JPRS ID: 8726 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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22 OCT06ER i9T9 CFOUO 32l79) i OF i
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- HOR OF'1~1('IAI, IISI? ONI.Y
JPRS L; 8726
- 22 October 1979
IJSSR Re ort
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
,
CFOlJO 32/79)
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JPRS L/8726
22 October 1979
_ USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIaS
(FOUO 32/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
. Soviet Comments on Punitive Functi:ns of U.S. Armed Forces `
(T. Belashchenko; ZARUBEZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 79).......... 1
Soviet Comments on New U.S. Civil Defense Program
(V. Guncharov; ZEIRUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 79)... 9
Soviet Comments on NATO Air-Space Reconnaissance Capabilities
, (L. Safronov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 79).... 11
Soviet Comments on New U.S. Nuclear Bombs
(V. Mar'in; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZItENIYE, Jun 79),...., 17
Soviet Comments on U.S. Experinental Pilotless AircraFt
(Yu. Kolesnikov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VCYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
- Jun 79) 20
Soviet Comments on U.S. Nuclear Accident Training Exercise
(V. Kirsanov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 79).... 23
Tr.aining Manual for Engineer NCOs
(~I~TODIKA TAKTIKO-SP~TSIAL'NOY PODGOTOVKI SERZHANTOV
INZHERNYKH VOYSK, 1977) 25
,
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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SOVIET COMMENTS ON PUNITIVE FUNCTIONS OF U.S. ARNIED FORCES
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Juri 79 signed
- to press 6 Jun 79 pp 10-15
~rticle by Capt 1st Rank T. Belashchenko: "Punitive Functians
of the U.S. Armed Forces"7
~ext7 Or,e of the basic func~;ions of any imperialist government's -
armed forces in modern times, as before, is the suppression of
the working masses protests, of national minority liberation
struggle actions, and of national liberation movements in colonial
and dependent countries. V.I. Lenin pointed out that in the -
bourgeois society, the army is always "a weapon of reaction, a
servant of capital in the struggle against l:ibor, an executioner
of public freedom" (Complete collected wor~s, vol 12, p 113).
. The ruling circles of t;he chief imperialist government in the
world~ the United S ta.tes of America, employ troops against the
working people particularly widely. Throughout its more than F
200 year history, the U.S. armed forces have been an instrument of
reaction, one of the main resources in the struggle of monopolis-
tic capital against the working Masses.
For modern America, as ior any other bourgeois country, charac- -
teristic acute society polarization exists, brought to the extreme
by the monepoly of the economy by major capital, the notorious
"big business", the worker~ are shamelessly exploited, and are
deprived of their economic and political rights. Living condi-
tions deteriorate from year to year for large groups of people, -
as inflation affects their materi.al position primarily. Over
the course of more than a decade, the U.S. has consistently dis-
played gloomy records in the capitalist world for unemployment.
numbers of unfortunate or dis-advantaged, and a general lowering
of the standard of 7.iving.
A situation such as this exerts considerable influence upon the
olitical climatE in the country and upon the prevailing mood
~here, Labor strike movements grow continuously. At the same,
~ f
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a sharp increase is noted in the activity of national minorities,
~ particularly of the black segment of the American population,
~ which speaks out against racism and racial discrimination. The
_ economic and national-liberation struggle in the U.S. has in
recent times, taken on a political tinge more and more frequently. _
- Laboring masses protest against the growth of militarism in the
country and its aggressive foreign political stance, increased
authority of the military-industrial complex, and tl-ie activization
_ of right-wing forces. Of considerable significance is the fact
_ that anti-govarnment moods continue to make themselves felt, par-
ticularly those developing during the struggle of progressive
forces in America against the imperialist's war in Indochina.
_ Al1 this has resulted in a stronger, more than in any other
- bourgeois country, acute antagonistic conflict between labor and
capital, the broad strata of the public on one hand, and the -
bosses of the military-industrial complex, the reactionary and -
military-political rulers on tha other.
. As is known, 35-4o million people participate in stoppages, strikes,
meetings, and demonstrations annually in the developed capitalist
- countries~ a considerable share of which occur in the U.S. For
just the period 1977-1978 more than 320 major stoppages were re-
corded in the main industries and several hundred national minor-
ity actions were noted, dozens of cities were the sites of mass
- meetings and demonstrations in defense of civil rights for the -
American people, in support of numerous political prisoners~ _
thrown behind bars in "democratic" America. The peace movement
is ever expanding in the country, its supporters speaking out
. for further detente, against its opponents from the midst of
_ American ultra-conservative circles.
The political leadership of the U.S. responds to opposition of its
internal policies with increased pun~+.ive measures and progra.ms
against the dissatisfied elements, utllizing all agencies of the
governmental machinery, including the armed forces agains the
"internal enemy".
Use of the army in the struggle against workers in the U.S. has
a long history, with origins in the times when the United States
had yet to come into being as an independent government. The
ruling circles in America have always viewed the armed forces
as the main base of support in the struggle with the masses and
national minorities. At the outset of the United States' very
- existence, peoples uprisings from the poor farming segment under
the leadership of Daniel Shays and John Brown were mercilessly
put down with soldiers' bayonets, army units were frequently
used to suppress industrial worker strikes, participated on
the side of racists in reprisals against negroes, indians, and
other American outcasts. Armed suppression of public dissent
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assumed even broader scale after the U.S . en tered ~i;he era of
imperialism. Accarding ~to the accounts of the military his~torian
Yu. Metvin, during the period 1900-~960, american troops ~took
par~t in "more than 500 operations to put down uprisings and
excesses".
Growing economic difficulties, continually deteriorating the
material situation of the workers, and profound social upheavals
experienced by the United States over the past two decades have
exacerbated the situation in the country even more. A powerful
impetus for strengthening the political struggle, as already
noted, was the extremely unpopular war in Vietnam. At the end
of the 60's and the beginning of the 70's, there occurred an
unprecedented wave of public protests. Troops were called ou~t
against people in the streets and weapons were used.
During the years 1967 through 1974, U.S. armed i'orces were used
more than 600 times "to combat internal disorders", and approxi-
ma~ely 500~000 soldiers from "national guard" units and regular
forces participated in pur~itive operations. Those operations -
were carried out with extreme brutality. In Washington alone in
Apri.l of 1971 during the armed suppression of mass anti-war pro-
tests (the entire 82nd Airborne Division and a number of other
units participated in punitive actions) 12 people were killed,
and more than 1,200 demonstrators were wounded, with more than
13,000 persons being arrested. Troops participated in dispersing
operations against demonstrations in Chicago, Detroit, New York, ~
and other cities. According to information from "Army" magazine,
during the period of U.S. aggression in Vietr~~m, just the major
operations against "rioters" during which troops were compelled
to show their presence, but also to employ arms numbered more
than 200.
Serious clashes between the army and the masses have occurred over
a period of many years for racial reasons. American troops have
many times been employed by the federal government and state
authorities to put dcwn "race riots" in the South in the cities of
Birmin;ham, Selma, Pittsburg, Montgomery, and others. The southern
sta-tes however, are not exceptions. Actual battles lasted almost
a week against the civil ribhts fighters in the black ghetto of -
Los Angeles--the section of Watts. The command assembled not only
, rifle units, but also tanks and artillery. Troops and police -
' killed 36 persons and over 1,000 "rioters" were wounded, ~to in-
clude not only blacks but whites as well.
With current conditions of deep instability in the internal ~
situation of the U.S., the country's reactionary circles, its
military-political leadership fearing new upheavals, are devot'ng
particular attention to ~roblems involving armed suppression o~' -
protests f.rom the dissatisfied masses, th~ struggle on the
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"internal fron~t", and are demonstrating particular concern re-
~ardiilg -training and use of troops against -~he workers . The
american administration is allocating considerable effort and
resources towar~ those goals, the army is conduting intensified
training, and industry is producing special weaponry and ammuni- ~
tion. Attempts are underway also to legal.ly jtzstify the right
of the bourgeois government to employ arms against the people.
Special regulations~ manuals, and instructions a-re being developed
governing the use of troops against workers, national minorities,
_ and other such "internal enemies", "rioters", etc.
The basic manual or regulating document of the U.S. Army in this
area is the manual FM 19-15 "Civil Unrest and Dis~ters" in which
the following questions are examin.ed in a rnost detailed manner: -
conducting reconnaissance of area where a potential threat of -
unrest erupting exists, tactical methods of comhat operations
against "rebels", the use of arms, methods of "crowd dispersal",
and others. "Knowing your enemy on the street," the manual states,
"is just as important and knowing your enemy on the battle field".
Required reading for officers are such publications as the text,
"Riot Suppression", prepared by Gen S. Wood~ and the brochure of -
Col R. Applegate, "Crowd Dispersal and Combat with Rioters".
Materials of a similar nature are systematically published by
= the "Army" magazine, "MarineCorps Gazette", and other military
publications.
Imperialist circles and the higher military leadership of the U.S.
consider the operations against the "internal enemy" as one of the
important types of m'iitary action of forces, and constantly re-
quire "the most dec~~ive and relentless actions" from the service-
men. For example i.,structions issued to the commander of the
sub-unit called to .~uppress "rioters" are provided in article
112 of the FM 19-15 manual: "Army units taking part in the
dispersal of rioters always operate with ~ixed bayonei;s...The
rifle or carbine is located in the "at the ready" posit~on, with
the bayonet aimed at the throat of the rioter...in the event arms
are employed, it is best to use the deep thrust. The eye is
fixed on that place of the rioter's body where the thrust is to
be carried out, the rifle is gripped firmly it1 the hands, and
with a thrust of the right foot, an abrupt sta.bbing rr~otion is
executed...If necessary, the stock of the weapon may also be
used...", -
' Another recommendation contained in that same manual needs no
comment: "Rifle fire is the most effective form of action against
rioters. After the decision is made to open fire, it is riecessary
to act clecisively and relentl.essly. In no case should the troops
be issued blank ammunition. Blank fire and firing over the heads
of the rioters is marginal.l effectiv~~, and is therefore ineffi-
cient. It is necessary to ~ire not ta wound, but to kill..."
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Conducting armed operations against the workers is reinforccd
_ als~ in the organizational structure of the U.S. military a;ency,
the Pentagon. In 1970, a special authority was crea-ted in the
armed forces, the directorate to combat civil unrest, as a part of
the army staff (oround forces). The directorate is primarily
vested with the missions of providing for readiness of forces to
- participate in combat with "rioters" and the coordination of
those actions on a country-wide scale. The army staff places
at its disposal up to six infantry and motorized infantry bribades,
stationed in various areas of the U.S., and thoroughly trained in
action against "ri~ting crowds". Action of this sort, it goes
without saying, is not limited to the specially alloca~ted units.
Foreign specialists note that in 1g68 the training of troops in
methods and tactics to "suppress civil disorders" was introduced
as a required discipline in the military training system for
army and marine corps units.
To undergo the so-called "higher course" o.f training for partici-
- patin~ in punitiv~ actions servicemen are sent in small groizps to
army training centers at Fort Sheridan, Fort Belvoir, Fort McNair
(near Washington), and also Fort Gulik (transliterated from the
original) in the Panama Canal Zone. The primary training mission
of the servicemen, in the words of the magazine, "U.S. News and
World Report" is to train them for conducting "operations to
suppress riots and rebellions organized now on large scales by
the communists and their allies". Characteristically, concurrent-
ly with american troops, large contingents of troops from other
countries undergo training at these training cen~ters "for com-
batting the internal enemy", inc].uding Chile, Paraguay, Haiti,
and Nicaragua, where anti-popular juntas and regimes are maintain-
ed only through force of arms and the armed suppression of workers'
protests.
According to information of the "Army Times", the basic training
course in such training centers, specifically at Ft. Gulik, i
designed for 30-4~0 weeks. It includes study of tactics for con-
ducting punitive actions in populated areas and counter-insurgency
operations in U.S.-dependent countries and colonies, methods and
techniques for conducting combat in suppressing "riots", actions
in mountainous, wooded, and swampy areas, and also the use of
various types of weapons (rifle, artillery, chemical) against
"rioting crowas", and the use of helicopters and armored personnel
carriers.
Command constantly strives to intensify the training process, to
make it more easily understood, more graphic. For this, ir. the
, centers where the trainin~ of the punitive units is conducted,
special training centers ~,.re set up, called "Riotville" (from
the English word riot). ~'hey constitute, as noted in the "Army"
magazine, "a typical American popula.ted area", in which the
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trainees receive object lessons: how to best act in the dis-
persal of "a rioting crowd", which methods are used to identify
"instigators and agitators"~ how to use weapons, etc.
Par~ticular attention is given combat action tactical training.
The e:cercise here is conducted bilaterally. The "rioting crowd"
. is formed from specially trained servicemen from organic training
cen~ter teams, dressed "for persuasiveness" in civilian garb and
made up as "women", "juveniles", and "agitators". During such
exercises, loudspeakers broadcast various noises (roar of the
= excited crowd, screams of women, children cryir~g, etc.). Soldiers
and officers are required "to be decisive and relentless in any
and all situations"~ "not to yield to any subterfuge of the
rioters".
"At times." one of the training aids for the suppression of in-
ternal disorders states,"women and even children may precede the
crowd. ^lhis must not confuse tl-~e troops. In every situation,
the troops must act decisively, remembering that they are facinb
enemy elements which must be neutralized at all costs".
The struggle of the laboring masses, of national minorities in
the U.S. for their rights, and national-liberation movements in
colonial and dependent countries compel the ruling circles of
America, the punitive organs of the Americari bourgeois society,
and the defense department to ever more actively prepare for
new clashes with working people, and fer the armed securi~ty of
its own rear area. The Pentagon developed and introduced a number
of special instructions to augment the manual FM 19-15, specific-
aly "Use of chemical agents in operations against rioters", and
"Peculiarities of conducting operations for tYie suppression of
riots in populated areas". Considerable attention is paid to
im~~roving the effectiveness of existing and building new types of
weapons, ammunition, and technol~~gy for use in operations against
the civilian populace.
Scientific research and design work in the above area i~ conducted
chiefly in a special laboratory of one of the U.S. Department of
Defense research centers. "We must," one of the directors of
this center, J. Matthews, wrote in the pages of the magazine,
"U.S. News and World Report", "develop more widely the technology
_ for combatting rioters and use them wherever possible, otherwise
the army in a very short time will be facing most serious diffi-
culties".
Currently U.S. armed forces are equipped with various weaponry
and combat equipment designed specially for combatting "civil
disorders". In addition to various models of special rifle
weapons (carbines, close battle au~f;omatics, pneumatic rubber
bullet firing rifles, etc.), they possess "anti-insurgent"
armored personnel carriers with side shields-grids (high voltage),
armored vehicles with powerful hydropumps and foam cannons, vari-
ous engineering equipment (machines for laying wire obstacles
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in s~treets, armor.ed bulldozers for destroying barricades, clear-
, ing barriers, and others).
Chemical weapons occupy a special place among agents to suppress
- ~the "internal enemy".
"Until recently," as is noted in R. Applegate's b-rochure, "civil
disorders in our country were put down with rifles only. Toda y,
such means are augmented by chemical agents. They allow ~troops
to rapidly and effectively, without incurring material dama~e,
to paralyze the actions of the rioting cr~owd. True, at times
protests are voiced against the use of chemicals during ~the
- suppression ef disorders which arise as the result of labor
conflicts and racial frictions. But this must be answered as
follows: a riot is a riot, and to suppress it, it is necessary
to act in the most decisive manner".
. Intensifying the training of its troops for combat with the
workers, the American military leadership devotes considerable
- attention to moral-psychological training of personnel for ~the
unseemly role of punisher and executioner in its own government
as well as in colonial and dependent countries. Military propa-
gandists and all agencias for ideologically processing the people
and army and navy personnel utilize as widely as possible the
bugbear of the "red danger", the notorious, thoroughly fallacious
myth of "communist penetration", "the hand of Moscow", ~~c. The
fantansy of the "communist soviet fifth column" is used, -to w7iich
reactionary forces in bour;eois countries resort to, including
the U.S. to fan psychosis, to intimidate inhabi~tants, and to
widely employ "witch hunts", of organized reac-tions for reprisals
= against progressive forces. American media systematically
~ publishes falsifications about "soviet spies", of allegedly
recruited "simple-minded duffers", o"secret submarines", which
deliver "subversive elements" to the U.S., Kremlin directives,
large sums of money (in the summer of 1977, a number of american
- papers published accounts that "somewhere on a Florida beach,"
a"soviet ruble" was picked up by someone, and others. Speculating
on stzch conjectures, reaction pulls throu;h anti-people, anti-
worker laws, attempting to convince the inhaY~itants that all the
many conflicts in american industry~ racially motivated clashes,
and the anti-war movement along witYi other protests from the
public "are inspired by Moscow" "are brought in by communists",
and therefore, it is said, force is not to be spared, and no
measure is to be rejected, even the most extreme measures, -to
relentlessly suppr�ess those protests.
Such ideas are intensivel;~ implanted even amog american soldiers
and sailors through the us~~ of various media resources. Molding
ForcesVaremprofessionalt'riired~foroesf athetpersc~nnel ~ of which,
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~.lthough the majority is drawn from the working s~trata of the
population, nevertheless are separated for extended periods from -
I,h~:~r class, are corrupted by graft and bribery, relen~tless'ly
:~i~p~>ressed by all means of disciplinary action, and as a result~
are, as a rule, prepared to carry out a11 orders of the bourgeoisie
as in ~the conducting of the ag~resive wars and occupational ventures _
.~.Ur�o~ld, and in E~er.forming ~the filthy role of ~their own Uco}~1c~' ~
- e xecutioner.
The broad training of punitive troops in the U.S., the daily use
of armed forces for the suppre~sion of the public protesting
- against the yoke of the military-industrial complex, the arbi-
trariness of racists~ the increasing growth of militarism and
- intensification of reaction, increases the anti-people nature
of the army and navy of the U.S., dangerous instruments in the
hands of american imperialism, a most evil enemy of the workers, _
a weapon of aggression in foreign policy, and ~ gendarme-political
f orce in the service of capital inside the country.
~ COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979 ~
8851
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I~OR OFFIC?AL~ USL O[VLY
SOVIET COMIVIENTS ON NEW U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM
~ Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 79
signed to press 6 Jun 79 p 26
- ~rticle by Maj V. Goncharov: "New U.S. Civil Defense Program"7 ~
~ext7 At the end of last year, U.S. President Carter approved
a new civil defEnse program for the country for the period to
1985. It is proposed to allocate more than 2 billion dollars for
program implementation, which will result in more than a two-fold
increase in annual expenditures for CD purposes.
Improvment of U.S. civil defense is planned primarily through the
development of effective programs for the evacuation of the popu-
lation during threat periods from regions of "heightened danger"
(400 in all) which, in the estimation of the U.S. command would
be primarily subject to nuclear missile attack by the probable
. enemy. In the opinion of American military specialists, organized
evacuation of the population, if the crisis escalates slowly,
would provide for the saving of approximately 70 million additional ~
people. Currently, according to foreign press evaluations, plans
now developed embrace approximately 15 percent of the popu~lation ~
earmarked for evacuation.
The new program envisages operations to identify and pre-equip
shelters in the anti-nuclear respect, improve the effectiveness
of warning and communications systems during emergency situations,
build protective shelters for federal and local authorities,
organizing training programs for the population for action during
threat periods, and also to conduct scientific researcli in this
sphere. Specifically, a decision was ratifx~ed to build a CD
dedicated satellite communications system in 1981. It is designed
to improve the reliability of alerting federal authorities and
state administrative organs during emergency situations, and also
for the control of civil. 3efense manpower and resources in the
event of a nuclear missi~~ attack upon the territory of the U.S.
It is considered that the program will be based on the operation _
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of a new federal agency--the Office for Emergency Preparedness .
(Administration for Emergency Actions). It is to be established
in 1979 based upon the Office of Civil Preparedness with a number
of attached organizatians now participating in various civil
defense programs throughout the country.
COPXRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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I'OR Or'FICIAL USL OP1LY
SOVTET COMMENTS ON NATO AIR-SPACE RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOXE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 79
_ signed to press 6 Jun 79 pp43-~6
_ ~r~ticle by Col-Engr L. Safronov (Ret) , Candidate, 2'echnical
Sciences, Docent: "NATO Overhead Reconnaissance Capabilities"7
~ext7 In the opinion of the NATO aggressive bloc military leader-
ship, overhead reconnaissance is considered the most important ~
way to insure.effective use of modern weaponry. The U.S. and
other member-countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
possess a large arsenal of resources designed for carryinb out
- recorinaissance of the Soviet Union and other socialist states~
and also for the broad utilization of those resources during
comba~~ actions. Capabilities of those resources, in the estimation
of' foreign specialists, are determined by the following factors:
tactical-flight properties of the platforms--space vehicles and
aircraft; specifications of onboard reconnaissance equipment and
ground-based equipment for collection and processing of data,
and also the training level of service personnel.
American military specialists consider that the primary means for
conducting global strategic reconnaissance during peacetime are
artificial earth satellites (ISZ). These are assi.gned the missions
of detecting military, industrial, and other types of objectives
of the probable enemy, of uninterrupted surveilance of their
activities and status, determination of ICBM launches, tracking -
aircraft flights and ship passages, de~ermining and evaluating
natural resources, and forecasting meteorological conditions.
Depending upon the specific missions, these ISZ are assigned the
necessary orbital parameters and the proper mix of their recon-.
naissance equipment is determined.
Specifically, the American ISZ, "Big Bird", tasked with scanning -
and detailed reconnaissance of the territories of the Soviet Union
and other socialist sta-t~;-~, has the following orbital parameters:
inclination 95-97 degrees, perigee 150-180 kilometers, and apogee
. 270-340 kilometers. According to foreign press information, the
1.1
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r~utc ur~r~ll:lEw U~~ U1VLY :
- ~~L-c~llites mount cameras with varying focal lenGths, radio-
ele~~troni.c, radar, and television reconnaissance equipment. -
-~7
In building the reconnaissance ISZ and associated equipment,
American experts consider that satellite orbital parameters and
equipmen~; specifications must provide for receiving images of the ~
earth's surface with a resolution capability enabling ground-based
objectives to be detected and identified. In evaluating the
requisite resolution capability of equipment for reconnaissance
- of various objectives, they utilize the values listed in table 1.
The following information was published in the American press
concerning the ISZ "Big Bird": certain of the onboard cameras
have resolution capabilities to areas 0.3 meters; accuracy of
determining height marks by phatographs is 0.01 percent, of the
center line section--0.33 percent of the photo height, and width -
of surface area photographed from an altitude of 160 kilometers
;.~i a single pas~ of the satellite is 300 kilometers.
Execution of the aerial reconnaissance mission in the Combat
Theater (TVD) in wartime is vested by the NATO command in piloted
and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, as they are highly efficient
in obtaining information of sufficient validity. This does not,
however, preclude the use of ISZ and manned sp~.ce platforms.
In onboard reconnaissance equipment packages installed on aircraft,
AFA (aerial cameras) have been most widely employed due to their ~
high resolution capabilities. Aerial photography using AFA is -
carried out to accomplish missions requiring the most detailed, [
exact, and valid data, and also during locale mapping operations.
_ In accordance with U.S, and NATO manuals adopted for aerial photo-
, graphy, average typical photo scales of military objectives when
conducting scanning reconnaissance are in the range 1:10,000--
1:30~000, and during detailed reconnaissance on the order of
1:2,000--1a10,000. According to published foreign press data,
the resolution capability of modern aerial cameras obtained under
laboratory conditions is 100-160 line pairs per 1 mm, which when
- photographing objectives with a~~rerage contrast on a scale of
1:10,000 enables details 0.10--0.06 meters wide to be differenti-
ated in the photographs. As can be seen from table 1, this permits
with photointerpretation to recognize the majority of uncamouflaged
objectives, and to even determine type of objective. However,
work is continuing abroad to further improve existing and build
new types of AFA, photography materials, develop methods and
_ techniques of photo interpretation in an effort to improve aerial -
photography. One of these areas is the development of color and
spectrozonal photo materi~~.ls, the use of which in the opinion flf
foreign specialists, will detect certain qualitative characteris-
tics of objectives and the earth's surface, specifically the pre-
sence of camouflage, humidification of area sectors, type and
condition of vegetation~ water basin pollution, etc.
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c~or, oi!~FIC:I'~L U,~r~ ONLY `
Concurrently, the U.S. and other NATO countries are devo~ting _
considerable attention to the training of specialists, including
photo interpretation specialists. As noted in the foreigr. press,
~the U.S. Air Force conducted the following ~xperiment to check the
validity of interpreting several objectives in photographs. ien
photo interpre~tation specialists with five years of experience and
40 novices were shown a~rial photos (scale from 1:12,600 to
1:18,000 and resolution capability to areas of 0.6--1.5 meters) ~
which included among the 212 objectives photographed: combat
position of a"Nike-Hercules" Air Defense Missile (ZRK), trans-
former sub-station, an electronic communications facility site,
and airfield and construction site. Interpretation was accom-
plished using a seven power magnifier over a period of 8 hours.
It was established that the average validity of interpretation
for experienced specialists was 80.5 percent, and 7~.1 percent
for the novices.
AFA, however, do have a number of shortcomings which considerably
reduce reconnaissance aircraft capabilities. The foreign press
lists those deficiencies: use of AFA is dependent upon meteo-
- rological conditions and time ol day, long time periods from the
time of photographing until receipt of information.
Unfavorable weather conditions impose extensive limits upon the
use of AFA and frequently preclude conducting AFA-assisted aerial
reconnaissance (poor visibility, low cloud cover, etc.). Use of
AFA at night even with good air transmittance is possiUle only
with illumination of targets with special photographic bombs or
powerful strobes. The long time period from photography to ob-
taining information is determined by time expenditure required
for the aircraft to the airfield, for removal and processing of
film and photo interpretation. In the opinion of many military
specialists, the average period required to obtain data from
aerial photography from the time the aircraft lands is apprnY:~-
mately 1 hour, and 3 hours when a photo mosaic must be coristructed.
Therefore, NATO country air forces are increasing the use of
aerial reconnaissance resources which are either less dependent
or totally independent of time of day, meteorological conditions
in the target area, for example: television, infrared and laser
equipment, and side-looking reconnaissance radar (RLS BO).
According to data published in the for~~gn press, -the resolution
capability of certain modern television reconnaissance receivers
is 400 lines per horizontal line, which enables the dete^tion of
individual tanks, armored personnel carriers, and motor vehicles
from a distance of 2,500--3,000 meters and recogriize their type
from 500--1,000 meters.
14
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Wi~th manned aircraft, the television systems are used chiefly to -
obtain in.formation in near real time frames. For example, the
Pirs~t photo~;raph of the videotape made at the ground receiva.n~~;
:-s l,,.i l,.ic~rl cari be r~eceived less thari 1 rninu 1;c a C ter Lh~ rec:onrl~.i: :~~1t1~:~~
aircrai't obs~rves ~;he objectives. However, ~the distancc o:i' the
television transmission, as noted in the foreign press, is limited
by line-of-sight, and the image quality ae~pndent to a signifi-
c~.nt degree upon the intensity of inter~ference ger~erated by the
_ enemy.
= Aircraft reconnaissance equipment frequently includes passive infra-
red instrumentation operating in the longwave segment of ~t'he IR
spectrum. These iristruments provide for obtaining thermal pictures =
of a loca~ity and for detection of camouflaged objectives ('aircraft,
tanks~ motor vehicles, missile launchers) through diffe~entiating
the temperature of their surface or engine exhaust gasas from the
temperature of the surrounding area. The resolution %:apabilities
- of certain such instruments: for temperatures 0.15--�0.3 degrees
- C, linear 1--~~5 mrad (approximately 0.001--0.015 of_ observation
distance), with angle of field of vision up to 120 degrees.
The most favorable time of day for con%lucting infr;~.red photography
in the opinion of foreign specialists, is at nighc (particularly
during pre-dawn hours) as distortion of the overall area picture
due to uneven solar heating of ob jecti~*es a~:~? ;,o pronounced
_ shadows is considered minimal.
Under adverse weather conditions, when the u:.e of the above listed -
optical systems is limited or totally impossi~le~ RLS B0~ is used
to conduct aerial scanning reconnaissance.
As noted in the foreign media, recently the U.S. is focusing
considerable attention upon thE development and perfection of new
t~rpes of reconnaissance systems--the so-called alarm system
detection sensors, which are sensitive elements capable of reacting
to the presence and movement of personnel or combat equipment in
their areas.
- Compact and rather lightweight (5--10 kg), a sensor of this type,
dropped from an airplane or helicopter, transmits signals via a
coupled radio receiver to the data receiving point (directly or
via a relay-aircraft) on the presence or movement of personnel
or equipment of the enemy in ~he area of the sensors.
Types of several existing foreign sensors and their capabilities
are listed in Table 2.
In the opinion of westAr~: military specialists, modern aerial-
space reconnaissance re~ources now part of NATO armies' arsenals
enable them to conduct systematic monitoring of the enemy, his
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Table 2
Capabilities of Certain Types of Signal
Detection Sen~ors
- Type of Sensor Reacts to: Detection Distance, meters
(principle of
operation) Man Military
Equipment
Accoustical Noises ?n the audio and
superaudio ranges 50--100 1,000
Seismic Soil vibrations (during .
= moving) 50--100 300--500
Magnetic Variations in magnetic
field due to ferro-
magnetic material objects 200--300
Thermal Rapid temperature changes
,
of ~nvironment 300 700
military and industrial facilities over large expanses during
both peacetime and war. However, many consider that artificial
- and natural c~.mouflage of ob~ectives and the carrying out by the
_ enemy of various deception prcgrams (use of military equipment
mock-ups, diversionary actions, frequent shift of military _
positions, etc.) are capable significantly reducing the effective-
ness of aerial-space reconnaissance.
#For details of the RLS B0, see "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye",
1978, No 12, pp 6z--69. Editors
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoy.e voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
8851
CSO: 1801
.
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SOVIET COMNIENTS ON NEW U.S. NUCI~EAR BOMBS
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 79
signed to press 6 Jun 79 Pp 53-5~
� ~rticle by Col-Engineer V. Mar'in, Candidate, Technical Sciences,
"Building New Nuclear Aerial Bombs in the U.S."7
~ext7 Military leadership in the U.S., inflating the myth of
the "soviet military threa+", is working intensively to expan3
its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The Congress of the
U.S. every year increases allocations for the development and
production of new nuclear munitions, including aerial bombs.
Specifically, as noted in foreign press accounts~ since 1974 the -
nuclear aerial bomb B7? has been under development. It possesses
a number of c3esign features which, in the opinion of american
specialists, provide for flexible military application and im-
proved safety in accidents involving carrier-aircraft. The bomb
may be delivered during execution by the aircraft of any form of
_ maneuwer, over a broad range of flight speeds and altitudes, in-
cluding extremely low altitudes. In addition, its power may be
varied from several kilotons to a megaton (this is dependent upon
the nature of the target to be hit and is set by the aircraft
crew during the flight). The B77 is proposes primar~ily for use
against high-durability objectives, and delivery vehicles cited
in the press include the B-52 and FB-111 bombers, tactical fight-
ers F-111, F-16~ and F-4, and the A-6 and A-7 ground-attack
_ aircraft.
Safety of the B77 aerial bomb is achieved through the use of a
new high-explosive for compression of nuclear materials. Due to
the low sensitivity to shock and fire, the explosive will not
detonate during a crash of the delivery-aircraft or in the event
of an accidental bomb drop. As a result, in the opinion of the
aerial bomb builders, such incidents cannot result in the dissapa-
tion of nuclear warhead r~adioactive substances, i.e., to a contam-
ination of the area. Such a conclusion was arrived at based upon
.a series of laboratory and range tests of the aforementioned
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r ~n ~r r L~.~.~ uoi~ uivLx
_ ~~x~~lo:.ivc . '1'h~~ fca~ture of the B77 aerial bomb was no L emphasized
in the U.S. press accidentally. The Pentagon is striving to
reassure the public of the ally-countries of the aggressive NATO '
bloc~ and above all those, upon whose territory american nuclear
weapons are stationed. However, certain foreign specialists
consider that laboratory and range tests cannot fully recreate
~11 actual accident situations and therefore total confidence in
the publicized high level of safety for the ne.w munition is impos-
sible.
- Considerable attention in the development of the B77 aerial bomb
was .ievoted to providing .for its use at minimum altitudes, alti-
tudes at which the probability of enemy anti-aircraft hits upon
the delivery-aircraft is considerably reduced. However~ in bomb-
ing from those same low altitudes, the timeframe from the moment
of drop to the moment of detonation is insufficien-c for withdr~awal
of the delivery-aircraft from the danger zone for destructive
effect of nuclear explosions (particularly with high-power war-
- heads). Therefore, a concept~~ally new parachute system was devel-
oped for the B-77 aerial bomb. The system consists of two para--
chutes. The first, the lift chuteo is�designed to lift the bomb
to an altitude of approximately 30 meters from the drop level.
It is manufactured from individual transverse strips~ which, when
exposed to the flow of oncoming air at a given angle, creates lift.
A special system exists for stabi'lizing the aerial bomb after
drop and for imparting the required positioning in spa~~e. It in-
cludes a gas generator, gyroscopes~ and a computer. The gas
- generator produces operating gas, and directs that gas through
tubing via controlled valves to eight nozzles (positioned on
the circumference of the aerial bomb casing). The gyro-system
determines the spatial positioning of the bomb after drop. This
information is fed to the computer for data processing and the
formulation of commands for the opening or closing of one valve
or another, which provides for stabilization of the bomb in a
given position and t~ze selection of its altitude with the lift
parachute. After attaining maximum altitude, this parachute
jetisons, and a second, the braking parachute, deploys to descend
with the bomb.
In conjunction with the developmental program for the new aerial
bomb, in 1977 a series of mock-up drops was carried out using
series-produced delivery-aircraft including the B-52G, the FB-111A
. and the F-4G, the m~ck-up being equipped with tne aforementioned
parachute system. A segment of those drops was conducted to
verify bomb-dropping capabilities for the B-52G bomber flying at
minimum altitudes (60 meters for this aircraft). Foreign press
published the following data on one such flight. The aircraft
- flew at an altitude of 60 meters with a speed of 69o k.p.h.
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~ Ai t~r ~the drop of the mock-u and its s~tabilization, ~the lii't
parachute (diameter-4 meters~ deployed, which effected an elevation
of the "bomb" to an altitude of 91 meters in 3 seconds, afterwhich
the lift chute jetisoned and the braking chute (diameter-11.6 meters
. opened, providin~ for a descent of the mock-up in the vertical
position. Total time from the moment of "bomb" drop to impact
was approximately 10 seconds, and ground impact speed was 18 m/s.
Given this information, american experts consider that the B77
can be dropped by a B-52 even from an altitude of 4~5 meters, and
the delivery-aircraft wilJ_ be able to depart the danger zone and
_ avoid the effects of nuclear explosion destructive factors.
The FB-111A drop of the B77 mock-up was conducted at a speed of
Nlach 2.2. The primary goal of this experiment was to verify
characteristics of the parachute system with bomb drops at super-
sonci flight speeds.
- Bombing from the F-4G fighter was carried out from an altitude of
60 meters and at a flight speed of the delivery-aircraft of 560
km/hour. Stabilizations of the mock-ug were achieved with 0.4
second, beginning of lift chute deployment--O.g second, and
completion within 1.2 seconds after separation :from the aircraft.
The braking parachute deployed at an altitude of approximately
- 90 meters. Evaluating the results of the tests, american special-
ists consider that the equipping of the Air Force with this bomb
would improve combat capabilities considerably.
_ Concurrently with the production of the nuclear B77 aerial bomb~
the U.S. is developing the B61 b~mb (with modi.fications B61-3
and B61-4) for tactical aviation delivery-aireraft. Foreign
press accounts also note that its design also allows the crew
of the aircraft to vary the blast power (equal to 1/3 the power
of the B77 bomb) depending upon the nature of the target to be
struck. It was noted that bombs of both modifications will be
used at even supersonic flight speeds of the delivery-aircraf't.
The B61 modi:,":ications reviewed are proposed with the employment ~
~ of a braking parachute made of the new highly durable material
Kevlar. The first stage range testing of this parachute employed
a special two-stage rocket sled, capable of developing speeds of
_ Mach 0.5--1.3.
The next test phase of the parachute is to be conducted with
drops of bomb mock-ups for botr modifications from tactical
fighters F-111A and F-4~D, and from the A-7D ground attack aircraft.
COPYRIuHT: "Zarubezhnoye vo,yennoye obozreniye", 1979
CSb1 1801
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SOVIET COMMENTS ON U.S. EXPERIMENTAL PILOTLESS AIRCRAFT
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, .Jlln 79 signed
to press 6 Jun 79 pp 5~-56
~rticle by Lt Col Yu. Kolesnikov: "Experimental Pilotless
Aircraft"
(At the request of our readers. Many readers of our magazine
have asked that we publisti materials on the building of an exper-
imental pilotless aircraft in the U.S. We are fulfilling their
requests.)
~ext7 Concurrent with the development and manufacture of modern
combat aircraft, the Pentagon is allocating considerable resources
for conducting scientific research and design work (NIOKR) to
construct next generation aviation technology. A considerable
part of this research embraces the so-called concept of "exper-
imental pilotless highly-maneuverable aircraft", which is being
carried out under the the HiMAT (Highly Maneuverable Aircraft
Technology) program.
The primary goal of the program is to build an experimental flying
platform qualitatively different from existing aircraft which is
intended for flight testing of various engineering solutions,
particularljr in the field of ~.erodynamics for future fighter air-
craft. This, in the opinion of American experts, will enable them
to reduce the time period between laboratory and flight testing of
actual aircraft.
_ As reported in the foreign press, in March, 1978, the American
firm~ "Rockwell International" completed the construction of the
first experimental aircraft prototype under the aforementioned
~ pragram. That prototype was executed according to an integral
aerodynamic layout, and has a variable sweep wing equipped with
ai.lerons and flaps. The forward horizontal empennage has a
large transverse V. Launch w ight qf the ilotle~s aircraft is
1556 kilograms, fusela~e leng~h is 6.85 me~ers, wing aspect span
is ~.87 meters. The aircraft is equipped with one J85-GE-21
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= turbojet engine manufactured by the "General Electric" company
_ with a thrust of 2,270 kilograms in the afterburner mode.
A feature of the pilotless aircraft is its modular construc~tion
priniciple~ i.e., it has the following interchangeable modules:
engine air intake and nozzle, wing (outer wing) assembly, forward
horizontal empennages, engine afterburner chambers, etc. Use of
~ quick-change ailerons, elevons, air brakes, rudders, and landing
gear struts is envisaged.
Aerodynamic properties of the aircraft, in the opinion of company
specialists, are considerably better than corresponding features
of current generation aircraft, particularly of the new F-16
fighter. This relates to maneuvering properties primarily. As
expected, the aircraft will be capable of performing a sustained
turn with 8 G loading at Mach 0.9 at an altitude of 10,000 meters.
At the same altitude and speed, the F-16 and F-4 fighter aircraft
are capable of similar turns with enly ~.5 and 2.5 G's, respec-
tively. Cruise speed of the experimental. aircraft is Mach 0.6,
with estimated maximum flight duration of 30 minutes. It is
capable of reaching Mach 1.4~ at an altitude of 12,000 meters in
3 minutes.
_ As noted frequently in the foreign media, the pilotless aircraft
has attained new maneuver properties through the installation of
direct controls for lift and lateral forces. It is considered ,
that at an altitude of 9,000 meters and a speed of Mach 0.9, the
aircraft can, with the aid of direct aerodynamic force controls,
execute a plane-parallel movement in the vertical plane with
normal 1-G loading and plane-parallel movements or plane turns in
the horizontal plane with a lateral load of 3 G's.
The forei~n press notes that previously in aircraft construction
attempts were made only to practically use component materials
in aircraft designs of differing roles or utilization, which
resulted chiefly in the replacement of inetal assemblies with
lighter and less-expensive assemblies. However, in the aircraft
built under the HiMAT program, these materials are widely utilized.
Their weight constitutes approximately 33 percent of the design
weight.
One of the innovations to be researched on the pilotless aircraft
is the en~ine axially asymmetric nozzle providing, in company
~specialists' o~inion, for changing the directing of thrust vectors
in order to increase lift and improve aircraft longitudinal control.
Additionally, it is considered the use of the two-dimensional
nozzle will enable the aircraft's Infrared (IR) silhouette to be
reduced.
With the pilotless aircrdit, plans are to test the new aerodynamic
_ wing profile and the forward horizontal empennage having, in the
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- opinioil of American specialists, high-level properties at near
- speed-of-sound flight speeds.
- The flight test program has not yet been worked out in all details,
but company representatives have announced that even in the first
flights, the pilotless aircraft will be flying in modes nPar the
proposed fligh~'t limits for the aircraft.
Edwards AFB, California has been selected for the location of
the flight tests to be conducted. The pilotless aircraft is to
be dropped from a B-52 carrier-aircraft at an altitude of 13,500
meters. Engine ignition and switch-on of onboard equipment is
effected from the ground (up until the instant of drop, the engine
operates in the idle mode). After drop and acceleration to the
assigned speed, the aircraft must perform a series of aerial
maneuvers and then a skid-assisted landing. Control of the flight
is planned through a ground-based complex, the relay being provided
by a remote-control system installed on the TF-104~ escort aircraft.
If communications.are lost from the ground station, for safety
considerations regarding the escort air~craft (for example~ if~in
the execution by the pilotless aircraft of a series of highly-
active maneuvers, when the escort aircraft is close to the pilot-
less aircraft), an emergency back-up control method is employed
temporarily. In this case, the on-board automatic control system
of the pilotless aircraft brings the aircraft out of the next
sequential maneuver and places it in a~orizontal flight~ which
continues until contact with the airborne or ground control sta-tion
is re-established.
_ The program also provides for the development of skid-assisted
landings after routine fligh.ts. For this, a homing Radar is to
be used to bring the aircraft in the landing approach zone, where
the ground control station operator will accomplish the landing,
using a television screen displaying the image transmitted from
the onboard television camera.
Operational results ob tained under the HiMAT program, as the for-
eign press attests, will find broad application in the construction
of future fighter aircraft. To evaluate the feasibility of '
realizing one idea or another which has been checked with the
pilotless aircraft, it is proposed to utilize the NASA Research
Center Trainer at Langley, which will enable the modelin~ of
ae rial combat between design aircraft and any existing aircraft.
T he HiMAT grogram is scheduled for two years, during the course of
which 20-25 flights will take place. It will, however, in ~the
opinion of Americal experts, be expanded relative to flight tests
results obtained and processed. Verification using the pilotless
aircraft of future discoveries in aerod amics is
conclude in 1980 in order to employ results obtained~incthe design-
ing of fighters during the latter half of the 1980's.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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i~~oii c~a~i~~cc, cni, u;ci~; c~ivt.Y
. SOVIET COMIV~NTS ON U.S. NUCLEAR ACCIDENT TRAINING EXERCISE
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 79
signed to press 6 Jun 79
~rticle by Col-Engineer V. Kirsanov: "NUACS Exercis~~",~
~ext7 The Pentagon, in preparation for undertaking nuclear
warfare, has several times been involved in crashes and accidents -
involving American ~ircraft carrying nuclear munitions on board.
_ This ha;, compelled the American c~mmand to adopt measures to
prevent and eliminate the consequences of such accidents, those
measures includ~.ng the conducting of special exercises.
As reported by the American press, on 6 April 1979~ the F~entagon
conducted a comprehensive exercise termed NUACS--Nuclear Accidents
("Nuclear Incidents"), the primary mission of which was to verify
the effectiveness of command organs, of new radiation detection
methods and means, and also to test the capability of newly formed
_ subunits (podrazdeleniye) to fulfill their assigned missions under
simulated conditions approximating real situations to the maximum
extent possible. The exercise, which lasted 7 days, involved more
than 500 ~pecialists and a considerable amourit of e~uipment.
Vice-Admiral R. Monroe, Director, Nuclear Munitions Agency, DOD,
was assigned~ as the exercise manager.
The exercise began with the receipt by the Pentagon Main Command
Center of the following urgent message: du~^ing a flight of a
C-14~1 military transport aircraft with six nuclear bombs on board;
several of the aircraft's systems failed, and the crew attempted
an emergency landing in a remote area of Nevada. It was later
learned that as a result of the unsuccessful landing attempt~ fire
had erupted and.one of the fuel tank groups had e~loded.
According to exercise scenario, three bombs were "ruptured" by
the fire, conventional explosives contained in the nuclear warhead
detonation s~rstem then "e~~loded", which resulted in the "dissapa-
tion" of radio active elements over a rather large area about the
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L~'OR Ol~'PICIIIL USIi. OIVL~Y
the aircraft, and a resulting radioactive dust cloud was drifting
toward a neighboring state. To simulate such a situation, a
liquid containing radioactive isotopes (radium-233 with a half-
life of 11 days) was atomized in sufficient quantities in the
area of the "accident" for instruments to operate, but in the
_ estimation of American specialists practically safe for the health
of personnel involved. According to exercise conditions, three
other nuclear bombs were also "damaged" and became sources of
radioactive radiation, and crew members sustained critical injuries
and were subjected to varying doses of radiation. ~
COPYRiGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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TRAINING MANUAL FOR L'NGINEER NCOS
, Moscow METODIKA TAKTIKO-SPETSIAL'NOY PODGOTOVKI SERZHANTOV INZHERNYKH
VOYSK (Methods for Tactical-Special Training of Engineer Troops' NCOs)
in Russian 1977 signed to press 26 Oct 76 pp 1, 2, 2-3, 122
- [Annotation, Table of Contents, Foreword, Chapter I, and recommended
reading list from book by V.S. Yermakov and A. F. Gontarev, Voyenizdat,
16,000 copies, 123 pages]
[Text] This booklet discusses the principles underlying the organization _
and conduct of tactical-special classes for NCOs in the subunits of
Engineer Troops and presents versions of inethodological work-ups for
conducting classes to train sergeants to perform as detachment (or platoon)
commanders for organizing the performance of tasks involved in combat
engineer support. The substance of the classes is given as applicable.
to the recommended themes for the tactical-special training of NCOs in
tlie Engineer Tro~ps and take into account the corresponding classes
conducted for thn subunits.
The booklet is intended as a methodological aid to be used by subunit ~
commanders in the Engineer Troops and for sergeants and students of
training subunits for preparing for classes.
Contents Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter I. The Organization and Conduct of Tactical-Special
- Classes for NCOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter II. Methodological Guidelines for Conducting Tactical-
Special Classes for the Detachment Commander 11
Theme 1. The Detachment Commander's Functions During the
Manual Laying of an Anti-Tank Minefield by the
Detachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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Page
Theme 2. The Detachment Commander's Functions When the ~ ~
, Detachment is Clearing a Passage Through Minefields
in Front of the Enemy's Forward Edge During Prepara-
~ ~ tions for an Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Theme 3. The Detachment Commander's Functions During
Bridge Demolitions Preparation by the Detachment 25
Theme 4. The Detachment Commander's Functions When the -
Detachment is Assembling a Bridge of R~ady-Made
Elements on Single-Bent Piers in an Uffensive 31
Theme 5. The Detachment Commander's Functions During the
Assembly of a Shelter by the Detachment and the Rules
Operating It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Theme 6. The Detachment Commander's Functions When~the
Detachment is Setting Up an Assault Cro~sing in an
Offensive From the March . . . . . . . . . . . . . SO
Theme 7. The Detachment Commander's Job When the Detachment.
Is Operating at a River Outpost . . . . . . . . . . 67
- Theme 8. The Detachment Commander's Functions.When the
Detachment is Widening A Passage Through a Minefield _
Chapter IIT. Methodological Plans for Conducting Tactical-Special
Classes to Train Sergeants as Platoon Commanders 87
Theme 9. The Platoon's Functions as Part of a Mobile
Obstacle Detachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Theme 10. The Platoon Commander's Functions When the
' Platoon is Setting Up a Ferry Crossing in an
Offensive From the March . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Theme 11. The Platoon Commander's Functions when the
- Platoon is Settin Up a Cross-Country Route During -
Preparations for an Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Addenda: 1. Group Exercise Assignment for NCOs on Theme 9... 119
2. The Decision of the Mobile Obstacle Detachment
Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
_ Recommended Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Foreword
The Soviet people, lead by the Communist Party, are successfully working
to accomplish the tasks involved in creating the material-technical base
' ~ for communism, building up the power of our nation and the other socialist
commonwealth nations and improving the worker's welfare.
Our Party, its Leninist Central Committee and the Soviet Government are
making an enormous effort, a truly titanic effort, to insure a foreign
policy situation conducive to the building of communism in the USSR and
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to the strengttlening of peace over the entire planet. This noble work has
bre~itly weakened the position of the proponents of war and has produced
. major advances in the normalization of relations among states with different
social structures.
At the same time, there is still tension in the world, and the danger of
military conflicts. In this situation, the Party regards the task of
strengthening the nation's defense capabilities and improving the combat -
readiness of the troops as one of our most important tasks. The successes
of the socialist economy and the outstanding achievements of science and
technology, which have made it possible to outfit our Armed Forces with the
latest weapons and combat equipment, have produced fundamental transtorm-
ations in the organizational structure of the forces, in the methods employed
inthe conduct of combat operations and throughout the system of training
and indoctrination of the personnel. -
Units and subunits of the Engineer Troops are now equipped with diverse,
high-performance equipment, which requires a high level of prafessional
skill, solid special and technical knowledge, and good physical condition-
ing. The modern Soviet fighting man of any arm of troops possesses all of
these qualities, along with profound ideological conviction as to the
- correctness oF our Party's policy and unshakable devotion to the socia~ist
homelanci . -
The fighing men who have completely mastered the modern equipment and are
trained to perform precisely and smoothly as a member of a team, crew or
detachment determine to a considerable degree the success achieved by the
subunits on the battlefield. "The development of a fighting man does not
take place automatically, however. It is the result of persistent work
on the part of commanders at all levels, including the junior command
_ element."1 The huge role played by the sergeants in the training and
indoctrination of the fighting men is primarily due to the fact that they
form "ellipses... the largest group of command personnel, closely linked
with the daily life, everyday affairs and training of the soldiers and sail-
ors."2 ~
In a battle, sergeants of the Engineer Troops frequently have to organize
the work of detachments and crews, and sometimes, separate teams isolated
from their units and subunits, interacting closely with units and subunits
of the di�ferent arms of troops. They must be ready at any time to replace
an oFficer put out of action or to assume command of teams (or crews)
with related specialties. -
l. A. A. Grechko, "Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo gosudarstvo" [The Armed
Forces of the Soviet State], Moscow, 1974, p. 223.
2. Ibid, p. 222.
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It is perfectly clear that sergeants of the Engineer Troops can only
achieve a high level of tactical-special training and good professional
com~:et,ence and can only develo~ their organizing abilities through
systemati.c, purposive and methodological.ly correct work on the part of
the of'ficers training and indoctrinating them.
The authors believe t,hat this training aid presented to the reader can help
officers of the Engineer Troops accomplish this important task. :
The training aid d.escribes the organization and the procedure for preparing
and conducting tactical.-special classes for sergear..ts. Methodological.
- plans for preparing for classes are presented for the most important subjects
in the tactical-special training of sergeants as specified by the Combat
Training Program for subunits of the ~gineer Troops.
Chapter I. ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF TACTICAIr,SPECIAI~ CLASSES FOR SERGEAIVTS
The tactical-special training of sergeants--one of the basic and foremest
areas of training--is ordinarily conducted in classes for commar.ders and
classes on instructional methods and at training method.s assemblies, and
is perfected in tactica~special classes arid exercises for subunits~ as well
as in combined-arms tactical exercises.
I~t focu.ses upor, improving the sergear.ts~ field training and upon developing
their practical sldlls in commanding a detachJnent (a team or crew) in the
performance of engineer support tasks. Tactical-special classes, in which
t,he sergeants perform as platoon commar,ders, are conducted to improve their
lmowledge and to prepare them to assume the duties of an officer.
The tactical-special training classes develop in the sergeants good moral-
combat qualities, initiative and boldness, the ability to make well-based
decisions rapidly ar~d precision in the assigning of the tasks, and improve
their sldlls in firmly controlling the actior~s of their subordinates.
The following may be the main types of tactical-special classes for sergeants:
practical classes:
demonstration classes;
classes on instructional method.s. ~
Practical tactical-special classes have the main role in the traini.ng of
sergearts. They are ordinarily conducted in the fox~rn ef group exercises
ar_d the practical. performance of the duties involved in the sergeantsf
positions.
In the group exercises all sergeants perform the duties of one of the
indiv~dual.s in charge (a detachment or platoon commar_der). -
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1?uring the practical performar.ce of the tasks, one of the sergeants
- .functions as the detachment (or platoon) commander~ while the others per- -
form the role cf soldiers (or sergeants and seldiers). _
In demonstration tactical-special classes the sergeants are shown an
exemplary pexformance for which. a detachment commander must strive when
organizing the performance of engineer support tasks. Careftzl preparation
should be made for the demonstration tactical-special classes. Or,e of the
squadrons, the commander of which has a good level of inethodological and
tactical-special training, is draian upon for the conduct of such classes.
Classes on instructionai methods for sergeants are conducted in order to
establish a ur_ified approach to the organization and conduct of impending
tactical-special training classes for the subunits. These clas~es provide
instruct~ons on the seq~:ence for studying the training subjects and present
a practical demonstration. of inethodological techniques for working on the
most difficult ones. These classes are conducted with the sergear~ts und.erL-
going training.
One or two classes may be conducted on each tactical-special training
theme. The length of a class is determined.by the training objectives
set, by the number of training subjects to be covered ar~d by the sergeants~
training level.
It is beneficial to conduct the tactical-training cla~ses for sergeants
_ in the field, in unfamiliar terrain, wherever possible, which makes it
po~sible to create a complex tactical and engineerin~ situation forcing
~;he sergear~ts to make decisions rapidly and to continuously control the
actions of their subordinates while they are performing the engineer
support ta�ks.
Now, let us discuss preparations for the tactical-special classes. The
successfl,il coraduct of tactical-special classes for sergeants depends
greatly upon the preparations made for these classes. It is therefore
an extremely important task of the instructor careflil.ly to prepare for
each. tactical-special class~ including preparation of the instructor
himself and of the sergeants~ and preparation of the materiel. ar~d of the
area in which the forthcoming classes are to be conducted.
The instructor~s preparatior:s include establishing the initial data re-
cluirec?, studying the proper referen~es, working out the tactical situation
~-ind the decision of the superior commar:der~ selecting and reconnoitering
the area in which the classes will be conducted~ ar~d compiling a method- -
ological plar. (an ou.tline) for conducting the class.
. The i.nitial data required to set up a tactical-special class consists of
the theme, the training subjects~ the substan_ce of th.e training subjects
and the time and place of the class.
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'['11c .insLructor~s preparations are begun by clariSying the theme and
establishing the training objectives, the training subjects and the time
i:o be spent on each.
As he clarifies the theme of the tactical-special class, the instructor
must determine the type of combat operations (an offensive~ a defense,
- a meeting battle, a march, and so forth) and the place and role of the
subunit of Engi.neer Troops in the execution of the combined-arms subunit~s
tasks, as well as their mode of operation d'zring the performar..ce of the
assigned task.
The instructor must base his determination of the training objectives on
the theme of the classes, the sergeants~ training level and the ta~ks
faci.ng them with respect to training their subordinates under the same ~
theme. The training objectives must have concrete substance.
The content of the training subjects ar_d the sequence for covering them
must conform to the training goals set and insure their achievement.
Enough time mu~t be al.located for the training subjects to make it possibl.e
to cover all of the material thoroughly and well. _
After the initial data are understood~ the instructor selects the necessary
literature on the given subject~ studies it and begins working out the
tactical and engineering situation, and adopts the decision for the comman.der
of that subunit of IIzgineer Troops one level above the subunit whose per- -
formance is to be covered in the class. The tactical situatior. and the
decision of the commander of the higher subunit of E~gineer Troops are
spelled out in textual form or are depicted graphically on a map (or
diagram) with a legend. They are then refined on the terrain during
reconnoitering of the area of the forthcoming cla~s.
The methodological plan or outline constitute the basic document for con-
duct:in~ classes. It must define the theme~ the training objectives~ the
make-up of the greup of trainees, the time and place for conducting the
class, material support an.d the procedure for conducting the class.
The e~lanation of the procedure f~r conducting a cl.ass indicates the
training subjects, the time allocated for them and the actions of the _
instructor and the trainees.
The section explaining the instructor~s flar_ctions describes the tactical
situation and the d.ecision made for the higher commander, ar.d contains
hypothetical situations~ of which the trainees are informed~ and the
specific actions to be taken by the i.nstructor in one or another tactical.
situat~ion. When necessary, the informatior, is illustrated ~,~ith drawings.
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The tr;zinees~ functions are indicatEd for each training subject. II1
addition, the instructor works out the most practical versiot~s of decisaons
by the trainees for all of the mean training subjects.
_ Preparation of the a.rea ar_d uf the materiel for conducting tactical-special
classes for sergearits plays an important role in the achievement of the
assigned trainiz~g objectives and is carried out in accordance with a
meth.od.ol.ogical. plan or outline.
Measures are taken in adv~ar..ce in the area of the classes, according to the
theme and the training subjects to be covered~ measures which help to
create the required tactical ar~d engineering situation. The basic measures
carried out to prepare an area for the conduct of tactical-special classes
may includ.e the following:
fortification of the positions of onets own troops and those of the
_ ~~nemy~~;
the laying of obstacles to be reconnoitered and to which the trainees
will make (or widen) passages;
the setting up of the necessary obstacles to be overcome, if such
do not exist on the terrain;
simulation of destruction, enemy fire points, areas of radioactive
~ contamination an.d other elements of situations required for covering the
training subjects well.
- The nature and the extent of these measures may vary and are established
separately for each sgecific class. In some cases already equipped training
fields and engineer training facilities may be used in order to reduce the
amount of work involved in preparing the area for classes. Preparation of
the area may sometimes be carried out in the form of classes giving the
subunits of Engineer Troops practice in the training subjects covered under
a theme.
Material support for tactical-special classes for sergeants may incl.ude
the preparation of engineer~ motor transport ar.d other equipment, standard
sectional structures or structures prepared by personnel of the unit (or
subunit), trai.ning equipment, expendable materials, topographic maps and
various drafting and dra~~ing supplies. Mileage for the motorized equipment
_ is computed in accordance with a plan, within the norms established for
combat training. Standard and nonstar.dard structures and equipment are
used according to the unit (or subunit) plan. Expendable materials and
office supplies are obtained.from the depot under the procedure established
in the un.it.
When the tactical-special classes are conducted, each tactical--special
training class should begin with a topographic and tactical orientation
conducted by the trainees themselves, with the instructor~s assistance.
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Following the trainees~ orientation at the site~ the instructor introduces
them to the new tactical and en~ineering situation or issues a combat order
(or instruction)~ performing the role of the higher commander. The trainees
are then g~ven time to study the assigned task, to appraise the ~ituation
and make a decision. When the allocated time has elapsed the trainees
- report their decisions to the instructor.
If the trainAes have made gross errors in their decisions and if those
decisions do not insure the accomplishment of the assigned task, the in-
~structor is required to assign additional problems to force the trainees
to understand their errors and to arrive at the right decision, that which
conforms to the existing situation. In addition, the i.nstructor endeavors
to see that the trainees formulate the decision competently and precisely.
The decision adopted by the commander of the detachment (or platoon) of
Ehgi.neer Troops must include the following:
the aim of the actions (the tasks upon which the main effort should
focus, the sequence and method to be followed in performing the assigned
engineer support task);
the tasks of the crew (or detachment) n~mbers;
the organization of interaction and control.
Based'on the decision approved by the instructor~ the trainees, performing
- as the detachment (or platoon) commander~ assign the tasks to their
subordinates (issue a verbal combat order). This training subject requires
special attention on the part of the instructor~ who must see to it that
the trainees issue the verbal combat order for the performance of engineer
support tasks concisely and precisely.
The ver.bal combat order issued by the d~etachment (or platoon) commander
must include the following:
reference points; �
a brief summary of i.nformation on the enemy; ,
the higher subunit~s task; ~
the detachment~s (or platoon~s) task�
the tasks of the crew (or detachment~ numbers;
command sig~als;
- the position, rank and name of the second in command.
The functions of the detachment (or platoon) commander for organizing
the performance of engineer support tasks are worked out on a prac;~tical
level, according to one of the verbal combat orders issued to the trainees.
The instructor monitors the performance of the trainees, builds up the
- tactical and engineering situation with Y~ypothetical problems and hears
the trainees~ decisions on them. Special attention is devoted ~o the
precise organization of the performance of engineer support tasks and
the tasks involved in controlling the performance of subordinates.
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A critique of the class is conducted after ali of the training sub~ects
have been covered, at which time the overall results of the class are
given, positive and negative aspects of the traineest performance are
noted~ individual evaluations are given for the sergeants, and instructions
- are issued for eliminating deficiencies revealed in their training.
Recommended Reading
1. A. A. Grechko9 ~~Vooruzhennyye Si1y Sovetskogo gosudarstvo" [The
Anned Forces of the Soviet State]~ Moscow~ Voyenizdat, 1971~�
2. V.K. Kharchenko, "Constant Attention to the Training of Sergeants,+~
VOYENNYY VESTIVIK, No. 11~ 1974.
3� V.I. Kalayda~ "Metodika provedeniya zanyatiy po inzhenernoy podgotovke"
[Methods for Conducting Engineer Training Classes], Moscow~ Voyenizdat,
1973.
V.N. Lutskov~ "Metody obucheniya sovetskikh voinov~~ [Methods for.
Training Soviet Fighting Men], Moscow~ Voyenizdat, 1g7o. .
5� I.F. Lysu.khin, "Inzhenernoye obespecheniye forsirovaniya rek" [Enp.neer
Support~for the Forcing of Rivers]~ Moscow~ Voyenizdat, 1968.
6. I.F. Lysukhi.n, ~~Metodika inzhenerno-takticheslfl.kh rashchetov~~ [Methods
for Making ~igineering-Tactical Computations], Moscow~ Voyenizdat, 1974�
7� F.I. Os~roukh, ~'Stroitel~stvo bystrovozvodimykh ubezhishch i protivo-
radiatsionnykh ulmytiy'~ [ Moscow~ Voyenizdat~ 1972�
8. V. Ya. Plyasld.n, et. al., ~~Inzhenernoye obespech.eni e obshchevoyskovogo
boya~~ [Engi.neer Support of the Combined-Arms Battle~, Moscow~ Voyeniz-
dat, 1972�
9� V.S. Chekalin and B.V. Varenyshev, ~~Fortifikatsionnoye oborudovaniye
mestnosti~~ [Fortification of the Terrain], Moscow~ Voyenizdat, ~974�
10. V.K. Shamshurov~ ~!Inzhenernoye obespecheniye boyevykh deystviy noch~yu
' ~ i v osobykh usloviyakh "[Ehgineer Support of Combat Operations at
Night and in Special Conditions]~ Moscow~ Voyenizdat, 1969. .
Other training and methodological literature at the instructor~s
discretion. ~
COF'YRIG~iT: Voyenizdat~ 1.977 .
~ .
l~?'99 END '
CSO: 1g01
. ~ 33
' ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100035-1