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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200020044-9 26 , , i OF i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 F'OR OFFI('IAL i1SE ONLY JPRS L/8780 - 2~6 November 1979 West E u ro e R e o rt p p ~CFOUO 65/79~ ~ - FB1~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign new,papers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency tratismissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language ' sources are translated; those from English-lar.guage sources r a~e transc:ribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets - are supplied by JPRS. Processinb indicators such as [Text] ~ or [E:ccerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, in3icate how the original informa.tion was - processed. Where no processing i.ndicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. - Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parenth~s~s. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthe~ical notes within the body of an _ item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of Lhe U.S. Government. For further information on report content call (7U3) 351-2811. or 351-2501 (Greece, C}~prus, Turkey) . COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION - OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFIC?AL USE ONLY. ~ ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE 0~1LY JPR5 L/8780 ~ 26 No~�ember 1979 - WEST EUROPE REPO RT ~ (FGUO 65/79) CO~ITENTS PAGE - ' COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE Details of Georges Seguy (CGT), Edmond Ma.ire (C~DT) Accord (Various sources, various dates) 1 � ` Analysis of P~litical Consequences, by Albert du Roy, Michel Jacques Communist Viewpoint Socialist Assessme~it, by Michele IZes~i Analysis of Communist Strategy, by Irene Allier, Georges Mamy How the CFD Won, Edmond Maire Interview Steps in Conception, Design of Navy's Ships Outlined ~ (Georges Helies; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Oct 79).,....... 19 ` Transportation Research Activities Noted - (AIR & COSMOS, 13 Oct 79) 25 I TALY Plan for Civilian-Military 'Integration' in Intelligence (Gerardo Cocchis; RIVISTA MILITARE, Jul-Aug 79~..,..... 28 SPAIN Briefs Tierno's Prestige 38 ~ GRAPO's Algerian Connection 38 ETA in Brussels 38 _ 'Descubierta' Class Corvettes 38 ~.ibya ~.'o Purchase Subs 38 ~ - a - [III - WE - 15G FC7U0] _ _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL US'.E ONLY ' a COUNTRY SECTION . FRANCE _ - DETAI~,S OF GEORGES SEGUY (CGT), EDMOND MAIRE (CFDT) ACCORD - Analysis of Political Consequences Paris L'EXPRESS in Fr~nch 6-12 Oct 79 pp 110-112 [Article by Albert du Roy and Michel Jacques: "Maire: A'~raiter in Spite of Himself"J ` . [Text] In mentioning the name of Edmond Mai:.e, was Giscard trying t~ dis- credit the trade union leader? The affair indeed throws l~ght on the pre- sent political situation--that of the government and that of the opposition. "Thexe are situations when silence some~imes safeguards the future better - - than ~tatements that will always be interpreted in po~.emic terms." That ~ _ precaution, pronounced on Saturday, 29 September, by Michel Rocard before the directive committee of the PS [Socialist Party] was meant for the socialist leaders, who had become evervated as a result of the continuing communist attack and who are again revealing PC [Communist Party] alignment with Moscow. Zhe remonstrance could just as well have been meant for Valery Giscard d'Estaing who, the night before, had made a speech and manifested his interest in certain proposals made by Edmond Maire, secretary general of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]. The~mere mention by the chief of state of the name of the trade union leader could be inter- preted, under the present circumstances, as political dama'ge. One i~e- diately saw this in the columns of L'HUMANITE, where Maire ~aas ~ccused of treachery. If Giscard intended, without any ulterior motive, to profit - from his suggestions, did he really need to proclaim it? One cannot find any better example of present political blockage. Whether one regrets it or whether one tries to turn it to account, the "Maire affair"'throws light on the political situation--both with respect to the - government and the opposition. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Let us review the facts. _ On Friday, 28 September, upon closing the Daca Processing and Enterpriae ~ Week at the Cong~essional Palace in Paris, Giecard said: "The provision of data processing in enterprises can lead to profound changes. I ask the government to think about the proposals put forward by Edmond Maire." The _ CFDT Ieader, during talks in which some ministers and heads of enterprises took part, had proposed that the workers of each enterprise be brought together. to consider the consequences of data processing progress on their workfng conditions. The recommendation of the chief of state may be understood in two ways. First: Giscard was captivated by the analysis of a man who, even though an opponent, nevertheless gave proof of great lucidity. Why would he refrain from referring to this? This is the interpretation held by the CFDT Committee, which immediately pressed its advantage: "If the presi- _ dential statements have any significance, some legal provisions with regard to thF~ enterprise.. and contractual committeea concerning the right of - expression on the part of workers must take place without delay." And the CFDT added: "Only aetions count." :4s a matter of fact, everyone is aware of the gulf that has separated the reformist goodwill of the chief of state and the timidity of his ma~ority since 1974. Second: If Giscard mentioned Maire's name, it was in order to captivate , him--and to initiate that precious "so~:ial agreement" of which he dreams-- or, atworst, in order to compromise it--and to divide the left stilb more. An ~ interpretation that was immediately reinforced by Jean Lecanuet, w~o, before - - the UDF [French Democratic Union] parliamentarians convened in Vittel, went after what he wanted: "In the ranks of the reformist left, there are - some responsible men who support courageous diagnoses." And there was Giscard's opening, reduced to the mediocre operation of a politician's recovery. On Saturday, 29 Septembe-r, it of course was the second interpretation that = the Communist Party bore in mind. L'HIJMANITE did not bother with fine points. The "informative" article was entitled: "Giscard Calls on Maire for Help." And the editorial, awkwardly entitled "Duet," strung out the perfidies: "Maire obligingly falls in with the operation...The class cooperation which the CFDT leader chooses...The social agreement concerning which Giscard and Maire yesterday gave us an example...A parallel was evidently immediately established with the "turning to the right " of the PS. On Monday, 1 October, Edmond Maire, first surprised by Giscard's speech, and then a traitor in spite of himself, gave an explanation in an interview with MATIN. "The winks of the ma~ority are not innocent," he answered those who took him for a naive man. And since people of good faith cannot dispute his opposition to the policy of the present government--"There are men whoae honesty in life is not at the mercy of a compliment," Francois Mitterand said with respect to him--Maire did not lose any time before striking hard . 2 FOR OFFICI.AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - a~ "the policy of economic enfeeblement and of social regression." But he gave a long, keen analysis of the communist attitude: "The argumentation ~ of the PC is poor, its bad faith singular. Its only reproach in our regard is that one of our proposals was considered by Giscard--as if it were not our role to propose solutions and to further them. The trade union movement has nothing to gain from the worst kind of politics. It will be in a - - better position if it obtains results by its own action." Not a word of criticism, on the other hand, regarding the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] which, it is true, did not add its voic~ to the ` virtuous communist indignations. The very day that L'HUMANITE struck hard at Maire, LA VIE OWRIERE, CGT weekly publication, proclaimed: "Unity of action has won and will live on." It praised the accord concluded on 17 September between the two trade union confederations. , Is this unusual shift between the PC and the CGT just a matter of circumstance or does it express a difference in analysis? The CGT was ready to take part in the talk on data processing. Only dis- " agreement on the place to be reserved to it turned it away. Moreover, some of its leaders share Maire's ideas regarding the consequences of data processing. The CGT would therefore have no basis to reproach thF~ CFDT, its participation in the talk, an~i its positions. Stinging Criticisms More remarkable is the conclusion of the accord on 17 September. Imme- diately after the end of the vacation period, Maire spoke clearly: "I fear," he said in Rouen, "that the CGT is doing on the trade union level what the Communist Party has decided to do on the political level." A clever way of forcing its partner to prove its independence. The speech did not please the PC. Three days before the meeting between the trade unions, in a report to ~ the Central Committee that was published in L'HUMANT_iE, Georges Marchais - was bitingly critical of Maire. It was difficu~t for the CGT to ignore that report: of the 16 members in the confederal bureau 8 are communist. = And yet, the accord was concluded--without the CFDT's having yielded. On t!~:~ centrary, it was around those key words that the trade union meetings were articulated. Some within the CGT believe that they perceive in that surprising accord the result of an internal CGT debate. Between the tradi- - tional "aligned" members, foremost among them Henri Krasucki, and the "independents" who, basing their arguments on the disastrous non-trade unionization (see Patrick Arnoux's article in the Economy section), wanted to put the interests of the trade union before those of the party. 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ The YC had two good reasons to agree, by way of exception, to this semblance of indep2ndence. A trade union reason: to the extent that the goveY~nment = translates ita words into actions, the "realiam" of the CFDT could be shown to be profitable in the ey~s of wage earnera. A political reason: _ the language is aufficiently hard at the top, between communiate ans eocia- lists, not to p~rmit adherence to the union to be expressed at the base. The CGT net could serve to quickly catch the fragments of the splintered Union - of the Left--to the advantage of the PC. ~ The Maire affair makes two simple strategies clear. That of the PC is to appear as the only force that is totally in opposition. And it throws sus- picion on all those who do not pursue the policy of all or nothing. That of Giscard, on the other hand, is t4 break up this simplistic alternative-- by favoring that which can undermine bipolarization. Edmond Maire has some trumps that doubtless will permit him to dodge both strategies. After all, on the trade union l~vel, the one that is right is the one that obtains results. Pierre Vanlerenberghe, secretary general of the CFDT Union of Administrative Personnel, explains: "We are not ~ust trying to draw attention, but are trying to effect social change." One will soon know if Giscard mentionec'~ Maire's name in order to compromise it and to stir up leftist dissention, or if he wants to prove that ft is poasi- : ble to be an opponenr and to be heard even so. Can the experiment be valid at the political level? Everyone knows that Maire and Recard are friends. Will the former pave the way for the latter? Rocard has been maintaining for a l~ng time that the PS must define a ' completely independent position with regard to communist positions. This political independence resembles that which the CFDT pursues on the trade union level. Irritation But the official PS doctrine binds the party to the communist strategy of all or nothing. The present socialist leaders around Mitterand still think ~ that the PS derives its strength from its indefectible adhea~ence to the Union of the Left. Even when that union no longer exists. ~ On Saturday, 29 September, the day of the directive committee, the Louis Harris poll published by L'EXPRESS, which mar~ifes+ted Rocard's popU.lari�ty with ' the public, was severely commented on. Mittera.nd dismissed it by simply saying: "Polls are always favorable to those w'no order them"--forgetting that his closest collaboratoes on 16 June had made use of another poll that was published by L'EXPRESS that was ~udged favorable to Mitterand. One should rather say that polls are always wrong in the eyes of those whom they displease. 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The irritation of the socialist leaders in reality is explained by refusal - to take into account facts that argue in favor of a change in line. Provided the "Maire affaix~" proves the effectiveness of the independence of the noncommunist lef.t with regard to the PC, it bears the ferment for an unsettlement of the convictions of the PS. COPYRIGHT: 1979 s.a. Groupe Express Communist Viewpoint Paris L'HUMANITE in French 1 Oct 79 p 6 [Article: "The CGT-CFDT Accord"] - [Text] A result of the combativeness of the workers. The VIE OUVRIERE published a round table of the CGT leaders. Under the title, "How the Union For Action Won and Will Live," the CGT weekly, VIE OWRIERE, this week reviewed the accord concluded on 17 September between the CGT and the CFDT, an accord that has already been extended to numerous enterprises and occupational branches. As a matter of fact, this accord was accompanied by numerous commentaries that are hostile to the CGT and by tendentious or fanciful speculations. "The Accord Is a Victory for the CFDT"; (the NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR title of an - interview with Edmond Maire: "How the CIFDT Won" is characteristic of that approach). The second tendency tried to support the idea of differences within the CGT delegation: "On the one hand, the hard liners; on the ~ other, the more pro-trade union line," for example wrate 1`UNITE, which led the confederal bureau to address a letter to the PS organ and to request its publication. L'UNITE appe.3red this week...wi.thout that letter, which is the best admission of the lucubrations that were advanced. The Element That Has Caused Things to Move Regarding those malicious commentaries Iienri Krasucki said: "It is ~ust simply that that accord troubles many people." He recalled the CGT reply to the antisocial measures of the government, its _ action week, etc. "It must indeed be said that at that moment the CFDT's language was different from the CGT's. It criticized even our initiatives." While the accord does not settle everything," continued H. Krasucki, it does f~oster the development of the movement regardfng dem~nds. For'us that is the main thing. . 5 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ Gerard Gaume thought that the action week organized by thE CGT "was the decisive element that made things move." - "Much of the media predicted a rupture, with the obvious desire of causing us tu bear the responsibility. One therefore understands the resentmerit of . some who are nout trying to distort the facts." The CFDT Refused Returnir.g to the conditions under which the agreement was concluded, Jacqueline Lambert indicated that the CFDT delegation first had "registered its surprise at our desire for unity. Then its proposals and demands caused us all to wonder if they were not going to refuse." Jacqueline Lambert specified that the CFDT wanted to limit the platform demands to two objectives: the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimu~ Growth Wage] and rerluction of work hours, "objectives that of course are importnat," but "which perforce limited the range of future actions." "The CFDT in the beginning manifestly was making a point of rupture of this matter. Now, our concern was to place those obviously essential demands in the broader context of the struggle of all workers..." Rene Lomet recalled "since the facts are apparent," from the very first the CGT delegation had proposed that the two organizations declare themselves ~ against the idea of agreement. "The CFUT refused." Henri Krasucki explained that, compared with a period during whYCh the two groups had "a resolute attitude of opposition to the antisocial policy of the government and employers," the situation is now different. The CGT had a categorical positinn regarding the cri$is, the policy of the government and of employers, and the measures that they take, whereas the CFDT, since what it ha~ called its "reorientation," accepts a certain austerity and an industrial policy with certain withdrawals and the conse- quences that that has on employment. "Obviously that attitude affects the vigor of action." ~ For the CGT leaders, the vital point is that it was possible to conclude an accord. Now it is a question of implementing it. "One does not start from nothing," said Rene Lomet. "There was action week, and after that many others ~oined in and are carrying on." "A unitary accord," stressed G. Gaume, "must not be made to the detriment o~ our own action." ~ "To implement the accord, everyone will do so with its own means," added H. Krasucki, "will express his ow-n ideas, his positinn with regar3 to governmental and employer positions and also his own freedom of initiative." 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "If one comea to an agreement on ob~ectives that have the conaent of the work~re, fine. If there are probleme, di�ficultiea, one goes back to the workere And CellH tl~em the truth. One 8H1CA them to help Kolve tt~~ee matters, making proposals to them. And if, with r~ good agreement there are still points on which there is not full agreement, well, the CGT will continue to saq and to do what it has to do; it~s up to the CFDT to do the same regarding its concerns. Finally, I would say that it is already as obvious for many workers as it is for the CGT: consider the support tliat is needed to cause matters to progress. Well, it is now time to provide - that support." Socialist Assessment - Paris L'UNITE in French 21-27 Sep 79 p S [Article by Michele Kespi: "The CGT-CFDT: The Worst Has been Averted"] [Text] The 17 September accord disengaged the jammed gear of dissension and rupture was avoided. "A red letter day," said Edmond Maire, CFDT leader, late in rhe evening of 17 September. The accord signed that day at the confederal level between . the CGT and the CFDT as a matter of fact i~ the first general accord since September 1977. Some difficult meetings. A first meeting of 4 hours an Friday, the 14th, had made it possible to pave the way. Before giving its decision, the CGT asked for an adjournment in order to consult on Monday, the 17th, with its executive committee, whose 93 members had already met the whole day or. Tuesday, the 12th. It is unusual for this group to meet at such short intervals. But the difficulties of the period, the differences ~aithin the CGT, doubtless explain that caution. A caution which, at the end of the interview on ~'riday, left the CDT leaders not al all optimistic. 'They entertained their impressions of the night before: one chance in two of arriving at an accord. That was the conclusion of the Nati~nal Bureau on 12 and 13 September. And on Thursday, the 13th, Edmond Maire alluded to "the impetus to be giv~en to the enormous problem of a unitary action"-- a problem that was all the more difficult since the CFDT refused "to let itself be pushed towa�rd initiatives that are more spectacular than effec- tive, to trade union actions which, under cover of demands, would first of all pursue a politicai ob~ective." _ A busy weekend in which a~oint CGT-CFDT committee had sought possibilit{es of compromise without finding them. It is doubtless the CGT executive committee, convened diiring the morning of the second meeting, that, gave the green light. As a matter of fact, there was a confrontation of two trends: those who wanted unity, those who did not. On one side, the "hard liners," grouped around Henri Krasucki and Michel Warcholach. On the other, the 7� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY more pro-trade union line which, in accordance with Gearges Seguy, Rene Buhl, and Jacqueline Lambert, urged an agreement. How, in fact, was one to explain to the workers that one was not granting priarity to the matter of low salaries or to a reduction in work hours? All the more so since the CFDT had known how to present quite flexible proposale to its partner that were difficult *o dismiss w3.thout further examination. The Seguy line won, and it was with the desire for an agreement that the CGT arrived on Monday, at 1600 hours, at Cadet Street. To say that it was all smooth sailing after that would be untrue. The ne- gotiation took a long time--about 5 hours--and it was laborious: the meeting adjourned no less than two times: the first, at the request of the - CGT; the second, on the initiative of the CFDT. The importance of the two delegations, seven for each side (Georges Seguy, Rene Lomet, Rene Buhl, Gerard Gannie, Jacqueline Lambert, Jean-Claude Laroze, and Michel Warcholach for the CGT; Ed~nnd Maire, Jacques Chereque, Mich~l Rolant, Jeannette Laot, Georges Begot, Hubert Lesire-Ogrel, and Albert Mercier for the CFDT), does not suff iciently explain the reason for the length of the discussions. "Of course there are still some differences; one has only to note the length of our discussions. But we have succeeded in disengaging the ~ammed gear of disagreement and in providing an impe~us for unitary action." Georges Seguy manifested a similar satisfaction: "The workers expected something other than a doctrinal quarrel from this meeting. It is useless to deny our differences, but we are determined to talk about them in a calm manner. The text on which we have agreed is cQnsonant with all of the obj ectives for which the worke~s have recently been f ighting. For the three ob~ectives to be considered (raising the low salaries and SMIC, reduction in work hours to 35 hours, right of expression on the part of the workers), the CGT anci CFDT are calling for some time off from work in the enterprises and the branches..." Action, if employer blockage continues,"will be developed at a later time by means of inte~occupational demonstrations under the auspices of regional unions." Finally, the two confederations will address the point at the end of October and, "if the conditions for the mobilization of the ma~ority of the workers are reconciled, they will envisage implementing a very broad interoccupational action." Following is the private j udgment of a leader of the Executive Committee of the CGT concerning the accord: "A text that is vPry close to the proposals of the CFDT." In fact, it includes the theory for actions, expressed on se~eral occasions, that is favored by that confederation. ~his caused Georges Seguy to declare that "no one can say that he is satisfied with this text...," while the CFDT delegation wore a beatific smile. Now, how will the accord be received by the militants? Will action be con- sonant with the accord? How will the two confederations together bring about . S FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024444-9 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - eventual negotiations? Rupture has been avoided. Only the future will tell if the 17 September accord w~s more than a declaration of unity that wa~ simply dependent on circumstances. Analysis of Communist Strategy Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 24 Sep 79 pp 54-55 [Article by Irene Allier and Georges Mamy: "When the Trade Unions Join the _ Relay"] [TextJ The event of the week was not Giscard's televised speech, of the - PC-PS meeting, but the rapprochement of Georges Seguy and Edmond Mai�re. Was Valery Ciscard's televised show on 17 September an important event? " Certainly not. And the meeting 3 days later between the delegations of the French Communist Party and of ~he Socialist Party? Not that, either. = On the other hand, during the same week, the accord concluded on 18 September between the CGT and the CFDT produced this evidence: there, _ on the contrary, something important, something new, occurred, which went beyond the trade union sphere. "That social contract cannot help but have consequences for the political movement," said Edmond Maire, the pugnacious architect of those unexpected meetings, in the interview that one will read about further on. It is a wager. But the CFDT starts from a reality: the specific fate of the French in th~ midst of a crisis. It is skillfully and effectively utilizing that irres~stible control lever to unlock the mechanisms of the government and those of the leftist parties, completely paralyzed by the political situation, and above all by the withdrawal of the PG. Success - is not guaranteed. But perhaps someth~Lng has begun to move. Finally... It seems that Giscard even disappointed many of his own people. In fact, it was an odd speech--that speech that he made on his third broadcast, "An hour with the president." Having opened in the manner of a Mendes France who was determined to speak the truth--before Frenchment who were quite correctly characterized as having three "attitudes": dissatisfaction, doubt, and anxiety--the proposal was to smoothly branch off to the e~cpediencies of a - P~inay, of a Queuille, or of a Lani.el. They, too, invariably threatened--but _ in vain, to "reduce expenditures" when all other solutions to the economic or budgetary equation eluded them. The chief of state concluded his publ~c interview--should the country be asked to "make every effort now" or spread _ 3t out over a longer period?--by con~irming Raymond Barre to his post. Find True Hegemony But what ambiguous compliments for this prime minister, modestly decked out in his "honesty," his supposed lack of "personal:i.ambition," and with consi- der~tion for his "colleagues"! And what was one to think of the presidential ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240020044-9 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ statement which specified that the accord had been granted in accordance wlth Barre's most r~cent measurea "in full settlement," if not that Matignon's account as a tenant was running low? Some made a risky deciaion. Will Che change in team occur in March, then; for example, between tw., parliamentary sessions and two budgets? P.nd to whose advantage? Jacques Chaban-Delmas? Robert Boulin? Jean-Francois Deniau? Andre Giraud? Jean Francois-Poncet?... Incorrigible, the small political group in no time at all set out again in the direction of its preferred amusements. It's of no importance, really. One development, howewer, was of particular interest in Giscard's interview: _ deploring the absence of a"social agreement," the president expressed the wish that thexe would be discussions concerning the matter of low salaries and the length of the work week. The approach doubtless was not politically - innocent. But, from a practical point of view, it was like an outstretched hand to the CFDT. In doing this, the chief of state even broke down th~e reticence of his prime minister, wha has always balked--against the advice o.f Robert Boulin--at the idea of a reduction in the work week. A few days earlier, the PC and the CGT would not have missed ttie opportunity to point out that there was complicity there between the CFDT and the govern- ~ ment. But, precisely on 18 September, the Communists did not resort to such expedients. And that indeed is where the remarkable effectiveness of the action carried out by Edmond Maire is apparent: at the same time, it , compelled the chief of state to take a step toward the CFDT and hp obliged - the CGT to conclude a contract with it, that is, to dissociate itself from the isolationist behavior of the PC. One would not be able to swear that this rapprochement--an unexpected one-- between the CFDT and the CGT will unquestionably resume a procedure which, - in time, would lead to a certain popular unity. At least, one has seen this _ CGT, which seemed frozen in an incomprehensible communist strat~gy, begin to move. It is true that it is on the trade union level that the PC "line" is most vulnerable, because of its contradic~ions. According to the new calculation of the Communist Party, it will one day directly take over, to ~ its advantage, the "movement of the masses." It is moreover this ambition that explains its concept of the "union at the base," a union that it intends to realize exclusively for itself. In fact, it no longer wants to exclusively play, beside the CGT, the role of a simple electoral force. On this ground, it believes, it will "always be beaten by social-democracy." According to its new strategic plan, the PC should arrive at a"real hegemon~ with respect to the masses," without the CGT, to which would fall the rattier imprecise "role of constant contestation of the political power." - A long-term plan, admittedly--"It's a matter of about 4~ years..."--and which will clash with some tough realities in the near future--and doubtless with the resistance of some CGT followers, whether communist or not. , 10 ~ FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - In the most recent iss~e of the publication, DZALECTIQUES, which appeared befor.e *_he meeting and the accord, Jean-Louis Moynot, confederal secretary of the CGT, wrote as follows: "Many of us are convinced that importar~~ progreas in the unity of action, in particular with the CFDT, would 'oe of sLCh a nature as to cause the entire French trade unian movement to advance. ~ That moreover is in line with a very profound aspiration of the non-trade union workers, who readily report with respect to "trade union disputes," their view that politics is a sterile show of fo~ces that baffles them." - Moynot is not looked upon as a representative ot the majority trend of the GGT. But it sometimes happens that he expresses somewhat in advance the - posjtions of Geroges Seguy, himself. Not all in the trade union confederation - have mechanically, automatically, donned the new uniform of the = co~nunist leadership. That manifestly served Maire and the CFDT. But other aspects, and therefore other retreats, are possible in the future... ~ The Socialist Parry--meeting with a communisfi delegation for the first time in 18 months--did not have to hope to be able to profit from similar contra- dictions or hesitations. At the PC no one hides it from you any longer: - after all, all the bridges are down, cut off. "I te11 you once and for all: _ = stop trying to find in the socio-political picture a premonitory sign of an improvement in our relations ~~ith the PS. You would b~ losing yout time." Since the Central Coumiittee meeting on Wednesday, 12 September, the coIImnunist leadership no longer hesitates to explain in ~ust as plain terms to the ` - militants, the sections and cells, how and why the PC has deliberately ~ changed its strategy. "The union of the left is over." "One must not count on a political agreement with the PS," "No question of ~oint actiona with it," "We will no longer do anything together: we saw the price of that." In other words, not only has the PC renounced the strategy of union of the left, for which it fought for almost 15 years, but it accents, for an . unforeseeable time, renunciation of accession to power. Why? First, because, as it has said a hundred times, it would risk coming to it in a state of _ weakness. It has repeatedly given to its own persistent accounts of the unitary period: :since September 1974 in each partial legislative election, it lost six votes. So, a negative balance. "We will not be the supplementary strength af the PS": the communist refrain came from this established fact. But it does not have a simple*^etical significance: it has a political - meaning. It repeatedly says that the PC does not want anything to do with a socio-democratic or reformist experience in which, paralyzed by a leadership agreement with the PS, it would lose:its 3ustification. "What we refused in 1978 and what we will refuse in 1981 is an electoral victory that does not provide any chance for real change. We have no more liking for social-democrat Schmidt than for Giscard. We renounced the revolution of 1917. But we nonetheless will not repeat 1945. And as for the Po~ular Front, that also is over." 11 F~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ~I1LY They Angry At Us _ Well, then? To tell the truth, the Cammunist Party seems not to know. While ` looking for an alternative solution, it puts out to pasture those of its - followers who still expect a political prospect, the vague idea of a"new union" established at the base (with wham?), of a self-styled "self-management strategy" (which, in the best of circumstances, would have the effect of democratizing the party a ltttle, but not of proposing a political outcom,e for it) and of a confidence in the "movement of the masses"...In the meantime, it concentrates on only one ob~ective: the change in the relative forces of the left, the strengthening of the party--and of the only party. It cherishes--one has said it, one confirms it--the hope of seeing the communist - candidate outstrip the socialist candidate in the presidential elect~.on. _ - Afterward~, we will see... - The Central Committe~ and, backing it, the "assets" of the party( 40,000 militants approximately) subscribed to that speech. As for the adherents, that is another~matter. Demobilized because c~f disappointment (They are angry at us," confessed a leader) or incredulous in the face of that 180-degree turn, they stay home and they do not seem, at least temporarily, particularly receptive. In the 14th arrondissement [district] of Paris, for example, it is the saction secretary, himself, whn still of late had to sell L'HUMA-DIMANCHE. He no longer could find any volunteers. _ But the Marchais leadership leaves no room for doubt. It perhaps does not - know where it is goin.g. But it is going there resolutely and no longer dissembles practically anything of this bewildering choice and its consequences. If the PC had not thought to be able to refuse right off the offer of a _ meeting made by Francois Mitterand at Anglet this summer, Charles Fiterman _ and his comrades showed~that it mattered little to them now to appear as they are. "We cannot accept proposals for action on objectives when, in other respects, we note that the Socialist Party is developing positions that are not ours, that are not consonant with the interests of the workers." With that pretext advanced by Fiterman, the PC then quietly re3ected the ma~ority of the proposals formulated by Pierre Beregovoy: a nonaggression pact; a joint appeal to all the rank and file orgar~izations of both parties; a preliminary plan for specific actions (including Schlumberger, Lardet-Babcock, _ Ugine, ezc.). However, it agreed to "promote the convergencies that might be manifeated with respect to the situation," and to convene the Union of the Left muni- cipal councils in order to mobilize public apinion--in particular against the increase in taxes... _ A step forward? A small step, perhaps. But who today can believe that the = broken engagement would be~patched up ~ either in a short, or inCermediate, period of time? .12 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Unlems a powerful social movement material,izes to modify the deaY and to _ _ uFset the eketchy calculations of the leadere: that is khe hope that causeci the CDT-atyle succeae this week." ~ COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur" - How the CFD Won , . Paris LE NOUVEL OVS.F.RVATEUR in French 24 Sep 79 pp 56-57 _ [Interview with Edmond Maire by Claude-Francois Jullien and Lucien Rioiisc, of LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "How the CFD Won"; date and place not given] , [Text] LE NOUVEL OBSERV~TEUR: The unity of action accord that you have , ~ust signed with the CGT is a victory for the CFDT. Edmond Maire: It is above a~1 a victory for the workers and for the en~ire - trade union movement, up to then bogged down in disagreement and in relative ineffectiveness. That accord reverts to the conclusions that we had drawn from the critical analysis of our past action. We said: We muat establish priority ob~ectives, in limited number, apecific ones, attainable on a - ahort-term basis, and which we will be able to induce oiir interlocutors to negotiate. The CFDT-CGT ac~ord has defined those ob~ectivea and we can achieve some results before the end of the year. Likewiae, we wanted eome coordinated actions from enterprises, then from branches and regions, in order, if possible, to come up with a national plan: the agreement provides - for that. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: ~Specific objectives, a specific calenda~r, the line of the CFDT is really what has been adopted... EDMOND MAIRE: The important thing is for that ].ine to be consonax~t with ~ ~ the present situation. Having said that, it is true that the priority demanda adopted by the accord--~aising the low salaries, reduction 1n work hours, right of expression in the enterprises--had been defined in our Brest congrese. ~ But we do not have a monopoly. They are above all the people's demands - ~ and well suited to the present situation. ~ LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Nevertheless, you did not seem to believe in that accord. After all, you wanted the CGT to accept your nroposalse That is what it did. How do you explain this? Edmond Maire: We had reason to be pessimistic. The CGT--Georges Seguy's . speech at Place de la Republique [R~public Square] confirmed this-~seemed > _ to want to eliminate us from the unity of, action, or at least to ~ut us in a lesser position. But precisely because we were pessimistic, we worked up ~ - 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 , - _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY our proposals. For about 10 hours, our national bureau went over them with a Line toothcoa~b and finally they impressed the CGT delegation, which deemed it necessary to convene its executive committee before giving us an anawer. On Saturday, ].5 September, we expressed thoae proposals in.a text that the - executive committee of the CGT was able t~ discuss on Monda}? morning. To - look at that dacument, it was clear that the criticisms that other trade unionists might have wanted to address to the CFDT would not have carried enough weight in a public debate. That must have counted for something. LE NUWEL OBS~RVATEUR: Those al~out faces of the CGT were odd, were they not? It wanted to carry out an independent action alone, then it forbade the unity of action in all domai.ns before coming round to a joint action with the CFDT. Why that evolution? Ec~mond Maire: We would like to know the reasons. Georges Seguy told us that he did not want to discuss disagreements that were expressed publicly , during the month of August because, according to him, that might cause harm. We would have preferred to speak of them and to know why, on 9 Auguat, even before it had made us any proposals at all, the CGT had accused us of _ passi.vity, whereas we were already trying to define an eifective action for realizable objectives. We did not want to undo or impair our discussions, - but only to avoid a repetition of that type of unfavorable and unexpected ~ change in the situation. We did not make refusal of the CGT a condition: - we wi11 speak of that later. As for explaining the fluctuations of the CGT, that is very difficult. What ~ we note, on the other hand, is that the positions of the Communist Party regarding the CFDT fluctuate quite a bit. The PC adopts a day by day policy - with respect to us. If we allow ourselves to criticze some nationaliat aspect in the position of the PC, the CFDT is called a passive organization, in favor of austerity, c].assified along with the PS as being in the social- democratic Gehenna...If we re~ect "the union for public safety," for a whilt we beeome allies in the struggle against the socialists. And since there are many communists on the.leadership ladder~of the CGT, such fluctuat~:.ons of position c~nnot help ~u'~ cause some interference. Fortunat~ly, those tensions did not prevent the conclusion of a good accord. ~ ~ LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: According to some rumors spread by some trade union � militants when the accord was about to be concluded, Henri Krasucki raised new problems and a noncommunist CGT adherent, Rene Buhl, cut him short and kept on talking until Seguy finally intervened, in favor of con.ciliation. 14 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . ~ - Edmond Maire: It's a serial story. There are always some differences with:tn a delegation--both within the CFDT and the CGT. To want to interpret them by saying: the former is in the good camp; the latter, in the bad, is to run right into an impasse. One must reason on an overall basis: there is no doubt that there are political interferences in the trade union positions. To express them in precise terms is a game that one often loses. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. Georges Seguy and you, yourself, set the limits of that accord. Seguy proved to be the most hesitant. No one, he said, can be _ entirely satisfied with it... EdmondiMaire: Seguy~�was speakjng for himsel.f at that moment. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: And you, yourself, specified: "It is not ~ust a question of an agreement depending on present circ~mmstances." How far can - this regained unity of action go? Edmond Maire: For 2 years, apart from partial agreemeuts on Social Security, on voluntary work suspension because of pregnancy, on has been practically impossible to define a joint confederal policy. Of course, relations were not broken, the ~pposite of what occurred bet~veen the pa:ties of the left. If the accord is essential for unity, it now remains to be translated into fact. That will not be simple. We will see to it that our ob~ectives are not drowned in a confused ensemble that would prevent their translation into fact. The priorities adopted by the confederations must prevail. _ We have envisioned three stages: 1) Action at the base in the; 2) If the movement is carried out and is developed in the branches, we wi11 organize some regional demonstrations; 3) If these actions have a real, profound impact on the majority of workers, we will envisage the third stage, that of a national interoccupational action, still with our three priority objectives. By attaining results, we will give the workers confidence. LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: The agreement is sufficiently specific for the trade unions--the CGT in particular, which was not enthusiastic in the beginning-- to feel bound by it. Is that not d~:.ngerous? Edmond Maire: When we sign an accord, we rely on the complete ioyaity of our partner. The applieation of that accord will require efforts from some of our CGT comrades, it is true. But the CGT, like us, knows from where we come. We have, they and we, experienced that long period of disagreement, of bitterness, following.the failure of the left ~nd of the difficuity to - remobilize the workers...if the agreement was concluded, it is not in order to conceal our differences from the public; it is the fruit of a reciprocal engagement. 15 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Can that accord between the two great French workers confederations have a positive effect on ~he political left that is so - " terribly divided? Edmond Maire: In the near future, I do not think so. But the dynamics are _ weli engaged. If one ~rants priority to the social atruggles in order to - change society, that is, politics, the economy, culture, it is indispensable for the trade unions ta begin to move and to give impetus to the f~.ght with rea'1 prospects of success. That social comhat canno~ help but have conse- quences for the political movement. In 1972, the "Joint Program" preceded the interconfederal accord that ~was signed in 1974. It was not the best step.� Since then the social movement has been placed in a perspective that is too exclusively political, involving electoral change. We made our self-critique and Georges Marchais, in his most recent speech to the Central Comm.i_ttee,,devoted partially to the CFDT, ` in turn dfd the same in terms sometimes were close to those of our _ camrade Moreau in his January 1978 report to the national council of the CFDT, outlining our new political action. So muc:h the better! LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: The PC and PS tear each other to piece~a; the CFDT and CGT find each other again. Is this not the old policy of two irons in _ - the fire; unitary with the CFDT and antiunitary with the PS? Edmond Maire: Such calculations may exist. They will not hold up in the face oi a strong, aware,.social mobilization. We indeed hope that the dynamics that wi11 result from the return of the unitary action between the CFDT and the CGT little by little will help to o~ercome the political difficulties and to recreate, on new bases, the conditions for a union of the people's forces. LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: The CFDT meets the PS on Monday, 24 September. Even ~ though many CDT adherents participated in the revival of the Socialist Party, relations between the political organization and the trade union move- ment are not good. This time, rhe interconfederal accord places you in a position of strength. So, what do you expect from that meeting? - Edmond Maire: A change of climate, better understanding. In spite of some 3oint actions on nuclear matters, or Social Security, we have had an " impression for 18 months that the Socialist Party has not understood the desire of the~CFDT to obtain some i~ediate results on the trade union or legislative level. It proved this, for example, by refusing the reform. of the Conciliation Board in Labor Disputes which, in spite of its imper- fections, provides supplementary guaranteees to the ma3ority of workers and can give a new impulse to trade unionism. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . , I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 - FOfi OFFICIAL USE ONLY The CFDT is convinced that the endlessly revived indictment of employers and the government is not enough and that it will not bring about new electoral - and political successes. On the contrary, from the failure of the left we . have concluded that it was necessary to give priority to social struggles, to mass action, and to i.mmediate results. That action moreover will provide _ increased chances for a leftist alternative. It is on all of that that we are gaing to make our point dnd we hope to overcome lack of understand3ng. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: .Your relations are not better with the PC. On 18 September, L'HUMANITE again denounced Edmond Maire's "contradictions"... What purpose could an eventual meeting serve? Edmond Maire: Since its congress, the Communist Party has again adopted . some CDT proposals, but refuses to acknowledge it. If it attacks the CFDT, per.haps it is so that its militants and the workei~s will not become aware ~ of it. When we say, for example, that there is some "reorientation," in the speech of the PC, the latter is not happy. It is not serious. It will pass. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: But you, yourself, denounced the contradictions of the PC... Edmond Maire: In fact, two contradictions seem outstanding~. As in the case of tY~e CFDT, the PC now affirms priority for social struggles. It - even does so with such emphasis that to listen to Marchais in the most recent Central Co~ittee, one might wonder about the limited role vested in the political parties and in t?1e accession of the left to the government. Fine...But we note that there is a contradiction between the party's speech and its application. Because, at the same time, the PC persists in its attitude of sheer denunciation, of denial of certain realities, or sets for itself objectives that are absolutely not in keeping with the struggles. And, if one looks at all of t~ie objectives that it proposes as immediate ones, not only is that ensemble not attainable now, but the PC would do well not to propose it in t.hat manner if it shoul3, in the future, accede to power. In short, the PC at the same time that it affirms priority for social struggles, continues to aim above all for its own increased ~phere of influ- _ emce, especially the electoral. Another example? The PC explains: no more politican-type politics. It _ - is not up ta the leaders to define the policy to be followed; each worker must deal with it, himself. That is socialist self-management. Well, with ~ respect to .*_~he definition., we say: we agree. But how can the Communist Party reconcile that with its concept of a working ~lass vanguard party-- ~ 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ and, under the circumstances, of a vanguard political bureau of the party? See how it goes in different directions. Always from the top. We will discuss al'1 of that with the PC and we will explain our action policy. At _ the same time, of course, we will listen to what it has to say, about our own contradictions, too. - LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What do you think of the "social agreement" desired by the president of the republic? - Edmond Maire: Valery Giscard d'Estaing speaks of the social agreement while in Europe France is the country that hoZds the record for inequalities. In = polarizing the political discussion around this theme, he is trying to cause one to forget realities, their harshness, and the merciless nature of our system with regard to those that are most poor. In fact, in the face of the crisis, never have the proposed solutions been so diametrically opposed between the dominant class and the French workers' movement. COPYRIGHT: 1979 111e Nouvel Observateur" 8255 CSO: 3100 - ~ 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUN'1 RY SI:CTION FRANCE STEPS IN CONCEPTION, DESIGN OF NAVY'S SHIPS OUTLINED Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Oct 79 pp 48-49 [Article by Capt Georges Helies: "From Operational Requirements to Mili- _ tary P rogram"] [Text] The design and construction of naval and naval-air ma- terizl, from weapons or the simplest equipment item to the most complex vessel, are placed far down the pipe- = line from the plans and programs that spell out the missions of the navy as well as the categories and levels of the major components to be envisaged. (Entering the Naval Academy in 1948, Capt . Georges Helies served for many years as missile-artillery of- - ficer on sea duty, in schools, and on the naval general staff. After commanding the fast Escort "Le Vendeen," the experimentation vessel "Ile d'Oleron," and, in the past, the flottilla of light vessels in the Atlantic, he participated in several armament and modernization programs for vessels of all sizes. He is currently chief, "fleet iznder construction," bureau, Navy General Staff.) After these points have been spelled out, we draw up the requirements which express what the navy general staff expects from equipment capable of ac- complishing these missions through simple or combined action. Not a Simple Problem of Terminology The first concept phase thus starts with the expression of the operational requirement. But, depending upon the more general definition of the term, the latter is conceived only if the situation has been untangled or if there is some kind of insufficiency. It may ~lso come from a necessity or from failure to adapt. _ Controlled by the operations division of the navy general staff, it involves basic ideas which largely go beyond this framework. Indeed, while the analysis of the threat, the environment, and the execution of missi~ns con- stituting the entire fabric, justify the adjective "," it is - 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY necessary, in formulating it correctly, to take into account the notions of performance, margin of characteristics, and other elements touching upon _ technology. Thc approach to it, both pragmatic and rational, therefore must be the fruit of a dialogue between operations officers, materiel officers and even equipment engineers. Its final shape must be sufficiently bold so as to not to risk rapid and highly realistic time limits and in order not to be involved in a"wild goose chase." But it is certain that the drafting of the memorandum expressing it must spring from combat concepts which will cover more than just a decade. This need for initial collaboration o~'ten leads to a blurred situation which extends all the way to the switch of the expression of the opera- tional requirement in the document characterizing the next phase, that is, the general staff objective. This is expressed in certain interservice publications by the fact that the "military requirement" and the "general staff objective" for the navy seem to respond to the same concern. In fact, the "operational requirement" remains an in-house document for th e navy general statf. It gives rise to a"general staff objective" which sum- marizes the foundations and defines the objectives to be attained by the new equipment. This document is the requirement which in turn is addressed to the DGA [General Delegation for Armament] and the technical directorate concerned so that the "feasibility study" may be started. These relative ambiguities in the initial terminology of programs clearly show that the trend of thought and the methods needed to get through the first development phase less simple than one might have thought. They also prove that the analysis of systems can be accomplished only through an iterative process if one wishes to create a military tool suitable for~the environment from its inception onward, harmonious iri terms of its operation and capable of surviving against developing threats and environments. The problem becomes even more complicated in the navy due to the fact that we like to use the same methodology, with the same concept and development guidelines,�in working ori weapons and equipment, that ~.s to say, "weapons systems" which will respond to one or more objectives and the vessels car- rying them, which must perform those missions. In most cases (except for small, single-purpose vessels or highly ambitious systems), the range of programs and especially their nature are not the same. The operations estimate does not always express this difference. 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL ?TSE ONLY The navy general staff expressed this differentiation of level and echelon over a period of time with two terms: "The general staff objective" which we mentioned; "The military program" which defines the essential military data,of a ves- - sel to be built. These two documen~s are drafted within the "Materiel Division of the Navy ,General Staff." Measured and Realistic Ambition: General Staff Objective It is interesting very briefly to analyze the data behind the general staff - objective in order better to understand the origin of a military program for the construction of a vessel. A piece of equipment or a system must last at least fifteen years and a vessel must go on for at least twenty years. Some people, from this stage onward, doubt that it is necessary to take in~o account the cost-effectiveness concept for a specific piece of equip- ment intended, in war time, to outclass the enemy's equipment. _ But how can one conceive and introduce the idea of choice and complementarity between several systems if this criterion is not maintained? - The general staff objective thus would have to bring out the following: The justification for the desired operational requirement, The desired performance figures, Restrictions liable to influence these performance figures (in particular, adaptation to the naval environment). The desired employment times (by outlining, as the case may be, the evolu- tion possibilities, by echelons, in order to increase the profitability), The priority to be assigned to the need, An initial inventory drawn up with the support of the technical directorate, showing the principles behind the solutions that seem worth exploring. The establishment, from the very beginning, of a"mixed study group includ- ing the EMM [Navy General Staff] and the DTCN [Technical Directorate of Shipbuilding]" is a fundamental element in the smooth handling of the pro- cess and the dialogue between operational specialists and engineers. This dialogue will facilitate the distribution of responsibilities throughaut the program. Its initial effort is designed to review the means liable to respond to the objsctive. 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY From this examination spring the following: The "military requirement statement card," drafted by the general staff, s~elling out the solution selected; The "technical and financial development program card," prepared by the DTCN. ' It is also during that period of time that the "program manager" engineer will be designated, along with a"project officer" for the important proqrams who will have the advantage of being able permanently to keep track of the specific evolution of solutions ancl inevitable interface problems. The organizational framework of the EMM must display much flexibility dur- ing the drafting of the "operational requirement" and the "general staff objective" in order to combine the influence of these various parameters which are involved in the program concerned. ~ Al1 of the divisions must help take into account the various threats, alliances, strategy, financial Fi.ans, and budgets, personnel requirements, maintenance policy, on-site logist~^ support, as well as the materiel policy which in the end benefits from the research and development pro- grams. Before the requirement is ever spelled out, these studies and exploratory development efforts must be conducted from various angles and on several levels, such as the CPE (Permanent Testing Commission), the DRET (Technical Research and Study Directorate), the EMM, the STCAN (Shipbuilding and Naval Weapons Technical Service), the CEPMAN (Naval Equipment Practical Study Commission), and the GROP (Paris Operatior~s Research Group). They must make it possible to prevent costly "adventures" and to limit the particularly heavy burden of technological and financial restrictions. The estimate of the advantages and inconveniences finally must take into account certain government guidelines. The clioices made can furthermore influence other programs. , Finally, the international exchange policy will become involved with indus- trial policy which may wish to balance some specifications or strengthen some other sector. Temptations of Perfectionism: Military Program For a Vessel ' The difficulties mentioned above only grow worse when it comes to spelling out the "military program" for a single vessel. The basic idea .as a m~cter of fact is to build a homogeneous assembly which will be ef- ficient on the basis of equipment that will be heterogeneous in terms of age, level of completion, and role. 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ " c While the same thinking processes and the same rules can be applied to a program which is thus found down the pipeline from the general staff ob- jective, we must a~mit certain truths and constant factors: A vessel may have to meet only multiple threats but it must be able easily to fit into a task force; It is a living unit in which equipment on different technological levels . must be harmonized and some of those levels are in the process of gestation at the moment the program is drawn up. Their presence adds considerable value. The risk must be weighed. There are ~nany ways to express operational requirements. The military program must not express the temptations that are commonly encountered: The exaggerated limitation of the tonnage which is not necessarily expressed by economies because it leads to expensive and penalizing structural con- straints. The hull, with its various installations, on the average involves on].y one-third of the basic estimate. The tremendous increase in units, in terms of number and Quality. Th~ basic estimate is full of them and space is always limited. One must of cour::,e admit that one cannot cover all of the saturating threats because that simply cannot be done even in hulls considered suf�icient at the beginning, without doing the following: Getting over the barrier represented by fund allocations (weapons and equip- ment items take about half of the basa.c estimate), Taking risks in terms of deudlines, Compromising the series-production effect, _ Bloc;king the indispensable reviews and revisions half way along the unit's life time. Multipurpose capability thus could only be limited. - Vessels will have to achieve full effectiveness through complementarity. However, the handling of ar.tion systems must permit each vessel to perform a certain spectrum of missions ir. keeping with its size. Experience proves as a matter of fact that missions change while vessels remain the same. These considerations caused a chief of naval operations of an Allied navy to say: "Give me a balanced navy and I will accomplish your missions." Let us keep in mind then that the military program must be a par.t of the - risk and the stakes. The vessel must be a tool whose vulnerability remains 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240020044-9 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY commensurate to the of.fensive and defensive systems it carries. The plan - for this program comprises two subheadings: The operational definition which recalls the employment concept, the tasks, characteristics, and the possibilities of maintenance, while spelling out ~ the specific dealines; The principle characteristics of the ship's installations, weapons, and ~ equipment, keeping in mind of course the cost ceiling. After the technical service has translated this program into "technical specifications," the builder will be able to build the vessel although the "basic document" will inform the authorities on the program's technical - and financial implementation process. This implementation process will be - controlled by a"program director," who will be supervised and guided by a "mixed committee." ' The "Fleet A-building" bureau, assisted by other bureaus, acts as the pro- ject off icer. The result must be a balanced assembly which will go into action about seven years after it has been conceived. COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises _ "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" 5058 CS0:3100 ~ ~ 24 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE - TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH ACTIVITIES NOTED Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Oct 79 p 13 [Text] To complement the scientific and technical research budget for 1980, whose ma,jor outlines we described in issue 779 of ATR & COSMOS, we are now giving some indications on ~he re- search activities of the ~i.nistry of Transportation, as described ~ in an annex to the finance bill for 1980, drawn up by the secre- tariat of state to the prime minister in charge of the general _ delegation for scientific and technical research. Aeronautic research activities of the Ministry of T ransportation in 1978 and 197g concentrated on ~hree areas: aeronautic con- struction, air navigation, and safety-regulations. Aeronautic Construction Three major goals were set: the reduction of nuisar~ces, reduction of fuel consumption, and improvement of competitivity. Reduction of nuisances. Research in thi,s area is designed to reduce the noise of turbomachinery (stu~ly of compressors ) and aircraft noise (especially light planes and helicopters), and also to reduce the pollutants emitted by turbomachinery. Reduction of fuel consumption. This research concentrates on - three poin.ts: reducin~ the structural masses of aircraft, de- creasing aircra~'t drag (which encompasses practically all of aeronautics), and studying engines to reduce their specific consumption. 25 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024444-9 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TrnE~rovetn~~nti oi' Cotnpetit~,vity = Here three lines for research have been establi,shed: - a. Uecreasing pro~ect costs, that is, the costs of develop- ment and cer~~ti~'icati,on; involved in this are computer methods, new test techniques, etc.; b. De~reasing production costs; c. Decreasing operating costs by improving reliability, by simplifying maintenance and by reducing consumption; d. Improving the qualit~ and the attractiveness of the product in relation to the performances, flexibility and ease of use of planes, and crew and passenger comfort. Air Navigation ~ In this area, the main effort has been concentrated on major technological developments in the field of the presentation of information to the pilot and the design of the instrument panel, - moving toward more elaborate data processing systems and a sophisticated integration of data and control features. In 197g a program was to be begun that would lead to.the development in 1982 of a complete MLS ground equipment model ; meeting international standards. Security-Regulations Inflammability and toxicity are very critical safety problems. Methods have been developed (research on criteria), teams formed, and effective coordiriation is being provided by the~FAA. Ex- plosions of ~et engines are also cr~.tical safety problemsy studies on the shielding of small ~et engines and the definition of "fail safe" shapes for larger engines are being conducted. Prospects for 1g80 . : The EERM [Meteorological Research and Study Facility] during the 7th Plan began a general research and development program whose two main ob,jectives are: the a~cquisition of an intellec- tual potential enabling it to handle the ma~or scientific . _ changes coming between 1g80-199o and the mastery of a certain number of techniques needed for practical applications. 26 - ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Iri t}ie ar~ea of general forecas~ing, the EERM's act~.viLy's main tar.get is the "Amethyste" program conducted ,jointly with the ~:entral forecasting service. Short-term ~'orecasting now makes special use of earth-synchronous satellites, such as Meteosat. For 1980, budget allocations amounting to 20.53 million .francs will enable continuing the Meteosat and Argos programs in the amount of 8.2 million francs. - In the field of civil aviation, budget allocations conie to 94.28 million francs, including a credit of 11 million francs, which will be the subject of a program contract between the - ministry of transportation and ONERA [National Office for Aero- _ space Studies and Research]. With the rest of the funding allocated for aeronautics, special effort will be made on programs - to save energy and reduce nuisances. Furthermore, in addition to this funding, agreement in principle has been reached on a - program contract between the secretariat of state for research and the ministry of transportation, amounting to 5 million . _ francs. This will be used to equip the regulation aircraft. COPYftIGHT: AIR & COSMOS, Paris, 1979 = 76 79 CSO: 3100 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUN7'RY S~CTION ITALY PLAN FOR CIVILIAN-MILITARY 'INTEGRATION' IN INTELLIGENCE Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 80-84 [Article by Gerardo Cocchis: "Behind the Lines of the Complex Army Corps-- Towards an 'Integrated' Civilian-Military Operational Intelligence Service"] [Text] Lt Col F. spe. [Infantry-Regular Army] Gerardo Cocchis _ has taken various specialization courses, including the 16th course for "I" [Intelligence] - SI05 [Intelligence and Spec- i~~.l Operations Service] officers and the 2nd course for mechanized units - Armored Troops School. He is presently performing the duties of chief of "I" section and chief of off-line code section of the 5th Military Zone Command. There would be no reason for proposing new criteria for organization of the operational intelligence service behind the lines of the Major Unified Units if the presentation, according to protocol, of an explicit declaration by an , ambassador wearing ceremonial hat and sword still constituted the initial act of a war. There would in fact be all or part of the time needed for mobilzz- ing the forces for territorial defense, noving the units, organizing the ser- vice itself and--what would count most in a world that still respected cer- tain specific codes of behavior--for carrying out the first urgent measures to achieve a gradual transition from a state of peace to a state of wax in an atmosphere of relative tranquillity. But ambassadors, rules of protocol, hostilities waged only by uniformed soldiers, along with so many other things, - are now part of the past. In the times in which we live, attack is made without forewarning, so as to hit the adversary while he is still unprepared, or at least, not sufficiently prepared. And this is the point of departure for examination of the problem that concerns us: any day "X" in a period of international tension not unlike so many other days, when suddenly, even if not entirely unexpectedly, hos- tilities begin. The Threat Z'he threat that hovers behind the lines breaks down into three principal com- ponents: psychological waxfare; guerrilla warfare; and outflanking from the sky and/or the sea, in direct or indirect support of offensive action de- veloped against the units at the line of defense. 28 FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL~ USE ONLY F'syc}iological warfare, which in the contemporary era is backing guer- rilla warfare on the one hand, and on the other, at weakening the spirit of resistance of the armed forces and the population~, and which is staxted in a more or less underhanded manner even before hostilities begin, can be expected to reach levels of maximum virulence from the very first hours of warfare. If it were not countered in a timely and effective manner, it would find fer- tile ground in evacuees, refugees, people in flight from very heavily damaged zones, wh~, if prey to panic, could make the traffic situation chaotic behind the lines--a zone in which units in movement and logistical support operations have to be able~to count on freedom of movement, apart from the fact that great difficulties for defense activity would arise from sabotage and from guerrilla action. Guerrilla warfare, in a future conflict, could take the shape of a"panto- graphic pro~ection" of the political terrorism alreac~y being carried out. There is no need to go into the disparate Y~ypotheses advanced from various sides regarding the international links in the armed subersion against con- stituted powers; one need only observe the problem to deduce that at the op- - portune moment, it will be supported with weapons, money, technical advice, etc, from those who have an interest in it. In this regard it is sufficient to recall that all up-to-date armies have parachute troops trained in espionage, reconnaissance, sabotage, surprise attack, etc. From this follows the simple hypothesis that such paxachute troops would find possibilities of protection and support behind the lines; _ but it is also realistic to suppose tYiat especially we11--qualified and spec- - ifically trained elements would receive assignments to organize, command and coordinate a"second front" spaxked, in the initial phase of the conflict, precisely by the militants of the various terrorist organizations. Vertical outflanking is routine procedure that is now conceptually incorpor- ated into the doctrines of a11 the armies abreast with the times, and is put into practice in the strategic and/or field in accordance with the quantitative and qualitative availability of airborne units, units trained for the purpose, and suitable airplarie and helicopter fleets. These three parameters have been referred to sepaxately because of require- ments of exposition. Actually, it is unrealistic to think that they will have their effect on the conduct of defense one at a time, staggered in time. On the contrary; it is more logical to suppose that in principle, they will be astutely put into action simultaneously with one another and in harmony with the main attack. on the advance defense positions. Thus it is necessary to foresee~as pErmanently immanent a composite threat, articulated under three different aspects, any of which could temporarily take on a more dangerous charcter than the,other ~wo, depending on the geo- graphical area and the phase ~f operations. ' ~ ~ ~ 29 . . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , , f . : . . . . _ . . , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Intelligence Problem Behind the lines of the Ma~or Unified Units, ~til such time as the military authorities are vested with civilian powers as well, civilian authorities and military authorities operate with their own particular responsibilities. The civilian authorities axe responsible for the activities pertaining to evacuees, refugees, public order, countering guerrilla warfare, etc; and the military authorities are responsible for the security of the units and for the military ob,jectives, tactical-logistical supply of the advance units, action against landings from the sky and/or from the sea, etc. _ Since the various responsibilities are exercised at the same time and in the same operational ambience, the following question is arises: how to clarify the situation and keep track of its continual evolution, avoiding possible interferences or breakdowns, with consequent failure to transmit intelligence from one authority to another, or divergent evaluations drawn from the same intelligence framework? So long as compartmentalization of civilian and mil~tary responsibilities per- sists, the answer is to be sought in different organization of the behind- the-lines operational intelligence sErvice. - The Restructuring of the Service The entire matter of the organization of intelligence behind the lines of the -complex aru~y corps requires a reconsideration in order to,pursue the hoped-for organizational and functional improvement, on the postulate that the exiating intelligence chains remain unaltered. As it happens, new means based on more advanced technology are not necessary, or at least are not indispensable; but what is absolutely indispensable is a different and more modern "mentality" that i.mplies the abandonment of narrow sectorial views of the intelligence problem. The organs of the state--civilian and military organs--cooperate with one an- other where necessary; and this concept of cooperation is still a valid one in those areas where it is necessary to harmonize diversified technical ac- tivities. On the other hand, there is no inherent diversification in the matter of intelligence, especially when it is directed towards the same ob- ~ectives. Hence it is necessary to aba,ndon the concept of cooperation, re- placing it with the more up-to-date concept of "integration." instrument for the purposes of effective control of the areas falling ~ behind the lines of the complex arrqy corps operating on natipnal soil appears to be the "integrated civi].ian-military intelligence service." It is not only desirable but also achievable, when one takes into account the fact that the territorial organization of the Carabinieri comes under double 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 - ~ �rl ~I f~ rl ~ 4-i N ,ri ~j ~ ~ . . ~"~j~�;' ;~,a ;r? 'J N O ~"i '~i N , 4D ~ ~ ~ r~ ~.?.3A~ ~ F ~ V ~ hTi ~ hi ~ . : ' . . ~y~,~,~ r-1 N c~'1 ~ tn ~O l~- 00 s;s1:'a~a.w...v~.,-w,u .,r..s...t..rn�: . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ~ . . 35 . FOR OFFICIAI: USE'ONLY . . . . . . . . . . . w , , _ . . . i_.. . , , . . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY --implies the necessity of finding specialist "I" personnei for capable organic staffing of Units or Administrations functioning a,s Military Garrison Command of the provincial capitals concerned. This dre,wback--which, however, is a very limited one because tile number of capitals is not high--would be com- pensated for both by the possibility of elimfnating connection with the Pre- fectures carried out by official means, as is now provided for, and by the advantages derived from it by Commands, civilian organs, territorial defense units and various units. The staffing, though, must be carried ou; beforehand, in peacetime, for the purpose of: --making the "mixed provincial intelligence center" functional, on the basis of agreements with the other organs concerned, in accordance with a periodic calendar that provides for meetings for compilation and updating of civilian- military intelligence planning as weli as appropriately programmed exer- cises ; --activating, in extremely short times, the entire "integrated" territorial intelligence network, both in case of serious international crisis and in case of natural calamities. � After mobilization, this arrangement could be taken as a sole model for - the entire national territory, with the duties of the "mixed center" assigned to the Provincial Military Commands (the setting-up of which is not provided for behind the lines of the I`~ajor Unified Units). Conclusions A few years ago, the proposal explained might have been considered precipitate. Today, though, the time seems to be ripe for adoption.of organizational con- cepts more in line with the dynamics of modern tactical procedures and for overcoming the compartmentalization at the lower and intermediate levels, with connections consequently effected solely at the higher levels, which, in any case, are to be preserved unaltered. War has never been a private matter of the military, but future war will be _ even less so. Thus, military and civilians involved together in equal measure in dangers, privations and sufferings of various kinds will have to unite in a common front of resistance, cemented by the same force of will and determination. But moral qualities and qualities of character are not enough by themselves - for coping with the serious perils of a war; it is also, and especially, nec- essary to organize with the means adapted in time to the requirements. The scheme outlined should obviously be developed in depth and studied in all the aspects of its application, and it might not even pass the scrutiny of close criticism applied in the light of obstr~:ctive considerations which at the moment escape one. 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200024444-9 c;~:; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY But the purpose of this lightly sketched study is to draw attention and to spark discussion among the civilian and military officials who, because of ~A direct responsibility or from simple personal interest, "notice" the problem. Other approaches might well be taken, provided that the two basic principles are preserved: a service that is functional and effective from peacetime on, ~,nd a unified civilian-military intelligence effort. i:' T ~ ~ The areas behind the lines of the complex ariqy corps are in zones where a ~ great many activities simultaneously take place that are especielly vulnerable . to any offensive that is not countered in a very timely~ manner. - It is vital that the civilian administrations and the military Commands have ~ a steadily clear and consistent view of the situation, so as to ensure order and security. It is vital because the forces behind the lines constitute the ` close support for the technical requirements and are the direct su~port of the moral and spiritual stability of the advance ar~y corps. i COPYRIGHT: RIVISTA MILITARE PERIODICO DELL'ESERCITO, ANNO CII, 1~1UMERO 4/1979 11267 d CSO: 3104 ; . � ~L~ Y, ~ ~ ~ ~ f - ~ � 4 ~ j ~ 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY - COUIITRY SECTION SPAIN _ BRIEFS ' TIERNO'S PRESTIGE--Enrique Tierno Galvan, mayor of Madrid, has asked ~ Alonso Puerta to have the Madrid Socialist Federation name him [Tierno] president of the federation. Enrique Tierno feels that it is not proper that he be a simple militant of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16�in Spanish 4 Nov 79 p 7] GRAPO'6 ALGERIAN CONNECTION--The guerrilla instruction manuals confiscated from GRAPO [First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups] by the Madrid _ police are clearly Algerian inspired. About 90 percent of its pages are devoted to the making of homemade arms and explosives. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 Nov 79 p 7] ETA IN BRUSSELS--Spanish security services have detected the presence of important ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] leaders in Brussels. - For 2 months now, and since the measures adopted by the French Government regarding Basque political ref.ugees went into effect, Bruss~els appears to have become one of the centers of E~A activities in Europe. [Text] [Ma- drid CA1~I0 16 in Spanish 28 Oct 79 p 7] 'DESCUBIERTA' CLASS CORVETTES--Spain will build three "Descubierta" class missile launching corvettes for the Thai navy. The corvettes will be built in Cartagena. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Oct 79 p 7] LIBYA TO PURCHASE SUBS--Libya is once again interested in purchasing four "Daphne" class submarines. These submarines will be built in Cartagena under French license. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIG 16 in Spanish 11 Nov 79 p 7] CSO: 3110 END 38 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020044-9