JPRS ID: 74695 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030002-4
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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3 DE~CEMBER i979 N0. Z0S2 i OF i
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JPRS 74695
3 December 1979
/ frica Re ort
Near East North A
p
No. 2052
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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST IN~OR(V1~?TION SERViCE
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NOTE
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Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the -
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was ,
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mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names pxeceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the .
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Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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3027~ -I II~cIp1~M's Acc~~~lon No.
REppR'T pOCUMFNTATION 1. ~c'~"T t1O.
PAQE JPRS 74695 _
~iea .~a weuu� ~ p.vo�s o.a -
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2052 3 December 1979 -
6.
7. Author(~l S. hAormin~ Or~~nl:~llo~ R~pt. No
9. P~rlormin~ Or~~nli~llon N~m~ ~nd Addr~~~ 10. ~ro~~ct/T~~k/WorN Unll Ho.
Joint Yublications Reaearch Service
1000 North Glebe Rosd 11. CoMnet(C) or GnM(fi) No.
Arlingtor~, Virginia 22201
~c~
l2. Spoeiswln~ Or~~nl:~tlon N~m~ ~nd Addms 17. Typ~ of R~poR 6 P~rlod Cov~nd =
As above i4.
~s. a~ca�m�m..y nw..
16. Ab~tr~et (llmit~ 200 wordU
Thig s~rial rPport contains information on socioeconomic, government, political,
and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
17. Docurr�M Analysl~ O~scrlpton
P~~tirical Science X Inter-Arab Affbirs X Libya Sultanate `
Suciology North African Mauritanfa of Oman
EconomLcs Affaire Morocco Syria
Culture (Social A,fghaniatan People's Demo- Tunisia
Scienc~:s) Algeria cratic Republic X United Arab
Ethnology X Bahrain df Yemen Emirates
_ Geography Egypt Persian Gulf Western Sahara
Techological X Iran Area Yem~n Arab
Military Sciencea Iraq Qatar Republic
X Israel X Saudi Arabia
Jor.dan Spanish North
x Kuwait Africa
X Lebanon X Sudan
b. IMntIMn/Op~~�End~d T~nns
coan ri.ieio~o 5D, 5C, SK, 15
1~. Av~ b^ M~ If. l~euAtY Clas~ (This R~port) 21. No. o} Paps
Uni~~te~ .'~vailability UNCLASSIFIED 56
Sold by NTI5 t~ t.owier cw.. c*ni. r.r~ za�
Springfield, Virginia 22161 LINCLASSIFIED
ce.. ~N~.~n s.. M�.~~�n Rw~.... oaw~ ro~w:~: a-�>
(Fenmrfy NTIi-~!)
- D~p~Rn�M of Comm~ro~
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JPRS 74695
3 December 1979
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
, No. 2052
CONTEN7S PA~E
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Report on Disagreements Among Arab Communist Parties
(AL-DUSTUR, 8-14 Oct 79) 1
Arab Borrowing and Investment Policies Analyzed
('Adnan Karimah; AL-HAWADITH, 12 Oct 79) 3
Briefs
Joint Petrochemical Company 8
BAHRAIN
; Information Minister, Officials Comment on Gul� Sectirity
(AL-HAWADITfi, 19 Oct 79) 9
IRAN
Kurdish Revolt Seen as Major Challenge to Khomeyni
(Kiekie M. Ngebay; ELIMA, 11 Oct 79) 16
ISRAEL
Expansion of Settlements in Judaea, Samaria Urged
(Editorial; HAZOFEH, 5 Oct 79) 18
Establishment of New Rightist Party Scored _
('Amos Eylon; HA'ARETZ, 12 Oct 79) 20
KUWAiT
U.S. Plot Seen Behind Gulf Security Proposal
(Editorial; AL-RA'Y AL-'ArIIri, 23 Sep 79) 23
-a- [III -NE &A- 121]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Boycott Against American Goods Urged
(Editorial; AL-RA'Y AL-'ANIlri, 22 Sep 79)............ 25
- Shifting Alliances i.n Kuwait, Gulf Region Analyzed
(Salim al-Lawzi; AL-HAWADITH, 26 Oct 79)........... 27
LEBANON
Statement of Maronite Patriarch Khuraysh
- (AL-SAFIR, 6 Oct 79) 34
LIBYA
I.ibyan Opposition Attacks Qadhdhafi Despotism
(AL-JIHAD, Sep 79) 36
Qadhdhafi Said Destroying Small Tradesmen
(AL-JIMAD, Sep 79) 40
Interview With Libyan Petroleum Secretary
(Ezzedin Mabruk Interview; AL-NAHAR ARAB REPOR.T
& MEMO, 15 Oct 79) 41
SAUDI ARABIA
Aid to Mali for Development, Islamj.c Activities
Reported
('Abd-al-Muhsin al-Daud; AL-RIYAD, 3 Oct 79)....... 43
- PETROMIN Announced Aircraft Fuel PipelinP
(AL-RIYAD, 11 Oct 79) 47
Briefs _
Well, Pipeline Maintenance 49
SUDAN
Khartoum Seeks Big Western Loan
(AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 15 Oct 79)........... 50
Brief s
Arab Monetary Fur.d Loan 52
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
UN1TEll A1tA~3 ~:MT[tA7'ES ~
Briefs
Resolution of Di~~erences 53
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
REPORT ON DISAGREEMENTS AMONG ARAB COMMi1NIST PARTIES
l~ondon AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8-14 Oct 79 p 6 ~
[Article: "The Lebanese Communist Party and Arab Communist Parties: Will
Disa~;reements I3ecome Critical?"]
~'1'ext] It appears that tlie Fourth Conference of the Lebanese Communist
1'arty did not go well, because in no time at all, party pamphlets were re-
vealing the existence of disagreements within the organization which go
back to earlier periods. _
'I'he group of Hasan Qaritam and Sawaya Sawaya, which is called the "Marxist-
I~c~ninist Platoons," announced tiiat disagreements exist within the party and
cl~arged Ceorge Hawi with dictatorship, juvenile leftisr adverturism, and hos-
- tility to the Soviet Union and the world communist movement.
In the pamphlet "Call of the People," which was distributed to newspapers,
magazines, and news agencies, the Qaritam-Sawaya group added that George
Hawi explo~_`d the exceptional security conditions which prevail in the
country to fabricate a"fourtll conference" and appoint his o~vn elements
directly and through his control. He then staged an internal "overthrow"
uperation against Niqula al-Shawi, toppling him from the leadership of the
general secretariat, and installed himself in his place. He gratified al-
Shawi with an honorary position in order to turn aside resentment and contain
a series of protests and objections.
The Communist Party has not yet replied to these "accusations," and it appears '
that the party leadership prefers silence to discussion with a group that
was purged during preparation for the Second Conference (1968), which came
_ immediately after the 5 June defeat.
ThE source of the Communist Party's fear of and aversion to issuing a reply
is the existence of certain hidden relationships between the Sawaya-Qari-
' tam group and some Arab communist parties which have complained about the
- criticisms of George Hawi.
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It is worth mentioning that some of the Arab communist parties were alarmed
by Hawi's recent statements and charged him with opportunism, a spirit of
adventurism, and ostentatiousness at the expense of destroying the legacy
and history of the other parties.
Some sources say that a certain amount of bloc formation has begun to mani-
fest itself within the Arab communist movement to confront the devisive
attitude of which George Hawi has been accused.
These sources add that some of the Arab communist parties (the group of
Khalid Bakdash in Syria, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Jordanian
Communist Party) have expressed their uneasiness about the haughty and
pedagogical orientation which the Lebanese Communist Party has displayed
toward them, especialiy on certain past and present political issues.
Moreover, it is likely that these disagreements will have serious reper-
cussions on the regular meetings which the Arab communist parties organize
from time to time. There is a real fear that the Arab communist movement
will split into two wings, each with its own theories, positions, and prac-
tices.
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,
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ARAB BORROWING AND INVESTMENT POLICIES ANALYZED
London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 12 Oct 79 pp 52-53
[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "How Do the Arabs Borrow From Abroad?"]
[Text] When the United States--or to be exact, the American Commerce De-
partment--announced that direct Arab investments re present 0.5 percent of
total foreign investments, amounting to $200 million out of a total of $40
billion in 1978, it undoubtedly ignored numerous channels through which
Arab money flows in to support the American economy.
For in addition to the profits and gains of American oil companies and other
companies working in the Arab region, and the value of goods and services
imported from the United States and paid for by area countries, there is a
- large influx of Arab funds into the various apparatuses which make up the
American capital market. The funds enter this market through several direct
and indirect channels.
� Without entering into a discussion of just how correct the American Commerce
Departments's figure is, we will content ourselves with presenting estimates
of invest;nents by OPEC countries. These estimates indicate that OPEC in-
vestments as of the end of last year totaled approximately $168 billion, of
whi~h $150 billion belonged to the Arab oil-producing states.
These investments appear in three channels, with the lion's share going to
the United States. _
--Through the first channel, various financial and direct investments to- -
taling $42 billion flowed into the United States. But though this estimate
is conf irmed by the American Treasury Department, the U.S. General Accounting
Office's estimate is higher by more than $10 billion, putting the figure
at $53 billion. This sum is distributed as follows: $3.9 billion in shares, _
$12.4 billion in Treasury bonds, $3.6 billion in nontransferrable certificates
uf deposit, $12.2 billion in deposits in American b anks, and $19.8 billion
in deposits in foreign branches of American banks.
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,
--The second channel consists of financial investments in international
m~~rketti ~imounCLng ta $60 billion. The American economy benefits from t}ies~~
! ui?dy t liruugl~ Ameri~~~~n :ind n~n-American I jIIRRC'I.FIl rind banking lnvti[utic~n5
whicl~ Lrade in the Am~:rican capital market.
--The third channel carries financial and direct investments into other in-
dustrialized states. The American economy also benefits from these invest-
ments through its institutions which operate in these states and trade in `
their markets.
~
Despite their small volume in relation to total foreign investments in the
United States, direct Arab investments in that country are considerably
li.igher, experts estimate, than Arab financial investments in the Arab states
tliemselves. T~iis has been the basis for complaints about the failure of
Arab capital to flow into those states and the lack of participation of
these funds in Arab development as required, to the extent that countries
needing loans turn to institutions in the international market to obtain
them, in some cases borrowing the very funds they have on deposit in foreign .
banks.
Statistics issued by the International Bank, which also appear in a publica-
- tion by Morgan Guaranty Trust, indicate that total Arab borrowing ir~ the
international market during ~he past 7 years amounted to $16.5 billion.
This falls into two categories: -
The first category encompasses loans made in the international bond markets
by foreign insti.tutions for the benefit of Arab borrowers, amount~ng to a
total of about $1.5 billion during the past 7 years. Algeria was the largest
borrower, alone accounting for about 80 percent of the total, or $1.187
biZlion. Next came Morocco with $136 million in loans, fol.lowed by Tunisia
with $83 million and the UAE with $42 million. Even Saudi Arabia had a
stiare in these loans, amounting to $10 million, and Lebanon abtained a
loan ~f $5 mi.llion.
_ The second category takes in public and private Arab loans in the inter-
national bank loan market, which were in the form of collective bank loans -
with a variablc interest rate. During the past 7 years, such loans amounted
to about 14 billion dollars, which was allocated to finance specific pro;jects
and to covE- deficits in balance of payments accounts, regular budgets, ;ind
devel.opment budgets.
Arab experts are of the opinion that this figure includes only those lending
operations which are publicized, since the details of the conditions of
many loans granted in this market are surrounded by a certain amount of
' secrecy on the part of Arab banks, and in the maj ority of cases ar~. not made
public at the request of the borrowers themselves. For this reason, these
experts estimatE~ that the true total of Arab borrowing in the international
bank lending market was not less than $15 billion during the specified
period.
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Algcria again occupied first place with regard to this type of loan, with ~
_ l~orrowings of about $6 hillion, followed by the UAE with $2.5 billion,
Morocco with $2.2 billion, and Iraq with $68~ million. Ranked Eifth was
Ggypt with $605 million, followed by Qatar with $450 million, T~inisia ~aith _
$3'LS million, Sudan with $302 million, Lebanon with $271 millio~i, and,
finally, Saudi Arabia with $265 million.
- Although Arab borrowing in international markets, whether throui;h bonds or
bank loans, jumped from $215 million in 1972 to $1.65 billion at the end
of 1978, this increase was in keeping with the general trend in all Third
World states, whose borrowing in general on international markets rose
greatly--especially following the oil price increase in 1973. The volume
of these loans increased from $3 billion in 1972 to more than $41 billion in
1978. The total amount of Third World loans during the past 7 years was
_ :ibout $114 billion. Thus Arab borrowing represented some 14 percent of total _
borrow ing by Third World states.
To indicate the role of the American financial and banking institutions
through which international bank loans are made to Arab borrowers, we can
make use of figures for 1978 which refer to 30 mixed foreign and Arab insti-
tutions from among the most important international financial institutions
which managed Arab loans. Three institutions had the lion's shaY., accounting
for approximately $1.4 billion out of the $3.8 billion which made up the
_ total of all lending operations by the 30 institutions. These three insti-
tutions were the Bank of America with $546 million, City Corporation ~aith
$449 million, and Toronto-Dominion Bank with $392 miliion.
A positive point to the advantage of the Arabs, though in a negative form, _
must be pointed out here. Statistics for 1978 indicate that Arab and joint
Arab-European institutions managed $1.2 billion, or 32 percent, of the total
funds on loan. This is an impressive percentage, aad Arab experts see it
as the start of real participatior. by Arab financial institutions in sec:uring -
ri portion of ttie reserves of Arab borrowers through their organizations and -
at competitive rates. This does not mean, however, rhat these institutions '
have taken this amount into their own individual lending portfolios; rather
they have sold a significant portic~n of the loans to other foreign insti-
tutions--a ract which arises from theiz restricted capacities to absorb -
large volumes of Arab loans into their own portfolios, either presently or
in the future, due to their limited capital. "or, as is widely known, there
are specified ratios which must be maintained between a bank's capital and
its total portfolio of loans in accordance with the principles of sound
international banking operations.
All of these f.acts about channels of Arab capital, expresspd with true
exactness by the figures, are closely r~eeded by Arab experts. Studies by
the ton have been produced on the necessity of adopting the required measures
to ensure that this capital is made to flow in Arab channels, so that it can
take part in developing the economy of the Arab homeland. The latest of
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these studies Ls a report prepared by a committee of experts commissioned
by the Council of Uirectors of Arab Central Banks. This report, entitled
"Metlt~ds of Developing the Arab Financial Market," was discussed by the
directors at their last meeting, which took place on 24 September of this
year in Tripoli West, Libya.
The report ~tates in its introduction: "Visib~~ trends incidate that the
coming decade will put Arab region ~,:p against a unique and unprecedented
challenge. On the one ha:~u, we find that the main Arab oil-producing coun-
- tries will amass vast and uninterrupted financial revenues, even after cover-
ing the financing requirements of their local development objectives, and
that these revenues must be invested to generate a permanent souce of in-
come, in view of the fact that the oil source is exhaustible. On the -
other hand, we find that foreign financial revenues will continue to play
a primary role in spurring the development and inve�tment potential of the
ottier Arab states and in making a success of their efforts to improve the
living standard of their citizens.
"Therefore," the report continues, "The great challenge which the Arab
region will face in the coming decade has become possible through enlisting
a long-range investment strategy which will achieve in practical terms a
deep-rooted conformity among the interests of both the Arab oil-produciag
statej and the Arab states which need capital."
However, as the experts point out in their report: "This matter requires
concentrated efforts to overcome problems corrected with the aid, which limits
the capacity of the Arab region to absorb new investments generated by oil
assets. This means providing the capability to sse financial aid obtained
- on easy terms, as well as the capacity to attract financing off.ered on a com-
petitive commercial basis through Arab financial markets in a way that will -
put existing investments policies in the Arab region in order--even though
they participate with or compete with similar policies our_side the area in
attracting Arab oil revenues available for investment."
_ Such a concept, in the view of the experts, makes the role of the financial
markets a truly important one with regard to working to increase the volume -
and effectiveness of private and public capital f lows within the Arab re-
gion on a commercial basis.
Absorption capacity is one of four things which the experts described as
fundamental to the development of a financial market, the other three being:
1. Financial apparatus and institutions.
2. Freedum of movement of funds.
3. An investment climate.
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'1'he last item is perhaps the most important, and lack ~f confidence in
- the Arab climate is undoubtedly one of the main reasons that Arabs have re-
~orr_ed to investing their assets abroad.
In vlew of the fact that the investment issue has now begun to transcend
ttie ~imits of individual initiatives and reach the heart of the official
poiicy of the two parties to an investment--noting that the majority of
Arab assets are government assets--the movement of Arab assets so that they
will end up in the various countries which make up the Arab economy requires,
as the e:cperts state in their report, that the investment climate be charac-
terized by a certain level of confidence, clarity, and stability, making
possible the implementation of integrated and large-scale investment pro-
grams. Since the majority of Arab assets belong to the government, this
lends a political character--to investment decisions--a fact which dictates _
= that a minimum level of coordination be created among the various financial
and investment policies of the different parties.
This means that what is required is, firstly, Arab political decisions at
the level of heads of state and kings in order to save Arab capital from
suffering a decline in value abroad, and secondly, the utilization of this
capital to strengthen the Arab economy.
Adding to the need for making such decisions is the fact that the pressures
which surround Arab assets, and the blocs formed or remarks circulated on
account of them abro ad, have turned an appropriate investment climate with-
in the Arab homeland into a~.,an-Arab and national responsibility which is
indispensable if Arabs are to maintain these assets and enable them to
escape the fate which may be planned for them.
_ In this connection, the Arab experts, in the repor.t they made to the directors
of the Arab central b anks, warned against any relaxation or carelessness, "for
with the passage of time and an increase in investment activities outside the
Arab homeland, we wi 11 reach a position where Ara~ investment comes closer
- to being a weapon against the Arab investors themselves--especially since
nationalization, sei zure, and asset-freezing operations by various states
abroad are no longer unexpected events." -
Do Arab politicians at the highest levels perceive the responsi5ility thrust
on their shoulders and the challenge awaiting them in the 1980's as their ex- -
_ perts perceive them? Will they be able to settle their deep-seated and per-
sistent differences in orde r to unify their positions vis-a-vis their fateful
problems, including the problem of maintaining their countries' wealth?
Despite the fact tha t hope is slim, we must repeat the proverb which says:
"How narrow life would be, were it not for the ampleness of hope!"
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- tNTER-ARAA AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
_ JOINT PETROCHEMICAL CCIMPANY--'Isa ibn Salman A1 Khalifa, amir of the State
of Bahrain, met with [Kuwaiti] Oil Minister 'Ali al-Khalifa al-Sabah
yesterday. It has been learned from a responsible source in al-Manamah
that 'Ali Sabah had sent the amir of Bahrain a message �eom his highness
the amir dealing with recent developments of common concern which have
occurred in the Gulf area. Meanwhile, Kuwait and Bahrain signed an agree-
ment yesterday for the establishment of a Kuwaiti-Bahraini petrochemicals
company. The agreement was signed on behalf of Kuwait by Oil Minister 'Ali
al-Khalifa al-Sabah, who arrived in al-Manamah 2 days ago. Signing for
Bahrain was Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi,
The capitalization of the company was not immediately announced. However,
a Bahraini source said that the volume of investments for the establishment
of projects related to the company is 140 million Bahraini dinars (about
$420 million). After the signing of the agreement founding the company,
which will be called the Kuwaiti-Bahraini Petrochemicals Company, the two
ministers expressed their hope that the venture will be the start of other
- joint projects which will help support the economic and industrial projecta i
which exist between~the two countries. The president of the Kuwaiti Petro- ~
chemicals Company, Abd-al-Baqi al-Nuri, said that the new company will
produce basic inputs for subsequent phases of the petrochemicals industry
through exploitation of natural gas, which is found in Bahrain in large
quantities. [Text] [Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'ArII~1 in Arabic 23 Sep 79 p 7]
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BAHRAIN
INFORMATION MINISTER, OFFICIALS COMMENT OP7 GULF SECURITY
London AL-HAWADITH iii Arabic 19 Oct 79 pp 27-30
[Interview with the information miiiister and other officials in Bahrain by
Salim A1-Lawzi: "Is Ayatollah Ruhani an Agent of the Shah or of Shaykh
'Isa?")
[Text] Early this w~~ek, the Bahraini ambassador presented his credentials to
the government in Teliran. Could that have been the happy ending of the
Iranian tempest whiclt has struck Bahrain? We single out Bahrain, because
the Kuwaiti authorities do not believe that the Iranian threat included Ku-
wait. The action taken by Kuwait's Interior Ministry in which 17 members of
the Mahri family--in-laws of Ayatollah Khomeyni--have been stripped of their
Kuwaiti nationality is seen in Kuwait as nothing more than a legal action
dealing with an ordinary violation of local laws and puttin~ a firm end to
- it.
The attempt to minimize the signif icance of what has happened in Kuwait is
undoubtedly a clever policy. In Bahrain, this policy is paralleled by the
policy typified by the old saying "Put away a problem before it puts you
away" [i.e. pre-emptive action]. The Bahraini authorities have success-
fully contained the tempest stirred up by Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani, the self-
styled leader of the Bahraini revolution dedicated to the overthrow of the
regime of Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman. Indeed, the authorities in Bahrain have
even managed to utilize the tempest to their own benefit and to reap its
fruits on the domestic, pan-Arab and international levels.
Was the tempest contrived and sham or was it simply the result of impulsive
actions? And if it is sham, who is it that contrived it? And who has en-
larged it and magnified it into an event that has rocked the region and sent
- ripples through the waters of the Gulf for the last 4 weeks?
_ The story had an ordinary beginning. A number of Shi'ite dignitaries in
Bahrain traveled to Iran to offer their congratulations on the tritir.?ph of
the Islamic revolution there. The group was led by Muhammad 'Ali al-Qa'ri,
a former Bahraini offi~ial-turned-imam who has been badgering the authorities
to prohil~it alcohol, ban mixed employment of inen and women, forbid the
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employm.ent of women in public service and abolish the teaching of music.
While in Tehran, the Bahr3ini dignitaries had a meeting with Ayatollah Sadiq
Kuhani who urged them to emulate what the Iranians had done against the
= shah's regime. By sheer coincidence, the Egyptian Vice President Husni
Mubarak was visiting the Sultanate of Oman at the time, where he read the
remarks made by Ayatollah Rouhani and the fierce Ir.aqi reply which warned
that Iran's fingers would be chopped off it they meddled in any Arab part
of the Gulf. Mubarak found it a propitious opportunity to declare that
Egypt was prepared to stand by any Arab country facing an external threat
and remark that "the Iranian threats against Bahrain imperil the security
of the Gulf and should be confr~nted firmly and strongly, and Egypt is
- prepared to discuss Bahrain's self-defense needs."
The Egyptian official's statements roused the region and kept it simmering.
In successive actions, Saudi Arabia declared that it was prepared [to help
Bahrain], the Kuwaiti prime minister and crown prince contacted Bahrain's
crown prince to tell him that Kuwait was prepared to send troops, and the _
prime minister of Bahr~in, Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Salman, took with him a
number of ministers and flew to Saudi Arabia for urgent talks with the Saudi
crown prince.
Amid this commotion, the AFP flashed a report which made the front pages of
newspapers in Europe, America, the Arab capitals and the Gulf. Briefly,
the AFP reported that Saudi forces had suddenly arrived in Bahrain and taken
up positions in strategic locations to deal with any emergency. The AFP -
attributed the report to Iranian opposition sources in Paris in what seems
to be an allusion to the Bakhtiar faction. On the same day, it was announced -
that King Khalid of Saudi Arabia would be visiting Libya, at a time when the
deputy premier of Iran was accusing Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi of having
spirited away Imam Musa al-Sadr [Lebanese Shi'ite leader] and holding him ~
responsible for al-Sadr's disappearance. ~
As those and other events and developments continued to unfold in rapid '
succession, it appeared as if the battle between the Sunnis and Shi'ites
and the Arabs and Persians has begun. This feeling was augmented by a
statement in which the new Iranian defense minister Dr Mostafa Shamran an- -
nounced that the Iranian fleet has begun naval maneuvers in the Gulf and
that land and aerial maneuvers will be conducted shortly because an Arab
state in the region is openly threatening Iran. He said that the government
in Iran wanted to demonstrate its ability to defend itself against any pos-
sible external military attack.
These reports continued to escalate for 4 days. After that came a torrent
of counter-statements which contained more confirmation than denial. The
AFP carried a statement by Bahrain's information minister Dr Tariq al-
Mu'ayyid which was published in the English-language newspaper GULF MIRROR.
- Dr al-Mu'ayyid said that military visits between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia
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were continuing. Asked about the military support offered by Husni Mubarak,
Presidc�nt al-Sadat's deputy, Dr al-Mu'ayyid said that the Saudis, in their
ca~~~icity ~is the nearest and dearest, are morc~ entitled to come to 13ahrain'S
c~Id. It was then the turn of Shaykh Hamad Ibn 'Isa, Bahrain's crown princc
and defense minister, to announce that there were no Arab forces in Bahrain `
"at present" and that the prime minister of Bahrain had gone to Saudi
Arabia to discuss the security situation in the Gulf.
Interestingly enough, Amir Sultan Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Saudi defense minis-
ter, said at a private gathering in Geneva which included a number of jour-
nalists: "...The kingdom has not sent forces to Bahrain, but we stand
ready to send Bahrain anything that it needs. When we invited the Gulf
heads of state to Khamis Mushayt in July to watch the Saudi Army's military
maneuvers, the message behind our invitation was that the Saudi Army is their
army, too." However, news agencies have failed to carry Amir Sultan's
statement and no paper has published it.
Was there an intention, a plan or an "imperialist plot" behind the escalation
of tension in the Gulf area, or was this hullabaloo merely the result of a
competition among news agencies to score a scoop?
I'went to see Bahraini Information Minister Tariq al-Mu'ayyid and put to
him the following question: Was the ambiguity in your press statements
intended? The minister was taken aback by the question. He adjusted his
glasses with his right hand, sat upright and said: "Intended? By whom?"
"By you," I said.
[Answer] If there is any intent, then Che news agencies are to blame.
They have been recently carrying many statements which have been distorted _
or slanted to serve certain purposes. Regrettably, our press in the Gulf
was carrying the statements and information reported by foreign news agencies
without first verifying them or contacting the source to check their vera-
city.
[Question] What are those certain purposes which you impute to the foreign
news agencies?
[Answer] To create the impression that there is an atmosphere of tension
in the region, whereas all the statements concerned were emphasizing that
what has happened was nothing more than a summer cloud.
[Question] If it was merely a summer cloud, as you say, why then the mili-
tary preparations, statements, visits and affirmatiAns of Arab solidarity,
and why was discussion of the Gul~~ security issue renewed?
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(Answer] By a summer cloud, I mean to describe the events which took place
in Bahrain. There were those ~aho wanted td exaggerate the significance
of those events to create the impression that we have internal problems.
As for external issues, foreign ambitions are nothing new to us. What is
new, however, are the statements and counter-statements which are not re-
assuring with regard to foreign intentions. The states of the Gulf found
it propitious, therefore, to reaffirm their solidarity and re-emphasize
their determination to defend themselves against any attempt at sabotage
or aggression....
[Question] External aggression?
[Answer] Of course. We can handle internal aggression.
[Question] (I found it a good opportunity to present to the minister--who
has lost 2 kilograms of weight in the past 2 months--some current press
information, so I said:) Is it true that Amir Fahd (Saudi Arabia's crown
prince and strongman) has asked the Bahraini delegation which visited him
under the leadership of Shaykh Khalif.ah, the prime minister, to pay a visit
to Baghdad?
[Answer] (The minister, who was now slouching in his seat, sat up again).
Al1 that I can say on this subject is that Iraq has a role to play in this
region. Both the Saudi and Bahraini governments believe in the importance
of that role. We cannot exclude Iraq from any moves made by the Gulf
states .
[QuestionJ Why then have you asked Syria to act as a mediator between you
and Khomeyni?
[Answer] We have received messages of support from a number of Arab states,
while other Arab states issued official and unofficial statements in which
they said that they stand with us against any threat. This indicates that
Arab soiidarity is a basic fact and that all the Arab states would not allow
any foreign interference in Bahrain's affairs. The fact of the matter is
that there are no problems between us and Imam Khomeyni or the Iranian
government. All that there is is that some men of religion in Iran have
made provocative statements which were magnified by the media beyond their
real significance.
[Question] I asked you about the Syrian mediation....
[Answer~ It was the media which described the good offices made by Presi-
dent Hafiz al-Asad as a mediation effort. We are grateful for such efforts.
[Question] Don't you believe that the contrived dispute with Iran has drag-
ged you into the ring of the Syrian-Iraqi struggle over influence?
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[Answer] (The minister stood up, lit up a Havana cigar and said:) I don't
wish to answer this question. In any case, I am not qualified to answer it.
The exaggeration of events, distortion of position and overstatements which
tl~e Bahraini minister of information has blamed on foreign news agencies
are considered by Kuwaiti officials to be a symptom of the informational
cancer in the Kuwaiti press. When I asked a senior Kuwaiti official about
the nature of the Syrian mediation, he immediately said: A Syrian mediation? _
We are not a party to the dispute with Iran. The recent verbal onslaught
was directed against Bahrain. Iran has not advocated the annexation of
Kuwait, as some Iranian men of religion have done with regard to Bahrain,
nor has anyone in Kuwait offered to lead an Islamic revolution against the
regime, as Ruhani has offered to do in Bahrain.
I clutched a number of morning papers which were lying on the desk of the
senior Kuwaiti official and said: These are Kuwaiti papers. It is these
papers which labeled the Syrian endeavors a"mediation" effort. Here is a
frontpage headline which reads: "A Syrian Mediation Between Kuwait and Bah-
rain and Iran." Here is a headline in another paper: "Success of the Syrian
Mediation Between Kuwait and Bahrain and Iran." And here are similar head-
lines in the other papers. The entire Kuwaiti press agrees on calling it a
mediation effort. The senior Kuwaiti official was irked--annoyance has
become quite common among officials and.nonofficials in the Gulf nowadays--
and said: You come fxom abroad where you sit in London and read the Kuwaiti
papers, and you imagine that things are'as news agencies and some journalists
writing in these papers have painted them to be. Anyone who lives abroad
and reads iCuwaiti newspapers will imagine that the world has gone topsy-
turvy in our country. The newspapers here write all kinds of hodgepodge.
He ruffled through the he~p of newspapers sitting on his desk and said:
Each newspaper weighs a kilogram, but most of what is written here is sheer
nonsense and gibberish. I told him: This is not unusual. Pardon my saying
so, but the oil press is indeed a sort of informational cancer, as you have
described it. When there is a competition among your papers, with each
paper trying to outstrip the others in number of pages, when the number of
professional journalists is far less than what is required and when this pheno-
menon spreads throughout the Gulf region, then don't expect the press here _
to measure up to the standard which you desire.
A similar remark was made to me by Shaykh Hamad Ibn 'Isa, the Bahraini
crown prince and defense minister!
[Question] I have read a statement attributed to you by the GULF NEWS AGENCY
in which you comment on reports that two Saudi brigades have arrived in
Bahrain by saying that there are no Arab forces in Bahrain at present. The
words "at preserit" could mean that there were forces in the past. I per-
sonally heard in Kuwait that Saudi national guard forces were dispatched to
Bahrain on 'Id al-Fitr following a pro-Khomeyni demonstration.
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(Answer] (Laughingly) God forgive the press and members of the press.
They have mixed up my statements with those of brother Tariq (al-Mu'ayyid,
ti~e minister of information).
[Question] Ayatollah Ruhani has not yet corrected the press statements he
- has made in Tehran and has not said that the statements were distorted.
Otherwise, the tempest which has struck the Gulf and kept it reeling was a
- tempest in a thimble, not even in a teacup.
[Answer] On the contrary, re has confirmed his statements. This has prompted
the Iranian ambassador in Paris (Shams al-Din Amiralai) to accuse him of
being an agent of the shah and to say that he has in his possession files
and documents to prove that.
[Question] Would you allow me to correct the Iranian ambassador in Paris?
[Answer] Please do.
[Question] I believe that Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani is an agent of Bahrain,
and who knows he may be connected with Mr Henderson of the intelligence
department.
(Before Shaykh Hamad could snap out of the astonishment which showed on
his face, I went on:) I don't know to what extent this Iranian tempest which
has struck Bahrain has been engineered and orchestrated, and to what extent
it has been caused by impulsion, emotion and haphazardness. I also cannot
judge to what extent foreign news agencies have been responsible for exag-
gerating events, distorting statements and planting information. Those news
agencies are, in fact, steeped in the arts of psychological manipulation.
But I can tabulate for your highness the domestic, Arab and international
gains garnered by Bahrain as a result ~f the statements made by Ayatollah
Sadiq Rouhani. On the domestic front, all that was needed to turn the
issue in Bahrain into one of Arabism versus non-Arabism was a call by an
- Iranian man of religion to lead an Islamic revolution in Bahrain to overthrow
the regime. Indeed, the Sunnis and Shi'ites banded together in a show of
solidarity and said in effect: We may have objections to and claims a-
gainst the regime, but the regime should remain an Arab one, and no non-
Bahraini should be allowed to interfere in our affairs. On the Arab front,
Bahrain has reaped endless gains. The Arab states, especially the Gulf
states, have all lined up on Bahrain's side. Thanks to the tempest, what
al-Sadat called "an Iraqi-Saudi axis in the Gulf area" has come true. The
Iranian tempest has enabled Iraq to enter the Gulf states' club as a full-
fledged and accepted--indeed, sought after.--member. On the global front,
one has only to scan foreign newspapers and news agency reports to realize
that Bahrain enjoyed an unlimited world sympathy.
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(I went on tongue-in-cheek: Frankly, I considered the idea of using Shaykh
Ryuhani to threaten AL-HAWADITH and offer to lead an Islamic revolution
against it, in the hope af getting even a small part of the gains you,
in Behrain, have gotten.
Next morning, I was at the ma,jlis [public council] of Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Sal-
man, the ruler of Bahrain, at his palace in A1-Rifa'. It was natural that
the conversation at the gathering should revolve around the Khomeyni revo-
lution, the various ayatollahs and their statements and pronouncements and
- the impact of all that on the Shi'ite Arabs in the Gulf. A Bahraini digni- .
tary said quietly: Even in Iran, the other sects do not practice their
rites as they do here in Bahrain. The Shi'ites here have their awn separate
waqfs [religious endowments] department as the Sunnis do. They have Ja'-
farite courts separate from the Sunnis courts. In the realm of personal
statute, inheritance procedures follow the Ja'farite doctrine. In fact,
there are special educational centers which fall under the ~urisdiction of
the Ja'farite guidance department.
It seems that the amir caught part of the talk which was whispered in my
ear, for his face suddenly darkened--a rare occurrence--and he slammed the
table with his little hand. Then he said: I do not allow in my council
any talk about Sunnis or Shi'ites. The secret of Bahrain's progress is that
it is a society of coexistence based on equal sharing. Competition is,
therefore, creative and constructive rather than destructive, and the spirit
which prevails is that of a closely knit family. One's first loyalty is to
Bahrain, after that each person is free to practice his beliefs and rites.
Calm returned to the amir's gentle face, and he went on: Allegiance to Bah-
rain is ~bove allegiance to anything else. The question of a ma~ ority and a
minority is not a valid~one, and anyone who raises this issue is a saboteur
working against the Shi'ites and the Sunnis alike.
I have known Shaykh 'Isa for moxe than 10 years, but I have never heard
him talk with the confidence and clarity with which he talked that day. As
I was leaving the amir's ma~lis, I told Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Rashid, undersecre-
tary of the Information Ministry: How munificent are the noble deeds of
Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani: I don't know what interest you have in quelling the
tempest he has whipped up when it continues to lavish all those bounties on
you.
9254
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i
IRAN
KUFDISH REVOLT SEEN AS MAJOR CHALLENGE TO KHOMEYNI
Kinshasa ELIMA in French 11 Oct 79 pp 1, 7
[Article by Kiekie M. Ngebay: "Who will Plead for the Kurds?"]
[Text] The smell of gunpowder continues to tickle the nostrils of the
inhabitants of Iran, which for some time now has been one of the hot spots
of our world.
A glance at the overall situation in Iran makes it apparent to any o~server
that ttie unity and harmony that existed between the forces of the country which
had led the struggle against the shah's regime, no longer exist today. Indeed,
each faction or political movement is struggling to promote its own program.
It is difficult to have a precise idea of the divisions within tlie political
forces of Iran. The religious communities certainly form the strongest
political groups, although that does not prevent differing points of view
between them on the sociopolitical makeup of Iran.
National minorities have become the No 1 problem, which in turn has become
part of a broader problem: that of the rights to be given to a people which
had been deprived of its rights and, consequently, one of the central problems
of the Islamic Republic created by the Ayatollah Khomeyni.
The national minorities, which had been politicized during the struggle a~;ainst
ttie shah's regime, just as all other Iranians, are acting together in order to
wage a more effective battle for~their rights. This concerted action is, up
to a point, facilitated by the fact that unlike the other Iranians, the
minorities all belong to the Sunnite sect.
_ That, under the present conditions in Iran, is very important. Iran, in a
general way, seems to be a multinational state. There are said to be 10
million Azerbaijani (who are related to the Turks), 3 million Kurds, 2 million
- Arabs (in Khuzestan), 1 million Baluchis, 700,000 Turkmens.
But present events in Iran are dominated by the problem of the Kurds, a
problem which is considered very delicate. The Kurds, living in compact groups
in countries bordering on Iran, are taking action to gain Kurdish autonomy.
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The demcind for ~iutonomy could develop intu a demand for ttie formation of an
independent Kurdish state. That explains the renewal of guerrilla activity
and tarrorism in Kurdestan, and that is taking place in spite of all the
measures taken by the Bazargan government to stem the tide of violence.
In Kurdestan then, the skirmishes between the Kurdish warriors and the
guardians of the revolution are increasing. The governor of the province in
question has explained that the "small degree of security in the region,
despite the presence of the army, is due to a lack of receptivity on the part
of the population;" the army is seen as a spearhead of the Ayatallah Khomeyni
and the population demands its withdrawal.
The problem of the minorities is, from all appearances, very delicate and
difficult to resolve. The present leaders of Iran are carefully trying to
decide what to do under the present circumstances under which rebellion is
growing in I~urdestan.
8956
CSO: 4900
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ISRAEL
EXPANSION OF SETTLII~NTS IN NDAEA, SAM~IA URGID
Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in ~iebrew 5 Oct 79 p 2
LEditorial: "Land for Settlers in Judaea and Samaria"~
LTex~ The settlers in 'Ofra evacuated the hill near their settlement as
demanded by the IDF co~nand. They said in advance that they would avoid
ar~y clash with the soldiers. But a serious problem still exists. This
settlement, like the other settlements in Judaea and Samaria, needs addi-
tional land like air for breathing. This demand has been heard for a long
time and the government promised to respond to their needs. Moreover, at
a meeting between the minister of defense and the representatives of the
NRP, which was held several days ago, the minister promised to submit the
positive conclusion to the minist erial committee for approval. In the mean-
time, he reneged on his promise, saying that the timing was not right for
expropriation of private land, which could evoke serious repercussions in
the international political arena. He transferred the matter to the govern-
ment for a debate and decision.
The government's fundamental policy on settlement in Judaea and Samaria has
loyal executors and they demand that growth and develop~ment in areas, which
meet their needs, be made possible for them. Since this concerns settlement
pioneers, who have been waiting for the fulfillment of the promises for a
long time, they must not be disappointed with constant delays bgsed on the
axgument that the ti.ming was inappropriate and that there was opposition to
the expropriation of private land. Those who made the promises knew all
thia in advance.
What are the real chances for expanding the areas of the Elqana, Bet Horon,
Ofra, Giv'on, Efrat, Qadum and Kiryat Arba settlements? The spokesmen of
- the settlements demonstrate that subsistence areas, without which it is lit-
erally impossible to exist Lsecond part of sentence illegibl~. The Arabs
axe closing on them with their buildings and farms on all sides, a planned
and deliberate closing. Time is against the settlers. Expansion has become
a very urgent need.
The choice is between expropriation, which involves a special law and may
lead to appeals, and the localization of certain settlements on areas where
there is government land. This is a practical decis~'on with political
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- implications involving the future of settlement in Judaea and Samaria. It
should be noted that not only the Arabs are against this settlement, not
only the Americans ob~ect to it, but most or the opposition uses it to gore
the government. The left wages a campaign of slander and provocation against
it .
The settlers, stubborn pioneers, who planted their settlements on bald moun-
tains and stony ground in order to settle the land of Judaea and Samaria,
- the first of the thousands that will follow them, will continue to fight for
their right to establish their homes here without the choking pressure of a
ghetto in the land of Israel. They stress that the autono~y is coming closer
and in a debate on the essence of the autonoiqy between the sidea the dozens
of Jewish settlements in the heart of the land of Judaea and Samaria will be
the decisive factor. They can disrupt the hasty steps to establish a Pales-
tinian entity in the axeas. This argument is not unreasonable for the ma-
~ority of the governme,-~t. But there is a difference between a political
stand and a political fact.
Every public opportunity must be utilized in order to attain the ob~ective
set by the settlers with the government's agreement, which is extensive
settlement on land needed for their subsistence. It is most advisable for
the government to be loyal to itself, to devote thought and time to clari- -
~ fication and decision and to submit it to the settlers. There is no room
for red tape. Promises must be kept.
The settlers are among the country's best people. They are believers and
observers of the commands, for whom the Torah of Israel and the land of Is-
rael axe one and total Jewishness is their consciousness, mission and way
of life. They and people like them, Zionist Jews in their essence, are the
best paxt ~f the Jewish population in the country and the hope of the future
of the state. In the face of foreign enemiea and deceitful people in the ~
country, including those who cringe before the heads of the PLO, we must ;
bless their presence and readiness to fight for the right to settle in all
land of Isre,el. Happy is the nation that has such sons and daughters.
It is right that the representatives of the religious and national movement,
whose vision lights the path of the settlers, in the Knesset and government
be the main spokesmen for these pioneers, so that they may reach their goal
~ in a respected wey and without difficult struggles for them and the state as
a whole .
The land of Judaea and Samaria will also remain within the borders of the
state of Israel during the period of autono~y, when dozens of Jewish settle- -
ments will shine on the slopes of its mountains and on their tops.
l1,k39
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~
ISRAEL
- ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW RIGHTIST PARTY SCOHID -
Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Oct 79 p 13 ~
LArticle by 'Amos Eylon: "Renaissance or Dying"f ~
LTex~ A young pop singer cried into the microphone: "Guys, I am dying to
sing and fished out "We Will Get up Tomorrow Morning With a New Song in Our
Hearts" from the hackneyed repertory. The songs that followed were also
old. Moshe Shamir, who since his departure from thP Likud knows well who
spreads pareve maxgexine on his meager slice of bread, preferred to go back
to Bialik's very old school: "If We Wish To Know From Where We Derived
Strength," he said in a free quotation, "Let Us Go :o the Roots" and so
forth. -
The yaxmulka wearers in the hall were pleased. Mrs. Geula Cohen quoted Rabbi
Nahman from Bratzlev. Hanan Porat quoted Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Cook from the
Merkaz Harav Yeshiva, who is the ayatollah of Gush Emunim LBlock of the Faith-
fu~. Efrayim Ben Hayim from the Bet Oren Kibbutz quoted the doctrine of Is- _
rael ar~d the doctrine of the land of Israel of Yitzhaq Tabenkin simultaneously. .
Thus, between one quotation and another a new political party to the right of
Herut was established with great fervor in Jerusalem this week--Tenu'at Ha-
tehiya" LRenaissance Movement/.
Demonstrators congregated outside, shouting: "The Renaissance Movement is
the movement of death" and exchanged curses with the members of Itakh LThus/
of Rabbi Kahana, who screamed that the two bad eyes of the state of Israel,
that is, Arabs and poverty, must be eradicated, There was violence in the
humid air and a thick chain of policemen separated the camps. If not for the
policemen, a riot would have certainly broken out. Obscene insults flew from
side to side.
There was again something in the atmosphere fraught with pY~ysicel e~nd verbal -
violence and great hatred, which against the background of rising inflation
could have reminded old people and those with good memory r~f the Weimar Re-
public. The name of the new paxty also could have evoked a terrible echo.
It is clear that the founders did not intend to have a Hebrew version of the
Iraqi Baath movement. Perha~s they thought about "Yourig People, Heralds of
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Renaissance, Came From the Corners of the Country." But what is good in
one generation sounds differently in another generation. In thie genera-
, tion, in this nation and under these circumstances the name of the new move-
ment restores the ghost of D eutschland Erwache!
The editor of YEDIOT AHARONOT welcomed the new party and estimated that "ob-
,~ectively, its chances for holding an important position are not bad. The -
people are tired of our endless foldings. They are almost at the threshold
of despair." If this is a sign for the future, this is certainly a sign of
demoralization. Not long ago that newspaper published an article in favor
of limiting democracy.
Is it an accident that no fewer than 3,000 desperate people crowded the big
hall of Binyaney Hauma in Jerusalem in order to witness the birth of the new
political creature? It is doubtful whether Begin or Peres could now gather
such a big crowd without first making complicated and expensive arrangements
for transporting the public. The hall was full to capacity. The public was
varied, although it was almost purely Ashkenazi. It included seculars and =
yarmulka wearers, respectable bourgeois people and youth.
Many came from the a.rmed ghettos surrounded by wire fences and watch dogs
in Judaea and Samaria, where they slept at night and which, apparently, were _
half empty during that evening. Elyaqim Hatzani, who threatens to establish
a private militia in Kiryat Arba,' and the famous "spitter" from the vege-
t able garden of Neot Sinai were present. _
It seems to me that of greater significance is the mixture, or the new coa-
lition that is being formed, between the fundamentalists of thz Merkaz Haxav
Yeshiva and the adventurous extremists who have emerged from the IDF in the
last few yeexs: the heads of Gush ~nunim and Prof Yuva1 Neeman and auch
people as tda~ Gen (Res ) Avraham Yafe, the famous paratrooper Aharon Davidi
and the hero of the 101 unit Meir Har-Tzion. '
Cul~tural despair, which often has been diagnosed as one of the sources of
European fascism, and blind "patriotism," which they call love of Israel,
i s their common denominator. Characteristically, the meeting we.s described
as a"call to the colors." It was held under the slogan "all"--"the redem~- -
tion of all the people of Israel in all of land of Israel." The public
clapped hands when it heard selected passages from the Book of Genesis:
"And God said... I shall give the land to your seed." No one mentioned the
Prophets and Hagiographa.
The voice of the announcer exploded over the heads of the excited people with
the primordial and alluring stre:~gth of the good tidings. The main speakers
accompanied these good tidings with threats and wa.rnings against deviators,
dese: ters, proponents of concession, sowers of despair and those that stick .
knives in the back and with ringing cries of congratulation and we,rm words of
encouragement for the healtY~y elements in the nation, first of all, the IDF
and, primarily, Chief of the General Staff Lieut Gen Rafael Eytan, as well as
"those who break the choking fences" in 'Ofra, Qedumim and other settlements.
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The chairman said about the chief of the general staff: '~We are with him
and he is with us." I would like to be more certain than I am that this is
, not true.
Prof Yuval Nee~?an, who was introduced as a scientific genius ana at least as
a wunderkind ("at the age of 15 he graduated from the Herzliyya Gymnasium")
_ demanded that the peace agreement with Egypt be cancelled, that there be no
withdrawal from the settlements and fram the oil wells and that Iaraeli cit-
izens be given the opportunity of taking a personal in3tiative against ter- ~
rorism. Knesset Member Geula Cohen determined resolutely that the people
wanted to fight, but the leadership was tired. "There is no more baxbaric
a slogan," Geula Cohen shouted, "than the slogan of the Likud 'Peace Is
Better Than Undivided Land of Israel.'" Down with the "mystics of 'Peace -
Now~" and "those crazy for normalization."
- Hanan Porat, one of the prophets of Gush E~unim, evoked a storm of applause _
among those present when he a:znounced a new elliance between seculax and re-
ligious people and between nationalists and socialists for a war against the
false peace and for spreading "~ustice, purity and light" throughout Undivided
Land of Israel. Professor Neeman proposed that one-third of the residents in
the axeas be evacuated to Saudi Arabia (applause). The rest, if they did not
identify themselves with the goals of the Renaissance Movement, would be con-
sidered "alien residents.~~
No one can now estimate the electoral strength of the new party. It is easier
to estimate its destructive effect on the exiating political system. Mr Begin
cannot easily get rid of those who try to realize the principles of his doc-
trine and who still have mar~y allies in the coalition and at the government
table. There is hardly ar~y doubt that it will cause additional confusion and
perhaps eactremism both in the Likud and the NRP.
What will be the reaction of the Aligrmient? Mr Shimon Peres cannot easi~y get
rid of the person that was his close adviser and confidant, Prof Yuval Neeman.
The middlemen of strength in the coalition and opposition will try to maneuver,
calm each other and comproanise with half truths and improvised gestures. In
the meantime, in the most vital area the dictatorship of Erik She,ron will con-
_ tinue behind the perforated screen of de~mocracy.
The bitter truth is that neither in the Likud and NRP, nor in the Labor Party,
for the time being, no one offers a convincing ideological answer to the ti-
dings of despair and empty patriotism emanating from the Renaissance. What
was born here thia week is nurtured on the rot and Y~ypocrisy spreading in all
existing parties.
11,439
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KUWAIT
U.S. PLOT SEEN BEHIND GULF SECURITY PROPOSAL
. Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AhIIrI in Arabic 23 Sep 79 pp 1, 19
[Editorial: "Plan To Protect the Gulf or Set Off a Conflagration in It?"]
[Text] Kuwait did well by promptly rejecting the Omani plan to give '
foreign states (America, Britain, and West Germany) the right to take _
part in the protection of the Gulf. We believe that it is incumbent on
all Gulf states to reject this plan, because fundamentally the Gulf does
not need foreign protection. On the contrary, by calling in guardians
sucti as these, it will enter a zone of certain danger. For, as a matter
of fact, the problem lies with them. They constitute the real danger to
the people and states of the Gulf.
It is they who engage in intrigues in this area, sow discord in it, and
draw dangers down upon it by amassing fleets and establishing bases, thereby
whetting the appetite of the Soviet Union to interfere and concentrate
forces in the area. lfiis makes the Gulf a theater for war rather than a
setting for peace.
Practically, the accomplishment of this plan would mean the de facto
occupation of all the states which border on this Gulf. And it is in the
nature of every occupation to kindle resistance, national pride, and
rejection. This alone would throw the area into a state of disorder and
chaos.
If these powers do not interfere, under whatever emblem or mask, then the
Persian Gulf is not threatened by anyone...except by agents of the United
States and Zionism. And this is a matter which is the responsibility of
self-maintained security by, as well as true and sincere cooperation among
the Gulf states themselves.
The sight of one American soldier--or any foreign soldier--on the land or
waters of the Gulf would set off-the blaze. Thus our hearts are filled
with bitterness by this bitter picture, and we can stand it no longer.
Perhaps the bitterness which is in us, and the pains and repressed feelings
within our memory, are enough,
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~
Furthermore, what kind of contempt does it show for our peoples i� we
continue Co bring in foreigners to protect the few under the pretext of
protecting the Gulf? For the fe~ a~e not the Gulf, nor are they the land
or the nations. And of course they are not Che oil. Therefore why, and
in what way, are we obliged to call in the Americans, with good cause, for
protection, while all their weapons are killing us in Labanon, stripping
us of our honor and sacred possessions, and leading us to the slaughter
represented in a settlement of the Palestinian problem by force, conspiracy,
and the ~owing of factional discord, or in the incitement of the world
against us? -
Have a little wisdom, people: And a little intelligence, as well--unless
this intelligen c e is employed for the sake of destroying this nation, or
for entering into the service of purposes which are inimical to it, or for
contradicting it s welfare, its honor, and its aspirations for sovereignty
and independence .
Whom do we fear with regard to the security of the Gulf? The Soviet Union?
The s implest pe rson knows that the Soviet staCe, in spite of its aspirations
to maintain an extensive presence in this rich area, is neither likely nor
able to risk en t ering into certain war with the West in case of any military
_ move against this area.
Thus, protection is directed at imaginery forces within the area so that
_ the plan, and c onsequently the intervention, can be justified--not to mention
the kindling of suspicions against the Palestinians themselves. That is,
in its policy of aggression against the Arabs, the United States wants to
make the Palestinians a threat, and thus is working with all its might
to smash every Palestinian right and subdue every trace of Palestinian
and Arab honor. Then it wants them to become eunuchs, slaves, American
Indians.
T'hus, through its assault on the Gulf--whether bv means of fleets and bases _
or suspicious p lans--the United States continues its operation of provocation,
whereby it can s et off a conflagration in the land of the Gulf and swallow
up this lan3 completely.
These are the goals of the American plan which is circulated on behalf of
the govoernment af Muscat. We believe that rejection, which has been
announced by Ba ghdadand Kuwait, will be complete for all the states of
the area. That is to say, not one rational person can even understand this
plan, so how much less can he accept it?:
8591
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KUWAIT
BOYCOTT AGAINST AMERICAN GOODS i7RGED
Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'ArII~I in Arabic 22 Sep 79 p 1
[Editorial: "Okay...Boycott Them:"]
[Text] Perhaps some people see in the verbal chicaneries which go on at
times between the United States and Israel--such as objections to the
establishment of settlements or rejection of the decision to purchase
land in the West Bank and the sector--somewhat of a change in the hostile
American position vis-a-vis the Arabs; or a possibility of wagering on
such a change.
However, in view of the mass of clear and proven data, we see only an
increase in American determination to subdue the Arab will, verbal
deceptions notwithstanding.
It is our belief that living nations--and even historical leaderships--can
discover the means to enable them to resist any aggressor who attacks them
or their causes. If, as a result of existing conditions, the Arabs'
circumstances do not permit them to embark on a military confrontation to
~ain national rights, this does not imply that there are no means of
confrontation by other effective and successful methods.
Perhaps we may learn from others. In the 1940's, when he was leading the
passive struggle against British colonialism, and perhaps on the basis of
the doctrine of nonviolence in which be believed, Mahatma Gandhi.found
that equality was impossible between an unarmed people, namely the Indian
people, and the heavily armed authorities of British colonialism.
Thus he decided on his special method of confrontation: peaceful demonstra-
tions. He also used other means of protest, the most important of which
was his call for a boycott on all Briti~h goods and action to prevent port
- workers from loading or unloading British ships in any Indian port.
The army used every means of intimidation, but this boycott remained total
~ until the British Crown was forced, in the face of this passive resistance,
to give up its biggest pearl, India. And so British colonialism picked up
its cane and left, and India became an independent state.
25
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At thiti lime w~~ arc~ in rin ur};c~nt stru~~;1e with the Unitrd Stat~s, lt is the
l~nlt~~~l SCr~tes wliicli iy undcrl,ikin~; to smasl~ the ~1rab p~rsonali~y and is
:iidin~; Israel. with all its might in continuing its occupation and plans for
~~xpansic~n. Sc~ lon~; as the r1r:~b military positic,n, because of griev~us
c~,ntiid~~r:irions, duc~s n~~t allc~w ~ffective conirc>ntation, tl~en nc~.~ Iether project involves construction of dental centers, including a pub-
lic center in the capital and branches in the form of dental clinics lo-
cated in various areas. A third project involves support for the importation _
~ of equipment and action to supplement this equipment, especially the essen-
tial items. A fourth project is for the construction of two Islamic re-
ligious courts in the cities of Mopti and Akai. These two courts will be -
completed in the near future. Mr Salih went on to say: "In addition, the
kingdom previously built the Great Bamako Mosque, considered one of the
biggest landmarks in the ci_ty, at a cost. of $4.5 million some years ago.
The Saudi Development Fund is financing 50 percent of the costs of a cattle-
raising project in the area of Nabujo in partnership with the Malian Govern-
ment and the U.S. AID organization. The project, which cost a total of
$13.5 million, is aimed at developing and improving cattle raising, protect-
ing the cattle from disease, and employing modern technology in raising them,
as well as at working toward exporting the cattle abroad."
Furthermore, the kindgom provided $2 million as its part for a popular hous-
ing project for state employees. The project is located on the airp~rt road
_ and contains 64 villas. The kingdom also paid $2 million to ensurP the
- purchase of irrigation equipment for the Niger River Administation when that
administration wanted to modernize and recondition its equipment. Also, the
kingdom paid $1 million for study of a project involving irrigation stations
in the northern regions of Timbuktu.
Mr 5alih added: "What I have mentioned thus far represents direct aid of-
fered by the kindgom over 3 years. The kingdom has also provided indirect
aid to the Malian Government, including the initial agreement on the part of
the Saudi Development Fund to participate in financing the construction of
a cement plant in the first region. The purpose of this project is to en-
sure the cement needs of the Senegal Basin project (Malinatali Dam), which
serves Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania. The Senegal Basin project is one of
the vital projects serving these three states. It i~ a joint venture in
which Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait all participate. The kingdom
alone participates with over $100 million. This project will help improve
navigation on the Niger River and will create an area for industrialization,
in view of the availability of electric power produced by the dam water.
The kingdom previously provided $S million in aid to the coastal states
and people suffering from the drought. The states which received this aid
included Mali, Senegal, Zambia, and Chad. The aid took the form of food
for the citiznes. Also included under indirect aid is the kingdom's parti-
cipation in various programs of UNESCO and the Internarional Food and Agri-
culture Ox~ganization. Thus, the kingdom took part in financing the opening
of a center ior the development of rice cultivation, among various other
programs."
44
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Islamic Aid
(:oncc:r.ning Islamic atd offered to the state of Mali by Saudi Arabia, Ahmad
'l.aki Salili, charge d'affaires of the Saudi Embassy in Mali, said: "There
is a large number of Islamic projects in which the Islamic World League
participates, one of which involves providing aid to the more than 45 Is-
lamic Arabic schools scattered throughout Mali. The league has also financed
a project involving a school for the Sunni and construction of the Mopti mos-
que, and has participated with 3 million riyals in the construction of an
Islamic vocational institute especially for graduates of Islamic Arabic
schools, as well as construction of the Djenne Mosque, construction of com-
mercial shops belonging to the Great Mosque in Bamako--which are dependent
on the mosque and whose proceeds are to be used for the mosque's upkeep--
_ and construction of a larger lecture hall for the mosque in Bamako."
The kingdom has also provided intermittent aid at various times to the
Ardbic and Islamic schools in order to assist them in fulfilling their mis-
.
sion, developing their instructional materials, and attracting the greatest =
possible number of Malians to study in them. The kingdom hopes to present
academic scholarships for Saudi universities to Malian youths in order to
enable them to complete their university education.
Islamic Youth Camp and Its Effect
_ Concerning the Islamic youth camp held in Bamako and the extent of its ef-
fect on the Malian people, Mr Salih said: "The idea of holding the camp
was a very profitable one. It serves Moslem youth and opens an avenue of
- communication among them, and it has received a good response--especially
from the Malian youth themselves, because the Malian people are known for
their Islamic attitude. Even the Malian minister of youth and culture was
continually in contact with the embassy to discuss the needs of the camp,
and so was the Malian ambassador to the kingdom. We are thankful that the -
_ camp has been held, and we have felt great success which encourages us to
hold another camp, because this first experience has been very encouraging.
"There was direct contact among the embassy, the World Council for Islamic _
Youth, and the Islamic Solidarity Fund for the purpose of participation and
assistance, and in fact we made some proposals which were accepted by the
council."
Speaking of Malian pilgrims, the ambassador said: "The embsssy cooperates
with the Malian Government in this area, an.d some time ago we began arranging
pilgrimage affairs and granting the pertinent visas. The embassy does many
things to facilitate matters for Malian pilgrims and supplies them with the
- necessary instructions. The embassy usually grants about 2,500 visas to
pilgrims each year."
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i
Moslems make up more than 90 percent of Mali's population, and a good por-
tion of them speak Arabic--especially those who have received their educa-
tion in Islamic or Arabic schools. Moreover, there is considerable interest
in Learning the Arabic language, and thus the kingdom tries to publicize
ttie~ Islamic institut~s, shcools, and centers in order to spread the teach-
ings of the true Islamic religion and the Arabic language among the friendly
Malian people.
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SAUDI ARABIA
PETROMIN ANNOUNCED AIRCRAFT FUEL PIPELINE
Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 11 Oct 79 p 2
[Articl.e: "PETROMIN Assumes Management of P ipeline To Transport Aircraft
Fuel in Dhahran; Work Is in Progress To Establish Lines To Transport Oil
Products in al-Sharqiyah"]
' [Text] Within the next 10 days, PETROMIN will assume management of a new
' pipeline to carry aircraft fuel from the main storage tanks in Dhahran.
The capacity of the 8.5-kilometer pipeline is 100,000 barrels per day.
This was announced in a statement by Mr Abu al-Jadayil, the executive mem-
ber assigned to marketing affairs for PETROMIN. He said that this is one '
of a large number of projects currently bein; implemented by the organiza-
tion, and that other projects will enter the implementation phase shortly.
He explained that the projects now being implemented include construction
of two pipelines to transport oil products f rom the Ra's Tannurah refinery `
to PETROMIN's storage tanks in Dhahran and the installation of pumps with a
capacity of 140,000 barrels [per day]. Z'he pipelines will b~ 15 miles long,
the entire distance under water.
He also said that inland pipelines and 11 loading platforms are to be con-
structed to load trucks and railroad cars.
Mr Abu al-Jadayil mentioned that PETROMIN is currently constructing eight
oil storage tanks with a combined capacity of 1.2 million barrels. The cost
of the tanks is 225 million riyals. The first stage of the project is
expected to be finished in the middle of next year, and the final stage
should be completed in 1981.
Also under construction are reserve storage tanks and loading platforms
in the al-Qatif area which will be supplied by a pipe from Ra's Tannurah.
These facilities will cost 25 million riyals.
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I'~TROMIN's marketing director a~so stated that projects soon to enter the
implementation phase in the al-Sharqiyah area at a cost of 120 million
riyals includc construr_~ion of storage tanks and petroleum distribution fa-
cll.itie~ in the citie;~ of al-Hufuf and al-Jubayl, and improvement and deve-
lopment uE distributi~~n Cacilities in the city of al-Safaniyah.
Concerning PETROMIN projects in the areas of Riyadh, al-Qasim, al-Kharj
and Najran, Mr Aru al-Jadayil mentioned that two tanks for storage of air-
craft f uel in the central region have been handed over. These tanks have
a capacity of 10~J,000 barrels and cost 6 million riyals.
A contract has been awarded for construction of storage tank.s and an installa-
tion to supply aircraft with fuel at Badanah airport at a cost of 15 million -
riyals. Also, work will begin soon on the development and improvmenet of
distrib ution facilities in the areas of Riyadh, al-Qasim, al-Kharj, and Naj-
ran. `
The director added that projects still under study include a project to -
- link distribution facilities in al-J~ibayl with pipelines from Ra's Tannurah;
construction of storage and distribution facilities in al-Qaysumah 3nd con-
nection of these facilities with pipelines originating at Ra's Tannurah and
al.-Jubayl; a project to link distribu'tion facilities in al-Kharj with pipe-
lines originating at the Riyadh oil refinery; and construction of an air-
craft f uel loading unit at the new Riyadh ariport and connection of this
unit wi th a pipeline from the Riyadh ref iner~.
With regard to PETROMIN's marketing activities, AbL al-Jadayil said that
the organization is presently distributing fuel to all areas of the kingdom, -
and is performing the service of supplying aircraft with fuel at the airports _
- of Riyadh, Dhahran, al-Qaysumah, Badanali, and Tarif.. In addition, it is
marketing lubricating oil and ship fuel at the port of al-Dammam, petroleum -
gas in Ra's Tannurah, and road asphalt in Riyadh. -
He added that PETROMIN now owns 19 distribution facilities in consumption �
areas in the different parts of the kingdom. It also owns a fleet of 320
tankers to transport petroleum products, and uses 120 railroad cars to trans-
port oil into the central region, in addition to trucks from local contractors.
At the conclusion of his statement, PETROMIN's marketing director stated that
85 percent of the warkers in the organization are Saudis, and distribution _
facilities operate 24 hours a day. -
8591
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SAUDI ARABIA
BRIEFS
WELL, PIPELINE MAINTENANCE--PETROMIN has begun implementing a project in-
volving complete maintenance of oil pipelines in the al-Sharqiyah area and
replacement of large portions of the existing network. This was announced
in a statement by a responsible source tn the organization, who said that
PETROMIN has signed a contract worth over 300 million riyals with a company
specializing in this field. The source added that this is part of an inte-
grated project to provide maintenance and fire protection for oil wells
as well as transport lines and large storage tanks. The source said that
rigorous and constant observation and monitoring are carried out to obviate
any accidents which might occur. The source mentionec that the safety of
the oil wells and of the transportation and distribution network in th e king-
- dom is good, and that the system is unr~ecedented in the world with respect
to its low incidence and degree of ~eriousness of accidents. [Text]
[Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 11 Oct 79 p 2J 8591
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~ ~
~
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.
Sin`AN
KHARTOUNf SEEKS BIG WESTERN LOAN
- Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Oct 79 p 4
[Text] Sudan is seeking some ~1.2 billion in loans to
re~nance its overdue commercial Fureign debts and has
= asked Western bankers For co~icessionary terms,
~ccording to reports fro?n London last week. The
~ bankers, who are holders of Sudanese debts, were
un~lerstuud to be planning meetings in October to _
decide how they will respond to the reyuest. Sudan
asked for the loan at a meetinq ~vith i[s creditors in
- London at the end of last month. Khartoum asked for
concessionary terms to help the cuuntry through what
it expects to be a diFficult period over the next few -
years until big new development projects begin to
buost its earnings from agricultural exports. Su~an's
current econort~ic: plight is ~ue in large measurc to the
uverheating caused by tltese dcvelupment projects and
the large volume of imports wh~ch they reyuired.
Sudan is also due to mect the Club of Paris in
fVovember to discuss rescheduling the debts held by
the Club, which is a consortium of Western export
credit guarantee agencies. Cominercial banks have been
asked in the meantime to find out how much of
Sudan's foreign debt has now ~~assed into Club's hands
as the result of export guarante~~ agreements.
According to the report~, Sudan is asking the
bankers to strucure the refinancing loan to take into
account its debt-servicing scliedule and to include
- repayments of interest on principal from now until
June 30, 19~f~, when a three~year agreement on
ecunomic reforms with the IMF comes to an end.
Sudan is also reported to be seoking additional cash to
help finance irnports and development prujects during
this pcriod.
Western bankers are understood to be
- sympathetic, if only because they do not want to see
Sudan cleclarc a furmal default un its debts. They are
exqectey howevcr to balk over the terms Khartoum is
seeking. Meanwhile, they can draw some comfurt frc~m
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tlic lihcr,ilis:itiun inr;~~urr, which ~rrcfan intru�ured last
niuntl~ (,1 ri ,Vrthur , l r~~f~ l~~ ~~~,r! ,1Jli,llU uf tirE,ICinhcr
IU1, wlu~li I in;uirr ~linnt~r ki,i~lr .il�Uin Sulriinan s:iys
:irc u~urkin~~, wril. ilic inr:i,in~ inclu~le ;i twii-licr
c~~li:in~~,~ r;ilr an~l rr~~,ul;itiun: wlu~h ~~rniiit Su~l:inru
tu u~~cii accuun~. in I~,c,il h,inl.~ ilrn~,iuin;ilc~ in
fiiiciRn currrnci~; :in~l ~re ~lr,ignr~~ tu ch,ii~ncl
remittances from Sudanese expatriate work-
- ers into the domestic banking system. Mr
Suleiman, who was in London last week,
said that imports were now being financed
from remittances. "The aim of the new
system is to give our creditors the con- -
fidence that we will be able to honour
any rescheduling," Mr Suleiman declared.
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SUDAN
BRIEFS
_ ARAB MONETARY FUND LOAN--The Arab Monetary Fund has agreed to l~nd Sudan
$44 million to help offset its severe balance of payments deficit. The
loan is the largest made by the A1~' anc~ bringa Sudan's total borrowing from
the Fund to $58.6 million. The new loan is in the form of an extended -
fund facility similar to the three-year facility provided to Sudan by the
IMF last May (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, May 14). Reports from Abu
~ Dhabi, where the AMF is based, said that the tough weasurea adopt~d by the
Sudanese government on the insistence of the I~ have improved the coun-
try's standing with international lenders. As this neweletter reported
in its October 22 issue, the European Economic Community and the Wor~i
Bank are considering loans totalling about $50 million to subsidise Su-
dane~e imports of pes~icides, fuel and spare parts for farmera. Sudan's
chronic balance of payments ills nevertheless made necessary a further de-
valuation of the pound this month, and Sudan i~s hoping for a massive
$1.2 billion from the West to help overcome its difficultiea. The AI~' has
now paid out about $90 million in loans to Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Mauri-
_ tania and Syria. The latest Sudanese loan was announced early this month.
- [Text] [Parie AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 29 Oct 79 p 3]
~ CSO: 4820
52
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UNTT[:D ARAIf 1:MTRATI?S
BRIEFS
RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES--A numher of people are using their good offices
to resolve the strained relations between Shaykh Rashid Ibn Sa'id, the ruler "
of Dubai and prime minister of the UAE, and UAE Foreign Minister Ahmad al-
Suwaydi, who has been living in seclusion in Europe. The estrangement be-
tween the two men developed on the eve of the formation of the new cabinet,
when al-Suwaydi learned through the grapevine that Shaykh Rashid has privately
berated hi.m and criticized him for worsening the relations between Shaykh
Rashid and the UAE head of state, Shaykh Zayid. As a result, al-Suwaydi
decided that under the circumstances cooperation between him and Shaykh
Rashid would be difficult, so he flew to Europe and failed to participate
in the swearing in of the new cabinet. Shaykh Zayid has worked hard to
sooth the feeling of the person who was his right hand man, and he took him
along with him on his recent visit to Morocco. A1-Suwaydi, however, still
remains in seclusion in Europe while friends are trying to complete the en-
deavors which were begun by Shaykh Zayid. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in
Arabic 19 Oct 79 p 13] 9254
CSO: 4802 E~
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