JPRS ID: 8773 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020034-0
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8773 -
20 November 1979
/ Africa R~ ort -
I~lear ~as~r I~lorth
~ _
CFOUO 45/79)
FBIS FOREiGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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- enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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JPRS L/8773
20 November 197~
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPOR~
- (.F.EWO ' A5/79)
~
CONTENTS PAGE ~
II~ER-AF~B AFP'AIRS
Chamber of Commerce Official Discu.sses Various Arab
Financial Matters
~8~~~'han al-Da.jani Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'AFiABI,
4-l0 oct 79) 1 =
- Briefs
- Steel Complex Planned 5
AI~GERIA
- :
Maladies Afflicting Algerian Society Examined -
- (Hamza Kaiai; ,TEtJNE AFRIQUE, 17 oct 79) 6
Political Events in Algeria M~.y Herald Increased Opennees
~ (AI~-WATAN AL~ t liL~1~D1 ~ ZU-24 oct 79 ) � ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ � 12 _
Ma,gazine Ref~ztes Charges That It Did Not Interview
= Algerian President -
( ~-waT~rr ~ ~z, 18-2~+ oct 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1~+ ~ -
n~aQ .
-
~ First Deputy Prime N1ir...iste~ Discusses Democracy,
Relations Wi~th Commu:i~ sts _
~Taha Yasin Rama.dan Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARA.BI,
13-19 Sep 79) 18 '
Brie fs ' '
' Petrol~wr Cor.�,ract RA:~ewal 27
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CONTEN!'S (Continued) ~ge -
~ LEEBAANON "
- SS:VP Leader Discusses Shift in Party's Positions -
(~Abdallah Sa~adeh Interview; AL--W.ATAN AL-'ARABI, =
' 20-26 Sep 791 28
Syrian Nationalist Party History~, Positions Traced -
(a~,-waTArt ~-t~sz, 20-26 SEp 79) 35
~ r~,uRZTaivra
Release of Former President From Mauritania to France _
Detailed -
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Oct 79)..... 41
- Briefs
= F`r~ench Hydrocarbon, Uranium Exnloration 48
Request for French Military Aid 48 -
SYRIA
Corresponde nt Says Syria Faces Urgent Need for Corrective
- Actions
(aL-waTarr aL-~ax~z, ~+-lo oct 79) 49 -
Paper Correspondent Takes Analytical Look at ?nternal ~
- Scene in Syria
(AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI, 27 Sep-3 Oct 79) 52
WESTERN SAHARA
- PLO Chief~s Mediation Efforts Seem To Have Ead Some
Results -
_ (JE[TNE AFRIQUE, 26 Sep 79~ 56
Briefs -
Algeria To Be More Conciliatory 57
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
CHANIBER OF CO1~AtERCE ~FFICIAL DISCUSSES VARIOUS ARA�~ FINANCIAL MATTERS
- Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Oct 79 p 48
[Interview with Dr Burhan al-Dajani, secretary general of the federation of
Arab chambers of commerce: Irloscow Welcomes Creation of an Arab-Sovie~ Bank. -
Arab Chambers of Commerce Assisted Expansion of Trade with Uarious Nations
and Rules of Israeli BoycottJ
[Text] Can Arab financial invest~ents find a market in the Soviet Union and
the socialist nations similar to areas of activity and investment in the _
capitalist market? This is one of a group of questions answered by Dr Burhan
al-Da~ani, secretary general of the federation of Arab chambers of commerce,
before he left London en route to Tunis, after having had consultations in
- ' the British capital pertaining to development and expansion of Br.itish-Arab
_ economic relations. -
Dr Burhan al-Da~ani, secretary general af the federation of Arab chambers of "
commerce, hardly ever stays in one place these days. His only escape from
Beirut and the problems of running the secretariat general is to pursue pro-
jects which take him to various world capitals. =
- AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met with him at London's Grosvenor Hotel, ~long with the
~ secretary general of the Anglo-Arab chamber of commerce, 'Abd al-Karim al-
Mudarris. He [al-Da~ani] had come from the last stop on his atill unfinished
jaurney, which this time was Moscow, where he held a conference of the federa-
tion~ of Ar~ab chambers of commerce at the invitation of the Sov:Let-Arab chamber
of commErce in Moscow. This was the first conference of its type, and it
bore a special stamp, not with respect to the growth of economic and trade
relations between the Arab world and tt-.e Soviet Un~`oa, but rather with regard
to pro~ects being presented by the secr~tary gQneral for consideration, and _
the eco~omic and monetary consideratioas pertaining to these pro~ects.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARAT3I asked him about the ffiost important of these pr~jects. _
(Answer] The most important pro~ect which wp reviewed with the Soviet side
was to organize m~ans of transporting technology ~~tween the Soviet Union
and the Arab nations. We propo~ed to the Soviet side the establishment of a
joint center whose mission would be to get to know the Soviet technology
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required by the Arah nations. They, of course, will study this proposal
and will inform us of their decision.
' Arab-Soviet Bank
[Question] It has been said that apart from that, you studied the matter
of establishing a bank in Moscow? -
_ [Answer] 'Tiie fact is that in this meeting we reviewed Arab-Soviet relations s
- in general, and then we turned to problems which a joint Soviet-Arab bank -
would encounter, since eristing Arab fur.ds abroad would play a role in world -
financial market activity, and not be limited to specif~ied countries.
- We felt that the Soviet Union and the socialist nations are prepared and
indeed want to enrer banking o~erations for commerctal financing in various
- 1ong, medium, and short-term [ventures]. ~'he Soviets had mentioned previously
that they would welcome this idea and wera prepared far the first time to
- en'ter into such an experiment as this. There is still ~:.�ork [to be done]
- to prepare a suitable atmosp~ere An the Arab level to achie~ve a project like
this.
_ [Question] What is the position of the chambers' federation toward ~gypt,
in the event it violates the Israeli boycott regulations, for instance?
[Answer] In the event Egypt violates the Israeli boycott laws, it would
be dealt with the same as the rest of the countries to whom these regulations
apply. I want to say here that tiade between Egypt and the Arab nations is
- not worth mentioni.ng, and so the dangers of boycotting it are not great. I
- wi11 give you an example of that. Egypt tried, before the Camp David agree- ~
- ment, to reach an agreement with the Arab-boycotted Ford company. But the
company, after making a study of the market, stated that it would be unable ,
to market its products. The :esult was that the company was transformed _
into a"workshop" for the repair of automobiles.
_ [QuestionJ This br~ngs us to a question which tire must raise regarding this
topic. What is the role of joint Arab chambers of c~mmerce in foreign
- countries?
- [AnswerJ There is no doubt that these chambers are able to assist in creating
a suitable climate for mutual economic and commercial exchange, in a somewhat
broad sznse, between the Arab nations and the partner nations in these chambers _
of commerce. They ar~, also able, at appropriate timea, whenever the Arab _
natian4 have exportable products, to assist in promotin~ these exports. : E
I want to clarify here that none of these chambers of commerce is content `
with commercial and econamic roles, but their activity also extends to cul- .
tural matters which help in the growth of frien3ship and the improvement of
~he Arab im~ge, as well as pr4tection of Arab interests such as occurred in ~
their ogposing laws aimed against thP Arab boycott of Israel. _
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,
Arab-Britisn Chamber of Commerce Activity
[Question] Could you cite an example in this regard--about chamber of
commerce activity which countered such a sensitive issue as this ? -
~ -
[Answer] Of course. There is the Arab-Britiah ch~mber of commerce. It -
upposed Zionist attempts to pressure for the enactment in the British
Parliament of a boycott law similar tc that passed in the United States.
- The chamber of commerce, which workzd to coordinate a campaign opposing
= this Zionist attempt, was able to defeat Israel's efforts in this regard--
a matter of considerable importance.
In the United States, despite passage af the law, the Arab-American chamber ~
of commerce was nevertheless able to tone the law do~m, since many loopholes
- were r~tained in it benefiting both American businessmen and the boycott.
[Question] Could you mention some of the accomplishments of the Arab-Br~tish
chamber of commerce, as a model for the othe~ chambers in this field?
[Answer] It should be said first that the chamber has offered to groups of -
important economic forces in its country to join in a framework which would
cause interaction between them and the Arab side, benefiting the two countries,
= and acting as the authority f.or all aspects of relations b~tween the two.
- In addition to that, there is the matter of its participation with several ~
- of the other chambcrs of commerce in protecting Arab interests, concentrating
' economic forces because they have interests with the Arab worl.d, and creating
a climate and finding a framework for these institutions. It is an active
embsssy for the Arab wo~ld= but it is not tied down by diplomat~c and pro- `
tocol consider~tions, and so is able to make contact with many broad-based
quarters.
[Qsestion] But are there specific ser.viGes which it has offered to the Arab
wo~ld? ~
' [AnswerJ Naturally. It has offered many services--for example, a forum in
1977, in which financiers and experts from Britain participated, on develop-
ment of the Arab financial market.
There is a project to offer scholarships to the Arab world. It will also
_ invite representatives fronl Arab chambers of commerce t~ a program in which
- they wi11 become acquainted with organizational ~spects of British chambers
of commerce which will be reflected back. to these chambers.
[Question] There are those who say that Arab chambers of commerce have~~.not
been resolute regardin.g Egypt's position; [wha~ is] the extent of that con-
: necticn with the Camp David agreements?
~ [AnswerJ ?'he chambers have done more than what was asked of us. As an
_ example, Egypt`s membershig in the federation of chambers of commerce was
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suspended, whereas the federation was not mentioned among the institutions
. called upon by the Baghdad conference to boycott it. Thus we were not asked _
to suspend Egypt's membership, but we did so on our own initiative. -
[Question] You mentioned that there was a pro~ect for an Arab market along
the lines of the European Common Market. What is the stazus of this project?
;
[Answer] The Arab market project which the Arab states have endorsed is a
project that we have basically promoted. Regrettably, however, it is still
on paper. I would like to say here that the practical application is not
commensurate with the decisions or with the importance of this project, We -
believe that an Arab financial market is the most important step which could
be taken toward creating the future world about which the Arabs dream. -
- COPYRIGHT: 1~179 A1-Watan al-'Arabi
7005 -
- CSO: 4802 ~ -
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INTER-ARAB AFTAIRS
BRIEFS -
STEEL COMPLEX PL~.NNED--The Arab nations, meeting secretly 3r~ Algiers, have _
just decided to build a steel manufacturing complex with a production
capacity of 20 million tons [per year, presumably]. Saudi Arabia will _
finance the venture which is to be ready to produce in 5 years. [Text]
[Paris PARIS MATGH in French 2 Nav 79 p 72]
CSO: 4800 _
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~ ALGERIA
~
- MALADIES AFFLICTING ALGERT4N SOCIETY.EXAMINED ~
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Oct 79 pp 56-59
[Article by Hamza Kaidi: "To Live in Algiers"] _
[Text] Seen from a jet preparing to land at Dar el-Beida Airgort, Algiers -
= has lost none of its legendary whiten~ss. Added to the blue of a bay that
- is considered one of the most beaui:if}il in the world, this b~illiance gives
= a feeling of pride to the emigrant returning to the country for vacation.
Alas, the airpart offers the spec~tacle of an eternal building site. Ne~~er
mind! The work will come to an en~i one day and the air terminal will only -
be more beauti�ul... This. is ._the feeling- expressed by Arezki N., who is a -
worker at Renault, near Paris, who has come tc spend a month's leave after
four years away. -
Things were already not going very well the last time he came, in 1975. The
news received since then has hardly been reassuring. "Housing crisis, unem-
ployment, inflation, shortage of products of prima~ry necessity have only
grown worse," affiymed the visitors who managed to go to France despite the
llraconian restriction on exit permits. But in April 1979 hope was born.
- Exit restrictions were lifted, supplies improved, housing construction made -
some progress. And, ~,hen a sojourn in France is b~coming increasingly prob-
lematical for Algerian workers, returning emigrants, it was stated, would
have priority for allocation of housing. Like the others, Arezki is counting
on taking advantage of the vacation to prepare for his return to the fold. -
But enthusiasm dwindles before the distressing spectacle offered by the _
streets of Algiers. The sidewalks and stairwells are strewn with filth and
refuse; the celbars are occupied by rats; a number of buildings are dilapidat-
ed. Wha~ carz be said about the elevators, which have not worked for ages, or
the pipes that leak everywhere? It is enough to discourage the most fervent
candidate for homecoming! I~ is true that since Arezki has been away this _
facade has begun to change. Early in September, in fact, a vast rehabilita-
tion operation was launched; it has now been extended to the whole country. -
As EL MOUDJAHID s~id, "Day and night, ar~ army of painters is covering the _
facades of the buildings, which yesterday~were pitted with dir~...The side-
- walks are swept, the garbage picked up, and the rats hav~ had to seek refuge =
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- in spaces less exposed for the moment to the demands of this cleanup campaign."
The fact remains that Algiers "is exploding;" in 17 years th~ population has
almost quadrupled, going from 600,000 souls in 1962 tc more than 2,000,000 ta-
- day. The occupation rate of housing is one of the world's highest. In many
quarters three to eight persons on the average share one room. Families
with seven, eight, or even ten children, to which are added the inevitable
cousins, uncles and other ax~re or less close relatives, are not unusual.
Since the launching of tl~e rehabilitation operz~tion, automobile and pedestri-
- an traffic has been controlled, th3nks to the stroitg-arm vigilance of the
police. But in some corners the crowd density is comparable to that in
Asiatic cities.
Badly housed, the Algerois do not lack other concerns. Provisioning, to be-
, gin with. When they do not lack semoli.na or butter, they lack eggs, pota-
toes or tomatoes. As soon as these products reappear in the Monoprix o;c in
the state ~tores, the shelves are taken by storm.
- Openly and publicly practised, the black market is flouri~~hing. Everything
is found there. Even so-called luxury items. Very partial to imported pro-
dus.ts, especially when they carry the Made in France lab~l, Algerians buy
cigarettes, razor blades, clothin~,, perfume, etc. ~n the black ~narke~. Jeans
that are worth about 150 French francs (7,500 CFA fxancs) in Europe, cost
350 dinars (over 20,000 CFA francs) here. High grade wr,iskey sells for
350 dinars a bottle and American cigarettes for 12 dinars (almost 750 CFA
francs).
- Another Algiers scandal is urban transportation. The poor maintenance of the
vehicles and the overloading have redu~ed a large part of �he state-owned
transportation company's rolling stock to the candition of wrecks. Buses go
by less and less often. At the stations, formerly crowded o~ly during z�ush
hours, one s~es veritable human tid~s at any hour of the day. Would one
rather take a taxi? The undertaking is scarc~ly made easy. There is no
jostling, but the wait is a long one. Sometimes an occupied taxi stops and
agrees to take one or two additional passengers. There i~ no question of
setting an itinerary for it. It is the driver who imposes the destinatiQn in
advance, No wonder! Because each passen~er will have to pay the total bill
- for the course.
Several years ago, ho~,vevex, there wa~ no iack of taxis in Algiers. Whol~~
lines of them could be faund at amy hour at the principal stations. Tr~e rar-
ity of the vehicl~s, the lazk of spare parts have caused many cab-dxivers to
give up practising thei~ profession. The slightest breakdown may bri.ng with
it immobilization of theix vehicles for ~everal months. It is necessary to
= move heaven and earth to get a set of points nr brake pads. The SONACOI~
[National Mechanical En.gineering Company] stores, which has the monopoly on
i?apo~ts, remain hopelessly empty.
Th~ last resort is the means of private transportation, for those wh~ can
have it. But to acquixe an automobile it is necessary tn be er.tered on the
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SONACOME lists, to waix--four years, five years, or longer, and to accept
whatever make and model is i;~posed. _
However, the delays can be shortened. A littlz "string-pulling" suffices.
Thanks to their connections, some people have been able to get several cars,
~ which they have resold several weeks later, realizing on each one a profit of
10,000 to 20,000 dinars (between 600,000 and 1,200,000 CFA francs). Others
have been able to clear t}irough customs cars brought hom.e from abroad, by
paying a very heavy tax (100 percent on a vehicle of under 7 horsepower).
- But this is an excellent investment, because an old Peugeot 504, worth
6,000 francs (300,000 CFA francs) in Europ~ can be sold for over 500,000 -
dinars (60,000 Prench francs, ur 3,000,000 CFA francs). _
Howev~~, is there not sor.~thing more serious--the breath~aking rise in ~rices? -
- Shrimps, formerly offered in bars as Kemia (appetizers) or sold for between
6 and 8 dinars a kilo (360 to 480 CFA francs) are currently worth 50 to 80
dinars (3,000 to 4,800 CFA francs). You ge~ four on a plate for 30 d~nars ~
(1,800 CFF: francs). Thz sardine, the poor people's dish, has followed the
- same curve, going from 1.50 dinars (90 CFA francs) a kilo to 12, even 1~ i
dinars (720, 900 CFA francs). This rise is due, it seems, to granting a
monopoly on the exporting of fish nrpducts.to a hi~hly-placed person. So
that only a small q~antity of fish and shellfish is sold on the local market. _
- In some markets methods worthy of the wildest capitalism are practised. ~
Thus this scene, which I witnessed: shellfish resembling shrimps ha~ been :
offered without much success for 35 dinars (2,100 CFA francs) a kilo. Us-
ually, uns~ld stock is sold off at reduced prices when the markets' closing r_
= time approaches. This was not the case that day. The original prices were _
maintained until the end. At closing time the uns~ld fish were thrown int~ -
the garbage. The next day the new arrivals were offered at the same price. _
~ _
Going back up to Po1~t Said Square, one overloQks the immense port of Algiers,
where an inter..se activity apparently reigns. Beyond the wharves about 50 -
boats may be seen, anchored in the bay. Some have been thsre for weeks.
Such a wait must cost the country the tidy sum of 30,000,000 dinars. The -
port is suffocating. The number of ships entering the port has certainly in- _
creased, but that is not the only reason it is saturated. The ~aarehouses and
even the wharves are cluttered with merchandise that has not been taken away.
- Subject to long and complicated formal.ities, imported products sometimes re- _
main there for many months. It even happens that peris;~able foods exposed to _
� bad weather spoil before they are taken away. According to the daily _
EL MOUDJAHID, that. was the case several years ago wz.th a cargo of potatoes,
which was discreetly unloaaEd in western E1-Harrach. A stock of butter that
- moulded before clearing customs would be sold to a soap factory.
They have certainly tried to unblock the port by transporting a good part of
the stock to places in the old Algiers Fair that nave been transformed into
warehouses. But that is not where the evil itself Zies. No one has trimmed
- the bureaucra^.y, or punished those responsible for serious acts of neglige~ce. _
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The evil goes beyond the precincts of the port. It is to be found nearly ev- _
- erywhere. And a certain nonchalance has cropped up, even a disinterest on
the part of a number of functionaries and those in charge. A.dministrations _
- 1n4 nationalized companies very often present a picture of somnolence and .
- emptiness. At the end of August EL MOUDJAHID imputed the situation to the .
- ramadan. In fact, absenteeism has raached worrisome proportions months ago.
The "corner cafes" are experiencing a very great affluence during business _
= hours. -
This generalize~ work stogpage goes back to the g~e~iod of the long agony of
~ President Bownedienne, which saw the country deprived of leadership for ].ong ~
months. But that scarcely explains the disenchantment of the professionals,
- civil servants and work~rs. The lowering of purchasing power, the pathetic
results of the austerity policy in relation to the effort put in, are better
explanations for the attiLUde of these salaried workers. The fact that it
~ras learned that austerity h?u not been applied to all, and that the social-
ist regime engendered cc~asionally-flagrant inequities, did not help matters.
Influence peddling, r.epotism, sometimes corruption, allowed some people to
provide themselves with. great material advantages, or even to gain real for- -
tunes. The names of high-level leaders are cften mentioned. _
Exhausted by its great effort at industrialization, Algeria found itself
shortly after the Second Quadremaisl Plan (1974-1977) faced with almost-in- _
soluble problems. They built plants in great numbers at the cost of heavy -
= sacrifices. But they failed to create the infrastru~tures that should accom-
pany ihem. Agriculture received only a very small portion of investments. -
Production declined appreciably. From 20,000,000 quintals on the average in
- the early 1960's (when Algeria had only 9,000,000 to 10,000,000 inhabitants), ~
cereal production fell to 11,000,000 quintals in 1976-1977, at a time when
- the population was reaching 18,000,000. Seventeen years after independen~e
the country, which used to be a wheat exporter, has to import two thirds of
its cereal consumption, which costs it over two thirds of its oil income.
Sixteen years after the promulgation of the Maxch 1963 decrees establishing
self management, more than one worker in the self-managed sector continues to
behave like a salaried worker, not much concerned with the profitability or
_ prosperity of his field. The Agrarian Revolution sectar* does not stir up
- much enthusiasm. Many beneficiaries have abandoned their land to go and look _
for jobs in industry or the tertiary sector.
A massive administration was put in place to market the production of the
Agrarian Revolution sector: regional cooperat~ives (CAPRA) [Agricultural Fro-
duction Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution]; communals (CAPCS) [Communal
Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperative]; and locals (COFEL) [Fruit and Vegetable _
~ Cooperative]. It carries out its mission badly. The prices offered the pro- _
, ducer do not often allow him to recoup the committed expenses. Conversely,
~ the selling prices of these very products in the city are disproportionate
in relation to the oxiginal price. Having much lower expenses, sales agents
* Algerian agriculture is divided into three sectors:
1. The socialist sector (or self-managed sector) benefiting from better
land (land recovered after the European colonists departed).
2. The Agrarian Revolution sector, including small fellahs [farmers]
beneficiaries of land taken from~the big national landowners after
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and midd.lemen, wlio should be officially abolished, continue to offer more
" advantageous prices t~ the producer. Many of those who receive Agrarian Re-
volution allotments secretly deliver part of their harvests to these agents. _
The industry which was to provide relief for oil (the reserves of black gold
are expected to last 15 years at the current rate of production) has hardly
met the hopes based on it. Few jobs have been created and plants are far
from operating at full speed. In many cases, production has hardly exce~ded
- 15 to 25 percent of capacity. In spitE of having recourse to the latest tech- _
~ nologies, the quality of the products leaves something to be desired. "They
talk to us abou� the latest technologies when we aren't even capable of mak- -
ing cans correctly," says a tap executive. Of course there is a little ex- -
aggeration there. But many production units set u~ in nationalized companies
are continuing--years after they were launched--to have significant current _
- accounts deficits. This is in spite of the monopolies, exemptions and other
= privileges of which they are the beneficiaries.
_ ~he ~rivate sector, which is more dynamic, reports better results. But its
' development is in danger of aggravating social inequities. Moreover, de- "
_ pendent for their supplies of raw materials or equipment on the nationalized
companies, which hold the import monopc~lies, the private sector sees its pro-
_ duction capability often limited.
It is a very heavy heritage that Mr Chadli Bendjedid had to assume! The third _
president of the Algerian republic has been trying to rEdress the situation -
- since his election in February 1979. Algiers' rehabilitation operation thus
- made unauthorized street peddlers and vendors vanish in a fe~v days. Petty _
crime was on the decline. The police acted ruthlessly, sometimes displaying ~
e~ccessive zeal. Several hundred persons, the majority of them young, were ~
presented before the courts for people caught in the act of committing a crime.
. Some of them will go to serve their sentences on work sites, or by gathering
' Esparto [grass] on the high plateaus.
- Although most Algerians have reacted favorably, one remains skeptical about -
= the operation's efficiency. "The~ are attacking the consequences of the evil -
rather than its origins," is heard here and there. The black market will not _
be abolished by imprisoning a few little vendors. Would it not have been pre-
� ferable to attack the big speculators, the ones who pu.ll the strings? ~
EL MOUDJAHID stated in an :oitorial, "that the police cannot and must not
make themselves the Master Jacc{ues of our society." Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui,
Party coordinator and co-director of the rehabilitation campaign, assured
that it was neither improvised nor provisional, and should result in educat-
ing the citizen. It would put an end "to all forms of crime, whatever their
~ source and whatever the level of the perpetrators in the hierarchy ~f respon-
sibilities."
Is that "the announcement of purges that might go very high up in the Party
or state apparatus," as our Parisian colleague LE MONi~E thinks? Probably.
Eradication of parasitism must begin with eliminating the fat leeches, such
' * 1971.
3. The private sector.
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as the Algerian "Khashoggi," busines:~men-brokers who deal with the state -
_ markets. ,
To combat iuvenile delinquen,:y, should not the p~cs~~ssional training centers be
increased? Many young people excluded. from the school system are condemned to
inactivity, wheraas the country lacks plwnbers, mechanics, b~icklayers,
carpenters, etc., who could be trained in a few manths. Forced labor camps
will not solve anything, for after their sentences are served the "delinquents"
arrested during the present campaign will find themselves in the street again.
To put an end to cyclical shortages and the proliferation of the black market,
distribution systems are to be completely revised. Above all, the heavy
bur~aucracy that is paralyzing them is to be tr'_~:uned. Some distribution or
importing monopolies axe to be abolished. Many nationalized companies are
conducting themselves in a despotic fashion. President Chadli is being begged
_ to put a stop to this "tyranny of the monopolies." Instructions have been giv-
- en to the ministries concerned to auth~rize private industry to directly im- '
- port the raw materials it needs. The chief of state also intended to reori-
ent the development policy. ~The "industrializing industries" will have to
give way agriculture, hydraulics, housing, education and training. "The
main lines of the next development plan (1980-1984) will be oriented toward
satisfying primary needs," says Mr Brahimi, minister of Planning. ~ -
The next extraordinary congress of the FLN (National Liberatior. Front, the
y single party), the date for which has not yet ~een set, will decide upon those =
orientations. But it seems to be already established that those priorities
will be confirmed. Nevertheless, this will not mean the end of the industrial- ~
- ization policy, but "the implantation of small and medium-sized businesses .
directed toward the immediate needs of the citi.zens" will be encouraged. Fo.r -
those industries it will not be a question of the latest technologies, but one �
of "efficient technologies." _
Rather more than a simple rehabilitation operation, it is a long and exacting
- task that awaits the team in power. President Chadli seems firmly committed ~
to it. But he will not be able to improve the situation without putting to
the question again certain established facts--which are not at all revolutian-
- ary. The road is strewn with pitfalls. By agreeing to look certain realities
in the face and acknowledge the errors of the past, he is making a good begin- `
- ning. A problem correctly raised, they say, i.s half solved.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 -
;
~ .
8946 , ` -
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ALGFRU
POLITICAL EVENTS IN AI+~PlIA MAY HSRAID i~tCREASID OPENN~
Psris AL-WATAN AL-+'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Qat p 1.6 -
[Article: '5urgical Operation on Bouteflika'~ Sole Kidney"]
- [Text] The step taken by the Algerian paee8ldancy lsat Sw~day to terminate t~he _
services of Hydraulics Minister Ahaed Ghosali xae tha eub~ect of attention aaong
political and dip3~o~tic circlss here. -
Ahmed Ghozsli's name carried xeight in the context a~ the coutetry'a baaie eco-
- nomic blessings, especially in the fi.~Ld a~ energy. He holds an engine~ring ~
degree from Paris, srd in the paat hald the poost of director of ansrgy sr~d fwls
- at the Induatry Mini~try. Then he aucce~ded ~bdeeaalea Belsid to the presiden-
cy a~' the Natiar~al 011 C~upar~y (So~atrach bet'ore succeeding hi~ as 1sin~ate~r -
of ~:nergy anai Petrochenical Industriea in the last cabinet ct~nge ~oade by I,ate
Presid~nt Boumect~e~e a fex aonths befose his dea~h.
Soms people here are askin8 xhsther thia dismisaal is th~e preface to oth~z
- ct~au~ges in senaitive positiona~ or xhsthsr it is 3ust an iaolated aaeaeurs sub-
3ect to special coneideratians. -
It is xorth ma:~tiariing th~.t for the last fex xeeka Algeria tws been xitnesaing =
an extensive ~psign to limit excesses o~ whatever ki~d. be thsY as slight as
non-complianca xith traffic regulatiana or ae axtenaive ae bribery, hoe?rding
focd~tuffs~ or cresting battlenscka in daily econ~ic life.
In another conte~ct, it has been observed that Ab~sla~i~ BautefllI~, and his
colleagues Draia arrd Tayebi Iarbi attended the recsnt ~eeting of the political
bureau, after the form~r foreign ~inis~Cer's absence fron the political scene
for xore than 6 months. _
Somre observers tried to explain this attendance as a raturn by Bou`teflika's _
group to the political arena, xhereas in raality such a return xoulcl be dif- _
= ficult under the present circumstances. In fact, Bouteflika 2~ii~ssslf lost no
time in leaving ~he country after the oeeting~ going to Sxit~erlaad for another
_ operatia~ au hiss sole res4lning kidney, the firat Ici~dney having been rsmoved =
durin8 an earliar surgicsl operatian.
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The third story xhich is ~nowadsys occupying politica.l circles in Algeria is ~
the regime's trend toxsrda lYghtening the reatrictiona on aoma forar oppoai-
- tion members. After the semi-confiraied nerrs sbout Former Preaident Ahmed Ben
~ Bella's imminent return to pursue his complete freedom, it xas learned tls~t _
- Secretary General of the Defens~ Ministry Col Qasidi Murbah recieved txa i~et- -
- eran Algerian leaders, Farhat 'Abbas and !(oussef Ben Kedda, Kho xere form~rly -
pxasidents of the provisional govez~ent after Algeria's indapendence. _
Th~ purpose behind this meeting xas to restore to them the phaz~acies xhich -
they oxned before their confiscation by Presideirt Boumediene in 1976~ in rers�~ _
- ponse to an opposition statement addreased to the authorities xhich Naas dis- -
~ tributed in Algier+e at that time and xhich ~as signed by the above-mentioned
- politicians an?ang others. -
The question raised in this context is~ xill Algeria, during caning xeelc$, -
xitness increased internal democratic openness toxards the various forces and
groups xhich took part in earlier atages of Algeria's struggle? :
COPYRTGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8559
- CSO~ 4~012
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~ -
- ALGERIA
~
MAGAZINE REFU~ES C}iARGES THAT IT L~ID NCIT INTERYIEX ALGEEtIAN PRESIDENT .
Pasis AL-iiATAN ~AL-' ARA~3I in Arabic 18-+24 oct 79 P 26 -
[Article~ 'This ia the Coaplete Story About the Interviex Mith Chadli
Bend~edid"]
[Text] This xeek the edytori~sl staff of AL-i1ATAN AI,-'ARd1BI seeks its readera'
permission to publiah aui article addrsased to thse firat and lsst~ perhaps the
first of its kind, pertalning to ita aethods of opention and ita go~l in its
gursuit a~ ~ournalistic servi~.
ile are addreesing, and glsdly aakin6 caa~sideration frn,~ no one but our read~,
xho haa ehox~? us hie trumt. Through hia ~ara~ continual ~~brace of AL-KATAN
AL-'ARABI, the aagasine haa achieved a broad circulstion and str~ngth of oor-
_ roboration.
~ Perl~ps the iawediate reason for tod~y's artiele Ls the xidssp~read ~c~saction _
to the nagazine's presa acaop in publishiAg the firat interviex xith Algerian
president Cha~dlt Bend~edid.
The interariex ~ttracted attention far aurp4asing all the ezpectations of the
Arab xorld's political~ diplomdtic snd popular circlss~ ~d the xorld's nsxa
- agencies atxi other infora~tion msdia xanted to report ita details.
P'urther~aore, AL-i1ATAN AL-'ARABI rec~ived arrd is atill receiving lettsra~ tele-
gra~os and phoae calls about the ~nterviex xith President Cha~dli~ ~hsther frot _
supportera or oppon~nta of Algerian policy, oc~r~tiag and aesking explanatiooaa. _
- The comon deso~iwator of the~ all ia that the interviex~ ia its forin and sub- _
~tance snl aspiratlon, i+as an ezcellent ~ovrnaliatic schieve,ent coming at ths
right ti.~e. .
Tha,t ia, the intervie~ caae aftsr the c~lebrationa ad' the 25th anniveraary of
' the mi.llion-~srtyr revolution, which csr~ciea hi~torical xeight in the Arab
xorl,d and the Third iiorld.
In the intsrviex~ Preaident Ctssdli surpriasd everyone xith his vfaion~ attitudea~
frankneas and ~odeaty. xhich xera coiplately differsnt fro~ sll ths prsss i~-
ages, sr9alyaes a~xi eap~cte~tions aurrow~ding his aince he took o~var the
i -
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~ presidency. He anse~erad cl~arly and unambiguously a~ nuntber of the ma. jor
questione xhich hac! continued to hang like cryptc~grsphs a~rour~3 Algsria'e true
situation and its future after the r.teparture of I~te President Boussdiene.
A number of ou.r colleaguas throughout the xorld~ of all tendencieg~ had pre- _
ceeded us in attacking the queation me~rke. Their corrsapot~dents came ar?d oon-
tinued to insistently knock on Algeria's door to get ana~aera. But Presid~nt
Chadli al~,~aya made an ~xcuse for not rec~iving any Arab or foreign ~ournaliata~ -
on the pretext that he preferxed tha.t, "the facts~ not he personally~ ansxer _
any question~," and that it xas only a natter of time until the facts beoame _
= obvious and open to viex.
But the editorial ataff af AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI continued to hold the vieK tha�t
- it xould try to convince President Chadli to talk and anawer himaelf some of'
the questions and explain his program and his method for operationally carry-
~ .ing out this policy, in his capacity as head of the nex political, social and
national leadership of Algeria.
- And since AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI had ~oined its colleagues iai despairing of knock-
a ing on the president's door ~i the traditional n~anner, it had to fi:d an un- _
- conventional rray.
Special Permission to Publish ;
- Becawsa of its nationalist line~ AL~i~ATAN AL-'ARABI has ma.n`y friend8 and en3oys
deep~ good xelations xith varioua political forces and fac~ors. Nhen it learn-
ed that one of these friendly political peraonalitiea had sn appointmn~nt Mith
the Algeria.n president, it lost no tise in asking him to carry ta Chad31
Bend~edid its ~nrgent requ~st that he grant it a conprehensive iriterviex. The
, frier~d pro~ised to try.
The matter xas actually.proposed to the preeidant~ xho agrsed~ after discuasing
the magazine's identity and tendencies~ to ansxer its qwestions. No sooneac had
the Arab political personality f~nished his private talk xith the preaident~ _
than the latter gracious~y set aside about an hour and s l~lf to talk xith
AL-WATAN AL-'ARAHI, and 6ave permisaion to publish the interviex. _
For us~ the interviex xas a mark of eateem from the Algerian president, snd xe -
xere very proud. For our readers, it xas an intense light cast on Algeria of
- today, in its domestic~ Arab ar~d iriterriatiwul contexts.
As for some of our professionsl colloaguea~ it xaa a ahxk~ or more properly a _
- "acoo~," xhich they had xaate~ to achieve. We at AL-iIATAN AL-'ARABI reapsct
- and w~deratand theae feelings very xell and xe respeat everything they arouae,
for they play the part of fuel in tt~e 3ournaliatic coapetition to provide
- greater aervi~e to the reader ard to the truth.
But We did not expect the echo6 of the eho~k to tske on all the~e diMnaions,
- and for the Arab press to encroach on the forei~ preaa and perhape even on a -
limited number of Algerians xho still dsal xith infos~stiaac~ in a tr~ditioaal
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manner, Kho sax in AL-WATAN AL-'A1~I's gaining the first interview with tha
preaident a. sort of diaregard for all they hold sacred.
� Therefare, xe xere surpsised to r~ad in an iasue of the French paper L~ MOI~IDE~ ~
published on Saturday 13 October 1979, a piece of nexs stnang~a in its forn and _
- content, in the shdpe of an anonytaowa article printed on the fifth pags. under
- the singl~ ward heading "correctio~~" xhich aaid, "The publication, by ~he
- Arabic-language ~gazine AI~-i~ATAN AL-'I?RABI publishe~d in Pa~cia, of an iuterviex
xith Algerian Pzesident Chad.li ~as atirred up reactions in A'_geria. Circles _
clase to the presidency are ~uoted as saying tha.~t tha president hard nat author~ _
ized ar~y interviex xith a foz~eign pe~per, and that the interviex publi.ahed in =
AL-iiATAN AL-'ARABI ~+as in fact private discuaeiona betxoen President Chadl.i
- and an Arab poli~ical personage, and th~t this pereonage had given the contents =
_ of these private discuasions, in aui approuimata form~ to the magazine."
Here ends the neus i~em~ rrhich has no precederrt in the history of ~ournalism -
in general and that of the gaper IE MOAIDE in particular. The signature to the
article xas even atranger, since betxeen parentheses xas the xord "letter~" -
a direct expression used by the nexepaper's sec~etariat to dieiavox responsi-
bility for the nexa on the one hand, and an indirect suggestion that ita pub- -
lication of an anvr~ymous letter xsa ir fact a courtesy to s certain party or
personality on the ather hand. ~his is xhat xe understood fron our conta,:~~s
xith the administration a~ IE MQNDE, for which we h~u~e ev~xy reepect.
= AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has continued to recsive i~uiriea from all over about this
strange newa iten?~ xhich xaa unable to disprove the interview but xhich on the
contrary confia7aed the truth of the president's isauance of it~ ana xhich gave
it ano~ther~ deaper di~eension of corroboration by describing it as "private talka"
betxeen the president arx~. the Arab political personality. It ia knoxn~ accord- _
= ing to the principles and standards of the profesaion, t3zat "private talk" Ls
- more truthful than "public preas interviex~" because it is characterized by a~ -
spor?taneity xhich xas nat squesaieh about choosing the term for publication
reasons.
oL-WATAN AL-'ARABI seirt a correction to its French colleague in xhich it said~ -
"You have published xords to the effect that the interviex xhich President
Chadli gave especial~}r to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI appears to be a aummary of a talk
conducted by the president with an Arab politician, xho eubsequent ~jr gave the
contents o~ his talk xith Chadl.i to AL-1iATAN AL-'ARABI.
'The fact ia that your pe~per avoided defining the source of the nexs, content- -
ing itself ~ith r~ferrir~g to "circles close to the presidency~" aithout aaking
AL-~1ATAN AL-'ARABI.
- "AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI strasses that President Chadli met xith its correspondent
for three hoiirs, that the interviax covered r~even antire pages of its ~gasine ~
- and that the presidency h~as not iasued a~y denial in this respect."
During their contacts erith the msga~ine~ some analysts have tended to think
that this "atrange newa" reflects some kind of struggle in Algeria~ but xe
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don't agree Hith this viex, We believe thr~t this strange piece of nexs xme
- ba~sically intended to either reveal the name of the "Arab politics~l peraonality" _
xho for some unknown re~uson and for aome tncomprehensible motive embarkad on _
such a.n irresponsible and ignoble course of b9havior, or else to deferid i~ an -
i unconvincing manner some ~a~rnallst colleagues, Rrabs and foreignex~~ xho did -
- not aucceed in ga.ining an intervie~ with President Chsdli eince he took rnrer
the prssidential responsibilit~. _
- AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI xants on~yr to tharik the anonymous author of the letter xMich "
brought the atrange nexa to I~ MONDE~ since he unintenti~anal~jr substantiated
xha.t AL-WATAN AL-' ARABI h~ad printed.
Although the matter of Pinding out the identity of tha "anat~ymous letter-
xriter and his motives is up to Algeria, that doesn't prevent us from clear~y
rEStating that Algerian President Chadli Bertd~edid granted us a prees interview
- ~ith his personal permiesion~ xhich had perhaps not come to the knoti?l~dge of
the "anonymous letter-irriter."
i~lho Is Responsible?
Above all, xe must observe that in his atrange nexs itsm~ the "anonymous letter-
- xriter" permitted himself to make use of the phrase "circlea closs to the pres- ,
- idency." ~'no exactly are these circles? Can the republican presidency of any _
country make observations or c~rrections to an interviex published in ar~y nexa-
gap~r xithout a clear official stateatent to that efferk. being issued by the
republican presidency or any c~ther responsible party? ~
According to our ir~ ormation, tha rties responsible for this ~eetter in A1- �
geria can be defined as threei (l~the office of the republican presidency,
_ for which its Secretary General Abde Loalek Batihabyles is responsiblei (2) the
- Miniatry of Infore~e~tion and Culture, for which ita Minister Abdelhaoid Mehri
is responsible~ and (3) the presa and infornation bureau of the republican =
presidency, for xhich fts Director Mahieddine Amiaour is responsible. -
Also, ac~ording to cur infor~atior~~ none of these peurtiea have issued~ in the
name of their responsibility, ai~y official statem~rat containing ar~y reference _
to the "strange nexs" fabri.cated by the "anon~ymous lertter-xriter."
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI proaises its z~eadars that it xill continue carrying out its
mission, commited to a full desire to subst~ntir~,te ita nexe and informe?tion~
as xell as to generous~}r open ita pages to opinians and o~ther opiriions xithin _
the context of commitment to the aationalist line in all its political, social -
and economic dimensions.
Here's to a ne?r journalistic scc>op.
COPYRIGHTs 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
- 8559
CSOt .
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' I~Q -
FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES DEMOCRACY, RELATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS _
Paris AL-W.ATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Sep 79 pp 19-21 ,
- [Interview With Taha Yasin Ramadan, Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister,
by Kamal Hasan Bakhit; "Democracy, Elections and Dispute With Communists
in Dialogue with Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister; Why Didn't W'e Imple- _
ment Parliamentary Formula 11 Years Ago Is Question Asked and Answered
- by Taha Yasin Ramadan; There Wi11 Be Central People's Asse~bly (Parlia- -
_ ment) and Provincxal People's Assemblies to Entrench Decentralization;
Continued Presence of Communist Party in National Front Is Necess~ry,
But on Basis of Abidance by Its Principles; Nomination Open for All Within `
Rules Set by Law; We will not Liquidate Communists, Will Not Prevent Them
from Leaving Country and We Are Ready to Hold Dialogue With Them to Reach
New Formulas"]
[Text] How will democracy in the Iraqi experiment be and what are its
constitutional institutions? Wfiere will the position of the released
political detainees be in society? Will they be given a new chance to
~ begin a new life? Has the relationship with the conmunist party reached
_ the er..d of a cul-de-sac or is the bridge still passable for establishing
sincere and frank dialogue and cooperation with the Ba'th Party through _
the Progressive National Front?
All this is answered by a prominent official of ~he Iraqi leadership,
namely Taha Yasin Ramadan, the Revolution Command Council member who has
recently assumed the post of the first deputy prime minister within the
- framework of the new work plan of the Council of Ministers.
~ In the new work vlan, the Iraqi Council of Ministers has been given a
bigger role as a ha,:....:.~~_Q and cooperative work team. This has been done
through the deputy prime ministers who will take charge of coordination
_ between the various aectors, each deputy prime minister in his field of ~
- specialization. The position of first deputy prime minister has been
introduced so that the holder may assist the prime minister, whc, is also -
the president of the republic, in directing and supervising the work of
the executive administration.
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The new position has been entrusted to Taha Yasin Ramadan, a prominent
party official who is a member of the Revolution CoQmnand Council and com-
mander of the popular army. On the occasion, AL-WATt1N AL-'ARABI has
addressed to Ramadan a number of queations dealing with the task of the
- Iraqi Council of Ministers in the light of its new structure.
The discussion on the Council of Ministers' work provided an opportunity -
to deal with domestic issues of concern to the Iraqis and the Arabs, such =
as the issue of democracy which preoccupies currently an important part
of the Iraqi leadership's thought and planning. In the interview, Ramadan -
- discloses new details that have not been snnounced yet coacerning the
- conditions for no~nination to the Central People's Assembly (Parliament)
_ and underlines th~ call for the election of provincial people's assemt?lies -
in the governorP~es, including the self-rule area, in order to entrench
decentraliza*_ion.
_ He also deals witk~ the iseue of the communists and of the release of -
political detainees, pointing out the leadership's decision to secure ~ork
for all those released so that they may begin a new honorable life and -
- so that they may be given another chance to prove their readiness to serve
their country because this is their right and duty.
As for the communists, the prominent Iraqi official has stressed the _
leadership's willingness to hold dialogue with them as a party, point3ng _
_ out that their preaence in the Progresaiee National Front is necessary,
_ but on 'che basis of the practical implementation of the front's principles ~
and goals.
Kamal Hasan Bakhit, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI correspondent in Baghdad, paints
a picture of Taha Ysein Ramadsn through the man's official daily work and -
- through the iffipressions of the citizen~ and of those working with Ramadata. _
Bakhit says that "he is a dynamic and decisivQ man who makes his decisions
after long deliberation. Ae has gained extensive experience through the
positions that he has held during the revolution's life. ~e is an eacel-
lent and highly capable administrator who combines in his work flexibility
in approach with firmneas in implementation." _
[Question] Why was the formula of ~orming the Council of Ministers pxo-
~ected in thia phase? ' -
~ [Answer] The idea of forming the council was not absent from our minds
even within the framework of the presidential system stipulated in the
constitution which provides for a council of ministers with the president =
of the republic as ita chairman. ~
There are definite powers for the Council of Mix~isters. But we have found _
in this phase that this formula has to be implemented precisely and pr~c-
tically to enable the executive iastitution tb carrq out its serious role. .
This is a first etep on the path of creatiag the ~~her institutions, such
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as the Central People's Assembly and the provincial people's assemblies.
This means the expanded emergence of the structures of the coun~ry's
democratic administration, both at the level of the mass and popular
action and the lavel of the administrativE action in the agencie~ of the
democratic state. These agenciea must have a clear mechanism for adminis-
- trative work and for work among the masses and among the popular organiza-
tions, in the sense that neither type of work should do away with the
other and that there should be integration and cohesion.
In the past pexiod, we benefited greatly from the actions similar to those
of a people's assembly through discussions in public symposiums. We used
- these symposiums as formulas and initiatives for the democratic administra-
tion within the state departments.
- After this experience, we got to be in a position that enabled us to study
_ the experience and to conclude from it clear and constant formulas that
can be legislated by law for implementation, committing all of us to their
_ observance and enforcement.
Foremost of these formulas is the Council of Ministers with its executive
- work and its management of the country's affairs in this regard. This
- formula will be followed, as is well known, by the other.formulas, such
as the Central People's Assembly and the provlncial people's assemblies,
- as I have already said, as well as other detailed formulas for a democratic
administration of the mechanics of the state agencies. A part of these
detailed formulas has been issued in some ministries. However, a general
central formula will be issued. All of these are currently the subject
of final study and discussion.
We have started by implementing the formula of the Council of Ministers
which constitutes a serious step on the path of facilitating the course
of the other steps. This is why, practically, we will not change the
constitution except through the formula of introducing the position of
= first deputy prime minister, considering that the president of the republic
is the prime minister, so that the Council of Ministers may assume its
~ practical character more strongly and deeply. This is in addition to
the positions of the deputy prime ministers that are considered normal
and that are present in similar formulas.
[Question] But do you consider the introduction of more than one deputy
prime minister as the adoption of a we11-known tradition in other countries
and systems or as something ema.nating from an Iraqi experience or a partisan
experience particular to the Ba'th Party?
[AnswerJ This is definitely connected with the party's experience. The
experience of the party's authority in Iraq for more than 11 years has
made us realize the need for these [deputy prime minister] positions so
that there may be some kind of actual followup and serious action in the
- period between two meetings of the Council of Ministers.
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This experience has resulted in the creation of sactors, each supervised
by a deputy prime minister, through Which contacts are directly made,
_ probiems solved and implementation of the decisions of the Council of
_ Ministers followed up through a formula which is definitely influenced
by the party's organizational theory--which is a theory ~f constant and
= uninterrupted motion and the innovation of intrinsic formulas ior the
followup of daily work.
~ From the subject of the Council of Ministers, we moved to the sub~ect of
the political detainees.
Opportunity Open for All
[Question] What does the release of the political detainees in Iraq in
- this manner mean? Is this considered a reply to what some of the western
information media have alleged about the absence of security and stability
or has it come for considerations dictated by the current phase?
- [Answer] The Cruth is that we do not proceed with our actions and measures
under the inf luence o# reactions to foreign propaganda. It has become
_ generally clear to a1J that the eastern and western media are against the
- Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and against its revolution. Naturally, there
is a difference and a variance of degree in this hostility. But generally,
~ there is semi-agreement, an unintentional agreement or an indirecr agree-
ment to distort this procession. We don't know in whose interest is this ~
distortion, ea~cept the interest of imperialism, Zionism and the Camp I~avid
parties. What is important is that we always stress that it is an inde-
pendent procession emanating from the reality of this nation and that this
procession is proving, at the same time, that it is a movement of the
Arab revolu.tion.
- We stress that our experience is always sub~ect to development and integra-
tion through our actions in the field and through the participation of
= the citizens, each in his position. It is definite that an experience
of this kind is more appealing to every citizen who feels that he is
contributi.ng to some details of this movement. This experience is not a
rigid formula like the other theories whose impleffientation is dictated.
This is my opinion. The truth is that in all our measures, such as the
_ release of prisoners, the arrest of some people or the issuance of some
sentences, we do not at all proceed on the basis of reacti~ns. We look
" where the interest lies so as to open a broader path for the procession
of the party and of the revolution, for the realization of the masses
_ aspirations and for the principle that we follow and that has been accepted
by all the honorable sons of Iraq--the principle that this liberated part
of the Arab homeland should be a base [muntalaq] for all the Arab revolu-
tionaries and, consequently, that the requirements of this liberated base
should be sece~red so that all the party's and Arab revolution's strugglers
may be enabled to work vigorously and with high morale.
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This i~ why when we find a need, for example, to execute people by the
_ dozen--as it is said--we know in advance what the lackey, imperialist and -
_ Zionist ~edia and the other [S~viet] ~edia, whether deliberately or
unintentionally, will say, even if those executed ara plotters seeking
to assassinate the revolution and its leaders. We know what the western _
- and hostile media will say under the pretext of their claim of human -
- purity, from which they are as remote as can be.
We carry out such action without any consideration for this or that. When `
we find that the interest calls for giving a chance to citizens whom we =
believe can be yet reformed, we take such action without hesitation and _
without apprehension because we feel the people's confidence and support
- for the revolution. Consequently, we do not think of the nature of the -
- negative returns from those we have releas~ed and who had been sentenced
only weeks or months earlier.
- We feel that the revolution is not protected by individuals or a leader-
ship but by a11 the masses. We feel that the revolution is rising con- -
- siderably and enjoying big popular support in this phase.
_ I don't believe that there is another similar country enjoying such a _
- blessin;, i.e. the strength of the people's support for their leadership
and their revolution. Thereiore, this is the best atmosphere in which -
to release all the political or ordinary detainees, benefiting from this .
positive climate a:~d this popular atmosphere. We have great hope that
the overwhelming majority, not to say all, of those we have released will
make use of this chance and will bec:ome a good part of this good people. -
- We are in the direst need of every sincere and honorable individual to -
work because the arena of work is broad and the Arab revolution, with its
arena, needs the efforts of many. We must not deny any citizen who
possesses even the minimum degree of willingness to participate in this � _
- big work the chance to do so. In the revolutionary concept, this is
simultaneously a right and a duty of all. _
On this basis, a general amnesty decree was issued, excluding nobody except
for 34 traitors involved in the latest plot.
_ It is well known that we have released the communist political detainees.
It is definite that if the request had come from their party, ~?~e would not
have responded to such a request. But we treated the communists as ordinary
- Iraqi citizens like the other citizens and with no privileges over any-
body else. We have done this to give them a chance, hoping that each of
_ them will feel that he is a part of this homeland and will work to serve
~ it without any foreign will, custodianship or instructions imposed on him
from abroad. -
. The release decision has not been lame but has been tied to guaranzees .
for the future of those released, namely the guarantee of providing all
of them, without exclusion, with work in the state agencies immediarely
upon their release. The truth is that this measure is intended to block -
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the path in the face o~ the enemies and to prevent them from entering through
any gap to exploit some people. At the same time, we are fu11y clear and .
completely confident of ourselves when we say that if any of thhse people
- resumes his erroneous activity, we will not hesitate for a single moment
- to bring him to account and malce uim pay what he deserves to pay because _
- we have not failed him and have not denied him the equal opportunity that
each Iraqi citizen must get.
Insofar as the released detainees scheduled to return to thei: jobs are
concerned, it is ~~ell-known that it has been decided that they will begin
collecting their wages as of 16 August 1978, i.e. as of the day of their
release, even though they have not yet reported for their work officially. _
Nomination Open to A11...But -
[Question] Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz has announced in a press
- conference that the leadership is currently studying the question of
establishing the national council through direct elections. What are the
phases covered by the leadership in this regard and what are the formulas _
in accordance with which the nomination and election operations will take
. place?
[Answer] The initial phases have been completed and we are now in the
legislative phases of this issue. Nomination is open to all the honorable
sons of the Iraqi people who work with inspiration from theix conscience
to enhance their country because they believe in the revolution's socialist
directiAn.
The qualifications that must be possessed by a nominee will be announced
in time. These will not take a long time and will be announced shortly,
_ God willing. ~
- We are now in the process of preparing the requirements of this step. We ~
can say that the step of the emergence of the Council of Ministers is a -
beginning that facilitates the way for the follnwi.ng step, namely the
_ emergence of the national co~.:ncil. We are still at the beginning of our
- work in the Council of Ministers and we do not need a long time before
the council assumes its dimensions as an executive experiment within the
formula which will prepare for ttie election of the Central People's
Assembly that will be tantamount to a parliament or a national council. ;
There will also be an assembly in each governorate, called [provincialJ
people's assembly. The members of this assembly will be elected by certain
ratios and with certain qualifications to serve in the local government
so as to entrench decentralism.
- All this emanates from the party's theory. The two formulas will be imple- ~
mented spontaneously, meaning the Central People's Assembly which will ;
have the reFresentatives of all the people, including of course the ;
Kurdish area, and the people's assemblies in every governorate. The i
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number of inembers in the latter will vary according to percentage [pre-
_ sumably`of each governorate~s population to the total population] and these
- assembli~es w.ill have specific powers in accordance with a special law.
We will begin at the start of next year building special buildings for.
- these assemblies. However, the start of the assemblies' work will ha~C _
nothing to do with the completion of these buildings. Their meetings will
be held in temporary premises.
[Question] After these,explanations on the measures that have already been
- taken, can Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan define for us the general directions of
the Iraqi leadership?
[Answer] The current procession is a continuation and an extension of
the previous procession in which there has been no change or alteration.
But this continuity must form an upward curve in terms of both action and ~
implementation. This is, of course, necessary even though there has been
no stagnation and no decline because stagnation and decline must not exist
in a revolutionary party and in the revolutionary movement generally,
including our party. _
Whenever we get better opportunities, we act to take advantage of them
immediately, including implementation of the Central People's Assembly
formula which is not a principled formula and not a formula in which our _
party believes. But in its detail, our formula is definitely different
from the liberal formulas to which we are opposed, even though we fully =
. believe in them as a general principle [sentence as published]. So why
didn't we implement this formula 11 years ago? Naturally, there are rea-
sons and justifications. When the opportunity became available, we worked
to implement it. The same applies to all the other formulas and actions
that emanate from the heart of the party's thinking but whose implementa-
- tion has been delayed or have been implemented inconpletely. However, ~
the party is on its way to a~hieve and implement these formulas.
Story of Dispute and Dialogue ',~ith Communists
[Question] The statement issued by the cammunist party's leadership abroad
has called for dialogue w~.th the party and revolution leadership in Iraq. -
- What is your opinion of this call and has anything of the sort taken place
in the wake of the dispute between you and the communists? If it hasn't,
could it take place in light of the recent release of the communists?
[Answer] Let us be a clear as usual. Several months ago, before the
dismissal of the communist ministers from the cabinet to be exact, the
- communists asked that one of t~?em represent them and meet with or~e of the _
, high-ranking ~fficials. The meeting did actually take place. The com-
munists asked the official to tell them the party's (Ba'th Party's) view
of the communist part~. Did the Ba'th Party seek to oust the co~nuniat _
party from the front? Did it d~cide to fight the communists finally and
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- to end their presence in the country? Naturally, the answer was to the _
- contrary. The official assured them that we in the Socialist Arab Ba'th -
Psrty still consider the continued presence of the front on the one hand
- and their presence as a co~unist party in the front on the other hand ae -
something necessary and natural, but on the basis of observance and actual
implementation of the front's principles and goals as approved with the
_ full agreement of all the parties concerned.
We are not at all imposing this formula [front formula] on the communist
party. Moreover, our party is the party that launched the revolution and =
that called for creating the front because the communist party was in no
position 'to do so and in no position to compel the Ba'th Party morally .
to include the communist party in the front. On the contrary, ne~ther _
the communist party's conduct nor its history and actions before or after
the revolution qualified it to be included in the front.
But our party, with its practical and serious theory and its eagerness to
~ block the path in the face of any attempt at casting doubts, pro3ected
the idea of the front to give the good people an opportunity. It presented
the front's charter for popular debate and then we held bilateral dis-
cussions with the conmunist party which lasted 2 years before the front's -
charter was signed.
- The first to contravene and violate the front's charter was the communist _
party with its organization in the armed forces. This violation took
place more than once and we adopted the measuxes serving the public in-
terest. This is something that is perfectly known to the communist party.
What we told their representative is that we had n~t at all decided to _
� expel the communist party from the front and that our position vis-a-vis -
- the front was a strategic position. We also told the representative: It
is also not our intention to liquidata you. The proof of this is our
- conduct, which is our judge. A11 the communists who left Iraq have left ~
_ it with Iraqi passports, with the kno~ledge of our agencies, in a very ;
normal way and aboard Iraqi and non-Iraqi planes. The real leaders are
the ones who have left. If we had any intention to liquidate the com-
munists, we would not have let their leaders leave Iraq. '
When one wants to carry out acts of liquidation, there are numerous means
to do so, and giving them the chance to move freely and to travel as they
wish are not among these means. The practical aspect conforms the sound-
- ness of our position and our intention toward them. The revolution's pro- _
- cession and the front's principles, goals and charter are the path and the
guarantee.
But the front will not at all protect any communist who acts in a manner -
that undermines the cc~untry�s ~e~~lrity because. one of the most important -
principles of the front is faith in the procession of this country's revolu- -
- tion and not acting and platting against it. We have said that despite _
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the action committed 'oy the communist party, and by its leadership in
particular--an action embodied in the [communist party's] hostile movement
abroad and in instigating all the political movements and all the world -
and international organizations against the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, -
and this in itself cons~itutes a glot against the Iraqi revolution--we
have no objection to having their responsible leaders come to Iraq so
that we may discuss with them why these incidents and those violations
have taken place and so that we may establish the controls for the rela- ~
tionship between our party, the Ba'th Party, and the communist party to
prevent any misinterpretation by the communist party of some provisions
of the front's charter that may be interpreted by the this party in one
way and that we understand in a different way, to clear all ambiguous and
vague points and to lay down new formulas capable of preventing any
violations or incidents similar to those that have happened recently.
This should be done without any shackles or preconditions. So let them
come. Nothing of the sort you mentioneci at the outset of your question
has happenedo Now you find them [communists] seeking the arbitration of `
the right at one time and of the left at another and sending us messages
asking that the meeting take place outside Iraq. Why outside Iraq? If
they are honorable Iraqis, then this is their country and if they are
afraid, then I believe that we could have prevented them from leaving
Iraq. We have high morals. So, let them come and let us hold the dialogue.
If we do not reach agreement, then we will tell them: God be with you.
If you like to live in Iraq, then this is your country and if you don't,
_ we will not stand in your way because we do not stand in the way of an
= Iraqi citizen who does not wish to live in his country. Moreover, we
do not wish to have such a citizen staying among us with such a spirit.
The true struggler always prefers to stay in his country, even if sub~ected -
to coercion, rather than live in the European capitals and declare his _
positions from there. Ultimately, the matter is in their hands and our
invitation to them is still open.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
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IRAQ
_ BRIEES _
PETROLEUM CONTRACT RENEWAL--The C~'P (French Petroleum Company) has high
~ hopes of being able to renew its long-term supply contracts with Iraq. _
Nothing has as yet been settled but Iraq's leaders have Iet it be known
that they are well dispo~ed in this respect. [Text] [Paris LA T~ETTRE DE `
L'EXPANSION in French 29 Oct 79 p 5]
CSO: 3100
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_ LEBANON
SSNP LEADER DISCUSSES SHIFT IN PARTY'S POSITIONS -
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Ara~ic 20-26 Sep 79 pp 22-24 -
[Interview with Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah, chairman of Syrian Social Nationalist _
Party; "Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah: We Still Abide by Our Opinion That There Are
Four Distinctive Arab Nations; Party's Socialism Does Not Emanate From Class
- Struggle and Seeks to Distribute Wealth Not Poverty; Party's Natural Position
Is in Left, Even in Extreme Left, In Sense of Changing Society's Environment;
Political Conditions Dictate Meeting Not Fighting Among Ba'thiats, Nasirists,
Communists and Syrian Nationalists"]
[Text] The party which fought with Camille Sham'un in the national revolution
in Lebanon in 1958 and whose history has been linked with tragic events and
catastrophes in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan is standing nowadays in the same _
line of the parties of the leftist Lebanese National Movement and has fought
with these parties, with the national revolution and with the Palestinian
resistance against all the forces with which it found itself allied 20 years
ago.
How and why did this big transformation occur? Where is the party's position
at present? What change has developed in its political line and its thought
vis-a-~~is important fssues, such as the issue of Arabism, unity, socialiam
and Palestine?
A colleague in AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI office in Beirut carried all these queations
and presented them to Br 'Abdallah Sa'adah, the partq chairman and one of the _
prominent leaders who have accompanied the party's long procession.
We Have Gone Beyond Fertile Crescent Environment -
- [Question] It is noticed that the SSNP [Syrian So~ial Nationalist Party] has
~ participated in recent years in Arab partisan and popular conferences and
activities. Is this participation the result of a new change in the party's
understanding of Arabism and Arab nationalism?
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[Answer] There is no doubt that the central Arab issue is the Paleatinian
issue and the dangers of the creafcicn of the alien and cancerous Zioniat entity
- in the body of our nation. There is also no doubt that this cancerous entity
has been directly tied with the escalating im~erialist-colonialist onslaught
against the Arab area from the ocean to the Gulf.
_ This serious challenge has played its ma~or role in crystallizing the Arab
ap~roach and the need to translate Arabism into integration, solidarity and
_ partnership to confront and repel this challenge. This approach [ta'ati] is ~
gaining iti cohesion and interaction day after day and is accompanied by the
enemy's efforts to fragment this cohesion, interaction and so~idarity.
By volunteering completely to confront the Zionist enemy and imperialism
- and their plots, our party has responded vigilantly and responsibly to the
requirements and dangers of the stage. Thus, the party's intErests and
activities have gone beyond the fertile Syrian crescent environment to concern
with and participation in the.progress and liberation movement in the entire ~
Arab area because of this movement's strategic and fateful connection with
confronting this big danger.
[Question] What I want to ask is: Does this mean a transformation in your -
_ national concept. In other words, does it mean abandoning the belief in the
unity of the natural Syria (Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Cyprus
and Sinai, according to the party's concept) for the belief in the concept of
_ Arab nationalism in its comprehensive sense?
[AnswerJ There is no doubt tha~ the general Arab p~rticipation further
strengthens the Arab bonds and ties the entire Arab ~orld together more firmly.
- Moreover, the bond of the Arab liberation a~id progress movements is getting
constantly stronger through this approach. The Arab liberation and progress -
movements are the party to which hopes are attached to develop the Arab relations
in the direction of escalating unity.
i
, Therefore, ~his approach and the escalating progressive and liberationist
- struggle has led to a clearer understanding of the value of the unity of the
Syrian environment and to realizing, through progressive and scientific ;
analyses, that this unity flows in the general Arab unionist direction. So
we and others in the Arab world have dropped our previous reservations concerning
_ the unity of the natural Syria and this unity has become a strategic demand
i:o face and confront the enemy.
- Four Arab Environments ~
[Question] In clearer words, I would like you to tell me whether you atill ~
believe in the presence of four Arab natione or peogles? :
~ ~
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[Answer] The distinctive four Arab environments are a social reality.
Changing this reality cannot be done on the basis of desire and interest.
However, this distinction does not preclude the integration, solidarity,
cohesion and unity required by the Arab bonds (Arabism) and dictated by the
needs of the phase of confronting the~imper~alist-Zionist enemy.
It is also obvious that the unionist line is strengthened, not weakened, by .
_ achieving the natural unities. This is why we have escalated our demand for -
_ uniting the Arabian Peninsula and for uniting the greater Arab Maghreb.
This is also why our insistence on the need to achieve the unity of the -
fertile Syrian crascent has intensified. -
_ [Question] Then, what specifically is your concept of Arab nationalism and
Arab unity?
[Answer] A distinction must be made between nationality and unity. Nationality
~ in our opinion, which is based on sociology and on the laws of social life, is
the people's awareness of an objective reality--the reality of their union
in a single socio-economic life cycle that produces a united social-cultural-
psychological texture, a united view of values and life and an aw~reness of
this distinct social entity.
Because our scientific social analysis of the Arab reality shows that there -
are four natural environments, each of which shares a distinct social-
econcmic-psychological life cycle, we have said that there are four Arab
- nations in the greater Arab Maghreb, in the Nile Valley, in the Arabian =
- Peninsula and in the fertile Syrian crescent. All of them are bound by -
_ Arabism, which means sharing the same language, history and ~piritual values
_ that pull the four nations toward common solidarity and integration.
: Unity is another thing. It means translating this common factor, namely
= Arabism, into actual solidarity, integration and cooperation. The Arab people's
aspirations for unity intensified whenever they felt the need to confront
_ the colonialist and imperialist, and recently, the cancerous Zionist challenges.
We are eager for and exert p~rsistent efforts to develop these asptrations so
that they may find their way toward realization.
[Question] Do you still underline the presence of this "distinction" between
the "Syrian nation" and the Arab nation?
[Answer] I~~ave stated in my preceding answera that a nation is a social
reality and we have defined this soc.ial reality as the common sharing of a
natural cycle of the economic-social-psychological life. Therefore we cannot
but, on the basis of this scientific definition, stress that the Arab reality
is a reality of four distinctive social environments bound together and
- polarized by the comprehensive Arabism toward unity, regardless of the formula
required and dictated by the phase and by its ob~ective conditions. -
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Unionist Formt:la Open
[Question] Antun Sa'adah, the party founder, says: "We do not call for the
Arab nation but we work for it." What does he mean by this statement? .
[Answer] Antun Sa'adah proceeded with this slogan on the basis that the Syrian _
nation is an Ar3b nation and on the basis of the fact that the Arab reality
is a reality of common interests and common destiny. This is why he included,
as of 1933, in the goal of the SSNP the "creation of an Arab front to constitute
a strong barrier in the face of the foreign colonialist ambitions and a power
_ with a big weight in deciding the major political issues." He also says:
"We will not abandon our position in the Arab world or our message toward it.
= But Syria must be strong with its social nationalist renaissance so that it
may be able to perform its main mission" and I underline the words "main
mission."
As for the unionist formu].a, [Antun] Sa'adah left it open and did nat restrict
it to the political aspect. He also stressed the social, economic, cultural
and military aspects, leaving the door open for dcilieving them under possible -
_ and realistic formulas.
[Question] It is s3id that the SSNP's reconsideration of its concepts and
positions has moved the party in a big leap from the far right to the far
- left. For example, the party is now an active member of the Lebanese National
Movement. -
[Answer] The SSNP was not to the right that it may be said that it has moved _
to the left. The party continued to have its permanent [mustamirrah] leader-
ship after the failure of the 1961 coup. Those who went to jail that year
and who had formed the party leadership before cannot be considered the
permanent party leadership. The party has principles and rules governing ~
the formation of its leadership and th~ emergence of this leadershig in and ~
from its higher i~istitutions.
As for the party's establishment of its political relations in the 1970's
- with the leftist forces, including the Nasirists, socialists, Ba'thists and _
communists, whereas hostility toward many of these forces had been the quality
- characterizing the party's policy before the 1970's--this is due primarily
to the fact that the natural position of the party, in its capacity as a
party for change, is in the left, even in the far left, in the sense of ~
changing society's political, social and moral structure fundamentally.
_
Moreover, the nature of the imperialist-Zionist-reactiona~-y onslaught and of
the successive catastrophes that have afflicted our people have stirred the
pan-Arab, national and progressive forces deeply and have:motivated the sincere
factions among them to seek to achieve popular solidarity in the face of the
intensifying imperialist-Zionist danger. These forces have pursued the
elements of unification and rapproachment among them and have discovered that :
what unites them at the political, social and struggle levels surpasses by
_ far all the elements of ideological disagreement among tl~em, despite the ;
importance of these latter elements. . ~ i_
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- Thus, through a re-examination which has not been confined to the SSNP solely,
the leftist forces have dis~overed the ties that unite them and have exerted
efforts to nurture and strengthen these ties whereas the past approach of
these forces emanated from the basis of discovering the separating elements
- and of rushing to adopt all tbe causes of dispute and of interfighting,
thus doing reaction and its for~es the greatest aervice.
~ We Don't Believe in Class Stt~uggle -
[Question] The party is now pv;sitioned to the lef t, even to the far left, as
= you say. Does this mean that the SSNP is a socialist party? If so, what
are the limits and dimensions of its socialism?
- [AnswerJ The SSNP's socialism emanates from its social nationalist creed
which emanates from the concept that existence and production are a social
existence and a shared common production. The shared co~non production is
the property of society and not of individuals and the production process
itself is a shared and common process.
The western capitalist system is the product of the individualistic theory
of understanding existence and production. It is a theory conflicting with
the reality and cannot, therefore, but produce an inhuman and clasaist system -
based on exploitation and oppression.
This fundamental ideological view which has produced the nationalist theory
= and social theory in the Syrian social nationalist thought bears within itself
the definition of its socialism--a definition that is distinct from those of
the other socialist schools.
Its socialism is contained in and emanating from its socialness [mu~tama'iyahJ.
It is not, therefore, a socialism that emanates from class struggle but from
- the reality of the unity of the material-spiritual nationalist existence and
_ from the requirements of unity of life, resources and production which provides _
man with the psychological, spiritual and social nationalist incentives that
make him give his society all his talents, capsbilities and virtues so that
- public w~~alth and common production may grow and the distribution of wealth, -
- not of po~~erty, may bP realized.
[Question] Concerning the Palestinian issue and the presence of 3 million 3ews ~
in the occupied land in the form of a usurping state, there are those who
call for the creation of a secular state in Palestine including the Arabs and
the Jews after elfminating th2 racial a~.nd sectarian quality of the Zionist _
- state. What is the party's o~-�3nion in this regard, considering that Palestine
is a part of Syria and the fertile crescent? _
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[Answer] The attention and interest of our thought are focused on the social-
cultural interaction in the nationalist environment. Society is a mixture of
races, extractions and sects that are given by the social environment the
need and the inevitability of the interaction that molds a single human society
out of them. -
Any observer of the Jewish issue cannot deny that in all the societies in
which the Jews have lived, the Jews have inherited a fanatic rebellion against .
the laws of social interaction because of their overpowering racism, of the
complex of superiority and of the chosen people and of the complex of the -
inferiority of other peoples that must be exploited to serve the Jewish
superiority.
In the light of this fact and in the light of the fact that the Zionist call
has been mobilizing the world Jewry to settle in Palestine, the SSNP has
since its foundation in 1932 urged the need to repel and prevent this Jewish
_ immigration with all means. The party has also held the belief that this
- racism people cannot fuse in the social nationalist life and that they
constitute an alien cancerous body that threatens our life and our survival
with the gravest dangers.
Here we are today suffering from the consequences of disregarding what Sa'adah
had warned of and drawn attention to. Even the United Nations has branded
Zionism as a form of racism, but onlq after the chain of crimes, aggressions,
- eviction and settlement. ~
We wonder, do those who believe in the unity of the Arab and Jewish origins
. think that their opinion will break the Jewish isolationism and racism? _
Through the way it deals with the sons of our people i.n the occupied land and !
through its annihilative aggressions against the Palestinians, Israel is
giving us the answer. i=
[Question] It is noticed that the party has been recently devoting special !
attention to the labor and social issues. Is this attention the outcome of an
intrinsic partisan interaction with these issues or does it come as part of the '
interest of the Lebanese National Movement as a whole in these issues?
~
[AnswerJ The focus on the social issues connected with organizing the labor ~
and production relations is a part of the character of the comprehensive
social nationalist revolution and of both its social and nationalist beginnings.
~ Even though the recent period has highlighted a stress on the social aspect i
of our revolution by a degree not noticed before, the party has never neglected
the social aspect of its revolution at any time. But the current phases of
political struggle are what made the stress a social nationalist need to i~
which the party has responded by virtue of its principles and its awareness
of the nature and requirements of the stage.
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[Question] This openness to the labor and social issues is also paralleled
by the party's openness to the communist countries through visits and meetings.
Does this mean that historical enmity between you and communism and the
communists has dropped?
_ [Answer] It is right to say that the socialist countries were the ones closed
to us. This was r~ot strange when the separating elements and the differences
, molded the political conduct of the pan-Arab, nationalist and leftist forces
toward each other and pushed them ~oward sharp conflicts, as was the case
Uetween us and the communists. There is no doubt that the stage of openness
which is evident in the friendship between us and the socialist and the ~
communist countries and in the official visits that we have started to pay
to some of them--there is no doubt that this stage constitutes a new turning
point and a new structure in our foreign re.lations, especially with the -
communist countries. _
The socialist camp, with its progressive policy that is seeking to help the
peoples with their liberationist and social revolutions and with its distinctive
position toward our fateful national struggle against Israel, has required
the nationalist forces committed to their peoplQs' causes, such as our party,
to consider bolstering their relations ot friendship with this camp a firm
base of the social nationalist policy and a strategic relationship in opposing
colonialism and imperialism and in eliminating international exploitation, as
well as in eliminating the policy of man's exploitation of fellowman.
Even though there are differences and distinctions between the Syrian social ~
nationalist creed and the communist ideology, the common interest we have in
breaking world imperialism and its Zionist instrument and in establishing
the new progressive huma.n system which is built on liberating man from social
exploitation and oppression and on respecting the freedom of peoples to mold
their lives on the basis of their heritage and their distinctive human reality
~?ush us toward growing agreement and cooperation that make us optimistic and
full of hope for the good of our people and of the wor~.d.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'~gi
8494
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LEBANON
SYRIAN NATIONALIST PARTY HISTORY, POSITIONS TRACED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 20-26 Sep 79 pp 24-25
[Articie: "Syrian Nationalist Party"]
- [Text] None of the Arab East parties has experienced transformations, turning
points and changes in its political and intellectual line like those e:~perienced
by the SSNP [Syr ian Social Nationalist Party].
The party was born in the mid-1930's on the hands of Antun Sa'adah, a university
professor and an educated Lebanese youth from the Orthodox sect in Duhur
al-Shuwayr town in Mount Lebanon.
The party's call was strange and new compared t~ the nationalist calls at the
time. Its non-Arab projection was in conflict with the Arab sentimental and
nationalist inclinations prevailing among the popular and educated circles
in the Arab East.
In its simple form, the call was founded on the concept that there is a single
"Syrian nation" living in the fertile crescent and its star, Cyprus. Sa'adah
meant by the fertile crescent the historical and geographic definition of this
crescent which includes that bow which begins with Shatt al-'Arab basin where
_ the Tigris and Euphrates rivers meet, ascends through the Aleppo plains,
falls west in a southerly direction along the mauntain ranges and plains in
Latakia and Lebanon, proceeds through Palestine and ends in the Sinai, with
Cyprus forming its star.
This projection was re~ected, especially since the "Syrian nation" itself to
which Sa'adah clings cannot abandon its Arabism and desert its nearer, richer
and more vital history to cling to dead and faded origins with lesser contribution
to the cultural and human history. ~
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Opponent's Opinion
The party opponents used to censure Sa'adah for his anti-Arabism [al-shu'ubiyah]
which re~ected the Arabism of Syria, the throbbing heart of the Arab nation
- at the time. They also censured him for adopting the faeciat political
_ structures and organizations prevailing in Europe at the time. The "storm,"
which is the party's emblem, is in the opinion of !;hose opponents as close
- as can be to the Nazi swastika and the party salute, with the arm stretched
out rigidly and with the heels clicked against one another, were as closs as
could be to the salutes of Fuhrer Hitler and of il Duce Mussolini, the masters _
of Europe in the 1930's.
Despite this and despite the confrontation with the French mandate authorities =
at the time, the party was able to spread among students and among some circles -
~ in the two countries [Syria and Lebanon] which found in Sa'adah's call a refuge ~
and an escape from the predominant Arabism and its sweeping tide.
But the party leader met a trauic end iii 1949. A local conflict developed
between the Syrian Nationalists and the Phalanges Party (which was at the time
a small party) in (Christian) eastern Beirut and the Lebanese authorities
exploited this conflict to pursue the Syrian Nationalist Party whose spread
and para-military organization these authorities viewed as a danger to themselves.
- Antun Sa'adah took refuge in Syria where the party had a similar and strong
- organization. Sa'adah established such strong relations with Field Marshal
- Husni al-Za'im, the military dictator who was in power then, that the latter
gave Sa'adah his personal pistol as a gift. But the political fluctuations
and the ever-rising and declining relations between the twin sisters of Syria
and Lebanon caused the fickle al'Za'im to arrest Sa'adah and hand him over to
the Lebanese authorities which quickly formed a military court that sentenced
Sa'adah to death and the sentence was carried out immediately.
~ But the tragic death was an incentive for greater partisan activity and popular
sympathy, especially since the Syrian Nationalists were known for their
discipline and their good conduct among the citizens. The party attained the
peak of its activity under the rule of dictator Abid al-Shishakli who ruled
Syria in the early 1950's and who is said to have been a member of the party
~
in his you;th.
_ Despite the g~od reputation which the Syrian Nationalists enjoyed at the
- popular level, they had their strong opponents who ranged from the far right
(Diuslim Brotherhood) to the far lPft (Ba'thists, Arab Nationalists and
communists).
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- Grave Political Mistakes ~
Moreover, the party committed grave political mistakes, such as assassinating
Riyad al-Su1h, a former Lebanese prime minister, during his visit to Jordan =
~ as the guest of Ki.ng 'Abdallah (King Husayn's grandfather). A1-Sulh was
- prime minister in the Lebanese government in whose term Sa'adah was executed. ~
The party then got involved in the assassination of Col 'Adnan al-Maliki, ~
_ the Syrian chief of staff, in 1955. The ugliness of the operation which was
- carried out under the eyes of tens of thousands of spectators in a sports
stadium in Damascus constituted the beginning of a f earful pursuit to which
the party was exposed. The party leaders and bases and the members of tihe -
party's military organization fell an easy prey in the hands of the Syrlan
_ authorities because the party was holding at the time a secret congress in
the Syrian capit~l.
- The only one to escape arrest was George 'Abd-al-Masih (Lebanese), the party
chairman, who fled to Lebanon leaving the party to ceaseless reprisals, revenge ;
and pursuit th~t laste3 for years. The Syrian au*.hc~rities were able to prFsent
to the court which tried the assassins and the party leaders evidence proving
that the partisan leadership wing which plan~ed the assassination had been in
contact in one way or another with the U.S. administration.
Col al-Maliki was considered a supporter of al-~Ba'th and had been sub~ected -
- to torture in al-Shishakli's jails. After al'Shishakl:i's fall, al-Maliki l
- was foremost among the army commanders and officers who opposed the principle
= of military alliances projected strongly by Washington at the time. ;
_ Syrian Nationalists Fought With Sham'un
The Syrian Nationalists fought on the side of Lebanese ex-President Camille I_
Sham'un when a raging popular revolution erupted in Lebanon in 1958 and they ~
continued to guard his presidential palace in al-Qantari area of the Muslim
western Beirut unti.l the end of his rule.
i
But the party's boat once again hit the authority's rock when the Syrian =
Nationalists surprised the late PrPSident Fu'ad Shihab, who succeeded Sham'un,
_ with a military-civilian coup on the 1960-61 new year's eve. But the coup
failed and the party was again subjected to an official pursuit in the 1960's
similar to the one to which it was subjected in Syria. ,
~
The motive for the coup was, in addition to the disagreement with President -
Shihab, the party's awareness of the approaching collapse of the Egyptian- '
Syrian unity. This is verhaps why the party Selieved that seizing power in '
- Lebanon would then make it easier for it to move to Syria. i
_ i
. ~
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Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah, the party chairman, and the party leaders were arrested ~
and its supporters were pursued. Death sentences were passed against the leaders
~ but were not carried out. A ger.er31 amnesty followed under the reign of
ex-President Charles Hilu.
It seems that the incarceration period constituted a time of re-examining the
party's principles and policy. The writings of the party leaders in that
period demonstrate the degree of change that developed in the party's
political thought.
The party resumed full activity at the beginning of the 1970's. The openness
- of the party's thought to the prevalent political thinking had its impact
on creating a stir within the party that was reflected in numerous divi~ions
and splits. While George 'Abd-al-Masih, with his radical Syrian nationalist
thoughts and his few partisans, were ousted, Asad al-Ashqar moved toward the
left in an attempt to inject the party with the Marxist principles, exactly
as the Arab Nationalists Movement did. At the same time, al-Ashqar has been
- trying to imbue his leadership with a special Lebanese characteristic
derived from his being a Maronite. -
In'am Ra'd's Writings and Thought
- Through his writings, books and partisan activity, In'am Ra'd followed a
_ more flexible line, opening up to the left without submitting to all the
Marxist theories. Moreover, the idea of Arabism has become, as a result of
the party's experience and actions, more acceptable and the unity of the
"Syrian nation" has become a prelude for the comprehensive Arab unity.
Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah perhaps agrees to a large degree with In'am Ra'd's line. -
Moreover, the party bases consider Dr Sa`adah a clean leader who has devuted
himself and his money to serve his cause, has suffered a lot because of this
and has endured imprisonment with rare courage. Even tho~gh Sa'adah headed
the party when the abortive coup attempt took place against Ma~or General
Shihab, the party sanctioned his actions and policy and did not consider his -
_ decisions faulty, contrary to what happened to 'Abd-al-Masih who was dismissed
by a partisan court in the wake of Col 'Adnan al-Maliki's assassination.
- This openness has qualified the party to rebuild its Lebanese and Arab
relations more clearly and definitively. The party is now a member of the
Lebanese National Movement which includes the main le~tist Lebanese parties
that waged the civil war, including the commur.~ist party, the "historical"
- enemy of the Syrian nationalist movement.
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_ The party has also rebuilt its Arab bridges with more than one Arab country,
especially with Syria, Iraq and Jordan. To indicate the degree of the party's
Arab openness, it is enough to point out that Dr Sa'adah delivered the
- Lebanese National Movement's address at the ceremony to eulogize the late
Zuhayr Muhsin, the leader of al-Sa'iqah Organization, which was held in ~
Damascus recently. _
- The Syrian nationalists can boasi that they were foremost among the National
~ Movement's factions in discipline and organization during the ~aar and that ~
they offered a large number of martyrs, including ane of the sons of Dr
Sa'adah who cut off his engineering studies in the United States to ~oin _
the party organization and who was killed on al-Shiyah-'Ayn al-Rummanah front
in 1976.
This is perhaps the most eloquent proof of the big change in the positions of
- the party that had one day fought alongside ex-President Cami~le Sham'un, the
- symbol of the Maronite right with his sectarian policies, in the national
revolution [of 1958]. '
The Syrian Nationalist Party has been able to overcome the splits that swept _
it as a result of the big transformation in its positions. Dr Sa'adah has
been reelected party chairman in place of In'am Ra'd. Only a small radical
rightist faction, led by 'Abd-al-Masih who has advanced in years and who is
- no longer capable of engaging in his usual activity, remains outside the -
= party.
_ Even the party's internal structure has undergone a big change. Despite -
maintainir~g its strict organization, the party has abandoned many of the
outwardly appearances for which its enemies and opponents censured it and
which they used to accuse the party of "fascism" in the past. The dialogue ~
between the party's leaderships and bases--a dialogue which has never stopped-- .
has become more flexible, lively and open. What is more, the party surprised
- all observers when it reunited its ranks at a time when other organizations
and parties born tens of years after it split ~nd disintegrated. The party ~
instrument has become mare democratic and is moving on the political stage -
with composure and in freedom from the rashness that characterized its past
movement which led the party to setbacks, shocks and tragedies that would !
- have been enough, were it not for this party's steadfastness 3nd obstinacy,
to destroy more than a similar party.
What else about the Syrian Nationalist Party? '
One of the principles which the party adopts, on which it has not shown any -
flexibility and from which it han not budged by a hair's width is its absolute ;
re~ection of the Zionist entity on the Palestinian soil because the Zionist ;
Jews cannot merge in the environment and society in which they live. The Syrian
Nationalists offer in this regard historical proofs and evidence-of the soundness _
of their analysis to the Zionist presence on the "Arab Syrian land."
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Perhaps this unshakable faith is what motivated Antun Sa'adah, the party's
departed leader, to ask the Syrian and Lebanese governments to supply him 1
with the weapons and ammunition necessary to equip 5,000 of the party's
militarily-trained youths who were ready to wage the 1948 war when the party
was at the peak of its strength.
It must also be pointed out in this regard that the party was the firat to
call for unifying the eastern front (Jordan and Syria) by virtue of its being
the "Syrian nationalist front" which will be entrusted before all others
~ with liberating the usurped "Syrian" land, considering that it is the front -
~ with the basic interest.
- COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI -
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MAURITANIA
_ RELEASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT FROM MAUkITA1vIA TO FRANCE DETAILED -
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Oct 7g pp 18-20, 21
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: '~Where Is Mokhtar Ould Daddah?"]
_ [Text] Is Mokhtar Ould Daddah free? No9 Is he in France? The
- military leaders of Mauritania "are not au courant~" but France~s
official answer isi Yes. Yet no one has seen him. It would seem
that he is in confinement. Is he so seriously ill that he can-
not receive visitors? Or onlg? exhausted by his 14 montha ~f de- _
tention and isolation? Fortunately the JEUNE AFRIQUE investiga-
~ tion conducted by Abdelaziz Dahman3 and the large amount of ac-
curate ev3dence collected in Mauritania itself allow us to home
in on at least part of the truth.
It was a very emaciated Mokhtar Ould Daddah~ txis drawn featurea
set in the encircling iron- gray beard~ hie garb a blue boubou
and sandals, with ra~thing but a radio for baggage~ who stepped
out of a Mauritanian military Defender aircraft at nightfall onto
the runway of the Nouakchott airpart.
The same man would emplane an hour and a half later in a P"rench
Mystere-20. He would no doubt deplane at dawn in aome Ii`rench
_ military airport and in the saiae clothing--all the more remark- -
_ abie in that the air was cool that autumn night in France. But
it was the air of freedom~ albeit a conditional freedom.
The former Mauritanian head of atate had on him neither papers
- nor passport nor money nor a change of clothing. For thoae ap-
~ointed to welcome him at this early m0rning hour, waa it atill
to be "Mr President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania" whom -
a coup d'etat had removed froffi power on 10 July 1978? One might -
have thought that an off3cial French limousine would be awaiting -
him at the foot of the stairs le~ding from the Mystere-20 ~ and
~hat it would soon "lose itself" in the maze of roads leading
_ towarci the capital~ to take Mokhtar Ould Daddah discreetly to
some military hospital in the Ile de France where he would be
cared for. _
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_ ~
But since that day, the secret has been well guarded~ in accord-
ance with the promise made ~o the Mauritanian military authori-
ties. The journalists learned nothin~ from the sealed lips at
~ the Elysee, the Quai d'Orsay or the French Ministry of Coopera- '
= tion.
The friends of the former preaident~ assailed with requeats for
information that cacne in from the entire world by telephone or
telex, could only replys "We do not know where he is." -
This complete and utter discretion might~ of course, be explained
by a concern for security, for the patient~s need for rest and
- rehabilitation, and even by reasons of general health. But one
- week lat~er, it was beginning to become oppressive. Did Ould Dad-
dah leave his confinement in Oualata on]Ly to disappear through a
trapdoor? Was his transfer to France a"medical evacuation" or
= a kind of cheap, undercover freedom with stringe attached? For ,
_ the services he has rendered to his country~ to Africa and to
the entire Arab world~ for his courage and integrity, the person
of Mokhtar Ould Daddah deserves better treatment than that.
The news of his 13beration which was ultimately no libe~ation at -
all~ was greteted with warmth 3ust about everywhere. In the ~+rords "
of the large Parisian daily~ LE MONl2Es "This liberation brings to ~
an end the or3eal of one of Africa~s most respected and upright
leaders. The former Yiead of state who wa~~ thanks to his talents
as a mediator, one of the best presidenta of the Organization of
African Unity, has always ea~3oyed the reapect of his adversariee~ ,
moreover, although they deplored his "obstinacy" in the Sahara
affair. The founder of the MRUritanian nation and passionately =
attached to its independence~ he had acquired a great prestige -
in international circle~ gor his affability~ hia serenity and his
complete disinterest as far as personal gaina were concerned."
- LE MONDE ~also recalled in this article, entitled "An Example #'or
- Afri~ca," that as early as 1957, Mokhtar Ould Daddah spoke of the
Spanish Sahara as making up "an integral part of Mauritania.," that _
- is, even before he himself acceded to power and before Mauritania
became independent in ~960. But the machinery of war makes no ~
loans to the poor.
Several African newspapera also ha3led the event~ such as LE SO- '
LEIL c~f Dakar: "This liberation will have a poeitive impact."
- It proves that the leadegs in Nouakchott are looking for "a real _
internal peace" and "have thus 3ust taken a decisive atep toward
~his national harmony. But thinge are not quite so clear or so
simple. Some say that11Mokhtar Ould Daddah is still a prisoner ~
released on his own recognizance~ and that he ia to come back to r
his place of detention as soon as his health has improved: r-`
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In view of the blackout which hangs heavily over this stay in
- France, let us return to Mauritania to see how the renowned pris-
o:ier was "liberated." A sudden decision~ all the leas expected
in that it happened at a moment of great internal tension, accom-
panied by police raids, an increased surveillance of radio broad-
- , casting and Government buildings and the extension of a curfew _
that had been in force since 10 3uly 1978; certain former minis- -
ters of riokhtar Ould Daddah, such as Haciidi Ould Mouknass ~Foreign
Affairs~, Ahmed Mohamed Salah and such Figlares as Ismail Ould
Ainar, the former director general of SNIM [National Industrial
and Mining Company~~ saw their homes~ already under surveillance,
changed to conditions of house-arrest. _
It was under such circumstances that a Land-Rover was seen on
~.iesday 2 October in the middle of tYie morning leaving the mili-
tary fort of Oualata with Mokhtar Ould Daddah inside, dressed in
the traditional blue boubou. The departures of the prisoner of
Oualata are so rare that the latter did not pass unnoticed. Nor -
did his arrival go unnoticed, in early afternoon:at Nema (100 km
distant~ where, accomp~nied by soldiers, he was taken by small army
prop plane of the Defender class to Nouakchott, more than 19000 km
to the north.
_ The only object that Mokhtar Ould Daddah had the time to take rlong
--according to the evidence given by those who saw him--was hia ac-
curate and very powerful radio set, which, according to his family,
had been his only means of contact with th~ outside world duxing
the past 14 months, when the only visitor he had was one of his
brothers-in-law.
- The confinement at Oualata, which Ould Daddah had brc~ken only two -
times, to go to Kiffa for treatment, was harder on ~:he prisoner
than might have been imagined. According to his onn ~visitor~ he
had suffered a great deal from the heat (for it reached more than
45 degrees centigrade over a period of at least three consecutive
. months). In spite of everything, according to the same aource,
, he had never been subj$cted to any indignities; quite the contrary~
he had become the ob~iect of resp~ct and veneration on the part of
his guards, the young military men who were conatantly being ro-
tated. It was through prayer (he is extremely pious~~ throu~h his -
strength of character and his good humor that he was beat able to
struggle againat this adversity.
Perhaps the semi-liberation of Ahmed Ben Hella was an influence
in arx�anging this discharge of Mokhtar Ould Daddah. Since June
1g65 the Algerians had tried to break the wil]. of Ahmed Hen Bella
by keeping him in total isolation. Not even 14 years had aufficed.
a For Mokhtar Ould Daddah, the Mauritauzian military pereonnel inter-
' rupted the experiment at the end of 1~F months.
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In Nema at ~iidday on Tueaday 2 October, a small Defender aircraft
was there.fore waiting for the Land-Rover, which was on its way
fre~~i Oualata. Mokhtar Ould Daddah and hie two pilots set out
- etrai~ht for Nouakchott~ with a ehort stop at Aioun El-Atrouas to -
refuel. It took the?n more than five houra to ~over the 1~000 km
between Nema and Nouakch.ct, a FYight over desolate country,
' slightly greener becau~;e of recent rains. The trip must have
awakened a great mr~ny souvenirs for the former president. In June
1978 over this sa?:~e route, he had begun construction of a new road,
a daring venture ~~:h~ch would bring to an end the isolation of an
entir~ region. The Nouakchott-Kiffa section of this road is a
reality today: more than 600 km of asphalted highway. Kiffa is
the very village to which Colonei Mo~stafa Ould Saleck, the prin-
cipal designer of the coup d'etat of 10 July 1978 and the presi- ~
= dent of the Republic--until 6 April ~979, the date on which he in
turn fell victim to a coup d~etat--withdrew, sick and disenchanted,
Ah, how the mesh of history is woven!
About 1900 hours on Tuesday 2 October, other witnesses saw the De-
fender land at Nouakchott. It was night, but this landing did not -
pass unnoticed in a city where the people are endowed with an in-
fallible flair for detecting ~svents. Already the departure from
Oualata had been communi~ated by the grapevine. These rwnors were
being fed, moreover, by the fact that a French Mystere-20 belong-
ing to GLAM [Groupement de Lisisons Aeriennes Ministerielles; _
riinisterial Air Liaison Pool] had arrived in Nouakchott ~he day _
_ before, Monday 1 October, and had~been left parked for the whole
day at a point ofg to one side of the runway. Observers were all
the more intrigued beca~se no passengers had emerged from the plane,
- and those who had approached it were able to notice that it was -
equipped to receive a sick person of considerable rank. ~
~
On this same 2 October~ however~ three members of the French Minis-
try of Cooperation~ led by Mr Viney, had deplaned at Nouakchott to
begin working with Maurita.-~ian leaders on a study of the ways and ,
- means to reestablish the economy and finances of the country. This ;
trip was a follow-up ~o the official Paris visit in mia-September,
of Lieutenant Colonel Khouna Ould Haidalla~ the prime rainister.
- And, still on 2 October~ came the announcement in Nouakchott of the
confirmation of the appointment of a new ambassador to Algeria~ Mr
_ Djelloul Bakhti~ a surprise happening after the diplomatic rupture _
of April ~976. Something to attenuate the effects of the new flir-
tation with France.
The final details of the departure of Mokhtar Ould Daddah for
France must have been arranged on that day~ 2 October~ during the
couxse of the morning, by the prime minieter~ who spoke at sonie .
length with Mr Maurice Courage~ the French ambassador who had re- ~
turned not long before to this country whose birth he had practi- -
ca11y witnessed when he was a young civil servant--in the days
i
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when biokhtar Ould Daddah was in the process of building the capi- -
tal and establishing the embryonic administration of a modern
- nation. -
As soon as the Defender from Nema had landed, a limousine could _
be seen approaching it, that of Lieutenant Colonel Ahmedou Ould
Abdallah, chief of staff of the army~ who since the de~th cf
Colonel Bousseif had become the new "strong man" of the Mauritan- _
- ian Military--as of 27 May off the coast of Dakar. The vehicle~
irx which a second military man lzad taken a seat~ remained parked =
for more than an hour at the end of the runway, awai~ing the ar-
rival of the French pilots in their Mystere- 20.
' Observers also saw a French colonel arrive~ a staff official, and
witnessed other goings and comings to and from the town. But it -
- is mos~ likely that Niokht~r Ould Daddah spent ~his layover time
in the ~imousine of the head of staff and in his company. In any
case, it was about 2030 hours wh$n the witnesses whom we ques-
tioned saw the emplaning from a distance. To these witneases~ -
and in the ava~.lable light at the airport~ Mokhtar Ould Daddah,
seeming to float in his overly large boubou, appeared very ema-
_ ciated, almost unrecognizable and quite exhausted. The Mystere-20
set out f~r France. According to our inquiry, it made no stops~
either in Algeria or in Morocco. _
Did th~ Mauritanian and French authorities hope to keep this de- _
parture a secret? Whatever were their intentions~ the rwnor of
the liberation~ at first cautious~ then more and more confident~
~ began to run about Mauritania beginning the next morning, Wednes-
' day 3 October--to become a certainty by Thursday evening 4 Octo-
ber, when a flash from the Agence France-Presse, received on for-
eign radios, made it pub~ic. On Friday 5 October9 the day of ~
prayer, more people than usual went to the mosques. People prayed
ferwently that God wauld pr~~erve the health of Mokhtar. The Ivo-
rian head of state~ Felix Houphnuet-Boigny~ was even included b~r
- some in these prayers~ because many Mauritanians--once agmin amnng
the greatest adepts in the world in the art of gathering informa-
tion--already knew about the affection in which he had k~eld Mokh-
tar for a long while~ and the role~ as efficacious as it was dis-
creet, which he ha~d no doubt played~ with the direct collabora-
tion o~' France, in Mokhtares delivery.
Thus the rumor kept spreading. But, although the AFP dispatch
was not officially bxoadcast in Mauritania~ on Saturday 6 October _
the Diauritanian Press Agency~ acting on Goverrunent orders~ pub-
lished a denial without commentarys "A dispa~eh from the Agence _
France-Presse has taken note of the liberat3on of former president
Mokhtar Ould Daddah. This 3nformation is devoid of all truth."
- In the eyes of the Mauritanian authorities~ therefore~ it was be- -
ing considered a forced and temporaz3r departure for reasons of
health, and not a liberation!
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As for reasons of health, they are there aplenty! The first
alert came from the Mauritanian military doctors who were caring
for the prisoner. It was in the little hospital at Kiffa, very
poorly equipped, where he haci be~n taken on two separate occa-
sions, suffering particularly from intestinal troubles. The Mau-
ritanian doctors, together with their Chinese colleagues working
in the Kiffa area, had noted that the former president had lost -
more than 15 kg in a few mnnths~ and they did not have the tech-
nological instruments to make a positive diagnASis of 3nis symp-
toms. -
Over and above the insistence of the alarmed doctors, who made
- the request that their patient be allowed to undergo analyses
and receive the care of specialists in a better equipped hospi-
tal, there was the discreet but ever increasi.ng pressure fram a
- large number of African and Arab heads of state~ and from people~ -
all over the world. They confirmed their inability to understand
why Mokhtar was being held secretly~ under the most wretched con-
ditions, withaut being accused of anything really definite, and
since Mauritania had disengaged itself--on 5 August in Algiers--
from the "Saharan War~" sxpressing the desire~ moreover~ to be -
on go~d terms with everyone in the region~ in order to consecrate
itseJ.f to the national reform measures and avoid any regional. or
tribal ruptures.
Among the heads of state, the most insistent were those of Sene-
gal, Leopold Sedar Senghor--from the very first day; Ivory Coast~
~ Felix Houphouet-Boigny, up to the last day; Cameroon, Ahmadou
Ahidjo; Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba; Sudan, Ja'far Numayri; King =
Khalid of Arabia; Sheikh Zayid~ the president of the United Arab '
Emirates and many others.
Aa for the private individuals~ Mr Amadou-Maht~r M~Bow, director- _
general of UNESCO, often interceded~ especially with certain Mau-
- ritanian officials currently in power, who were his studente when
he taught in Mauritania during the fift~es. Mr Leon Hoissier-
Palun9 a famous lawyer who was formerl~ ~he president of the Great
Council of Western Africa, and as such the former "bosa" of Mokh-
tar Ould Daddah while the latter wa~ a legal apprentice in Dakar~ _
also intervened discreetly and at various levels of government.
Committees of support finally came to life in several European
countries~ especially in the FRG, where a dip3omat and fox~me~ am- -
bassador to Mauritania, Dr Nalter Reichhold~ did not cease to ;
alert publi~~ opinion to the need to "save one of the most upright
- and honest men on the African Continent."
- Most of these efforts involved France and reached the attention of ,
President Valery Giacard d~Eataing--who was well dispoaed himse~lf
and held the beat trump cards as fa~ as the Mauritanian leaders
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were concerned. It was probably the Bokassa affair that precipi-
tated the French coramitment~ inasmuch as the character of Mokhtar
Ould Daddah, his respectability and in~egrity~ is well calculated
to ternper the negative effects of the tragicomedy of Hokassa~s
fall and subsequent exile to the Ivory Coast.
, COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1979
- s~i7
_ csos ~+~+oo
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'i ~
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~ _
_ MAURITANIA
BRIEFS
FRENCH HYDROCARBON, URANIUM EXPLORATIOt1--French companies are going to under-
take, between now and the end of the year, prospecting to determine the
possibilities far the exploitation of hydrocarbons and uranium in Mauritania,
` stated Mr Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, the Mauritanian minister of foreign affairs
in Nouakchott on 22 September. The minister declared to .AFP that the group `
Elf-Aquitaine would begin oil exploration in the eastern part of the country _
and offshore near Nouakchott. Uranium exploration will be concentrated in
the northeast of Mauritania between Bir Moghrein and Ain Ben Tilli. This _
exploration will be carr.ied out in association with Cogema, Ugine-Kulhmann and
a Japanese company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEI3ITERRANEENS in
French 28 Sep 79 p 2632] 8956
REQUEST FOR FRENCH MILITARY AID--The request was made by the Mauritanian prime
minister, Lt Col Khouna Ould Haidalla, duri.ng his official visit to France
on 18, 19 September. The French did not say no. On condition that Mauritania "
guarantee that the "Saudi pump" will still be working when the bills come due.
[Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Oct 79 p 52] 8956
CSO: 4400 ' -
c
~
,
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SYRIA
CORRESPONDENT SAYS SYRIA FACES UR~ENT NEED FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Oct 79 p 26
[Article by a Correspondent of AL-WATAft AI,-'ARABI; "Apropos of the National
Progressive Front's Statement: The Regime in Syria Practices Self-criticism"]
- [Text] The S~rrian National Front has put its finger on the
problem and has diagnosed its causes in a candid statement _
, which is tantamount to a daring act of self-criticism. What
_ remains now is the problem of taking action to alleviate and
avoid those causes. This is a problem that has become more
= pressing and urgent than anytime before.
Damascus--The Progressive National Front in Syria. has now been in existence
for nearly 8 years. Its establishment was one of the ma~or goals of -
President Hafiz al-Asad's regime following his 1970 corrective movement within
_ the party and the government. Although this political grouping led by the
ruling party has been in existence fbr all that time, the front has f~iled ~
to demonstrate its effectiveness an.d vitality in contrast with the activities
of the ruling party, although all the parties involved in~the front arp
~ represented in the government.
In fact, President al-Asad has made it coiranon practice to meet with the
central command of the front, which consists of the leaders of the parties
recognized b,y the regime, to discus s with them the country's affairs and to `
brief them on the outcome of his talks with Poreign leaders either at home
- or abroad.
And so while the front has been operative at the top of the hierarchy, it
has been unable to establish $rassroots or to create a broad popular base for
itself. With the exception of election time, when the parties represented in
the front enter the electoral battle with a co~nmon platform and divide the
constituencies among themselves according to certain praportions, the
Syrian citi zen is not Pul],y aware oP the front's existence. -
~ Parties of the National Front
In addition to the ruling party, the frottt includes the Co~unist Party,
~s -
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which is one of the oldest communist parties in the Arab World. The "historical" _
leader of the S~rian CP, Khalid Bakdash, is still quite energetic and active _
despite his advanced age and various illnesses. It seems that the internal di-
visions with the CP have prevented it From exercising its role as the "formal
opposition" within the framework of the National Front--a role designed to point
out errors and transgressions by the government. The party simp~y treats such
errors and infractions With kid gloves in its party ne~spaper Which remains ~
unlicensed and has a very limited circulation.
- The National Front also includes Nasirite and sociali~t parties which have -
~ also been prey to divisions and which have also failed to play their role as
a constructive critic of the regime within the framework of the National Front,
so that they have ultimate~}r tended to appear as an appenda~?e of the ruling
- party or the authority in power. .
It dces appear, however, that President al-Asad intends to revitalize and
_ reactivate the Progressive National Front. Therefore, he has chosen to act
tnrough the front's central committee to issue the first statement which _
probably represents the first round in the mnvement of changes which he plans ,
to carry out in order to avoid the causes of the "shortcomings" cited by the
front's statement. In other words, the Syrian president is determined to
broaden the popular base of his regime by activating the various organizations
which constitute ~he National Front and by energizing them so that they mqy ,
be able to play a more effective role on the popular mass level. That is to ?
say that he does not intend to restrict himself to his ruling party.
_ ;
- This is wt~y there have recent]y been references to the possibility of ~
establishing centers for the National ~ont in the countryside. It is not
unlikely that the front will be allowed to publish its own papers in accordance
with the front's charter. It is noted, however, that the daily papers in the
_ country belong to the ruling party or are directed by the regime. ,
� i
Implementation of Recoaanendations a Pressing Need ~
The most urgent task in Syria today is to implement the resolutions adopted
by the National F~ont, since the front is more of a consultative body that
does not have executive powers. Therefore, the responsibility of implementing
those recom~mendations lies with the ruling party. It is an especially
difficult responsibility since the machinery which is suffering from short- i-
- comings is the one required to uridertake the implQmentation of the resclutions ~
I
in questians. I
The reco~nendations cited in the statement by the Progressive National Fronf:
~ embrace the various problems which the front believes that Syria urgen.t~y ~
needs to tackle and solve. These axe problPms which cannot find quick , i
solutions, but if the strong will and sincere desire for action are there, , ~
then it will be possible to get rid of many of the problems Which have become _
- a source of complaint by citizens, as ofPicials themselves have reco~ized in -
their constructive and candid act of self-criticism.
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~ =
~
` F'inRl.ly, it needs to be said that the armed violence mounte~i b.y certain `
_ radical reli~ious F;roups m~y help to speed up the required reform. This is
the only effect armed ~violence is likely to have, since it is ridiculous to
bel.ieve that the violent actions carried out by the radical ri~ht can shake
the regime of President al-Asad, regardless of the administrative shortcomings -
and errors.
- Utimately, armed violence remains an expression of despair by those who carry -
out violence surreptiotiously--despair of being accepted by the broad sectors -
= of the people. -
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
92 54
cso: 4802
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SYRIA _
PAPER CORRESPONDENT TAKES ANALYTICAL IAOK AT INTERNIIL SCFNE IN SYRIA
Paris AL-4TATAN AIr'ARABI in Arabic 27 Sep-3 Oct 79 pp 30-31
= [Article: "An Attempt to Read the Political Palm of Damascus; Syria--Will A1- -
Asad Lead a New 'Corrective Movement'?]
[Text] What is ~oing on in ~ria nowadays? What are the
primary concerns of the Syrians: al-Sadat an d Csmp David?
Or is it the task of their forces in Lebanon? Or are they
principally concerned about internal developmen�s or living ~
conditions at home? A correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
went to Damascus last week to try to Find answers to these
questions. In the follo~ing report, he rePlects the views -
and posi�,ions of political and official circles in S~rria
and tries to draw a genera~ picture of the political and
official acti.vity going on in that Arab country in the light
of internal events and developnents there. He also
speculates about possible changes which may b e made to
cope with the requirements of the present phase, especially
the need to deal with the syndrame of armed violence, an =
levels which are not necessari~}r canfined to security
measures. -
Damascus--Syria today is the scene of extensive political and official -
activity the like of which has not been experienced since a long time a~o.
Informed cixcles here expect President Hafiz al Asad to undertake wide-scale -
political and administrative changes which would respand to the requirements -
J of the present situation in the country. The forthcoming regional congress
- of the ruling Ba'th party may be the opening gambit in these changes which
- are expected to be both drematic and radical. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI was the
- first publication to report the possibility of con~~ening such a congress _
after President al-Asad's return fra~n the Havana su~it. Observers predict
that the regional congress will be held either in October or November. It
- was originally scheduled for last April.
Accordingly, it can be said that a new Syr:Ian government will ~merge after
the congress. It has been customary to carry out political and executive
changes after such ca~gresses. ' -
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_ ,
A Cabinet Headed by Al-Asad
Informed circles here have been circulatin~ the names of possible ce,ndidates
to head the n ew cabinet. Some circles do not exclude the possibility that _
the cabinet wil:l be led by President al-Asad himself,, because of the exigen-
cies of the present phase and the heavy burdens which will be laid on the ne~w
cabinet. Should this be the case, it can be said that the al-Asad cabinet _
would undertake what may be tantamount to a corrective movement reminiscent _
of the or.e carried out by President al-Asad within the government and the _
party in 1970.
Qne of the names frequently me:ntioned is that of Ma~ Gen 'Abd al-Rahman
= Khulayfawi, a retired senior Ba'thist oPficer born in Damascus who is no~r in
his forties. He is knoWn for his integrity and sternness and has headed
several governments during a1-Asad's presidency. _
Among other candidates for the premiership is Mahmud al-Ayyubi, a Damascus--
born Ba'this leader who has also served as a premier durin~ al-Asad's -
_ presidency.
A name that has often been in the limelight recently is that of Dr 'Abd al-Ra'uf -
- al-Kasim, the governor of Damascus and e former dean of the college of Pine ~
arts. -
,
The question, hawever, is not so much who should head the new cabinet but ;
whether such a person will be able to dischaxge his task at this particular ,
- time. In other words, the prospective premier should have the powers and -
prerogatives which Would enable him to carry out his duties and overcome the
obstacles which ha,d hamstrung previous prime ministers aud forced them to
- abandon their efforts, with the result that obstacles had increased and -
_ transgressions became rife with no solution in sight. This situation has `
touched �~f complaints both within the government and among the people. It
has aiso provided certain citizens with a prete:~t to exploit it by means oP I
using violence and with an argwnent that only negative actions can turn ~
- things aroun d. '
I
- It seems that the formation of a new cabinet will be accompanied tiy amendments ,
and changes in the structure an d makeup of the~Progressive National Front
i-
which includes the Ra'th Party and other parties and or~anizations allied with ;
it, including the Communist Party. The tzndency now is to giv~e the front and
its various organizations a greater role after re-energizing and revitalizing
it, so that it msy become a popular base for the ruling party. ~
~
A Phase of Overall Review �
Informed party sources say that Pres~dent al-Asad is now in the process of !
conducting an overall review of his regime in the light of repor~s prepared
by various e:dv~sers and specialists as well as officiel and party cor?miitte~s.
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The reports deal with the status and conditions of various agencies and
institutions.
The consensus is that it is not too late yet to undertake quick ini.tiatives !
to introduce sweeping and deep-driving reforms a.nd changes and to forestall
an d thwart the efforts of the elements of violence. Observers concede, -
however, that such initiatives should be preceded by stern party and govern-
ment measures against yerpetrators of transgressions and infractions so as to -
bring about a rapid end to those excesses, regaxdless of their source, and -
that it is necessary at times to deal with things firm~.y and decisively
regardless of any considerations.
It can be said that Syria, which is bearing the brunt of its Arab responsi-
bilities in Lebanon and milit ary respor.sihilities on the frontline, feels that
- it should also put its own house in order as soon as possible,and that
inasmuch as attention should be paid to pressing pan-Arab and national
problems, attention should equslly be paid to the day-to-day afPairs and social
problems at home, so that solutions can be devised for the bread and trans- -
portation crises, the exodus from the countryside to the cities and the _
problems of housing and inflation.
Dealing with the Phenomenon of Violence =
As to the phenomenon of violence, various circles are fully convinced that
dealing with this problem should not be left solely to the security a~encies, _
which have been known to adopt certain methods that have proved after all -
to be inadequate and insufficient in dealing with the perpetrators of
= violence. On the contrary, official v3olence might intensit~r the armed ~
~ violence exercised by certain militant religious groups. TherePore, bro~d
_ sectors within the paxty and among political circles believe that the most
- appropriate method to deal with this situation is to Pace it square~y and to
address the problems directly as well as to ca11 things by their real names `
and to exercise candor. They also belie-,~ that there should be �the lar~test
_ possible degree of political liberalization on various levels and a broadening
of the base of popular deb ate and dialogue as. well as ~'ulfillment of the
_ everyday needs of the citizens. One prooF oP the premise that it is not
enough to lee.ve the task of dealing with the acts of violence to the security
agencies alone is the fact that the recent executions and the hanging of the
corpses of the executed persons in public squares have not deterred members
oP the groups and organizations responsible for the recent wave of violence.
_ In fact, several incidents have occured aPter those executions, with the
result that a number of innocent ~ersons have been victimized. It is likely
that the political authorities are aWare of this now and that they are
determined to deal with the situation from a difPerent a.ngle, using methods
that difPer completely from repressive measures.
It is fair to say that the vast ma~ority of the ordinary citizens do not
share the views/or�s3~mp athize with the motives of the groups responsible for
_ the cycle of violence and that they consider what is going on in S~ria now a
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- serious and e.bnormal ~henomenon in the Syrian society. Therefore, the
azmed groups are operating within a very narrow scope of extreme secrecy.
It is also fair to say that the citizens demand urgent solutions for a number =
oP problems, in order to foresta?1 the efforts of the violence mon~ers and -
to prevent them from further exploiting those problems. -
An International Conference to Discuss the Middle East Crisis _
47e have talked thus far about the internal situation, but what about the
external situation and S~?ria's position vis-a-vis the Middle F~ast crisis? I
was told here that Syria no longer favors the idea of taking the problem to
- the United Nations but prefers as an alternative the holcling of a new inter- -
national conference under the auspices of the United Nations to discusa the
Middle East problem ~iie light of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, on _
the grounds that a1-Sadat's Egypt has been satisfied with the return of Sinai -
and has, therefore, ceased pressin~ for Palestinian and otY~er Arab rights. _
In advancing such a premise, the Syrian state believes that the al-Sadat =
regime will be forced at such an interna.tional conference to discuss the
Palestinia.n issue in terms that would coincide with the Arab position,
~ because that regime would no longer be able tu foresake some Palestinian
claims in order to win the f~lPillment of more F~gyptian national claims. As
the Syrians see it, the al-Sadat regime's main concern now is to secure
implementation of Israel's comanitmen~ to withdraw from another se~nent of
Sinai. They believe that Egypt is ready in return to speed up the normaliza-
tion of relations with Israel. This was the message cleaxly conveyed by -
Egyptian leaders to American envoy Robert Strauss in the autonon4Y talks, when
they asked him during his latest visit to Egypt not to embarras them with
Begin lest he carry out his threat to r2consider everything. In fact, the
Fgyptian Minister of State Por Foreign Affairs Butrua Gha1i has told Strauss -
- that "what concerns Egypt at the present phase is Sinai Pirst, second and `
last." ' -
i
COPYWR26HT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI ~ ~
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WESTERN SAHARA
PLO CHIEF'S MEDIATION EFFORTS SEEM TO HAVE HAD SOME RESULTS
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Sep 79 p 19
�
[Text] Will Mr Yasir 'Arafat be the man who will calm spirits in the Western
Sahara affair? In any case, the mediation efforts the president of the PLO -
undertook, at the end of the month of August, between Algiers and Rabat, seem
to have yielded results. The Palestinian leader was able to get Qadhdhafi -
to agree not to bring up the subject in his speech of 1 September (JEUNE
AFR~QUF 975). He also succeeded in having canceled the participation of a
- POLISARIO colu~n in the military parade from Benghazi on the tenth anniversary
of Libyan independence: "Nothing must be done which would interfere with a
peace in the Sahraoui affair," Yasir 'Arafat stated to the international
press Lhe day after 1 September.
The steps taken by the president of the PLO extend to all the parties tied
directly or inclirectly to the conflict. On Friday 31 August, in Tripoli,
= he met with the secretary general of the POLISARIO, Mr Mohamed Abdelaziz, �
- as well as the Libyan and Algerian presidents. A,t the time of his trip to _
Madrid, he tal.ked on Thursday I3 September with the Spanish prime minister,
Mr Adolfo Suarez and the Sahara affair was one of the main subjects of
dlscussion. From Madrid, Yasir 'Arafat went directly to A1gieYS for talks =
with President Chadli. Finally, on Sunday 16 September, h~ was in Ifrane,
where he was received by the Moroccan king, Hassan II. If.he has denied,
probably out of discretion, having been responsible for these efforts at
mediation, it is believed that Yasir 'Arafat is trying to organize a mini ~
summit, which would bring together all the interested parties,. Nevertheless,
that has not stilled the fighting in the desert. On Sunday 16 September,
the governments of Rabat and of Algiers each published their oian account of _
an attack by the POLISARIO against the town of Lemsied, located in an uncon-
tested part of Morocco. "Several hundred Mo.roccan soldiers:~ere killed and
several hundred captu~ed," according ta Algiers. "Ninety of~the enemy forces
~ were killed and 55 of their vehicles destroyed," according to Rabat.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8956 ~
- CSO: 4400
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_ WESTERN SAHARA
BRIEFS '
_ ALGERIA TO BE MORE CONCILIATORY--Authorities in Algiers are trying to
- separate themselves from Libya (which supports the POLISARIO), since it is
- concerned over the plans for an Islamic United States of the Sahel and over
- the Berber movement, both of which are supported by Qadhdhafi. (JEUNE '
AFRIQUE 97S) [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Sep 79 p 35] 8956
CSO: 4400 END '
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