JPRS ID: 8737 WORLDWIDE REPORT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

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ANo
29 OCT06ER 1979
(FOUO SlT9)
i OF i
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FOk OFNicini. IISr ONLv
JPRS L/8737
29 O'ctober 1979
Worldwide Report
NUCLEAR DEVELC)PMENT AND PROLIFERATION
(FOUO 5/79)
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2�ux ur*r�iL;lA.U U5r, uivLS.
JPRS L/8737
, 29 October 1979
WORIDWIDE REPORT
NiJCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION
(FOUO 5/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
WOfiLDWIDE AFFATRS
At-t;i.tudes Z'oward U.S. Nuclear, Nonprol.iferation Policy
(ENERGIA E MATERIE F'RIME, Jul-Aug 79) 1
Po1.emics With Allies Analyzed, by Karl KaisEr
Comments on Kaiser Ar:icle
- a- tI II - WW - 141 FOUO ]
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WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS
a
ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. NUCLEAR, NONPROLII'ERATIOtY POLICY
_ Polemics With Allies Analyzed
Rome ENERGIA F. MATERIE PRIME in Italian Jul-Aug 78 pp 11-21
[Article by Karl Kaiser: "Search for a Worldwide Nucleai ur3er"]
[Text] In the attempt t.o find an international consensus
on the issue of nuclear arms nonproliferation, the world
powers do not seem to take into account the fact that
MA there is a precise relationship between the nuclear
arms race and proliferation.
Few decisions held such tremendous international importance as those adopted
� in the nuclear energy field starting during the middle of the seirenties.
That should not startle us because this is a field in which we find the super-
position of two categories of problems that are of vital importance not only
- to the survival of the economic system but also to the maintenance of inter-
national stability: energy supply and nuclear proliferation. We should there-
fore not be astonished by the confusion and emotion aroused by the contro-
_ versies between the United States and its allies, giving rise to new coali-
tions in international policy and creating serious disagreement within the
individual countries. But these aspects mean that the real critical points
in the search for a worldwide nuclear order are often concealed.
Erosion of Consensus
The international comununity is trying to channel the ever declining consensus
toward those standards and objectives that had regulated the nuclear arms
nonproliferation system during the postwar period. Many countries in Western
Europe and the Third World were alarmed over what they considered unilateral
American measures that threatened the very foundations of the standards in
question and that damaged their interests. The Americans on the other hand
were amazed at what in their eyes was a dangerous laclc of sensitivity on the
part of the others with regard to the new developments that demanded a sw3ft
adaptation of the postwar nonproliferation system. How did we arrive at that
situation?
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We must go back to the efforts made during the sixties !:o prevent proliferation.
- The NPT, signed in 1968, produced only a partial consensus liecause it was
subscrtbed to neither by China, nor by France, nor by any other emergi.ng
iiucLear power5, :including India, Brazil, Argentina, and some countries in the
- Near Last (although France later on did decide to behave as if it ]ikewi.se
was a party to that treaty). Besides, the consensus, implicit in the treaty,
was obtriineci only af.ter lengthy and complex negotiations in which--similar to
what. is happening +_oday--West Germany came out as the protagonist of the
debate concerning Article IV, that is to say, the article guara-nteeing access
to nuclear technology. In a treaty that proposes to prevent proliferation
thraugh control over technology and the renunciation of st4tus as a power
having nuclear arms (articles I and II), unlimited access to nuclear techno-
logy, coitti the proper security measures, t;as considered essential by all
count.ries that did not have nuclear arms.'
From these negotions emerged not only Article TV--which in its def.initive
sect:.ion guarantees such access--but also many clarifications and off.icial
interpretations on the part of the United States government, clarifications
and interpratattons which were designed to Iielp overcome tfiP reluctance of
numercus governments during the frequently by no means easy ratification
procedures.
Tal.lcing aboLit the concerns e:cpressed all ovzr the world, Arthur Go].dberg,
head of the American delegation to the United Nations, said this on 15 May
1968:"'Chere is no reason whatsoever to worry that this treaty might impose
protiibitions or limitations upon countries that do not have nuclear arms
as regards the possibility of developing their own capabilities in the field
af nuclear science and technology. The entire field of nuclear science,
tied to electric energy production, is today freely accessible and it will
continue to 'oe so even more under tTiis treaty for those wtio may wish to
utilize it. This concerns not only the current generation of electric
nuclear power plants but also advanced technology involved in fast breeder
reactors, which is now in the development phase."
This statement clasiles heavily with American policy after 1975 which was
ned at preventing the reprocessing of spent fuel (that is to say, fue7. already
" used in the reactor and intended for chemical retreatment to extract residual
plutunium and uranium) and the development of fast lireeder reactors so as to
pr.event the circulation of plutonium which would be suitable for the manu-
facture of nuclear arms. As a matter of fact, the lacas introduced into the
United States Congress in 1977 threatened to interrupt American nuclear
assistance and cooperation regarding 2ny country that received or ceded re-
processing or enrichment technology or that would reprocess nuclear fuel
iurnished by the United States without prior United States approval. That
rai.sed the following question: up to what point would one or more countries
have the right unilaterally to modify the consensus that was tiehind a universal
treaty?
The consensus on another fundamental element of nonproliferation policy
during the sixties vanished for similar reasons: the role and significance
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of safety measures. According to the old system, any technology suitable for
the generation of nuclear energy could Fie acquired or ceded only so long as
it remained subject to the safeguaxds of the inspection system set up by tfie
IAEA which, in the case of unauthorized diversion of nuclear material,
would have to sound the alarm and thus alert the international cc+mmunity.
Consequently, the safeguards were designed only as an accounting and reForti.ng
mechanism. But around 1975 the conviction began to spread both inside and
outside the United States that simple surveillance over nuclear technology
- could have offered many countries an opportunity to make nuclear weapons
and this in turn of course would promote the dangEr of a spread of the
"bomb without completely violating the rules"1. The United States at that
time began to exert pressure to move on from the detection of violations
to their prevention, thus once again bringing up for discussion tfie funda-
mental principles of the norms and institutions in force with respect to
nonproIiferation.
The erosion of consensus thus spread from nonproliferation policy to the
field of energy poiicy with an almost reciprocally strengthening effect.
Indeed, after the 1973-1974 oil crisis, ane could observe a general accord
on the indispensability of reducing dependence on petroleum coming from the
OPEC member nations; but the subsequent speed up in the nuclear programs of
many countries only increased the worries about the dissemination o� nuclear
arms technology. While most af the countries now consider fast breeder
reactors and reprocessing as a necessity for efficient energy utilization,
others view this as the direct road to thP nuclear inferno.
Development of Disagreements
No country has changecl its own opinions on the matter of nonproliferation
as quickly and as substantially as the United States. First of all 4n an
unsystematic and offhand manner and then with growing resoluteness, American
' policy changed when the Carter administration came into office; the initi-
ative was transformed into a real attempt at a total revision of nuclear
_ policy once again bringing up for discussian the status quo even at the
cost of damaging other American interests.
There are three developmer_ts that play a particular role in the genesis of
this controversy. First of all, the 1973-1974 oil crisis ushered in the
era of raw materials nationalism and a new tendency towards reducing
dependence on foreign supply sources. In Europe, in Japan, and in some
countries of the Third World--which almost exclusively depend on imports
for their petroleum--nuclear energy expansion was the key to everything.
The United States also at that time launched the "Project Independence"
which comprised a major nuclear component.
Countries poor in raw mater9_als considered enrichment on their own, the re-
processing of spent fuel, as well as fast breeder reactors (which increasP
the energy potential of uranium by aiaout 50 percent) as measures suitable
for increasing the safety of their own supplies. And, without wishing to do so,

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Che United Strites itself consolidated this viewpoint when, ir.
unexpectedly stopped sales of enriched uranium, in spite of tht.
Euratom (European Atomie Energy Community), Brazil, and some c,_.~.:-
had already undertaken certairi comunitments (in some cases this
volved advance payr:ients). It thus appeared evident to everyboc,-/ th~.:t.
dependence on foreign sources--even if that involved friends and s--
creates problems in long-term energy planning. A temporary ban
export of reactors and fissile materials, in 1975, ordered by the U-ii.teci
States f_or administrativz reasons, had a similar e�fect.
The explosion of India's first nuclear bomb in May 1974 was the seconw.
event that helped strengthen the convicti.on of the United States that :r.
old nonproliferation system had liig gaps in it. That explosion rerni;_Lcca
_ everybody that nuclear energy had come to the Third tdorld and the prosp~c.r
of nuclear arms in unstalile regions became a nightmare. The case of
among other things demonstrated that the partial safeguard system, in
countries that did not s~gn the NPT, could he circumvented witizout forn i l~.
violating the rules. It was then that the peti_tion for control over a.11
nuc:lear activities conducted in the country in question (full scope
came up as the only possible solution. Inciia asserted that this was a
"peaceful" explosion, demonstrating in passing that there is no distinctian
between peaceful nucle.ar explosives--whom the NPT had given a certain de~;rec:
of international legitimacy--and military e;tiplosives.
The third event which abruptly altered the ici? ernational scEne was the
~ agreener.t between West Germany and Brazil una,-; u;hc?;,e provisions West
~ Germany would supply Erazil with nuclear reacto7-s as wel.l as enrichment anci
reprocessing technology in return for access to future pruduction of uranium
iri Brazil2. 1his accord led to the most serious disagreement ever recorded
- in relations beLween the United States and West Germany since the end of the
_ war and considerably helped speed up efforts aimed at modifying nonproli-
feration po:licy. Along with the promise by France to supply reprocessing
plants to South Korea and Palcistan, the German-Braz.i:li.an agreement for the
f-irst time inc3.uded the transfer of a"sensitive" t--echnology (that is to say,
1 a tectlnology capable af leading to military nuclear developments) to a country
iri the Third World situated in an area characterizeci by international in-
stability and rivalry. Thus, toward the end of the eighties, each of these
countries would have access to fissile material wlllcll in theory could be used
to make weapons. Besi.des, neither Brazil, nor Pal�:istan had signed the NPT
arid T3razil had also been rather amtaiguous with respect to the right to
carry out "peaceful" nuclear explosions.
Although the economic aspect was secondary in connu_,tirnn with the anticipated
'r'rench supplies going to Pakistan3 and to South Korea and al.though more than
obvious questions were raised as to the possible ui~~~_-ior motives of a
mi.lil-ary nature, the German-Brazilian accord attracL,d most attenti.on in the
Uni ted S+_ates. In tfie final analysis, the accord w;is cc,eicluded in what was
rraditionally considered an American sphere of inflnence. Besides, ihe
United States was not accustomed to insubordination ot this kind on the part of:
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a close ally who sntil i:tiat moment had generalily had the habit of sharing
or accepting United Stat`s policy. The most severe critics even recalled
the past record of the Germans, saying that it was such as to rule out such
a policy for moral reasons`+. In the end, people got the impression that
the Ger.mans had thumbed their noses at the Americans in the "nuclear deal
of the century" and this entire matter served to recall to mind rather
painfully that the United States share of worldwi.de reactor exports had
dropped from two-third.s in 1974 to less than fialf in 1976.
This means that the United States government opposed the German--8razilian
deal because West Germany was Fiecoming an uncomfortable competitor. In spite
of some assertions on this score by the Germans, there is no proof that
Washington took its nonproliferation poli.cy as a pretext to protect com-
mercial interests. The objective of American policy iwas and sti:ll is non-
proliferation, even at the cost of damaging its own industry. It is of
course something entirely different to consider what the significance af
this would have been to the German nuclear industry if the United States
- had managed to stop the deal with 2irazil from the very beginning; in that
case, it would probably have been driven out of many markets in the TTiird
World for some time.
When the Germans informed the United States government early in 1475 that
they were preparing the agreement in question, a United States delegation
went to Bonn. Realizing that Germany was determined to go tfirougfi witfi the
~ deal, the American negotiators suggested a series of amendments whicii had
to do not only witfi control agreements with countries that fiad not joined the
NPT but also witfi the experience in dealing with India. When the tri-
partite safety agreement was signed between Brazil, the FRG, and the IAEA,
it included preventive safeguard and control measures which were more
rigorous than those pertaining to any other technology transfer that had
taken place earlier to a country that had not joined the NPT. The agreements
eliminated the evasion of control standards which is possible under earlier
, agreements and subjected the only suitable reprocessing system (Purex)
eo permanent safeguards, also providing a joint management body with combined
- Brazilian and German personnel, with the implication of further control.
In view oT ever more numerous criticisms, the Germans constantly maintained
that they acted within the framework of existing agreements. They drew
attention not only to the earlier interpretation under the NPT but also to
the fact that reprocessing was likewise provided for the lists of nuclear
materials suitable for military use, materials which were to be sulijected to
safeguards; that list by the way was agreed upon on an international level.
We know that the German diplomats rather unwillingly let the opportunity
for a suhtle disquisition of a legal nature get away but that interpretation
of the NPT was not in any way a German invention. It had to do with an
international agreement that could not be amended through unilateral action
on the part of one or more countries.
The dea.l with Brazil had barely come up in talks on the highest level between
the German government and the United States government when both President
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- Ford and 5ecretary of State Kissinger felt that they were in a rather un-
- comfortable position on *his score. The bitter criticisms in Congress and
in the press llad iiot encouraged either one of them to eppose the accord
act3.vely. When somebady suggested that use be made of American troops
stricioned in Eur.ope or that joint American-Soviet initiatives be under-
takun to exert pressure on ttie West German government, Kj.ssinger felt duty-
bouiid to reply that this was not the right way to haiidle a close ally.
Dur:ing a meeting with West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in
June 1975, he had to tell him that the amendments introduced into the
agreement upon the proposal of the Americans were considered satisfactory
and on that basis the West German government then signed the agreement
shortly thereafter.
Policy of Rejection and Prob lem of Legitimacy
Following the Indian nuclear explosion, the United'States in autumn 1974
launched confidential talks with the other major supplier countries in tlii_s
sector, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Japan, West Germany, and
the Soviet Union. Tfie group later on was also to include Belgium, Hollanu,
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland. By
IVovember 1975, this group fi ad arrived at an agreement on the directions to
be Eol.]_owed in nuclear exports--directives whicfi were almost identical to
those published in January 1978, with.the exceptioii of some additions and
the important "trigger list" (in other words, the l:sr_ of materials that
G;ere capable of increasing nuclear arms proliferaticn and over which special
control. had to be exercised).
ihese directives established that various governments had to furnish
guarantees designed to "exclude any utilization that r,iight give rise tc any nuclear expl.osive"; the nuclear material furthermore had to &e protected
adeyuately against theft and had to be subjPCted to strict safety measures.
As it latter on happened also to the Carter administratiori, the United States
government at that cime did not manage to get the full-scope safeguards
accepted for all plants in the country of destination. The most impor.tant
t}iing from the policy viewpoint hocoever was the promise by the suppliers
to use "moderation in the tratisfer of plants and sensitive technologies
as well as materials suitable for the manufacture of weapons" as well as
"caution" iu order tu prevent the production of any nuclear material not
subjected to saf eguards.
These clauses were not equivalent to a ban on the export of reprocessing
- platits, as the United States administration and its supparters liad wanted,
but r.hey did represent a big step forward in that direction, although the
deals with Brazil and Pakistan were not involved (.the French-South Korean
ar_cord was canceal.ed following American intervention in Seoul). The accord
finally underscored the need for a cooperative-type position and committecl
- the supplier countries to consult with each other "so as to malce sure that
- ariy sale would not increase the danger of conflicts or instabi.7.ity" and
together to eaamine the steps to b.e adopted in case of vio.lation of the
agr. eements .
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In the discussions leading to the directives in questions, some fundamental
disagreements of opinion were also c?eared up and prolilems came up which
- continue to be of crucial importance in the debate on the international
nuclear order. The question of the legitimacy of any amendments in inter-
national norms was brought up righ t away. If the existing system is in-
adequate, who has the power to change it. On the one hand,the superpowers
- and the uranium producers (the United States, the Soviet Union, and Canada)
spons ored the"cartel" method,.if the suppliers were to agree on imposing more
severe conditions to watch over nonproliferation and if they were determined
not to damage themselves in the process by offering the goods at a lower
price, then the addressees would have had no other choicp but to accept
the modifications which, in tfie f inal analysis, were drawn up not in the
interest of one'country but in the interest of the entire international
c ommuni ty .
On the other hand, France and West Germany--with the full although unseen
support of Japan and with Great Britain in a midway position--declared tfiat
any major amendment in the rules would have to be subjected to the approval
of all i.nterested parties. Without a minimum of legitimacy, tfie new rules
would not have had any influence. Cunsequently, France and West Germany
_ declared that they were in favor of involvir;g all of the major addressees
but they ran into Soviet and American resistance. The American position--
which was later on sustained by the Carter administration--was this: if
some countries did not take upon themselves the responsibility for the rest
of the world, then there ti*as little prohahility that anything big would ever
be accomplished.
The second dilemma concerned the right of the supplier countries to refuse
- nuclear technology to nations that asked for it. The first group, headed
by the United States, maintained that, because of past omissions, the
biggest problem for the future sprang from the availability of materials
suitable for arms manufacture even rhough it may be subjected to the proper
safeguards. This is why it was a good idea not to sugply reprocessing and
enrichment technologies to those nations that might lie tempted to produce
explosive deyices.
France and West Germany, on the other hand, asserted that, if and.when a
country had decided to get nuclear arms for itself, it undoub.tedly did so
for important political reasons and that--among a11 of the possible approaches
to an operation of this kind--the "ciyilian" route was the one that took the
longest time and'the most money. Uranium reprocessing and enrichment are
very attractive for othEr reasons: reliable supplies, reduction of dependence
on petroleum, environmental pr.otection. If these technologies were not
furnished through a system of cooperation and control, then it would never-
theless have been possible to get it some other way--without any controls.
In the final analysis, reprocessing was already available in developing
_ countries, including India and Argentina5. Pushed too vigorously, a policy
_ of ref usal could therefore have caused the collapse of the nonproliferation
system on which an agreement had been arrived at.

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Zn practical tecros, however, the disagreement was not as serious as it
seemed. TPiere tiaas complete agreement on the fact that no country, run by
an aggressive dictator, involved in continuous bitter debates witli its
own neighbors and with underdeveloped infrastructures at home, should receive
technologies capable of being used for nuclear weapons. But where to draw
ttie l:i.ne? Was it perhaps necessary, for the sake of international stability,
to introduce a new distinction hetween countries that can or cannot benefit
f rom sensitive technologies?
The commitment to "moderation" on the supply of technologies considered here
in reality constituted a ban on exports the moment no major country was
plaruling to purchase reprocessing plants. The supplier countries undertook
two commitments: the first one permitted the conclusion of the deals with
Brazi1 anO Pakistan; the second one was contained in the idea of multi-
national plants as an alternative to the national efforts aimed at enrichment
and repracessing. The United States and other countries had dug this con-
cepc up again and had promoted a broad study on regional fuel cycle centers
_ wittiin the IAEA. The trouble kias that, two years larer, in the act of
pubJ_ishing this study, the United States assumed a more skeptical position,
mairltaining that these centers could be sources of dissemination of knowledge
on sensitive technologies.
7
DLring tlie last year of the Ford administration, while relations between the
United States and other countries where characterized by a rather restless
nuclear modus vivendi, several domestic pressure groups pushed for a change
in policy. The Congress continued to concern itself witli tiie problem but a
decisive change came only when Carter turned nonproliferac:ion into one of ttie
most impurtant points in his presidential campaign and openly criticized Uotli
the Ford administration and France as well as West Germany. It was.under
pre:;sure from his opponent in the presidential race and on the basis uf broad
interdepartmental research that Fard on 28 October 1976 proposed a three-
yFar moratorium on the issue oF authorizations for national reprocessing
nlants and on the export cf sucn plants, as well as new internati.otial agr.eP-
menLs for stricter conr_rol ove.r plutonium and for the storage of spent nuclear
Euel. ThE cenCral idea was tnat "it was no longer necessary to consider the
reprocessing of spent f uel for the production of plutonium as a necessary and
inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle."
Uut.Lawir.g Plutonium
iiie Carrer administration's new nuclear policy began with a program Lind a
stiFf dispute. The program was the so-called Ford-Mitre Study--ttie woric of
_ a group of experts who examined the entire issue of the hasic choices in the
nuclear Eieldb. As for the dispute itself, it involved the renewed agreement
with West Germany in connection with the Brazilian deal.
`ihe central point of the new policy again brought out the debate where Ford
had interrupted it. A complete reexamination led to the decision, made by
_ Carter on 7 April 1977, indefinitely to postpone both reprocessing ancl ttie
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fast breeder reactor. This decision furthermore became the basis for new
American legislation on exports. The foundation was furnished liy the Ford-
Mitre study whose authors-�-who did have a certain degree of authority--in
considerable numbers joined the new administration (particularly Joseph Nye
who became deputy undersecretary of state for nuclear nonproliferation policy
matters). The newly elected President discussed the research results with
the authors and the outside world, not without justification, judged the
study in question to be the intellectual basis for the new administration's
policy.
The report seemed to be slanted toward supporting the light-water reactor
technr,logy used for the most part in power reactors both in the United States
. and in other countries (they use lightly enriched uranium as fuel and they
use natural water as coolant). These reactors were presented as being safe
and reliable but the administration did not make much of an effort to put
into practice what was implicit in the study: to help a national industry,
which was having a difficult time following the opposition of the movements
f.or the defense of nature and on account of the orders that were issued.
- But never since the announcement of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program has
a pr.esident been so reserved if not implicitly hostile toward nuclear energy.
Every time the argument was taken up in public--such as, for example, in
the case of the "fireside chat" which the President on 18 April 1977 devoted
to energy--it was always presented as a problem and, very rarely, as a
potential means for improving the energy supply. When he presented his own
energy program on 20 April 1977, Carter created the inipression that it was
- desirable "to reduce any effort in favor of nuclear energy to a minimum."
- While American industry was disturbed by these words, foreign governments
were frightened by tliem. Most of them already had to face major domestic
opposition to nuclear programs and they were worried by the fact that the
biggest petroleum consumer, in a world characterized by ever greater scarcity
of crude, seemed to want to overlook the potential of nuclear energy. TIle
signlls that arrived from the United States seemed to indicate laasic op-
_ position to that energy source. During the months that followed, the United
States government had its hands full trying to correct that impression.
Tne administration concludecl that the dissemination of the entire fuel cycle
and the fast breeder reactor throughout the world would each year have
produced a quantity of materials sufficient to manufacture thousands of
nucl.ear bombs and that ths availability of these technologies could have
caused ciangerous temptations. This danger, it was maintained, could not be
counterbalanced by any potential gain. Thus the administration maintained
that there would not have been any benefits within any forseeable period of
time and that both reprocessing and the fast breeder reactor therefore were
premature. The Ford--Mitre study conclucied by asserting that the uranium
r.eserves were sufficient until the end of the century and that it was possible,
without any danger, to store spent fuel for a].ong period of time.
It is not surprising that this position ran into considerable opposition and
nany criticisms. All of them however can essentially be boiled down to
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the Idea that the decisions and proposals of the United States essentially
refi.eceed its own positions and interests and did noC sufficiently take into
account the problems of ottier countries.
Ttie American thesis, according to which there was enough uranium in the
wor:l.d to justify a postponement of the fast breeder reactor and of reprocess-
ing, was not accepted by the majority of the other countries. In 1977 the
rhing that was of interest toas no longer the existence of worldwide uranium
reserves but rather the access to existing reserves. Besides, 80 percent -
of the uranium reserves of the noncommunis't world are in the United States, .
Ausl-ralia, Canada, and South Africa. Over the past several years, access
_ to these reserves was limited so seriously as completely to shift the pros-
pects of the tiranium consuming countries. In December 1976, Canada could
have imposed a toCal embargo on uranium supplies also in dealing with close
allies and stable countries, such as those of Euratom; but a country in the
'C}iirci World was bound to get only a pessimistic view of the futui�e safety
oE :its own supplies.
'Che administral-ion's thesis--according to which reprocessing made no sense
trom the economic viewpoint--was not accepted either. Besides, even American
studies supported the opposite viewpoint7. Reprocessing permits a raw
matcrial saving (.through the reuse of unburned fuel) and reduces the natural
uranium requirements by as much as 34 percent and the separation effort by
as much as '26 percent (in connection with isotope enrichment). Even at high
cosr_, reprocessing reduces the balance of payments pro'u-?ems. Some countries,
including West German}�, are already experimenting with this type of "plutonium
savings" and are planning to build bigger plants, such as the United States _
had been doing until a short time ago at the Barnwell plant, in South Carolina.
'1'h