JPRS ID: 8765 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/8765
16 November 1979 -
West E u ro e R e o rt ~
p p
~FOUO 63/79)
r
~
Fg~$ FOREICN BR~ADCAST INFORMIATION SERVIC~ _
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~Please change the serial number
of L/8763, 14 November 1979, of
this series to read (FOUO 62/79).
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JPRS L/8765 _
16 November 1979
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FODU 63/79)
_ ~ -
CONTENTS PAGE
THEATER NUCZEAR FORCES
_ INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
_ Raymond Aron Views U.S., Soviet Nuclear Balance, Strategy
(Ra~~rnond Aron; COMMlIIVT~y.IRE, No 5, 1979) 1
= Us~ of Nuclear Weapons b y FATAC Described
(Christian Auzepy; ARNlEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Sep 79~..... 18
Soviet Nuclear Superiority, West European Vulnerability
(Jean-Francois Revel; L'EXPRESS, 8-14 Sep j9) 23
~
COUNTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS -
Briefs
~ Franco-Belgian Misunderstand.ing 26 -
FRANCE
Civil Aviation Budget for 1980 Outlined ~
(AIR & COSMOS, 22 SeP 79~ 27
O~jectives, Tactics of FATAC Delineated -
(Michel Forget; ARMEES DtAUJOURD'HUI, Sep 79)....... 33
Ariane Launching Set for Mid-December
(Pierre Langereux; AIl~ & COSMOS, 29 Sep 79) 42
Effects of Reorganization on Artillery Noted
( Olivier de Gabory; A,RMEES D' AUJOURD' HUI, Sep 79 45 .
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONT~NTS (Coiitinued) Pa,ge
Dc:tailc on MPM 3~0, RTM 321 Military Hellcopter Lngi.iies ~
(AIR & COSMOS, 2g Sep 79) ~9
ITALY
Dissent Within Red Brigades Implies Change in Tactics -
(LE NOWF~ OBSE~VATEUR, 2~+ Sep 79~ 52
- SPAIN
Fraga Iribarne Calls on Army To Counteract Terrorism
(Manuel Fraga Iribarne Interview; CAN~IO 16, ~
14 oct 79) 55
- b -
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
RAYMOND ARON VIEWS U.S., SOVIET NUCLEAR BALANCE, STRATEGY
Paris COMMENTAIRE in French No 5, 1979 pp 3-14
[Article by Raymond Aron: "From American Imperialism to Soviet Hegemonism"~
~TextJ Some 30 years ago, the professor of international relations and the
- man in the street pictured the world in about the same way. The professor
used scholarly teYms to describe the system of relations between states as
. a"bipolar" system. The man in the street's picture focused on the rivalry _
betweea the United States and the Soviet Union, ~ot without underestimating
the overall ecanomic an~ military superiority of the maritime power, the -
American republic, a superiority over the Euro-Asi.an land mass cou~parable
to Great Britain's former s~periarity over Europe. And it was only 20
~ years agc that mankind was terrified and held its breath when KrushchPv
issued his quasi-ultimatu~ on Berlin (1958), and again a few years later ~
(1962) duriag the LCuban~ missile crisis.
Today, professors and the man in the sr_reet probably agree, but no longer
on a:~y one picture of the world, If anything, they would both consider the
world too difficult to picture clearly because of its sheer complexity.
Should the Moscow-Peking-Washington triangle replace the Moscow-Washington
duel? Which of the duelists now ha.s military supremacy? Does the East-West _
conflict still have the global significance we attributed to it until about
the early 1960's?
Admittediy cne u~:ited States and the So~~iet Union continue to merit the =
_ distinctive position they have assumed, a position which observers admit
they have. They are the only nations possessing a complete arsenal on
land and sea, in air and space, from submachine guns to megaton bombs. _
They alone have the capability of pro~jecting their military strength to -
any point on the globe. They alone have participat~d in the conquest of
space. What is more, from now until the end of the century they will
essentially retain this duopoly, regardless of what progress the People's
Republic nf China may make during the next 20 years.
Why do we havF; a blurred picture of the world instead of the unduly simple
- structure of the cold war? Keeping to the e~sential points, here, in ~y
view, are tlie ma3or reasons: -
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1. The confusion in distinguishing between the Soviet Union and Marxism-
Leninism which transfigured a great power rivalry into ideological warfare
now belongs to the past: the so-called socialist bloc has shattered into
fragments. The PRC denounces Soviet "hegemonism" as the number-one enemy. -
' In the absence of Moscow, the intelligentsia could dream of a real Mecca in
Belgrade or Havana, with Titc or Fidel Castro against the Stalinist or
capitalist Goliath. How can one possibly choose between North Vietnam's
- quasi-Stalini.sm and Kampuchea's ~uasi-ger.ocide? China supgorts Phnom Penh
because Moscow supports ftanoi. Once in power, communist parties revive -
_ their nations' historic quarrels. -
It would be too simple to eliminate the ideological dimensiun and return to
the chess games of diplomacy. In Asia, both empires, Russian and Chinese,
have elevated the same ideology to a"truth of state." They accuse each
. other of betraying that truth. In so doing, they have stripped th~ir
ma.neuvers, alliances, and hostilities of all ideological garb: pure and
naked power politics has thus emerged frorn the terminology that once
disguised it, and both powers are now unmasking each other. -
Elsewhere, it is an altogether different story. The victory of a progressive
or Marxist-Leninist party does not necessarily result in that country's
alinement with the Soviet bloc, although it frequently daes. Even i^ the
absence of such alinement, the new regime that professes to be socialist
~ conducts a different brand of diploma;,y than the moderate or Fro-Western
regime it overthrew. Entry of the communist party into the government of
Paris or Rome would be an event fraught with unpredictable international
- consequences: any extreme interpretation--i.e. a disaster or a brief -
episode--would be mentally satisfyin~ but would present the real facts in -
a wrong light.
2. The Russian-American relationship itself has become ambiguous, equivocal.
Does it approximate a condiminium or a life and death struggle? Are the
two superpowers playir~g out their dispute little by little or are they .
concealing it? In the final analysis, the SALT accords are based on mutual
distrust. H. Kissinger hoped to conclude partial agreements with Moscow,
- a sort of network tinat would confine, as it were, the revolutionary or ex-
revolutionary power.
Did he succeed or fai~? Ha.s Brezhnev's Russia become, as G.F. Kennan ~
claims, a conservative power from which the United Stdtes or our allies
- no longer have anything to fear? Or else is it, as dissidents maintain,
still the same, in other words,, cautious but always ready to seize any -
opportunity t~ exterd its sphere of influence or domination, more ambitious
than in Stalin's time because it now has the resources to be such, more
norma.l internally b~cause the gerontracy, survivor of so ma,ny earth-shaking
events, has rou~inized its rule and d:~spotism?
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- Containment was the watchword or inspiration for the bipartisan diplomacy
of the United States. There i~ no longer a bipartisan diplomacy on the
other side of the Atlantic. On all issues--the "Chinese card," SALT abree-
ments, African action, and defense budget--the intellectuals of the Eaetern
establishment, Republicans and Democrats, who conceived and supported the
postwar bipartisan policy are nuw divided, and sometimes to such a goint _
` that yesterday's friends no longer speak to each other.
_ 3. The two superpowers have no~. lost their military supremacy, but what
_ are they doing with it? tirhat can they do with it? Is inactive force real
_ force? In 1950-53, the United States was not victorious over North ~orea,
that half of a co~zntry saved by the intervention of "volunteers," in cther
words, regular PRC troops. The United States was defeated by ~;orth Vietnam,
another half country, defeated in the sense that North Vietnam achieved its
goals without, however, having thereby defeated the U.S. expeditionary force.
- Did the Soviet Union need 40,000 tanks to quell the Hungarian revolt? To
b ring to heel, in Prague, Marxist-Leninists who were dreaming of a type of
socialism with a human face?
Diplomats with less cynicism than Stalin--"the Pope, how many divisions
- does he have?"--never forgot, in their negotiations and calculations, how
- many men under arms each ambassador represented. Today, the number of
special embassy counselors--cultural, scientific, commercial, public affairs--
symbolizes total diplomacy, illustrates the new dimensions of diplomacy.
4. These conditions give rise, therefore, to one major question: Where
_ does the essential element of relations between states lie? On the one
hand, it lies in the accumulation of weapons and the technical advances
made in nuclear znd nonnuclear weapons; on the other, in national economies _
operating within a world market. For the first time in history, as historians _
- have pointed out, a world market does not extend and operate inside a world
empire. European industry depends on oil from the Persian Gulf. National
or multinational firms obtain necessary parts for their machinery from
countries where wages are low. Our relations with our partners in the
European Community, with the oil-praducing countries, wi.th the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe involve commercial exchanges primarily, and intellectual -
or artistic exchanges secondarily. Socialist countries do not fully belong
to the empire of u~erchants, but they are linked to it by their recourse to
private bank loans with which to finance purchases in the West.
A world society, so to speak, consists of a set of compl~x international -
- and transnatio:~al relations as much as or more than traditional diplomatic-
strategic relations. Ideas or news reports cross borders and go around
the world in a few minutes. Technical innovations and scientific discoveries
are disseminated with increasing rapidity. In this transnational society,
states no longer always play the leading role.
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All of this accounts for tt~~e diversity of images from which professors of
= international relations hesitate to choose any one picture. Which one of
them correspond:~ most to current reality? I do not propose to discuss, in
~he abstract, the respective merits of these pictures that are probably
more complementary than incomgatible. I shall take as my starting point
- the distinction betwePn the system of relations between states, a system
governed by ttie ratio of forces, and the world society over which no one
actor exercises sovereign rule. I shall also discuss th~? respective -
positions of the United States and the Soviet Union within this system of
relations and this world society. Does the relative decline of the United
States mark the passage from American imperialism tc Soviet hegemonism?
Arms and Diplomacy -
Russian-American rivalry assumed two altogether different forms, one in
Europe, the other in the rest of the world. Here in Europe, two coalitions
gradually took shape, from 1947 to 1955, on both sides of the demarcation
- line: the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance. Borders did not change -
and neither of the two coalitions resorted to military action to alter them.
In Asia and the Middle East, these two superpoloer~s acted behind the scenes,
if not on the scene, but their troops never clashed directly on the battle-
field.
The two limited wars in which the United States committed an expeditionary =
force both had an accidental character. Stalin would probably not have
_ ~iven Kim I1-song the green light if Washington's diplomats had let it be
clearly known in advance that the United States would not tolerate the
invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops. Hostilities would not have
continued for 3 years if Truman had heeded the Chinese warnings India's
- ambassador had relayed to him. Likewise, the United States, opposed to the
- return of the French to Indochina, reversed its attitude as a result of =
Ma.o Tse-Tung's victory in China. After the Geneva Conference, the United _
_ States did not have to perpetuate a Korean-type situation in Vietnam under
condition.s far more unfavorable than in Korea: unlike the South Korea?n armed -
Forces, the South Vietnamese armed force~ did not counterbalance the troops f
mobilized by the other half of the country.
Leaving these two limited wars aside, the system of relatir,ns between states
ch~nged as a result of decolonization, internal uprisings, and shifts of -
allegiance from one bloc to the other. The United States or. the Soviet Union -
intervened in the internal politics of countries and between countries, but
under juridical camouflage that was impeccable more often than not. The
United Nations Charter does not prohibit a country from buying arms c4: the ~
outside or fram requesting aid from another countr;?. The United States aad
the Soviet Union have responded to this type of request, and they have -
withdrawn their advisers and troops whenever the local government has called _
upon them to do so. President Sadat obtained the withdrawal of Soviet
advisers. Ethiopia's revolutionary regime also obtained the departure of
most American diplomats and military personnel. -
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At times, the Zegal cover did not withstand close examination. The French-
British expedition in answer to nationalization of the Suez Canal failed
for multiple reasons. It would have succeeded only if it had caused
Nasac~r's overthrow nnd the inun~diAte arri.val of anotlier prceident.
I:ncouraged by the Sovie[ ambassador and the position taken by the United
States, Nasser sta~d fast. The English pound was unable tc wi.thstand the
- turmoil, and the rrench-3ritish troops ingloriously withdrew. At the same
time, Soviet troops put down the Hungarian rev~lution, at the request of
the peasant-worker government headed by Janos Kadar. The juridical
camoflauge for this Soviet action was scarcely more vali.d than the pretext
the French and British used for occupying the Canal Zone in order to separate
the Israeli and Egyptian belligerents. In 1968, the Kremlin improved the
zmage of its military intervention by associating its Warsaw Pact allies in
the operation. Except for the crises of 1956 and 1968, the superpowers
intervened in the internal affairs of other countries without expressly
violating international law: overt intervention by furnishing arms or
_ advisers, covert intervention in an effort to destabilize a regime by
supporting its opposition or rebellious ethnic minorities. From this stand-
point, it can be said that gunboat diplamacy has gone out of style.
In the Middle East, Israel a.nd the Arab countries have waged four wars--1948,
195b, 1967, and 1973 (omitting the 1970 war. of attrition)--ended by cease-
fires and never a peace treat,y� In 1956, France and Great Britain partici-
~ pated in the operations. Since then, they have been kept out of the
negotiations in crisis situations. Not because of their role in 1956, but
for a simpler reason. When countries wage wars against each other, the
only other countries they will listen to are those capable of mobilizing
- forces in the theater of operations. In 1956, 1967 and 1973, the Russian-
American negotiations, conducted in the background of the United Nations
S~curity Council and General As~embly, influenced the duration of the
hostilities and the tern~s and conditions of the cease-fire. Russians and
Americans refrained from any direct participation in the fighting, thus
enabling the Israelis to win victories in the field. In 1973, Y~owever,
= the Russians first, and then the Americans, resupplied their respective
proteges during the fighting. And they hastened the declaration of a
cease-fi.re in order to save an Egyptian azmy surrounded in the desert.
- In a simi.lar crisis when the Kramlin seemed to be about to dispatch airborne
divisions to the Middle F.ast, what ratio of forces determined the outcome of
- the test of wills? Was it the ratio of forces available in the theater, in
other words, the American Sixth Fleet, the Soviet fleet in the eastern
Mediterranean, and the aircraft squadrons operating from land bases? Or
else was it the ratio of all Russian and American forces, nuclear and
conventional, throughout the globe? I do not think anyone, not even
H. Kissinger or. R. IZixon, can answer this question with any certainty.
Officials in the Kremlin did not wish to take the risk of committing their
troops against the Israelis. They did not want to tolerate a total Israeli
_ victory. For his part, H. Kissinger wanted to spare Egypt a defeat that
- would have prohibited Sadat from pursuing a policy of peace. Once a Syrian-
Egyptian victory was ruled out, both the Russians and the Americans wanted
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essentially the same end to the conflict. Both parties did, nevertheless,
ca?culate the ratio of forces, regional or worldwide. They avoided confron-
tation and tacitly accepted the verdict of the battlefield (a verdict gained
by others).
l,~iether it bc in Ethiopia, South Yemen, A~ghanigtan, Mozambique, or Angola,
, have Soviet advances been connecCed in some way with the relative number of
nuclear warheads on American and Russian silo-launched or submarine-launched
missiles? Or with the number of tanks or fighter squadrons on each side of
the demarcation line in Europe? On the surface, the question answers itself,
so to speak. The liberation movement in Mozambique upheld Marxist or
progressive ideas. It was not in Moscow but in our European unive-rsities
that Af rica's liberators learned their ideology. A progressive movement won -
in Angola because the U.S. Congress refused to appropriate tl~e funds needed
to support the nonprogressive liberation movement. The ratio of forces
between the various parties inside Ethiopia and Angola does not depend on
the overall +ratio of forces between the Soviet Union and the TJnited States,
but on the respective capability or willingness of Westerners and Soviets _
to help their party.
The apparent separation between the ratio of local forces and the ratio of
global forces of the two superpowers is never a complete one. The interven-
- tions in Africa by Cuban troops presupposed the existence in the Soviet bloc
oF transport aircraft, a series of air bases, and perraps even airborne
aivisions should they be needed. In the Middle East, the Kremlin tolerated
the Isr:~eli victory in 1967 and was reluctant to employ its airborne divisions
in 1973 because of U.S. power as much as because of regional circumstances.
In the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962, all the advantages were on the
American side: locally, the U~S. Army, Navy, and Air Force had overwhelming
superiority; likewise U.S. strategic nuclear weapons were three or four
times more powerful than those af the Soviet Union. -
How can anyone accurately determine the relative part played in settling a
- crisis by conventional weapons in the theater of operations and nuclear
weapons ?
The best approach is to s*_ick to prudent conclusions. The central balance,
- the one encompassing both Europe and the strategic weapons of the two
superpowers, does exercise an influence over crises and over diplomatic
confrontations and their outcome when armies face each other or when
- recourse to arms by the superpowers appears ~rabable or at least plausible.
On the other ~and, whenever Russian-American rivalry extends inside ' -
countries, the ratio of global forces exercises only a very indirect
influence o~~ the protagonists. Nothing succeeds as much as success.
Whenever thP wind from the East seems to get the better of ~he wind from '
the West, progressivism's arguments thereby become more canvincing. And
the ratio of global forces between the United States and the Soviet Union -
has been changing year by year in favor of the latter.
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Arms Control
The Soviet Union has aiways maintained a considerably large military
establishment. A comparison between, for example, the number of Soviet
ar_d American tanks--50,000 versus 10,000--is enough to give the impression
that Moscow now surpasses Washington. We could easily add many other such
statistics. For instance, the Soviet Union's military budget increases _
3 to S percent annually, and represents some 13 percent, perhaps even 15
percent, of the USSR's gross national product, a percentage triple that of
the United States (5 percent). Even in the nuclear weapons field, the -
Soviets are the ones who have made the most progress. They have deployed
' two new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems, and three -
land-based missile systems. The Americans have deployed only one new SLBM -
system, the Trident, have MIRVed their Minuteman and ~oseidon missiles, -
and improved the accuracy of their nuclear warheads. During the past 10
years, negotiations on strategic arms limitations agreemeats (SALT 1 and -
SALT 2) have accompanied and dissembled Soviet progress.
The SALT agreements are based on the so-called arms control doctrine. The -
crux of this doctrine may be described as follows: establish an arms ratio
such that neither of the duelists will be tempted to use them. Arms control
does not involve disarmament or the reduction of arms to a minimum: if
each of the superpowers had only some 100 missiles, each would run the risk
of being disarmed by a first strike, and this risk would increase instability.
The Americans focused tf~eir attention on the so-called strategic arms, in .
- other words, on those weapons that could reach Soviet territory when launched
from American territory or submarines (or vice versa). The SALT agreements
are aim~d at creating "stability" not between all the military resources of _
- the two superpowers but between one category of nuclear weapons, namely
intercontinental launchers. Insofar as these agr_eements achieve their
goal, they "neutralize," as it were, these weapons. Stabilization entails -
nonuti.lization of these weapons, unless there is a direct attack against
them or against national territory. What is left of their deterrent func-
tion? The very principle of SALT cannot help but revive, with greater
urgency, the issue Europeans have been raising for the past 20 years:
Is European security assured by NATO's conventional forces or by the thermo- -
nuclear capability of the Uni'ced States? -
- In the early days of NATO, the presence of American troops symbolically
obliterated the distance between the Old World and the New World: "Ich
bin ein Berliner." An agreement limited to strategic arms wi.dens the gulf
between Western Europe and the United States. The lengthy Russian-American -
- controversy over the Backfire bomber highlights the logic and the paradox
of these negotiations at once and the same time; if the goal of these _
negotiations is equality or equivalertce in one isolated field--long-range
launchers--the Americans are logical in prohibiting giving the Backfire an
intercontinental function or capability. But when this bomber is employed
in the theater of opera~ions, it contributes substantially to the strength -
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of the Soviet bloc even though it would not add much to the arsenal of
' intercontinental launchers. Logical in an agreement limited to one type
of weapon, illogical in an agreement encompassing all weapons.
Between the time the arms control doctrine was formulated and the SALT 2
negotiations were concluded, technical advances outs*ripped diplomacy.
~ A. [dohlstetter's famous article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," has -
assumed a new current relevance. The number of nuclear warheads, augmented -
- by the ins~rtian of several warheads in each missile, and their accuracy,
= now make it possible for one of the two superpowers to destroy almost all ~
= of the other's land-based missiles in a first strike. In such a case, the
only recourse left to the attacked party would be to retaliate with its
= SLBM's by striking at the aggressor`s industrial and urban ir~stallations,
~ but with the certainty of suffering a similar fate. After the first strike
on the other's land-based missiles, the attacker still has thousands of
nuclear warheads available for a third strike.
- If the two superpowers have an equal (or equivalent) destruction capability, -
solely a counterforce operation remains plausible. One of the two (or both) .
- superpowers may well have a first-strike capability against land-based
missiles. In that case, one superpower would give the other no alternative -
but to negotiate after having lost most of its land-based missiles, or else
counter by hitting cities at the risk of escalating into a suicidal orgy of
_ violence. The increasing number of objections to SALT 2 reveal;: the impasse -
reached by negotiations restricted to intercontinental launchers. This
agreement would no.*. "stabilize" the ratio of intercontinental weapons, and -
- at the same time it would separate the European theater from the nuclear -
. capabilities of the two superpowers.
" What is more, the Americans are now discovering that through their over-
confidence in the resources of their techno logy, they have let themselves
be equalled or surpassed in certain respects. Masters of miniaturization,
they armed their Minuteman missiles wiLh three (170-kiloton) nuclear warheads. `
The less skillful Soviets relied on he?vy missiles whose throw weight exceeds
= by far the throw weight of all American mi.ssiles. The Soviets mount eight
nuclear warheads of 2 megatons each in their SS-18 missiles. Between now
- and 1985, the 303 MIRVed SS-18's would present a destructive threat to the
- silos of U.S. land-based missiles.
In a few years ~ime, wi.th or without the ratification of SALT 2, specialists
wili perhaps deem that the Soviet Union has attained a certain superiority
at the highest-level of intercontinental missiles: superiority is attributed
to the country that has a better chance than its rival of destroying all of
the other's land-based missiles in one fell swoop. All polemi.cs aside, we
do note that the implementation of arms control has furthered neith~r dis-
armament, nor the stability of the level of inter~ontinental weapons, nor
Europe's security. This failure is due in part to the doctrine itself
- (restricted to one type of weapon), and in part to technical innovations
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(MTRV, firing accuracy). Technicians were making stability impossible at
the same time that diplomats were doggedly seeking such stability. Soviet
inferiority in miniaturizat~.on turned itself into superiority in the throw
weight of heavy launchers. Optimists were rejoicing at 'Snutual assured
_ destruction," unaware that, at the same time, the deterrent threat of
_ nuclear weapons was becoming less and less plausible.
A number of ~uropeans will interpret the American doctrine as one prompted _
by the desire to spare U.S. territory the ravages of war, whatever the
circumstances. Neutralization of t~e strategic forces does, in a way:
exclude Soviet and American territories from the possible theater of
operations. I am not convinced by this interpretation. By maix~taining
200,000 to 300,000 of its soldiers in central Europe, the United States
3ooms itself to unprecedented disaster if it does not succeed in preventing, _
by zvery possible means, the invasion of West~rn Europe by Soviet troops.
Two ideas guide the thinking and action of American officials and their
advisers. The first is that ~ussian-American rivalry is inscribed in the
_ "big book af history" but can assume more or less violent forms and attain
a rnora or less high level of intensity. The second is that it is in the
~ common interest of the two superpowers and of a11 mankind not to wage the
"unthinkable" war,
These are reasonable ide~s that can be endorsed but they do allow one
element of doubt to linger. The course of diplomacy, crises and their
_ outcome, are affected by the arms available to one side or the other. -
What influence will the results of SALT exercise on possible confrontations
between the two superpowers? Considering the future status of nuclear
forces in 1982 or 1985, would a confrontation of the same type as the 1962
- ' Cuban crisis or the 1973 Yom Kippur War end in the same way?
China's Entry
- Does the diplomatic activi.sm of Mao Tse-tung's succes~ors alter the structure
of the system of relations between states? Even before the Great Helmsman's
death, tension between Moscow and Peking had compelled the men in the Kremlin
to mass 44 divisions and a fourth of their ':.actical air forces along the ~
_ Chinese bor.der. The resources required to maintain a large army in the Far
East, with its bases and supplies, proportionately reduce the resources
available in the West. Regardless of the state of relations between iche
Peoples Republic of China and the United States or European countries, the -
PRC, by its hostility toward the Soviet Union, is of service to the West.
In the language of Marxist-Leninists, we can refer to it as an objective
alliance. Objectively, the enemy of my Qnemy is my friend.
What did change in 1978, however, was China�s opening to the outside world -
- and the policy of four modernizations: agriculture, industry, armed forces
- and technology. Deng Xiaoping has replaced the supremacy of ideology with
the supremacy of efficiency tnot without quoting, now and then, one of Mao's
- sayings when it agrees with current policy). At the same time, he is nut -
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' relucL~nt to burrow macl~ines lrom Ldesterners and also the dollara witli
whicti to buy titem. The objective alliance assumes a new aspect the moment
- Westerners begin helping, with their money and kn~w-how, the 1'RC's modern-
ization effort, and consequently its economic and military reinforcement. -
How far do Western interests in the strengthening of China extend? There
- are many Europeans and Westerners who wonder about a possible conflict -
between Western short-term and long term interests. What will Marxist
China's policy line be tomorrow? The leader of the modernization-at-all-
costs faction, Deng Xiaoping, is over 70 years old. Would a modernized `
and powerful China pursue a policy consistent with the material or moral -
interests of the United States or all Westerners?
rtany more objections and misgivings can be expressed. They automatically -
come to mind. But wh~t is at issue today is the response to be given to
the PRC's advances. We lend muney to the Soviet Union. We sell it complete
factories. Why not do the same for China? The Soviet Union buys neither
weapons nor nuclear power plants ~rom us, whereas the PRC would like to buy
some of these from us. The United States has decided not to sell arms to
- 1'eking but has already let it be known that it would not oppose any contrary
decision by Europeans.
The Soviets definitely look with disfavor on this rapprochement between
Westerners and Chinese. For ~ur part, we rnust not delude ourselves about
the military scope of this "objective alliance." If the Soviet Union were
to launch an offensive limited to one or another of the hot spots on the _
Sino-Soviet border, the United States would have neither the intention nor
the means of intervening. Likewise, assuming the Soviet Union launched its
armed forces toward the Atlantic, China would not come to our rescue.
China is not for Western Europe the ally at the enemy's back that Russia
was for France at the beginning of the century.
The men in the Kremlin probably see a mortal danger in China's alliance
with Japan and China's modernization with the help of the West. But this
is only a medium-term or long-term matter. The Chinese armed forces are
20 years behind the Soviet armed forces from an equipment standpoint. Japan
, allocates about only 1 percent of its gross national product to its self-
defense forces. I doubt that by playing the Chinese card, the United States
will bring Moscow to display more flexibility or ma.ke more concessions.
The opposite result seems more probable to me. The Vietnamese wanted, at
all costs, to liquidate the Pol Pot regime. Tha Soviets, to say the least,
were not annoyed when this liquidation occurred shortly after Washingtc~n's
~ recognition of the People's Republic of China.
The Chinese rightly denounce Soviet hegemonism as the number-one enemy. -
From their viewpoint, quite obviously, because they have no comtmn border
- with the United States, but do have a 2,000-kiiometer border with the
- Soviet imperium in Asia. This formula is also true for a large part of
the wor.ld. In Europe, the Soviet Union maintains a superiority in troops
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and equipment, not to mention its nuclear superiority (the mobile and -
- MIRVed SS-20). More than the United States, the USSR is now determined
to project its forces wherever the opportunity presents itself, and for -
such military expeditions it has more of its own forces (some 10 airbQrne
divisions) and more furnished by its allies (Cuba) and the German Democratic
Republic).
The leaders of the Soviet Union certainly do not agree with American
professors who hold that military strength is playing a waning role in
international relations. In the system af relations between states,
divisions or missiles do count, as does also the will to use them. Soviet
hegemonism replaces American imperialiam in this respect.
World Market
In the early post-World War II period, the United States dominated the
world market even m~ore than the system of relations between states. The
North Korean Army, augmented later by Chinese volunteers, held out against -
an American expeditionary force and highlighted the limits of the military
power of the United States on the ground. The period of European coloniza-
tion had passed. Countries other than Japan had acquired the resources
and organization needed to practice the modern art of warfare. As for
nuclear weapons, then a U.S. monopoly, they terrified neither Moscow nor
Peking. Both moral and political reasons deterred the inzshington leader- -
ship from employing them, even against communist "aggressors."
The United States alone ruled the world market, so to speak. It was the
financial, commercial and industrial center of the so-called free world.
It allocated available surplus capital to foreign investments. It held '
first place in most of the advanced technologies. Some 6 percent of the
world's total population consumed 50 percent of the raw materials used by
a11 ma.nkind. It was an abnormal situation that could not last and it
prompted the establishment of such international organizations as the
International Monetary Fund, GATT, and the United Nations.
The Ma.rshall Plan, and the recovery of Western Europe and Japan were
consistent with the logic of the system of relations between states as
well as the logic of the world market, such as these were viewed by leaders
in Washington. What now remains of the United States' supremacy, some 30
years after the Marshall Plan?
Per capita production in Europe's most advanced countries now seems to be
hi.gher than that ir,~ the United States when we use the official rates of
- exchange. Even though the underevaluation of the dollar distorts these
figures, the fact remains that per capita production in Switzerland, Sweden,
and the Federal Republic of Germany, ha.s come close to or equalled that in
the United States. The United States still retains its superiority in an
area that is the deciding factor in the system of relations between states, -
namely that only the United States coa~bines high productivity with iinnense
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space and a large population. The Japanese popul3tion, h~lf that of the
United States, is concentrated within a narrow space. Western Europe is .
divi.ded into countries, the most populated of which have no more than
~ one-fo~zrth the population of the United States. Japan and Western Europe ~
lack raw materials and energy. They depend on foreign trade to a much
greatPr degree than the American republic. Although Japan and Western
Europe compete with the United States within the world market, they are
not its rivals within the system of relations b~tween states. They remain
protected states, even when the American republic denounces the invasion -
of goods in Japan.
The Bretton Woods monetary system was ma.intained until 1971, for better or
for worse. The overev