JPRS ID: 8766 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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- JPRS L/8766
16 November 1979
L~tin Arr~er~c~ Re ort -
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(FOUO ~ 2/79) -
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- JPRS L/8766
~ 16 November 1979 -
LATIN AMERICA REPORT
(FOUO 12/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
ARGENTINA
Videla's TYip to Japan TerTMed Diplomatic Success
- (Eduardo J. Paredes; LA OPINION, 21 dct 79)............ ~ _
Pandolfi Reflects on Armed Forces Ob~ectives, Means
(Rodolfo Pandolfi; LA OPINION, 22 Oct 79) 5 -
Briefs
_ Leftward Drift Signaled 8
CUBA
Soviet Writer on Cuba's Vanguard Role in Nonalined Meeting
- (Leonid Levchenko; AMERICA LATINA, No 3, 1979)......... 9
U.S.-Cuban Relations Question Explored
- (Piotr Litavrin; AMERICA LATINA, No 3, 1979)........... 16
'Arafat Congratulates Castro on TJN Speech
(PRELA, 17 Oct 79) 26
t1ICARAGUA
- Somoza in Paraguay Tells of Return Plans
(STERN, ~3 Sep 79) 27
PERU
Republican Guardsman Kills ~ao Ecuadorean Fishermen
(DPA, 2 Nov 79) 31 '
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ARGENTINA -
VIDELA'S TRIp TO JAFAN TERMED DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS G
Buenos Aires IA OFINION in Spanish 21 Oct 79 pp 12-13 ~
[Article by Eduar~do J. Paredes: "A Presidential Trip to Be Considered and a
: Critical Opening"J
~ [Text] Preside.lt Videla has by now been engaged again in~the comple~e exercis~ F
of his functions for several days, following his trip to Japan. And it is
time to tell the reader that, insofar as foreign policy is concerneci, "nothing
' is either true or false," and often everything depends on the tone, etc. Thcre
~ were some who, eager to an~icipate t?etter results for the nation, axpECted to _
see Lt General Jidela arrive with a fine package of advantageous busineas deals -
I under his arm; and this was not the casa. From that pragmatic standpoint,
ea s com lete la~k of understandin about the Ja an-
which.simultaneously rev 1 a p g p
ese style in international transactions, the trip may have appeared to be a
~ failure. Actually, if one regards the event in its true dimensions and cor-
rectiy notes the guidelines involved in its development, the criticism is not
~ fair ar.d the results are quite satisfactory.
i In the first place, many have forgotten that it was Japan which showed r~n in- _
i terest in promoting an offici~I, practi~a:l rapprochement with Argentina through
an invitation handled on the level of the respective foreigr_ ministries. This
was an invitaticn which Argentina could not disdain because, since there are
many countries which have been waiting for yeara for a positive wink �rom the
land of slanted eyes, being selected as an esteemed interlocutor by one of the .
~ world's great powers has eradicated all the images indicating a lack of sta~i-
I lity and reliability with respect to Qur eommitmen:~ts, which we unfortunately
- had. But, on the other hand, at s time when the country's i~ternational rela-
~ tions are beset w~th problems, it waa e~sential from a political standpoint
~ tha~ the Western powers observe a rapprochement with Japan, no le8s, fostered
; by the latter's interest ~nd nat by a mournful plea from Buenc+s Ai~es.
, So, when analyzed from a political standpoint, the rapprochment w3.th Japan and ^
~ the joint do~umen~ quite deliberately favoring the initiation of a strong bi-
lateral eco:~om~ic relationship are a success. When viewed from a purely eco-
nomic anglp, it may have dashed hopes if the sectors expected to see ~ridela _
; arrive like a kind of Santa Claus, carrying the trad~.tion~l bag filled with
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investments and loans. In the first place, Japan is not a country readily =
- disposed toward making foreigu investments, and it has always preferred to
grant loans foi~ the purpose of narketing its own products outside of the ar-
- chipelago. Argentina needs investments raore tnan it needs loans steered in
a certain direction. Then the conclusion was reaehed that the president made
; the trip in search of an agreement on rapprochment ior a future bilateral eco-
nomic association, which was achieved. There were some who made the criticism -
that the president's figure was used to begin negotiations, instea~3 of to be 4
a signatory thereof. But, actually, many factors would ha~e to be placed on -
the scale to understand why tlne compromise that was used was accepted. First
of all, the president was not going to deal with Japanese industrialists, but
- was rather on an absolutely equal footing with the Japanese prime mini~ter
ins~far as rank was concerned, and went at the special invitation of the em-
pEror. Secondly, in view of the Japanese deference in seeking a direct rap-
prochement with Arger.tina, it was not a matter of embarking on the area of
protocolar subtleties.
The various newspaper articles showed that Japan was particularly interested _
in negotiating two loan plans for projects using Japanese technology in the
country: the electrification of the Roca railroad branch, and the industrial
expansion of the SOMISA [Argentine Joint Iron-and-Steel Associatian] steel
- plant. The trip made it possible for both pr.ojects to be included on a gene-
ral agenda, whicfi also included the possibility of deneloping teleco~nunica- -
tions technology and fishing operations. But it is important to stress the
_ fact that Japan began to hint at a slight, but real interest in investing,
so long as Argentina is in a position to guarantee stability in all aspects
of the bilateral pact, and a capacity for being for Japan a good market for
food and ~ven oil supplies, insofar as technology and good fortune can help
us to raise our production to the point wher~e we might have exportable sur-
pluses.
To put it briefly, we Argentines are constantly embroiled in easy criticism.
We either say "nothing has happened here," if there is immobility in a ruler, ;
or we say "he finally went and nothing happened," if the ruler ceases his ~
immobility and tries to make up for deeades of backwardness. O~jectively, -
we can only state that the president's tYip to Japan was important from a po- -
litical standpoint, we can cautiously term it positive from ar. economic stand-
. point and we can say that it was really positive from a diplomatic staadpoint.
Japan winked one of its slan~ed eyes and, wit~ the speed of the indescribable
pool game played by our feZlow countrymen, Argentina managed to respond to the
sign. Now it will have to wait for the progress of the negotiations to learn
whether the assumption that, at a time when the international situation is
quite difficult, we have succeeded in arranging future act~.vity with a partner ~
by no meana to be underestimated: the third-ranki~.g power in the world, wiYl
bec,ome a reality.
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.
And What About China?
, 1es, it is possible that the president may travel to China also. For some
time, since the early 1960's, the vast country of the Clrient has been seekir.g
in the Southern Cone of Ameri~a the great opportunitie~ f~r purchasing food
for 1 billion Chinese, in a country wherein even the daily use of manure is
planned, and on the day when that plar,ning fails, the entire structure col-
lapses. A billion people in a socialist planning system pose a rather seri-
ous problem. The Chinese re~lize this and are preparing for an era in which
the standard of living of its inhabitant~ will be improved and there will be
a breakthrough toward an econmmy with greater eonsumption. Moreover, China
does not make its business dealings an ideol~gical prob?em, because it does
not o~fer exchanges with ~ul[ural roots, but merely busiaess. And ~It pays
- far more punctually than other countries which gorge themselves talking about
" capitalism. The;ce are Ameriean Sinologists who claim that China is socialist
inside and overtly capitalist outside; while simultaneously maintxining that
- its stLongly nationalistic quality senarates it from the internationalist con-
. c~epts of proletarian r.evolutions. Furthermore, China has serioss historical
- .problems, past and present, and involving borders and culture, with the other
communist giant, the Soviet Union; and henee it must neeessarily look to the
West in the searcfi for absolLtely necessary openings which have little to do
with ideology. _
� If we manage to increase our productivity, we could sell good quality food
- and industrial products to the Chinese at a good priee and without abliga-
tion (as the pen sellers on the collectives say). Argentina should widen
its commercial and international view without any inhibitions (as, it is only -
_ fair to admi~, the Radicai mo~rement tried to do, with serious internal prob- -
lems, between 1963 and 1965); and if, for this purpose, Lt General Videla
should have to ~ravel to Peking, it would be a good opportunity fcr us to
put an end to our pre~udicesi and let things take their caurse....
- And Foreign Relations?
T:iey are bad, thant: you. Everything that we have been analyzing is directly
related to a changing Western world wherein Argentina's status again has the
Kafka-like odd quality that has marked it sinre the end of World W~.r II. When
the West was governed by the right wing, we were center libe=als; when they
- began to try neoliberalfsm, we were enthu3iastic populists and corporativists.
Now, when the vast ma~ority of th~m are democratic socialists, w~ tlave a right -
wing government. But, although this i~ an iniportant ~nd almo~t serious m~tter, -
we should not despair; becauge in today's world, calling ~omething right or
- left is merely a game ~f semantics. The important thing is to determine the
individual's role in society, and to gear th~ political aad economic syatem _
to that humanistic criterion. The overall situation is nega~ive: 7.'he United
States has a bad opinion of us, and the European Parlfa~ent's view is even
woa~se. Latin America, with but few exceptions, is ia a stiate of upheaval in
search of democracy; and the Vatican is afFECtionately pull.ing our ears now
_ and then (right�ully, at best). We are a truly Western, Christiar_ countr}?,
which has, paradoxically, been criticized by the ~v'est and the Chui~ch. _
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It would be ridicL?.ous t_~ c1.~im that we ~r~ust continue with blinders on, wait-
ing for the European s~cia.J. democra.*,s ~n~1 the North Americans to shifr to the
right, and for Monsig~noi I.efr.bvr~ to the one to apply the Council of Trent
rite to the Vatican'~ rule~. ,
- It is obvious that, wit~:~~.i:: ?.osing +;~sr .rtational essence, and without losing -
the great store of ideas th~at have s:~~p,~~d the nation (and note that ~11 the
historical eras, all of tfie~., hav~e S~~d t:h~ir signifieance in that sha~+ing),
i[ is Argentina wr.ich m~iss. aaapt ~to th~~ ~a~rld in which it has to l~ve, and ~i�-'-
it must not feel that i~- t~ suffita.ently ~ighty to expect the world to change. =
. We Argentines are well ~-sa.r~ of the ra~c9: that the process of national reor-
ga~nization is not a dicta;..a;shi~. Bur w~ are algo well aware that it is not
the vanguard political :~y~r~m irr ~hz Western world. We are, through our own
fault, slightly against ti.1e grain os t?i~~.ory. So, it is impossible to neglect
th2 future effort to at*~-~.n a~ a~re~}r~nt on national unity which will be aim- -
; ed at a democratic syst6.u, c~ri.t~~ ca;~~:l~tP ,justice and dzvelopment for the in- _
dividual, so that the i.~ct~~rnat,4na3. cormniinity will admit us into its midst.
~ Perhaps there i~ no ner_�,3 t:o a~.cel~r.~t~z ~he deadlines, but we must hasten the
- period leading to stru~~t~:r.~l ch~n~;P.~ anci the transformation of a mediocre,
_ weary society into a c:~:~a*_~.~~, v~Lgvrz.za~ society. In the days ahead, this pro-
cess has a possibilitr s~': ~~$inn3.,~~ tc~ ~peak a political language through a _
proposal which mus t in~:.vi r~bly r:~~ta.~.~�i ~wo unavoidable premises : it mus t be
directed at the nation.`~ soc~a~. rea7.ity, and also at the international reality
wherein the nation is de~~~::iopin~,
The interna~tional t:her�~x,:~~~er iz~d3.::at~:~ ~hree important temperatures for the
_ country: below zeru in E~r~pe, ~n:.d the United States and a slight aign o~
spring in the Vatican� '~J~ s~Ya~Z c,nqu~stionably have to devise a dome~tic po~- �
licy which, although i~ does ilat r.ece}sarily have to make us the ic~eologxcal
- partne.rs of anyone agains~ Qur Gi~3ay a�� least will not doom us to having any-
~ one as enemies; because na Qr.e cc.,l.~ s~.riously imagine an axis cc..~~sti~?g of
Buenos Aires, Asuncionp Pioti~~vi~~~.~ aa~ Ca~~etown against the rest of the world.
Not even Menotti would make ca.a w~.rs ~~at game. -
Moreover, Argentina has a~ultu~al ohiigation to ~oin in the evolution of the
West, ax~d is prevente~ from ~Qc~amir.~ szparated therefrom. Even in many of the _
aspects for which it ~.~s currenzly i~~ing criticized, it ia possible that the
judgment of history wt!ich wiZl evzx~t~a].ly prove it right is not far ofcf. But,
by the same token, th~xe is no Y~a~on to losp sight ef either our own cultur-
- al roots nor those beq~eat~~~d ti~ t~~; by Europe; because we eannot ~end up in an
odd state of fraternizatian crit~. ~:he Ivory Coast, and withdraw our ambassadors
from the great politi~:al ck~zC~xs o~' ~he West. Argeatina mu~st "a~t in the
forefront."
And Inflation?
~ Dr Martinez de Hoz said "~ram 3?0 5 years." We are at the end of the fourth. ,
God willing, there ar~: ~w~ po:~si"s;ilifies: either he is not mistaken or, in
case he i.s, he will a~pl~ h3.~ i~c~fsputable magnanimity as a man of honor and ,
admit it before it is too la~F. 'I'~in inflation is very severe; it corrupts;
~ it is another enemy, of ~v~ryot~~~ 4
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~ ARGENTINA
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~ PANDOLFI REFLECTS ON ARMED FORCES OBJECTIVES, MEANS
I Buenos Aires LA OPINION in S anish 22 Oct 79 7
~ P P
i [ArticYe by Rodolfo Pandolfi: "Means and Goals in the Present Political Period"]
[Text] Any assessment of the situativn that exists under the present circum-
stances entails the necessary and dynamic correlation bstween the intentions
of the leaders of the process and the response from the realfacts existing
apart from the process that is under way (which does not necessarily imply
an opposing intention).
The intention is at all times gaged by relating it to the main factors which
- are operating in the same context:
~ a. International political factor; b. internatianal eGOnomic factor; c. intex-
~ na~ional financial factor; d. international cultural factor; e. national poli- -
tical factor; f. national economic factor; g. nat~onal financial factor; h. _
national social factor.
- Added to those factors, which are not necessarily the most important ones, are
- all the visible subcategories (the effeet af the regional political factor on
the present period) and, of course, many others (atctitude of the Catholic
Church, effect of the passage of time itself on the population's expectations,
' etc.).
The essential idea that will underly the Armed Forces' political proposal is -
the establishment of an efficient, stable democra~y founded upon a system of
political parties an~l representation through the parliamentary institution.
Hence, in the last atialysis the objective is compliance with the National Con-
~ stitution.
~
' Gradualism -
; In order to attain that ob3ective, those leading the~current proceas ptefer '
the gradualist method and, one may a~sume, the so-called informed gradualist
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method (in other words, communicating with the citizenry regarding the com-
pletion of the respective stages).
However, it is obvious that the incorporation of the gradualist method affords
- some variations. The first "step" might be on the municipal, parliamentary -
or provincial level. There are several possibilities in this respect. Any
method that might be chosen inevitably offers both advzntages and disadvan-
tages. In any event, one consideration should be taken into account: It
would not appear easy to complete all the steps during an interval exceeding
. the period of the mandates themselves.
For example (based on one of the draft bills that have been disseminated),
it might be assumed that the first step would consist of normalization of the
provinces. That step would be earried out on the basis of substages, leading
to the normalization of provinces "in turns." However, the device would be-
come complicated if it entailed a change in officials before the cycle had
% concluded. For example, if each provincial governor remains in office for
4 years, the fact that the other one has chosen his course of action for
the first titne produces a spe~cial situation. ~
The other problem posed by the steps is the possibility of politicizing areas
� which should not necessarily be subject to politicization. The most recurrent
objection that has been made to the starting of normalization in the small `
and medium-sized municipalities is that either this period does not represent
- embarking on a political path',. or else it leads to a communal hyper-
_ politicization.
To be sure, the opposite cour~e of aetion (calling for simultaeous elections -
at a given time) also poses serious obstaeles, ~nd could lead to a serious
discrepancy in time between the goals sought (a stable democrac~) and the
resu~ts accrued. Establishing an overall contest at one and the same time
would lead to a polarization which would detract viability from the under- ~
standings between the civilian and the military sectors.
Another Problem
~ The question might be this: The beginning of institutional normalization over
a very extensive period of time could result in a political hyper-polarization
that would deprive the center of space. The suspension of the partiea itself, ~
while productive and trade union a~tivity pursues its course, becomes danger- ~
ous in this regard. At the same time, a normalization "in juat a single turn" ,
would also lead to polarization. Perhaps the method should be sought in a ,
medium term, with phases of completion covering intermediate intervals.
But the government (any government) is far removed from being an a~solute
creator of reality, and all ideas must necesaarily be geared in so~ measure
to the course of events. No one can govern in a vacuum. ,
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Over and above methodological problems, there remains to be resolved the mat-
ter of the goals which have been proposed, as to whether the gradualism or the
simultaneous consultations should hdve specific purposes. What is the future
- government which is desired, and what values are we seeking to preserve?
COYYRICIiT: LA OPINION, 1979
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ARGCNT INA
,
BRIEFS
LEFTWARD DRIFT SIGNALED--Argentina is drawing closer to the Soviet bloc.
A frigate of the Argentine Naval Academy anchored in the Leningrad road-
stead in September, and Soviet engineers will be working Qn hydroelectric
powerplant construction in the Argentinian back-country. Polish fishing
ships are operating off the Patagonia coast, and the Czechs are to provide
Buenos Aires with a new sewer system. [Text] [Paxis VALEURS ACTUELLES
in French 15 Oct 79 p 43]
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CUBA
SOVIET WRITER ON CUBA'S VANGUARD ROLE IN NONALINED MEETING
Mascow AMERICA LATINA in Spanish No 3, 197} pp 22-3~
[Commentary by Leonid Levchenko]
[Text] In September the sixth su~nnit conference o~ nonalined countries will
be held in Havana. The fact that the members of the mc~vement have selected
the Cuban capital as the sit~ of their latest top-levex meeting is furth~r
evidence of the increasing interaction of th~ nonalined countries and the
~ socialist coiranunity, of which Cuba is a member, in the struggle against im-
. perialism, for peace and for social progress. Moreover, that choice provides
additional proof of the unquestioned consolidation of Cuba's role as one of
the movement's leaders, as a country that takes principled anti-imperialist
and anticolonialist positions ar,d gives as much support as possible to the
peoples' national liberation struggle.
At a ceremony honoring the ZSth anniversary of the heroic attack on the Mon-
cada Barracks, Fidel Castro said, "Cuba is a nonalined country because it is
not a party to any military pact; but it ie definitely against reaction,
_ imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, fa~cism, raci~m, zionism, unequal
relationships and the exploitation of the underdev~loped peoples. Cuba reso-
lutely supports liberation movements, just causes and progressive groups ~
throughout the world, pri.mary objectives for whiah the nonalined movement was
created."1 The Republic of Cuba has been a member of the movement since its ~
creation. Thus, at the first conference, held in Belgrade, the Cuban delega-
tion was instrumental in the drafting of documents of an anti-imperialist
nature. Thanks to its effoxts in particular, the Belgrade meeting's final
sfiatement ("Declaration by the Chie�s of State and Head$ o� Governments of
the Nonalined Countries") directly linked the ma~ntenance of a lasting peace
to the need for "colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism to be extermi-
nated in all their manifestations." The par~tic~pants in the conference ex- ~
pressed the opinion of all those who favor proc,~ress on our planet when they _
said, "War ar~ong the peoples is not only an anachronism but also a crfine can-
~ mitted by warped people." The delegates declared that "peaceful coexistence _
among the peoples is an ind.ispensable condition of their liberty and
progress," and they acknowledged the princip~.es of peaceful coexistence as
_ "the only basis for all international relationships."
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In keeping with Cuba's proposals~ the ~inal declaration contained a statement
that "the member countries consider the establishment and maintenance of for-
eign military ::ases on sta~tes' territory, especially against their expressed
will, a serious violation o~ ~:ieir ~overeigntX. Moreover, they proclaimed _
their "unlimite~ :;uppdri of countries ari.shing to eliminate these bases." The
declara.tion also said, "The presence of the American military base At Guanta-
_ namo (Cuba), which is opposed by the government and the people2of Cuba,
violates that country's sovereignty and terri:torial integrity."
The newspaper GRANMA said, when commenting on ~he statements approved at
Belg~ade, "In September 1961, th~se attending the first summit conference -
of nonalined countries drafted a final declaration in which they ac-
_ knowledged the expanding role of Latin America, and particularly of Cuba, _
in the struggie against imperialism an3 for world peace. One of the princi-
ples affirmed in it was to respect the right of Cuba and of all peuples to
fr~aely choose their political and social system. The support and
sc,~lidarity received by our country assured it, in time, the role of initiat~r -
~f a movement that would advance the rights of the Latin American peoples to -
speak with their own voices on the world stage."3
Cuba was the first Latin~American country to join the young Movement of
Nonalined Countries. It later came to occupy a leading position in it and -
marked the trail for other peoples of the region who were seeking, and still
are seeking, in the movement support for their anti-imperialist struggle for
- independence, especially with respect to U.S. imperialism.
At the second conference, heZd in Cairo, Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, president
of Cuba, stressed that his country's foreign policy was directed toward the
stre~zgthening of peaceful coexistence and that the Cuban Government consi-
ders peace indivisible. The Cuban head of government again spoke in favor ~
of the dismantling of foreign military bases and called upon member countries -
to confirm the Belgrade resolution demanding that the United States return
the occupied territory at Guantanamo to the Cubans and remove its troops.
Dorticos stated that his country opposes racial discrimination, and he pro-
posed that the nonalined chiefs of state support British Guiana's and Puerto
~ Rico's right to be independent.4
Declarations approved at that conference also condemned the United States'
, illegitimate occupation of the base at Guantanamo and the economic and com-
mercial blockade of the island. At Cuba's urging, the uelegates censured _
the attempts "by colonialists and neocolonialists in Latin America to in-
fringe the rights to self-determination and independence of the peoples of -
- that region."5 -
The results of the Cairo conference were highly praised in the Soviet-Cuban
jo;_nt communique concerning Dorticos' visit to the Soviet Union, which took
place after the international gathering. The coaununique said, "The second
conference of the chiefs of state and he~ds of government of the nonalined
- countries, in which Cuba participated, aras a major international event.
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The Soviets believe that the actions at th~.s con�erence o~ the Cuban dele- -
gation, led by President Dorticos, ef�ectively contributed to its positive
results. They believe~ moreover~ that the can~erence resolutions�concerning
Cuba strengthen its inter:.~~~onal standinq and confirm once more the Cuban
people's right to continue invigorating and developing their freely chosen
social system."6
As the prestig~ of the Movement of Nonalined Countries rose and its ranks
swelled, the imperialists intensified and refined their efforts to undermine
the movement from within, taking advantage of its sociopolitical htterogeneity
and the discord and conflicts among its mem~ers. Besides disparaging tlie
movement's pzogressive political principles, they attempted to turn its mem-
bers against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
At the fourth conference of the chiefs of state and heads of government of
the nonalined countries, held in Algiers, there was a massive effort to
turn the movement against its natural ally, the socialist coic�nunity. The `
imperialist er.emies of nonalinement substituted--this is their typical method ~
of carrying out propaganda--false principles for the movement's initial authen-
tic principles, imposing on it the tendency.of the "poor" to live at the ex-
pense of the "rich," unconditional neutralism and even isolationism, the ba-
lance between the "superpowers" and the desire to obtain concessions from
one or another by bargaining. The purpose of those propagandistic actions -
is to weaken the movement's anti-imperialist content.
Such maneuvers, accompanied by the attempt to ascribe "imperialistic inten-
_ tions" to the Soviet Union based or. the pretext of its "excessive" economic
and military power and its "too active" international ~olitics, did not go
unanswered at the conference. Fidel Castro gave the firmest response to the
enemies of nonalinement. "Any effort to place the nonalined countries in
opposition to the socialist camp," he said, "is profoundly counterrevolution-
ary and solely and exclusively benefits imperialist interests. There can -
be only one reason for inventing a false enemy: to avoid the true enemy."~
Fidel Castro unequivocably answered the question of what principle has
priori.ty for the socialist state: nonalinement and proletarian international-
ism. "I want to recall," he said, "the fact that Cu}sa is a socialist,
Mazxist-Leninist country whose ultimate goal is co~mnnianism. We are proud of
this! Working from this conception of human society, vae determine our na-
tional and internatiQnal policies. Above all, v~e are faithful to the prin-
- ciples of international proletarianism. For us, the world is divided
into capitalist countries and socialist countries, imperialist countries and
progressive countries; in short, governments that support imperialism, colo-
nialism, neocolonialism and racism, and governments that are opposed to im-
perialism, col~nialism, neocolonialism and racism. To us, this is basic to
the issue of alinement, for nothing wholly exempts us from the fundamental -
obligation to energetically remedy the cri.mes that have been con�nitted and
' are being co~nitted against humarzity."8 _
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Owing in large measure to the stance taken }~X~ the Cuban delegation, the
Algi:ers con~erence witnessed the ~ailure o~ those ~ho Sought to impose upon
the nonalined countries i.deas that ~tere incons~stent with the interests and
objecti'ves of tfie movement and that would tend to separate its members from
the states~ in tlie socialist co~nunity.
The principles set forth by Fidel Castro at the conference itself determine
the country's political line within the nona~ined movement. The Cuban com-
munists' highest body ratified those princ~ples vzhen it a~firmed that hence-
forth Cuba would also belong to that movement, in keeping with the tasks
proposed by Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Central Co~�nittee of the
- Cuban Communist Party and Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba, in the
speech he delivered at the fourth conferez~ce of nonalined countries (Algiers,
1973), in order to achieve unity within the movement and strengthen its 9
bonds with its historic allies, the countries of the socialist community.
Cuba contributed substantially to the development of the concept of non-
alinement in the realm of foreign policy and has made a valuable contri- -
bution to its practical application. By pursuing a genuinely internatic~nal-
ist policy, that country is fighting to consolidate the movement's anti-� ~
imperialist orientation and resisting efforts to give it a"neutralist"
character. It convinces other nonalined states that, given the irreversible
change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism, it is impossible to
solve the movement's principal groblems without unity with those carr~ing
on a consistent anti-imperialisL struggle, especially with the socialist
states. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Political Bureau and of the =
Secretariut of the Central Coimnittee of the Cuban Communist Party and vice
president of the Councils of State and Mir~ister~, told reporters in Belgrade
- in July 1978 that nonalinement does not mean, either for Cuba or for any
other. nonalined country, neutrality and failure to become in.volved in the
serious issues related to the fight against war and to the support of libe- ;
- ration movements. What is important to Cuba is that the group of nonalined ~
countries constitutes a co~nunity of states having different social and poli- -
tical systems and belor.ging to different socioeconomic systems but not belong- -
ing to any of the military blocs and accepting the movement's program.
Cuba, C. R. Rodriguez noted, fully meets those criteria. Speaking of Cuba's
position reqarding the issue of military blocs, he stated tha~ Cuba supports ;
and completely agrees with the nonalined countries' point of view; that is, i
that the existence of blocs-is a negative factor i.n the i:nternational situa- ;
tion and their eliminati~n should be sought. That does not suggest, hc~wever,
that they should be equated; on the contrary` a careful distinction must be '
made between them. For example, the Warsa~r Treaty arose from the need for '
detense against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an ag9ressive ~
imperialist bloc. Furthermore, Fie went on, the mil~tary alliance of capi-
talist countries rests on the principle of aggregs~on, expansi.onism, inter-
vention and threats. ~
' s as a member of the Movement of Nonalined Countries, which I
Cuba s ac~tion
benefit the common struggle of the peoples against imperialism,, colonialism I
and racism, have won widespread international recognition. That country's
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lirie, which is consistent and,faithful to ~~xinci~les in its ~oreign poli-
cy, has insured the rapid rise of its international prestige and the con- _
tinuous expansion of its international bonds. The Isle of Liberty offers -
an example of the truly revolutionary and i:nternationalist policy of a
socialist country.
This was also confirmed by the fifth conference of the chiefs of state and
heads of government of the nonalined countries, vlhich was held in Colombo. -
That gathering which was most representative of the movement was attended bl+
leaders from 86 states that were full mem]~ers of the movement and by dele-
gates from 22 countries, international organizations and national liberation
movements present as observers, as well as by inyited representatives of
7 countries. The composition of that conference r.eflected the marked in-
crease in the nonalined movement's prestige and power, due largely to the _
= relaxation of international tensions that:'~resulted from the shift of the ba-
lance of forces in favor of peace, national liberation and socialism.
On the eve of the conference and after it began, the imperialists and their
allies tried once again to eliminate the anti-imperialist essence of the
Movement of Nonalined Countries, to weaken it and to separate it from other
- progressive groups. Some in effect called for revision of the previously
' developed criteria that determine whether one or another country may belong
- to the movement. Along with the imperialists, Peking's leaders intensified
their subversive activity, anxious to bring the nonalined movement under
their influence and place it at the service of their jingoist hegemonic as-
pirations. Pretending to be "friends" of the movement, Peking's emissaries
attempted to "mold" some countries and hurled false charges about the foreign
policy of the USSR and othzr socialist countries, particularly Cuba and
Vietnam, which also is among the most active members of the movement.
With respect t~ Cuba, the Maoists launched a furious propaganda campaign in
comanon with ~he imperialists, especially regarding the events in Angola.
The efforts to prove the "illicit" nature of Cuba's conduct in the interna-
, tional turned out to be completely fruitless. "The charyes that in reality
Cuba is not a nonalined country, that the Cubans are the troops of coaanunist
intervention in Africa, etc."--we are quoting the newspaper GRANMA--"do not
succeed in obscuring the truth of the actions undertaken by Cuba in support -
of the just cause of the liberation and independence of the peoples, set
forth in all declarations by the movement.ond specifically mentioned in the
"Political Declaration of the Fifth Surmnit Conference which.praises
- "the Republic of Cuba and other states that helped the people o~ angola to
frustrate the expansionist and coloni.alist strategy of South Africa's racist
regime and its allies."10
The Colombo conference was the occasion of a great political victory for
_ Cuba. The delegates~ acknowledged Cuba~s significant role in the nonalined
_ movement and agreed to hold their next sununit meeting in Havana.
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That decision clearly displeased the imperialists, the leaders in Beijing and
othex reactionary grou~s. On the eve of the conference in Belgrade of for-
eign ministers of the nonalined countries (July 1978), Washinqton and Beijing,
, publicly cast doubt on the suitability of Culia's and Vietnam's membership in
the Movenent of Nonalined Countries in order to accentuate the movement's
- internal contradictions and to ruin the conference planned for Havana. The
attempts to lead the movement along the road of active anticommunism con-
tinued at the Belgrade meeting itself. For example, the representatives of
Somalia, Zaire, Egypt and other states tried to censure the internationalist
aid given by Cuba and other socialist countries to the peoples of Africa
who are fighting for their liberty and independence. Some praposed that the
sixth summit conference not be held in Fiavana. In this last instance, varied
expression was given to the idea, advanced by U.S. President James Carter,
that the conference would contribute to radicalization of the movement, to
its deviation from stated objectives and its submission to the policies of
the socialist countries.
However, those efforts were a notable failure. If the imperialists, the
provocators in Peking and other reactionary groups had succeeded in foment-
ing a crisis within the nonalined movement, the countries most seriously
harmed by that would not have been Cuba or Vietnam, but rather those that
hoped to find in the movement effective support ~or their struggle against
imperialism and for economic and political rights. The Belgrade meeting _
confirmed, as expected, the plans to hold the summit meeting in Havana in
Septsmber 1979 and, in keeping with the established tradition, Cuba's role
as coordinator of the movement during the period 1979-1982; that is, until
the next meeting.
GRANMA said this about the decision: "The justness of Cuba's international-
ist policy concerning Angola and Ethiopia was ratified, and plans to hold
the sixth summit in Havana were approved by consensus in the face of '
the isolated stance taken by Somalia, Zaire, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. No
one has been able to deny the prestige attained by Cuba within and outside
the Movement of Nonalined Countries."11
On the contrary, later events--especially China's aggression against Vietnam, !
begun on 17 February--revedled very clearly the true essence of Beijing's
warlike, expansionist policy, directed, too~ again&t nonalined countries.
As Isidoro Malmierca, Cuba's foreign minister, ~aid in an interview with
the newspaper IZVESTIYA, that aggression has profoundly alarmed all the _
countries belonging to the movement, all the more because Vietnam is its
cc~mrade in arms~. Again-~he said~-we are witne&ses to the jingoist, hegQ-
monic appetite of Beijing,~ahich has as~umed the role of Trojan Horse for ~
imperialism, is tryin~2to divide the Movement o~ Nonalined Countries and ;
to hinder its growth.
Thus, the si'xth conference of the chiefs of state and heads of government
of the nonalined countries, meeting in Havana, will be a major event in
international life. Profiting from the political prestige attained by
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Y that group o~ countri.es in the world arena, the kiayana meeting will be able
to give a reply to the provocatory blackmail and pressure from the imperial-
ist and Maoist ~orces and make a contrihution t~ the noble cause of the
continued easing of tension and the consolidation o~ the princi.ples of ~eace-~
- ful coexistence in international rel$tions and sugport for the peoples'
liberation struggle.
FOOTNOT'ES
1. BOHEMIA, No.31, Havana, 1978, p 44.
2. El Movimiento de los Paises Ho Alineados en documentos y materiales
jThe Niovement of Nonalined Countries in Documents and Papers], Moscow,
1975, pp 65, 69-70.
3. GRANMA SEMANAL, 12 Nov 78, p S.
- 4. PRP,VDA, 9 Oct 64.
5. See E1 Movimiento de los Paises No Alineados en documentos y materiales,
pp 90 and 95.
6. PRAVDA, 19 Oct 64.
7. Fidel Castro, "The Success and the Future of the Nonalined Movement
Will Lie in Its Not Letting Itself Be Infiltrated, Misled or Tricked
by Imperialist Ideology," Havana, 1973, p 16.
8. Ibid., p 12.
9. Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba. Memorias [First Congress
of the Cuban Communist Party. Reports], Vol 3, Fiavana, 1976, p 227.
I0. GRANMA, 10 Jul 78.
11. GRANMA SEMANAL, 12 Nov 78, p 5.
12. IZVESTIYA, 21 Mar 79.
COPYRIGHT: Traduccion de Editorial Progre~o
COPYRIGHT; America L,atina, 1979
9085
CSO: 3010
~I,
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CUH~A =
U.S.-CUBAN RELATION~ Q~JESTION EXPLORED
Moscow AMERICA LATINA in Spanish No 3, 1979 pp 183-194
[Commentary by Piotr Litavrin]
[Text] It is widely known that during the mid~1970's certain changes in
Cuban-American relations took place, particularly ~Qllovaing the Democra~s! ;
accession to power xn the United States. However, late_- ~vents showed that ;
the U.S. Governm.ent was not pr_epared ta re'establish relations on a basis af
equality and noninterference in its nefgh3~or's internal affai~s. Washington
tried to condition normalization of relations on Cuba~s withdrawal of aid
to national lilieration movements in Africa and attempted to impose on it
a specious discussion of "human rights" and to meddle in its domestic po- .
licy. When these efforts failed and the American "rules af the game" were
rejected, James Carter's govexnment blaaaed Cuba for a lack of desire for
"genuine normalization" and halted the evoltition of relations with Havana. ;
This turnabout ~a~ not unexpected. Norn?alization of relations with Cuba is
a fairly complex, contradictory and painful process for those governing the
United States, as is abandonment of traditional ideas and attitudes. None- ~
theless, this process which is under way in Cuban-American relations evidences ~
a fundamental evolution of opinion in U.S. governing circles regarding the
issue of normalization of relations with its neiqhbor. ,
This issue arose when Washington instituted the econo~ic and political
blockade of the Isle of Liberty in hQpes of bringing the Cuban ~eople to '
their knees. It was already obvious to th~ most perceptive, realistic ~
Amwricans that this blockade would seriously~di$credit the United States ~
in the eyes of Latin America and the ~rorld.l There were, however, few who ~
shared this point of view during the 1960's, when mo$t American politicians
and specialists were comanitt:d to the idea that Cuba had to be isolated. ,
- Even when American political analxsts spok~e #avorab~.y of the possi:bility of ;
establishing contacts with Cuba, tfi~ey conce~ved of ~t in terms that Were '
wholly unacceptable to Cuba. For eacample, Mario Lazo wrote that relations
between Cuba and tfie United States wuuld be restored when the former re- ~
joined the family of "free" countries�.2 Tak~ng ~nto account this termino- I
logy used in bourgeois publications, we aan conclude that Lazo, like most i
;
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o~ the other speciali.sts, had not in f~ct analXzed the i,ssue of norcnalization
of relations with ~/socialist/ jin italics] Cuba.
_ Zt took 10 yearS~of successful construction of socialism in Cuba, the growth
- of its in.ternational prestiqe and the marked failure of the blockade before
; those in the United States would begin to acknowledge reality with a more -
= astute point of view.
A significant role in this was played by the easing of tension in interna- _
- tional relations- and the spreading throughout the world of the principles
of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The expansion of U.S. relations
with the USSR and other socialist states confron~ed advocates of the embargo -
with the fo~lowing: Why can the U.S. Goverrnnent establish contacts with the
' socialist countries overseas and not with Cuba, its neighboring socialist
~ state? It is because of this that in American political and scientific
circles there was a growing sense that the United States should put an end
to its fruitless efforts to isolate Cuba diplomatically and economically.3
I
' Furthermore, the very fact of isolation spemed questionable; for the Isle
of Liberty was successfully developing relations with both the socialist
~ states and many capitalist states, as well as Latin American ones. The
blockade's failure was recognized more and more widely in the United States
' and often noted as an example of the unsuitability of a complete economic
and political embargo as an instrument of foreign policy,~ _
~ The sharp edge of the increasing critiicism in the United States was directed
- toward the government's p~sition of' ignoring the issue. The opinion that
- something had to be done wi.th re~~ect to Cuba spread among American politi-
cal analysts, whereas official Washington remained immobile concerning the
matter. M. Deutsch, the well-known expert on international relations,
~ wrote, "The United States Government is maintaining a negative stance with
( respect to the Castro government, but there is no indicatior,. of a desire
on our part to state what this government should do so tha't our negative
sanctions against it will end."5 The progressive American historian M.
Needler expressed a similar viera on pointing out that Cuba's foreign policy
is completely understandable and justifiable as a defrensive reaction
"against possible attack by the United States."6
~ Analysts also speak of the negative effect of the policy of nonrecognition
I on inter-American relations, for it aggravated the cc;~flict betateen Washing-
; ton and many of its "members" of the Ozganization of American States (OAS),
, who insisted that the embargo be li~ted. Some experts have concluded that
r~vision of this obsolete line is also necessary ~or the achievetnent of more
_ general goals of U.S. foreign policy. ~'or example, G. Lodge, a seasoned
politician who held a responsible post in tlie Eisenhower administration,
wrote that by resisting a change of course relative to Cuba and declaring
itself in favor of maintaining the status quo in Latin America, the United
States is falli:ng behind in the competi:tion introduced in~o Latin Anserica
by Cuba and the Soviet Union.~
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E
Despite the flood o,~ bouks and a:rticles abont the "Cuban question," American
political thoLght at th~ Y~eyinning o~ the 1970's was characterized hy the
absence of any real i3ea co~:cex~ inq nonttalization of relations wfth Havana. _
It is true that studiAs hac~ ~Zre~dy been carried out regarding the medium- `
and long-term solutions to i:he p:robler~. In fact, an analysis financed by _
the Ford Foundation, �he REIt?v Ccrporation and the University of California _
ended with a recomunendaticn tha~Y. at first proposed "lifting tlne embargo
partially or completely a~i3 ~llowing Cuba to participate in the work of _
inter-American bodies." '�h~ cbjec~ive of the U.S. policy was also expressed =
sufficiently explicitly: tc m~:~ Cuba more ir~dependent of the USSR and to
diversify its foreign ~+olit~c~l relationships. However, all in all, the ~
praspects of the development of Cuban~American relations continued to be -
subject to Havar~~'s "behavior," to its~ response to the American initiative.a
Thus, amon~ cne reasons for normalization already mentioned, there appeared
in the political analysts' lucubrations another factor that induced them to
speak in favor of alteration of the course that had failed, with the added
peculiarity that in time they began to place it above the others.
At any rate, coirmlentaries by opponents of the blockade of Cuba seven or eight
years ago were largely critical and not constructive, not solel.y or primarily
because there was no real basis for an easing of tension between the two
- countries, but rather because it depended on a decision by the government
- whether it was appropriate in principle to normalize relations with Havana.
It should be borne in mind that, despite the growing criticism of the embargo _
policy by experts and the press, the official circles of that era not only
denied the need for changes but also tried to directly demonstrate the
"positive results" arising from the blockade of Culia. In particular, at
meetings of the subcommittee qn foreign relations of the United States Senate,
the then deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affsirs,
R. Hurwitch, argued that the embargo was useful because it forced Cuba to
consume energy, money and human resources to solve domestic problems,
which--he believed--reduced its subversive activity abroad.9 The White ;
House often shared such "cold war" thoughts. The extremely hostile
attitude toward Cuba of the then U.S. President Nixon is very well known,
as are his friendly connections with Cuban emigrants in Florida.
With all this, the undeniable failure of the embargo polic~~ forced those op-
posed to the development of relations with Havana to seek new arguments to
shore up their position. On the one hand, they often promoted the view that
the "Cuban question" was not so important that an i~nediate solution was
necessary: "Cuba isn't China, and relations with it of~er no political bene-
fits."10 On the other hand, the terms for normalization being proposed
were wholly unacceptable to any independent state. For example, the Ameri-
can expert R. Crassweller said, wlien analyzing the possibilities of modifi-
cation of the U.S. policy, that although better relations may perhaps be
established in the future between the United States and Cuba, it is~unlxkely
that it wil i happen "as long as~Fide1 Castro has nearly all the power ~n
his hands." 1
- ;
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_ The traditio~al argument o~ those oppos.ed to normalization of relations with
~ Cuba was the view that saw in Washington~s disposition to tolerate Havana
"an important sign of U.S. acquiescence in accepting ideological pluralism ~
on the American continent," which inevitably meant that American leaders
were admitting the possibility of the future appearance of socialist states
in the Western Hemisphere.12 In reality, such a step would lead to de facto
rer_unciation of "pan-Americanism," the "Monroe Doctrine" and the theory of
"geographical determinism," and, finally, it could constitute a significant
precedent for the United States' entire foreign poiicy. Naturally, it is
not easy for those governing the United States to take a step of this sort.
However, events have already demonstrated the inconsistency of the afure- -
_ mentioned doctrines and ideas. In criticizing the inability of American
politiciaris to abandon traditional positions and the oid ideological baggage,
A. Lowenthal, a prominent American specialist in Latin American affairs,
wrote, "Before worrying about preventing (in Latin America--author's note)
the second Cuba, shouldn't we recognize the first one?"13 -
In the mid-1970's a new phase began in t.he development of American politi-
cal thought concerning the issue of normalization of relations with Cuba.
During this phase, the "Cuban question" was discussed in the OAS, that body
rescinded sanctions for trading with Cuba, and there were changes in offi-
cial Washington's position regaxding that country. Finally, direct -
Cuban-American conversa~ions and contacts we~e initiated. Moreover, there
was a shift in U.S. public opinion concerning the issue. Whereas at the
end of the 1960's and in the early 1970's only one-fourth of those polled
favored normalization of relations with Eiavana, in 1974 over one-half were
in favor of it, and later those in favor of normalization reached 60 percent,
and it is interesting that a large portion of the remaining 40 percent had
_ no opinion. As wa~ acknowledged within the Senate in 1975, "Today only a
very small minority of Americans--many of them for personal reasons--rejects
the basic idea of normalizing relations with Cuba."14
It is natural that there have been fundataental changes in the stance taken -
by American politicians and experts regarding the "Cuban question." They
are due in large measure to the increasing contacts taking place between
the two countries, especially to the trips by Senators C. Pell, J. Javits
and G. McGovern to Cuba and to the opportunity to directly experience the -
life of the Cuban people. Now the issue debated was no longer that of
the "appropriateness of developing relations with Havana," but the dif-
ficulties blockmng the road to normalization. As a result, it was only as
a matter of form that American analysts~ and politicians could be divided
into opponents and supporters of normalizati,on with Havana. The extreme
position of rejecting any contacts~was~occupied by only a hand~ul of ultra-
reactionaries who were ~lined with right~wing Cuban emigrants. There had -
also been marked changes in emigrants~ opinions concern~ng the issue of _
normalization of relations with Havana. Of course, there is no single -
view, for the emigrants~split into various organizations which are often
mutually antagonistic. Some (for example, "Brigade 2506") continue to
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occupy positions strongly opposed to Cuba and are ~re~ared to carry out any
sort of provocation to wreck the process of easing tension between Cuba and
the United States~ while others are beginning to express support for normali-
zation of relations with the Isle of Liberty. In fact, in Nc~vember 1978
six Cuban exile social organizations, led by J. Roblejo Lorie, a prom~nent -
figure, spoke in favor of continuing the d~alog with Havana. In a letter to
R. Carter, the president's w~fe, they asked that the blockade against Cuba
be lifted and that co~nercial flights between the twa countries be initiated. ~
Furthermore, many second-generation Cuban exiles do not merely support recog- r
nition of Cuba but are also friends of the socialist republic.
- Despite the obvious changes in American political thinking concerning the
prospects for normalization of relations with Cuba, it cannot be said that
there has been a sharp decline in the number of the island's enemies among
American men of science and politicians. Tfie placement of the "Cuban quss- '
tion" in the "order of the day" of U.S. policy simply brought its true ob--
jectives and intentions into sharp relief as never before. _
There are now three currents of American political thinking regarding this
issue.
The first is that of the most consistent supporters of the development of
Cuban-American relations, who believe that the United States should take
- the first step in that direction, unconditionally lifting the blockade, and
addressing legal issues only after that. This realistic point of view is
entirely constructive because it is based on universally recognized standards
of international law and coincides with the Cubans' sense of the basis on t
which the development of contacts should rest. This point of view is
shared by a vast number of American.politicians, public figures and scholars.
Among them, the clearest position is that of the communists, who have always
advocated the re-establishment and development of re~ations between Cuba
and the United States on a basis of equality, mutual respect, sovereignty
and noninterference in internal affairs. In expressing solidarity with the
Cuban people's struggle, they believe that the nornaalization of contacts -
_ between Havana and Washington represents a success for those who love peace.
Gus Hall, secretary general of the U.S. Communist Party, visited Cuba as
the leader of a delegation of American communists, expressing his satisfac- ~
tion with the increased possibilities that relations would be resumed
between the two countries.
A prompt solution to the "Cuban question~' is also called for by bourgeois
students of Latin American problems J. Petras, 1K. Needler, A. Lowenthal,
Congressman .7. Binghaa?, an active analyst of the possibilities for develop- '
ment of relations with Cuba, and many others. Although there are signifi- ;
_ cant differences of opinion among them regarding the si.tuation ~nd the con-
tents of the normalization process, the group is characterized by a broad
view of the problem and the desire to establish relations with Havana on a
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y
basis of equal rights. Statements bX same repxe~entative~ o~ this current ~
are very radical at times, such as, for example, the one that "Cuha is the
only ~aodern society in Latin America,"Z5 and they even express a sense of
guilt and responsibility for their country~s actions with respect to Cuba. _
Most American political analysts of this stripe agree that re-establishment
and develop,?~er,t of relations with Cuba in the broadest spheres�would benefit
both par~ies, with the added aspect that "in the economic realm the United
States and Cuba would gain equally, and in the political realm the United
~ Sicates would perhaps gain more," for it would cease being a large state
"intimidating a small country.'~16
~ Of course,.~ome politicians and analysts in this group try to justify the
need for U.S. :Lntervention in its neighbor's~internal affairs, and they
harbor glans tc, correct the Cuban Government's doanestic and foreign policy
for the benefit of U.S. imperialism. These, though, are surreptitious ef-
- f orts . -
The second group, perhaps larger and mare amorphous, comprises those who in
principle favor normalization but address the issue from a purely pragmatic
perspective, focusing on the i~nediate a3vantages accruing to the United
States if it expanded contiacts with Havana. Some political analysts in
this group advocate immediate elimination of t~e embargo, urging the govern-
ment to "acknowledge the realities," to give evidence of good sense, and so
forth. However, the essential difference between the two groups is that
the second believes that the United States should maintain and expand re-
lations with Cuba primarily in order to exert pressure on it. These experts
and politicians frankly declare that their objective is to contribute to
- the diversification of Havana's foreign political ties and to weaken its
relations with the USSR. For example, R. Fontaine, a well-known scholar
connected with government circles, has written with total candor that the
United States' long-term objective "can be nothing less than to eliminate
the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba without having recourse to war, sub-
- version or the embargo," and "to weaken its ties taith Moscow."17 Although
such arguments in favor of normalization of Cuban-American relations have
been heard now for several years, it is today that U.S. political thinkers
are considering them with increasing interest.
Although the first group favoring normalization of relations with Havana -
has a broader view of the issue, it understands the need for a relaxation
of tension between the two countries ~o that general U.S. foreign policy
tasks can be carried out and that country can attempt to adapt to the new
world situation. The second group of experts and politicians is seeking _
only petty objective$. As a result, tTie entire process of expanding
Cuban-American relations is subordinated to the matter of whetlier or not
the United States~can achieve these objectives and, concerning that, Cuba's
reaction to the U.S. Government's actions. ~'or this reason, these politi-
- cal analysts~ initiatives and opinions fluctuate with events and are thus
unstable. The Cuban Goverrnnent had scarcely stated tliat it would not cede
on issues relative to its competence and that it was pre~ared ~o develop _
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- relations with the United ~tates only on the basis o~ the principles of
equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs, when those exQerts
and politicians attac;ked Havana w.ith.accusations and threats. Furthermore,
it is not surprising. It should be noted that the ranks of those favoring
normalization of relations with Cuba were riurriedly joined hy a large number
af thosP wfio un~il very recently had been opponents and even declared enemies
of the Cuban people. They were aware of the lack of perspective in their
pasition of ignoring reality and were anxious to accrue political capital.
In the preface ta a book of his, the American scholar R. Radosh noted with
irony that those wh~ during the 1960's justified the need to isolate Cuba
- now assert that relations with it must be developed immediately.18 Moreover,
- in 1977, when favorable conditions were created for the development of rela-
tions between Havana and Washington, they urged the administration to be more
flexible. It is symptomatic that the report by a group of experts that
traveled to Cuba in February of that year stated that the United States -
should take steps without delay to normalize Cuban-American relations, for
_ in time "Cuba's ability to respond to U.S. initiatives and make concess.ions
(sic!--author's note) could diminish."19 Unfortunately, the views of this
group of political analysts coincide in many ways with those of a large num-
ber of top American officials, including Z. Brzezinski, who is seeking the
solution to the "Cuban question" only in terms of the battle against coi?m~u-
nism.
They are unable to understand the absurdity and lack of perspective of the
view that assigns Cuba the role of satellite of one o� the "superpowers," _
and the status of a sort of "coin of exchange" in the solution of global
problems.20
- This attitude, when an independent state knowingly places itself in a posi-
tion of inequality and does not consider itself a sovereign partner in a
_ dialog, is a general characteristic of the course of U.S. foreign policy, ;
particularly when dealing with problems involving small coun~ries. Hence
American political analysts' desire to condition development of relations
with Havana on concessions by it; they want "proof" that Cuba "is prepared"
to sacrifice some of its principles and interests for the sake of warmer
relations with the United States. '
In this order of things, it must be noted that, as shown by the history of ~
Soviet-American relations and of U.S. relations with the other socialist
countries, these proposals have al~rays characterized the American stance.
It is obvious that in the future there will be no lack, either, of attempts -
to "influence" socialist stateS, but thei:r inanity wi.ll be reaclily apparent.
One part of this group of analysts tries at times to address the solution to
- the "Cuban question" in an "impartial"~spirit, scrupulously weighing all the
pros and cons. They are seeking an "objective answer" to the question of
whether the United States would �ind it useful to c~evelop relations with its
_ neighbor. They calculate the volume of potential exchange between the two
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countries, and they study the ~ossi.ble effect on Havana of the. means at
Washington's disposal. In drawing up the balance, they sometiimes pair o~f
such factors as the need to enhance U.S. prestige in Latin America and
around the world by re-esta~lishing relation$ with Cuba with the fear that
this step would irritate counterrevolutionary CuT~an zxiles in Florida.21
Usually, a more or less conscientious analysis of tfie situation leads the
pragmatic American observers to acknowledge the necessity of nor�nalizing
relations and of the U.S. Government's adopting more energetic measures in
that direction. The noted analyst of U.S. Latin American policy J. Domin-
guez, a native of Cuba and a naturalized American citizen, emphasized that
only a revision of policy in several spheres would constitute a step forward,
one that should beqin with the lifting of the embargo.22
The principal error committed by the second group of political analysts
lies in their failure to take into account the followir.g fact as a principle:
Normalization of relations with Cuba should not be considered a concession
made by the Americans; and the wisdom of it rests still less in the "need
to influence" the Cuban Government. As G. McGovern pointed out in his re-
port on the trip to Cuba in May 1975, the Unitec: States also needs the
re-establishment and expansion of relations with the Republic of Cuba, for
the previous policy "undermines confidence in our common sense."23 It
~ seems as if most American political analysts should even understand thate
At the same time, in American academic and political circles there are many
people who must $till be categorized as opponents of normalization of
Cuban-American relations, although now they often try to deny this un-
conditioned judgment. Without totally rejecting the idea of expanding -
contacts with the Isle of Liberty, they set up so man,y conditions that i~ ~
is essentiall.y impossible to talk about normalization. They even greeted _
the recent limited contacts between the two countries and a cer~ain incli-
nation on the part of the Carter administration to expand relations with
its neighbor with bared fangs. Senate R. Dole, in particular, blamed the
White House for "encouraging Cuban interventian in Africa" and declared:
"Our officials should insist on certain conditions before any consideration
is given to normalization of relations."24
By "conditions" advocates of the "hard line" mean, above all, the need for
Cuba to pay for the nationalized property of U.S. firms. The Cuban Govern-
ment--as their argument goes--will lose any reason for considering the
issue if it resumes diplomatic relations with the United States and has
- access to American goods. It is also deman~ed that "political prisoners"
in Cuba be freed and that its domestic policies be modified. Conditions
of this sort are insisted upon deli.berately, fqr their unacce~tability to
~ Cuba, as to any sovereign state, is evident in all regards. Nor is there _
a lack of American political analy~ts who decry the solution to the "Cuban -
question" for ideological reasons. Most often they are old professors
i~ners~d in the ideas of the "cold war" era and too far behind the times to
be able to change their views, or they are experts and politicians closely
linked with counterrevolutionary emigrants and full of hate toward the
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Eirst socialist state in the Weszern HemiS~here. For example, L. McDonald,
a democrat and a member of the House o~ Re~resentatives, declared that
by continuing the embargo the United States is haiupering Cuha's aggressive
plans in the Western Hemisphere. Moreov~r, in his opinion, normalization
of relations with Fidel Castro would bring financial benefits to the
Cuban regime and enable it to spread terrorism and subversion in Latin
' America.25
Summing up the reasoning of American political analysts concerning the is-
. sue of normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba, we
reach the following conclusion. In the last decade, most of them adopted
more realistic positions whose common characteristic is recognition of the
~ need for a prompt solution to the "Cuban question." At the same time,
American political thinkers have not stopped seeking means of fighting
revolutionary Cuba in order to undermine the foundations of socialism on
the Isle of Liberty. However, Cuba's 20 years of independent existence
and the era of struggle, against both armed aggression and ideological _
subversion and American pressure, have demonstrated the futility of the
impe rialists' efforts.
FOOTNOTES
1. See John Gerassi,"The Great Fear in Latin America," New York &
London, 1963.
2. Mario Lazo,'l~merican Policy Failure in Cuba, Dagger in the Heart,"
New York, 1968, p 417.
3. See"U.S. Caribbean Policy. Part I. Hearings Be~ore the Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs of the Co~nittee on Foreign Affairs, House _
of Representatives, 93d Congress, 2d Session;'Washington, 1974, p 7.
4. See WORLD POLITICS, Vo~ 25, No 3, Princeton, 1973, p 413.
5. Morton Deutsch,"The Resolution of Conflict;'Yale, 1973, p 136.
- 6. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No 2, New York, 1974, p 224.
7. See George C. Lodge,"Engines of Ch~nge. U.S. Interests and Revolution
in Latin America,"New York, 1970, p 321. -
8. See Edward Gonzalez,"Partners in Deadlock. The U.S. and Castro,
1950-7.971,"New York, 1972, p 35.
~ 9. See"United States Policy Towards Cuba. Hearing Before the Subcommit-
. tee on Forei n Relations. "
5 ~4.~,: Senate, 92d Congress, lst Ses~ion,
- Washington, 16 September 1971, pp 4-5.
�24 ~
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10. "The Americas in a Changing World,"New~Xork, 1975, p 117.
11. See Robert D. Crassweller,~~he Caribbean Community. Chanqing Societies
and U.S. Policy,"New York, Washington, London, 1972, p 383. _
12. William Watts, Jorge I. Dominguez,'~ Policy Perspective. Tne United
States and Cuba: Old Issues and New Directions~;'Washington, 1977, p 45.
13. "U.S. Caribbean Policy. Part I. Hearings". p 6.
14. "Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, lst Session,"
Washington, 1975, p 123.
15. THE NATIGN, Vol 224, No 9, New York, 1977, p 273.
16. CURRENT HISTORY, Vol 74, No 434, Philadelphia, 1978, pp 85-86.
- 17. Rodger W. Fontaine,"On Negotiating With Cuba~ Washington, 1975, -
pp 84-85.
18. R. Radosh,"The New Cuba. Paradoxes and Potentials;'New York, 1976,
= p 17.
19. "Toward Improved United States-Cuba Relations, Report of a Special
Study Mission to Cuba, February 10-15, 1977,"Washington, 1977, p 21.
20. Fontaine, op. cit., p 93.
21. "The Americas in a Changing World,"p 119.
_ 22. Ibid., p 125.
23. George So McGovern,'rLban Realities: May 1975;'Washington, 1~75,
p 1.
24. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, Vol 57, No 2, Washington, 1978, p 45.
25. See U.S. NEw5 AND WORLD REPORT, Vol 82, No 9, New York, 1977, pp 73-74.
COPYRIGHT: Traduccion de Editorial Progreso
COPYRIGHT: America Latina, 1979
' 9085
CSO: 3010
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CUBA
'ARAFAT CONGRATULATES CA~TR+D ON UN SPEECH
PA182343 Havana PRELA in Spanish 131q GMT 17 Oct 79 PA
(Text] Havana, 17 October (PL)--The Palest;nian people's leader, Yasir -
'Arafat, has said that the speech by President Fidel Castro at the 34th UN
_ General Assembly was a historical one.
'Arafat sent Castro a message which was published todsy in GRANMA in a 2-
column red box. ~
"The Palestinian people and their revolutionaries heard the historical
speech given at the United Nations. We appreciate it greatly," the message
says. It adds that Fidel defended the world's just causes. beginning with ;
the Palestine people's problem.
It adds that it supported the inalienable right of the Palestine people to
- their land, to aelf-determination and to their own independent state.
- Castro's attitude has tlxe respect and admiration of our people, and we have !
always respected his revolutionary stand toward liberation movements, 'Arafat
said. '
Regarding the attainment of the rights of the people, these are based on
principles which neither weaken nor bend, he said. '
j
In your speech you showed your role as the vanguard, as president of the
_ nonalined countries, and as abiding by the great decieions taken in Havana,
the Palestinian leader said. In the name of our people, of the Palestine ~
Liberation Organizati~nn and in my own name, I wish you and the great Cuban ;
people progress, well-being and victory over the enemies of the peoplea~-the '
imperialists, Zionis~s and their all.ies, 'Arafat said in his message. i
~
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NICARAGUA
SOMOZA IN PARAGUAY TELLS OF RETURN PLANS
- Hamburg STERN in Gextnan 13 Sep 79 pp 256-258
[Text] In his first int~rview after his escape,
Nicaragua's ex-dictator S anoza revealed his
return plans to STERN reporters Walter Unger and
Perry KLetz. -
The Villa Morra in Paraguay's capital Asuncion produces a pastoral
effect on anyone passing by. Green is the lawn which separates the
` bungalow from the busy Avenida Mariscal Lopez, green are the pa Lns and
shrubs in the garden behind the house. At first glance a peaceful
resting place for Anas~asio Somoza, who after his escape fran Nicaragua
and his breathing spells in Florida, the Bahamas and Guatemala has found
sheiter here for the time being. _
Green, however, are also the steel helmets which gleam between the bushes
in the sun and which start bo move when we are admitted~into the house.
And there he stands suddenly, the dictator ret. He beams at us, greets
us by our first names and embraces us as ,though we were old friends. His
- face is cold and feverish-moist. But lie gives the impression of being
so lively, as if his world had not changes since the cocktail party to
dedicate his new house in Managua, the last time that we met him in private.
Does he not know what we reported about h':~ !:is c:~:., which fleeced
Nicaragua for 4 decades, about the terror practices of his milita~}r,
about the bloodbath among the civilian population which he ordered at
the end of his 12-year long reign?
He knows it. "But," he says, "you never played only the game of the
communists who are now ruining my country, or the game of the blockheads
in Washington who deceived me and did me in."
_ While sitting in the garden wi.th us, which is separated from the
neighboring properties by a wall of a man's height and is guarded by
soldiers at a11 corners, he becomes increasingly furious in responae
to the question about his relationship to the big brother United States,
who for so long aupported him and his family.
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"I love America, and the Americans are good people," he said, and as he
speaks his cadet ring from the West Point Military Academy with the
engraved year of 1946 sparkles in the sun. "I have powerful friends in
Congress in Washington. But then came Carter with his false h~anan rights
morality. He was and is a misfortune for me and my country. My friends
in Congress understood that I needed help in the struggle against the
communiat danger which is threatening all of Latin America. The more
they flexed their muscles for me, the more angrily this apostle
Carter reacted."
Did Nicaragua not continue to receive econanic and military aid during _
the CartEr administration?
"Only credits. We paid for every weapon fran the United States. And
Carter had hardly entered office when he ordered a total stop of arms
deliveries. ~o we ended up having to haggle even to get the weapons
whici~ had been contractually pranised. This was a personal de~laration
of war by this basCard against me."
Somoza is getting so angry that his tie feels too tight. He disappears
- into the house. When he returns, he is wearing an open pink Dior shirt.
But he is still gaaping for breath because he is so furious: "It was
not discontent and poverty in Nicaragua which forced me to resign, as
is asserted throughout the world, but an international conspiracy,
blessed by the greatest killer--Carter."
It is difficult to canprehend that he really believes in such nonaense.
We ask him what induced him nevertheless to go into exile in Florida
and to put himself into the hands of this Carter.
"The agreement was clear. I resign and turn my office over to Francisco
Urcuyo, who takes care of things only until the new government is fonined.
In return for this Washington guarantees me a safe place to atay--safe
against extradition. Th.e only condition was that I am no longer -
actively involved in politics. I kept my part of the agreement
meticulously."
And why, then, did this Urcuyo suddenly not want to give up his office?
" "I have nothing to do with that. My mistake was that I proposed him
as successor. But Carter and his people i~r?ediately turned this into
- a trap for me. Warren Christopher, the U.S. deputy secretary of
state for Latin America, called me and demanded that I bring Urcuyo to
his senses. I explained to him that this is not my buainess. Thereupon
they hinted in excellent diplomatic franknesa that in that case Washington
could not guarantee that a request for ~xtradition on the part of the new
rulers in Mana.gua would in fact be turned down. In other words, first
_ Carter did me in, then he deceived me on top of that."
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Would it not have been better had he liatened to the advice of his
~;ener:ils and stepped down 2 yeare ago?
"Not a soul gave me such advice. And I would not have followed it. The
only one wht~ talked about giving up was my cook--and he did so only
because the provisions were running law. That was 1 week before the
- end. All of us had believed that in the end Washington would come to its
senses anc~ would not allaw the communists to set up housekeeping on the
doorsteps of the United States. But that is Carter for you. In order to
appear as human rights hero, he is stamping me as a dictator and permits
an entire country to go to the dogs. A diaguating hypocrite. As long
as he is in office, I could not breathe in the United States."
Now he is sitting in Paraguay, a country that is alsu not exactly famous
as a bastion of freedan, which extended hospitality to the German Nazis,
which has bec ane the refuge of discharged presidents fran Argen,tina,
Brazil and Bolivia, and whose own president Alfredo Stroessner has just
c anpleted his 25th anniversary in office as dictator. Is the air here
better for breathing?
Before answering, S anoza orders vodka--no longer, as once at hane,
American blend of vodka, but genuine Russian blend. "I am grateful to
President Stroessner for the hospitality," he says routinely. After a
pause, during which he strokes the coat of his Pekinese "Titi" and for
a moment looks as if he were going to cry, he adds: "As you know, I am
only renting this honse, just like my predecessor, the ambassador of
South Africa. My contract runs for 6 months. Nothing in this house belongs
to me. I am living like a gypsy, and I don't know where I will finally _
_ stay. First of all I want to get same rest."
When Somoza fled t~ the United States in July, he arrived with a visa for ~
4 years, which identified him as an "industrialist." And, indeed,
during his presidency he had worked in that capacity in actual fact and witil
a great deal of financial success. His danestic wealth, consisting of
property in land and factories, was estimated at $500 million in round
_ figures. His possessions abroad, mostly in Florida, where his wife Hope.
- who lives separated fr an him, his cousin Luis Debayle and his girl friend
Dinorah Sampson-Lagos reside, is valued at approximately the same sum.
; Does he have to worry ~bout the future?
This sub3ect again sends him into a rage. "I am not a poor man. But the
figures which are being printed everywhere are lies. My possessions came
to a total of $100 million. I worked hard for this property and earned
I
everything honestly. What is left to me is $20 million, the rest was
i stolen by the co~unists. And I am anxious to see what kind of a
rep ublic they are goinb to make out of Nicaragua. If a law of justice
~ really exists there, and not a law of weapons, they muat return everything
j to me. I will fight for this." -
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r va vrr l~,~cw U~~ V1VLY
Anastasi Somoza says this, but he himself does not believe it. Juat
like a few w~eks ago when he was huddling in his windowless bunker in
Managua and talking confidently about the end of "some caamunist
mischief-makers" in the near future, while his airplanes were destroying
- the cities and his guard member s executed thousands of people, now in -
exile in Paraguay he is talking as though he had left his country only for
a short holiday excursion. "The poor people in Nicaragua," he says, "will
eventually learn what they have lost. They are still in a victorioua mood,
but when the time c anes'and they understand what a Cuban adventure the
Sandinistas present to them, they will wish for my return."
In any case, he wants to go back. Back into politics as well? SamoTa
smiles: "No, I will not be a candidate, there are enough capable people
in my liberal party. I will just be a farmer then."
While accompanying us to the gate with his son Anastaeio, the ex-boss
of the infamous National Guard, he laughs about the joke which is now
making the rounds in Paraguay: Somoza is in the country in order to
= prepare himaelf for the succession of Alfredo Stroessner. Then he waves
at us and ahouts after us: "If ~?ou get to Nicaragua, give my people
regards from the general."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
8970 ~
CSO: 3103
30 I
- FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020026-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020026-9
FOR OFFICIAL U~SE.ONLY
PERU
REPUBLICAN GUARDSMAN KILLS TWO ECUADOREAN ~ISHEItMEN
PA032244 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 1650 GMT 2 Nov 79 PA
[Text] Quito, 2 Nov (DPA)--A member of the Hepublican Guard of Peru has
~ shot and killed two Ecuadorean fishermen who were fishing in the Calvas
River, in the municipality of Calvas, Loja Province. This took place
on 26 October but did not become known in Quito until today.
According to the report filed by the daily EL MUNDO, of Lo~a, a Peruvian
~ . guard, Juan Portugal Rivera, is accused of having directed the attack
against the two Ecuadoreans, Humberto Salazar and Indalecio Aguirre,
- while they were bathing and fishing with explosives in the Calvas River.
The bodies were remc~ved from the river and taken to Peruvian territory,
to a site known as Ayabaca, according to investigations carried out by
the police of Cariamanga, Ecuador.
In E1 Playon on the border between the two countries, the chief of the
police detachment there, Ciceron Calderon, confirmed the report on the
death of the two Ecuadorean fiahermen and indicated guard Juan Portugal ~
was the person who had carriea. out the attack.
When the Quito Fnreign Ministry was asked about this incident, it noted
the deputy secretary of the Foreign Ministrq~s political office asked -
the acting Peruvian~ charge d'affaires to his office where he handed h3m -
a protest note demanding an im~ediate investigation on the part of
Peruvian Government authorities and the returning of the bod~es.
~tao months ago there was anather incident when a fisherman was shot in
Ecuadorean sea waters by the crew of a Peruvian patrol boat. The fisher-
man, Juan Quinde, died. The Peruviata Goaerament has admitted his widow
is entitled to an indemnity.
- CSO : 3010 ~D
31 ~
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FOR OFFICIAL USLr},`~ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020026-9