comradely advise and assistance_ The pilots' excitement does not always become apparent while they are busy preparing for a flight. As soon as there is a lull in their activities, _ after they haae. completed their drawings and maps, and so forth, howeve. c, a state of heightened excitement can be observed, especially in those who lack experience in perfoxiriing t'~e kind nf task~ facing them. At this time it is highly beneficial for them to hear experts in the combat employment of the aircraft speak about their experience in operating the control elements of the armament systems, approaching a target undetected and per- fornu.n~ the operations directly i.nvolved in the bombing, in carrying out - attacks, 1a~ching missiles, landing airborne forces, and so forth. Talks by vet~rar_ pilots and reminders of the need for precise actions in all phases of the flight help to strengthen the pilots' self-confidence. Trai.ning sessions with special equipment and in aircraft cockpits are espe- - ni~lly important for developing the qualities of good fighters and a positive frame of mi.nd in tne pilots. Along with developing skill in operating the Systems, it is important to devote serious attention to instilling confidence in -the correctness of their actions in the pilots.. This is achieved with a - skiliful combination of simple and complex operations during practical train- ing sessions in the cockpit pilot or on a trainer and by demonstrating and ` anaiyzing errors most frequently encountered on a flight (confusing the toggle switches, failure to switch on individual units of armament systems, and so forth). S~rict abservance of safety measures is especially important when practicing to use the control elements for the aircraft armaments from the coc.kpit. Aircraft specially prepared for this type of practical training are carefully inspected and tested. After a pilot has seated himself in the cockpit of an aircraft readied for take- � ofi he concentrates on being extremely calm and precise in his actions, in order to av~oid accidentally engaging the armament systems. The pilot's psycho- logical state at this time is one of.~onsiderable tensicn, and it is therefore important to be especially attentive and patient with him during the issuing ' of instructions prior to takeoff and during radio exchanges. Any raising of the vaice, any irritability or hastiness can have undesirable consequences. - - 64 ' ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ThaQe commanders are proceedinq correctly, who, during classes in a trainer, work out the steps to be taken in possible situations not covered by regula- tions (special flight situations) resulting from malfunctions of individual armament units until those actions become automatic. They strive to see that the pilot is capable of responding to each specific situation with p rompt . aad correct actions and is able to correct errors and inaccuracies in his wozic . Precise clarification of the flight assignment, familiarity with the expe- rience of senior comrades, a thorough knowledge of the equipment, tactics _ and the w~eapons, and focused, independent preparation all help to develop vonfidence, pasitive reactions and fighting gusto in the pilots. In actual practice, active preparations for a mission in an exercise or at a range are follawed by a period of waiting for takeoff. If the pilots~are , not in the aircraft cockpits it is advisable to focus their attention on clarifying the route, rehearsing the procedure of action for the various phases of the flight, checking their knawledge of the main and stan~y radio frequencies, keeping them in a positive frame of mind for the flight and main- - tai.ninq a high level of volitional and psychological activi*y. Any relaxa- tion of their attention or deterioration of their attitude toward the flight can have a negative effect on their reacti.on time and on the precision of . their performanre in the air, especially during the first phase of the flight. 2. During the Performance of Flight Assignments During Missile La~chings, Fix�ing and Bombing Practice In the phase .the beginning of the actual Pmployment of the weapons - the crew does not always possess adequate informarion on the air situation. Zn this case it is important that the pilot not focus his attention on one or two abjects (instruments, the search for the target, and so forth) but that he operate from an overall standpoint, simultaneously performing several of the most important tasks an@ fil].ing in information previously abtained. When approaching the range, for example, it is advisable to conduct contin- uous observation in all directions, to search for the target, monitor the readings of the piloting and navigational instruments, to prepare the bombing or missi2e launching equipment, and so forth. Th.e actual performance of the live firing, missile launching and bombing is ' characterized by a further build-up of psychological tension, by the crew's cumulative concentration on destroying the target and by an atmosphere of dynamism both outside the aircraft and in the cockpit. Time is limited, and � the pilot must fly the aircraft, engage in observation, continuously follow _ the target, visually or by means of the airborne radar, precisely determine ~ the approarh and monitor the instruments. The extent of rapid change occurring in the situation and the volume of information may reach their maximum at this time, and if the pilot has learned to properly distribute his attention and to 65 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ , control the!fire with precise actions developed to the point of automation, " and is capable of restraining himself in the face of new and unexpected - prablems, then the successful performance of the combat mi.ssion is ensured. In his desire to perform the combat mission with excellence, an inexperienced pilot sometimes becomes tense and constrained, concentrates on a narrow sector and is not constantly in control of himself. This complicates the - performance of t'~e assignment and som~times brings the efforts of the entire crew to naught. � . On ~ne flight the crew of officer U, was to deliver a strike against an "enemy" airfield. The pilot flew the bomber right to the target. The navi- gator opened the bomb-bay doors, found the bomb-release button with his hand and bent over the eyepiece of the optical sight. The target should appear any time. The navigator spied "enemy" aircraft on the ground and reported happily to the aircraft commander: "Target in sight. Ztvo degrees right": . "Roger. Two degrees right," the pilot turned the aircra~t onto the course indicated by the navigator. The target entered the graticule. Th~ navigator waited the required period oE time, pressed the bomb-release button and then reported to the commander that the bombs had been dropped. It was time to switch off the bomber armament, and the navigator reached for the main switch. His fingers did not find the automatic circuit pro- tection device in the upper position--it was disengaged. '~How can that be? I m sure i did everything rignt," thought the disturbed navigator. "Did I really forget to switch the main toggle switch?" In order to find out, he - pressed the general verification button and saw the silhouette of a bomb on the lighted transpaz~ency.... Why Y~:ad this happened? In order to answer this question, we must trace the crew's actions flom the very beginning. Following the long flight along the route, the pilot reached the precalculated point and made a turn. The navigator checked the settings on the sight and the position of the main - scaitches for the last time. The emotional tension of the pilot and navigator reachecl its apex when they reached the beginning of the bombing run. All of their attention was occupied with maintaining the required flight parameters. "Engaging the main switch?." the navigator reported and moved his hand to the bomb control panel. .~1t that ~noment, the aircraft conunander requested the instrument altitude. "Climb 50 meters," the navigator answered hastily and returned his arm to the armrest without turning on the main switch. . 66 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAI~ USE ONLY After that~ he operated in accorclance with the flight plan. Both the navi,qator and the pilot were to blame for what happened. The former was neglig~ent in �forgetting� to turn on the main switch, while the latter c3ecided to check the flight altitude at the wrc^q time. The flight phase covering the start of th~e bombing run and the bombing run itself should be . strictly regimented for the flight crew, planned in advance down to the , tiniest detail and eliminating the need for any sort of clarifications except for those absolutely essential for the bombing. As a rule, the naviqational, piloting and bombing equipme*:t carried by modern ~ aircraft is duplicated, and any crew member can check the instrument readings, the signal, lights and the position of the switches. When the crew members work in a well-coordinated manner, it is not greatly difficult for one of ~ them to check the actions of a comrade. The pilot had only to check the siqnal lights following the navigator~s report that the main switch had been turned on, and the bombing w4uld have been successful. Various forms and methods are used tor developing moral-psychological stability in the flight personnel in the performance of combat training flights. Highly effective among them are accounts of their experiences by those who have par- ticipated in combat operations, who have a great deal of experience in the employment of weapons under modern conditions. Such accounts help to develop in the aviators the courage, determination, boldness and other moral and , militant qualities essential to the victorious conduct of aerial combat. Follawing is a description of an actual flight by Hero of the Soviet Dnioaz M. Chechneva: ' 'There was nawhere in the air for the pilot to hide: there was no solid earth to be found. Ahead lay only a savage play of fire.... Piskareva , and Rnzanova plunged unhesitatingly into the fire, rushing to the aid of their frie~ds. Katya maneuvered the aircraft masterfully. She flew the air- _ craft in zigzags--now a long leg, now a short one. She gave the antiaircraft qunners no opportunity to take aim, while persistently moving toward the fording point. Rozanova released an illuminating aerial bomb.... Three pale-blue beams of light struck the aircraft.... Fragments c3rummed upon - the skin. Piskareva wove her intricate evasion pattern.... And there was ~ the target: a long column of motor vehicles and numerous moving dots. Rozanova dropped a second aerial illumination bomb.... She instructed~the . pilot to turn 15 degrees.... 'Maintain bombing course`! Piskareva maintaxned the f~ight mode ideally, making it possible for the navigator to drop the bombs accurately. ` 'During those seconds when the aircraft is on the bombing run, hawever, it . makes a perfect target for enemy antiaircraft gunners. The aircraft shuddereci from the impact of fragments--again and again. The aircraft _ rocked and banked to the side--a direct hit by a shell~ Without taking her eyes off the sight, Rr~zanova instructed the pilot: ~ 67 ~ k'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 'Maintain bombing course`! ' "With a final effort, Katya Piskareva returned the crippled aircraft to a horizontal position. "Long and agonizing seconds of sighting.... ThE navxgator pressed the bomb- release lever, and the bombs flew out. 'Ready. Take off!' Rozanova gave the cignal to withdraw from the tarqet. "Piskareva renewed the zigzag flight and maneuvering. The crew was hurrying to get out of firing range. The navigator observed the bomb bursts. They ~ expl.oded in the vexy thick of the vehicles. A blast shook the aircraft. Frequent flashes with white and blue tongues of fire flickered on the ground. The firing continued.... Just one flight! "An.d Hero of the Soviet Union Larisa Rozanova has 816 to her credit." Sometimes, the crews perform combat exercises in the same air or range sit- uation for a long time~ which helps the pilots to become accustomed to standard flight conditions. And while these flights are permissible in the case of the young pilots lacking experience in the combat employmenL� oc the aircraft, sucl~. i.ndulgences are harmful for others, since they do not con- tribute anything to the improvement of their tactical and firing skill, are detrimental ~o their combat training and do not help them to develAp the needed psychological stability. ~ During a check-out in one of the units, the senior chief ordered a strike against ground targets located at a range with which the pilots wer~ not ' familiar. Despite what seemed to be good preliminary preparations, during which the flight personnel studied the target situation from diagrams and - perfo~ed a practice ru.z-through of the mission, t.he results achieved in the actual mission by some of the pilots, especially the young ones, were not _ especially good. Those who received low scores attempted to use the strong crosswind, the difficult approach to the range and the fact that the leading pairs of aircraft had not maneuvered entirely correctly as an excuse for their error.s . ~ ~ ~ 7'he mai.n explanation for the low performance, however, was poor preparation _ on the part of those pilots, who had become accustomed to operating on a ' range with which they were thoroughly fami,liar. , ' In the interest of improving the pilots' combat training, the expPrienced aviation supervisors endeavor to increase the complexity of assignments from one flight to another and to place the crews in circumstances which contrib- ute ~o the development of good moral-combat and psychological qualities. The offi,cer in charge of firing in one unit, for example, altered the approach conditions and the direction for approaching, the flight pattern 68 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � ' - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY after coming out of the dive, flight altitude, and so forth. This forced the pilots to appraise the situation in detail, to demonstrate initiative aad to function at their full capaci.ty. Setiing up the firing practice in this manner has helped to improve the combat skills of pilots in this unit. We should stress the fact that in the initial stages of training in the various components of combat employment of the weapons, the pilots should . be given the opportunity to attack the target from their usual, "standard" positi~. In the process~ it is ii~ortant to raise the crews' training to ' a level giving them confidence in themselves and in the quality and trouble- free performance of the weapons, and pezmitting them to acquire a feel for the ai.rcraft in all the different flight phases. ~'he conditions and the procedure for performing the missions are made more.complicated after~the pilots have become familiar with the range and have acquired solid skills in bombing. firing and missile-launching. This promo~es steady improvement of th~ flight personnel's combat proficiency and helps to toughen their moral-psychological makeup. . It is especially difficult for the young pilots to master law-altitude flights to the range, involving employment of the airborne weapens. In their attempt to reach the target and deliver the strike rapidly, some of them are not precise in their actions; they rush preparation of the bombing and missile equipment and do not maintain the prescribed altitudes for beginning the attack. This sometimes results in poor performance of the exercises. On one flight, young officer M. reached the precalculated point, executed a ~ - vertical maneuver, took the aircraft into a dive and immediately opened fire. His actions appeared to have been correct in all respects, and according to ~ the pilot's calculations, the shells should have destroyed the targets. Unfortunately, however, this was not the case. The shells missed because - of the pilot's hasty actions and because he opened fire at too great a . distance. It is not an easy matter to practice in the combat employment of the weapons on low-altitude flights. Maximum concentration on piloting arid orientation immediately above the~earth, the need to maneuver after attacking the target and the limited amount of time available for the operations--all o� this and many other factors create great psychological stress and make it essential for the pilots to perform with exceptional precision, to be atten- ~ tive and perform with flexibility and efficiency. � � A pilot with an inadequate attention span will sometimes take a long time to adjust the sight precisely and will beqin "chasing after" the sight marker, thereby causing the aircraft to wobble in the dive. As the earth approaches _ the pilot be comes increasingly anxious to complete the fire as rapidly as possibl~ and to take the aircraft out of the dive. This is not fear. It is simply activation of the human protective impulses. A pilot in this situation . especially needs a strong will, fortitude and the ability to force himself to cross ~e frontier of danger. ' 69 . ~ ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ Tn the diving process it is important to determine the proper moment for . opening fire (or launching the missiles). Certain parts of this almost instantaneous action can be worked out on a trainer, bnt the crucial factor will b~ the pilot's practical perception in the air, when the learned dimen- sions of the targefi begin to approximate those of real ones. When the target dimensions are not knawn, sighting precision is determined by the position of the marker or from other sight data. ~ Anyone who has ever performed a firing is familiar with the way the heart stops and breathing is arre~ted when one pushes the trigger or launching button. As he waits for the gun burst or the missile latu~?ch, the individual seems to be cut off from the rest of the world and sees only the target. ~ In an attempt to see the firing results, some pilots delay bringing the air- craft out of the dive, and then, when the earth is even closer, whip the air- craft out of the dive literally with a single movement, and this could result in a critical angle of attack or a stall condition. For firing at ground targets a pilot must withstand prolonged mental exertion and be able to properly distribute and shift his attention and to control the aircraft and himself near the earth, at both low and high speeds. T'hese qualities and skills can only be acquired through persistent training and regular drilling and with a creative approach to the assigned job. When the Target Is On the S'creen i~ 'i~e interception of air targets in modern fighters involves an entire system of complex maneuvers by the interceptor, r,ombined with an active target search with gro~d and airborne radar, sonic or telemetered target designation, lock- = on of the target with the sight and an attack with missiles or guns. This type of aerial combat, especially interceptions in the clouds or at night, is among the most difficult from the standpoint of psychological tension. Success in seaxching for the target is greatly dete~mined by the interaction - between the aircraft controller and the interceptor pilot. If it is smoothly coordinated, the guidance process occupies only a small interval of time and ~ proceeds smoothly and in an organized manner. The aircraft`s ability to determine the distance between the interceptor and the target and the correct c~urse for entering the attack curve from the blips on the ground radar ' screen and his ability to check his own calculations are frequently the de~ermining factor in an intexception. An aircraft controller sometimes hurries, does not bother to make accurate calculations and rushes to instruct the aircraft to take a new flight course or altitude. There is a continuous stream of commands from him to the air. _ This sort of flight "control" increases the psychological pressure on the pilot, makes him nervous and prevents him from systematically monitoring the ~ 70 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . ' i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY piloting instruments or the situation on the sight sc~een. This~ of course, , can result in a breakdown of control and. consequently, in an unsuccessful intercapt. The range of tactical procedures used in interceptions has expanded con- siderably in recent years. More extensive use is being made of instrument . guidance with computers, and the interceptor's capabilities for c~etecting and destroying targets have grawn. All of this has further complicated the pilot's functions and increased the amount of information received by hiat, especially during the approach to the target~ the lock-on and launching. Prior to this phase, the pilot executes commands from ground and can devote a considerable amount of to piloting by instrument, continuously monitoring tYqe aircraft's position, but when the target blip appears on the screen there are considerably fewer opportunities to do this, since the pilot is nvw focusing attention on the sight screen. In this phase of an interception the amount of time available for integrating the instrument ' readings and those on the sight screen is also greatly reduced. Z'he pilot ~ can no lonqer permit himself to hold his attention on one or two instruments: he glances quickl.y at the dials and then returns his attention to the sight screen. In an attempt to destroy the target as rapidly as possible, some pilots prematurely switch the sight to the lock-on mode, which sometimes results in an unsuccesSful interception. It is important to wait a certain amount of time, check the distance to the target and only then, press the lock-on button. After detecting the "enemy" on one flight, officer P, hastily switched the siqht to the intercept mode at a range exceeding the prescribed distance. . The target blip appeared at the center of the screen for a certain length of time, but the "enemy" only had to perform a vigorous maneuver.and the sight was no longer locked on to the target. The pilot appraised the ' situation and promptly corrected his error. He detected the target again, approached to the required distance and locked on. Continuously tracking the target and monitoring the piloting instruments, he determined that the "enemy" had begun a new maneuver--this time on a ve rtical plane. The pilot beqan to climb and performed a zooming maneuverP while purs the target relentlessly. - Z'he intensity of the battle qrew. While never taking his attention away from , the sight screen, the pilot concentrated on his piloting, on determining the _ distance to the "enemy" and holding the blip in the center of the electronic circle. And when the final launching sic~nal came,, he pressed the launch button vigorously, while keeping the target blip at the zero azimuth. ' The "enemy" was intercepted in this position. . The ability persistently to hold an air target in lock-on position always produces a surge of energy and confidence and a desire to complete the attack 71 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY successfully. ?1nd, no matter how the target maneuvers, the pilot, psycho- logically attuned to the intercept mission, proceeds boldly to approach the - target, pilots confidentl.y and achieves victory. Naturally, it is practically impossible to maintain a heightened psycho- ~ logical state throughout an entire, sometimes fairiy long fliqht in the clouds, ana this state shou].d be al.ternated with brief periods of partial mental relaxation when the situation becomes someiahat less complicated. The lengthy state of tension existing during the performance of an inter- ception may result in premature fatigue, errors i.n assessing the situation and faulty actions. As pilots experience in intercepting targets, they develop psy~clio-- logical stamina and solid skills in piloting in the clouds while simulta- neously operating the sight. They monitor the movement of the target blip on the screen, as well as the speed of approach, the distance to the target, � - changing flight altitude and so forth, with greater confidence. The piloting and operation of the sight becomes somewhat automatic, which reduces the mental load an.d helps to increase psychological stability. One of the most complicated types of work performed by pilots is that of piloting in clouds and operating a sight simultaneously. Not every indi- vidual is capable of rapidly mastering the entire interception process. This is why it is important to pay exceptionally close attention to those who lack experience in the performance of such flights, to endeavor to eliminate the slightest doubt or vagueness in their mi.nds, and to take advantage of every opportunity to conduct classes, personal r3iscussions and flights in a dual-control trainer to improve their psychological preparedness " to fly intercept missions. ~ Exercises--A Serious Test Tactical flight exercises constitute a real school of combat proficiency for fliers and a serious test of their preparedness to perform combat missions. An air and ground situation approaching the conditians of an actual air battle is created for the exercises. The professional skill of the airmen and the level of their moral-combat and psychological qualities are judged from the results of tactical flight exercises. . As they perfoxm tasks of vazying complexity and scope, interacting with - other branches of aviation and with ground forces, the airmen demonstrate tn,e proficiency they have acquired and improved in training flights involving bombing, firing, missile launchinqs, interceptions, reconnaissance and the dropping of airborne landing�forces and cargo. ' While the crews ordinarily have advance notice of the mission per- fozmed on flights covered by combat training plans and have an opportunity to prepare for it, in exercises the combat mission is frequently assigned ~ 72 FOR OFFICIAL USE.ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - ~ ~ to tha pilots after ta3ceoff. Z!he element of surprise has a considerable affect upon the pilots' mental and emotional state. It is one thing to perform a bombing or firing mission on a familiar range, and anotrier ta carry out bomb:ng attacks and missile la~nchinqs agai.nst unfamiliar targets. ' ~e fact of not knowing the air or ground situation may have a negative effect upon the individual's mental and emotional state and may lower his volitional action level. WI'ien pre~aring for tactacal flight exercises steps are therefore taken to reduc~% the effects of vagueness in~the situation by conducting additional reoonnaissance, by studying available mosaics of the area of impending operations, and so forth. A thorough understanding of the procedure for handling the sight and the bombing, missile and artillery, navigational and other equipment helps to create solid internal psychological links and, consequently, to dev~elop confidence in the crews that the missions will be successfully accoag~lished. The performance.of two pilots in one exercise is worthy of inention in con- nection..with~ this. Z'hey were performinq.identicai missions of firing at� - a qround target. And they were performing under adverse condi'-ions: a low cloud cover, poor visibiJ.ity and a strong crosswi.nd. The firsz pilot was ~ not able to the unfamiliar situation swiftly and efficiently or to determuie the target`s locatian or the proper procedure for approaching it. As a result, his attack was aborted. Fie had to start all over f~om the begixuiing. Z'he second pilot analyzed the conditions rapidly and correctly and determined what sort af maneuver was required on the basis of his . analysi.s. He then performed a vigorous zooming maneuver, took the plane _ ~ into a div~e out of a turn and opened fire at the right moment. The~target was destroyed. ~ The commander d"erived the correct conclusion from his analysis of the per- _ formance of the two pilo~s, who had apprcximately the same traininq back- . qround, that they were not psychologically prepared~ to the same degree for the exercise. The first pilot was not able to rapidly ~npraise t2ie complex - situation and make the right decision with his limited .'iri`ormation. That is, he was nat able to fully activate his capabilities. Z'he secorid pilot was able to concentrate in the complex situation, determining his sequence of action rapidly and correctZy, which ensured his successful performance - of the mi.ssion. ~ ~ - When perf~~x_minq exercise missions an individual will frequently take an intui- tive apprcia~h in appraising the constantly changing situation. His success depends greatly upon his ability to analxze, his flight experience and the _ thoroughness of his knawledge and skills. The more a pilot learns about the grounc~ and air situation, about weather conditions and other peculiarities ~ of the specific flights, the more effective is his intuition. ~ ~ 73 . , FOR OFFICTAL USE.ONLY' . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mental flexibility and efficiency on the part of flight personnel is - highly important to successful performance in exercises. In a situation - of rapidly changing circumstances and limi,ted time, this helps them to - evaluate events correctly and, consequently, to make intelligent decision~. Mental flexi.bility and efficiency require the activation of all psycho- logical elements, first and foremost, attention, willpower, persistence � and determination. - Subunits are frequently assigned ne~w missions in the air during tactical ' flight exercises. Such refocusing of groups, especially for the subsequent performance of complex assignments in an unfamiliar area of combat operations, when there is a I.engthy period of psychological stress, can result in the intensification of retardation processes in the nerve centers of the brain. - In many cases ttiis leads to negative emotions, deterioration of concentra- tion and a slowin.g of response, and consequently, to deterioration in the performance of flight assignments.~ Such negative phenomena can be forestalled by rimning through the refocusing of a group during the daily flight training, by conducting the combat training , without i.ndulgences or simplifcations, and by persistently seeking the most effective possibZe actions in a situation which changes� rapidly and drastically. There are things to be learned in this respect from the experience acquired _ in the squadron comananded by officer N. Tyutyunnikov. In that squadron, ~ombat training plans are carefully compiled, strict sequence is observed for working on the combat training tasks, and a persistent campaign is waged agai.nst routine, indulgences and simplifications and against all violations of the requirements contained in flight service regulations. The trai.nin3 and indoctrination process is geared to the future and~the ~ perfonnance of more difficult tasks. All of this makes it possible for the squadron to achieve good results in combat development and to perform suc- ` cessfully in tactical flight exercises. In one exercise the squadron was assigned the mission of covering a route without detection, penetrating the "enemy`s" air defenses and delivering a - strike against a target. The time allocated for preparations was curtailed, and it was decided to carry out the attack from various directions, based on a detailed study of the situation and the target area. After takeoff, the squadron commander received additional infoz~mation and altered his decision, deciding to approach the target at minimum altitude ~and to maneu- ' ~ � ver for the attack before coming within visible range. The squadron arrived at the designated pnint precisely at the time spe,cified ~ and flying at great speed, performed t'~e maneuver briskly, perforcned bombing, missile and gun attacks against the target and, after taking evasive action, departed the attack with the same speed. The performance by squadron flight personnel was given a good rating. The exe`rcise director noted, along with the tactical and fire training of the pilots, their good psychological con- ditioning, determination, resourcefulness and boldness. 74 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFP'ICIAL USE ONLY Preparations for and the organization of tactical fla.qht exercises is highly ~ important in the contemporary situation. Success in exercises conducted without sim}~lifications or indulgences is ensured primarily by thoroughly planning fihe kind of preparations to be made and the methods to be employed, by elaborating the various components of the~combat operations in great detail, by thoroughly appraising the combat training level of the persorinel - and their psychological preparedness for engaging in modern aer.ial combat and by creating a highly militant frame of mind in the airn~en. . ~ The c~mmaanders and political workers i.n the outstanding units boldly coag~li- . cate the situation after the exercises are under way, in order to develop psychological stability in the pilots. The unexpected appearance of "enemy" ai.r defense fighters, temporary cessation of radio contact (radio silence), the jam�ning of ground ~and airborne radio equipment and the retargeting of crews in the ai.r for strikes against new objectives--all of this helps to develop in the ai.rm~en the determination, initiative, independence and other qualities essential to vi.ctory in modern combat. � Combat training flights and the personnel's participation in exercises are thus the most complex and important elements of combat icrai.ning for fliers and of the process of improving their psychological conditioning. The proper - organization and conduct of flight critiques, the ~umming up of exerci~es and evaluation of tlze mi.ssions performed have an important role. A correct and objective evaluation important factor in the indoc~rination of flight personnel. It is absolutely inadmissible to give ratings higher than those actually earned, because this disorients the pilots and frequently brings on serious problems. \The aviation co~nander is required to participate in the evaluation of the fligYit performance of each pilot, arew, flight, ' � detachment and squadron, and to~ensure that their combat training is evaluated from a strictly objective standpo~nt. , ~ . ~ ~ ~5 FOR OFFICIAL T1SE GNLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Chapter V. M~RAL-PSYQiOLOGICAL TRAIHIldG AS A FLI(~iT SAFETY FACTOR 1. Flight Service Regulations--A Law ~ Requlations, manuals, instructions and other documents governing flight work reflect the experience of many years of conducting flights and training and indoctrinating airmen and in operating and maintaining a.i.rcraft with the - latest achieve.ments of science and technology,, and the practical experience _ of outstanding units and subun,its. A thorough knowledge and precise ful- fillment of the requirements contained in these documents give the personnel � a high level of discipline and create the kind of positive frame of mind which contributes to the confident performance of flight assigrunents, to the maintenance of strict order at the airfield and ta the competent operation of the equipment on the ground and in the air. The personal examples set by co~nanders and.chiefs in the study and fulfill- a~nt of requirements contained in doc~nents is highly important. Continuous work to improve themselves and strict ac]herence to regulations, manuals and instructions help them to organize the trai.ning and indoctrina- ~ tion of subordinates purposively and correctly from the methodological stand- point, to mobilize them for exemplazy performance of the assigned tasks and to steadily strengthen military discipline and order. Flight work makes no allawances for anyone, especially fox supervisory personnel, for lack of knawledge, inadequate skill, a low level of demandingness or inadequate prepa- ratio~ for flights, and severely punishes those who rely totally upon skills and knawledge already acquired and who do not try to improve. As they organize the study of documents governing flight work, the experienced cotrunanders and chiefs:constantly attemQt to see that evexy flier acquires a thorough knawledge of;;::regulations, manuals and instructions, understands every paragraph and takes a conscientious attitude toward the classes, one reflecting a sense of great responsibility. They devote special attention to the study of documents defining the organization of flight service, first and foremost, ~ the performance of flights an~ the navigation and aviation engineer services. fihe objective of such classes is only achieved when they are conducted at a high methodological level and take the training and the individual psycho- loqical trai.ts of the students into account. Commanders and chiefs consider it their duty to look after the independent - work of the airmen, which focuses on the thorough study of guiding documents. ~ They set up consultations, help their subordinates select the proper liter- ature and strive to see that the greatest possible results are obtained from ~ the self-instruction. When the airmen are highly demanding of themselves and focus their willpower on the study of regulations, manuals and instructions and on their practical implementation, their knowledge is expand2d and strength- ened and become a powerful motivating factor.. 76 ~ FOR OFFT_CI.AL USE O:JLY ~ b APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . ~ Well-organized monitoring of the fulfillment of requirements contained in ~ documents qoverning flight work is an inseparable part of the campaign for flight safety. It helps to indoctrinate the airmen in a spirit of good orqanizatioai and discipline and helps to promptly correct deficiencies and , errors in the combat training and in the performance of flights. The main - purpose of this control is to step up efforts to prevent the development of _ situations which could giv~e rise to fl,ight accidents and to increase the feeling of responsibility in each individual who participates in the flights or in ~heir support. Verification of the i~lementation of requirenients - . contained in regulatians, manuals and instructions and in flight training ~ courses calls for being higtily demanding of those performing the work, pro- viding them with on-the-spot assistance and conducting a determi.ned campaign aqainst the slightest deviations from flight service regulations. ~ Zhe flight plan is, of course, the basic document for a flight day (or night). It c3efines the course exercises, the takeoff sequence, the a~ount of time the crews are to remain in the air, flight zones, ranges, routes and so forth, ~ the agenda for flight personnel. The flight plan is an order, which, when received by the airneen, stimulates emotional and volitional processes focusing � on the quality performance of each flight assignment. Naturally, al~ of this takes place in a background of goal-oriented work by commanders, political Workers, p arty and Komsomol organizations and of persistent efforts on their Part to mobilize the men. ~ Supervisozy personnel of units and subunits do everything possible to instill in the aiz~men a feeling of special respect for the flight plan and a desire . to perform all of the exercises well and within the time allocated for the - purpose. This makes the flight work proceed smoothly and evenly and ensures stable order on the ground and in the air and ultimately, flight safety as - well. . - The airmen receive all-rotmd support and encouragement from command for demon- strating intelligent initiative in the performance of the flight schedule and a creative attitude toward the assigned job, and for endeavoring to focus t~eir knawledge and experience on the performance of the assigned mis~ions. Manifestatioz~s of, lethargy and inertia, on the other hand, create alarm and concern and re~uire that prcper steps be taken to correct the situation. The political-indoctrinational work conducted during flights is designed to ~ ensure that every airman considers himself to be an active fighter for _ implementation of the flight plan and responsible for the safety of each flight, from the time the aircraft taxis out until the engine has been - switched off after landing. A great deal depends upon the emotional state - of the men, upon their relationships and upon the emotional atmosnhere created in the collective, both on the days preceding flights and while they are under way. The elimiriation of haste~ a situation of mutual demandingness and respon-- , siaility for the comba~- readiness of the unit and for flight safety, and 77 ~ FOR OFI'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFILIAL USE ONLY mutual aid and assistance in the work create that spirit of fraternity and comradeship which contributes greatly to tile successful performance of the assi~ed tasks and to the insurance of accident-free flight work. A high level of discipline and organization and the precise implementation of each paragraph of regulations, instructions and manuals by everyone involved in organizing flights is a guarantee of success, bo�~h in the pro- fessional development of the pilots and in the observance of safety measures. _ Special importance is also attached to the self-discipline of each airman, which ensures a high level of organization and precision of action in any situation, no matter how complicated. Commanders and political workers, therefore, demonstrate special concern for indoctrinating the airmen with an inner need,~for efficiency, internal 3iscipline and personal convic~ion as to the need for strict observance of flight regulations. - 2. Psychological Analys~s of Errors CommiLted by Flight Personnel on Flights What Is "Human Error"? ~ We know from experience that psychological factors and not deficient control of the aircraft constitute the main cau.~e of errors committed in the per- formance of flight assignments. They include incorrect appraisal of the situation, violation of the procedure for distributing attention, and so forth. These factors are ordinarily referred to as "human err~r." Errors are frequently defined and recorded (in flight logs and reports) as deviations of the aircraft, however: leveling-out too high, landing at too high a speed, insufficient gliding angle or failure to maintain the assigned ~ flight altitude, or the general "error in piloting techniques." From the psychological sl:andpoint it cannot be the ultimate goal to simply state an incident in this manner, to establish only the external cause of the error. This is only the starting point for an analysis to establish the dependency of the external, immediate cause of the error upon more remote circums tances, which can be acted upon with preventive measures. Nor is it beneficial to attempt to classify the causes of errors by type, to place them into an existing pattern, a general group of errors . This, in turn, leads to a situation in which preventive measures are reduced to general demands for xnwrovement of training methods, piloting techniques and the organization of flights. r The psychological analysis requires identifying that which is characteristic of the specific incident in each concrete case of erroneous action, thor- oughly considering everything pertaining to the pilot, and in each of his errors, looking not only at the deviation of the aircraft or even, let us say, at the improper distribution of attention, but at the human error in that state and under those conditions which existed in the given instance. This method makes it possible to reveal the true causes of errors, to elimi- - nate deficiencies and to improve flight safety and the combat readiness of the pilot. Let us reinforce this idea with examples. 78 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 . - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Returning from a flight on a desi.gnated route, pilot 2. was ready to lower the lancling gear prior to the third turn. At that moment the flight operation officer asked how much fuel~was ],eft. Tha pilot answe.redz "Ev~ery- thing nonnalF landing gear down; green lights on...,� ~nd he attempted to make a landing with the landing gear retracted. This incident, which could have caused a flight accident, was attributed to carelessness resulting from inadequate s}cills in using the equipment. On his first solo flight, a circular flight at night on a MiG-17, one cadet at a flight school reported the landing gear down on the "T" traverse. He ~ was actually flying with the landing gea,r retracted, however. The flight operation officer concluded that the error was due to the cadet's careless- operatinq the equipment in the aircraft cockpit. _ As he was returning from the range, pilot S, witnessed an incident involving a comrade. At the proper locatioa, he made the routine statement that he was lowering the landing gear but did not perform the action. The flight operation officer did not notice the pilot`s failure to do so. As a result, _ he landed with the landing gear retracted. Fortunately, the pilot emerged safe from the incident. The error was attributed to lack of discipline and inadequate skills in using the cockpit equipment. These were three externally similar errors, and three identical conclusions were drawn as to tl~eir causes. Did they reveal the true causes of each incident and make it ~ossible to take specific steps to prevent such errors _ in the future? Obviously, they did not. It should be pointed out that attributing atte~ts to perform landings with the lancling gear retracted to lack of discipline or inadequate training does not reflect the psychological nature of the causes. Even the most irrespon- _ sib le pilot clearly understands the consequences of such a landing, including the consequences for his own life, and does not make such a landing out of negligence. Consequently, the explanation in this case lay in the psycho- physiological mechanisms underlying flight skills. A flight may be an unbroken chain of activity, consisting of numerous, separate acts following one after the other. It has been calculated, for example, that a circular flight invol~ves around 200 separate actions. As flight skills develop, these initially separate actions are combined into larger actions, comprising a single integrated act serving the overall task. ' : The end of one act or movement automatically prompts the beginning of the next act. The shifting or elimi.nation of one of the links in the chain can , result in serious complication of the flight. . . A system of neural links (conditioned re~flexes) between the cells of the cerebral cortex, which is developed and strengthened in the pxocess of flying, forms the physiological basis of flight habits. Excitatior~ in a nerve cel? or a group of cells is t',ransmitted to a ~econd cell or group, . 7Q - FOR OFFICIi~L USE CNLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the termination of excitation in the second initiating excitation in a third, and so forth. The complex of interrelated conditioned reflexes is " called a dynamic stereotype. This sequence of habitual actions, automatically activated, as it were, and which constitutes a developed flight habit, is an essential condition for the performance of flight assignments. It eliminates the need for continu- ously monitoring the aircraft control moveme.nts themselves and makes it possible to focus attentioii on for the iarget, performing the necessazy computations and making decisions, conducting radio exchanges, and so forth. At the same time, however, if for any reasan one of the actions is omitted and the mind is greatly occupied at that particular moment, this link leaves the consciousness not restored in subsequent activity. This is precisely what happene~ to pilot Z. Preparing to lower the landing ~ gear, he substituted his exchange with the flight operation officer for the action, as i` were. As he subsequently performed the approach and, naturally, was concentrating on this, he performed all of tiie next successive actions one after another in accordance with the dynamic stereotype, in which _ there was no place for lowering the Iandin~ gear. The actual origin of the error thus lay in external circumstan ces: a radio _ request a~ an inopportune time in the pilot's work and the structure of the flic~ht habit itself. The most effective possible preventive measures in this case might not have been additional practice in lo~aering the landing gears, which would have r.einforced the stereotype of actions, buL practice on trainers, with special distractions inserted into the situation, and alarification for the pilots and flight control personnel of the psycho- logical nature of such errors and of the need to choose a better time for ~ radio exchanges or to exercise extra control in a gi~en situation. Incidents like the one we have just analyzed occ~r when an unusual situation develops, when external complicating factors arise during a phase of the flight which has not been completely mastered, factors.which wedge into the accustomed stereotype and make it necessary to restructure, to transform previously ~ acquired habits and their sequence and to include new or unforeseen actions ' in fhe structure. Such factors might be the appearance of another aircraft alongside, straying off the fixed route, the performance of one action ~ instead of another or a deterioration of weather conditions. A proper unders tanding of such circumstances forces a pilot to be more vigilant and to m.onitor his actions more closely. - The sacr~e sort of inechanism, this one defined by internal circumstances, under- lies the student pilot's actions in caming in for a landing with the landing gear retracted. After taking off and retracting the landing gear, he failed _ to return the valve to the neutral position. Performing a movement of the arm on the "T" traverse and not checking it visually, he moved the valve from the "retracted" to the "neutral" position, believing that he had lowered the . landing gear. All of his subsequent actions, including his radio report, were 60 . ~ FOR OFFICI~L USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY performed accorclin.g to the stereotype. Tension, which is natural, on a first night solo flight and which considerably.reduces the pilot's ability to switch his attention, also contri.buted to the erxnr. Once more, proper preventive measures could have been defined by establishing the true cause of the erroneous action: In this case, tliey wouJ,d have involved traininq methods . The theory af the formation of habits tells us that emotional experiences ~ have a considerable effect upon the correctness, precisian and sequence of acti.ans. They produce a deterioration of coordination among the nervous system connections, weakening some links and activating others, which some- times results in disorderly, chaotic inov~ments and actions. Such experiences were the main cause of the error co~aitted by pilot S. Consequently, pre- ventive measures mus t also focus on strengthening the emotional stability and the psychological conditioning of a given pilot and on explaining to flight operation officers haw emotions affect fligl~t work. ~ A hat~it becomes more crude and less perfect under emotional stress. Elements of past phases in the development of a habit are sometimes manifested in the developed habit. It is as though the habit goes b ack to its beginning or even reniv~s an old, past habit. This negative transfer of habits ordinarily occurs in a state of stress produced by various factors, most frequently, emotional experien~es or a rigid time limitation. In the preparations for combat training flights--involving firing, bombing or missile la~chings--a ~ great deal of attention is therefore devoted to familiarizing the pilot with - differences between the arrangements of cockpit equipment on combat and trai.ning aircraft, to the clevelopment of motor skills and to the operation of the levers, buttons and toggle switches which must be used on a flight. Zhe practice moti*ements are always performed at the tempo required on an actual flight. ~ flight work weaken habits considerably. We know that the more complex a skill is, the more rapidly it is lost. The main focus is there- - fore placed upon the most difficult flight components following breaks in flyinq. S uch an interruption not only affects the quality of piloting techniques, but also, to a certain degree, results in a breakdown of the sequence for inclusion of the separate actions into the work. After such a break, the pilot devotes a gre~t deal of attention to the immediate process of piloting, which reduces his possibilities for observing the space beyond the cockpit and for monitoring the instruments.and signals not directly involved in the piloting. A skill weakened b~~ breaks in the , flight work is most suscepti.ble to the negative influence of external and i.nternal factors . Train;nq In Focusing the Atter.,t,ion We knaw from experience that 75 percent of all pilot errors are the.result ~ of a breakdown of concentration. Proper evaluation of man's concentration abilities helps to thorou3hly analyze such occurrences. � � ~ 81 ' , FOR OFFICIAL iTSE ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 - ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Attention is tP;e focusing and cor~~~entration of the mind upon a specific object. Zhere is an inverse relationship between these facet~ of attention: the broader the focus at a specific moment, the weaker is the concentration. And conversely, the stronger the concentration of attention, the narrower will be its focus. Broad focus and precise distribution of attention involves the simu]~neous concentration of attention on two or several objects or actions. It is oizly ~ possible if one of the actions is very familiar and is perforn~ed automatically, and if all of the activity is taking piace in a calm and fami.liar atmosphere. If the acti.vity becomes more complicated~or if an unfam,iliar, nonstandard ~ situation arises, the field of. efficient functioning of the attention is greatly reduced. One's attention i.s concentrated on individual objects and oo9nitive control, time and active volitional effort are required to switch it from one object~to another. When a pilot concentrates on the performance of some specific task and focusing upon a single instrument, he may not notice the readings of another instrument, even an adjacent one: As he performs one action, he may overlook another. As he glided in for a daytime landing in good weather, for example, one pilot . once dropped below the prescribed glide path and did not stop the descent t~til he was reminded to do so by the flight operation officer. It was later _ revealed that he was attempting to correct a malfunction of a flap at that moment. Extreme concentration on searching for, tracking and attacking the target has in some c'ases resulted in loss of altitude and speed and to increased banking. When complications arise on a flight,~ the pilot concentrates on determining the causes of the problem, on fin$ing th~ proper solution and on taking ' vigorous action to get himself out of the situation. 'In such a situation he is sometimes simply not in a position to engage in radio exchanges or to answer the questions of the flight operation officer, and sometimes, he does � not even hear or does not understand ground instructions. It is precisely ~ _ for this reason that pilots sometimes fail to report their actions in a diffi.cult situation. ~ . A landing approach glide in adverse weather conditions is one of the most difficult flight components. It is characterized by great pressure on the pilot's attention, produced by the process of controlling the aicraft and it strictly on ~course and on the glide path; by a~rigid time limi- ~ tation, which becomes a shortage of time when even flight complications occur; by increased emotional and functional tension resulting from the great degree of responsibility tor the performance of each action, as we~l as by the complexity of the si=_nsomotor activities; and by increased concentration on the group of actions`,,.immediately involved in piloting the aircraft, with a re,~~ulting drop in th1~ ability to transfer attention from one object to another. Sometimes, a pilot milst concentrate so greatly on correcting a deviation from ~ the pattern that he may fail to notice changes in the readings of the altimeter, the rate-oi`-climb indicator, the tachometer and other instruments. 82 . FOR~OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4 An incident involving pilot S. demonstrates the level which concentration can reach in such situa~ti.ons . He fai.led to lower the landing gear during ~ a landing approach. He was concentrating ~o greatly on the landing pattern ~ that he ~ras not aware when the navigator remi.nded him to lower the landing qear and did.not hear the flight operation officer instruct him to make a sacond circle, and he made the landing with the landing gear retracted. _ Z'he individual involved in this ~usual.incident was, of course, an inexpe- rienced and emotionally unstable pilot. The comple:city of the landing approach glide, the limited possibilities for concentration and the inade- quacy of attention mentioned above are real, hawever. This is why a large percentage of errors recorded on flights--up to 65 percent--occur in this phase of a fl.ight. A psychological analysis of the spcific ~characteristics of pilnting, taking concentration possibili~ies into account, makes it possi.ble to train flight personnel in a more purposiv~e manner and to fore- see likely errors on a flight. Semi.automatic landing approach systems make the Filot's work a great deal easier by relieving oF control tasks and permitting,him to .focus attention entirely on monitoring the performance of the system. In this case, errors may occur in the case of any sort of system failures if the pilot is not ~ prepared for them. Special drills in the prompt recognition of such failures and in the seiection of the right decisions and actions are therefore con- ducted as preventive measures. Errors of perception are fairly widespread in flight work. Man's sensory organs are well adapted to ground conditions, but their capabilities are limi.ted in the air. Man does not have a perfect sense of speed (he assesses only acceleration) and he encounters difficulties in determining flight altitudes and directions, in estimating time intervals and distinguishing the details Qf an object. Visual illusions, which we have already discussed, are a graphic exa.~nple of errors of percept,ion. Considerablg less is heard about errors of perception relate d to a specific situation, to the expectation of seeing something and to taking an anticipated phenomenon for a reality. Forecasting, predicting developments for a certain period into the future, is a feature of the pilot's work. [n-~e~i he perforn~s a certain action, he knows in advance what will follow, how the plane's position, the flight . � mode and, the instrtmient readings will change (or that they will remain the same). The pilot therefore does not look at the entire instrument but only ~ at that part or segment of the dial where the arrow should be, at that section of the instrument panel where the anticipa,ted signal should appear, knowing in advance, as an example, that the flight altitude is 600 meters and that th~ green light indicating that the landing gear is down is on or will light up at any moment. , . ' 83 ' FOI~ OFFICIAL USE OYLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY This fozeseeing of events considerak~].y reduces perception time, frees the atte.ntion and serves to prevent such negative developments as a shortage of time, fatigue, and others. At the same time, attunement of the mind to the anticipated can lead to errors of perception, when the individual sees not the reality but that which he is In a radio exchange, for example, a pilot ordinarily knows in advance what will come next in a given situation. Tflere have been cases in which pilots have requested permission to take off but have heard only the first word of the answer, "Takeoff forbidden." And-have taken off. There have also been cases in which the fact that the flight operation officer has changed the number of the zone has not registered in the mi,nds of the pilots, and they have performed their assignments at the previously designated site. It is perfectly natural for man to make errors of this nature, and they result from a preparedness to perceive the mostly likely occurrence, which - is developed in the practical training process. Therein lies the possibility~ for taking steps to prevent such errors. A command forbidding an act, for example, should begin with the word "forbid," and the zone number, especially _ whhen it differs from the anticipated one, should be reported at a moment of least tension--after the t~Jceoff has been completed and the landing gear - retracted, for example. Specific errors may have a connection with the pecuiiarities of time percep- ti~n. Man does not have a special organ for perceiving time. He learns to depict and estimate the duration of processes from a number of external (the passage of day and night, the periodicity of phases of the work, and hours) and internal (hunger, thirst, and sleepiness) signals. Time is an enormously important factor in flight work, and a proper understand- ing of the ramifications of time is of great importance with respect to pre- venting errors aiid ensuring flight safety. We knaw, for example, that it takes 0.2 seconds to respond to a visual signal under laboratory conditions. During a fligh t, however, one must first assess the incoming information and make a decision and only then, implement it. Deliberation and precision are as important as sgeed, since an error in control can have more serious conse- quences than a few seconds of delay in performing the proper action. It has been established, for examgle, that it takes approximately 2.5 seconds to - appraise the situation and make a decision as to the aircraft's location, and 3.5 seconds to take an aircraft out of a bank, while a total of 15 se~:onds is � required to return an aircraft to horizorial flight from a difficult position. ~ A pilot must correctly estimate the amouni of time available as an important condition for emerging safely from an emergency situation. The skill needed for .stimating timP, including the distribution of attention, wl:':ich envisages, first, determination of flight altitude and then, actions dependent upon that altitude, is developed in advance, during ground training. 84 ~ F0~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~ ~ r ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Various factors may produce a distorted perception of the duration of ~ events, a temporal illusion. Emotional experiences have the greatest distortion effect. Positive emotions cause the individual to underestimate the amount of time elapsing (it seems that the time flies), while negative emotions result in underestimation of the passage of time (time crawls). The individual has an unconscious desire to accelerate events ito compensate for what appears to be a dragqing of time. This may caiise errors. There _-have been cases i.n which pilots with a shortage of fuel have failed to maintain the prescri.bed intervals in the flight patterns and the lancling . ~ approach, believing that they were allowing sufficient time to pass. As a result of overstimating the tin?e, a pilot sometimes takes too long to adjust the landing pattern, to the detriment of altitude control, and sometimes descends from the clouds prematurely in an atte~pt to spot the rimway as rapidly as possible. Landing speed is sometimes increased, the . result of a tendency to accelerate events. It i.s ha.ghly possible to develop a good sense of time through practical _ drilZs. Special experiments have shawn that one can learn to estimate time - to within tenths or even himdredths of a seconcl and that experienced parachutists in a highly emotional state (during freefall) determine the _ passage of time with greater precision than on the grotmd, in a state of - calm. Calaaiass Is Always Necessary It is an established fact that the capabilities of one and the same nersfln fluctuate within a broad range, depending upon his mental and physical state. An analysis of errors conanitted by flight personnel during flight . should therefore take into account, in addition to all other factors, the state of the individual when the error was made. That state itself is some- times the main cause of errors, other circumstances being only contributory - factors . ~ ;~1 ~ - This tenet is made quite clear by an analysis of the performance of pilots in adverse, emergency situations. At the same time, errors are frequently - made tmder exactly the opposite flight conditions--in relatively easy flight _ phases, in a calm and famil.iar situation, when the pilot relaxes and does not anticipate any sort of complications. ~ A crew is unusually composed when flying in adverse wea~ther conditions. It ~ carefully maintains all of the flight parameters, monitors the airwav~es closely and follaws the air situation and the positions of other aircraft. - In good weather, especially when there is good visibility, some pilots, especially the experienced ones, will sometimes take liberties in piloting, maintai.ning the flight mode and observation. This is a result of a spe- cific, natural psychological pattern. It has been established that vigi- . lance drops when performing si.mple work, that all people, even the most conscientious, make errors in a calm situa~tion. 'As a rule, however, such errors are not encountered in tense, dangerous situations. ~ ~ 85 ~ . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A relaxation oi psychic tone and a drop in criticality of thought and conce~tration sometimes occur as a sort of discharging process following an extremely tension-filled and responsible period of activity. A student at one of t~e fligr?t schools~ for example, who had passed his flying exam - with an ~`excellent" rating, was to perform one more flight according to the flight plan. He was so excited and so overjoyed that he forgot about vigilance and committed a gross error, which almost resulted in a serious flight accident. A v~eteran pilot may experience this sort of relaxation - after the successful completian of a difficult assignment. After a target interception, for example, a low-altitude flight, and so forth, when the final phase of the flight, especially one performed in good weather, would appear to present no great difficulty. Experience has shawn that the repeated performance of the same flight com- ponent leads to deterioration of control and, consequently, to deterioration in the perfozinance, even to the point of errors. In many cases, as an example, when a pilot practices diving at a target over and over, he deter- mines the moment for pulling out of the dive less and less precisely. ` It goes without saying that none of these psychological patterns or e~cpla- - nations in any way justify the commission of errors. They simply attest the need for cognitive self-discipline on the part of every pilot, based on a correct understanding of the peculiarities of their work, for careful psychological preparation for every flight and for unremitting control over their actions throughout the entire flight. Fatigue may be the cause of errors. In this case, there is a reduced will to work, which can manifest itself in carelessness or in the.deterioration of precision in maintaining the prescri.bed flight parameters. Fatigue results first of all in a lnss of inental flexibility: it becomes difficult to switch one's attention, there is a desire to perform in a routine manner, and one becomes irritable and iinpatient. There hav~ been cases in which a pilot, after making several uns.uccessful attempts to approach for a landing, has even tried to land the aircraft from an incorrect approach. . Depression, eznotional suffering or inadequate rest prior to flights can act as factors temporarily lowering.mental tonus. It should be borne in mind that negativ~ emotions, no matter what the cause--service probiems, family difficulties, and so forth--build up, as it were, combine with the nervous and emotional tension of a flight and can lead to overstress, to a nervous �breakdaan . . . It is especially important in such cases for the individual to be frank and o~en, to be able to overcome his'feeling of false shame. It is no secret that pilots do not always report errors made in flying techniques or in ' operating the equipment, loss of orientation on the terrain, a lack of _ confidence prior to takeoff that the flight, will be successful, and posi- tional illusions. This is caused by,.their fear that being open about their errors might daruage th~:.-- service career, might lower their personal pres- tige, cause them to be laughed at or accused of weakness~ that the error 86 FOR OFFICIAL USE flNLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 ~I FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY ~ will officially be considered a precondi.tion for a fliqht accident; or that tbe pilot will be grounded or penalized in some other way. Obviously, what is needed in such not only and not so much orders (and they exist for all such incidents) as murh as we need to create a psychological, comradely atmosphere in the subuni'c or ~i.t, in which openness will further, and not hinder, success in the flight service. This ~.;s not an easy task, and ocaananders and political workers must possess a good knawledge of psychology and ~edagogics, sensitivity and a high level of prest.ige in order to accomplish it. ~ Ia the interest of our work, we must thoroughly analyze every flight error and take steps to see that it is not repeated. Naturally, it would be - difficult to perform such an analysis for each pilot at the general unit . flight critique. It ~ould obviously be more effectiv~e to conduct an initial postflight critique~on the flight or group level. Self-analysis and self- critique are also effective. They malce it possible to thoroughly reveal shortcomi.ngs pertaining to person~l traits, the mental state, physical health and other factors which might aot be known to the commander con- ductin~ the flight critique. i~ In the:' vast majority of cases there .are severa7. causes of errors or factors to them. It is important to bring out the main cause in the anal.ysis, to analyze it thoroughly and to plan essential preventive measures. Errors are ordinarily separated into two groups when they are analyzed: professional errors related to inadequacies in flight proficiency (inco~lete trai.ning, loss of or incoag~lete restoration of skills, lack of knowledge, or inadequate preparations for a specific fliqht), and '~human" errors, which depend upon the personal psychological characteristics of the pilot. The � iatter are far more common and it is far more difficult to reveal them, - since they require in-depth analysis. They may also include a lack of con- formi.ty between the pilot's psychophysiological capabilities and those requirements made of him in a given situation; a poor mental or physical state on the part of pilot; and lack of discipline, carelessness, compla- cency and inadequate vigilance on the part of the crew. Naturally, the preventive measures should differ for each specific cas,e. 3. Flight SuFervision and Psychology Flight Supervision--Personnel Supervision - , ~ As a result of the expancled range of tasks performed by the aviation, the continued development of te~hnology and the drastic increase in the amount of information arriving over numerous cha.nnels~ flight supervision has' become considerably more complicated in the contemporary situation. The need for zeliable, precise and continuous control of the crews in the air . and on the ground and for flight safety places special responsibility upon the flightline crew. This, in turn, increases the emotional tension of eac3~ member, especially the flight operation officer. Flight supervision - 87 ~ FOR CFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY is primarily a matter of supervising people, into account their training leve]., the~r efficiency and discipline and their specific psycho- logical traits.. . Appraising weather ccnditions is, of course, one of the most important duties of the flight operation officer. A correct analysis of the we~ther oontributes tc the successfui accomplishment of flight assignments and _ helps to maintain good organization in the flight work and to ensure flight safety. Failure to consider a possible change in the we ather or an unex- ~ pected deterioratfon of weather conditions fsequently not only izecessitates adjustment of the tasks being performed by the pilots, but also considerably complicates control of the crews and has a negative effect on the psycho- logical atmosphere in the team providing flight support. Weather conditions in the airfield area sometimes unexpectedly fall below tha established weather minimum. There is perhaps no more difficult a situation for a flight con~rol officer: On the one hand, he wants to land the crews at their own airfield (There is no place like home!), while on the other hand, the situation makes it necessary to send the pilots to an alternate airfield. Doubts be9~in to devel.op as to whether all of the crews will be ab].e to cope with an apioroach and landing at an unfamiliar airfield. Tha crews are ordinarily sent to the alternate ai.rfield if we ather conditions there are satisfactozy and if they have adequate fuel. When the weather deterierates at the alternate airfield and the tanks contain a minimum of fuel, the flight operation officer is in an extremely difficult situation, and his nervous and emotional condition becomes extremely tense. For whom are such moments most difficult--for the pilots awaiting a decision from gro~nd or ior the ~light Qperation officer? Each pilot answers for himself, while the flight operation officer is responsi.ble for everyone in the air. , The documents covering such situations iECOmmend that every possible step be taken tc ensure a safe landing at the home airfield, taking the situation and the level of training of the crews into account. The flight operation officer may permit the crews to descend to the altitude for passing over the inner marker beacon after crossing the distant beacon, in to emergP from the clouds. What if the pilots cannot see the runway lights ; even after passing over the inner beacon? Once again, the flight operation - officer is troubled by alarming indecision as to the proper course of action, and time is not standing still. . ; After weighing all of the factors;~ �-.he flight operation officer decides to land the aircraft at their own ai.r.�field. And the decision is carried out , prscisely and pronptly through the joint efforts of the flightline crew and the pilots. The above example and the actual flight work demonstrate the fact that the psychological stablility of crews in the air depends to a gYeat degree upor. - 88 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100104426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .~the nervous and emotional state flf the flight operation officer, upon his tone of voice when he issues instructions and his ability to support the pilats ~ at the right time with both words and deeds, while the calmness and self- control of the flight operation officer is, in turn, produced by the moral- _ psychological condi.tion of the crews performing the flight assignments. In other words, all aspects of interaction on the ground and in the air should be regarded as parts of a dialectical whole, but the determining role in the psychological pilot-flight operation officer duo goes to the latter. ~ A pilot who finds himself in difficult circumstances will sometimes become nervous, make frequent radia requests and d3.vert the personnel away from their flight supervision work. Naturally, this evokes a certain corresponding response. No matter haw difficult the situation, hawever, a flight operation offioer is required to remain calm and sensible, to provide competent and prompt assistance to anyone in need of it, anyone who has not withstood the extreme pressure. A flight operation officer is under special tension when it is necessar1 to help a pilot in trouble, without delay and with an acute shortage of time. - At such moments the flight operation officer is under such great mental and emoti.onal pressure that he can temporarily Iose his self-control and become confused, a situation containing the seeds of n~nerous problems in the ai.r and on the gro~md. Once, during a night takeoff, young officer B. strayed off the runway axis. He noti.ced it too late, hawev~er, and knocked over a runway light with an tank. Continuing his takeoff run, the right wheel of the air- craft went over the edge of the runway onto the grotmd and raised a cloud of dust. Officer Yu. Alekseyev, flight operation officer, noticed the dust and asked the pilot what had happened, but he received no answer. It is not difficult to imagine the state of the.flight operation officer in that alarming and totally unclear situation. Later, Officer Alekseyev had this to say about what happened: "I was watching the takeoff run of the aircraft when I noticed that the afterburner flame had suddenly disappeared. I attemp~ed to contact the pilot but there was no answer. Judging from the amount of time which had pa~sed, I felt that the aircraft should lift off the ground at any momenf:. What should I do? What sort of co~nand should - I give? If the afterburner had been disengaged, the pilot would have to continue the takeoff. If the aircraft had lost speed, I would have to give immediate instructions for the pilot to cut ~'the engine, maintain direction, � apply emergency brakes and let out the brake parachute, for.there was a moun- tain ridge ahead. This is what I did, and i t turned out to be the right thinq. " ~ In this case the pilot was undex great nervous and emotiorial tension, but the flight operation officer was under equal psychological stress. He was . _ able to grasp the difficult and contradictory situation within a matter of . seconds and to arrive at the only correct decision. The slightest delay on 89 ~ il ~ FOR .~FFTCIAT. TTCF nNT,y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 : FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY his part could have resulted in a flight accident. The reaction speed of the flight operation officer, his ability instantaneously to put aside all othex kinc3s of information and external stimuli of the psyche, his resolute- ness, calamess and self-control made it possible for him to save a crew and an aircraf t in a situation with an acute shortage of time. Certain flight operation officers, ordinarily inexperienced ones, sometimes get in a hurry, become nervous, raise their voices and issue unclear instructions. This inevitably weakens the psychological stability of the pilot, who i.s already in a difficult situation. Once, as he was climbing in the clouds, one pilot noticed that the hydraulic system manometers were giving inaccurate readings. He immediately reported this to officer B., flight operation officer. Making no effort to determine the cause, the latter ordered the pilot to break off the assignment and land. There was, incidentally, no acute need for the pilot to land. In this case the flight operation officer did r~ot demonstrate a high level of technical competence or persistence: he did not take into account the - fact that the supersonic fighter was being flawn a young pilot lacking solid volitional habits. There was no acute need in this situation for the deci~ion to land an aircraft with a large amount of fuel remaining in the - tanks. The flight operation officer should have instilled confidence in the pilot and helped him to overcome his fear of a possib le loss of control. Instead of this, the flight operation officer was h~sty and placed the inexperienced pilot into a difficult situation. - Sometimes, instead of a clear and concise command, a flight operation officer will only inform the pilot: "I think you have an undershoot" ~ (naturally, the pilot revs up the turbine and up) , and then--"Now you have clearly overshot." This sort of information does not help the pilot, does not focus his attention or discipline him, but only makes the error worse. It is important to preserve conciseness, precision and an atmosphere of speci al trust and respect in relations between flight operation officers and pilots. A calm and kindly voice frorn ground inspires and disciplines th~ crew, and a flight operation officer'can, in turn, derive information on the pilot's psychological state and on flight conditions from the pilot's ` tone of voice. The pilot sees in the flight operation officer a senior and � experienced comrade, from whom he I~~as nothing to hide and to whom he is required to frankly report all of his difficulties and dnubts, knowing that he will receive assistance without fail when he needs it. - In some cases an inexperienced flight operation officer will attempt to = explai.n to the pilot everything pertaining to a landing j;.1st before the landing. The fliers joke about this: "Here we go with the preliminary preparations." Verbosity on the part of the flight operatir~n officer in such a case can only be detrimental. When the communication channels are 90 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000'100'100026-'1 ; r ~ ~~g~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON~,Y ~ loaded down, the pilots cannot report com~letion of important phases of their flight or contact ground control in general, caiu~ot ask for advice ~ or assistance when needed. This is j~t a step away, so to speak, from a violation of safety measures. _ One o~ the important qualities for a flight operation officer is the ability to .;onsider the psychological traits o~ the pilots wider his control. It cantributes to the quality performance ~f flight assignments, to tlze improve- ment of the airmen's cQmbat proficiency and the insur~.nce of flight safety. Officer Ye, and his crew were once sent up to intercept an air target in ; adverse weather conditions. In his haste, the pilot forgot to don his oxygen mask and pressurize the cockpit, noticing this only after he had ~ already reachad a high altitude. Turning over control of the ai rcraft to officer P., the other member of the crew, he began to put on the oxygen - mask but lost consciousness just at that moment. A taciturn individual - by nature, pilot P. did not ask the aircraft co~nander haw he felt and continuzd climbing. It was not until a few minutes latzr that he directed a ques tion to the commander. Naturally, he received no answ~r. The pilot immediately reported the incident to groimd. The report greatly alarmed the flight operation officer. `!'he weather was very bad, and officer P. had little experience in flying under such conditions. ~ Officer G. Gerasimov, the flight operation officer, was in an extremely difficult psychological state and he had to decided whether to trust offi- cer P. to continue piloting the combat aircraft. Familiar with the pilot's good volitional qualiti~s, he permitted officer P. to make the landing. ' His anxiety remained, however. Would tr~e pilot be able to break through the ld-kilometer-thick mass of .;louds? Could his psyche withstand such a test? The flight operation officer knew haw tense were the pilot`s nerves and he therefore did not bother him with unessential questions or instructions. He supported the pilot's decision to make a second circle and gave him con- - fidence with his calmness. C~nsiderinq tl-~e psychological makeup of offi- cer P., his unhurried a^tions and taciturnity, the flight operation officer g~v~e him only two commands rahile he was descending and making the landing. 'I~e landing was normal. Had the flight operation officer lost his head, even temporarily, raised his voice or talked excessively, it is dif~icult to say haw the flight would have ended. A flight operation officer under great stress will sometimes speak abruptly � to the pilots. Naturally, it is not an e asy matter to create smooth and . calm relations with each airman aL the ~irfield and in the air, especially since some of them with their lack of efficiency force the flight operation officer to be highly demanding. This certainly does not mean that the~ demandingness can be combined with rudeness, however. If efficiency, mod- - esty and discipline are persistently instilled in tl~~e personnel, then, naturally there is no need to repeat instructions, to raise one`s voice or ~ speak abruptly. I t is the duty of , flight ope ration officers, aiong with commanders, political workers and part~~ organizations, to take an active part in the indoctrination of all categories of aviators. 91 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 , ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Flight Operation Officer's Responsibility Officers manning the couunand post, the landing control officer and the assistant flight control officer, together with the flight control officer, help direct airborne crews. The landing system operators are also authorized to radio inforination on the aircraft's positicn and he~ring and on the pres- ence of other aircraft in the flight area. Zones of responsibility are assigned in order to achieve better organization of flight control. The flight operation officer or his assistant, for example, direct aircraft witnin visible range ir. the takeoff and landing zone. The landing control ~ , of=icer directs aircraft in the near zone, approaching for a landing from . a fixed point, a straight-end landing, a landing with two .180 degree turns or a"box" landing~ as well as on circular flights. Aircraft in the far - zone are directed and controlled by th~ command post team. The great responsi.bility and the specific location of the flight operation officer make it necessary for him to be the director of aircraft both on _ the ground and in the air~ to see and hear everything which goes on, to ~ axercise continuous control over both the crews and the flight control ' team and, when necessary, to intercede resolutely in the control process. and processing ~ large volume of information, he sometimes intui- tively knows where each or the crews is located and mentally compiles an aicraft flight plan over the airfield, a plan which must be i~lemented by officers manning the command post, by system personnel and by the flight operation officer himself. Frequently, especially in a complicated situation, the f1143ht operation _ officer is inundated by an enormous flow of information arriving from the screens of outlying radar sets and over telephone and radio lines. And ~ when his physical and mental systems are not properly adapted for handling _ the sharply external stimuli (stress factors) the alarm reaction as the first stage of stress may develop into the second stage--the resistance stage--and f'rom it, if the system's ability to adapt is weaker than the stress force, into the third stage--that of exhaustion--that is, into a loss of con- trol over his emotions and his sensory organs. In some cases, a desire to land the crews as rapidly as possible (wnen the weather. is deteriorating, when another group is ready to take off, and so forth} results in an accumulation of aircraft in the airfield zone, ,aith some of them in a radar dead ~z~ne. This deprives the flight operation offi- . ce r of the opportunity of picturing the entire air situation on radar screens a.~d plotting boards and keeps him in a state of psychological tension for a langthy period. No matter who is participating in the flight control process, the main respon- - sibility.for �light safety falls upon the flight operation officer, who can take over control of the aircraft in any zone when necessary. The airways frequently become crowded in such situations, and if the aircraft crews, the officers the command post and the landing system operators have no~ 92 , FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY ~ I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040140100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - been prop~rly trained to handle radio traffic, the flight operation officer may find himself in an extremely difficult situation. Precise delimitation of duties within the flight contral group, a high level of demandingness on the part of the flight operation officer, mutual trust and a sense of respon- sibility or~ the part of each individual a microphone all help to establish a good psycholoqical working environment on the airways and to create a nozmal situation for performing and controlling fl?ghts. A pilot performinq a flight in a complicated situation sometimes receives ~ so much information from the instruments and from groimd that only an _ individual with a solid moral-psychological foundation is capable of receiv- ing.and "digesting" it and accomplishing the assignment successfully, An overabundance of instructions from the command post, the vectoring station ` ~ or the flight operation officer sometimes becomes the cause of a mission failure, development of the precondit~ions for a flight accident or a break- _ down of flight safety. A pilot performing a combat training assignment once came dangerously close to the target and returned to the airfield with the missiles still on board. After lanciin,g, he exnlained what had happened in the following manner: "Everything was normal when I detected~the target. I effec~ed the 'lock-on' and moved the aiming marker up to ~he electronic circle. The command post requested a report just before I pressed the la~ching button. I complied. I cannot understand why the missiles did not fire. I did everything ' according to instruction." There was no reason not to believe the veteran pilot, and the engineers therefore began looking for a malfunction in the equipment. There was _ nothing wrong with the equipment or the armament, however. Just why, then, was there no characteristic "pip" on the oscillogram? What had happened in the air? Why had the mi.ssiles remained beneath the aircraft wings? In order to answer these questions. the commznder had to move into another _ area--the area of the human senses.... ~ The air situati.on was complicated during those minutes, especially during the vectoring phase. Flying by instruments, it took the pilot a long time ` to deter_t the tazget, and he became excited and frequently requested infor- matiun from the command post on the target's location and range. Ground _ reported that the target was alre ady within detection range of the airborne � sight, but the screen in front of the pilot remained blank. Soon, another, , internal stimulus was added to the external stimuli affecting tite pilot's psyche: "What if I ruin the missile launching? I certainly won`t get a pat on the back for that...." _ When the target blip appeared on the screen, the aircraft was already approaching it at considerable speed. This produced yet another stimulus-- a fear of colliding with the target. This increased the pilot's concern even more. At this point the sica.t "locked onto" the target, but the target _ blip was not centered. The pilot began to hurry. He attempted to bring the ~ ~ 93 ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY blip back into the electronic r~ng as rapidly as possible, because the thought of his rapid approach to the target was increasing his alarm. How he had the target inside the electronic ring. The pilot removed the firing button from ~ the safety device, but just at that moment the aircraft controller came over the sir and inopportunely requested a report on the pilot's actions. The latter reported that he was attacking. The aircraft controller did not hear the report and asked for a repeat. Gro~d did not receive the answer, however: the dangerous approach light came on, and the pilot turned the in terceptor vigorously to take it away from the target. Why had this happened? Who was to blame for the mission failure? Upon receiving the total group of internal and external stimuli (stress factors), the pilot fo~d himself in a difficult situation, with a shortage of time and a possible violation of safety measures--a dangerous approach to the target. In this stress situation, he forgot to press the firing button. The ai.rcraft controller aiso acted improperly. There was no need to go on the air and request a report from the pilot at that moment when he was in the firing position. ~ Sometimes, when the tacit agreement of the fliglit operation officer, an air- - craft will receive dozens of instructions, commands and requests from the command post, the landing system and the vectoring station. The pilot is not capable of processing such a volume of information within a short time and sometimes draws hasty conclusions from it and makes baseless decisions. ` It is tl~erefore important for the flight operation officer constantly to monitor the radio traffic and to combat the slightest infractions with determination. E~cperience and strong-willed commanders are appoi.nted as flight operation officex~s, but there are limits even to their physical and psychological , capabilities. This is especially applicable to the memory, which frequently has to bear a heavy load. Many crews are frequently in the air at the same time, and the fZight operation officers must know a great deal about them: where they are located on the routes, tt~eir points of interception, their sequence for arriving at the marker beacon and for entering the descent glide path, and so forth. It is not an easy matter to remember all of this. In _ such cases, the use of automation equipment considerably expands the possi- ~ Yiility for controlling flights and for improving their dependability and ~ safety. Even then, however, the flight operation officer still has the final word. . ~ ATe knaw from observation that when the air situation becomes complicated, some flight operation officers become very tense, make errors and are - inaccurate in transmi.tting instructions to the aircraft, and manifest ner- vousness and a lack of objectivity in appraising the actions of the pilots. Others mobilize all of their spiritual and physical strengths in similar situations, perform competently, boldly and resolutely, and transmit use- :Eul advice and effective instructions to the crews efficiently and pro~tly. 94 ~ FOR OFFICIAL IJSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ ~he reasons for this lie not only in the specific psychological qualities of the flight operation officers, but in their professional training level as w~ll. Practical sessions play a large role in +~-he training and 'i~rove- _ ment of flight operation officers by helping to expand their knawledge, strengthen their skills, speed-up their reactions and reduce errors in directing the crews . Group exercises which model the components of flight supervision occup~r an - i~ortant place among the various kinds of practical training sessions. Pilots and officers from the co~nand post and the landing system are drawn upon to conduct them. This makes it possible to cre ate a situation approach- ing actual flight conditions to the maximum degree possible. The modeling of a pressure situation with an acute shortage of time heightens the emotional load on the flight operation officers, thereby helping to develop essential " professional skills and psycholoqical qualities in them. . An officer's interrelations with his superiors and his service comrades, his family relationships, his rest and eating habits and his emotional surroundings are of . considerable iug~ortance with respect to the officer's preparedness to direct flights. Any disturbance of his preflight regimen-- inad~quate rest, a change in eating habits, quarrels, loud discussions, and so forth--have a negative effect upon his flight control performance and increase the number of errors made while directing the aircraft, even in simple situations. The situation becomes ev~en more complicated.when there is a rigid time limitation and a greatly increased volume of infor- mation, and the flight operation officer may not be able to cope with the duties assiqned him. . The factor of f.atigue on the part of the flight operation officer is some- times not taken into account when a flight day (or night) is planned. In . such cases the most di=ficult and responsible assignments are scheduled for the second half of the flight shift. It would obviously be more practical ` to schedule a mi.nimum of flights and less complicateu exercises for the last hour of flying, taking into account the lowered psychological tonus. of all those participating in flight control. It shou:id be noted in conclusion that the flight operation officer's great responsibilities and the specific nature of modern flight control work ' demand that he continuously improve his proficiency, persistently seek more effective ways and means of performing the job and further deveiop his - psychological qualities. � 35 . . FOR OFFICIAL 11SY~ ~Ni,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4. When A Special Situation Arises The Effect of an Emergency Situation Upon the Pilot ~ In recent years a great deal of attention has been devoted to the study of a pilot's behavior in emergency, extreme situation, or, in special flight situations, as they are cdmmonly referred to in the aviation. Under such circumstances a pilot's behavior is detezmined not only by the level of his professiorial training but by his psychophysiological qualities as well: the degree of his nervous and emotional stability, his capability f~r directing his attention and volitional actions according to the force of external stimuli, and so zorth; Any complication of the air situation produces psychological tension in an individual. It mobilizes the will, increases the psychological capabilities and improves the efficiency of some, while it has the opposite effect upan others, producing constraint, depression, confusion and functional dis- coordination or even fear. In other words, a pilot with a strong nervous - system perfo~ms boldly, resolutely and intelligently and manifests a high - level of voliti~nal activeness and self-control in a special situation, while _ another. individual, one with an unstable psyche and with a weak nervous system, will be slow in appr~ising the situation, take a long time to make decisions an.d make errors in operating the aircraft control elements and the engir_e . ~ HumPraus studies h.ave demonstrated the fact that such p,~ychophysiological features of man as his speed of reaction to an external stimulus, his capai~ility for receiving and processing information within a unit of time, and othexs, have their limy.tations, but, at the same time, there are ' practically unlimited possibilities for developing skills in operating the aircraft, the engine and the radar sight; skills which have a consid- erable effect upon the individual's behavior in an emergency situation. The individual's nervous and emotional constitUion have a substantial " effect upon the development of skills, either accelerating or retarding the process. The limits to man's capability for operating ~he complex combat equipment have expanded as the technical and tactical characteristics (speed, f.light ceiling, range, complexity of airborne equipment, and so forth) have increased. Because of the flexibility and resilience of the psyche, man adapts to his � _ circumstances, developing a complex system which compensates for temporary ceficiencies in his ability to react, his attention span, and so forth, to the point that they are eliminated by means of new functional capabilities cf psyche and through the conditioniiig of personal psychological qualities - of the individual in complicated situations. By intensifying the condi- tioning �and the automated skills developed in the grocess, it is possible not only to attain the basic reaction time, information processing capac- ity, and so fortYi, under ordinazy conditions, but even to exceed them 96 FOR OFF~CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR 0~'FICrAL USE ONLY considerably. This imgortant feature of the human organism is especially ` important for preparing a pilot to fly under complicated conditions and to perform in special cases, with little fuel re;~aininq, with a drastic deterioration of weather conditions in the landing pattern, and so forth. _ A pilot in a critical situation not only controls the aircraft but also retains hundreds of bits of information and figures in his memory and selects from among numerous recommendations contained in manuals and instructions those which will help him out of the difficult situatian. When an engine fails at a medium altitude, for example, the pilot must make numerous decisions, both large and small, with respect to determining the mode of descent, the alti~ude and time for starting the engine in the air, working out steps to take in case of a forced landing at the airfield, and so forth, along with controlling the aircraft. In addition, he must demonstrate exceptional self-control, perform swiftly and precisely, and adopt and implement the only right decision. Any delay, the slightest degree of confusion or a temporary loss of his volitional capacities can have irreparable conseqiaences. Experience has shown that in a co~licated situation, external stimuli are oonsiderably weaker when the required skills hav~e been automatced, which makes it easier to concentrate one`s attentio~i and volitional efforts for eliminating the special situation. For example, certain power-consuming _ units such as the automatic radio compass, the sight, and so forth, must be turned off in case of generator fa.i.lure on a night flight in adverse conditions. Switching off the radio compass in such conditi.ons, however, poses the danger of complicating the flight even more, since there is danger involyed in approaching the airfield and ccmin~ in for a landing without this instrument. The well-trained.pilot is capable of making a landing approach with the radio compass turned off, although he will expe- rience tension, and the task may prove too great for an inexperienced pilot. Studies have shown that dozens or even hundreds of special training sessions with special equipment, in a cockpit or during the performance of flight assignments are require~ in ordex to develop a stab le automatic habi t. Furthermore, it is best to develop automatic habits for functioninc~ in special situations little by little, gradually increasing their complexity and number. Such training drills increase the speed of simple reactions by 40-50 percent, that of compl~x reactions requiring multifaceted actions, by 30-35 percent. , Experienced commanders and i.nstructors a~ere to the following sequence for practical training drills to deveiop proper habits for functioninq in a complex situation: they first organize the study of instructions and then work eut the procedure for practical training in an aircraft cockpit or in a trainer. Finally, they create emergency situations without giving advance warning to the pilot. The situations introduced are varied with respect t~ time and place and to flight phase in order to give the trainees an opportunity to practice what they are to do in the same sort of special - ' 97 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE O~TLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY situation at di.fferent flight altitudes, at different distances from the airfield, in ci~.fferent weather conditions, and so forth. Z"hey sometimes simulate a breakdown which do2s not require immediate action but which mus t be dealt with after a certain amount of time has elapsed. A breakdown of the hydraulic system, for example, is simulated after takeoff and after the landing gear has been retracted, in order to force the pilot throughout the flight to consider the possibility of an emergency lowering of the landing gear and the flaps. Such drills considerab ly heighten the , pilots' interest in su.:l~ situations, which steps up their mental activity - and improves their grasp of the problems involved. The practice of assigning priority to the development of ~ction to be taken in case of those failures which are most likely to occur is not entirely correct. If such a breakdown does n~t produce emotional tension and is - easily remedied, it is sufficient to explain and run through the situation once or twice. If, hawever, an emergency situation, even one which is rarely encountered and which may not occur for a time, produces a high ~ level of nervous ana emotional tension and creates major difficulties with respect to making a decision and in the subsequent piloting, it should be nui through frequently and repeated. The initiative demonstrated in unit "X" is worthy of study in this connection. Sugplementary devices for use with the standard trainer have been prepared there ~nder the supervision of officer I. Lazarev, which make it possible to simulate complex failures which are rarely encountered on actual flights and which create tension, constraint of ~ction and sometimes even a prestress " coiidition in many pilots. A trainee in that unit does not ~earn about a failuz~e by zadio, as is ordinarily the case in training practices, but ' ~the readings of the instruments and signaling devices and from external signs ~ (a sudden vibration, a tug of the control lever, and so forth), that is, as _ ifi. occurs on an actual flight. The ~ollawing descri;~es one exercise conducted in this sort of trainer. A - sic,~nal light indicating generator fai.lure came on during the climb in a "departure" on an intercept mission. The young pilot undergoing training switched off part of the electric power consumers, reported the incident to the counnand post and turned toward the landing airfield. There was a sudden jerk of the control stick--a malfunction in the hydraulic system. The complexity of the situation had increased, and the psychological strain on the pilot as well. He would have to function ~recisely and rapidly to control the aircraft in a situation of an increasing flow of inf.ormation on external stimuli. As he eliminated the malfunctions or reacted to them with a severe shortage of time, the pilot began reporting his actions less~fre- quen~ly and to make more frequent errors in his determination of the air- cra.ft's location. When the "fire" iight on the instrument panel came on, he lost his composure for a certain period of time: Z'he first stage of stress (a reaction of alarm) was followed by the second (the stage of resistance)--the organism's adaptation to a stress situation. 98 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY ~ Afte.r conquering his confusion, the pilot switched off the engine and acti- vated the fire-fighting equipment. At that moment, however, he felt a jerk and the control stick went dead--the rudders wedqed in the glide position. ~ ~ Zhere was only one thing left to do--eject. He then made a hasty report to ' the instructor and performed the necessazy operations prior to ab andoning the aircra~t. The pilot pressed the catch forcefully, thers was a sound like a ~ shot, and the seat, together with the pilot, hung from the edge of the cockpit, thrown there by a special device. Opening his eyes, the pilot had an embar- rassed grin on his face: "That was a good drill! Almost like a real fliSht. My heart is even bea*_ing fast." In the course of such practical training the instructor has the opportunity ' to monitor many actions of the trainee by means of signal lights mounted on - = the control panel of the trainer. Th.e trainer, which is extensiveiy r~mployed in unit "X," helps the flight persoruiel to develop stable habits of reacting in a comprehensive manner to the instrument readings and to audio and light signals, to considerab ly increase their speed of reaction to external stimuli in special flight situations and to develop a capacity for foresight, which has a positive effect upon the individual`s psychological preparedness for possible compli- cations in the air. Training sessions in an aicraft cockpit aze also highly imgortant in training - the pilots to function in an emergency situation. The systematic run-th.rough of many flight situations, the actions performed in the process~ the concept acquired of the tasks being performed and the simultaneous sensation oi ~ living through the actual situation leave a deep mark in the individual's memory and reinforce the standard decisions and the skills acquired. After ~ completing such practical training sessions in an aircraft cockpit, the development of a similar situation on an actual flight, seems familiar, like ~ an event one has already experienced and survived. This does a great deal to reduce and sometimes, even to eliminate, the main adverse factor in any emergency situation--unexpectedness. . The sight, hydraulic systems and radio equipment are frequently switched on during prac~ical training sessions in an aireraft cockpit, which makes the flight conditions more realistic. Flights in a dual-control trainer, with one or several instruments turned ' off during the performance of tne assignment, have a considerable effect - upon the pilot's psyche in his training to handle special situations. It is not an easy task to fly an aircraft with the piloting instruments switched off. It creates considerable nervous and emational tension, forces the pilot to perform as though on an actual flight, making 3n all- - out effort, and consequently, reinforces his psychological�conditioning. One of the engines is sometimes switched off during training flights in a dual-contrr~l trainer. This is what one such training session was like, as 99 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ri APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY an exatt~ple. Tn the practice zone, at the instructor's command, the trainee (one o� the autno-rs of this book) reduced the speed of one of the engines, fixed it at the required speed and, without taking his eyes off the revolu- tian counter and the other instruments, moved the engine control lever to "Stop." He felt himself involuntarily squeezing ~he stick and the control I.ever of the working engine and pressing heavily upon the pedals. He glanced at the oxygen indicator: his "throat" began to open and close more fre- _ quen*ly than usual--his breathing had become more rapid. All of his atten- , tion was upon the instrument and control panels. Radio traffic between the other crews and the runway control point became . barely audib le for a certain period of time, as though the volume of the radio set had been turned down. The instructor's voice was unusually loud over the i.ntercom s,~stem. The trainee was made aware that the engine had been s~aitched off by a jerk of the rudder pedal--the automatic course control _ had been activated. It was only after this that he noticed the drop in rpm an t~.e tachometer. Flyir�y on one engine was not a great deal different from flying with two enqinesr but because of the extreme caution exercised by the trainee, the piloting operations ~vere overly smootn and drawn-out. A certain calmness set in, and radio traffic became audible again. The trainee did not respond a.mmediately zo a request fram the flight operation officer--some time was s~nt thinking over `he content of the report to ground on the performance of ~he equipment. '?`he trair_ee started the engine at once, with a single motion developed to - t'.he poinL- of automation, as though he had been waiting a long time for the comn~.~,nd to switch it on. The turn pedal leveled out, and a movement of the ' coaztro'1 stick aligned the needles indicating the rpm's o� the two engines. ~'he trainee ~.ook his pulse. It was 178, two and a half times the normal. ~ie got his bearings and began prEparing to switch off the second engine.... Aftar ianding and taxiing onto the parking area, the trainee did not =aant tca Zeave the cockpit. He removed his oxygen mask. He felt tired from the ~ension experi~nced during this not entirely ordinary flight. He felt as tho~zgh he had been performing physical labor all day. '.t'i~e above example illustrates the fact that the pilot experiences increased psychophysiological pressure even on a training flight with the simulation a conL-rolled special si~uation. This pressure increases even more in ~~~e case of a sudden failure of an engine, the hydraulic system, the boosters , or the generator when flying at night or in the clouds, and may increase to - tna limits of man's psychophysiolog~cal capacity and result in a stress condition. It is, therefore, in the best interest of flight work to conduct various t,ypes of practical training drills systematically, in conditions approaching an actual flight situation to the maximum possible degree. 100 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , . Extensive use is now being made of an automatic pro~ting device for pilots in emergency situations. This piece of equ.ipment helps them to focus their - attention properly upon priority obiects and reduces the load upon their psyche, thereby contributing to flight safety. It is important that every pilot learn how to make proper use of this equipment. The Development of Psychological Stability A special situation usually disturbs the stereotype which the individual - has developed. When he functions i.n the new situation, the pilot frequently employs different methods of controlling the aircraft and the equipment. ~hat is, he alters not only his habits but also his attitude taward the situation, his emotions. A stereotype developed on ordinary flights may have a constraining effect in snecial situations, especially at that moment when emergency measures must be taken. The situation forces him to alter his established stereotype, and this, naturally, demands certain volitional acts. ~ As a rule, the disturbance of the stereotype lasts for some time, and a pilot in the air sometimes has only a limited number of seconds to take steps to extract himself from the critical situation. It is therefore important for him to prepare himseZf in advance for possible wzexpected developments in the air, to work persistently on his methods of. eliminating the special situation and to condition his psyche. Highly active and excitable Deople have a more dynamic and pliable stereotype. They rapidly develop a temporary pattern of action and therefore get their bearings more rapidly in a complicated situation, make decisions more efficiently and swiftly, and operate the control elements smoothly. People who perceive developments around.them more slowly talce a long time to make up their mind in complicated circumstances, and the breakdown of their stereo- type is more difficult and takes more time. The opinion is sometimes voiced that man's inherited traits ("He was born that way and nothing can be done about it.") are dominant in his actions and that it is therefore hardly practical to d~vote a great deal of attention to developing in some pilots precision in operating the control elements or the ability to orient themselves rapidly in a complicated situation, since, it is presumed, they will develop these abilities naturally with experience and the accumula~ion of flying time. One cannot agree with this opinion: It has been refuted by our experience in flight work. The personality of the trainee, as well as everything which actually affects _ the human psyche and creates the temporary pattern of action, forming new dynamic stereotypes, constitute the crucial factor in the development of ~ psychological stability and solid skills for handling special situations in flight personnel. By repeatedly performing exercises focusing upon the developrnent of such skills, a pilot can develop qualitatively new skills, which supplement his inherited skills, and form new nervous and emotional patterrrs . _ ioi FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY With special classes and drills a slow-functioning, lethargic and ine�fi- cient individual can achieve the required speed and flexibility and learn to react promptly to abrupt changes in the situation. The resilience of the human psyche makes it possible to "mold" character and affect the te~erament, making them serve the demands of flight work. This process is not a brief one, hawever, and it requires great effort and application =j on the part of both the student and the instructors. Single drills and special classes, eveii lengthy ones, have little effect. The skills and necformations produced i.n the psyche survive longer when the training sessions, exercises and classes are conducted systematically, when they are focused and are conducted under circiunstances approaching actual flight conditions. An unexpected complication in the air situation, a sudden failure of the aircraft equipment, s2uggishness or inefficiency on the part of the pilot can erode his psychological stability. The difficulty lies in the fact that it is practically impossible to determine the maximum psychological load which can prompt an acute, sometimes spasmodic, deterioration of the volitional processes, which is ordinarily followed by a loss of self- control, confusion and uncoordinated actions--that is, stress. If one fails to focus his will and attention upon the most powerful external s timulus, if he delays or is diverted to secoridary signals, the result may be further. intensification of the emergency situation, muscular sluggish- ness and, finally, stress, making it impossible to take steps to extricate o~eself from the criticai situation. 1~s a rule, emergency air situations set in unexpectedly. The first reaction is one of alarm, whereby the individual, while attempting to understand the nature af the new development (equipn~ent failure, a lowering of the cloud c~ver, deterioration of visibility, and so forth), takes responsive action (the resistance staye). If the indiviiiual's reaction has been prompt an d accurate, the prestress situation is gradually restored and the origin ~f 'rhe alarm is pinpointed: The pilot switches on the duplicate systems or berins a second circle or, in case of a deterioration of weather conditions, departs for an alternate airfield. The stage of exhaustion may set in if the individual's capacity for temporarily rearranging his psyche and elimi- nating the source of alaYm have not measured up to the stress leve 1(the time for responding with action has been permittec3 to elapse, constraint and lack of coordination developed or it is technically impossible to ta~ce responsive steps to restore the functional efficiency of the equipment). E1 breaking down a pilot's actions in special si~tuations into separate - temporal segments and stages, it is possible to ~dentify those hidden elements of his psychic reaetions, which have had a positive ar a negative effect upon his struggle with himself cr with the equipment, to establish the effect of pressure ~ip~:: the individual's behavior and, finally, to pergorm a psychological analysis of his actions. 102 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Sametimes, when inexperienced pilots d~tect an equipment failure signal, , they engage in so-called impulse activity. That is, they take steps to eliminate the effects of the failure without thinking ov~er their action or a analyzing the situation--from their first impression or, at first ylance, as they say--and this can have disastrous consequences. Haste in responding to a powerfu]. external stimulus, inability to control oneself and failure to _ consider other flight factors are usually the result of poor training and an wnstable psyche. The ability thoroughly to size up an emergency situa- tion, to grasp the physical process of the failure and to determine specific steps to complete the assignment safely are primarily produced by a g~od - knowledge of the aircraft equipment, automation of the basic skills required , for operating tlze control elements of the aircraft and the engine, by res traint and self-control. Another type of pilot action is volitional, based on deliberate and intel- ligent act~.ons in special flight situations. As a rule, a pilot's volitional activity is performed with awareness and contains a certain mental focus. Some.times, in a critical and frequently conflicting situation, when there is no time to report to the flight oppration officer or to obtain needed instruc- , tions from him, or to consult officers manning the command post, a pilot finds himself alone to handle malfunctioning equipment, and the f7.ight's progression and outcome depend totally upon his determined and accurate - actions. Deliberateness and accuracy are therefore no less important than speed when there is a severe shortage of time. The f~ct that there is ordinarily a shortage of information on what nas occurred makes it difficult to determine the nature of a failure in the limited available. In an attempt to supplement this information, the pilot is forced to generalize and analyze the available information, to irt~cuitivel.y determine the possible side effects and, on this basis, to work out his decision and outline his sequence of action. In both cases, when an ava7azche of various types of information (radio, signal lights, instruuments and so forth) descends upon the pilot, he extracts from it the most important, the crucial. .taturally, the abundan ce of external stimuli can negatively affect control of the aircraft, the and the various systems. The abtmdarice of information in a co~lex situation sometimes places the . pilot into a position bringing him close to the limits of his psychophysio- logical capabilities, and this can result in loss of spatial orientation in clouds, have a ruinuous effect upon the situation and, frequently, place the crew into an extremel.y dangerous situation. Anyone who finds himself in such a situation and has the opportunity to transmit by radio should be ar in mind that the first alarm signal transmitted from the aircraft should be fol~o~ed by radio silence, with only the flight operation officer mair.tai.ning stable contact with the i.ndividual experiencing the emergency - to assist him with recommendations and advice. 103 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The increased flight speeds deprive the pilot of any extra time. A failure of one tmit in the air frequently entails the failure of another, and this demands an immediate decision on the part of the pilot. Within a matter of a few moments he must grasp wnat has happened and, without disrupting his control over the flight, be capable of monitoring the instrtm~esits and switching this or that unit on or off unerrinyly. An error in such a situation can have drastic consequences. The pilot's ability to utilize the time is especially i~ortant in special situations occurring in adverse weather conditions. While in good weather conditions t..'~ere is ardinarily extra time for determining what has happened, art inadequately trai.ned pilot flying in the clouds, whose attention is sometimes occupied almost to maximum capacity with monitoriz~g the instruments, cannot react to some tynes of outside stimuli, being too occupied and inca- pable of "" new focuses of attention. In such a situation, any stress factor may overload his attention capacity, and then the pi~ot's entire psyche, thereby destroying the unity of the "man-aircraft" system. results in a drastic reduction in his psychophysiological capability for reacting promptly to unexpected changes in the functioning of the engine ~r of t.he aircraft sytems or in the mission performance conditions. Prior - to flying in clouds, i~t is therefore impo~tant carefully to p repare pilots from the psychophysiological standpoint, expanding the range of their capabilities by me.ans of practical training sessions, special exercises, fl.i~iits in a dual-contxol trainer, and so forth. ~v2rccming difficulties in the air ar..d conq~aering his own weaknesses give a pilot satisfaction, create a positive frame of mind and expel feelings - of apprehension and fear. Experienced conunanders and political workers _ netrnx let positive emot.ions go unnoticed and make thorough use of them in the indoctrinational work. ~'his helps to develop self-confidence in the airren, contributes to their sense of personal dignity and contributes to ' ~h~ir successful mastery of the flight training components and, consequently, ~ to the development of qualities and skills essential for performing effi- cieritly in special. flight situations . There are cases,, however, in which an emergency situation experienced by an individual causes psychological damage from which he takes a long time to recover. As a result, some pilots experience traumatic neuroses, which have a neqative effect upon them and cause them to experience psychological te~zsiUn and to anticipate danger even before takeoff. , Gi~ce, pilot K. and his instructor were coming in for a landing after their faurth flight of the day. A strong crosswind carried the dual-control ~ r to the edge of the concrete runway. The pilots attempted to correct ths situation, but without success. A feeling of helplessness overcame them, _ _ and they became flustered for a momentz The extreme stage of stress set in, the stage at which the individual cannot overcome his confusion, loses mo~ive power and becomes passive. The engine had to be switched off imme- diately and the gear retracted in order to prevent ,a collision with 104 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY oth~er parked aircraft (the dual-control trainer was hea3ed straight for them) . This is what the instructions called for and what the emergency situation demanded. The pilot~ were not able to accompli~h this, howev~er. _ And only good fortune prevanted a ser~ous flight accident. A few days later, pilot K. took off again in a combat trainer. Fie piloted the plane confidently and eff.iciently in the zone. As he neared the earth in the landinc~ approach glide, howevzr, he experienced a state of shock-- the recent psychological trauma paralyzed his muscles, obscured his mind and depriv~d him of willpower and the pilot was not able to continue con- trollinq the ai.rcraft. The instructor made the landing. Successful actions in a special. flight situation depend greatly u�on the coordinated and precise actions of each crew member. The exchange of prampt and accurate information among them on the operation of the control elements helps to keep the crew members infornied and, consequently, increases their confidence in themselves and their actions. A change in the position of most of the toggle switches, valves and levers is ordinarily indicated by a system of lights desigiied to keep the crew in~formed. Other equipment in the cockpit, hawever, does not hav~e signaling devices, and this can produce psychological pressure or even confusion _ when the crew members are not perfoxtning with coordination. While gaining altitude on one flight, the instructor left the landing gear valve. in the retracted position, which prevented pilot B. from lowering the front wheels as he approached for a landing in clouds. The pilot took the failure of the landing gear to drop as a malfunctioning of the hydrau- lic system and, intent upon switching the back and forth, he inad- vertently reduced speed and strayed off course. When the instructor told him to maintain the flight mode precisely, he reacted only by moving the control lever sharply to increase speed, and continued to descend ` as he endeavored to eliminate the malfunction. The nearer they came to the airfield, the more frantic became the actions of the crew, which were in a difficult situation because of their uncoordinated actions. , F~rgetting that he had placed the valve in the retracted position following takeoff ("I was forced to help the pilot because he was not operating the cockpit equipment fast enough.^), the instructor did not check .the instrument readings for the hydraulic system or the positions of the levers and valves and did not remind the pilot of the procedure for checking the performance of the units making up the hydraulic system. And the pilot misled the flight ope ration officer by hastily reporting a nonfunctioning landing gear to ground. It was only after they had departed on a second circle that the crew of the dual-control trainer figured out what had happened by following instructions from the f3ight control officer and the duty engineer. A lack of coordinatior, on the part of the instructor and the pilot thus complicated the situation not only onboard the a.i.rcraft but throughout the entire flight control and support system. 105 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The ~raining received by pilots to pernlit them to function in special _ flight situations focuses on memorizing the procedure to be followed in a complicated situation, on developing a system of automatic habits and tuiderstanding them. A hignly effective method of accomplishing this task, among other forms and methods, is that based on the use of algorithms, that is, diagrams (graphs) depicting the pilot's actions in special situations in a definite time and logic sequence. The use of algorithms in the training helps the pilots to form automatic habits, to develop the ability to foresee a possible complication of the air situation and to work out tir.iely preventive measures to ensure flight safety. Their knowledge of the algorithms for their actions is reinforced with special ~ exercises i.n trainers and in aircraft cockpits. Combat training performed without indulgences or simplifications, a gradual buildup of the complexity of flight assignments, the development of restraint, boldness and determination in the flight personnel, and a conscious stress upon surmounting all difficulties all contribute to the all-around preparation of man's nerv~us and emotional capacities for ftu~.ctioning i.n special flight si~tuations. The more frequently a pilot deals with various simulated elements of special situations, overcomes complicated air situations and received advice and recommendations from - veteran airmen,, t1~e stronger becomes his will and the greater is his ~ _ confidence that an emergency situation will be successfully surnounted. 1Q6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 _ FOR OFF'CCIAL USE ONLY Chapter VI. Tf~ MORAL-PSYCHOIAGICAL CONDITIONING OF FLIGHT PERSONNEL DURIIQG THEIR TRAINING IN THE OPERATION OF NEW EQUIPMFNT _ 1. Retraining to Operate New Equipment--An Important Job Motivating the Airmen to Master New Equipment In the contemporary stage of development of the military aviation, units - and subunits are constantly receiving new models of combat equipment and weapons, and the personnei are continuously undergoing trainir~g in their _ operation. The process of retraining personnel in the operation of the , new equipnuent has therefore developed from a periodic undertaking into a . permanent part of the overall combat training system for aviation personnel. This has necessitated a qual.itatively new approach to the problem of - mastering the equipment and, in many cases, a basic restructuring of the t~aininq and indoctrinational process, the extensiv~ summarization of the advanced experience of units and WZ's, adoption of the achievements of the military pedagogical and psychological sciences in the retraining process, taking into account the specific conditions of.their employment in the aviation, and a quest for more effective forms and methods for . studying problems.related to the mastery of new equipment. The development of realistic combat situations constitutes an important - factor Zending urgency to the need to perfect forms and methods of mastering the aviation equipment. At such a time it will be necessary immediately to bring a large quantity of aviation equipment and a large number of servicing specialists into combat action. The reduced periods of time , available for activating personnel and equipment will make it necessary to ~ alter the ~ethods used for retraining personnel and for preparing them morally ancl psyciiologically for the rapid and thorough mastery and the _ combat employment of this equipment in a wartime situation. Retraining for new aviation equipment consists of a co~ lex organizational- methodological system, which includes an extensive group of ineasures, forn~s and methods of training and indoctrinational work. They are determined by the nature of the specific section of the combaf~ training tasks being performed, by the type of aircraft involved, the level of training of the personnel, the quality of the training materials base, the availability of experienced instructors to instruc~ on the new equipment, the clima~ic conditions and the handling capacity of the airfield at which the given ' unit is based, and other factors. The process of retraining for new aviation equipment is ordinarily broken down into two phases: a theoretical program and the practical retraining. ' The main tasks of the theoretical retraining are to nrovide the personnel with a solid knowledge ~f the design and the aerodynamics of the aircraft ~ involved and of its combat employment and servicing methods, and to familiarize themselves with documents governing the flight work. The main ~ 107 FOR OFFICIAT. trcF p~,y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY tasks of the practical retraining are to provide the personnel with stable , skills in the combat employment and servicing of the aviation equipment. In order to make it convenient to consider retraining problems, each of these phases can, in turn, be divided into two periods: the tk~ieoretical phase--intc a preparatory period and a period duriag which the personnel mast.~r the scientific principles of the operation and design of the equip- ment and the rules for operating it, and the practical phase--a period for conducting the first flights for mastPring the piloting techniques and a period of training in tiie combat employment of the new aircraft. Specific organizational and training tasks are performed in each period. ~lork is perfo~d to motivate the personnel to successfully complete the tasks involved in the retrai.ning for the new equipment in all of the phases, and each phase has its own specific features. Commanders, political workers, engineersr party and Komsomol organizations and a broad section of the aktiv tal~:e part in this work. During the preparatory and the theoretical periods of mastering the new equipment, the main effort is focused upon explaining the retraining tasks ~:.o the personnei and in~tilling in them a feeling of great responsibility for the completion of these tasks, and on preparation of the training base and purposive organization of the training and indoctrinational process. During these and siinsequent periods, a great deal of attention is devoted to indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of great vigilance. This matter . is di~cussed at party and Komsomol meetings. Commanders and political workers present reports and conduct talks with the military personnel and 'their families and explain to them the importance of guarding military and ~tate secrets. Candidates for retraining are thoroughly instructed. During the process of ` selecting the trainees and sending them far retraining, party and Komsomol organizers are appointed in the groups, and under their supervision th~ _ activists perform various kinds of work to ensure a high level of organiza- - tion and discipline in the personnel and efficient use of training time, and that there wi11 be comradely mutual assistance among the trainees. As they mobilize the personnel fur exemplary training on the new equipment, commanders, political workers, engineers, party and Komsomol organizations see that good tx�aining conditions are created for the airntien. The training L-ase and instructional methods are improved for these purposes, an exchange o~ experience in the study of new equipment is arranged, and talks, consul- tations, evening discussions on specific subjects, technical quizzes and ather activities are conducted to expand the military-technical perspec~tive - of the airmen. Meetings of party and Komsomol organizations, committees and bureaus discuss issues pertaining to the retraining, to ensuring that communist and Komsomol activists have an avant garde role in the training, to improving the training 108 FOA OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and ir:doctrinational proress and to the placement of the aktiv. Essential steps are taken to see that the ~nain political-indoctrinational work is ~ ~ concentrated in the subunits, that it be flexible, timely and concrete and that it provide the personnel with maximum assistance in the performance of the assigned tasks. r As the pilots begin their training ~o fly the new type of aircraft, com- manders~ political workers, party and Komsomol organizations focus their main effort upon ensuring that thorough preparation is made for the first solo flight and that the requirements contained in regulations, manuals and instructions are strictly followed by each airman. This work takes into account the nature of the forthcoming flight day, the pilots' level of trai.ning and the specific nature of the scheduled exercises. During the practical retraining prime importance is attached to the exchange af expertise in the performance of flight assignments and in the operation and servicing of the equipment. (Startovki), operational news sheets, express-reports and stands displaying appeals and excerpts from instructions, radio- and photo-newspapers play a large mobili.zational role this period. ~ Commanders, politi~cal workers, party and Komsomol organizations devote a great deal of attention to the development of socialist competition, and effective _ means of ensuring successful mastery of the new aviation equipment. They sum up the results of co~etition in a timely manner and see that competi- tion is given publicity, and do everything necessazy to ensure that the conm?itments accepted are fulfilled well and on time. Any defect, not to speak of the preconditions for flight accidents, are analyzed in detail and are brought to the attention of all personnel, and essential steps are taken to improve discipline, order and organization. - General Psychological and Pedagogical Peculiarities of the Retraining Process On~the psychological and pedagogical level the process of retraining for new aviation equipment is a cor,iplex one. Training and retraining are not iden~tical concepts. What makes retraining different is the fact that it involves the transformatior. of previous e~ertise, taking the general and special training level into account, into a qualitatively new pattern of knowledge and skills essential to the operation and servicing and to the . combat employment of new equipment. Furthermore, the retraining process involves more than the simple accretion of knawle3ge and skills: it is a . complex process of transforming the old expertise and knowledge previously acquired into a solid basis for the formation of a new sysi:em of skills and abilities. In other words, it involves not quantitative but qualitative grawth,.the end result of which is the developmEnt of technical and tactical thought in the airmen and improvement of their ~rofessional skills. ~ 109 ~ FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY On a psychological plane, retraining is nothing other than a complex process � of developing new structures of psychic elements providing for the subtle, differentiated and multifaceted assimilation by the personnel of new condi- tions involved in the operation of equipment, and also embracing the trans- formation and adaptation of structures previously formed and their successful application in these new conditions. The process of forming new structures of psychic elements during the retraining takes place in conjunction with ~the development of other psychic processes, taking personal characteristics - into acco~t. The development and manifestation of such psychic processes ~ as perception, concentration, memory, conception, imagination and thought in the retraining process hsve a number of distinguishing features. ~n the physiological plane, the formation of new structures of psychic ~ elements is based upon a complex process of development in the cerebral cortex of specific conditioned-reflex patterns and systems of dynamic stere~types to meet the new operationaZ conditions, by means of a certain transformation and of interaction with patterns and dynamic stereotypes previously established. Since the retraining process involves more complicated aviation equipment, ~ - both the newly-formed patterns and their interconnections are on a new and higher stage of development. The former conditioned-reflex patterns and establishe 3 dynamic stereotypes, throughout this entire system of complex stereotype elemenLS, do not simply "sprout" quantitatively new links, "connecting up" with the enew elements, but are themselves transfozzned and actively interact~with the new patterns, comprising an integral and active link in the chain of th.e elements fornbed. This is the approach to the revelation of the ph~siological mechanisms involved in the transformation and applicatioz of fornier expertise which makes it po~sible correctly to explain and take into account the manifestation of psychological mechanisms ~ involved in the posi4ive or negative carryover of habits and to make more efficienz use of the forms and methods of psychological conditioning in the prncess of mastering the new equipment. Zt i.s important to note the fact that in the retraining process previous }-.nawledge, skills and experience (and on the physiological plane, previous coarlitioned-reflex patterns and dynamic stereotypes) do not have simply a passive effect upon the development of new structures of psychic elements (new patterns and dynamic stereotypes) but are a major factor raising the pnysiological activity of the trainees during the course of their retraining � for new equipment. 'I`he mastery of new equipment is accompanied by a con- ~inuous process of comparison of everything learned with previously acquired e:cperience and knowledge, and there is continuous adjustment ot the spe- - cialist's work based on that comparison. Consideration of the inhibitory and interference effects of previous know- how is a characteristic of its use in the formation of new skills during the retraining process. Under certain conditions this know-how may inhibit progress in combat improvement and serve as the physiological basis for a - negative carryover of habifs into the new situation. 110 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Experience has shawn that it becomes moze difficult to detect and prevent the negative carryove~ of habits as the aviation equipment becomes nore complex. This is due to the fact that in the past, when less co~lex equip- ~ent was being learned there was a comparatively small number of simple , reactions corresponding to the si~le stimuli, whereas the new equipment of today involves a larger number of combined and correlated effects of ~ stimuli responded to with a more extensive correlat~.on of reactions as they occur. Not only is there a change in the degree of influence of previous know-how as `a factor of physiological activity~ but the flow of psychomotor processes itself is altered. The naturE and the degree of the change occurring in tlie individual psychomotor~processes during retraining are determined by ~ the quantity and complexity of changes~occurring in the sensory and motor areas and by the level of previously formed habits and abilities. These . changes are especially 'typical of the complex sensomotor reactinns and the realization of sensomotor coordination in flight personnel at the beginning of their training on the new equipment. They are reflected in quantitative and qualitative shifts i.n the main parameters of the processes indicated. To be specific, there may be an i.ncrease in the duration of the central and motor elements of complex reactions in complex sensomotor reactions. This is due to the fact that when a pilot is retraining, especially during the first flights, he has to process a large quar~tity of new information not previously encountered. The time to recognize, evaluate and select incoming signals therefore increases in the perception process. In addition, there is ordinarily a process of subconscious comparison of what is perceived with former experience with an aircraft previously operated, ~ as a result of which there is ar} inevitable increase in the duration of the central eZement in most complex reations. - The increased duration of the motor element of reactions in retraining is brought about by the increase in the amount of time determining the beginning of motion, due to the pilot's extra, cognitive verification of the correct- - ness of his selection and determination of control objects (buttons, toggle _ switches,. levers, instruments, and so forth) on the new aircraft. The extent of temporary changes in the motor element of complex reactions in this case deperds on how greatly the equipment arrangement in the cockpit of the new aircraft differs from that of the aircraft previously flown, upon the quality � _ of the preliminary preparation performed during the retraining period, the level of the pilot's overall trai.ning and his individual psychic peculiarities. The i.nfluence of the factors listed above, which produce temporary changes in the main parameters of complex sensomotor reacti~ns during retraining, are especially vividly manifested in the process of sensomotor coordination when piloting the new aircraft on the first flights, since both perception and motion are continuously occurring, and the motion is regulated by the perception of its effects. Errors and shifts related both to perception 111 FOR GFFICZAL USE ONZY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY and motor processes are possible in this case, ordinarily reflected in an increase in the time of reaction to a starter signal (a command from ground, instrument readings, and so forth), general reaction time and reaction accuracy. It is very important to consider the abc:~e psychological pecu- liarities involved in the formation and manifestation oL new skills, but most importantly, to foresee them in the retraining process. In preparing the personnel for their first flights on new aircraft, it is important to see that all operations and actions involving the cockpit equipment have been thoroughly worked out and to actively monitor the actions of each pilot p~:or to flights. Hero of the Soviet LT:zion M. A. Gallay, test pilot, has made some valuable statements pertai;iing to this. In an analysis of preparations for the first flights in a neiv aircraft, he notes "that it was not enough (for the pilot) to know what this or that instrument indicated or what effect was produced by moving a certain lever. He had to learn to use them automatically. A pilot should control an air- craft the way an individual uses his arm, as an exam~le, without thinking about wnat muscles should be tensed or relaxed and in what sequence. "It is an interesting fact that on any flight, if a pilot does not have a special assignn~nt to register the readings of a.~y of the instruments, he zemembers only those which he considers to be abnormal. Everything else - (and do not forget that he has dozens of instruments in front of him) merges in his mind into a general, summarizing sensation--normal. This is due to the tact that the pilot's attention seems to slide over the instrument panel c,~ith efficient semiautomation, filtering everything he sees and pa~sing on to his consciousness only that which requires certain steps, or cognitive activity. "Without this valuable automation, not a single pilot would be able freely to handle the complex works inside the cockpits of modern aircraft, r~ot to speak of tne other work for which he is responsible. He would certainly have no attention to devo~~: to~it. "The fact that a pilot can correctly describe the function and the location of any instrument or lever--the landing gear retraction valve, for example-- does not mean that he nas learned all he needs to know about his work position. When the order 'Retract landing gear!' is given, however, and his hand moves to the proper valve an its own, before the idea has formed in the pilot's mi.nd, only then can it be considered that he has mastered . the cockpit.'~13 A general analysis of the retraining process shows that on the psychological and pedagogical plane it has its own qualitative and quantitative definition. Cognitive and indoctrinational tasks and tasks involved in the psychological conditioning of personnel for the new conditions are performed during the course of the training, each of which has specific objectives. The general - trai.ning task, for examp~.e, covers the study, based on knowledge previously 112 ~ ~ FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ acquired, of the design and the functioning of the new aircraft, its engine and all the equi.pment, followed by the formation of new skills and abilities in the operati.on, control and servicing of the equipment in the altered circumstances oF its combat employment bg transforming and adapting previous know-haw. T'he development of techniques, methods, ways and forms for - efficiently and experi~nce and knowledge previously _ acquired is therefore the most important element in the development of a new system of retraining methods. At the same time, it is important in the retraining process not simply to s~udy and m~G~r a given type of aircraft, thereby raising the pilot`s level of personal development, but to davelop special methodological techniques and rorms and to make special plans and select training material which will deveiop his skills in summarizing and abstracting, his ability to apply his knowledge and habits for performing despite any changes in his work conditiions and teach the personnel methods of working on their own and the sequence for studying the new equipment and the rules for operating it, that is, successfully accomplish the task of preparing them for subsequent - retraining within a shorter period of time and on a higher level. ~ The indoctrinational and phsychological conditioning tasks have the objective - of developing in the personnel good morale and aggressive qualities, a love for and confidence in the new equipment, a readiness to make full use of - its combat capabilities and the desire to thoroughly master its servicing and combat employment, and to develop in the airmen the psychological sta- bility and self-control for overcoming negative psychic conditions which tnay arise in the process of lear.ning the new equipment. - 2. In the Course of the Theoretical Training ~ The Increased Role of Theoretical Training . In the recent past, as we know, ~he theoretical training of personnel had a subordinate role in the mastexy of new types of aircraft. It was not a ~ determining element in the development of skills and abilities for operating and servicing the aircraft involved, but was basically designed to improve the study of its design and, to some degree, the functional peculiarities of the individual systems. Today, however, a knowledge of the scientific principles un.derlying the arrangement and the functioning of the equipment is essential not only in order to study its design but also in order to , uL�ilize and service it c~rrectly and co~etently on the ground and in the - air. As a result of this, the dependency of maximum employment of the combat capabilities of new aviation equipment upon a knocoledge of. the scientific principles its arrangement and operation has become a specific law. Experience has show:i that all skills and abilities acquired today have an intellectual orientation. That is, most of the actions and operations ~ , ' 113 FOR OFFICZaI. USE OhZY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ performed during the operation and servicing of an aircr~ft require thorough theorezical insight. If this is not taken into account on the practical level, then deficiencies or even failures will inevitably occur in the combat employme.nt and the servicing of equipment. A special study, for example, has shvwn that more than half of the pre- conditions for flight accidents, failures of aircraft eq~~.pment and errors committed by the personnF~l, which are listed under incompetent performance, are not due to a superfi~;ial knowledge of the design of the assemblies and instruments but to improper actions resulting from insufficient knowledge of the physical nature of the processes occur.ring in the func- _ tioning of the equip~nt or to an incomplete ~~mderstanding of the conse- quences of this or that action. One of the reasons for this situation is the erroneous view of some pilots and ev~e~z some flight instructors, who assume that the development of skills and abilities is mainly a mechanical (motor) process, that theoretical kncwledge has a sma11 role in the developmen~ of t-hese skills. This some- times has a negative effect upon the pilots, esp~cially the young ones. Some of the~ demonstrate disregard for theoretical knawledge and a lack of desire thoroughly to understand the complex aerodynamic aspects of an air- craft, the thermodynamics of the engine, ballistics~ and so forth, and a desize simply to enter the cockpit and begin flying as soon as possible. This underestimation of the role of knowledge in the development of skills _ and abilities even results in errors in the orqanization of retraining. Such errors are ma.nife~ted in the fact that the practical and theoretical courses are separated in tne retraining programs and are covered indeper.- _ dently of ~ach ~ther. In some cases, for example, only two or three visits to the airfield are ~ scheduled to familiarize the trainees with the new equipment during the entire period covered by the theoretical retraining programs. This leads to separation of the theoretical training from the performance of the practical tasks involved in developing flight skills and abilities, creates an unnecessary psychological barrier in th~ minds of the flight personnel and gives them the psychological illusion that theoretical knowledge has nothing to do with the develapment of flight proficiency. Furthermore, a negative psychological premise complicates assimilation of - tha theoretical knawledge itself, since the knowledge acquired is of a contemplative nature, so to speak, if the theoretical portion of the - retraining program does not have a practical orientation, and this oom- piicates its practical applicatioii. The gap separating the theoretical and the practical tra.ining complicates - the re~raining process as a whole and makes their mergence a special problem for the future. Observation of a group of pilots undergoing 114 - FOR GFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY retraining in one unit durir:~ the first S or 6 days of their practical work at the airfield following theoretical retraining, for example, showed that during preparation for their first flights the majority of them were forced to return to some extent and with a different approach to the theoretical material already covered. As a result~ it became necessary to conduct additianal classes on many of the subjects during the preliminary prepara- tion. And to e~end considerable effort upon the psychological readj~.stment of the flight personnel. Zhe gap between the theoretical and the practical retraining courses some- times creates the preconditions for flight accidents. After a group had separated for the landing flights in unit �X," for e::dmple, one of ~ the pil.ots abruptly approached the aircraft flying ahead of him and failed _ to keep an eye on the speed and altitude of his own fighter after the fourth turn, because he was concentrating on the aircraft ahead. His speed of advance dropped as a result and his vertical speed increased, and the air- craf~ fell considerably below the normal glide path. In an atte~t to - correct the situation, the pilot first increased engine thrust and then reduce~ vertical speed but.did not achieve the desired effect. The landing almost had serious consequences. An analysis of the causes of this precondition for a flight accident revealed that all of the landing phases had been discussed in detail with the flight personn~l th~ day before the flights: movement on the flight path, leveling- out, holding, the landing run and action to be taken in each phase. The pilot demonstrated a good knowledge of all these questions. When he noticed that his aircraft was descending on the flight, however, he acted without con- sidering the effect of the surrounding teznperature upon `he landing. This was a result of the fact that the pilot's knowledge was only superficially. related to the practical requirements for this specific landing. This clearly reveals another psychological aspect of the matter: The theoretical knowledge acquired by the pilot in the retraining process must have a certain degree of strength and emotional stability and must manifest itself imder any flight conditions, even the most difficult. In this case, they lacked psychological stability, which resulted in imprecise action. The theoretical training naw has an increasingly polytechnic orientation as a result of the highly technical equipment of the modern aviation, the increased complexity of the desiqn of modern aircraft and of the rules for operating them, and the increased requirements made of the training of the . personne 1. That is, the number af disciplines studied is growing, it is becoming necessary to coordinate their interaction and conditionality with a niunber of other sciences, the content of the sunjects studied is becoming more co~licated, and so ferth. ~ 'I'he objective premise for the polytechnic orientation of the retraining process lies in the fact that the same basic patterns revealed by aerodynamics, thermodynamics, physics and other sciences comprise the scientific basis for 115 FOR OFFICIAT. TTSR ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . the structural arrangement of various t~es of aircraft and engines, as ~ well as for the methods applied in their combat employment and servicing. - Zhe laws of these sciences compr.ise the psychblogical basis for providing the training with a pol~rtechnic orientation, primarily those laws pertaining to the carry-over of previous knowledge and skills into the new situation. Impler~.ntation of tne requirements made by the polytechnic ~rientation of retraining on the psychologicai level consists in creating conditions which contribute to the successful carry over of previous knowledge and skills into the new situation, that is, creating methods of organizing and con- ducting the theoretical retraining, which make it possible to find the correct point of contact between the old and the new knowledge, skills and abilities and which ensure that the carry-over is a positive one. This accounts for the increased importance of inethodological techniques which contribute to the intelligent application of previous know-haw as an essential condition for the achievement of results in the retrainix~g process. In order to operate an aircraft successfully the personnel must also acquire new knowledge, and highly diverse knowledge at that. Consequently, it is essential strictly to coordinate the extent and the nature of this knowledge, to oertect the structure and the content of retraining programs, the training base and the forms and methods used in the training and iridoctrination. An important requirement put forth by the polytechnic orientation of the _ theoretical retraining is based upon the need to study first the general principles underlying the design and functioning of the aircraft systems and assemblies, and then the peculiarities of the equipment involved, taking into account experience in the operation and servicing of the type of air- craft previousl.1 operated. This method is effective because it is easier for the trainees to grasp specific and concrete questions pertai.ning to the specific model of equipment after they have mastered the general laws and = principles of this or that ph~nomenon. - . T4ie polytechnic orientation of the theoretical retraining helps to develop ir~ tl:e personnel creative initiative, the ability to think on their own and the ability correctly to estimate the place of the a.ircraft involved within the long-range development of the military, aviation as a whole and to draw ~ the proper practical conclusions f~r themselves. This is especially impor- tant during tha preparatory period, when, in anticipation of the start of retzai.ning, lectures and reports of a general nature are presented in the - ~ units as part of the system of commander and technical training, and the personnel involved in the retraining have not yet seen the new aircraft and ~ do not have a concr~~e concept of it. ~7,'he polytechnic orientation of the theoretical retraining makes it possible to establish not only specific lin]cs and connections between the various ~ branches of science studied but also the and qualitative char- acteristics of those Iinks and their mutual conditionality. This means that it is important for the training and indocrrinational work to take into 116 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . accoimt the specific nature of the work performed by various categories of pers~nel and their training level. Therein lies the need for strict differentiation of the trainees when making up the groups, planning the tra~ninq process and selecting the f~rms, means and methods of presenting . the tra~n;nq material. ~e polytechnic orientation of the training process is of practical imp~r- taRoe only when the theoretical material presented co~rises not a discon- nected assemblage ~f premises and conclu.,ions drawn f.rom various sciences, but an integrated and comp lete system or cycle base d on the training level of the specialists. The purpose is best served by planning the cycles of study for each category of personnel separately. The realization of requirements set by the polytechnic orientation of retrain- inq achieves its goal only when, in the course of the training, the airmen _ develop a psychological preparedness to apply ~he knowledge acquired under . various flight conditions. This kind of readiness requires that the personnel clevelop a positive attitude taward the new equipment and cont"idence in its good comb at qualities and reliability, and emotional and volitional stability for overcoming difficulties. Pedagogics and Psychology Must Be Closely Linked Diverse training and indoctrinational work is performed in the theoretical - retraining process. Its effectiveness depends ta a great degree upon how fully it meets the requirements set by military pedagogics and psychoiogy and upon the degree to which the forms and methods reco~nended by them are organically combined i.n the training and indoctrination of the personnel. Let us consider these questions from the standpoint of the specific periods of theoretical During the preparatory period, when the unit has s till not received the new equipment and the personnel only have a general concept of it, lectures and~ reports are scheduled for the airmen as part of the commander and technical training syst:~m, at flight methods assemblies and at universities for the - improvement of technical standards. They discuss the basic laws of aero- dynamic~ and thermodynamics, the general principles underlying the functioning _ - of the aircraft systems and the engine and the nature of their"functional prooesses, the fundamentals of combat employment of the equipment and ot~er more general aspects of the operation and servicing of the aircraft involved. This makes it important for the personnel to form an integrated concept of the new aircraft and of its aeronautical, tactical and operational char- acteristics, which, from the psychological standpoint, helps the airmen to dev~ lop a positive frame of mind and the proper attitude toward the study of the new equipment and the mastery of its combat capabilities. The lectures and reports delivered during the main period of theoretical retraining have a concrete focus. Z'hey devote a great deal of attention to explanation of the arrangement and functioning of the aircraft systems and 117 FOR OFFICIAi. tTSF ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY mechanisms and of the engine, and to the ~resentation cf practical conclu- sions and g~neralizations on th.e operation, servicing and cembat employ- _ ment of the given type of aircraft. Extensive use is made of visual aids: posters~ diagrams, assemblies and mechanisms. When they explain the design and the functioning of the aircraft systems , or the engine, veteran instructors direct the attention of the trainees to the ge.neral, basic similarity between the given system and that previcusly stiudied, and then to its perculiarities and their i,~~portance in the operation - of the new aircraft. This method of presenting the material helps to heighten ~ tha thinking process of the trainees and promotes more rapid and intelligent carry-over of expertise previously acquired into th~ new situation. ' In this case, tne previous know-how becomes the external and internal frame of reference for the successful and thorough mastery of the new knowledge, skills and abilities. From the psychological standpoint the employment of previous know-how in the retraining process helps to create a positive frame of mind in ~he personnel and confidence that the new aircraft will be - successfully mastered, and develops ttieir technical and cre ative mental process. If, on the other hand, the previous exF,erience is not utilized and the trainees concentrate only on the new material, they develop the ~ o~,inion that it is overly voluminous and complicated and as a result, lose _ confidence in the fact that they can assimilate the new knowledge within the set period. p.s they present the training material the veteran instructors make skillful use of possible elements of negative carry-over of previous knowledge and skills. The most effective method of accomplishing this is the so-called ixZVerse-proof inethod, whereby the explanation is begun by describing possible errors or instances of negative carry-over of previous know-how. In classes on practical aerodynamics, for example, when the instructor explai,ns the aerodynamic peculiarities of behavior of the MiCr 21 on the landing run, he calls the attention of the trainees to the possibil,ity of a rise in longitudinal wobble. He stresses the fact that when they flew the MiG-17 many of the pilots, in an attempt to eliminate this undesirable condit.ion, would begin bral:ing impulsively, that is, they would press and release the brake iever repeatedly, which produced certain results. On the Mi('~-21, however, this action has the opposite effect, intensifying aircraft wobble, and can produce undesirable consequences. It is the refore better to brake this type of aircraft with a gradual, single braking action. . x`he inverse proof inethod is extremely effective in the psychological-peda- gogical respect. Its skillful employment helps to prevent the negative carry-over of previous knowledge and skills into the new situation, increases the practical impact of recommendations as to the proper kinds of action, creates a positive psychological premise for giving the personnel confidence that they can master the new equipment, stimulates the concentration and cognitive activity of the trainees and heightens their interest in the material studied. 118 ~ ' � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000140100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , The theoretical retraining in somz, uni,ts and subunits contains shortcomings resultinq from underestimati,on of ~the psXch,ological factors determining the most practical syst.em for organizing the cognitive activity of the trainees. This deficiency essentially arises from the fact that the retraining progra~ns and the specific methods employed i.n the theoretical disciPlines devote an ~justifiable amount of attention to the inductive me.thod of presenting and = assimilating the training material. In other words, despite the fact that most of the personnel have a general understan.ding of the issues covered and ~ have considerable experience in operating and servicing various types of aircraft, the training process proceeds from the specific to the general, which is not rational and which takes a great deal of time. Furthermore, the same phenomena are interpreted in a contradictory mariner - or are duplicated in the study of related disci~lines, which waste training Alang with this, the disconnected facts and ph~nomena presented do not reflect the full picture of the aircraft's behavior in the individual flight modes or of the actions required to operate the equipment. As a zesult, the trai.nees acquire separate facts, bits of information and concepts but are not able to iink them togetfier and comprehend them for purposes of pract.ical employment. An analysis of answers given on exams in one of the units undergoing retrain- ing and errors committed in the control and operation of the new aircraft on the first flights, �or example, showed that some of the pilots had a clear understanding of the characteristics of the new aircraft and know what might occur if certain parameters were altered, but when several parameters were _ al~ered and it became necessary to derive generalized conclusions and to react in a comprehensive manner to the changes, they were lost and committed errors. Experience has sYiown that the mastery of general tenets, basic concepts and principles by the personnel ensures a good mastery of a large number of inter- xelated phenomena and contributes to the intelligent carry over of techniques and methods into the training on the new aircraft. At the same time, the assmi.liation of separate facts and data and the specific peculiarities of the equipment, closely linked with basic principles, concepts and general laws, and bas? d upon pre vious expertise, heightens the cognitive activity of the _ personnel, since it opens up broad possibilities for independent analysis, for summarization of the materials studiea and for the performan~e of spe- cific tasks involved in the operation and servicing of the new type of aircraft. Consequently, the jcb d~mands that in the presentation of the new training material the attention of the trainees be focused on the basic key problems and that the presentation of the other training subjects for that section of the course center around them. Oral presenta~ion of the training material in the theoretical retraining process is ordinarily closely combined with a demonstrat'ion of models of combat equipment and with diagrams, drawings, tables and training films, and sometimes with a demonstration of techniques in the aircraft itself and with trai.ning equipment. ~ 119 ~ . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The demonstration method has been expanded today, and its role and impor- tance have grown greatly. This is due to the fact that in order to master - new equipment the personnel must possess a knowledge of the phy~ical and the technological nature of the complex processes occurring in the functioning of the equipment and thorough understanding of the principles underlying the structural arrangement~ the functioning and interactian of the aircraft's complex assemblies and mechanisms and its engine in various flight modes. And this cannot be accomplished without using various types of training aids. The situation today differs from that of the past in that the drawings, pos ters, graphs and diagrams are more than simp le visual aids: they ~_e the actual oY~jects of study. They make it possible visually to follow the physical phenomena clarifying the operating principles of the units, assemblies and systems, to break down this or that process and demonstrate ~ its separate phases, and to trace the interdependencies in the functioning of the aircraft`s individual mechanisms and its engine. This is why experienced i.nstructor-methodologists use a large number of drawings, graphs, diagrams and posters for teaching theoretical topics. And th~s is justi�ied from the psychological standpoint; because an extremely affective memory .reserve--visual memory--is involved in the training process. Studies have shown that its capabilities greatly exceed those of the motor an3 audial, memories. Furthermore, a skillful combination of explanation and demonstration with visual aids makes the classes lively and interesting. Various types of diagrams have come into extensive use in the theoretical retraining process. General and component layouts and block diagzams, and sometimes simple la~routs of the separate systems and mechanisms, for example, are used during the preparatory period, when the unit has not yet received the new equipment and general lectures are being presented for the personnel. They help to stimulate the cognitive activity of the personnel and help provide them with a thorough understanding of the nature of the physical processes and the principles underlying the arrangement and functioning of _ - the new aviation equipment, and help the students fnrm a graphic concept of ~.he prospects for the development of new equipment, thereby exerting an ~ active influence upon the development of their technical thinking.. During the theoretical retraining ir becomes necessary thnroughly to maste= ' tze dynamic processes occurring in the functioning of the separate systems, the specific nature of the interaction occurring among the mechanisms and assemblies, and the kinematics of automatic and remote control. It is also frequently necessary to clarify the physical essence of this or that . ~henonenon or process, which it is difficult or impossible to explain and demonstrate on the equipment or by means of layouts. Combination functional, eiectrified diagrams, trainer diagrams, imit diagrams and so forth are used - in those cases. The movement of liquid during the functioning of one system ~r ar?other or the order in which the various mechanisms are activated can - be demonstrated by means of electric lights installed on them, which light up in sequence. Some layouts have the controls for a system installed upon 120 ` ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a cockpit mock-up with an instrument board, which makes it possible to relate the study of the system`s design and functioning with man`s work under realistic ogerating and servicing conditions for the aircra~t involved. Experience has shawn that in order for the theoretical retraining to be effectiv~e the diagrams must be properly employed, taking into account the psychological peculiarities of the organization of the cognitive activity of the traineps. ' So~thing can be learned in this respect from the work of Officer V. Solov'yev, an instructor. When he prepares for classes, he selects the ~ di.agrams ahead of time and plans haw they are to be used.. As he explains the arrangement and functional principles of an aircraft system, which has : a qreat deal, in common with th~ analogous system in an aircraft previously flawn, the officer shows diagrams of the systems of both the former and , the new aircraft and points out their differences far the students. Z'his method helps make active use of the students' experience, reduce the time required to study a giv~en system and creates in the trainees a positive frame of mind for mastering the material presented. ~ As he shows and explai.ns complex functional and combination diagrams, the ins;txuctor advises the students as to which elements and cycles in the~ c~ctioning of a system should be given special attention. He frequently poses problematic or attention-focusing questions and recalls analogous moments in the occurrence of individual processes in the functioning of systems previously studied. When a diagram has co~licated parts, he explains the physical nature of the phenomena and makes drawings on the board, and sometimes asks the students what mi.ght occur i.n case of a malfunction or a breakdown of some certain assembly in the system studied. When, during the explanation of questions pertaining to the overall diagram. it becomes necessary to a~ into greater detail about the design and func- tioning of certain assemtilies or mechanismso using other diagrams, Officer Solov'yev always stresses the role, the purpose and place of the assembly or mechanism within the overall scheme of the given system. Z"his method gives the students an integrated concept of the system studied, and the - explanation of the desic3n of individual assemblies and units fits logically into the overall sequence of study of the system as a whole. Training films, the.results of flight observations and demonstrations of . techniques for operating the cockpit equipment by experienced pilots are ex~ensively used in many units and subunits for organizing the study of the theoretical disciplines. Observations of flights, for example, are of great practical importance. They are set up in the following manner. The instructor prepares a special assignment plan for the students in advanee, which indicates what phases and elements of the takeoff, landing and flight they should observe, what I', _ 121 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - specific features in the aircraft control should receive their special attent:ion and what they should review and study prior to leaving for the airfield. ' ~i During the f?ight observations, the instructor asks the trainees what errors and deviations they have noticed in the performance of the pilots _ and how they should be eliminated, what tI~?e instrument readings should be dixring one flight phase or ~nother, and so forth. Hypothetical special flight situations requiring a concr~te decision are also possd for the trainees. Various visual aids are used during the flight observations: aircraft tnock-ups, charts for�making landing computations according to the aircraft's flying weight and weather conditions, diagrams of the glide path, charts showing the aerodynamic forces in effect dux~ing takeoff and landing, and characteristic maneuvers (in a bank, on a turn, and so forth), as well as a mock-up or diagram of the aircraft cockpit, by means of which the trainees verbally duplicate the actions of th.e pilot of the aircraft being observed. At t.he end of the fli~ht day the trainees attend a critique of the flights, during which the results of their observations are co~ared with the opinions of the commanders and the pilots performinq the missions. Expsrience has shown that the well-conceived employment of flight observations helps to combine theoretical. knowledge with practical flight requirements and to improve the quality of psychological conditioning of the personnel for - upcor.~ing flights on the new equipment, that is, their psychological adaptatian. I~ r.onciusion, we should point out that serious consideration of the pecu-� liarities of theoretical training makes it possible to use the training rime more efficiently and to help the perscnnel thoroughly master the new aviation equipment and the rules for its combat employment, operation and servicing. 3, In the Practical Retraining Process The Ne~a Equipment Is Necessitating Adjustments 'iha final phase of retraining for new equipment c~nsists of the flight program. It involves the practical application of the knowledge acquired~ , during the theoretical training and the development on this basis of skills ~nd abilities for operating and servicing the aircraft. Pra.ctical retraining is an important and responsi.ble period for evezy' airman. In the course of practical training, a qualitatively new foundation is laid for tha further development of skills and abilities, the moral-combat and psy~h.ological qualities of the personnel are actively improved, and they form � a definite attitude toward the riew equipment, acquire.experience and build up confidence in themselves and in their ability to master a new and higher stage - of cambat proficiency. 122 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . While in the past, zn the course of practical retrai.ning, flight and technical personnel mastered the operation and servicing of aircraft which differed little in design~ operation and combat employment, and flight akills and the tecnnical servicing of the aircraft were basically simply improved when a transition was made from one aircraft to another, now, when i-he aviation has been reoutfitted with supersonic aircraft carrying power- ful nuclear missiles, it has become necessary, along with the transfer of previous know-how, to develop basically new skills and abilities or to thoroughly re-form or destroy skills previously developed. This specific aspect of modern practicai retraining is due to the pecu- liarities inherent in the development of skills and abilities, peculiari- hies related, in the first place, to s~tructural engineering improvements made in the new aviation equipment and, in the second place, to the aero- dynami.c characteristics of modern supersonic aircraft. We shall discuss these peculiarities in detail. The personnel today are mainly dealing with complex automatic or semiautomatic _systems, which alters the nature of their work considerably: they function p~:imarily as operators. This has resulted in a reduced role for muscular activity and an increase in the load borne by the higher divisions of the central nervous system and the sensory organs. While the objective of retraining in the pas t was that of developing new motor skills out of the pilot's old ones, the task of formtng mental and sensory skills and complex skills for performing the various tasks i.nvolved in the operation and combat ~~loyment of new aircraft has naw moved to the fore. The substantial differences distinguishing the contr_ol of modern aircraft from that of the older ones have made it necessary primarily to develop skills in instrument flying, even for uncomplicated flights. While in the past a number of flight parameters and the aircraft's position were mainly determined by the gyro-compass and from ground reference points, as flight altitudes and speeds increased and as more advanced piloting and navigational instruments came into being, instruments came to be used more and more exten- - ~ively for orienta~ion purposes. Today, a pilot can obtain correct informa- tion on the aircraft's position only from instruments. As a result, it has become vexy important to instill in the flight pers~nnel confidence in the ~ veracity of instrument information, even when it conflicts with their own. fee lings . , Modern aviation eguipment alsa embodies considerable changes in aerodynamic I characteristics, which have a considerable ef,~ect upon the process of flight s}cills devnlopment. This is pri~narily due to the specific nature of t,he supersonic flow of the aerodynamic shapes of modern aircraft, which reflects _ the essence of a11 the aerodynami.c effects during a flight. 123 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1'he separate changes frequently require not only a dynamic restructuring of flight skills, but a thoroughly conceived psychological preparedness for perceiving these changes as well. Modern turbojet engines, for example,and their air intake devices have a complicated automatic control system. Acti- vation of the automatic system at certain engine speeds produces character- ~ istic noises. In the retraining process, especially during the first solo flights, these noises evoke caution in the pilots and distract their attention. It is therefore beneficial to perntit the pilots to beco~ accustomed to the noises on the ground, prior to the first flight, and to direct attention to - them on subsequent flights. Failure to do so may complicate flight conditions. Once, while .flying at night in good weather, pilot K. heard a loud knock in the engine compartment while executing a turn at a 60 degree bank. He reduced rpm and, after seeing them drop, reported to ground that the engine had failed. At the specific altitude, at a command from the flight operation officer, the pilot restarted the engine and immediately discovered that the front landing gear strut was in the lowered position. An analysis of the pilot's actions and a special check flight in the aircraft confirmed that the pilot had taken the spontaneous dropping of the forward strut on the turn and the sound it made as it locked in place as a disturbance in the engine. The pilot took the sharp drop in rpm, for which he himself was responsible, as engine failure. Sometiines, immediately after liftoff in a supersonic aircraft, there will be d~.started readings on certain piloting instruments (the gyrecompass, the ~ altimeter and the rate-of-climb indicator), which complicates piloting, especially at night and in adverse weather conditions, and creates additional osychological tension in the pilot. With this in mind, veteran flight instruc- tor~ develQp additional methods to be used in the retraining for monitoring the aircraft's position and direct the pilot's attention immedia~ely prior to takeoff to the imAOrtance of operating with precision. For this p urpose they place tne aircraft i.n the takeoff or landing position and show the pilot haw to select the best scaruzing sector and~the best sequence of surveillance, ~ explain possible errors in visual observation according to the height of the pilot`s seat, direct his atten~:~on to characteristic lines of sight along the aircraft hood or other parts of the cockpit relative to the horizon, and so forth. Vigorous and extensive movements of the control lever can produce a longitudin~I wobble in modern supersonic aircraft during takeoff and during the second half vf the takeoff run, when the nose wheel is off the ground. This makes it dif- ficult to maintain a constant takeoff angle during the second half of the take- off run. IL is therefore necessary in the retraining carefully to develop ~ skill in maintaining the aircraft`s longitudinal balance in the takeoff posi- ticn, according to the speed of the aircraft, its flying weight and temperature conditions. 124 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � . Oeri the psychologi,cal plane it is i~ortant specially to prepare flight per- sonnel to detect and accept calmly these and many other characteristic piloting peculiarities of the new types of aircraft. This helps considerably to relieve psychological pressure and emotional overstress, especially on the first solo ~ �lights. ~ ' ` Experience in the retraining of outstanding units and subunits has shown that . whe.Z the peculiarities of the new equipment are thoroughly considered, the process of mastering it proceeds successfully, fewer errors are committed an the first flights and the flight personnel develop more rapidly the necessary skills and abilities and confidence in the reliability of the new ~ equipment. Take the Individual's Psychological Peculiarities Into Account An important element of the overall system of practical retraining for new equipmP~t is the preparation of flight personnel for the first solo flight. It consists of general ground preparation for flights on the new type of aircraft and immediate preparations for the tirst solo flight. The general ground preparation is ordinarily begun by acquainting the com- mander (or the flight instructor) with the pilots assigned to him. He care- fully studies each~of the pilots, the positive and negative aspects of his flight training and his personal psychological qualities in order to ensure successful fulfillment of the retraining program. The experience of Officer B. Voronkov is instructive in this respect. As he studies the pilots whom he will be retraining on the new equipment, he grad- ually records i.nformation on them in a special notebook. He gives special attention to the following questions: total flight time, number of hours flown during the past year, class rating~ reports of the flight-surgeon's commission, types of aircraft flown, certifications for flight work, dis- ruptions in flight worl:, checks on piloting techniques, training in ejection on the ground, flight training courses, instances of psychological break- downs, data on any forced landings he has made, and so forth. This infor- ~ mation is later checked in personal tal}cs with the pilots and while obser~,~ing them in the training process. In the talks with the trainees Officer Voronkov inquires about each pilot's instrument training and his attitude toward the retraining on a new type of aircraft, and clarifies any questions he might have. If it becomes necessary, he requests assistance from those who have taught the pilot and flown with him in the past. ~ All of this helps the officer to plan and conduct the pilot`s preparation for the first solo flight, correctly and with a good pedagogi~al and psycho-, and to perfect his skills during the flights, taking his _ individual characteristics into account. ~ 125. ' � ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY As an exan~le, let us describe the methods used by Officer Voronkov to train you.~g pilot K. ~nd veteran pilot P. The following data was collected on ~ilot K.: third-class ratinq, previously flown three types of aircraft, medium total numbex of flying hours (note: poor in instrument training); no restrictions for reasons of health, but suffered injury to right elbow joint prior to retraining as a result of which he was grounded ior 35 days; total of 2 hours 40 minutes of flying following checkout flights, after which he did not fly for 32 days while undergoing theoretical retrai.ning (note: check ntunber of practical instrument training sessions); two preconditions for a flight accident--overshoot during a landing, and once rolled off the end of the runway (note: dete rmined causes of preconditions); landing most ~if- ficult element of piloting techniques (note: devotes special attention to _ development of skills) . The following noL-ations were made following the first talk with the pilot: qood-nat�ured~ excessively talkative, demonstrates some carelessness (note: step up control over classes and practical training sessions); expressed apprehension about training sessions to develop skills in breathing under excessive pressure: since childhood, afraid to sleep with his head covered up; almost drowned at ithe age of 8 years. After considering the personal characteristics of pilot K., Officer Voronkov comniled the following recommendations: ~ 1~ Concluct his drills in breathing under excessive pressure last to make it possible for the pilot to observe the training of his comrades. Begin the sessions at the minimum acceptable excessive pressure, after personally demonstrating how to breathe properly under excessive pressure; 2. Pay special attention to the development of actions to be taken in special situations involving depressurization of cockpit in the air; 3. Conduct exchange of experience in given type of training within the group; ~1. Speak with doctor about working out special psychological training measures ror pilot aiid step up control during his training sessions and during the performance af his first flights; 5. Assign an exper~enced pilot from the group to pilot K, for the entire practical retraining period. All of this heZped the young pilot to correct the deficiencies and to retrain successfully for the r.ew type of aircraft. Officer Voronkov made the following notes after getting to knaw pilot R.: squadron commander, first-class rating, flown seven types of aircraft, ex~ensxve total flying time; flies under all conditions, flight instructor, - nc limi.tations for reasons of health, twice involved in emergency situations, no residual traumatic etxects observed. 'I'he overall picture was good: This was an experienced and determined pilot. During the talk with the pilot, however, it was revealed that Officer R. felt that those in charqe of the retraining placed too much emphasis on theoretical matters and that more attention should be devoted to the practicaY 126 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . flight training. This attitude alerted the instructor, and he decided to check the pilot's knowledge of the theoretical principles underlying prac- tical aerodynamics and to assign him to classes in the group studying "Aerodynamic Peculiarities of Takeoffs and ?~andings with Aircraft Involved in Retraining" and "Peculiarities of Aircraft Stability and Controllability on Takeoff Run and at Flight Ceiling." In addition, the instructor noticed in his talk with the pilot what he considered to be ov~erconfidence. As a result of this, he tactfully told the pilot about several preconditions for flight accidents resulting frcam � poor knowledge. of theoretical matters and from certain developments occurring in flight. At the sam~e tim~e~ the instructor stressec~ the fact that in the interest of achieving the very best results in the retraining the same high demands were made of all pilots, regardless of their raazk or position. The instructor informed the commander of his doubts about the theoretical preparedness of Pilot R. The co~zder spoke with the pilot and revealed a ntunber of gaps in his knowledge of aircraft aerodynamics and the opera`cion of the engine and aircraft eouipment. The pilot admitted that he had devoted little attention in recent years to improving his theoretical level and that he had not understood evexything in the theoretical retraining bi~t, as senior member of the group, had been embarrassed to ask questions. Pilot R. received the assistance he needed, made up his theoretical training deficiency and successfully completed the practical retraining. The pilot's study of piloting technique instructions and other dociunents governing flight work on the given type of aircraft constitutes an inseparable part of the overall solo flight preparation. It is closely tied in with other training activities of the practical retraining phase. Learning the Aircraft Cockpit As we have already pointed out, the cockpit of a modern aircraft contains a complex system of instruments, equipment for controlling flight mode, control - levers, communication equipment, and so forth. Flight safety and the success- . ful~perfection of flight skills as a whole depend upon how thoroughly the flight personnel master this system. Experience has shown that the effective development of skills in operating the cockpit equipment depends primarily upon the employment of sound training methods and upon a knawledge of and consideration for a niunber of important psychological factors. Let us describe an example taker_ from retraining experience in order to present a graphic concept of the psychological peculiarities linked to learning the cockpit. The squadron commander in one of the subunits undergoing retraining checked out young pilot U. for solo flight certification. The checkout flight was 127 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONi.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' far from The pilot was constrained, operated the cockpit . equipment without confidence, demonstrated nervousness and was slow in reacting to commands from ground and from the tester. 'i'he squadron cousnander concluded that the pilot had not mastered th~~ aircraft cockpit satisfactorily and that he had not developed the requir~d .~~nctional automa.tism. The flight commander threw up his hands in amazement and asserted that he had personally checked the pilot several times in a trainer cockpit. Each time the pilot had unerringly named and pointed out the instruments, levers and control sticlcs and had accurately described the sequence for distributing his attention among the i.nstruments during the most important flight pl-iases . ` What had happened? A knawledge of psychology helped to clarify the situation. - An analysis of the pilot's actions and his methods of preparing for flights demonstrated the fact that there had been psychological gaps in his training. They involved the actual methodological system developed by _ certain coamanders and flight i.nstructors for teaching the aircraft cockpit. We knaw, of course, that despite the great multiplicity of techniques and methods employed in flight training practices, a number of systems of - methods have been developed for developing skills in working with the cock- pit equipmen t on modern aircraft. � All of the groups of inethods can be differentiated by content into three main categories~ each of which has a strictly defined psychological basis: l. The study and development of actions involved in operating the cockpit ~i.rcraft by area of location in the cockpit (that is, the equipment on the left panel is studied first, followed by that on the right h~nd panel, the instrument board, and so farth); Z. The study and development of operations involving cockpit equipment by separate coaitrol items (the study of the radio equipment control panel, Yor example, that of the equipment pertaining to the landing gear, the flaps, _ the s~ght and the separate systems and so farth?; 3. 7'he study and development of skills in working with the cockpit aircraft according to basic operations and flight phases (take off, landing, circular flights, flights on a route, piloting during the performance of various pilotir_g maneuvers and the performance of general, solidly established combat emnloyment techniques, and so forth). an the psychological plane, these groups of inethods are used for performing such tasks as memorization of the location of this or that instrument, lever or toggle switch in the cockpit, rapid registration of their readings and the development of skills in operating the quipment in an efficient sequence, and, - .final ly, the establishment of a logically-based relationship between the instrument readings or the positions of the control levers and the state of functioning of the control object; in accordance with the prescribed flight modes. 128 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE~ONLY Each group of inethods has its positive aad negative sides. The study of th~e cockpit and the development of~skills in operating it according to ' basic operations and flight phases, for example, contributes to the rapid dev~elopa?ent of a skillful sequence of action approaching that follawed on actual flights. This method of instruction recreates the essential set of actions most completely and precisely~ that is, it forms a specific syste~ of actions. Under this system, havever, less stress is laid upon rememberinq the locations of the instrumen~s, the control levers and toggle switches, and u~pan their relationship to the ai.rcraft and engine systems and assemblies. "The study af the equipment and the development of skills in operating the cockpit equipment by areas of surveillance, on the other hand, contributes to the rapid memorization of the positions of equipment in the cockpit but - is not effective for developing the sequence of actions. Furthermore, this system of inethods does not orient the pilot to~aard establishing a connection betw~een the instrument control or the control lever with the state of the ~ object which they affect. Zhis deficiency is best eliminated in the second group of inethods, whereby the study of the equipment and the development of _ skill in operating the coc}cpit equipment are conducted from the beginning by individual objects of control. Psychological studies have shown that the use of one or another group of methods in isolation for mastering the cockpit in all of the training phases is not sufficiently effective. The best resu].ts are obtai.ned when they are used in conjiuiction, accordin to the theoretical and practical tasks being performed. From the very beginning of the theoretical training, in their explanation _ of the design of the separate systems and mechanisms, veteran teachers, flig~t instructors and engineers simultaneously direct the trainees' atten- tion to the principles underlying remote control of a given system or mecha- nism and the positions of instruments, tumblers and control levers for the system, explain the basic operating parameters and demonstrate ~he specific manner of manipulating the control levers in various flight modes. That is, they su~cessfully use the system of studying and mastering the aircraft cockpit by separate control objects at a given phase of training. In Awr?y cases in this phase of training, however, when the flight personriel does not yet have a clear concept of the aircraft involved~ seme instructors give additional explanations of the peculiarities of control over the system or mechanism studied in ints dynamic setting, that is, as applicable to�a certain complex or operation involved in the aireraft control as a whole. As a result, the study of the cockpit is not as effective. - In the above case there is a stratification of logically baseless informa- tion, the trainees' attention is overextended, and the value of the practical . recaa~endations presented is reduced. During this period~ the training purpose is best served by employing the method of mastering the cockpit by individual objects controlled and regulated directly fxom the aircraft cockpit. , 129 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The study of the cockpit of a new aircraft during the theoretical retraining period is thus a sort of preparatory stage for the further improvement and development of skills in aircraft control. All of the groups of inethods can be used, both in combination and separately, during preparations for the first solo flights on the new equipment. To be specific, many veteran flight instructors use the second and third groups of methods during the first days for checking the trainees' knowledcre and for reviewing and reinforcing the material covered in the course of the theoretical ~ retraining. From the cockpit itself, they check the pilots' k.~owledge of the separate aircraft systems and mechanisms and methods of regulating and control- ling their functioning, direct the attention of the flight personnel to the peculiarities involved in operating the various control levers, valves and togyle switches, demonstrate the proper speed of action, explain possi.ble - errors in thE! process~ and demonstrate the sequence for distri.buting atten- tion in the c~ontrol and automatic control processes and during the performance of specific functions. - In other cvords, if in the theoretical retraining process, the instructor has mainly explained the positions and the structure of this or that item of cockpit equipment, then at this stage the flight instructor concentrates , mainly on teaching the pilots to use the equipment efficiently. The develop- ment of specific skills in controlling and operating the r~ew aircraft are thus formed, along wit_h the performance of cognitive tasks. During this period some flight instructors make successful use of the first yroup of inethods, that is, the study and mastery of the cockpit by areas of cockpit equipment. Exper~ence has shown that the final checkout is most effec~ive cahen the flight instructor need only verify how well the trainees have learned the positions of tl-~e instruments and control levers. This is due to the fact that the given method makes it possible to focus upon the location of the instrument and equipment in isolation from the operations and from the control of the separate systems, that is, it makes it possible to heighten the students' attention and draw it to the positions of the instrimtients in the cockpit. In some units a more complicated version of this method is snmetimes used-- the so-called blind checkout, whereby the flight personnel`s knowledge of the oockpit equipment on the aircraft for which they are retraining is tested with their eyes closed. It is important to consider the specific nature of the flight personnel's perception and activity when this method is used. That is, the assignments should be geared to their capabilities and should _ focus mainly upon the development of_ automatism in determining the arrange- ment of the cockpit equipment and upon the development of the structure of the skill as a whole. It is furthermore advisable to employ the system of learning the cockpit by areas of equipment distribution as the main method, since the study of instruments and equipment in isolation from the operations required in the different flight phases or without relating them to requlation or control over the individual systems and assemblies can result 130 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFZCIAL USE ONLY � in the mechanical memorization cnly of their locations and of separate and discorlnected ope.rations performe$ with them. Furthermore, it frequently has , a neqative effect upon, and interferes with the development of, certain complex skills required by the pilot for controlling the aircraft in the various flight modes. Experience has shown that employment of the third group of inethods is more ~ effective for the development of complex skills and of a dynamic stereotype for controlling and operating the new aircraft, that is, the system whereby the study and development of operations involving the cockpit equipment are Performed in u coordinated manner, by individual complex operations and according to the main flight phases or the cycles af operations involved in controlling and monitoring the performance of the systems and mechanisms. This is the main and concluding phase in the pilot`s mastery of the cockpit, and aZl of the preparatory work is brought together in it. On the psychological level, it is ircq~ortant i.n this phase to a~ere constantly to strict sequence and graduated buildup of complexity in developing skills in operating the cockpit equipment, both in special classes and the practical _ training sessions conducted as part of the ground training process and when - working on each flight assignment during the practical flight training period. When they employ tliis method for teaching the cockpit, veteran flight instruc- tors first review and reinforce the pilots' knowledge of the total group of ; _ instr~nents and control elements in the cockpit, their structure an~i arrange- ment, by xndividual systems and mechanisms, work out sets of actions to be perfo rmed with this equipment and then perfect the cycles of operations already completed, in a specific sequence corresponding to the flight phases covered by the program for mastering the piloting equipment. Furthermore, experience has shown that in the first stages the mastery of the cockpit equipmezit and its operation proceeds more successfully when the more co~:lex cyc].es of actions or operations are broken down into more simple com- ponents or a].gorithms of action (the pilot's cycle of actians during the first half of the takeoff run, for example,during the second half, at the moment of liftoff, during the climb, and so forth). It is i~ortant, however, that the performance of the operation first be explained as a whole, that is, that the flight instructor explain the general takeoff peculiarities for the given type of aircraft and possible errors, demonstrate the group of pilot actions for all the phases, from the beginning of the takeoff run to the attainment of the assigned altitude, and then discuss in greater detail and go through the operation of the cockpit equipment for each phase. From the psychological standpoint, the effectiveness of this system lies in the fact that it gives the general purpose of the performance of the entire program af actions as a whole. The pilot grasps the integrated structure of the operations studied, and the p~rformance of its separate elements seem to logically fit int~ the structure without destroying its unity. AnothPr 131 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY positive factor in this case is the fact that in the process of comprehending what he has perceived the pilot is relieved of the necessity of making an additional mental effort to combine the separate algorithms of action into a total operation. At the same time, some teachers and flight instrucrors sometimes commit major errors in this area. In an attempt to provide the best and most complete information possible on the equipment in the cockpit of a new aircraft, they forget to adhere to the sequence estab lished for presenting the material. When they explain the peculiarities of operating this or that instrument or control lever, before the pilots have a complete picture of the complex nperations and the patterns of actions i.nvolved in the various fliqht phases and before they have covered the fundamentals of the systems~ these instruc- tors attempt to explain the peculiarities involved in operating an instru- ment or a control lever in various flight situations or in connection with the operation of other systems not yet covered. The result is ar: unwieldy buildup of information and a disorderly accumulation of disconnected facts, which has a negative effect upon the study of the cockpit instruments. � What we have discussed here, naturally, does not reflect the entire highly diverse employment of inethods of learning an aircraft cockpit. It is only one of �~he possibZe versions of a structure and sequence for developing the methocls to be used in this important and co~lex process. Caution! Negative Carryover of Habits An aircraft failure occurred in one oi the air units, during the first solo f~ights on the new equigment. For 8 years, Pilot K. had successfully flown ` the MiG-17 and had earned a first-class rating 4 years in a row. As one of ~ the best pilots, he was among the first to be permitted to train for the � new aircraft. Following intense study and practical training, it came time for his first solo flight. The instructor had no doubts as to the pilot's ~ readiness. The unforeseen occurred, however. As he was appr~aching for a landing the pilot discovered that the landing gear would not descend. He reported this to the flight operation officer, who directed him to begin a second cir.cle and to effect an emergency lowering of the landing gear. Naturally, the fact that this was the first solo flight on the new aircraft created a certain constraint and tenseness in the pilot, and added to that-- a malfunction.... The flight operation officer understood this and issued instructions calmly and precisely. Following his instructions, the pilot began ~o move the valve from neutral to the "lowering" position, that is, downward, to effect the emergency lowering of the landing gear. Z'he valve _ would not move. The pilot made another strong effort, and the valve broke. This complicated landing conditions drastically. What had happened? ~Was - it equipment faiLure, happenstance or simply a pilot error? An analysis of ~ the incident showed that the pilot was basically to blame. It was not a simple error, however, or a result of carelessness. In order to move the 132 FOR 4FFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040140100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY valve to the "lawering" position on this type of aircraft, the valve lock had to be moved toward the pilot and the valve moved downward. It was just the opposite on the MiG-17. After many years of flying the pilot had developed finnly establi:.3,;>.d habits in operating the cockpit equipment, specifically the landinq gea~ valve. This habit had apparently not been completely broken or grecisely altered in the process of retraining on the new aircraft. Under ordinary cir~umstances, or even, perhaps, durinq training flights, the pilat would have functioned confidently and correctly in the cockpit, but when conditions Ghanged and became more complicated, and time was running out, - he experienced a so-:.alled spontaneous loss of individual habits not solidly established. xhe physiological mechanism of this development of the psyche was based on a solidly established dynamic stereotype of conditioned reflexes in response . - t~ certain signals on a flight, which had develc~ped in the pilot`s cerebral ~ortex in. the process of many years of flying. In this case, the instruction t~~ effzct aii emergency lowering of the landing ge3r served as the signal. In his preparatory training for the flight, in the analysis of action to be - taken in special situations, the pilot had undoubtedly operated the emergency - valve for lawering the landing gear. In a calm situation, with time to think, constant self-control rad permitted him to function properly. This newly- developed habit had not been practiced to the point of automatism, however. More than that, it had not even become a part of his conscious actions. The pilot's error was not a result of confusion or of hasty instructions from the fiight operution officer. The real cause of the pilot's incorrect operation of ~he coclcpit equipment was something different. In the complicated situation, when the pilot had to focus his attentic~n pro- perly in order. to perform a specific type of function within an extremely short time, the flight operation officer's command snould have sti,::alated ' him even more. Since the pilot had still not developed a dynamic stereo- type for c~perating the new equipment, however, he received the co~nand , subconsciously, perfunctorily. It acted as a sort of stimulus ab ruptly _ activating the previous stereotype, and thisP in turn, l.ed to an erroneous reaction to the command. Instead of removing the lock from the valve and ' moving it to the "lo~vering" posi.tion, the pilot pressed the valve lock and - 'nrokz it by movinc~ it too far. . - Aviation equipment is c~nstantly undergoing renewal at the present stage of - development. Not only do fundamentally new aircraft come into being each - year, but existing aircraft are also undergoing constant improvement. Flight ' personnel not only have to unr.ergo systematic retraining as a result, but - also have to undergo additional training for the old equipment, making certain adjus~ments in their habits and skills. ChangPS brought about in the pilot`s work as a result of improvements in the aviatian equipment c;reate certain conditions for the negative carryover of foz-cner skills into the new situat~on. How does one account for the nevelopmPnt 133 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040140100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of these conditions? The most likelx causes are the following: structural chanqes in the control elements for the mechanisms and systems; the reloca- tion of levers, buttons, toggle switches and instruments in the cackpit; chanc~es in the pilot's attention distribution pattern in the important flight phases dwe to changes made in the sequence of op~rations performed for con- trolling the aircraft; and the breakdown of previously developed temporal intervals in the performance of certain actions. This can be illustrated ~ising the following exa~le. _ Night flights in adverse weather conditions were ending in one air unit. ~ The flight commander, an experienced pilot, was in the air. Having completed the flight assignment, he had received permission to make a straight-end landing. The lights of the approaching aircraft came into view in the sky. But why were there so few of ~.hem? "Your out.side landing gear lights are not an." reported the flight operation officer. There was no doubt that the pilot was coming in for a landing with the landing gear retracted. The flight operation officer ordered the pilot to begin a second circle. The lights came on just at that moment, indicating that the pilot had only then lowered the landing gear. It was soon learned that the pilot had forgotten to perform this operation at the right time. How could this have happene d? After all, this was an experienced pilot in ~he sky, a pilot who had performed hundreds of landings.... Let us run ~ through his actions. Upon receiving permission to approaching for a straight- end landing, the pilot began, the required maneuver. On the 30--second horizontal stretch, he slowed the aircraft to the prescribed speed by mean.s of the brake flaps. We would point out that the pilot reduced speed not by lawering engine rpm as the instructions indicate, but by lowering the ~rake flaps. A new action involved in pressing the air brake button was i~ntro~ucecl into the habitual, developed set of actions. In the pilot's words, ~ this somehow filled a subconscious quantitative and temporal gap in the established dynamic stereotype and somehaw took the place of the omitted - action with the toggle switch controlling the valve for lowering the landing gear. After performing the operation with the button controlling the air brake ' flaps, he somehow automatically began lowering the wing flaps into the landing gear position. Upon noticing that the aircraft speed was increasing a~. the giv+ei~ rpm, ho~~everr he began to doubt the speed indicator. In order to check ~,e speed indicator, he took the aircraft into a temporary climb. The speed inclicator correctly indicated the reduction in speed. R~t conditions for a negative carryover of a habit were created in the above c~:se by introducing an additional operation into the developed sequence of c~erations. A negative carryover of habits can also take the form of a so-called carryover ' by association. This can be caused either by sets of skills and habits of operating in a strictly defined manner, which have devel.oped in the process of flight work an aircraft previously flown or, in part, by skills and habits I34 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY produced by the individual's.daily life-style or by his te~erament. In other words, carryover by association consists of spontaneous actions on - the part of the pilot by analogy with the mdnner in which he was accustomed to performi.nq pre~~iously. This soxt of carzyover of habits may be negative or positive. The neqative carryover in this casa is one which has a harm- ~ ful effect upon the pilot's work, especially when learning to fly a new aircraft. . The nature of a negative carryover of habits can be illustratEd in the _ manner. We knaw that when piloting subsonic aircraft the pilot's manipulations of the rudders and ailerons have greater amplitude and there are shorter intervals between movements of the control lever, whereas ~he carzyover of analogous actions to the control of supersonic aircraft can have dangerous consequences. This is~especially clearly manifested during takeoff. Physically, this is due to the fact that tihere is less contrast be.tween changes in speed and the effectiveness of the rudders on subsonic ~ aircraft than on supersonic ones. As a result af the smaller area of the � rudders during the first harf of the takeoff run, their effectiveness increased more slavly, increasing sharply during the second half as a result ' oE the rapid buildup of speed. Because of this, a differentiated approach must be taken to developing skills in operating the rudders when learning ta fly supersonic aircraft. During the second half of the takeoff run these actions should be smooth and should be performed somewhat in advance of t,he need. Experience has shown, however, that due to the increased psychological tension in this phase, many pilots who previously flew subsonic aircraft skillfully subconsciously carry over the more abrupt movements. This fre- quently produces a dangerous longitudinal wobble in the aircraft during takeoff. Special studies indicate that pilots with a good theoretical knawledge of the use of the rudder during takeoff beging to function in the presence of slight complications in the manner in which they were accustomed to performing praviously. That is, they have a ca.rr.yover of skills by . association. - In many cases, the pilot's tempera~nt, or his psychic reactivity, as they say, in fluences the pilot`s actions. For exa~le, when flight conditions become complicated the actions of pilots with a choleric temperament~may � _ become quicker and more abrupt, which has a negative effect upon aircraft - control and sometimes results in the development of preconditions for flight accidents. Pilots who are phlegmatic by nature, on the othez hand, become more~ sluggish in their actions in such cases, and there is an intensification of i'nhibitory processes in the cerebral cortex and as a result, poor recep- tivi''~.y to ground commands, a slowing of sensomotor reactions and delayed response to deviations of the aircraft in flight. Therc.~fore, when flight prepaiations are made and when the pilots are working on actions they are � - to tak~~ i.n -~dverse conditions, it is important carefully to differentiate the foZccasti.ulg of their behavior and to work out special steps and recom- mendations in a~dvance for the fiight operation officer. This, in turn, requires a special study of each pilot's personality and a knowledge of the psychological peculiarities of behavior of the flight personnel on the part of everyone taking part in the flight control work. 135 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONt..Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Speakinq of the ~roblem of negative carryover of habits, we should mention yet another variaLion of carxyover by association, which pertains mainly to skills used in actions related to a specific pace of movement. This mainly ~ applies to motor reactions and operations perfonned with the cockpit equip- ment, in which the and the end of the motion to be asynchronous. valve rapidly but closing it slawly, for example, making an abxupt and rapid motion with the hands and a simultaneous smooth movement of the feet and so forth. It is important to take i.nto account the possibility of negative carryover of habits in flight work during the organization and conduct of all types of training of the personnel and to extensively apply special psycholcgical and pedagogical methods of preventing these developments. A considerable body of experience i.n this area has been ac~umulated in the forces. In the process of mastering new equipment, for example, or when converting to modifications of aircraft already mastered, commanders, political workers and instructors in the outstanding units analyze and determine in advance ~ possi.ble points of contiguity between previously acquired skills and those newly developed in the control and operation of the new equipment, taking each pilot's personal characteristics and training level into account. They also taIce into account the possibility of a negative carryover of skills, depending upon the type of aircraft which the pilot has previously flown and the type on which he is presently training. Sn many units, flight methods committees and specialists from the various , services together thorough ly analyze instances of pilot errors caused by a negative carryover of habits and then woxk out a system of ineasures to pre- vent such occurrences in the process of mastering the new equipment. During the preparations for flights, in the course of each class and practical training session, veteran commanders and flight instructors foresee possible instances of erroneous actions and conditions conducive to the negative carry- over of previous habits in the specific flight conditions. They draw the pilots' attention especially to such si~tuations, explai.n and demonstrate the - typical causes of erroneous actions and explain their consequences. When the flight instructors in one of the units were retraining on a new combat training aircraft, the pilots frequently overshot on the landings during the first flights. The initial analysis of their actions did not. produce positive results. The overshoots continued to occur. Only a detailed s~udy of each action performed by a pilot during a landing made it possible t~ detect the element of negative carryover of a previous habit. It turned - out that the nose section of the new aircraft had a larger angle of rake than ths one previous~.y flown. The pilots were fixing the horizon sighting iine on the edge of hood just as they Piad done on the types of aircraft pre- viously flown, and were creating a considerably greater angle of pitch when landing the new aircraft. As a result, they were overshooting on the landings. This fact was pointed out to all of the pilots, and proper adjustments were made in the computations, All of this helped to eliminate piloting errors during landings. 136 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY When they organize training and methodological work to prevent negative carry- over of habits, veteran cormnanders and flight instructors schedule special classes and practical training sessions to reinforce new skills and break down old ones. The follawing techniques and methods are e~loyed: explanation � and demonstration of what should and should not be done; description of possib le indications of erroneous actions and of their consequencss; inverse explanation and demonstration, whereby the trainer or instructor first explains the process involved in the performance of an erroneous action and the con- sequences, and then tells how to perform this or that operation or action properly. All of this helps to prevent the negative carryover of previous habits into the new situation and accelerates the process of their attenuation and breakdokm. The following are effective means of preventing negative carryover of habits: the posing of various problematic questions and hypothetical problems; focusing - the attention of the trainees upon the incorrect actions of their comrades while observing flights and other practical training exercises; reviewing _ specially important incidents in the course of training on the new type of aircraft; analyzing the correct actions of pilots during flight critiques, and so forth. ' What Goes Into a Successful Solo FI.ight Today, practical training of the personnel on trainers and in the aircraft themselv~es are exceptionally important for retraining on new equipment. The content of this tra.ining has grown considerably more complicated and the range of training subjects has expanded. This is due to the fact that for piloting a modern aircraft the crews must process an enormous volume of infor- m~tion on the aircraft's position and the functioning of the engines and ~ equipnient, conver~ this information by a logical thought process, make decisions and manipulate the control elements correspondingly. It is important to consider a number of peculiarities of this training - method in the retraining process, when using trainers to develop essential sY.ills and abilities in flight personnel. A trainer is not simply an external replica of a weapon, mechanism or systiem but a complex technical device - making it poss~b le to samulate the si_tuation in which the pilot operates ` while controlling the aircraft and to take into account the psychological factors contributing to the development of essential skills in the trainees. It is therefore important when using training equipment to devote attention - not only to the recreation of a specific sequence and technology for the performance of the technique or a~tion being studied, but also to create realistic conditions and the various operational-tactical situations i~1 which tixe new,ly formed skills and abilities will be demonstrated in the future. In the practical retraining, it is not always possible to create with training equipment a completely auth.entic combat situation. When trai.ners are used 137 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY which lack the equi,pment for visually simulating the conditions under which the skills and abilities should be developed, the instructor must verbally describe those conditions, constantly readjust them during the course of a practical training session and explain the causes of erroneous actions and _ ways of eliminating them. Movies, television and film slides can be used simultaneously to present a more graphic picture of the conditions and the tactical background, as well as the sequence and pace for performing the action or operation being learned. - When work~ng on landi~gs in a trainer, for example, it is important first to show all of the components of a landing specially filmed for training purposes (the commentary can be written or verbal). And it is desirabJ.e to shaa not only the aircraft's maneuvering as a result of the proper performance of certain actions but also, when possible, the actions of the pilot in the cockpit and the positions of th~ indicators on piloting and other instruments. A demonstration of possible errors of action and their consequences also - contributes to the proper development of skills, ~ One impor.tant requirement of training conducted in a trainer is that the psychological structures underlying the development of habits conform - totally to those of the actual skills. That is, the actions practiced may be taken out of a complex work situation, but they must remain the same as wh~n they are performed in the real situations. ~ Training with the use of trainers must also be set up so as to exclude to the fullest possible degree all conditions which would result in interference of habits. That is, the carryo~er of habits formed by means of trainers should be positive and should not entail any sort of psychological readjust- ' ment i.n the actual situation. This means that the sequence and the pace for performing the actions, the positions of the instruments and control levers and the working conditions (degree of restriction, lighting, coloration, temperature, and so forth) in exercises performed in a trainer should confozm t~ the actual conditions for operating the combat equipment. This makes it important to develop standards for all exercises conducted on trainers and to justify them psychologically, taking the structural features of the trainer into account. It is important to combine exercises on trainers with exercises on the new equipment in the retraining process in order to achieve good development of the required skills and abilities in the flight personnel. And this combining of ~xercises must be accomplished, whenever possible, after each logically com~lete cycle of actions or operations has been worked out. - Initiation flights constitute the final phase in the practical training for tne first solo flight. They are conducted on a combat training aircraft and are subdivided into familiarization, demonstration and checkout flights. 13$ FOR OFFZCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~ FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY . Duiring the course of.advance, preliminatv and preflight ~raining, along with makinq a detailed study of the pilot's actions as specified by the retraining � proqram, conananders and fliqht instructors direct the trainees' attention specially to the peculiarities of each flight, to the specific techniques �or piloting the new type of aircraft as compared with those previously flown, and to possible errors and deviations in pilotinq techniques resulting from ne~ative carryover of previous habits. , The advance~ preliminary and preflight training is more effective when it is canducted not in the form of simple instruction, whereby the instructions on piloting techniques are simply repeated, as is sometimes done, but when ~ problematic questions are posed and special hypothetical problems are assigned in the classes, and when the trainees themselves are involved in analyzing the questions and answers and the instructor only directs the training and s�++++++a*-izes the answers, when visual aids such as miniature takeoff strips, - . aircraft models, diagrams of airfields, cockpit mock-ups, and so forth, are actively used. The flight instructor ordinarily employs several different methodological - techniques when training the pilots on a flight. The basic techniques employed on initi.ation flights are demonstrations of aircraft control actions, joint control, observation and suggestions made over the aircraft intercom. Before a flight the veteran flight instructors r.emind the pilot as to which elements he should give special attention and what difficulties may be encoun- tered in piloting the new aircraft, compared with the aircraft previously flown. Zhe instructor performs the first two or three flights as demonstration flights, depending upon the pilot's training level. On these flights the pilot participates in the control and observns the instructor`s procedures. � Gtri subsequent flights the pilot is given greater independence, and the ~ instructor's actions basicallY consist in observing and i.nstructing the trainee. On any flight it is important to teach the pilot to concentrate on the main pe~~uliarities of each flight element. On the takeoff, for example, the instructor direc~s the pilot's attention to maintaining course on the first half of the takeoff run by means of the brakes, to the instant of liftoff of the nose wheel, separation of the aircraft from the earth, operation of the controls after leaving the earth and the raising of the landing gear, as well as the procedure for distributing his attention in the takeoff phases. The development of skills in piloting techniques is far more effective when the instructor not only indicates a certain reference point for an action ~ but links it with the action itself, that is, when he demonstrates the pace of a movement and its amplitude~ the sequence for switching attention,, and so �orth. After the instructor has assumed control during a landing, for example, and after he has arrived at the precise computation and achieved leveling-off alti.tude. he directs the pilot's attention with instructions such as the ~ 139 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY following: "Alti.tude 7 meters; leveli,ng of~; reducing rpm." and "Altitude Z meter; rpm reduced." In this manner the instructor develops the conditional ~ links between alt-.itudes and the requi,red actions on the part of the pilot. Z'hat is, this training ~ethod contributes to the trainee`s understanding of what he must do and at the same time helps develop a stereotype of the motor reaction required upon receiving the orientation signal. . An analysis of actual flight retraining has shown that when they are trainini~ pilots some instructors demonstrate excessive nervousness and raise their voices when conversing and giving instructions, which creates tension in Lhe train~es and impairs their mastery of the flight elements. Other instructors, on th,2 other hand, allow talking d�aring a flight, which detracts the pilot's attention away froin the work of piloting the aircraft. Without making fully certain that the pilots undergoing retraining are ade- quately prepared, some instructors entrust them with such important elements as takeoffs and landings on the first flights, which frequently leads to 5ross deviations in pilotage, creates great tension in the pilots and pro- duces a lack of confidence on subsequent flights. The opposite is also some- times true, whereby the instructors underestimate the experience of a trainee and do not trust him ta pilot the aircraft during the initiation flights and are overly pratective, thereby creating a lack of confidence in the pilot and instilling doubts as to his ability to master the new aircraft successfully. ~ A typical failure of some instructors lies in the fact that wh~n they are teaching certain flight elements they tell the trainee what should be done but do not instruct h~.m as to how to perform this or that operation or action, or how to check to see that it has been properly performed and by what means. So~ instructors do not accustom the trainee to analyzing a flight after it has been completed but limit themselves to pointing out and enumerating errors and deficiencies. And when they do conduct a critique of errors, some ~f them ~ perform it only superficially, that is, they simply indicate how they occurred on the flight and their possible consequences, but do not reveal or analyze _ their real causes. And this greatly hampers the conscious and.thorough develop- ment of skills in a pilot, necessitates an increase in the number of initiation *_'liqhts and prolongs the retraining period. It is even more important to consider these matters when organizing and con- ducting the first~solo fli~hts on a new aircraft. The pilot`s psychological conditioning for the first solo flight and the psychological peculiarities involved in directing the flights and conducting the flight critiques are especially i.mportant here. The preliminary and preflight preparation of flight personnel for the first solo �lights on a new aircraft is conducted in the usual manner. Veteran instructors, however, devote greater attention to in-depth and thorough control over each pilot`s actions~ taking into account his personal charac- teristics as revealed during the performance of the initiation flight program. 140 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~'hey di,rect the attention of the flight pezsonnel to possible equipment _ failure and cti.anges in weather conditions, which could complicate the~flight . situation, and thoroughly clarify the separate aspects of..the pilot's inter- action witti ttte flight operation officer. During the run-through of the flight each pilot works out all of the actions and operations involved in - the i.mpending initial solo flight. Observations of preparations for the first solo flight and questionnaires ~ filled out by pilots and talks with them immediately followiz~g the first _ solo flight show that the flight personnel develop certain psychological conditions during this period, including tension, const~raint, nervousness, retardation of sensomotor reactions, and so forth. They are especially clearly manifested when the flight personnel is forced to learn to fly new types of aircraft without dual-control trainers, that is, without training an a cambat training aircraft with aerodynamic and tactical characteristics - simi.lar to those of the new aircraft. In this situation the flight personnel. exper.i~nce most intensely the newness of the aircraft's behavior on a flight - an.d are forced to master a number of new elements of piloting techniques on fiheir own and to make independent decisions in an unforeseen situation. Numerous exa~les taken from our experience in conducting initial solo flights demonstrate the fact that, as a rule, the pilots perform under maximum pressure precisely on these flights. The pressure is manifested in abrupt . and extreme movements of the controls, in constraint of control actions, in slaw reactions to commands, in poor switching of attention, in failure to observe the proper sequence of actions when operating the cockpit equip- ment, and so forth. The pilot`s tension sometimes causes a retardation of i_n.dividual habits or even various types of illusions. We have mentioned - before, for ex~le, the fact that pilots experiencing tension on their solo flights have failed to lower the landing gear and confused the toggle switches during a landing, that during takeoff some of them have expErienced _ the illusion that the control stick has become wedged, that the aircraft is departing from the axial line of the runway and so forth. ~ Various factors can create tension on a flight. In one case, it may be a lack of confidence in the functional reliability of the new equipment, in another--inadequate knowledge of the aircraft structure and the rules f~r - operating it, and in a third case--a negative emotional situation created the evening before the flights. _ Out of 50 pilots surveyed as ta their impressions during the first two or ~ three flights on a new aircraft, for example, 42 stated that the main con- ~ dition underlying their psychological preparedness f~r the first flight and for its successful accomplishment was the possession of a solid and deeply cognizant knowledge of the design of the new aircraft, of the methods of operating it and of its aerodynamic features. Some pilots say that they would prefer that such flights be conducted like ordinary flights, without ceremony, that a great deal of advise and instructions not be given by various individuals prior to the f1igI~~t and that only one individual, the 141 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY coa~ider oX the i,nstructor, be involved in instructing them. Some pilots hav~e even indicated a desire to have the instructor continue helping them to ready the aircraft up to the point of closing the cockpit canopy: ~ Many pilots even state that they are more calm when the instructor or com- mander, who has flown the new aircraft repeatedly, does not specially stress the negative aspects of piloting the aircraft but simply explain its charac- _ teristics and its advantages over the aircraft previously flown. We know from experience that during the first solo flights on a new aircraft flight personnel are favorably affected psychologically by the fact that v+eteran pilots, the unit and subunit commanders, have flo~m the new aircraft ahead of them, tha~ other pilots involved in the retraining are to observe their flights from the ground. Frank talks with commanders and veteran pilots and thorough answers to questions help to raise the trainees` confi- dence in the reliability of the new aircraft and their confidence that the flight missions will be successfully accomplished. The fli5ht o~eration officer has a responsible role in the organization and conduct of solo flights on new aircraft. Experienced commander-methodologists, individuals who fly the given type of aircraft skillfully and are familiar with all of the fine points of flying it, are therefore drawn upon to direct the flights. During the first solo flights~ veteran flight operation officers attempt to - issue all of the commands and instructions to pilots in the air precisely and calmly and to give the pilot the opportunity and time to comprehend each command. At the same time, they try to avoid disturbing a pilot in the air with insignificant explanations or detracting his attention away from the performance of the main flight elements. When a flight operation officer concludes from certain signs (a delayed response to an ins~ruction, a com- parison of infonnation received from the pilot with the results of his own flight observations, and so forth) that a pilot is experiencing great tension - on a flight, he calmly reminds the pilot of the sequence for performing the basic actions and of the procedure for exercising self-control over his actions, thereby calming the pilot and giving him confidence that the flight assignment will be successfully accomplished. 142 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONT.~ Chaptez VIl:. THE MORAI,-PSXC~iOLOGIC,AL PRIIdCIPL~S UNDERLYING TF~ FORMATION - AND Tf~ WORK OF AVIATION TEAMS 1. Problems Involved in the Group Tra~n~*+g of Crews Under Modern Conditions The combat amployment, operation and servicing of modern aircraft requires a coordinated effort on the part of a large number of specialists~and military teams and the development of teamwork in the personnel for their joint work with the equipment. There are two aspects to the accomplishment of these tasks. In the first place, if the job is to be perforn~ed well these quali- ties and skills must be developed within the aircrev~s, teams and equivalent _ subunits themselves, and in the second place, their develapment is necessitated by the need for interaction between the aircraft crews and the flight support services. The problem of developing teamwork in the pezsonnel has become especially important in the contemporary situation. This is a result of the increased comnlexity of the tasks performed by the aviation, by the intensity of flight trai.ning and the increase in the nimiber of specialists servicing the aircraft and readying them for flight. It has become a practical necessity ~ to develop a definite system of interaction among the specialists and to develop their skills in working together. The Crew Mi .:;t Be United perforn~ed by ar. aircrew (or team) today is extremely difficult with - respect to the physical and the moral-psychological pressure involved. The crew has a special responsibility for the successful performance of the com- bat trai.ning tasks. The solidarity, smooth functioning and efficiency of a crew or:�~eam determines to a great extent the success of its assigned job. Z`he practical combat training work in the forces has shown that a specialist will sometimes demonstrate an excellent knowledge of his 3uties with respect to the combat employment, operation and servicing of the equipment and weapons on tests and exams, and then make errors and exhibit deficiencies when it comes to the performance of com~lex, joint tasks. Tkiis is due to a lack of proper teamwork training in the personnel and to the unsatisfactozy applica- tion of scientifically-based forms and methods of training and indactrinatiiig the servicemen and the military teams. Because of this, one of our prime tasks is presently that of working out a _ number of new and more effective psychological and pedagogical techniques in the methods used in the joint training of crews and teams for combat actions; selecting the training material intelligently; coordinating the sequen~e for conducting the individual and group training of crew members ana other s2rvicing specialists; improving the system of comprehensive training exercises to G~velop their teamwork skills; and further improving the development of team- work abilities in the members of teams and crews, especially for working in the compl.ex conditions of combat training. ~ 143 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ In other words, training and indoctrinational tasks are combined on the psycho- logical and pedagogical level in the process of training a crew or team. The main tasksN,are those of developing teamwork skills in the members of a crew or - � team~aiid teamwork between the crew members and the specialists of servicing subunits, of irbtilling teamwork qualities in the members of a crew or team, and developing in them a feelin.g of friendship, comradeship, mutual trust, and respect for the commander. The accomplishment of these tasks is influenced by a number of peculiarities, can be differentiated into two main categories: peculiarities involved i.n the training and indoctrination of the members of crews and teams, resulting from changes occurring in their work as a result of improvements in the equip- ment and weapons; and peculiarities in the training and indoctrination of the members of teams and crews, related to changes occurring in methods used in the combat employment af the equipment and weapons and in the tactics of combat - operations. These special factors are given full consideration when the train- ing of the crews and teams is organized in outstanding air units and subunits. For example, special p rograms and methods aids are worked out for the training process, which, together cvith the.individual training of the servicemen, cover the training of the crew or team as a whole, a system of special training classes is outlined covering different aspects of interaction among crew members, and methods assemblies are scheduled for i.nstructors and for crew _ and team cammanders. Many units employ special plans for preparing the crew and team members psychologically for the various conditions of their work. ~'hese plans devote special attention to the makeup of the crews, taking the psychological compatibility of the servicemen into account, to the dev~elop- ment of skills in the performance of complicated joint operations and to the development of such moral-combat and psychological qualities as boldness, determination, personal responsibility for the performance of the comb at - nussion and the ability to stand up under prol.onged nervous and psychologir:al� pressure aiid under maximum physical loads. Zn the interest of solidly uniting crews and teams, the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations of units and subunits perform a great deal of work to strengthen the primary party and Komsomol collectives and to indoctrinate the fighting men in a spirit of friendship and comrade- ship, and personal responsibility for the success of the entire team on the part of each specialist, raise the ef.fectiveness of socialist competition among the fightinq men, crews and teams~ and summ~:._ize progressive experience. 21~ey thereby effectively influence the process of developing in the airmen _ good teamwork qualities and a desire to master related specialties and to help a comrade on the crew. Tha Co~nprehensive Approach--A Dictate of the Times - We have discovered from experience that some people are still of the opinion _ that the group training of the fighting men should not be initiated until significant progress has been made in the individual training. In othe r 144 � - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY woxds, the development of teamwork ha~bits and skills in the specialists should be accomplished in the last phase of the training: It should not be performed - from the beginning of training on tt-~e new aircraft but when the entire crew ~ beqins practical rraining on the equipment. This has produced a situation ~ in whirh the training programs, various types of classes and checkout tests and exams focus upon the individual training of the sgecialists. As a result. despite the fact that the crew and team members have a fair understanding of their duties, incorrect actions and errors in the operation of the oombat equipment and weapons occur at the beginning of the cooperative work. Certain specYalists demonstrate constraint and tension in their work, and someti.m~es fail to complete their assignments when the combat training work becomes cott~licated. Consequently, this approach to the development of teamwork skills in the crew and team members produces a situation in which the~level of their preparedness to perform together lags behind their abilities to work individually. Along with this, the servicemen experience increased nervous-psychological and emotional tension, it is more difficult to establish comradely relationships ~ wi~hin the crew or team, and additional difficulties arise in the development of team behavior patterns. . On the other hand, good results are achieved in combat ~mprovement when the individual and collective training of teams and crews is performed together. On a practical level this is accomplished in the �olZowing manner. Individual and training of the servi.cemen is conducte d simultaneously from the moment the crew or team is formed. As a result, the specialists gradually understand their place and role within the crew or team and the functions of their service comrades, learn the personal traits and capabilities of each, and so forth. As a result, by the time the joint practical work is begun in the crew or tean?, they are fully prepared and perform their collective duties better. We would especially like to s tress the importance of solidarity, friendship and mutual understanding in the crews, which are nade up of flight, engineering and technical personnel. It is their joint efforts, after all, which primar- ily account for the successful performance of flight assignments. It is with good reason, therefore, that commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations devote so much attention to the formation, training and indoc- trination of this sort of avi ation team. ~ 2. Ways to Strengthen the Aviation Team It is a difficult and important task to develop united, efficie*:t and amicable aviation teams and to train and indoctrinate them. S uccess depends primarily upon haw much thought is giv~en to their formation from the standpoint of selec- ting the men and upon the degree to which their training and indoctrination is conducted in a purposive and objective manner. 145 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144426-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY What is Psycholo~ical Compatibility? ~ ' Due to the increased complexity of the work parformed by aviation personnel today, it is becoming increasingly necessary to consider so-called psycho- logical compatibility ~.n the teams, tiiat is, to deal with matters of inter- relationships among people performing a common task and their ability to work harmoniously. And this is not surprising. The modern aviation complexes, " as we have already pointed out, are complex ~ystems made up of many inter- related objects and linkages. Diverse control processes, strictly delimited by ~ask and time, occur in them, and they o;,cupy a large number of people differing in training, experience and charactex. We encounter instances of incompat~bility of components within a system, includ.;ng psychological incompat~bility of people, more frequently than before. What is the nature of this phenomenon and what causes it? This can be determined from the following example. . A new crew had been formed in one of th~ air units. ThP pilot and navigator Ytad a solid flying background, and both were specialists first-class. There appeared to be every reason to expect the crew to be successful_ It turned out otherwise, however: The training of the crew never shaped up, and the flight assignmznt results were frequently low. The pilot and navigator dem- onstrated antipathy for eacr? other. What was the cause? The answer was discovered unexpectedly. It was decided to listen to the radio exc~-~ange among the crew duxing important flights. The interchanges between the crew members indicated irritability. Because of his dynami.c personality, the commander did not entirely trust the phlegmatic navigator, - huzried him when t_here was no special need and freque~ntly requested the flight parameters. 'I'he navigator would not have time to make the required computa- t:.i.ons and would go to pieces, finally becoming angry or simply thrawing up his hands. `t'hz pjychological incompatibility of ttie two men with different personalities was apparent. This gave rise to a dislike for each other, to irritability and other negative developments in relations. It was clear that the situa- tion could not be corrected, neither with an order, nor with punishment or any other means. One of them had to be transferred to another crew. Psychological incompatibility can be produced by a large number of factors in any l:ind of work. Trro people or a team of workers may not be able to work together because their views on certain matters do not coincide, for example. Another individual or group of specialists may not be capable of servicing this or that s~stem we11, because they do not possess the r.equired physical attributes. In the above case it was a matter of incompatib ility of the personalities of two men. We would point out, in passing, that inadequately trained comrades consider this to be the main cause of incompatibility. In fact, however, this is far from true. Other traits of the psyche also produce _ psychological incompatibility o.f people. Dislike or distrust for one of the - 146 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FdR OFFICIAL USE ONLY members of a flight crew, for example, may arise becav~ he is always morose ~ and silent, even though he may cape with his duties w~ , Man's inner world, as we know, is extraordinarily comple.~c and diverse. It ; is determi.ned by traits of personality and temperament and the abilities ' of the individu~l, and by his knowledge, skills, habits and convictions. _ We also know that the nature of man's actions is also very complex and some- times difficult to explain. This is what gives rise to the various factors the work ~f a crew or team an.d of each member, factors which a _ commander must understand in order to avoid taking the wrong steps. - The following examples are worth reviewing in this respect. In one air unit, pilot K. had been transferred from one flight to another several times because he had not been ab le to get along with the team and had committed acts of impropriaty. In another unit it became necessary to relieve Officer N. of his post and transfer him to another job. The reason was psychic instability. As soon as the officer took over the mi.crophone to begin his duties as a flight operation officer he would bec~me nervous and raise his voice, and would become unsettled in a complicated situation, although he was a good pilot himse].f~ Here, we have two different situations. Pilot K. is not accepted by the co'llective, while Officer N. cannot work with others because he frequently becomes nervous and resorts to yelling and rudeness. The decision would appear to be obvious in both cases--transfer each officer to another collective. And this is what was done. There was apparently nothing else to do with Officer N. But what about Pilot K.? One could hardly agree that moving him from one flight to another was the thing to do. Since it was entirely a matter of the individual's personal qualities, which did not depend upon his ps~chic makeiip, but specific flaws in his indoctrination, the pilot should ' be helped to rid himself of those nersonal mannerisms which ~aere discrediting him. And it should be done in his present subunit, without transferring him anywhere , ' � The issue of interrelations among people within a"closed" collective is a subtle and delicate one. One must not derive hasty conclusions or take ill- conceived steps in th~ matter. Unfortunately, this rule is not always followed. Frequently, only administrative measures are taken in the training and indoc- trination of the airmen, and no attempt is made to delve into the psychological aspects of the problem. Not all commanders, political workers and aviation doctors thoroughly study the conc?itions giving rise to psychological conflicts, - clarify their objective causes or analyze the motivating factors behind people's behavior in detail. Sometimes, only the formal characteristics (education and experience) are taken into account when the crews are made up, while the ideological-political and moral qualities of the people are not considered. An in-depth analysis of the relations among people forming a team and pre- ventive work in this area are not a once-only measure but a complex and multi- level process. 147 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~ _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX . What are the basic ways and means of ensuring psychological compatibility in the aviation teams? First of all, a thorough study must be made of the specialists, th~ir indi- vidual traits must be taken into account and the people who will be working together should be selected in a rational manner. Furthermore, a comprehen- sive and creative approach is required in these matters. For example, one _ must not evaluate the emotional and volitional qualities of every pilot in . the same manner. Sometimes, two individuals will possess the very same trait--emotional instability and a quick temper--but one of them will be able to restrain himself when necessary, to suppress his emotional tension with an ef�ort of will and force himself to function calmly, while the other, on the contrary, will lose self-control, become hysterical and so forth, in the same situations. When making up a crew it is important for the pilot and navigator to compli- - ~ ment each other, to prevent a situation in which the makeup of the crews do not change at the beginning of each training year. After all~ it takes time for the crew members to learn to function together smoothly. And the smooth functioning and solidarity of a crew have a great deal ~o do with its moral- psychological preparedness and its success in combat improvement. Secondly, a systematic effort to develop teamwork behavior in th~ fighting men and the development of special methods for forming skills in working together in the combat employment and servicing of the aviation equipment and weapons.. are an effective means of ensuring psychological co~atibility of the members of a team. Thirdly, certain types of physical training and sports can be used, and types of activities selected which involve either a rapid change in the situati�on or a smooth and even process for purposes of preventing psychological incompati- bility due to differences in temperament among the specialists. For example, it is good to recommend that specialists of phlegmatic temperament engage in such sports as soccer, basketball, tennis, volleyball, driving automobiles and training activities on special equipment with constantly changing hypo- thetical problems. It is best for servicemen with dynamic personality features and a highly active nervous system to engage in smooth and rhythmic types of sports--swimming, skiing, rowing and heavy athletics. It is also beneficial for them to train on trainers and on combat equipment, resolving hypothetical problems involving carefuly prelimi.nary thought as to the actions ahead of them. In the fourth place, the prevention of psychological incompatibility b ased on social-psychological factors (a breakdown in the chain of command, in interrelations among various categories of specialists and moral-domestic relations, and departures from duty) requir~s indoctrinational work to raise f11e political awareness of the airr.?en and to deve].op in thsm a communist out- look on life, ideological strength and convicti~n, patriotism and a desire to perform their military duty irreproachably. 148 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 . _ FOR OFFICIAL�USE ONLY A fifth important area of the work performed to create strong and battle worthy collectives involves purposive and systematic indoctrinational work with the commanders of crews and teams. The achievement of a positive psychoiagical frame of mind in their subordinates in the collectiv~es and the achiev~ement of success in combat improvement depend greatly upon them. ~ Pedaqogical tact, self-control and proper relations between the commander ~ and his subordi.nates have a great deal to do with the accomplishment of these tasks. Fussiness, lack of restraint and lack of confidence for adopting decisions hamper the indoctrination and training of the airmen aad the creation of a lively and energetic mood in the collective. Naturally, what we have covered does not e~aust the entire arsenal o� means and methods of psychological incompatibility. Arn~y reality is extre~ly diverse and can give rise to new dev~elopments of a psychological - nature requiring a new approach to the resoluti.on of the problems arising. The Development of a Sense of Collectivity Among the Fighting Men Zhe development of collective qualities in the fightinq men and of teamwork skills in the personnel constitute an important means of.strengthening the aviation collective. A specific system of performing this work has developed in the air imits and subunits, which produces positive results. The following are the primary forms and methods used to develop teamwork skills in the members of crews and teams: 1, the development of skills in working together in trainers and on the combat equipment itself; 2. practical training on other crews (or teams) and observation of their combat training work; 3. the conduct of special measures to prepare the servicemen psychologically for functioning as part of a team; 4. the study of the functions of other members of the crew (or team) ; 5. su~narization and adoption of progressive experience in the training of crews; 6. .discussion~ during flight critiques of matters pertaining to intra- collective relati.ons and the functional harmony and organization of the work within each crew or team; 7. employment of the applied types of physical training and sports, which help to develop teamwork .~:cills. . As they apply these forms and methods, many instructors, commanders and � engineers employ a number of eff.ective psychological and pedagogical tech- niques whibh stimulate the attention of the servicemen and help them assimilate the material studied. A description of the duties of a certain crew member, for example, is combined with an explanation of the actions performed by the other crew members with whom he will come into contact most frequently in the joint work. Special attention is devoted to analyzing the causes of errors on the part of other crew members. The instructors demon-' strate techniques and methods of control and self-control, which is also highly beneficial. 1~9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY All of this not only improves the study of the material covered by the fightir}g men but also helps to develop such qualities as responsibility to the col- lective for their actions, readiness to help.each other out, determination ~and boldness for functioning in a difficult or dangerous situation. Veteran instructors and subunit commanders begin developing teamwork skills in the crew as soon as the members begin studying the arrangement of the aviation equipment and weapons and the principles underlying their combat employment. Special attention is devoted to the need for absolute observance of the requirements contained in documents governing flight work and to the inadmissibility of errors and carelessness in the operation and servicing of ~ the equipment. This sort of focus in the training and indoctrination helps each airman develop a deep awareness of his personal responsibility for the performance of his service duty and for the insurance of flight-work safety. The work performed to prevent deficiencies in the operation and servicing of equipment and weapons typically includes classes which cover the most typical kinds of failures of aircraft assemblies and instruments through the fault of the personnel, and cases of improper interaction among the specialists i.n the performance of a certain operation. Special training sessi.ons are scheduled in some cases, which include hypothetical problems covering various ~ types of equipment failures in flight. In this training sessions, the instruc- tors out possible failures of the aviation assemblies and instruments and the tr�ainees describe the causes and what they are to do in such compli- catecl situations. This is an effective method not only from the standpoint of improving the trainees' knowledge of the equipment design and the rules for operating it, but also from the point of view of developing collective .`..hinking habits and skills in working together in various situations. -Experience has shown tha~t the process of developing teamwork skills produces greater results when complex matters are broken down into more simple ones, i.nto so-called algorithms of action. When an air interception is being covered, for example, attention should be given mainly to the following components: the search for the target, the approach to the target and the attack. It is important that the problem of interception first be analyzed as a whole, and then by parts, taking the peculiarities of each flight phase - into account. Z'he results of observations of the crews and teams in the dynamics of flight work have an important role in their training. It is important carefully to plan the observation methods, to prepare for them and ~o analyze their results. ~zaving the crew members observe the specialists whose work is closely related to their own, as well as the crew and team commanders, is a proven observa- uan method. On the psychological plane, this technique makes it possible for the 'trainees to form a complete and comprehensive picture of the work ,perforn~ed by the crew as a whole, to identify the specific techniques employed by their comrades and to cempare.those with their own capabilities in one 150 ' ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY complex situation or another, and to determine the best way to coordinate - their awn actions with those of other crew members in changing situations. Observation of the crew or team coa~ander makes it possi.ble to watch him work and to evaluate his performance, to adopt his expertise and to determine one's avn place in the work of the team as a whole. Such observations have a positive influence not only upon the effectiveness of the training process but also upon the development of teamwork behavior in the crew and team members. In the course of the observations the spe- cialists accumulate a certai.n body of experience in teamwork, which provides the basis for developing confidence in themselves and in their comrades in the crew, and responsibility for the perfonnance of their service duties, - as well as emotional-volitional stability for working together. Training sessions on special equipment and on the combat equipment itself ~ hav~e a large role in the development of teamwork skills in the airmen. The effectiveness of this training depends in the first place, upon the methods eaq~loyed for conducting them, and, in the second place, upon hav effectively ' the working conditions of crew or team members are modeled. When they conduct this sort of practical training the veteran methods experts assign the crew or t~am hypothetical problems, even before the classes begin, ~ and descr~be or reproduce training conditions approaching those of actual combat. In order to stimulate the trainees, each crew member is told the main moments in his joint work with the other crew members and techniques for personally controlling the performance of the operations, and sp~cific periods are set for the performance of the exercises and are gradually reduced. ~'he follvwing methodological device has justified itself entirely from the psychological standpoint: During the practical training sessions the instruc- tors have trai.nees.with similar jobs replace each other and assign th~m hypo- thetical problems designed to encourage interaction among the crew members. This helps enliven the training process, on the one hand, and to develop the tactical thinking of the fighting men, on the other. - When teamwork skills are being developed on training equipment or on the combat equipment itself, the veteran commanders and instructors devote attention to ~he quality of the individual training, as well as to the correctness of the actions performed by the crew members, from the point of view of teamwork. The fighting men also develop teamwork skills in the process of physical train- ing and sports. These help the crew or team members to achieve a mutual understanding and to develop various types of sensomotor reactions, and the - proZonged physical exertion helps them develop stamina. ' The conduct of various types of exercises is an important stage in the,develop- ment of teamwork skills and collective action in the airmen. They achieve their purpose only when they are carefully planned and conducted in a situa- tion approaching actual combat to the maximum possible degree, when the fiqhting men perform at their full capacity and demonstrate initiative and persistence in the performance of the assigned tasks.. 151 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Party-political work plays an effective role in the development of teamwork in the airmen. As they organize and conduct this work, commanders, political w~rkers, party and Komsomol orqanizations keep the solidarity and efficiency _ of the crews and teams constantZy in mind, help develop co~etition within and among them, summarize and publicize the experience of the best, and indoctrinate the fighting men in a spirit of friendship, mutual assistance and rescue. In the outstanding units and subunits great important is attached to special measures to prepare the airmen psychologically to work together in difficult situations. Special stress is laid upon the thorough mastery by crew and team members of the rules for operating the equipment and weapons, the physical natwre and the reliability of the protective equipment and precau- tionary measures to be taken when working with the equipment, and upon giving , the crew and team members confidence in their knowledge and in the proficiency of each specialist. - Trne results of a survey of 50 pilots following their first flights on a new fighter are worth noting in ~his respect. The vast majority of them stated that during the period of preparing for the first flight they had been greatly concerned about the navigator's ability to perform his job successfully. ~'his r_oncern only began to abate after they had gone through joint training sessions on special equipment and in the aircraft cockpit, based upon the forthcoming assignment. xn conclusion, we should point out the fact that only a comprehensive approach - to the and indoctrination of airmen and consideration for their individual characteristics ensure the successful development of collective attitudes and teamwork skills in them. 152 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ Chapter VIII. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF MORAL-PSYC~iOLOGICAL TRAINING OF FLIQiT SQi00L CADETS - 1. Traininq and Indoctrination--A Single Process The training and indoctrination of the future air fighters begins the day the cadets arrive at the school. These are youth between 18 and 22 years of age. They have the psychological characteristica typical for that age, characteristics which cannot be ignored in the training and indoctrinational work. The individual's transition from youth to maturity begins and the develop- ment of his nervous system is completed during this period of his life. The functional physiolagical processes occurring in the cerebral cortex at this age are very intensive, and interaction between the excitation and inhibitozy processes is developing into a definite individual system. All of this produces a complex psychic personality structure in the cadet, primarily with respect to his active thoughts, emotional and volitional functioning. Together with this, we should stress the fact that at this age, due to the _ intensity of the biochemical and physiological processes occurring in ~he individual and to the fact that he lacks experience, the excitation pro- cesses still prev~ail over the inhibitory p rocesses. This is sometimes pre- cisely the reason for inconsistency of behavior, lark of restraint, emotional breakdowns and frustrations occur, even in highly disciplined and well- trained cadets. The functional intellectual processes are well develcped in the cadets at this age: they have good concentration and can switch it easily; they have good memory capabilities with respect to speed and retention; their imagina- tion is dis~inguished by a rich diversity of combinations, vividness of images and sufficient r~iism; their thought process clearly reflects a ~ tendency toward in-depth analysis and synthesis, abstraction and general- izations; and their speech is highly expressive and emotional. They only have to develop these qualities and skill as applicable to the specific nature of flight work. This applies, first of all, to the training of the memozy for rECeiving and accumulating technical information, to the develop- ment of their ability to think in technical and tactical flight terms, the improvement of their capacity for combinatorial analysis for the multifaceted evaluation of the performance of complex aircraft systems and of the physical nature of the phenomena and processes underlying their functioning. An important area of the cadet's training involves actively influencing the development and conditioning of sensomotor reactions and the formation of systems of logical structuxes for his intellectual activity (systems of - technical categories and concepts, skills in the cognitive reading of blue- prints, graphs, tables and diagrams, a:id the ability to utilize reference and technical literature intelligently) and of a qualitatively new basis for space-and-time orientation. ~i 153 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE O,tLY - On the social and political plane, air school cadets, all Soviet youth, are oriented taward the future, have a desire to be among the front ranks in the building of the communist society and to fulfill their duty to the homeland with honor, and are highly active in public affairs. They have a correct concept of the world, as a rule, and are prepared to serve communist ideals. Zhe public activeness of cadets is reflected i.n a demonstrated interest in - problems pertaining to political life and in events occurring within the _ nation and abroad, in broad participation in th~ life and affairs of the s~unit Komsomot organizations and in a responsible attitude toward the per- f.ormance of their public assignments. Air school cadets also hav~e good morals. They not only correctly perceive _ the requirecrents made of them by communist morals, but also attempt to establish socialist communal standards i.n their practical affairs. Their high values and moral purity give the cadets a feeling of valid pride in the Soviet socialist way of life, and revulsion and contempt for perverse ~anifestations of bourgeois morals: servile acco~nodation, cowardliness, obsequiousness~ egotistical end~avor and individualism. The views and concepts of the cadets are not always adequately systematized, howe~~er, and not always completely cognitive. Becaus~ of this, it is some- times difficu~t for some of them to understand tY~.e complex developments of 1ife, to evaluate certain events corre~tly or to understand the prospects for their devalopment. They frequently find it difficult to defend their views and convicLions, to evaluate negative phenomena correctly. . Within a certain segment of the cadets one encounters individuals with inade- quate moral upbringing. Their behavior reflects a lack of discipline, dis- raspect for work and training and disrespect for their comrades. 'I'he existence of conflicts, uncontrolled spontaneity and deficiencies in the ~oral upbringing of a certain seqment of the cadets makes it necessary for commanders and political workers to devote greater atten}ion to the develop- ~ent of the young cadet"s outlook, to provide them with political knawledge and a familiarity with the modern natural sciences, to guide the development of th~ir interests and to promptly detect standards of behavior alien to our communist morals and help to overcome them. I~oyalty to military comradeship is a characteristic moral feature of most cadets. When a young man enrolls in a military school, it marks the beginning of his independent life. He lacks self-confidence, however, and only feels - his independence in the ~ociety of peers. In addition, the newness of the miYitary way of life and the enormcus flow of training information to which hE is exposed makes it necessary for him to unload psychologically, to share his impressions with someone and to convince himself as to the correctness of his behavior and his plans. In the military collective the cadets are united by common interests and emotional experiences, and the ties of friend- st~ip developed there are therefore especially strong ones. 154 FOR OF:'ICIAL U~E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Their youthful cou~?ulsion for friendship and their need to be a member of a coa.lective form a psychological base conducive to the indoctrination of ~ the cadets in a spirit of friendship aii3 ~r.ilitary comradeship and for the formation of solidly united military collectives. Relying upon such a coliective, the co~ander and poZitical worker campaign successfully against instances of egotism, mutual covering-up, individualism and other ~noral developments. The cadets hav~e a highly developed sense of personal dignity and a desire to be i.ndepenc~ent. Zhey are energetic and have a great deal of enthusiasm, ~ many nable intentions and a desire to fi.nd their place in life as rapidly as possib le, to make a favorable impression, to demonstrate their full capabilities. In order to convert these aspirations an~ this enthusiasm - _ into stable personality features, however, it is important for the indoc- trinational work to encourage in every way prudent daring and innovation on the part of the cadets, and they must be assigned responsible tasks, rejecting petty patronage. While respecting the self-esteem of the cadets and givinq them scope to exercise their energy and initiative, however, we must not forget the fact that a feeling of personal d.i.gnity and a desire for independence can turn into conceit and vanity. In order . to prevent this, it is necessary to be highly demanding of all cadets at all times, to teach them to analyze their actions and behavior self- critically. The cadets' feeling of personal dignity and their desire for independence are inseparably linked with a clearly defined Lmyieldingness in their opinions. As a rule, their statements are categorical, and tlieir opinions absolute. They always express their thoughts frankly. It is im~ortant to . keep this always in mind, especially when the matter of erroneous vi~ws is discussed. One should show them their errors and refute their incorrect opinions convi.ncingly and using concrete facts. In no case should crude ~ pressure be used or one's authority brought to bear. The cadet's psychic makeup may embody inconsistencies in the evaluation of facts and phenomena of reality and of their actions. Because ot their ~ limited experience the youn.g cadets are not yet able to recognize their own capabilities sufficiently or to evaluate them objectively. Z'hey frequently evaluate their personal capabilities not from the results of their practical - work but on the basis of superficial ideas about reality and about their ~ capabilities. Zt is extremely important to take this fact into account in the indoctrinational Work. It makes it necessary for commanders and political workers to conduct explanatory work systematically and painstakingly, and with well-reasoned arguments. It is important to develop and improve the cadets' feeling of independence and personal dignity in the indoctrinational process. And from - the standpoint of the cadets--future pilots--it is important that the develop- ment of these qualities be closely intezwoven with the development of honor, integrity and sincerity. 155 . ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' Because of the age-group characteristics of their physiological and psycho- logical development, young people are acutely perceptive, highly impres- sionable and emotional. They rapidly perceive and remember everything - happening around them. Each failure or esrar leaves a large i~ression _ in their consciousness. A remark by an instructor or a commander frequently _ becomes a determining factor lasting months or even years. The cadets feel the pulse of life with extraordinary sensitivity and notice everything vivid, unusual or new. This is precisely what interests them in classes which are conducted in a liv~ely and interesting manner and which provide them wit.h - new impressions and new knawledge. The feel for the nec~ and the heightened emotio~al perceptiv~eness of the cadets are linked to romantic aspirations. For the most part, the youth are bold and brave. Their feeling for the romantic provides the motivating force behind the creative activeness, bold plans, deeds and interests of Soviet youth. The flying profession has always attracted and continues to attract the youth with its romanticism and novelty and because of the great intellectual and physical demands it makes. Cadets, who have dedicated themselves to service in the aviation, persistently - develop such qualities as honor, nobility and valor, and they do not fear the difficulties and dangers involved in flight work. Many of them have a desire to tes~ their strengths and abilities, to do something unusual~ something heroic. This is frequently a source of inner preparedness to perform out- standing feats. This inner preparedness sometimes takes over the cadet's consciousness and helps him to function in complica.ted situations, resolutely, courageously and resourcefully, gives him confidence that he can achieve the planned objective and mcbilizes his physical and spiritual strengths. ~ Ti1e cadet's romantic orientation only bECOmes a valuable quality, howev~er, - when it is combined with a correct understanding of the nature of heroism, bravery and valor, and with an awareness of the necessity of working per- - sistently to achieve the goal he has set for himself. Othezwise, a desire for boldness may develop into a show of dashing behavior and braggadocio. Furthermore, a romantic inclination in cadets with inadeguate upbringing _ and their daily sensation of continuously growing creative strengths and capabilities sometimes give birth to neolistic views on past experience and the merits of predecessors, indifference toward superiors and the enphasizing of their imagi.nary superiority over the latter. After hecoming accustomed to flying the complex modern supersonic aircraft, for example, certain pilots sometimes develop contempt for everything pertaining to the piston- dxiven subsonic aircraft and to training on it. Since an incorrect wlderstanding of the romantic can give rise to incorrect behavior in some cadets, this phenomenon should rAceive close attention from all categories of indoctrinators at the school. It is impor.tant to channel the cadets' romantic inclinations into selfless service to the homeland, the responsible performance of their military duty, the overcoming of routine difficulties in the service and training, and a thorough and solid mastery of the knowledge and skills involved in flight work. 156 � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ � � w An ine~ortant area of indoctrinational work with air school cadets involves developing in them a love for the flying profession, for the combat equip- ment and weapons. Many cadets hav~e derived their ideas about the flying profession, the romantic ~ nature of flight service and the modern combat equipment and we apons from ~ books and movies and from stories told by their parents and their peers. Zhese concepts are somet~:.mes incomplete, artificially embellished or distorted, and , the cadets may not expect the difficulties which they will encounter immedi- � ately after arriving at the school. This makes it possi.ble to break down the cadets' psychological framework and permits them to reassess their life goals ' and reconsider decisions previously made. On the psychological plane, it is therefore ext.remely important to actively build in the future fliers a complete and abjective concept of the nature and substance of flight work in the contemporary situation and a feeling of great responsibility for the exemplary mastery of the profession of a military pilot. One effective means of this involv~es the vivid and purposive ~ gublicizinq of the combat traditions of military aviators, their courage and combat valor demonstrated during the years of peacetime construction and their combat trials on the battlefields, and e~cplanation of the good combat capabilities of our Soviet-produced aviation equipment and weapons. For this purpose the schools schedule open-door days, exhibits of aviation equipment and demonstration flights at airfields for the young cadets. In many schools the cadets beqin their acquaintanceship with the school by visiting museums of combat glory. The method whereby, during tYie course of the training, the instructors intro- duce the cadets to the history of the development of aviation equipment and weapons, along the humanities and the te chnical disciplines, and tell about the heroic past of the aviation, has proven itself entirely. Such activities as readers' conferences on books about aviation, discussions on the subject "The Pilot--A Heroic Profession," evening competitions in knowledge of the aviation equipment, discussions on films about the lives and-th e combat service of aviators, and so forth, have proven to be an effective extracur- ricular means. All of these activities help to develop in the cadets a feeling of pride in the achievements of Soviet aviation, and in being a tnember of the glorious family of winged defenders of the Soviet homeland. 2. Psychological Aspects of the Cadets' Training The Ynstructor's Personality--An Important Factor in the Training and Indoctrination The flight instructor has an exceptionally important role in the training and indoctrination of air school cadets. He is involved, more than anyone else, - i.n the ground training of the cadets, their training in the air and the flight critiques, and constantly exerts an indoctrinational influence upon his students. 157 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 Astronaut and flight instructor G. S. Titov speaks of his instructor with - great warmth and respect: "Captain Stanislav Ivanovich Korotkov was my instructor when I learned to fly the MiG's. He was considered one of the best methods experts at the school. He never judged people hastily, but studied them with great interest and tact. He thought deeply, was capable af subtle perception and knew how to talk with us cadets, who had still not experienced life, as equals. We loved and trusted him as someone very close. I owe a great deal to Stanislav Ivanovich Korotkov...."14 When he first joins a flight group, the cadet is especially interested in the instructor: his personality, his flying experience, his rating and a great deal more, because he is now linked with the instructor by invisible bonds of intimacy, collectivism and common tasks. And the success in the training and indoctrination of the entire flight group and the fate of each cadet depend to a great extent upon what kind of relationship the instructor establishes with the cadets. A cadet views the instructor not only as a senior chief but also as an individual in a position to issue him a ticket to the skies and to help him achiev~e the main goal of his life--to become _ a pilot. Certain instructors do not always attach proper importance to the impression - the cadet retains after~~is first meetings with his teacher in the ground _ training process, in the familiarization and first initiation flights, and make no attempt to put their bsst foot forward with respect to uniform, civilian, manners and conversation. Naturally, this has a negative sffect upon the training and indoctrination of the future airman and reduces _ the instructor's prestige. In everyday life the instructor does more than just i~art to the cadets his ex~erience and knowledge and concerns himself for their all-round training, _ their intellectual, physical and aesthetic development and the development of psychological stability in them. He also strives to see that his students are fervent patriots, bold and courageous fighters of the air, kind and con- cerned people, demanding of themselves and those around them. The political- moral sta~e of the cadets in the group depends to a great extent upon the instructor's political awareness and ideological conditioning. It is an interesting fact that many cadets try to be like the instructor, to walk and talk like him and even to wear the service cap in his manner and adopt his interests. His every move is noticed by the cadets and the behavior of the cadets can be predicted from the instructor's behavior in various situations. This fully applies to the instructor`s psychological traits and his emotional-voliti~onal stability. All of the cadets study aerodynamics, aviation engineering and piloting under a single program, they are equally fit medically and go through the ground t'raining for flying together, but their piloting is not identical and they make ~~arious errors and master the various flight elements differently. 158 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY This depends botti upon the degree of the general development and training of the cadets and upon the focus, level and depth of their nervous and emotional stability, as well as upon tne psychological and pedagogical training of the instructor and his ability to find a personal approach to each cadet and to achieve the best results in his tra~n~ng and indoctrination. It is difficult, apparently even i..mpossible, to develop a cadet into a real _ pilot if one does not know his character and temperament, the level of his knawledge, his psychological traits and the reliability of his volitionaZ qu-~lities, and if one does not find the one and only way to reach the indi- v'~dual's feelings and emotions~ the only one which leads to success. The instructor studies the cadet's personality throughout the training period, from the first meeting to the final exam. He carefully observe the cadet`s behavior in the classroom, during the ground training~ in the air, on the . athlatic field and in his daily life. ~Z'hese observations make it possible to determine the merits and the shortcomings in the cadet's personality~ to explain certain of his actions and the degree to which he is i.nfluenced by his comrades and the collective, the accuracy of his reactions to external stimuli, his ability to concentrate on the main thing, and so forth. As he talks with a cadet, the instructor reveals not only the level of his knowledge and his general development, but also his psych~logical peculiari- ties, his activeness, the range of his attention and his ability rapidly to switch from one object to another or to external stimuli. The experimental ntethod can be used in the work performed on a trainer and on the familiariza- tion and initiation flights to determine the cadet`s ability promptly to react to instrument readings and to various hypothetical problems, and to determine the degree to which he is capable of orienting himself in space, detexmining the earth's approach, and so forth. An analysis of the observa- tions pezm.its the instructor to work out methods and techniques for training ' the cadet and to make full application of hi5 emotion'.al-volitional qualities far the lasting mastezy af flight elements and actions;:taken xn complex ~ituations and for increasing his interest in the pilot's profession. The future pilot's moral-psychological qualities, as we know, are formed in the family, at school and in the collective, and the instructor should learn about his life and training before entering the air school. In other words, he should know the level of development of the cadet's psyche and his posi- tive and negatxve sides from the stan,dpoint of their influence upon the flight training and the indoctrination. - On Initiation and Checkout Flights The first flights with an instructor, which give the trainer an opportunity to observe the trainee's control of the aircraft after this or that flight element has been demonstrated, are especially important for studying the cadet's psyche. The instructor takes into account the fact that a cadet ~ may not notice everything happening around him on the first flights, and he therefore instills elements of organizational principles in the trainee's 159 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY peroeption capacity by focusing his attention upon the main and determining elements (upon the aircraft`s position relative to the horizon in horizontal flight, upon coordi.nated manipulation of the controls on a turn, and so forth). Errors co~nitted at this stage should not bring an immediate reaction from the instructor and he should especially not react sharply to them. Errors are sometiaties repeated flight after flight, and the cadet does not eliminate - them even though the instructor has pointed tliem out. This can irritate the instructor, naturally, but he should try to restrain himself from raising _ hi.s voice over the intercom, from jerking the control stick, and so forth, because it is not impossible that this will destroy the psychological rapport previously established between the instructor and the cadet. An emotional and easily offended cadet may withdraw, lose his interest in flying or his _ confidence in his own strengths and abilities, or even regret having chosen the profession of a pilot. ~he instructor's every word and every action should be kind and comradely and st~ould focus upon helping the cadet master the art of piloting an aircraft as rapidly as possible. It is important for him to notice all of the air- craft's deviations and point out the cadet`s errors, but he should not bring them up over and over and should steel himself with patience and give the trainee the opportunity to notice his own errors and time to remedy them _ himself. Naturally, his tolerance of the cadet's errors should not go beyond the limits of flight safety. ~ Gn a fli.ght, unlike the ground training, the instructor does not have the opportunity to explain everything in detail, and his speech is concise while saying a great deal, and forceful, which cannot help having an effect upon tt-.e cadet. Each word uttered by the instructor focuses the tiainee`s atten- tian upon a specific object and then switches it to other instruments or coni:ral elements or to maintaining the flight parameters. At the highest point in a wingover, for example, the instructor focuses the cadet's atten- t~on upon the need to move the stick smoothly, reinforcing his words a demon- stration of the proper actions, and later, after the maneuver has been c~mpleted, he has the opportunity to discuss in detail any error made by the cadet. The thorough analysis of the entire flight and the critique of the trainee's errors, however, are not conducted until the aircraft has landed and taxied onto the pa�rking area. In this process, it is advisable also to stress the posi.tive elements in the cadet's actions, which makes him feel better and increases his desire to learn to fly even better and more confidently. During the flight critique it is important to have the trainee mentally run through the performance of the assignment, which permits the instructor to analyze - the fl.ight phases in sequence and to determine the degree to which the trainee has mastered what has been covered. Experience has shown that the majority of cadets master the flight elements rapidly in the beginning, and then the flight training~process slows somewhat. This is pe~fectly natural, because in the beginning the trainee does not have 160 ' ~ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 I I Ft~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY to deal with the worst type of errors and masters the relatively si~le flight elements without any special difficulty. Subsequently, he performs increasingly difficult missions, which require precise coordination and ~ strict observance of flight parameters, that is, the application of complex skills. This frequently gives rise to constraint, awkwardness, uncoordinated actions, excessive concentration on one object~ fussiness and a reduced . memory scope, that is, to tension. ~ Tension is characterized by reduced efficiency and deterioration of t~e trainee's psychological functions, and by reduced reliability of aircraft and engine control. It is most frequently manifested on the first flights, when mastering new piloting and comnat employment techniques, when retraining ' types of aircraft an~3 on missions performed f~llowing lengthy breaks - in flight work. We should stress the fact that a purely mechanical approach to the training ` can result in a cadet's removal from the school for failing to progress in the flight trainin~, due mainly to tension. This sometimes causes the con- cept "tension" to be surrounded by various conjectures, which distort the caneept itself and create alarm, or even fear, in some young pilots. Experience " has shown that tension is experienced in one degree or another by many airn?e~n, ` ~ including veteran pilots, but that it gradually disappears with subsequent practical training and flights, although it may remain with some pilots for a long time. Z"Ze following are the most typical causes, of tension: the newness of the situation and the fact that the cadet's skills may not match the exercise being performed; peculiarities of the trainee`s nervous and psychological - makeup, specifically, the presence of. a persistent state of heightened emo- tional excitability; a breakd~wn in the training methods, primarily involving premature complicatian of the exercise; inadequate consideration of the indi- vidual's psychological characteristics, an incorrect pedagogical approach to the trainee and lack of restraint on the instructor's part in their inter- relations; a lack of confidence on the part of the cadet in his strengths and his ability to master the given type of aircraft, and a f.ear of washing out of the school for lack oz progress. It is important to consider all of these causes of tension in the training and indoctrinatin of cadets, and to endeavor to overcome the ~ension by means of additional exercises on a trainer, in the aircraft cockpit and during - flights. It is crucial in the battle with tension to give the cadets confi- dence that they can successfully master the aviation equipment and to develop in them stable skills in controliing the aircraft in the air. Veteran instructors ~o everything possible to make the cadets aware of the positive results of their work and to build up their confidence from flight - to flight, from one training session to another. When flying together with the cadets, they help the trainees to distribute their attention properly, attempt not to mention the need strictly to maintain flight parameters too 161 ' _ FOR ~JFFICIAI. USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~'ux ur~r~t~l~ u~~ uNLz frequ~ently, and avoid interfering in the control in the case of slight devia- tions of th.e aircraft. Those instructors are acting properly~ wha create a goal-oriented situation for the cadet on each flight, a situation helping him concentrate on individual flight elements ("Try to maintain precise angular speed on the bank," or "Do not bank more than when executing a chandelle," for example). Special physical exercises with exercise equip- mrnt and fast-moving sports such as volleyball, basketball and soccer are also helpful for overcoming tension. Encouraginq a cadet promptly for any initiative demonstrated, providing him witn the opportunity ta convince himself as to the reliability of the equip- m~ent and its good controllability and gradually complica*ing the flight assign- ment conditions--these and other measures con~ribute a great deal to the rapid reduction, and then complete elimination, of tension in the trainees. In the case of te.~orary failures and lack of confidence on the part of the cadet , whi.le mastering the complex flight elements, the instructor carefully analyzes the causes and persistently seeks ways and means of making the traininr, more effective a,nd of stimulating fi,he traa.nee himself to greater activity. In one _ case this may involve a new series of initiation flights, in another case-- ~raise from the instructor, and in yet a third case--joint flights and talks with the fZight or some other chief. ~he tc~ne of the cliscussion between the instructor and the certifying officer the critique and evaluation of a joint flight is very important. Even if the cadet is adequately prepared for his solo flight, one must not blow ~ up t.he psychological situation or exaggerate. It is best to conduct the f~,j cri.tique of checkout flights so as not to cause the cadet to lose confidence that the solo flight will be a success. The certifying officer can give a cadet so miic~h spirit and confidence, even after not entirely successful check- out flights, by saying "You will be flying!" and then telling the instructor �`T~et r~im make five or six more flights to polish up his landings." 4~Tnen Working on Complex Flight Elemen~s Flight training experi.ence has shown tl-iat it is fairly common for cadets to uia.ste~ fairly well takeoffs, turns, landing approaches and route flights, and then, as soon as he begins performing the actual landings, piloting maneuvers - and other complex flight elements, he will display extreme caution, heightened excitability and, sometimes, even fear. The flight proficiency and attentive- ness of the flight instructor, and his ability correctly to demonstrate one flight ele~nt or another are especially important in such cases. This deter- mines to a great extent the cadet's first impression, which frequently becomes a determining factor in his subsequent training. Each d~monstration, followed by the cadet's own perfozmance of the flight element, dev~elops a skill in the cadet, and his mastery of the specific - operation depends greatly upon the quality of the demonstration. The instruc- tor's p roficiency and his flight "style" are literally absorbed by the trainee and suasequently manifest themselves in his ability to pilot the aircraft on 162 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY his own. The ski].1 is gradually reinforced and perfected. If, on the other hand, the instructor performs the demonstration extensive deviations from - standards, the development of the skill is drawn out or the skill dev~eloped is incorrect. Any change in a habit, any inclusian of new and influential elements into the established flight system creates additional difficulties for the trainee. Any erro r or lack of consistency on the part of the instructor during the training period considerably complicates the cadet�s mastery of the aircraft. This is especially intolerable when the cadet is learning such an important ~ flight element as the landing. The complexity involved in mastering landings _ on a modern, high-speed aircraft is due in great part to the extreme effective- - ness of the rudder and elevator. Even the slightest exaggerated movement of the con~trol stick toward the pilot immediately results in a ballooning effect ~ or a high Zeveling-off. This frequently creates emotional tension, excessive caution or even fear of landing in the trainee. The complexity of landing training is also a result of the fact that it ~akes place so rapidly. There is a passage of only 8-12 seconds between the - of the leveling-off phase and the landing of a training aircraft. ~ Conseque.ntly, there is a total of only 5-6 minutes for landing training during 40 i.nitiation flights. At the saine time, the total length of flights involving 40 takeoffs is approximately only 80 minutes. We can see that the ratio does not favor landing training. Landing time on a modern high-speed aircraft is even less than on a training aircraft, which makes it even more difficult to learn this flight element. ~ During the performa.*~ce of landing the instructor finds himself in a v~ery complex situation: He simultaneously determines the dis- tance to the ground and the direction of the aircraft`s mavement relative to ` - the landing strip, reduces engine rpm and the glide angle, observes the per- formance of the train~e and establishes the aircraft's landing position--all of this while communicating by radio and over the aircraft intercom system. _ Instructors lacking experience in this flight phase either perform the landing accurately but fall behind in their explanation of ~heir actions - over the intercom system, or, on the contrary, give good explanations but co~it piloting errors. An er~tire flight group of cadets will frequently execute the leveling-off for a too high or will overshoot. An analysis of the causes of these errors reveals that the instructor himself levels off too high and that the ~adets in the group ha~~e adopted this error during their training. It is very difficult to alter an established dynamic stereotype, and any change made in it, as a rule, is a diff.icult emotional experience for the cadets. - Any instructor error ordinarily has a negative effect upon the cadet's psyche _ which is still not solidly formed, and complicates his formatinn of an accu- - rate concept of this or that piloting or combat employment technique. It is sometimes difficult for him to form a mental picture of all of the elements 163 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~'OR UHFICIAL U5~ UNLY involved in a piloting maneuver or a landing, since he has not seen them and has not experienced them as an integrated whole, within the dynamics of their _ pEirfozmance. It would be timely, at this point, to refer to an example given in an article by Major General of Aviation V. Filimonov.l5 Instructor Klimov was once sent on an urgent assignment, and he hastily - turned his flight group over to instructor B. When he made the transfer, he made the following sta'tement: "All of the cadets are sk.illed fliers, but Litvinov is not quite as good as the rest." The new instructor had little time to acquaint himself with the cadets, and the very next day he began flights under the initiation program. It turned out that cadet Litvinov did, i.n fact, co~it extensive deviations in the pe rformance of certain flight elements and had not developed stable skills in making landing compu- tations and performing the landing itself. " During a flight critique the instructor told the cadet: "If you continue to make such errors, you will never become a good pilot." Z'!zis categorical - judgment on the part of the instructor shocked the cadet.and wounded his ego. A state of depression began to dominate ov~er him. He lost interest in his chosen career. 7'he.quality of his ~lights deteriorated, and the cadet was on the verge of washing out at the flight school. By this time instructor Klimov had returned from his assignment. He care- - =ully analyzed all of the circumstances, revealzd the real cause of the cadet's failures and resolved tca achieve success. The instructor began giving the cadet special attention and performing extra work with him. He mainl_y focuset~ upon the psychological conditioning of the cadet, however, ~*~d did everything possible in order to reverse his attitude and to develop aptimism and con�idence in him. Z'he instructor`s actions and discussions were kindly and demonstrated an interest in helping the cadet. During the training in the air the instructor was patient and commended his trainee for even slight success, but he gave instructions over the aircraft intercom _ system in a firm manner. The instructor's confidence spread to the trainee-- the cadet overcame the psychological barrier and his flight training success began to improve noticeably. Most importantly. however, he became convinced that he could master even the most complex flight elements. Litvinov soon began to fly confidently on his awn, gradually caught up with his comrades in the training and graduated from the school. Subsequently, good reports ~ on the pilot began to come in from the line units . _ � Zn~ pedagogical error made by instructor B. had a harmful effect upon the cadet's flight training, and failure to take his personal traits and emotional instability into account almost resulted in the cadet`s removal from the school. Z'his example also illustrates the fact that a skillful instructor-- and Officer Klimov is unquestionably such an instructor--highly skilled in working with the trainees on an individual basis, can localize and reduce the influence of a trainee's psychological deficiencies, and then gradually eliminate them. , ~ ~ 164 FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ Durinq the Salo Flight Z9ie cadet's solo fliqht period, especially the first solo fliqhts, is perhaps - the most difficult in the psychoingical respect for any instructor. One can frequ~ently see an instructor at the airfield, observing a landinq by one of his cadets after a solo flight, whisperiny.the words: �Reduce speed! Mov~e the stick, move the s tickt Hold it there! That's the way! Good going!'~ What dces this mean? Is it an unhealthy thing? No, it is the instructor's natural psychological reaction, his emc~tional excitement producec~, as they say, by the firs~ test of strength by one of his cadets. = In each element of a flight, especially in a landingr the instruct~r witnesses the results of his work and sees with his awn eyes haw well he has prepared the trainee to perform on his awn. how successful he has been in developing the cadet's emoti.onal stability and volitional qualities. ~ It should be pointed out that the proper organization of the cadets' moral- ~ psychological trai.ning is one of the most i~ortant conditions for successful sol~ flights and for success in all of the trai.nees' subsequent flight training. The simple fact that there is no instructor on board and no one to advise the pilot or correct his errors in the air creates emotional tension in a cadet, tension which may fluctuate, naw increasing~ now decreasing, in intensity. ~ This is a natural mental and emotional state in an individual who feels his increased responsibility for flight safety and for the quality of the flight. Experience has shown that emotional tension can have a positive effect upon an individual's psyche, producing all-round stimLslation of his volitional qualities. If on the other hand, as the flight continues, tension increases sharply and is accompanied by extreme anxiety on the part of the cadet, it - can produce a sharp deterioration in the trainee's emotional stability and in his flying proficiency. A cac~t's psychological preparation for flying is begun long before the solo ' flight takes place. When the cadets are being taught piloting techniques, prime importance is attached to developing their confidence in the reliability of ttie equipment, in their own abilities and in the fact that the forthcoming s~lo flight will be a success. This is done by conducting demonstration flights and talks and by giving the cadet the opportunity to participate in the ca~n trol of the aircraft and the engine. As the trainee masters the s~parate flight el~ments, the instructor periodically pexmits him to fly , the ai.rcraft himself. This helps him to develop certain positive reactions and the required level of volitional activity. As the cadet is permitted to fly longer and longer without interference on the part of the instructor, he ~ gradually becomes accustomed to the feeling that he is capable of the flight elements, including the complex ones. 165~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 ~oK ~r�ricl~. us~ vrrLY ` As they talk with the cadets, the veteran instructors do not stress the exoeptional status or the difficulty of the solo flight, although it does involv~e extensive emotional pressure and requires a certain level of piloting skill. They attempt to see that the cadets come to regard the solo fl, a routine flight, the only difference being that there is no instructor on board. Naturally, this is not an easy thing to achieve: No matter how he attempt to protect his psyche against external s timuli, ~he cadet will sti.ll become excited. It is desirable to reduce the emotional tension to the minimum, however. As he prepares a cad~t for a solo flight, the instructor takes careful nc~te of his behavior, his mood and activity level and his interrelations with comrades. If he notices excessive nervousness, excitability or extreme_ concentration or distraction in ttie trainee, he has an obligation to post- pone the solo flight, because the cadet is not prepared for it emotionally. The instructor must tactfully inform the trainee of his decision and provide good reasons, in order to avoid hurting him pscyhologically. The cadet's personal confidence, based on actual readiness is an important . factor in the overall system of psychological preparation to ready a cadet for his first solo flights. When asked, a trainee will sometimes tell his instructor: "I am not ready yet." Such an admission is convincing proof of the fact that an atmosphere of benevolence and frankness has been created within the flight group. ~ - Cases of premature, false confidence also sontetimes occur. This ordinarily happens when most of the trainees in a group are already flying by themselves, but one of them is still not adequately prepared for solo flights. His desire to solo as rapidly as possible begins to dominate his mind, and the cadet announces that he is ready to solo. In such cases the instructor should be es~ecially attentive and should provide the cadet with practical proof that his declaration is premature--that is, on a joint flight. tf the leveling-off altitude for a landing changes from flight to flight, for example, the instruc- tor can tell the cadet something like the following: "You can see for your- self that your leveling-off altitude for land.ins~s is not constant. In my - opinion, you are not ready for a solo flight. If you really want to solo, ' you can, after you have polished up your landings." An instructor`s decision to forbid a solo flight, which is not backed up with proof, does nothing to stimulate the trainee`s volitional and emotional qualities and does not moti- vate him to overcome the temporary difficulties as rapidly as possible and to mas'ter the most complex element of a flight, and sometimes, even destroys a cadet's positive frame of mind, gives him doubts and puts him into an asthenic state. _ Astute instructors devate special attention to the creation of good psycho- logical conditions when setting up the solo flight assignment. The instruc- tor's every word and every gesture and the expression on his ~ace should be filled with calmness, benevolence and confidence in the success of the assign- ment: Such behavior on the part of the instruct~r inspires ~he cadet, heigYitens his wlitional activity and efficiency and puts him into a brisk and joyful mood. 166 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY After the cadet has performed his solo flight, the i.nstructor, naturally, ' wants to make comments and give advice. Experience has shown, however, that this.must be done tactfully and precisely and must be backed up with - solid reasoning. Such instructions as "Don't raise the nose wheel too soon," "L~vel off somewhat lower," and "Don't reduce speed too soon" can result in new errors, since the terms "somewhat lower" and Ksomewhat higher" per- tain to the specific flight, and the cadet is accustourad to normal takeoff and landing parameters, to a routine altitude. If the flight deserves an overall positive rating, then it is best to refrain from making comments, because the focusing of the cadet's attention upon errors,~ given the consid- erab le emotional tension which he is experiencing~ can have a reverse effect. Zhat is, it can produce other errors. If, on the other hand, the cadet hia~self points out his errors, then the instructor may make his awn cortunents and giv~e advice. Subsequently, as the cadet acquires skill and as his dynamic stereotype becomes formed~ his errors should be discussed more openly and boldly, without fear of overloading the trainee�s psyche. Naturally, hawever, this must be 3one tactfully, with good reasoning and without caustic conme.nts . A cad~et's solo circular flights, flights to the zone and along a route, and ~ then flights involving combat employment will become more complicated. This, given the proper performance of the program and a high level of demandingness ori the part of superiors, helps to develop in the young airmen proper emotional stat~ility and such qualities as determination, boldness, goalrorientation, discipline, initiative and independence. - As it sometimes happens, a cadet will pilot the aircraf_t well when performing a circular flight or when flying in the zone, precisely maintain the prescribed parameters on a route flight and confidently perform firing and bomging missions, but will lose his head and commit gross errors when the situation becomes coug~licated. What is the cause of this? It lies in the cadet's inability to ~ oontrol himself in such a sitnation. , The modern equipment is very complex, and it is not easy to operate. It is even more difficult for the pilot to control himself, however, especially in circ~u tances never before encountered by the individual. Self-control is based primarily upon will, that is, the "practical side of the consciousness," which implements the individual's plans and his determination to withstand an ua~exRected complication of the situation. In other words, the will is based upon aware control of one's actions and of behavior involved in the overcoming of barriers standing in the way of achieving the goal. Volitional qualities are formed and developed in the training and indoctrina- tional process. Their development calls for political awareness and ideo- logical c~nviction on the part of the airmen, a thorough understanding of their military duty and a desire to develop these qualities in themselves. On ev~ery flight a cadet is affected by a large number of stimuli, which he is forced to synthesize in order to gain a picture of the overall situation. . 167 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 r~x urri~itw uar, utrLr Because of the time limitation, an inexperienced airman is not always capable of coping successfully with this task. For example, he may not always be capable of inentally encompassing all of the objects i.n the cockpit, of reacting to the instrument readings~ and so forth. Training on the ground and in the air, designed to reduce the time required to perceive signals and respond in the required manner, gradually expands the cadet's attention range, and the stronger are his vo3itional efforts, the ~ more rapidly will occur the "acclimatization" of the trainee~s nervous and emotional capacity for f~ctioning with a time shortage. Any deliberate acceleration of this process by increasing the duration and frequency of the training sessions can complicate the development of the required skills and qualities in the trainee. A planned and intelligent increasing of the duration and frequenc-y of the training sessions will help to develop the _ cadet's concentration and thinking and to form the required conditioned reflexes and improve his volitional qualities. The cadets experience especially great psychological tension when they per- - form combat employment exercises: aerial combat, firing at ground targets, and bombings. The volume of incoming information increases sha~cply in such situations, flight speeds and aititudes change rapidly, and respon~ibility for flight safety increases due to the existence of ammunition on board the aircraft. While, as a rule, the cadet has previously dealt with optimal flignt conditions, now, as he trains in the combat e~loyment of the aircraft, h~e may encounter extreme flight conditions. And the young airman experiences great emot~.onal tension when firing at ground targets or performing bombing _ practice involving complex maneuvering, with the rapidly approaching earth vi.sible through the windshield. The psychological tension experienced by cadets when training in the combat employment of the aircraft can sometimes approach maximum or even a prestress condition. It is therefore exceptionally impartant for the instructor to nave a clos~ psychological rapport with each cadet in his group during this phase of the flight training. If a climate of openness and benevolence has been created within the group, then an airman returning from a flight is not embarrassed to talk about what he has'encountered, felt and experienced in the air. He knows that his frankness will not bring a reproach or a"dressing down" from the instructor, that his senior comrade will help him and his ~ comrades. The instructor only has to forget tact or to condemn a cadet, and the latter will withdraw, and irivisible wall of alienation will spring up between them, a wall which can only be broken down with a great deal of ~ffort and time. As the cadets~ solo time builds up, they begin to demonstrate individual piloting techn.iques--their own "style," as it is referred to. Certain of them will take the aircraft into a turn with a considerable bank, for example; while others will keep the target within the sight not just by means of the foot controls, but with the levers as well, during a dive when firing at ground targets. This is only natural, and each individual should ~ 168 � ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � not be required to copy the instructor's flight style precisely. Naturally, the manifestation of individuality in piloting techniques should not be permitted to go beyond the bounc3s of flight safety. The instructor is not simply an observer of all this. He tactfully and insis- tently directs the cadet's work and his increased activeness and confidence, _ ' points out and encourages diligence and irutiative on the part of the trainee, and makes increasing demaniis of him. In doing so, the instructor helps to sti.mulate the cadets' professional activity and their desire to accomplish the flight train~nq tasks successfully. In the process of training on a new aircraft the trainees encounter both ~ successes and failures. The joy derived from a flight well performed can ~3ive way to disappointment following an unsuccessful landing. Each indi- vidual experiences both success and failure in his awn way. The more ~ emotional an individual, the more vividly is manifested his attitude toward the rating of his work. An indifferent individual rarely becomes excited, _ he barely shaws his feelings, and they are superficial and quick to pass. It is the instructor's duty to concern himself constantly to see that each cadet begins the day in a good mood and with a desire to perform any flight � assignment in the best possible manner. Joking, a brisk word or a word of comfort, a voice reflecting confidence and firmness and joy at the prospect of ineeting the sky, the romanticism of flying, a feeling of closeness and oneness with the machine, and a spirited mood on the part of the instructor himself always have a positive effect upon the emotional state of the cadets, heighten their activeness and stimulate the application of their volitional qualities. FOOTNOTES 1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda I~SS" [Mat~rials of the 25th CPSU Congress~, Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 83. 2., A. Yakovlev, �Tsel' zhizni" [The Goal of a Lifetime], Moscow. Politizdat, 1966, p 431. ~ ~ 3. AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, No 2, 1971, p 14. 4.. AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, No 1, 1971, p 12. 5. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 121. _ 6. Zbid. 7. "Materialy XXV s"yezda I~SS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], . MosCOw. Politizdat, 1976, p 74. 8. Ibid. , p 76 . 169 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY S APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 9. Ibid., pp 74-75. . 10 . Ibid. , p 75. . - 11. A. M. Gor'kiy, "Sobr. soch." [Callected WorksJ, vol 18, Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoy literatury, 1955, p 267. 12. A. Saint-Exuperi, Selected Works, Moscow~ izd-vo '~Khudozhestvennaya literatura," 1964, p 590. 13. M. L. Gallay, `~Cherez nevidimyye bar'yery. Ispytano v nebe" ['t'hrough Invisible Barriers--Tested in the Sky], Moscow, "Molodaya gvardiya," 1965, p 107. 14. G. Titov, "700,000 kilometrov kosmose" [700,000 Kilometers in Space], Moscaw, izd-vo "Pravda," 1961, p 34. 15. AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, No 8, 1973, p I8. COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdet, 197f.i 11499 ~ CSO: 1801 . 170 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100026-1