JPRS ID: 8736 SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/8736
- 29 October 1979
~
~~uth and East Asia Re or#
p
(FOUO 6/79)
,
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JPRS L/8736
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29 Oc~taber 19 79
SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT
~
(FOUO 6/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
INDTA
~
Solar Energy Development ~roceeds Rapidly
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 24~Sep 79 1
KAMPUCHEA
Sihanouk Writes on Kampuchean Situation
(Norodom Sihanouk; L'EXPRESS, 1 Sep 79) 2 -
~ LA~S
Lao Refugee Reports Vietnam Tnfluence in Country `
(GUNJI KENKYU, Oct 79) 17
~ Information on Lao Military Units 18
Information on Lao Military Units 23 ~
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- a - [III - ASIA - 107 FOU~]
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- INDlA
SOLAR ~NERGY DEVELOPMENT PROCEEDS RAPIDLY
~ To~yo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 24 Sep 79 p 7
[Text]
- TNDIA, too, is keen on de- by an Indian technology," Dr. more uneven in makeup than
veloping solar energy. Of this Jain explained. "I estitnate that polycrystalline silicon, amor-
we were made aware at the its cost can be reduce~i to one- phous silicoi~, like grass, con-
National Physical Laboratory, tenttf of the coet ot singla tains atoms and molecules un-
New Delhi, which has devised crystal silicon:' evenly distributed.
a polycrystalliae silicon solar Polycrystalliae silicon, be- Japanese universities and in-
cell. ing an .assembly of tiny aingle dustrial companies started re-
"It replaces' a single-crystal cr~+sts?1~, ia con4idard� ~sty search into amorphous silicon
silicon solar cell which still is inferior in electric'ity-geaera� cells a year or two ago.
too expensive to be servicea- tion efficiancy. This officieacy Cells made of amorphous
b1e," explained the labor- is determined by the output, silicon are poor in efficiency,
atory's Dr. Jain. in milliwatts, obtainable by so the Poona laboratory use~ -
In an outdoor experutlent- means of a cell one square an alloy of silicon and ordi-
ir~g stati~n we were shown centimeter in area from 100, nar}~ hydrogen. It has devised
eight solar-cell panels, each ~watts of solar ray projected an apparatus to produce silane
about 20 centimeters by SO Pa' ~luare centianeter. (SiH,~). the gas for p~aking the
- centimeters, supported by an The polycrystalline silicon alloy. "Our goal is an effi-
iron frame stood slantingly. cells made at the New Delhi cie~cy rate of 10 percent for
Small, disk-shaped solar cells laboratory' are each 1.6 centi- our cells, says the labora-
were laid all over each panel meters in diameter and 17 tory's Dr. S. T. Kshirsagar.
' like so many checkers on a milliwatts in output,. That If ali goes well, there is hope
~ checkerboard. A declining af- means an efficiency rate of of making the cells at lower
; ternoon sun shone full on about 8.5 percent, compared cost than polycrystalline sili-
them. with the i0-14 percent for the con celis.
- A cord stretched from the single-crystal silicon ce~ls in Amorphous siticon cells are
i panels into an experime~lting servtce in 7a~an. But the dif- expected to go into commer-
house close by. Dr. Jain ference in cost makes an emi- cial production in Japan in the
~ switched on the cord. A small nently redeeming feature for near future, but their efficien-
alectric fan on an experiment- the New Delhi produc~ cy rate is as low as 2 per-
ing table began generating a Woman does the work cent or so.
; soothing breeze. In Japan, so'.1r cells are
Tf~e solar cells in service in In the laboratory's inspec- used mainly in lighthouses and
Japan aze mosdy single-crystal tion room, a sari-clad woman at radio relay stations. In In- _
silicon cells which Dr. 7ain ~ ~'as hard at, work, placing dia,� there should be a big fu-
finds expensive. A single crys- oae cell after another~ on a ture demand for them as pow-
~ tal is made up of silicon atom measuring instrument and re- er sources for homes in re-
lattices neatly arranged. It cording their characteristics mote areas. For one thing,
takes a'great deal of time and �'ith a pen recorder. they require no transmission
~ money to produce single crys- '~e National Chemical La-. wires which cost much
~ tals on a commercial basis. boratory in Poona, near Bom- money to set , up. But
i "Our polycrystalline silicon bay, has gone a step further above all, tt~dia is rich in sua-
has been developed out of a and started expenmenting shine.
j byproduct of iron-steel mills with amorphous silicon. Even
, CON1~'RTGHT: ~sahi Evening News, 1979
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ICAMPUCHEA -
SIHANOUK WRITES ON KAMPUCHEAN SITUATION
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 1 Sep 79 pp 146-151, 154-155, 158
[Article by Norodom Sihanouk: "Cambodia: War and Suicide"]
[Text] A prisoner in his pa.lace, Prince Norodom Sihanouk
- was present during thac abomination known as the Cambodian
genocide, He followed the ups~and-downs of the war
between communists when Giap's tanks swarmed over his
- � country. He saw child soldiers trained to commit acts
of cruelty. He heard the comments of their leaders. He ~
now gives us his eye-witness report of those events. .
His book, "Chroniques de guerre et d'espoir" [Chronicle
of War and Hope], published by Stock-Hachette, will appear
, in bookstores next week. Suddenly, ~:ti.e incomprehensible
becomes clear. Norodom Sihanouk reveals his conversations -
with Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong, and the ulterior
motives of the Khmer Rouge. But above all, he offers ~
a comprehensive explanation revealing that this conflir_t
between Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge had, in fact, been _
raging for 8 years. Even at the Y?eight of the war with
the Americans, between 1970 and 1975, the alleged brothers
of the former Indochina were settling old scores and -
killing one another. Norodom Sihanouk names--occasionally -
with anger--those persons responsible. In an exclusive -
interview given L'EXPRESS by te~_ex from Pyongyang, the
capital of North Korea, where he has taken refuge, the
' former Cambodian chief of state explains why he no longer
agrees with the present Peking leadership. [Translation
of this interview follows Sihanouk's article].
In late December 1977, the armed forces of. socialist Vietnam launched their
"Blitzkrieg No 1" against "democratic" Kampuchea.* The Vietnamese soldiers -
and their armored vehicles attacked Pol Pot's troops on several fronts
= along practically the entire iength of the common Vietnamese-Kampuchean t~
~ Kampuchea: Cambodia. Kampuchean: Cambodian.
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border from the high pl.ateaus to th~ Gulf of Thailand. The invaders
advanced to within some 50 kilometers of Phnom Penh.
This blitzkrieg was merely "fireworks." General Giap's armored and infantry
units began withdrawing from Kampuchea on b January 1978, taking with them
150,000 Khmer "members" of Pol Pot's "cooperatives."* According to
Rac~io Hanoi, these Kampucheans had "freed themselves" by their own means
and succeeded in fle~eing to Vietnam. Radio Phnom Penh retorted that the .
- retreating invasior. forces have forcibly taken the (150,000) refugees with
them. The truth is that the Vietnamese used these 150,000 rafugees to
provide more or less voluntary supporters for the United Front for the
National Salvation of Kampuchea (FUNSK, an organ3zation created by Hanoi
in December 1978) and also to give a certait~ credibiiity to the "Kampuchean
people's movement" directed against Pol Pot and the People's Republic of
China! '
~ Pol Pot's supporters made some serious mistakes after 6 Jatauary 1978. The ~
withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops made them insanely arrogant. The
6th of January became a"historic date" on the "national calendar." ~
Khmer Rouge leaders declared that the "victory of 6 January 1978" surpassed
in importar.ce even the victory of 17 April 1975," their entry into Phnom Penh.
Khmer Rouge propaganda never stopped harping on the same slogan to the effect
that "democratic" Kampuchea was 10 times, 100 times, 1,0~0 t~mes more
- powerful than Socialist Vietnam, an.d that it had "the world's most responsible,
most respectable, most far~sighted, and most extraordinary" leaders. As a
result,the armed forces, cadres and members of the Khmer Rouge party, all
- ultimately no longer believed in the possibility of any victorious revenge
by the Vietnamese.
e
. Pol Pot became intoxicated a little too quickly with "his" victory and to
such a point r_hat he was comparing himself to the greatest conquerors of
thP past, such as Alexander of~~Macedonia, Caesar the Roman, Napoleon the
- Corsican, Hitler the Nazi, etc. Pol Pot is a"visionary." According to
Khieu Samphan (the chief of state), who acted som~ewhat as Pol pot's
_ spokesman to "the r.etired Sihanouk," it appeared that the "Vietnamese
Danger," with a capital D, was like a cancer endangering the Kampuchean
body's existence in the same way that cancer could eat away at a man's
body. Son Sen, Pol Pot's defense minister, had previously told me, in '
September 1975, that to save Kampuchea and the Kampuchean race from total
and irreversible extinction, this Vietnamese disease, this cancer, had
to be removed from "Kampuchea's body" once and for all by a"thre~fold
surgical operation."
On several occasions in the course of our ~rare) conversations during the
period 1976-1978, Khieu Samphan insisted on explaining the details of this
"thre?fold surgical operation":
* Pol Pot's "cooperatives" are concentration camps, as Norodom Sihanouk
~ explains later in his article.
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First, categorically deny to all Vietnamase, no matter who they may be,
the right to live in Kampuchea. The measures taken for this purpose by -
the Khmer Rouge included the physical liquidation of a large number of '
Vietnamese residents "suspected of being Viet Minh or Viet Cong agents
or spies," and also the expulsion "manu militari" of all other Vietnamese
residents. This latter action had already been taken by the second half =
of I973.
Second, give all Kampuchean men and women the order to work 2 times,
= 10 rimes harder than the Vietnamese people, and this, Khieu ~amphan
exp].ained to me, was for the purpose of making Kampuchea much stronger
than Vietnam in all respects, militarily, economically and ideologically. .
According to the Khmer Rouge leaders, this forced labor imposed on their
own people would transform Kampuchea into an "impregnable fortress." _
Third, "accept" a large-scale armed confrontation with Vietnam so as to
block Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism which, without the "barrier" erected
- by Democratic Kampuchea, would inevitably quickly spread over the rest of
Southeast Asia.
In a late 1978 press coiiference, Pol Pot mentioned, in utter seriousness,
' the "probability" that Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Bulgarian and East German
troops would be sent to the rescue of the Vietnamese, Soviets and Cubans
"in full route in Kampuchea." In all seriousness, Pol Pot asserted that
the Vietnamese were too weak to dare pit themselves "alone" against
Kampuchea's revolutionary army. He added that this was why the Soviets
had had to commit to the anti~Kampuchean war a good number of Russian and
Cuban pilots, tankers, artillerymen, and staff officers.
Pol Pot, still "very serious," explained that despite this formidable
Russian-Cuban reinforcement, the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam would be totally defeated by his Khmer Rouge troops, He then
imperturbably predicted that the USSR would soon be obliged to help the
collapsing Vietnamese by dispatching troops from East European countries,
- "r~embers of the Warsaw Pact." Speaking in the grandiloquent tone of a
"gre.at expert" in guerrilla warfare, Fol Pot gave his journalistic "fr.iends"
_ a magisterial lecture to which, T imagine they must have listened open- -
mouthed: "We Khmer Rouge have provided for everything. We ha.ve taken all
adequate measures to "welcome" these Bulgarians, Czechoslovaks, East
Germans, etc, Like the Yankees in 1970. These Wsrsaw Pact Europeans
will be quickly decimated by our guerrilla forces, and also by our
country's extremely hot climate, by the terrible drawbacks (for them) of our r
~ rainy season, etc."
~n a decidedly imaginative mood, Pol Pot laugtiingly added: "Accustomed to
a daily fare of bread and European disl:es, to drinking wine or beer, these
Europeans from the Warsaw Pact will very rapidly become hors de combat as
soon as they find themselves unable to become inured to the waters from ,
our stagnant pools and our ponds, and once they have exhausted their canned
food!"
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Admittedly, in a war, one must not overestimate the enemy. But it is also
extremely dangerous to underestimate that enemy and scorn it. Wnat is -
~ more, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary,* Khieu Samphan and Son Sen took inordinate delight '
in imagining all sorts of utterly freakish occurrences for the subsequent
phases of the Kampuchean-Vietnamese war, for example, direct intervention
i
' by combat troops dispatched from Moscow, Havana, and even Prague, Sofia,
Budapest and East Berlin, all of whom would fall like so many flies sprayed _
with insecticide. -
This folly eventually spread among the young Khmer Reuge. My jailers took ~
pleasure in telling my entourage about their "recent exploits at the front."
These men were most probably excellent and even heroic soldiers. But once
- they were far removed from the front, they ended up thinking they had become
legendary heroes, whereas�they were really mor~ like Tartarins de Tarascon _
[Tartarin is the novelist Alphonse Daudet's comic, boastful hero who is so
carried away by his own tall stories that he believes them]. They claimed,
with unfeigned conviction, that they had each killed, in each "clash," dozens
of Vietnamese and even destroyed, with their "unsophisticated" weapons, -
tanks, aircraft, etc. ' -
This then is how the Khmer Rouge became caught in the trap of their own
monstrous propaganda machine.
This ostrichlike policy prevented the Khmer Rouge from facing up to certain
disagreeable facts. Here, as an example, is only one of the hundr.ed such
facts: the insidious and persistent infiltration of Vietnamese units into
_ a certain number of border areas, particularly into the so-called "203" area.
As a matter of fact, after their alleged "total withdrawal" on 6 January 1978,
the Vietnamese succeeded in establishing and consolidating impregnable
military bases in certain sectors of strategic importance, such as the _
"Parrot's Beak" and the rubber plantations of Kompong.
~ Radio Peking endeavored to draw the attention of Kampucheans "indirectly"
- to this slow, discreet but nevertheless real, successful infiltration by ~
the Vietnamese. By listening to Radio Peking, it was possible to obtain
a very clear, daily picture of the territorial "gains" made by the
Vietnamese. Yet Pol Pot's supporters imperturbably continued to proclaim
over their radio that they were not losing even 1 inch of ground.
Radio Phnom Penh daily announced new impeccable victories over the
- Vietnamese who were labeled "funky and cowardly to the nth degree."
Towards the end of th~ir reign, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary mistrusted everyone.
_ They ended up displeasing a good part of their own armed forces by making
a distinction between the "die-hards" of the southwestern region and the .
"less reliable" military personnel in other regions. There were six
* lleputy prime minister for foreign affairs, and the No 2 man in the
Khmer Rouge regime.
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"superdivisions" protecting the Pol Pots and the Ieng Sarys in Phnom Penh
and around the capital. The "ordinary" divisions were called upon to
_ march "normally" to their death at the front. They were not as well-fed
or as w~ll-equipped with madern weapons a:~ the "superdivisions" of the
"Praetorian guard" and had less firepower than the latter.
Pol Pot's favorites were the Yothea, peasants from the Mount Aural region
in Kompong Speu Province. Unlike most of the peasants in the res~ of
Cambodia, they had spontaneously and totally devoted themselves to the
Khmer Rouge revolution. They accepted all possible sacrifices to ensure
the triumph of Pol Pot's cause. As a result, they received the supreme
- honor of m~nning a"safety belt" around Phnom Penh, of providing security
for the capital i.tself, and of conducting various punitive operations
against "undisciplined elements" of the revolutionary army, particularly
those in Area 203 bordering on South Vietnam, (and to which the following
had "belonged": Heng Samrin, Chea Sim and Ros Samay, currer.tly "in the
government" in Phnom Penh).
The result of such a"class policy" proved disastrous to Pol Pot's attempt
to retain power in Phnom Penh. The "ordinary" divisions were sacrificed
in advance. In December 1978, General Giap's "W~rr.~acht" cut them down
in the eastern and northeastern provinces and in the famous Parrot's Beak.
_ When Giap's armored columns appeared before the gates of Phnom Penh in early
- January 1979, Pol Pot and Teng Sary decided to leave them the cap ital in
order to save the six superdivision of their praetorian guard. They held
them in reserve for future counteroffensives to be launched from guerrilla
strongholds in the Elephant and Cardamom mountain ranges.
By 1978, according to Radio Hanoi, Pol Fot and Ieng Sary had already
"liquidated" 3 million Kampucheans. Hanoi was doubtlessly exaggerating.
Yet even if Pol Pot and Ieng Sary k.illed only 1.5 million Cambodians
between 1975 and 1978, the constantly shrinking population of Kampuchea
was enough to portend a bitter defeat for Pol Pot when Hanoi launched
another blitzkrieg, especially since the surviving 5 million Khmer were .
already exhausted after 3 years of forced labor, privations of every kind,
and adversities unparalleled in the entire history of mankind!
_ Another aspect of this very dark picture was the agonizing flight of those
' desperate persons wishing to escape the hell created by Pol Pot and
Ieng Sary, These "slaves" o~ the regime--former uni.versity and secondary
~ school students, compulsorily unfrocked Buddhist mo~iks, doctors, officials
of *he previous regime, former Lon Nol soldiers, bourgeois, ex-capitalists
having "miraculously" survived the genocide of "class enemies," peasants
unwilling to accept communism, etc.--took considerable risks in braving
minefields and other deadly booby traps in an effort to find freedom "
beyond their national borders.
Those Khmers crowded into refugee camps in Thailand report that scarcely
one-tenth of the fugitives succeeded in safely crossing the border.
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Why were the Khmer Rouge so cruel?
There are two basic reasons:
- 1. Their recruiting methods: the only persons "recruited" were "poor ~
peasants," Montagnards, persons living in forested areas and the inost remote
villages, in short, those who had been most neglected by the previous
regime. For what purpose? A clever propaganda campaign imbued their hearts
and minds with an increasingly burnirig hatred, an inextinguishable hatred,
of the "upper classes," namel;� those p~rsons wealthy enough to be well- ,
housed, well-clothed and well-fed, those who could send their children to
scho~~l without needing to keep them at home to worlc in the fields or care
for the oxen or buffaloes, those who had servants and owned a great deal of
personal and real property, those whu had no trouble paying their taxes or
' who collected taxes, those who administered, who governed. In a word,
all those who "oppressed."
2. The use of children: as soon as these children were enlisted. in the
revolutionary armed forces, they were separated from their family, removed
far from their native v~llage, and regrouped within the indoctrination ;
mold of Pol Pot supporters. Recruits began their military career at
12 years of age. Taken in hand at a very earl'y age by their leaders, they
became quickly convinced that the party had bestowed the greatest possible
_ honor on them by designating them "the p2rty's dictatorial instrument." -
Being "the party's dictatorial instrumenC" meant having the possibility to
command the "herds of workers," those men and women who were not members
of the party, those men and women--inc].uding intellectuals and former
- university students,-who had been driven from the cities and rich villages
at the end of the war (April 1975), those znen and women who had been
members of FUNK*~~including former ambassador of the Royal Government of
National Union of Kampuchea--and whom the party had not yet decided
to "liquidate."
~ r n
Being the party s dictatorial instrument meant having the right to life _
and death over all herds of slaves "of every category~" It meant having
the r.i~ht to freely consume whatever could be found in cooperatives or in
the fields (.fruits~ meat, etc.), whereas the ordinary "civilians" received
only a daily ration strictly measured out by the local "chairman."
The Khmer Rouge child soldiers had no reason to detest Pol Pot's inhuman
regime. They had never known or could not clearly recall the "gentle
life" of the Sihanouk era. And they sincerely believed what they were
_ being told about the "former society," a"detestable, contemptible, corrupt,
unju~t ar,d utterly oppressive" society.
* FiJP~C: National United Front of KampUchea, established by Norodom
Sitianouk on 23 March 1970.
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Back in the 1960's, Pol Pnt, Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan had
- dec9.ded to eliminate, with no qualms, all obstacles they might face in their
_ determined march toward total domination of Kampuchea. One of the first -
trai.ning methods designed to harden their soldiers was the "game of cruelty"
in which young recruits began to "harden the3r heart and mind" by using a
stick or bayonet to kill dogs, cats and other "edible" animals.
Even after their victory of 17 April 1975, when the Khmer Rouge no longer
had any human beings to torture or kill, these young soldiers kept themselves
in "shape" by throwing animals into a roaring f ire.
In the Royal Palace where I was kept under house arrest, I saw, in 1976,
the political "commissar" in charge of the "princely prisoners," and his staff
derived great pleasure from catching mice, locking them in a cage, and then _
set~ing f ire. to the cage. The commissar and his men enjoyed themselves
immensely at the sight of th e mice scurrying atiout, desperately and vainly
trying to find a way out. They then gleefully wa~ched the death-throes of
these animals burned al ive. This was a daily show. And it was simply
out of the question for my f amily to lect~re its jailers, because they
- would hav e been at a loss to understand "enervative Buddhism."
. Another " game" consisted in torturing monkeys whose "suffering resembled
that of humans." The torturers would cut off the monkey's tail with an axe.
- They also enchained them. The chain, wound around the monkey's neck, would
choke him little by little as he was forced to run behind his torturer
who kept pulling harder and harder on the chain~ The poor monkeys would _
shriek with pain. The spectacle and screams were unbearable. But the =
y ouung Khmer Rouge were overjoyed at these sights and sounds.
One day, a skinny female dog ran into the palace grounds, She was pregnant.
A soldier took a stick and bludgeoned her to death. A few hours late~, we
were "treated" to roast dog and roast fetus of puppies.
Not far from the Royal Palace, a company of soldiers had a rather "special"
method of raising crocodiles. They fed them live monkeys, Every day,
monkeys were thrown into the crocodile pit and the soldiers reveled in the
actions of the unfortunate simians Toho yelped with terror and tried in vain
to get ou t of the pit. And then, subdued and hypnotized by the stony stare
of the monstrous reptiles, the monkeys were inevitably snapped up and
devoured.
Pol Pot h ad believed, and rightly so, that by hardening his soldiers ear]_y
_ in the "game of cruelty," they would ultimately become infatuated wit_h
butchery, and consequently cvith war, During the 3 years of my detention
among the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh, I often heard the soldiers guarding
. my "camp" bemoan the fact that they had not been sent back "to the front" `
and could not "kill themselves some Vietnamese," It is certain that the
best gift Pol Pot and Ieng Sary could give their soldiers was to just simply
send them into the front lines to clash with the enemy. Khmer Rouge
- soldiers, men and women, fel t no f ear of being killed or wounded, and they
continue to ignore such Eear completely, In this connection, we must give
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credit to the Khmer Rouge soldiers: while they do "adore" killing and making
their victims suffer as much as possible, these Pol Pot supporters, or
- "Polpotians" as they are called, rise above their awn physical suffering _
and maintain a perfectly stoical. attitude itt the worse personal situations. _
What are the factors that contributed to the Vietnamese victory in Kampuchea
on 7 January 1979?
The Vietnamese are a~ extremely intelligent, tenacious, and heroic people.
Their government and party are closely knit and united. In the opinion
of the best experts, Vietnam has one of the world's finest armies. In
~ addition, the Vietnamese never forget the humiliation inflicted upon them.
These are the facts that a person should know if he wants to understand the
Socialist Rep ublic of Vietnam. `
, In tiis youth, Ieng Sary lived for a long time in Vietnam. He should have ~
known, therefore, that provoking the Vietnamese was playing with fire! ~
When you choose a"mortal enemy," it is essential first to know that enemy ~
well from eve~py aspect, "from every angle." Admittedly the Khmer Rouge ~
were right in telling me that it was absolutely n~cessary to beware of over-
estimating the enemy, that it was essential to free Kampucheans of any
inferiority complex with respect to the Vietnamese~ But what ruined these
"revolutionary" Kampucheans was their truly extraordinary superiority complex ~
= with respect to the Vietnamese, to Vietnam�in its entirety, to the United ;
(of course!), even to their dearest allies, in short, to the whole world! I
In such matters as arrogance, bluster and contempt for one's allies, Hitler ;
is largely surpassed by his Khmer Rouge "disciples." '
I shall analyze this lexicon of arrogance* `
i
_ In 197b-1978, Khieu Samphan complacently told me that the Koreans qf
Kim Il-song's regime (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) were "on the
wrong course" in communization and defense matters, because in wanting to
inordinately raise their people's standard o~ living and develop their
economy, the North Koreans ended up having luxurious houses arid automobiles
and much too beautiful country homes. "Those people," he added, "are letting
themselves become captivated by the comforts of their new, allegedly
communist, way of life." And they no longer dare provoke or even face up
to a new war to lib~rate South Korea and achieve national reunification."
In September 1975, Premier Chou En-1ai, already very ill at the time,
received us in his Peking hospital room. During that meeting he advised,
in my presence, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Thirith (Mrs ~eng Sary) not to
attempt to attain integral communism in one single giant "leap." The wise _
- and far-sighted veteran of the Chinese Revolution underscored the necessity
of "proceeding by stages," of advaricing cautiously towards socialism. Once
the stage of socialism has been reached after several years of patient effort,
it will then be time, at that particular movement, to advance towards
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- communism. Premier Chou En-lai recalled how China itself had suffered bitter
and disastrous setbacks not so long ago by wanting to make "great leaps
forward." He recommended: "Proceed instead by sma11 stages. That is the
surest way to lead Katt~i~uchea and its people to development, prosperity -
- and happiness." In rpply, the "3uniors," Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary, merely
smiled with an air of skepticism and "superiority."
During that same period, hav3ng reCurned to Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan and
Son Sen told me--no cioubt as an 3.ndirect reply to Chou En-lai--thaC their
Kampuchea was going to give the whol~ world proof that integral communism
- can be achieved in one fe.~.l swoop,
"Thus," they added, "our country wi11 have its name inscribed in letters of -
gold in wor.ld history, having been the first country to communize success-
- fully without goLng through useless stages."
Tt is understandable, therefore, that such folly was able to render the
Khmer Rouge totally blind to the tremendous Vietnamese "potet~tialities."
= The Vietnamese, for their part, realized full well that they would be able
to brin~ ttie arrogant Po1 P~t-Ieng Sary governm6nt to recognize its errors
only by waging war against it, a major war organized according to all the
_ rules of the "martial" art.
If the truth must be told, the alleged Viet*lamese "defeat" in late ~
December 1977 at the hands of the Khmer Rouge army was never any such thing.
- As part of their Blitzkrieg No 1, the Vietnamese literally swept away all
Khmer Rouge divisions opposing their advance to Neak Luong, a strategic
~ position from which the captrare of Phnam Penh would have been mere child's
play. In 1977, crossing the Mekong opposite Neak Luong would have been
no problem whatsoever for. the Vietnamese who had amphibious vehicles and -
, ferries.
Pol Pot's artillery was still "in its inf ancy" and had no capability of
opposing such a river crossing. As for the Khmer Rouge air Force, it was
insignificant, indeed even nonexistent. But the Vietnamese had no intention
of attacking Phnom Penh at that time. They wished to avoid any inopportune
and dangerous international condemnation.
The mistake made by Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, when confronted with the Vietnamese
Blitzkrieg No 2(1978-1979), was to organize the permanent departure from
_ Phnom Penh of foreign embassies at the approach of Vo Nguyen Giap's "Wehrmacht."
By 6 January 1979, all diplomats friendly to the Khmer Rouge had left the
capital. On 7 January, the Viets enCered it en masse, Nobody could testify
_ to their presence in Phnom Penh or in the rest of the country, except, of
course, the Russians and their satellites who~-as we can readly guess---
deliberately "saw nothing."
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The Vietnamese sCrategy was obvious: they organized the tota]. conquest
of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary's Kampuchea into two distinct stages. Blitzkrieg No 1
was the firet stage of the process. It destroyed a large part of the enemy's i
vital elements and ruined a large part of its national economy: looted tY~e ,
recently harvested rice and other gr~ins, and the rubber from rubber
plantations. It also destroyed these plantations and all factories and
industrial enterprises. Another very important action taken was the ;
elimination of "excessively Polpotian" cadres, while the "recoverable"
Khmer Rouge and the "slaves" were taken into Vie~nameae terr3tory, over~
- joyed at extricating themselves so easilq and being able to escape the
living hell of Kampuchea. In this way, the Vietnamese were ab1e, in
January 1978, to bring into Vietnam tens of thousands of Kampuchean ~
- civilians, men and women. Once "settled" in Vietnam, the Buddhist monks ;
unfrocked by Pol Pot were able to don, once again, the saffron-colored
_ robes of Buddha's disciples, and also become ardent advocates of the
rebellion against Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. ~
i
_ Hence, thanks to the Vietnamese Blitzkrieg No 1, the future "government" ~
- of Heng Samrin was able to have, as of January 1978, a large number of
persons under its jurisdic~ion--at least 150,000-~-including cadres (Khmer ;
= Rouge voluntarily changed into Khmer Viet Minh), professors, teachers, ,
doctors, technicians, even journalists (.Pol Pot~s slaves now emanicipaCed),
all of them ral~lied to the cause of the "Indochinese Federation" under the
aegis of the "heirs of Uncle Ho."
The last factor having contributed to the Vietnamese victorq in January 1979
is called the USSR. The Soviets had an old score to settle with the -
_ Khmer Rouge.Son Sen, the deputy prime minister for national defense,
described for me, in September 1975, "the Russian-Kampuchean incident" of
17 April 1975: Upon entering "liberated" Phnom Penh on that day, a Khmer
Rouge detachment expelled "manu militari" the Soviet diplomats from their
embassy building and authoritatiively lowered the USSR colors flying above
' the embassy. ,
The initial reaction of the Soviets was to refuse to come out of the
building. The Polpotian soldiers first took an intimidatory measure: they
riddled the embassy walls wirh bullets. They then stormed the building.
The Russian diplomats were forced to follow their "eaptors," but not
without having been suhjected to yeC another humiliation: their wrists
were tied with a very abrasive, farmer's-type rope. This rope was not -
removed until the Soviets were brought into the French embassy compound
which had been transformed, despite French protestations, into a(temporary)
concentration camp "reserved for foreigners" pending their expulsion from
the "new Kampuchea." Leonid Brezhnev's representatives never forgave the
Khmer Rouge for this insult.
But this insult was not the only th3ng that persuaded the Russians to give
the Vietnamese decisive assistance. From 1975 to 1977, the entire Soviet
- bloc exerted an unprecedented effort to get in the good graces of the Khmer
Rouge. It was hoped, contrary to all common sense, thati Pol Pot, Ieng Sary,
- Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, all "150 percent" pro-Chinese, would eventually
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relerit under the influence of the East's "good will" and "outburst of ardent
~ overtures," a11 of which were totally suspect, however. Cuba, the spearhead
of ":�~ocial-imperialist" penetration into the Third World, had made a point
of of'ficially supporting the Khmer Rouge anti-American resistance from
1970 to 1975. It did not succeed, however, in convincing the new Kampvchean _
republic to declare itself "a neutral and nonalined country" equally dlstant -
from the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.
War-weary and humiliated, the USSR, in an effort to avoid losing face and ,
correc't its bad image resulting from iCs support of the Lon Nol regime from
1970 to 1975, decided to regain Kampuchea's "friendship " by force and with
Vietnam as intermediary. This decision by the Russians was also consistent
_ with their hegemonic aims in the Third World.
For China, it was fundamental and even vital that Kampuchea not aline itself
with ~'ietnam and the USSR who were already controlling Laos. Because the
Polpotians had stubbornly, and with highly humiliating disdain, repulsed
the Soviet bloc's advances and toadyism, and alined themselves 150 percent
with China, they had to be punished. Such was the purpose of the Blitzt~.rieg.
In February�-March 1979, the Chinese Army's steamroller crushed the too
- ~ arrogant Vietnamese in Vietnam's northern provinces. This Chinese operation ~
- literally enabled the K'nmer Rouge regime to survive.
Today, that regime does indeed subsist in certain parts of Kampuchea. Its ~
guerrillas are much more at home in the jung].e than in the cities. They
are beginning to perk up and are making the future of the "government" of
Hanoi`s "Quisling," Hen~ Samrin, more uncertain than ever.
Sometime in 1978, Khieu Samph~n, my successox as Kampuchean chief of state,
told me that even at the height of the anti-American war (1970~1975),
Kampuchea's Communist Party and revolutionary army nevex ceased considering
_ North Vietnam and its army as enemy No 1, with American imperialism ranking
- only second. Khieu Samphan explained that "the Americans could conquer
our country only superficially, whereas the men from Iianoi would swallow _
it, would send in tens of millions of Vietnamese to colonize it in depth,
thereby reducing our 8 million Kampucheans to the status of an ethnic _
minority. That would mean the end of our race and our national sovereignty!"
This was no doubt one of the reasons Lon Nol's very weak "Khmer Republic"
was so slow in "falling like ripe fruit." The American press itself--the
same one which, in 1971-1972, had predicted, without excessive pessimism,
- that the Lon Nol regime would fa7.l in 1973 at the latest--expressed astonish-
ment in 1974 at that regime's "inexplicable" longevity! The reason for this
"astonishing longevity" was simple: the Khmer Rouge did not worry much
about American imperialism, instead their primary coricern was to settle -
their score with their Viet Minh-Viet Cong "comrades" and "companions in
arms," not to mention the difficult liquidation of the Khmer Viet Minh and
the Sihanoukists! There is no doubt about it, the war that stretched from
March 1970 to April 1975 was certainly not commonplace. Indeed it was
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One day in March 1973 when I was in the liberated area, I asked Son Sen-- j-
- then the chief of staff of the Khmer Rouge forces--how combat operations ~
were coordinated between his troops and Vietnamese troops. Son Sen very
calmly answered thati "the Vietnamese iiad to fend for themselves." Fighting
separaCely, without any coordination, without any cooperation, without any i-
mutual assistance, and completely ignoring one another, even though the i
American enemy was all-powerful: such conduct was beyond anyone's imagina- I
tion, even the imagination of a Kafka! ,
I am convinced that, in spite of everything, there were certain "relations"
between the "hostile brothers," and I shall mention the following, among
others�
- l. Use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail for the transportation of supplies and other
aid from the People's Republic of China to the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge
told me that the Vietnamese were shamelessly helping themselves to these -
supplies. But I believe that at least part of the shipments from China
must have reached the Kampucheans.
2. The artillery support~--especially from heavy artillery--obviously fur--
nished by the Vietnamese in ~mportant Kl~er Rouge operations. ' .
3. The repeated round trips to China made via the Ho Chi l!inh Trail by
such key figures of the regime as Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and company.
These gentlemen made more and more frequent trips, at Vietnamese expense.
The Khmer Rouge denounced the "criminal ego~sm" of the Vietnamese lieca,use, ~
in 1973, the latter had finally signed an agreement which provisionally _
ended the war between the Viets and the Americans~ This cessation of the '
fighting ensured the "availability" of all U.S~ air and naval~a~r forces
in the Far East, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. These forces were then
- massively employed against the Khmer Rouge.
During my entire stay in the liberated area of Kampuchea, in March 1973,
I witnessed varied and ruthless round~the-clock bombings and straf:ings of
our cities, small market towns, villages, lines of communicatiori, archeo--
logical treasures, croplands, rice fields, rubber plantations, and even
virgin forests, in fact anything likely to serve the Khmer Rouge as cover. _
These extremely murderous American operations were conducted without respite~
even on Sundays. With my w ife Monique, I had the special honor of e::~
periencing bombings and straf~ngs alongside Khmer Rouge leaders (including
Pol Pot) .
~
Upon my return to Kampuchea after the ~,pril 1975 victoryt I was allowed to
see and talk to Khieu Samphan, Son Sen and associates. They made me very -
conscious of the resentment and even the hatred tfiey harbored toward the -
leaders in Hanoi as a result of the "Vietnamese betrayal" of 1973, After
a while, they admitted to me that by leaving them in the lurch, the Viets
had allowed them to take draconian measures designed to put an end to
the presence of the North Vietnamese Viet Cong.
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The Viets Yiad previously been able to live like "fish in the Kampuchean
= water." They were allawed to take certain Kampucheans back to Hanoi to serve -
them in military, political, ideological, economic, social and other
= capacities. After my departure from the liberated area (April 1973) and
retnrn to Peking, the Khmer Rouge decided to deprive the Viet "fish" of -
Kampuchean "water." They took it upon themselves to "regroup" the population
of each commune and each district into "cooperatives." These were rapidly -
transformed into veritable concentration camps whose compulsory members were,
of cour~e, denied the possibility of having any kind of dealings with the
Viets.
For instance, the Khmer Rouge began, in 1973, to empty our Tonle Sap (Great
Lake), our rivers and streams of their Vietnamese occupants. These -
Vietnamese were ~ishermen. In 1969, there were more than 400,000 Vietnamese
in hampuchea. Immediately after their coup d'etat of 1970, Lon Nol supporters
elimizated and expelled into Vietnam at least half of these Vietnamese. As
personally acknowledged by Khieu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge "did the rest"
between 1973 and 1975. In 1978, Radio Hanoi confirmed the Pol Pot regime's
murder or massive repatriation of Vietnamese residents of Kampuchea.
In his speeches and press conferences, PoI Pot showed himself to be deeply
fascinated by Hitler: He would obsessively harp on this disturbing theme:
"We are accused of having committed monstrous crimes! But we are not Hitlers!
Hitler was the only one capable of genocide!" Pol Pot would pronounce and
mention this name--"Hitler"..."Hitler"..."Hitler"--with obvious relish and
obsession. The genocide of Vietnamese by Lon Nol, and afterward by Pol Pot,
strangely resembled Hitler's genocide of Jews.
Who Are the Khmer Rouge?
The Khmer Rouge leaders belong to two ca~egories of intellectuals.
The first category, which I call the "superintellectuals," is composed of
persons with advanced degrees. For example, Khieu Samphan has a doctorate
of economics from a celebrated French university, and Thiounn Mumm is the
= only Khmer to have graduated from the French Ecole Polytechnique. The
other two "specimens," whose reputation is now international, were Hou Youn
- and Hu Nim. Each held a Doctor of Laws degree. Interior Minister
_ Hou Youn and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim were very likely assassinated--one
after the victory of 17 April 1975 and the other in late March or early -
- April 1977--on orders from Pol Pot and Ieng Sary because they were felt
to be "too dynamic" and "too popular." -
The second category is composed of secondary school teachers (example:
� Son Sen) or e].ementary school teachers who became secondary schvol teachers
after completing teacher training in France (example: Pol Pot and Ieng Sary).
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~ These two categories of Khmer Rouge have the followtng in comanon: hatred
of the monarchy which they say is "bimillennial: this really is the limit!'';
a supernationalism much more chauvinistic than Sihanouk's; an ardent love
of t~he People's Republic of China and unbounded admiration for Chinese ;
communism when the latter was carried to its most terrible extremism
(Cultural Revolution). And yet these Khmer Rouge leaders had started out ;
being republican nationalists back in the days when some of them were
studen ts and others teachers. ~
- Their association with French and international co~nunists in France had
made our young "antifeudalisCs" turn "Red." When they returned to Phnom
Penh and entered, after 1956, into relations with diplomats of the People's
Republic of China, our "Parisian communists" changed into "Maoist Reds." '
Between 1956 and 1970 (.the year of the Lon Nol coup), "our" Khmer Rouge ,
- steadily "grew taller and bigger" ideologically "by sucking" on the People's .
Republic of Chin~. According to Pol Pot himself, more and more frequent
contacts and more and fruitful cooperatiotl were established clandestinely
and harmoniously between Peking's embassy i.n Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge
leaders. A good number of them were even able to secretly visit Mao Tse-tung
in China. The 5 years of the anti--AmArican and anti-Lon Nol war (1970-1975)
only served to strengtfien the "matrimonial" bonds between Khmer Rouge leaders
and Chinese leaders.
And by an irony of fate, the Vietinamese communists are the ones who played
the "cuckold's" role in this rather peculiar type of "theater."
Interview with Ivorodom Sihanouk
[Question] You left Peking for Pyongyang, North Korea. Have you quarreled
with the Chinese?
[Answer] I continue to like China but can no longer live there permanently.
First, because we have altogether opposite and irreconcilable views on the
Cambodian problem and the fate of the unfortunate Cambodian people.
Second, China is currently the large base area for the Khmer Rouge criminals
responsihle for my people's terrible and unending-misfortunes. I do not
- want to breathe the same air as Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, and
company who are pampered by China~ I did go Co Peking last week. It was
to spare Mrs Chou En-lai, the former premier's widow, a tiring trip to
Pyongyang. The late premier and T were great friends,
Third, China continues, despite my appeals, to do everything it can to get
me to change my mind and form a united front with the Khmer Rouge for a ~
second t~me.
" ~Q>>~:,;:ion] Yet you did have the inten~ion of assuming the leadership of that -
uni ted front.
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~ [Answer] Since the day I first introduced that idea, various Khmer intel~
lectuals in Paris have been conducting a campaign against me and doing
everything to deter me. I have dropped the idea of heading a united f.r~~nt.
[Question] If, in spite of everything, this frbnt is created, will it not
be necessary to forget the past and plsc8 yourself once again alongside
Po1 Pot and his friends?
[Answer] The united front should have as its goals not only the liberation
of Cambodia from the Viet~tamese yoke, but equally the liberation of the
Khmer people from such bloodthirsty archcriminals as Po~ Pot, Ieng Sary,
Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, etc. Aside from those principals
responsible for the national gehocide, the united front should accept those
Khmer Rouge without any such responsibi.lity, provided they agree to lay down
their arms, because I advocate a peaceful solut3on of the Khmer problems.
[Question] Why have you not come to Paris? Are you coming here this winter?
[Answer] According to information given me by certain fellow countrymen in
Paris, information confirmed by news agency dispatches, particc~larly those
by REUTERS, and newspaper rPports, LE MONDE's for example, the French
Government, though 3ssuing me a visa, still fear.s that my presence in .
France may create difficulties between France on the one hand, and Vietnam,
the USSR and even China on the other. Consequently, I shall not go to France
this winter.
_ [Question) Do you still believe the Cambodian problem can be settled by _
negotiation with Vietnam or by an international conference of the Geneva type?
[Anawer] The hour is not ripe, but the increasing and insurmountable _
difficulties Vietnam will encounter both at home and in Cambodia and on the
international level may force that country to accept a negotiated solution
or an international conference. That international conference will be
realizable only if China and the USSR support it. China and the USSR will
not decide in favor of any international conference until that day their _
respective clients, that is the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese, start
gasping on the battlef ield of Cambodia.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 S.A. Groupe Express -
8041
CSO: 4200
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- LAOS
LAO REFUGEE REPORTS VIETNAM INFLUENCE IN COUNTRY,
Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU (JAPAN MILITARY REVIEW) in Japanese Oct 79 pp 109-110
[Article: "Vietnamese Secret Police in Laos"J
[Text] To suppress discontented elements in Laos, Vietnam has permanently
- stationed 800 secret police in Laos and has begun to settle Vietnamese in
the border area of Vietnam and Laos.
~ A former leading Lao People's Revolutionary Party cadre who fled to
Thailand told the following to the UPI correspondent at the Nong Khai
Refugee Camp in Thailand:
While several thousand Vietnamese are allowed to cross the border and
settle in the region from Sam Neua to Savannakhet, Lao are encouraged
to settle in Vietnam.
- Vietnamese control of Laos is accomplished by four Vietnamese divisions
(4U,000 or more~ and 6,000 or more Vietnamese specialists and advisers.
. In contrast, there are only about 24,000 Lao troops.
The Vietnamese who controls activity in Laos is Colonal Nguyen Van Ho,
who is around 55 years old. He meets with Prime Minister Kaysone almost -
every day. The prime minister goes to Hanoi almost every month to confer.
In the past 3 years more than 200 party members have been arrested because
they opposed the party policq. Among them, he [the Lao refugee] heard
that about 100 have already been executed. No more than 10 percent of the
party members give full support to SecreCary General Kaysone. Another
10 percent are positively opposed and the remaining ~i0 percent vacillate.
COPYRIGHT: Japan Military Review, 1979
CSO: 4105
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INFORMATION ON LAO MILITARY UNITS
[The following information was extracted from Vientiane Domestic Service
broadcasts in Lao at 0400 GMT unless otherwise noted on the dates indicated,
or from Lao press material as indicated. Unit designators and locations are `
, as given. The remarks include a brief summary of the information available
in the source.]
UNIT REMARRS
Unit "A" Visited by delegation of Nationalities
under Air Force Command in Co~ittee (30 Aug 79)
~
~ Vientiane
Unit "E" attached to Signal Installed machines, repaired others, en-
Corps in Vientiane gaged in agricultural production Jul-
Aug (30 Aug 79)
Nam Souang Irrigation Project Carried out specialized work. Attended
Construction Unit political courses, engaged in agricul-
tural production (30 Aug 79)
Veterinary Unit of Army Settle- Started vaccinating animals early Aug
metn in Southern Region (30 Aug 79) _
.
Film Projection Unit Showed films in Jul (30 Aug 79)
Xieng Khouang Military Region "
Logiatics Office Held meeting 17 Aug to review achieve-
Saravane Province ments (31 Aug 79)
Medical Cadres Cured patients, built clinics, produced -
Nam Souang Hospital traditional medicine (31 Aug 79)
Vientiane Military Training Closed political, military training
Scl~ool course 20 Aug (1 Sep 79)
Military Command, [Meuang] Samtai Held military training course for local
District Houa Phan Province cadres, combatants early Jul (1 Sep 79)
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Unit "A" Organized political classes for local
Vientiane people, se~ up agricultural cooperatives
, Sep 79)
Military Command, [Meuang] Loa Ngam Organized local guerrilla-militia forces,
� District Saravane Province attended political course, planted crops
~ (1 Sep 79)
Vientiane Auto Repair Shop Repaired vehicles, typed documents, cured
patients, attended two political courses
(2 Sep 79)
Local guerrillas [Tasseng] Engaged in agricultural production, car-
Phonsai Canton, [Meuang] Samtai ried out specialized tasks (2 Sep 79)
District, Houa Phan Province
Regional Force, [Meuang] Samtai Engaged in agricultural production,
I~istrict, Houa Phan Province raised animals, saved rice and salt,
kip (2 Sep 79)
Construction Unit under Sam Neua Built warehouses, repa~red four guest
Provincial Military~~'Gommand houses,.~planted crops, organized sports
and liberature activities (2 Sep 79)
Military Training School in Opened political training course 23 Aug
Vientiane (3 Sep 79)
_ Military Command, [Meuang] Carried out training for cadres, combat-
Khamtai District, Houa Phan ants in mid-Aug (3 Sep 79)
_ Province
Regional Forces [Meuang] Samtai Engaged in military, political training
District in mid-Aug (3 Sep 79)
Political Office of Military Organized political training course for
Command, Viangsai Region cadres 13 Aug (3 Sep 79)
Infantry Unit "T" Scored achievements in specialized work
Northern Military Region (4 Sep 79) ~
Army Shoemaking Factory Engaged in political study in Jul-Aug
Vientaine~ (4 Sep 79)
Army Unit "E" Scored achievements in specialized duties
Vientiane Capital and public service work (4 Sep 79) -
Army Unit "S" Built more living quarters, offices Jul-
~ Vientiane Capital Aug (4 Sep 79)
19
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Army Unit "A" ~ Stepped up efforta to boost food produc- .
attached to Central Region tion (4 Sep 79)
- Command
Air Force Command Opened cultural training program for
Vientiane children 3 Sep (5 Sep 79)
Army Fish Sauce Factory Produced fish sauce (5 Sep 79)
Army Unit "Y" Studied Army regulations, discipline
Vientiane Capital in early Aug (5 Sep 79)
Unit "T" attached to Infantry Corps Attended military training 19 Aug
in Northern Region (6 Sep 79)
Public Security Force of [Mguang] Engaged in self-sufficient agricultural
Pak Ou District, Luang Prabang production (6 Sep 79)
- Province
Military Training School Attended political, military courses;
Northern Military Region cleared land, raised,many animals
(6 Sep 79)
A~cmy Signal Branch Repaired communication equipment (6 Sep 79)
Vientiane
_ Unit "C" attached to Armored Corps Planted crops, raised cattle (6 Sep 79)
Unit "S" attached to Vientiane Attended political course (6 Sep 79)
Armored Corps
Vientiane Public Security Force Taking care of rice fields (6 Sep 79)
, Army Garment Factory Pledge to produce garments (7 Sep 79)
Vientiane
Unit "T" Conducted patrol missions, attended poli-
Northern Region tical courses, cured patients, built
houses and warehouses, transported goods,
planted crops (7 Sep 79)
Army Sports Corps Engaging in sports activities, attending
Vientiane political course (7 Sep 79)
Xieng I~::~~~.~ang Provincial Military Opened cultural training course 26 Aug
~ Cor~�.li.d (7 Sep 79)
20
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Army Technical Repair Unit Scored achievements in specialized work
_ Sth Enginaer Corps in Vientiane (9 Sep 79)
area
Guerrilla Unit, [Tasseng] Houai Scored outstanding achievement in public
Khoua Luang Canton security work, assisted people in farm
Sayabourgy Province work (9 Sep 79)
- Bn "S" in Northern Region Took care of rice plants, people (9 Sep 79)
Army Staff Officers, Houa Phan Visited people in [Tasseng] Phonsai Can-
Military Provincial Command ton [Meuang] Samtai District in Aug
(9 Sep 79)
_ Infantry Unit "S" Built several buildings, raised livestock
in Vientiane Region Apr-Aug (9 Sep 79)
Guerrillas in [Meuang] Khai, Nan Conducted patrol missions, planted rice,
Districts, Luang Prabang helped local people built irrigation
Province canals (10 Sep 79)
Regional Forces in [Meuang] Pak Attended political, military courses;
Ou District, Luang Prabang planted crops; built irrigation canal;
Province raised animals (10 Sep 79)
Staff Office under Sayaboury Loaded and unloaded goods, conducted
~ Provincial Military Command patrol missions, engaged in agricultural
production (10 Sep 79)
Guerrillas of (Tasseng] Phou Louang Built two clinics (10 Sep 79)
Canton [Meuang] Chomphet, Luang
Prabang Province
Vientiane Provincial Military Held meeting 1 Sep to review work
Command (11 Sep 79)
Vientiane Army Settlement Produced animal feed (11 Sep 79)
Vientiane Army Medical Training Built houses, repaired roads, planted
School crops (11 Sep 79)
Logistics Department in Vientiane Cleared land, built three schools, clubs
and barracks (11 Sep 79)
Cultural Training School of Army Held ceremony 7 Sep to review results of
Logistics Department in Vientiane school year (12 Sep 79)
21
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Army Logistics School under Attended political courses, built houses,
Army Logistics Department in repaired others, planted crops (12 Sep 79)
Vientiane
Youth Section attached to Luang Held political course for local youths
Prabang Provincial Militaiy in Aug (12 Sep 79)
Command
~ Sayabourp;~~ Provincial Mil3tary Seld ceremony 4 Sep to close political ~
Command course (12 Sep 79)
Northern Region Military Command Closed meeting 6 Sep which concerned
buildin~ all-round strong companies
(13 Sep 79)
Driving Schoo"1 under Army Attended speciaZized, political and mili-
Logistics Department in tary courses (13 Sep 79)
Vientiane
Regional Force in Savannakhet Cleared land for rice cultivation (13 Sep 79)
Province ~
Finance School under Army Built houses and warehouses, cured patients,
Lugistics Department in attended cultural courses (13 Sep 79)
Vientiane
Air Force Hospital in Cured patients;; vaccinated and gave medi-
' Vientiane cine, contribut:ed to agricultural pro-
duction (14 Sep 79)
Army Rice Mill in Vientiane Repaired machines, built barracks,
planted crops (14 Sep 79)
Army Noodle Factory in Vientiane Produced noodles, ;ahile carrying out rice
farming in Jul-Aug (~5 Sep 79)
Cultural Training School attached Studied culture Mar-Jul (15 Sep 79)
to Army Logistics Department
in Vientiane
Army Auto Repair School Concluded political study 4 Sep (16 Sep 79)
in Vientiane
Army Art Troupe in Vientiane Stagecl performances Aug-Sep (17 Sep 79)
- Defense Unit "A" in Vientiane Attended political, military courses
- (17 Sep 79)
~ Army Driving School, Vientiane Started attending political course 11 Sep
to study documents on socialism (18 Sep 79)
22
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= FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
i
LAOS
INFORMATTON ON LAO MILITARY UNITS
- [The following information was extracted from Vientiane Domestic Service
broadcasts in Lao at 0400 GMT unless otherwise noted on the dates indicated,
or from Lao press material as indicated. Unit designators and locations are
- as given. The remarks include a brief summary of the information available
in the ~~urce.] _
UNIT REMARKS
- Southern Region's Logistics Office Attended political and cultural classes
since Jun (19 Sep 79) -
Army Band Raised animals in first half of 1979
Vientiane (19 Sep 79)
Basic Medical Training School under Planted crops, raised many animals in
_ Vientiane Public Security Force July (20 Sep 79)
Specialized Corps in Attended political, military, cultural
Central Region courses, engaged in agricultural production
(20 Sep 79)
Political Training School under Studied documents of party and state f
Vientiane Public Security Force (20 Sep 79)
Anti-Aircraft Bn "A" in Planted rice, raised animals, cooperated
Vientiane with other local units to carry out
public security tasks ('L1 Sep 79)
Military Command of [Meuaag] Closed military training course held for
Hatsaifong, Vientiane Province guerrillas in [Tasseng] Tha Mouang Canton _
on 7 Sep (21 Sep 79)
Driving School attached to Held ceremony 18 Sep to mark closing of
- Vientiane Public Security Forces first driving course (21 Sep 79) _
Political Training School under Planted crops in first half of 1979
Vientiane Public Security Force (21 Sep 79)
23
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
Air Force Command in Vientiane Opened political tra3.ning courae 5 Sep, _
- training course concluded 18 Sep (22 Sep
79)
Infantry Bn "S" Studied politics since June, planted
Vientiane cropa (22 Sep 79)
Units "S" and "TH" Held caremony 11 Sep to mark conclusion
Southern Region Command of miliCary trainin~ courses (22 Sep 79)
Infantry Bn "S" Published more than 10 reactionaries from
VienCiane Jan-Jun. Persuaded tribal people to come
under patronage of state and party
- (23 Sep 79)
Political Office Successfully concluded political training
Xien~ Khouang Military Command 8 Sep (23 Sep 79) '
Engineering School Held ceremony 6 Sep to conclude 6-month
Xiecig Khouang Military Command txaining. (23 Sep 79)
[Meuang] Lamam District Military Opened military and politi~al classes _
Command 2Q Aug (24 Sep 79)
Brick Producing Unit under Attended cultural training course 20 Aug -
Xieng Khouang Military Region (24 Sep 79)
Engineering School Cl~ared land, engaged in self-suff icient
Xieng Khouang Military Region agricultural production since Mar (24 Sep
79)
- Driving School Conducted 402 patrol missions, built
under Public Security Forces barracks, off ices and other buildings, -
- repaired vehicles, planted crops (25 Sep
_ 79)
Regional Forces Engaged in agricultural production (25 Sep
Oudomsai Province 79~
V3rious Units under Carried out specialized tasks while
Sayaboury Provincial Military engaging in agricultural production
Command (25 Sep 79)
Regional Force Attended political, military classes since
Oudomsai Province early this year (26 Sep 79) _
Signal Unit "S" under Closed political course 22 Sep (26 Sep
Xieng Khouang Military Region 79) -
24 ~
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Vientiane Transport Unit "S" AtCended meeting 24 Sep to review achieve-
. ments of first half of 1979 (26 Sep 79) ~
Vientiane Public Security School Planted rice, raised animals, attended
- political course (2? Sep 79)
Transport Bn "A" in Transported goods, soldiers and people
Vientiane since early this year (27 Sep 79)
Art:illery Corps in Attended political courses, military
Vientiane course. Planted crops, raised animals
(28 Sep 79)
Construction Corps "A" in Planted rice, raised many animals
Central Region (28 Sep 79)
School of Accountancy under Studied specialized subjects, engaged in
Xieng Khouang Region's Logistics agricultural production (28 Sep 79)
Office
Regional Force Cured patients, built buildings, raised
Houa Phan Province animals (28 Sep 79)
- Regional Armed Forces Studied specialized subjects, culture,
Savannakhet Province carried out patrol activities, publicizing
line and policies of party and state and
boosted production (29 Sep 79)
Infantry Bn "GN" Opened training on general staff work
Vientiane Region 2 Sep. training concluded 26 Sep
(29 Sep 79) -
Cultural Training School Held ceremony 16 l.,ug to mark end of
academic year (29 Sep 79) ,
Regional Armed Forces of Maintained tranquillity of their -
Luang Prabang Province responsible areas, planted crops _
(29 Sep 79)
Vientiane Provincial Military O~ened military training course
Command (30 Sep 79)
Saravane Provincial Military Scored achievements in specialized work,
Command food production (30 Sep 79)
Logistics Office Held study session to study various
Central Region documents of Party Central Committee -
16 Sep (30 Sep 79)
25
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Artillery Bn "Y" Pledged to contribute to socialist trans- ~
Vientiane formation and construction (1 Oct 79)
Pat~-iotic Women's Association Held meeting 26 Sep to review results of
- Air Force Command political study (1 Oct 79)
- Mobilization and Training Office Held banquet 30 Sep for delegation of
of Army Political Department Ethnic minor3ty people in Louang Namtha
Province (2 Oct 79)
cso: 4206 ~ND -
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