JPRS ID: 8826 WORLDWIDE REPORT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030042-0
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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20 DECEMBER 1979 C FOUO 7r79 ) 1 OF 1.
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1~()R ()I~N'll'IAI, 11~1~: ()NI.Y
JPRS L/~826
- 20 December ~ 979 _
~
~ ~ Worldwide Re ort
p
_ NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION
~ C~r0U0 7/79) -
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- F~I$ FOREIGN BROADC~ST INFORMATION SERVICE -
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~ JPRS L/8~326 ~
_ 20 December 1979
.
WO~LDWIDE REPORT
- NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AhD PROLIFERATION
(FOUO 7/79)
' CONTENT.~ PAGE !
WORLWIDE AFFAIRS
Atlantic Explosion Raises I'ears of South African
- Nuclear Potential
(Harold Jackson; THE GLTARDIAN, 27 Oct 79) 1
Pym Ac'.vocates NATO Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons
~ (Clare Hollingworth; THE GUARDIAN, 29 Oct 79) 4
- Swedish Defense Institute Says USSR Explodes Nuclear
Device
(REUI'ER, 5 oc~ 79) 5 _
LATIN AMERICP.
ARGENTINA
FRG Contract Heralds Beginning of Vast Nuclear Industry
(Martin F..Yriart; LA OPINION, 3 Oct 79) 6
MEXICO
Briefs
First Nuclear 1'lant S -
ti+IEST EUROPE
INTERNATIONAL A~'F'AIRS
FRG-France Nuclear Cooperation Problems Explo,i~d
(Ulrich Steger; WIRTSCHAFTSWOG'HE, 1 Oct 79) 9
- a- IIII - WW - 141 FOUOj:
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- CONTENTS� ( Continued) pa,ge
FRANCE
Minister of Industry Interviewed on Nuclear Policy .
(Andre Giraud Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
�3 oct 79 ) . . . . . . . 1.2
- Biographical Information on Uranium Engineer Anne .
Duthilleul
(LE NOtJVEI, OBSERVATEUR, 8 Oct 79) 20
~3io~;raphical Information on EDF's Le Marechal
(LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 1 OCt 79) 21
~ Briefs
EURODIF To Sue Iran 22
- UNITED KINGDOM _
Defense Ministry Decides on Tridents as Independent
Nuclear Deterrent
(David Fairhall; THE GUARDZAN, 1 Nov 79) 23
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WORLDZdIDE AFFAIRS
ATLANTIC EXPLOSION RAISES FEARS OF SOUTH AFRICAIV NUCLEAR POTLNTIAL -
LD29150i Londr~n THE GUARDIAN in English 27 Oct 79 p 17 LD
[Harold Jackson dispatch: "The Bang That Almost Went Unheard"]
- [Tevt~ Washington--The American Government was caught badly on the hop in two wa,ys hy
thP r~,ports~of an atom~,c explosion in the south Atlantic. In the first place the evidence _
was ~:rii~natic at best in that only one set of thc world-wide network of instruments
resporide~ on September 22 and there did not seem to be any confirmation from othei~ sources.
~ In the second place, the BAC.television network got hold of this nugget and made it public
long before the State Department was ready to go on record. The experts of the National''
Security Council and the Pentagon were still trying to piece together the bits of the
i puzzle.
The result was the extremely cautious f ormal statement issued late on Thursday ni~?t
: which pushed official language to its furthest limits of uncertainty. There was, the
world was told, "an indication suggesting the possibility" of a small nuclear test some-
where in an area roughly the size of China. The name of South Africa was not mentioned.
The United States has long been concerned that Pretoria was actively engaged in developing
an atomic weapon and had three of its embassy officials thrown out f or spying in April.
No one in Washington ever canfirmed, of course, that that was what they were doing but
- the prime minister, Mr Botha, alleged that a concealed camera under the co-pilots seat in
the American ambassador~s plane had been used to photograph �some of our most sensiti.ve
installations.~~
The most sensitive installation likely to have been of interest to America is only 15
miles f rom the South African capital--the nuclear research plant at Valindaba and its
associated uranium enrichment facility at Pelindaba nearby. The ostensible purpose is
to produc~e the fuel for the two French reactors which were bought three years ago and -
are due to'come into operati.on generating electricity next year. Originally the fuel
' was going to be supplied by the U.S. but the deal was cancelled because of South Africa~s
refusal to sign the nuclear� non-proliferation treaty. _
The reason the South African~ would not si~, by their own account, was that the
';alindaba plant had discovered a neW and secret way of enriching uranium. The treaty~s _
requirement for international supervision of all nuclear installations could mean that '
this commercially valuable process would be stolen by unscrupulous rivals. It never
- sounded v~ry convincing to Washington and the suspicion grew that Valindaba was in the
business of turning out weapons grade uranium.
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TM.". beLLel' was not ~imply based on ingrained scenticism but on solid evldettce from a
1'al?�ly urillk.oly sou~~ce--the ;ioviet Union, In August 197? the Americans hac9 been al~Y~ted
l~,y 1;1~~t KrnmlJn LhaL a;,ouLh IltrCcan nucloar ~ost was lmminent. A Hu3st~ii ~E~y saLc111tc
ti;id upoLted an a~~parent test site tn the Kalahari desert. The American:, conduct;ed the.lr own
satelllte reconnaissance which confirmed ie Soviet findings and a frenzy of diplomatic
acl;lvll.y ensued. On August the rrench~foreiqn minister issued a publlc warning Lhat
a;;ouLh African t;es1; would have "serious consequcnces," a warning apparently taken
su�fictently seriously for the test to be abandoned.
_ But no one thought that was the end of the matter, not least because of a speech by the
~ South African finance minister, Mr Owen Horwood, In spite of the government~s efforts
to damp down the issue, Mr Horwood told a rally of the party faithful on August 30, 1977
that the country would develop a bomb if it seemed necessary. "If we wish to do things
with oui~ nuclear potential, we will ,~olly well da so aecording to our own decisions and
our own ,Judgement. American cannot pressure us. We will not allow it."
So the facilities which America has deployed aroimd the world to detect nuclear explo- `
sions have also been trained on the south Atlan tic and the Indian Ocean. There is a wide
variety of alternative instruments and the one possibility that does not seem to have
becn considered is that they would produce different answers. -
_ 'Phe pr3me method of surveillance is the network of m~litary observation satellites con- `
Stantly circling the globe. As was plainly demonstrated during the Kalahari llap, both
,superporrers cooperate in pool3n g their information when the issue i~ of equally vital
concern to each. These satellites can not only make visual observation but are also
equipped with radiation detectc_s. To back up this system,and to serve both as a con- ,
i'irma~,;.on and a cross-reference, there are a number of acoustical and seismic monitoring
si;ations around the globe, some of them planted on the sea bed. Finally there are the ~
U-2 high-flying reconnaissance aircraft--still fl,ying after nearly 30 years-- which pa-
trol on a 24-hour basis. Qze version of the plane, luzown as the HASU��2, is used to moni-
tor the high air samples near its maximum ceiling of 80,000 feet. It is equipped with
special f ilters whiah enable it to collect the radioactive debris inevitably thrown out
by any atomic explosion.
In the case of this latest episode the problem seems to arise because only one set of
instruments recorderi anything that might be associated with a nuclear test. The past
month ha s apparently been spen t in tryjn g to find either clearer read~n gs from the other
monitors or reliable evidence from what are being called "hu.man sources"--spies to any-
one else. � '
'Che swift South African denial is not regarded as ev:dence by anyone. Pretoria was
- b ound to rr~ake it whatever the facts: The eruption of\a South African atomic!device on
the international scene at this stage of history will have totally unpredictable eftects
on Southern Africa. Mor~ cogent in assessing the probab ility is an off icial assessment
b y the Central Intelligence Agency, revealed "by mistake" 18 months ago, that Soubh Africa
_ "could advance with a nuclsar weapons programme if seriously threatened." That report
was written in September 1974 and the evidence available sugge.sts that Pretoria has not
b een sitting on its hands in the past five years.
An even more sinister possibility is raised by the CIA dccument and by its later statements.
The agency concluded in the document that the Israelis had built atomic weapons at that
time--in 1974-.-and two years later expressed its belief that they then had between 10 and
2U warheads.
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In a world of almost universal hostility one of the few nations which has maintained close
t,i~> with South Africa has been Israel. There have been persistent, though totally uncon-
I'iih~ied alleE~tinns that the two nations have cooperated in atomic research. 'Phr desci~ip-
I,ia~ ol' I;hc~ oxplorlon on Sepl:ember 22 is Y.hat: it: was "a nuclear device," n phrase crnmnunly
unc~l I:~~ dc;iinLc ;:um~:Lhiri~! lcfsn ttclri ~ wu1~ImUle w~apon. '1'hir, Ibr exauiple, wue: l:ha way L-hc~
indiari test was described.
So the nasty thought is around that two cotmtries deeply involved in two of the world~s
most intractable trouble spots may have decided that this was the time to get together
for their mutual wellbeing. It is not a happy prospect for the rest of us. ~
C~PYRIGRT: Guardian Newspaper Limited, 27 October 1979 -
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_ Z+IORLDWIDE AFFAIRS
PYM ADVOCATES NATO ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR [~APONS
LD291309 L~ndon THE GUARDIAN in English 29 Oct 79 p 6 LD
- [Report by Clare Hollingworth: "Pym in Lead To Keep NATO Teeth Sharp"] ~
[Text~ Mr Pym, u~efence secretary, is taking the lead among European members of NATO
. to acquire nuclear weapons to counter the SS 20 missile and the Backfire bomber which -
the Russians have already deployed. It would be "highly irresponsible and dangerous,"
Mr Pym said yesterday, for members of the Atlantic alliance to continue ostrich -like
to bury *heir heads i n the sand in the face of Russian gr.owth in nuclear capacity.
'Phe minister emphasi.sed the need for NATO powers to maintain their nuclear deterrence
capab:`~.lity. To f orgo modernisation of their theatre nuclear weapons, as suggested by -
President Brezhnev, wo~.ild mean that "we should soon be in a position of unacceptable
weakness," he said, My Pym, who was speaking to university students in Nottingham, -
said tPiat introduction by the Russians since the mid -1970s of the supersonic Backfires
swing-~~ing bomber and the new mobile SS 20 missile "had given rise to..very real concern
for us~ �
~ The SS 20 has the capability of delivering three nuclear w2rheads very accurately om ~
widely separated targets_ s ay, the Houses of Parliament, the RAF station at Cottesmore,
Leicestershire, and Grimsby Docks. But because the,y ].ack the range to cross the ,
Atlantic the SS 20 and the Backi'ire are not includel in the SALT I agreement on
limitation of strategic arms. ~ . ;
Russian deployment, Mr Pym said, was in sharp contrast to NATO's. NATC had not dep loyed -
any comparable new systems since introduction of the F.~.ls~:(bombers) in the late 1960s
and the British Vulcan bombers, which were even older;,and due to be phased out in the
early 1980s. Mr pym assured his youthful audience he was not a warmonger, and said i
that Mr.,Brezhnev~s "use of highly selective statistics in his recent speech --cannot ~
~
obscure the rea.l and formidable growth in Soviet nuclear capability.� ,
Referring to NATO's plans to improve theatre_nuclear weapons in Europe,
the minister emphasised "we are not intending, nor is it necessary, to match
each Soviet deployment, system for system." But to maintain capability and '
flexibility NATO had to have nuclear weapons capable of str.iking the Soviet ~
Union in a situation in which the only alternative would be to resort to .
strategic forces.
Mr Pym did not sdd that the Americans would be most reluctant t~ launcn stra- ~
- tegic missiles which would render their own cities vulnerable to Russian
missiles. '
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspaper Limi4ed, 29 Oct 1979
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WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS -
SWEDISH DEFENSE INSTITUTE SAYS BSSR EXPLODES NUCLEAR DEVICE
WA051250 Londo~~ REUTER in English 1139 GMT 5 Oct 79 WA
[Text] Stockholm, Oct 5, REUTER--The Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device last ni~ht
in an area away from its usual test sites, the Swedish National Defense Institute said
today.
The blast, east of the Ural Mountains near the Ob Rivei�, could be part o: an earth-movin~
pro;Jec~t, Dr Ola Dahlman, head of the institutets seismic department, said.
_ ~
It iaas the sir.th Soviet nuclear explosion this year outside normal test sites and could
indicate increased Soviet use of atomic explosions for engineering purposes, Dr Dahlman
� said.
- "Dut one can never be certain. Military and civil explosions look the same on our
- ~ instruments," he said.
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ARGENTINA
FRG CONTRACT HERALDS BEGINNING OF VAST NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
~ Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 3 Oct 79 p 13
[Article,by Martin F. Yriart: "The Argentine Nuclear Industry"]
[Text] A ~hif* in the orientation and the expectations of the incipient
- nuclear industry sector is, prima facie, the immediate consequence of the
decision:to choose for the Atucha II nuclear power pl:~nt the pressure
vessel system~developed.in Germany. The decision was made by the Executive
Power on the eve of the Xrip of President Jorge Rafael Videla to Japan,
following the recommendation of the National Atomic Energy Commission
(~CI3EA) and the advice of an ad hoc interministerial commission which
unanimously ratified the CNEA suggestion.
. ~ The decision, which in itself was not unexpected, nevertheless surprised
those who usually keep up with the subject because the drafting and signing
of the corresponding decree was done in the greatest secrecy, and the most
- widespread conjjectures outside the CNEA were that the recent bisit of th.e
_ foreign trade mi.nister of ~anada and .the announced visit of his colleague
of state:participations of~Italy, jointly with the insistence of the
- Argentine private enterprises that Atomic Energy of Canada LCd and its
European.associates restate their position vis-a-vis the CNEA and make a,,
- new offer, would cause the final decision about Atucha II to be postponed
at least until the return of Presideri~~:Videla from Japan.
, In the cl:osing portions of the address delivered at the headquarters of the
CNEA in Nunez last Monday, Castro Madero spoke to the industrialists in
terms tha~t can be interpreted as a tacit admission that this sector, whose
most significant, though incip.ient, developme~:was due in large measure -
to the possibilities of participating in the Ec~ba1'se works and supplies
and whose growth expectations basically hinged on the accessibility which
the Canadi_a,n system offers, must make an effort to adapt, keeping in mind
that the pressure vessel system imposes limitations in scale in some aspects
and calls for a new effort to absorb technology and productive capacity.
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In Monday's address, however, Castro Madero hastened to point out that with
Ehe award of the power plant to the German KWU company, the participation
of the national sector in the work and supplies (wnich is almost the same
as the Canadian offer on a percentage basis) wi11 represent contracts and
purchases for $811 million, that is to say, almost $200 million more than
if the�Canadian system had been chosen. Castro Madero also insisted that
many components to be acquired for the two systems are comparable, or
merely require slight modifications. And as to those which perforce must
be imp orted, he emphasized that various concerns in different countries
are able to provide them. -
From the industrial and management standpoint, Decree No 2441 always left
something in doubt which might possibly be clarified in the course of the
final negotiation between the KWU and the CNEA. On several occasions during -
the past few months, Che CNEA had expressed the intention of setting up two
joint enterprises with the successful bidders of the Atucha II power plant.
One would be in charge of managing the proje~t and, in particular, of~
letting the subcontracts. Its role would be that of the "industrial
architect" that puts in place the pieces of'the jigsaw puzzle delivered
by the main contractor and th~ subcontractors.
The other was an engineering concern. The latter is explicitly contemplated
in Article 2 of Decree No 2441. Qn the other hand, there is no reference
to the fermer. Castro Madero, however, stated in Monday's address that
the Atucha II nuclear pow er plant would be "jointly" built by the KWU and
the CNEA�
The subject of the management concern touches on a point which the CNEA has
considered vital since 1976, and which is its,adaptation to the rules of
the game of "nuclear business" that make necessary a substantial modification
of the juridical and administrative system of what was a predominantly
' academic ~nstitution and control organization until a short time ago, and
which now is in the process of becoming a vast nuclear enterprise which
cxploits mineral deposits, manufactures fuel and other supplies, builds
~,ower plants and generates energy.
COPYRIGHT: La O~inion, 1979
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MEXICO
BRIEFS
FIRST NUCLEAR PLANT--Mexico City, 27 Oct--The Federal Elsctricity Com-
- mission (CFE) has announced that Mexico will inaugurate its first nuclear -
plant in 1982. The plant is being builtin Laguna Verde, Veracruz State,
and will generate 650,000 kilowatts with an investment of over 25 billion
pesos (about $1.1 billion). The Laguna Verde nuclear plant will be -
equipped with the most advanced security measures to prevent accidents
such as those that have occurred in the United States, CFE Director Hugo
Cervantes del Rio repoxted. [Mexico City PRELA in Spanish to PRELA Hav~na
1726 GMT 27 Oct 79 PAj
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FRG-FRANCE NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROBLEMS EXPLORED
Duesseldor~ WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German l Oct 79 pp 18,20 -
[Article by SPD Bundestag Deputy Ulr3ch Steger: "Friction Between Bonn
and Paris"] -
- [Text] Lately, the German-French nuclear friendship has cooled consider-
_ ably. SPD Bundestag Deputy Ulrich Steger examines the problems which have
- marred coo~eration between the two countries in th~e field of nuclear
technology. -
Within the framework of conditions governing energy policy considerable _
differences in strategy ehist between Bonn and Paris. The policy of the
FRG aim~ at energy conservation, the use of coal and new energy technologies.
In this scheme nuclear power is expected to supply the unfilled power
demand. in contrast, France relies unilaterally on nuclear power. More
- than 50 percent of all power is expected to be supplied by nuclear power
plants to replace the use of oil (partly even for electric heating) as ,
early as in 1985. Within the same time span the first commercial breeder
reactor "Superphoenix" in Mal~iille in the borough of Cr~ys is expected to
- come on line followed immediately thereafter by others. This is surely a
_ high-risk strateg,y--whose cost may partly have to be borne also by the
FRG Republic in t~he form of deliveries arising from the Montanunion agree-
ment.
Of course, in France there is opposition to nuclear power estimated to -
include a good quarter to close to a third of the en~ir2 population. That
- the opposition was hitherto unable to exert its influence is due--according
. to the NEW YORK TTMES--to the centralist and authoritarian administrative
system prevailing in that country with power concentrated in the hands of
the technocratic elite, people who have all attended the same school, know ~y
each other personally and are convinced of the correctness of the course
they have embarked on. .
By establishing a Nuclear Power Commission an instrument was created which
has arrogated to itself the jurisdiction over all aspects of nuclear power
(including security and licensing) and all capacities (industry included)
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and developed it into an "unstoppable bureaucratic bulldozer" (NEW YORK
TIMES).
The endeavor by France to change the 1957 Euratom agreement aiming only at
= a"renationalization of the nuclear fuel policy" p~ses a special problem
_ for the FRG. But according to the NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG "it is clear that
the changes in the clause governing supply desired by France would affect
- the entire Euratom agreement by analogous interpretations." According ,
to the Swiss paper "France wishes to strengthen i.ts special position with
regard to the nuclear fuel policy by insisting on national premises and
prerogat?ves, break out of the limits imposed by EEC constraints and derive
economic and political advantages from its priviledged position in commer-
cializing know-how in the nuclear fuel cycle." -
. This may mean advantages in the export of nuclear power plants where the -
F'rencl~ today are already miles removed from tlie constraints imposed by
Curopean solidarity whenever lnrge orders are involved which become an
object of domestic nuclear controversy in the FRG. Here the burden of the -
_ oversized and technologically obsolete French uranium enrichment plants may
be playing a role, just like the efforts by the French to gain a3vantage
over its neighbours (and competitors) by making use of their special
relationship with former colonies such as Niger or Gabon with their rich _
uranium deposits.
' But the French wishes for revision may really turn into a touchy issue -
once they start intrud3ng into the realm of international policy. In his
- declaration to the National Assembly on 15 December of last year Minister ~
of Foreign Affairs Jean Francois Poncet left no doubt that in implementing
and applying the Euratom agreement in the future the nations possessing
nuclear weapons must be given special consideration.
This puts the nondiscrimination clause towards nonnuclear states contained
in the nonproliferation treaty into jeopardy for the FRG not only on a
ruropean but on a worldwide scale, because the application of the Euratom
agreement in relations with the United States and at the INFCE Conference* ~
is a strang supportive argument and represents a model of a tool by which
. the misuse of the peaceful application of nuclear power for nuclear weapons
- production can be prevented by controls and multinational cooperation.
The French tactics with respect to "thermal recycling" (recycling plutonium ~ ~
resulting from the reprocessing of fuel elements in light water reactors)
- or the French opposition to the British-German-Dutch gas centrifuge '
development, which they call especially proliferation-prone (suitable for .
* International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference, working groups -
from 50 nations, meeting currently in Vienna, which on the init3ative
of the United States President Jimmy Carter are expected to find out
how nuclear arms proliferation can be prevented by the peaceful use of
nuclear power.
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i~~cn; c~r~l~'.Cr rn~, u;,i~; c~Ni,Y
transmission), raises fears that in reality the French want to invalidate
the Fqual rights of--at least European--states in the peaceful use of
nuclear power in order to gain pri-vileges for the states possessing
nuclear weapons. -
To the existing conflicts~can be added the re~ecting attitude of France
toward Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's initiative to improve and
standardize reactor safety procedures by international agreements. Paris -
is of L-he opinion that such agreements could lead to a moratorium. In
addition, the French claim that reactor safety is exclusively each state's ~
internal business and not subject to external control. Worthy of inention -
are further the quarrels about tre parliamentarian inquiry into the
disposal agreements of German power supply enterprises with the Cap de la
- Hague reprocessing plant or the protracted negotiations on the return of
, the plutonium recovered ~here. ~
Small wonder then, things being what they are, that in German-French
cooperation there is considerable friction also at lower levels. For
example, the French are adamant in their~3.nsistence that the cooperation
- in breeder reactor technology implies only the pooling of joint (systems-)
know-how~but not the transfer of know-how about breeder reactors or the -
production of breeder fuel elements or their reprocessing. On the other
hand they exhibit almost no interest in the other agreed-upon cooperation
on the high-temperature reactor.
- Therefore, it appears that the situation is developing in a direction which
speaks forr rethinking German-French nuclear cooperation and leaving illusions
- aside. Wh~n the differences i'n strateg3es involving energy and foreign
economic and military policies between France and the FRG are as great as
they are in the nuclear energy field then a sober reexamination is called
for to ~etermine where common interests for continued cooperation still
exist in this spec3al area. On the other hand closer cooperation in the
field of nuclear power might easily be possible with countries such as -
Great Britain pursuing policies similar to Bonn~s.
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FRANCE
. .
�
MINISTER OF INDUSTRY INTERVIEWED ON NUCL~AR POLICY ~
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 8 Oct 79 pp 48-50
- [Interview with Andre Giraud, Minister of Industry, by Jr,.~ette Alia--date
and placa not given] ~ j
~ ~
, i ~ ~ ~
.
[Text]--One should be wary of Andre Giraud: He has
Viking blue eyes aiid the Norman frame, but was born in
the Bordeaux region. He is the energy tsar, the atomic j-
dictator, the man who is going to straighten out industry ;
_ . with an iron hand, leaving his velvet gloves 4n the -
- coat sCand. But he adores children's films and he spends ~
his leisure painting. In short, he pursues diverse i-
activities, and enjoy this. As a student at the Ecole
" Polytechnique, he used to play rugby and do parachute ~
jumping (at the same time as Massu). As a senior official,
he always destested the slaw proceedings and red tape of
administration. As minister of industry, he sets aside ~
professianal politics and dreams of being a company head. -
Could he be a future prime minister? "The question is '
irrelevant," he answers in a tone whYch has suddenly ~
= turned icy, whereas just a moment before, he had been
laughing heartily. '
Andre Giraud had first dedicated himself to the oil sector
at a time, 1g47 when France had neither oil nor an oil -
- p olicy. So why did he choose oil after an honorable~ ~
mentian in math he received at a c anpetetive examination?
He liked literature. But his father, vice-principal of
~ the Bordeaux High School, decided that Andre was good in
math, so he would become an engineer. At that time, no �
arguments were permitted. So l:e joined the Ecole Poly-
technique, naturally leaving as head of his class in 1944.
He was 19 years old. France was in a post-war period, ;
with ratianing in import licences, and poverty in all
sectors and primarily in energy. Is that why he then
chose the Ecole des Mines, and later the Ecole Super.ieure _
' du Petrole? At that time there were already quite a few
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' people who believed, Lhat we had to "fight~like dogs" to
make France independent in the energy sector. In 1949,
he went to Texas, where he remained for a year. It was
a shook, the discovery of another world, the fascination
for American technology, abundance and industry. We must, ~
~yes, indeed we must c:.tch up with them. A crusade was
started. -
1950-1970: Twenty years of oil. Guillaumat (the "pope,"
_ the power behind the throne), Giraud and a few others
'worked silently, almost secretly on their great goal:
France should have its national oil, because oil will
one day. become more rare in the world and will become .
- a powerful means by which the cauntries who have it will
~ put pressure an the ones who do not. "It was obvious,
since the Mosaddeq affair. Then it all happe:.ed in-
~ escapably." Then the heavy blow of 1962 fell: loss of
Algerian oil. "At that point we had to begin again from
zero." But a new beginning was mad~e; for Giraud
believes that oil is ane of the great political weapans. _
The proof of this was that in May 19Ei8, at the time of ~
the revolution and barricades, people were fighting in -
- the streets, singing and arguing with joy. But as for
~ Andre Giraud, he was not amused. He can unders~and:
his san was a student. Well, society was changing. But
it was also the country falling to the distaff, and
he didn't like that. At the Fuel Bepartment, where he
~ was the all powerful~boss, he pu~ his system in order. .
Road transportation was still in operation. Gas distri-
butors can be convinced by arousing co~npetition, by send-
ing a few tank trucks to Paris. At the Champs-Elysees
' demonstration, Malreaux and Debre sang the Marseillaise.
Was it to be civil war? No? It wou~:d be a great weekend
spree. The gas pumps were open once;;'again! The weather
was fine! Paris drove off to the countryside. The
revolution died down. Finally, the real p aaer rested =
with the Fuel De*~artment.
, 1970: The nature of the energy has changed. It is now
called nuclear, and Giraud is certain that it is the only
_ form of energy which could take over with the threat of
_ rarer oil he f oresees, fears and expects. He takes over
the management of the Atomic Energy Commission, enterinb -
the nuclear field like someone joining a religious
order; But a crusading monk: to revive the CEA (Atomic
Energy Commission) that all believe to be in its death ,
_ throes, he worked hard, made decisions, separa*ed re-
~ search and industry; he also made man enemies. Oh, the
results were not disputed; in his hands, the CEA became
a real power, a key point to power. The French nuclear
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program is one of the most structured and important in
the whole world. Giraud imposes his image: vigor and
humor. For controversy is mounting in the nuclear
sector. And the technocrat who rendered accounts to no
one, the expert who only accepted discussions at symposia,
was suddenly faced with sometliing wh:Lch had been par.t
neither of his plans nor calculations: public opinion,
and with the matter of fissures in the power stations a
demanding, implacable and increasingly well inf ormed
~ public opinian (see the article by Michel Bosquet on
- p 54). First of all, he was irritated, revealing~a
' vulnerability that was little known. Then he reconsidered
- and speaks. But not, as will be.apparent, without same .
hesitation.
" jQuestion] "You havz been the oil man, then the nuclear energy man. What
- will the next technological 1eap; the next mutation be?"
[Answer] "In my opinian, ir~f ormatics and micro-informatics are much more
important than oil and nuclear devices, which only produce energy,
whereas informatics is going to induce a total transformation of society: _
why sh ould one continue to w ork in offices if the same thing can be done
at h ane, on a computer terminal or a telecopying unit? Why should one be
- burdenend with bills, coins or even checits when electronic money, ~vith
punched cards, is almost completely perfected? There are not just
material changes:, informatics is going te change our i3ays of thinking,
, our concepts. It represents a sort of amplification, an extension of
human intelligence. Already our children do not calculate in the same
manner as we do, they do not know the same things as we do. And things ~
will be moving very fast: the public does not measure at all the extent -
of the phen anenon, but familiarization has already taken place. People
have become used to pocket calculators, to computers. At this very
~ moment, a law is being voted upon which would tend to accept as proof a
recording on a magnetic tape! And no one stands up to oppose it. And
yet these are the real political problems."
[Questian) "Do you see'any danger in it?"
- [Answer] "Yes. Informatics can obviously be a tool of political domina-
- tian, or. simply insure the cultural imperialism of those who "are in the
know!" But it may also restore a more direct communication between the
pvwers and the.citizens: telematics reviving the Greek Agora! A dream.
In any case it should make it possible to succeed where other sciences
_ have failed: ~,ut them on the public quare, inf orm the citizens questian _
them, make it possible for them to evaluate the usefulness or lack of
usefulness of any technical ~dvance. The stunning achievements of
= genetics for example will not be long in posing serious moral and ethical
~ problems. This time one should not take the wrong turning on the way to
- reconciling public opinion and science."
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- [:~uestion] "This was a step which was not taken in tMe nuclear sector?"
_ [Answer] "No, indeed it was not done. And that's a pity."
~ [Question] "Why?" ~
[Ans~aerl "I believe that at the.beginning men working in the nuclear
field were so proud of their work that they shut themselves up in thier _
ivory tower. Then they were opposed, attacked, sometimes very unjustly
and harshly. Then they had a moment of reflection, and really their
project deserved a defense. Obviously, it might have been better to
adopt a different approach: inform, consult. Since this was not done, it
aroused blind fear, the fear of the unkn~bwn. The mystery.~ Therein lies
the whole problem: how can this fear be dissipated?"
[QuestionJ "For 8 y mrs you were the head of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Why did you not do this at that time?"
[Answer] "If you can provide me with a good solution for thorough infor-
mation on nuclear energy, I am prepared to adopt it. But how? The
_ technical data are so complex that it is impossible to communicate them.
Then how could one get any idea on the subject? In principle, experts
are consulted. For my part, not being omniscient, not being versed in
metallurgy, electronics, or the rest, I acquired an idea of the real and _
potential risk.from people whom I believed were credibl~ and whose =
credibility I trusted at all times. Then I was able to take the re-
sponsibilaty. But what about the public? How do you think they would
manage to make any sense when some scientists are accusing others? H+~w
would they be able to judge between cranks and others? The only thing it
is possible to do today is to work seriously, and then convince people -
- that the nuclear sector is in the hands of reliable people, who can be
trusted: This assumes that~the importar~t data can be checked." -
[Question] "Did you see the "China Syndrome"? ~
[Answer] "No." ~ ~
[Question] "Were you afraid during the Three Mile Island accident?"
[Answer] "I could not understand why they were .losing their heads there,
in view of the technical elements which reached us. I began to worry when
they began talking of that blasted hydrogen bubble, on Sunday, because '
- that was something abnormal, samething unexpected. But in the final
analysis, the interpretation had been exaggerated, the tiny bubble did not `
pose any danger."
[Question] "In that case what was alarming was not the bubble, but the
er.rors committed by the American experts. How can one refrain from think-
ing about it, now when people are talking of dangerous fissures in the
steel of two reactors? This time, in France..."
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[Answer] "Th.is phenomenon has been known and studied for months. All
the sections in charge of safety established a report stating formally
- that the loading of these reactors posed no hazards. If this phenomenori,
which, by the way, is superficial, were to be aggravated, its evolution
cou~d be followed over se~veral years. I have therefore no reason to
refuse today approval for loading."
- ~[Question] "Why should everything be centered around the~nuclear sector? -
One could also practice self-control, and even, why not, change one's
lifestyle?" -
[Answer] "Actually, if a change in lifestyle were really accepted (although,
in my opinion, the French people are not prepared for this), we could
dispense with some of our energy. But at that time, I would stand up to
ask: what energy would it be better for us to give up? ;dell, it would
certain ly not be nuclear energy, which is most sure and least dangerous.
� Yes, the least dangerous: in normal operation,;ttne radioactivity around
the power stations is at an extremely law level.' In case of normal
operation, the whole design provides for the radioactivity to remain inside
the building. And it does remain inside. On the other hand, with fuel...
Take the example of the Nogent power statian, near Paris. With the same
- lifestyle, either nuclear electricity is used, which does not affect the _
population, or one must accept the fact that a million tons of fuel oil,
or a million and a half tons of coal, more must be burnt in the Parisian '
_ h~mes.. There you are, you can calculate yourself the number of cancers
this pollution will induce. Now I ask you which is th2 decision requiring
_ more courage, which is the one which makes a dangerous sacrifice to .
fashion?"
[Questian) "So after all, nuclear energy is completely safe?"
[Answer] "I never said it was completely safe! I te11 you that it is a
risk comparable with all the other risks which our society faces today. ,
No human activity is totally safe."
[Question] "Nevertheless, it's a pity there should be no more oil. It
was so practical." .
[Answer] "Yes, but that's all over. We are heading, with ups and downs,
towards a situation of increasingly rare oil. This is a facty and those
who state that there is no problem, or no more pro~lems, are thoughtless."
[QuestionJ "What is the concrete meaning of "rarefied oil"? What are
the critical thresholds? The possible ruptures7"
[Answer] "I do not believe there will be a sudden rupture, but rather
a continuous dwindling of the role of oil in our production of energy.
It should be retained only in indispensable areas, for instance petroleum
_ chemistry and motor oils, about 30 percent of our annual consumption." ~
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[Question] "And this could be done without any problems, without up-
heavals? Wi.thout any crisis?"
(Answcr] "Thc crlsis may arise at any moment. Yoi~ only need some kind .
oC seri ais political situation somewhere. Look at Iran...but, finally
let us assume that everyone behaves. Let us assume that the producing
and consuming countries agree, that energy conservation be reinforced,
- that alternative sources of energy be sought actively, and also that no
political blunders be made. In that case there may be a certain alleviation
of the pressure and even (perhaps) adjustment with the other sources of -
energy."`
[Question] "And when would this link up take place? In 5 years, in 10
years?" _
[Answer] "No important decision could bear fruit in less than 5 years. A
period of 5 years would be needed to implement a new petroleum production,
5 ro 10 years f or coal or bituminous schists; the nuclear programs launched
today will only start their production in 6 to 10 years; we wil~ have to .
wait 10 years to modify the consumption of the automobile f leet and 25 -
years to�reorganize the property. So1ar energy cannot be included in the
forecasts because the fundamental research in this area has not yet been
_ adequately developed. Conclusion: We would need a lot of peace in the
early eighties!"
[Questian] "But what are you doing with regard to these S years?"
[Answer] "We are doing our utmest to relax the oil tension: There has
recentl.y been a serious progress in the discussion between consumers.
Among others, the United States are going to suppress the $5.00 subsidy,
and speculation at Rotterdam has been, I will not say controlled, but
' kept at bay. The important thing is to loosen the hold very quickly, so
that it does not strangle us!" ~ ~
[Question] "Have.you the means to achieve this? Do you feel more p aaerful _
as a minister, than when you were head of the CEA, for instance?"
[Answer] "The situation is totally different. At the CEA, it.was hard at
first: 32,000 persons to reallocate, to distribute in a different way. -
- When I left, there were 25,000 p~rsons left, and no ane had been dismissed.
But in saane way, it was also simpler: I had boundaries within which I '
- had to act. Whereas the functioning of the government in a ministerial -
position is extremely complex. Many administrative complications are
often useless: I do not believe in fit~icky controls;.they are stupid and -
ineffective. But everybody, citizens as well as state, is more or less
responsible for this situation. When I joined this ministry, I wanted
to begin oil prospecting in th.e north of France. I pestered the adminis-
- trations constantly, and they did what they could, but I was able to
obtain the prospecting permit only 14 months later. And they say the
minister is all powerful!"
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� rox orFlcr~u. usL orrLY
[Question] "Does that discourage you?"
[Answer] "No, it irritates me. I get hopping mad when I see the amount
oF time and energy one has to consume to surmount ridiculous details and
reduce to some extent the evils of contralization." ;
[Questian] "How do you relax? At the cinema?" ~
~ [Answer] "I go to the movies with my daughter, to see children's films.
I adore that. Or I see reruns of old films ~"i TV." '
;
~ ~
[Question] ."You are into painting too. What kind of painting?"
[Answer] "Well...yes, I do paint."
[Question] "On the whole, you are not deeply interested in politics. You
never held a really political post...."
- [Answer] "I did in 1969, when I became (the decision had to be made in
5 minutes) head of the cabinet of Olivier Guichard, then minister for
national education. We had to apply the law of orientation in higher
teaching. It was no doubt, not the most difficult, but the most acrobatic
moment of my career: the whole administrative machine was upside down,
we had no means of action-not even directories nor organizational charts.
I too?c up my-p'ost at 11 one morning. Who did I have to see in that place? ~
- Fortunately, the secretary knew. Afi 3 p.m. they told me the Ecole Normale
Superieure was occupied. The next morning, it was the Vincennes
University..."
[Question] "Then you became again a senior civil servant. With relief?" ~
[Answer] "I would not say that. When you have a responsibility, whatever
it may be, you have to accept it. And then, it is very useful to change -
one's activity: at the CEA, I had laid down a rule by which a deputy
- never replaced his boss, that made people move, created new.teams, broke
the routine. It is really suicidal.to accept routine, i~n our modern
society. But to answer your question: what is the difference between
_ the post of senior civil servant and of a minister? I wo.uld say that ;
_ the two are political: at the CEA, it was particularly international '
politics; at the Fuel Department, it was internal politics. That was
- apparent in May, 1968...What is the difference, is that the Minister has
two additional responsibilities: that of defining what the French want .
ar?d that of explaining to the French what the government is doing. Not
easy to speak and be heard by all, when during one's whole life one has
_ used a more elliptic speech, with peaple who were technical or high
officials. I am trying, it can be learned. At least, I hope so..."
[Question] "What.embarrasses you most in your new situation of political
person? Is it public controversy?
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~ [Answer]i "I do not like to be taken to task by sameone whom I do not
knc~w and with whom I, cannot have a direct explanation. I have not managed
to get used to this yet."
[Qu~Stion~ "AfCer all, you give the impression that you would like to
~ manage the Ministry Industry as though you were a company director, that ~
you woulld like to send your of ficials to the fields, or rather to the
coal mines, in the Chinese fashion, and recruit private P.-D.G. (Chairmen
and General Directors) as high officials, as they do in America. Am I
mistaken?"
[AnswerJ' "Not altogether. This administration should be equipped
material:ly and intellectually to react as a head of company in the face
of industry. The industrialis ts should have as conversation partners
ilere people who car~ achieve a synthesis of their interests and not
_ specialist, hawever competent they may be. Well, about appointing P.-D.G.
Erom private companies? I am quite prepared to do so, I have even done
~ it. But at the higher level, peop le from the private sector cost a lot,
- too much. Beyond the financia 1 means of the public sector. Too bad!"
[Question] "Do you see yourself in the role of a prime minister?"
- [Answer] 10The question is not relevant!"
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Ob servateur"
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� FRANCE
BIOGR/1PHICAL. INFORMATION ON URANIUM ENGINEER ANNE DUTHILLEUL
_ Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 8 Oct 79 p 60
[Article: "Anne Duthilleul, 26, Mining Engineer"]
[Text] Something metal and very heavy, mouse-gray. From Canada to South
Atrica everyone is searching for it with the same greedy fever as the
, old cowboys of the goldrush. It is uranium, uraizium with which nuclear
powerplants are heated.... In our country, the directar-in-chief of operations
, for uranium prospecting~is a woman, and young into the bargain:. Anne
D~ithilleul, 26, polytechnique major, one of the ''eggheads" of the Department
oF Raw Materials at the Ministry of Industry. ~
Do you remember Miss Chopinet, who by placing first in polytechnique.competitive
- examinatioti in 1972 jumped over a male threshQld? This is she, married
now, established, too--and well. With her piercing brown eyes she supervises
all French mining searches, particularly searches for uranium in Herault,
Vendee, Haul-Vienne or abroad. All requests for exploitation permits pass
- through her hands. Anne Duthilleul is, then, one of the key elements in
Fr,ench nuclear policy. And she is proud of it: "I favor nuclear energy
for reasons of energy independence."
� On weekends, after having worked all week for "national independence,"
this practicing Catholic is writing a work on freedom based on an old text ,
of Saint Thomas entitled "Concerning Evil" together with her husband and a
cousin (a Dominican).... ~
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COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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FRANCE
. BTOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON EDF'S LE MARECHAL
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 1 Oct 79 p 64
[Article: "Tanneguy Le Marechal, 40, Department Head at the EDF"] _
['Pext] Who makes the (civil) nuclear policy of France? Andre Giraud, the
minister of industry. Of course, it is not he who decides on the setting
up of power stations in Brittany or the Parisian Basin. It is a Polytechnique
graduate in a red tie who works in Office 725 of one of the,directorships
oF the ~DF [French Electric Power Company]. None of the opponents of
nuclear power know his name, and yet Tanneguy Le Marechal, who is new to _
- this post, is in the process of creating the France that the "ecologists" do
_ not want, by exploring and marking sites where new "Super Phoenixes" will
be erected. -
If you see him strolling in your district with topographical maps, surveyors
and engineers, heaven help you...! Probably a nuclear powerplant is coming
to your area. In any case, Tanneguy T~e Marechal will not acknowledge _
responsibility: '.'I'm not the one who makes the decisions," he says, and
he is right. The head of the Sites-Environment-Information Department at
- ~DF, this man, who has b een in house for nearly 20 years, is limited to
advising the decision-makers. They listen to him. And in 10 years no one
will be able to say that the nuclear France of tomorrow was born of an
unknown father.
4
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COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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i FRANCE
BRIEFS
" ~URODIF TO SUE IRAN--EURODIF (European Company for Uranium Enrichment) is .
going to sue Iran. The reason: Teheran has never paid the 500 million
francs owed for work done on its behalf by the Tricastin nuclear [uranium
enrichment] plant. [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 16 Nov 79 p 70] ' _
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UNITED KINGDOM
llEFENSE MINISTRY DECIDES ON TRIDENTS AS INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT
_ ,
LD011129 London THE GUARDIAN in English 1 Nov 79 p 1 LD
[David Fairhall report: "UK Ready To Buy Trident Missiles"]
, [Text] A firm decision has been taken at the Ministry of Defence that Britain~s indepen-
dent nuclear deterrent should be replaced in the 199o~s by a fleet of five submarines -
_ carrying American Trident missiles fitted with British warheads.
" A recommendation will he submitted next week to a special cabinet sub-conunittee, chaired'
~by Mrs Thatcher, which is expected to endorse the plan. The.hope is that the Trident~s
purchase, a direct successor to the Polaris missile deal but not on such favorable terms,
can then be finalised with President Carter during Mrs Thatcher~s visit to Washington in
December. .
~
The plan is to have the first of the new submarines in servioe by the mid-i99os, with a
fleet of five boats eventually replacing the Royal Navy~s present fleet of four Polaris -
~ submarines~ so as to have at least two boats on patrol at any time. Gach of them will
probabl,y carry 1G Trident 'C missiles, which a re three-stage ballistic rockets with a
ran~e of 7,000 kilometres, currently under development for the US Navy.
The Aldermaston atomic weapons [?division] will be asked to develop a new warhead carrying
MTRV~s (P1~ltiple Independently Targeteable Re-entry Vehicles) on which some design work
has already been done. It is not clear whether the British warhead would have as an option
P4anoeuvrable Re-entry Veh9.cles (MARVs) as planned for the American Trident I, but either
_ design would presumably require a ma~or testing programme.
4'he cost of the new deterrent force can hardly be iess than 4,000 million pounds, since
the last authoritative estimate of such a replacement, prepared by Ian Smart of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, suggested that it might cost nearly 3,000 million
pounds in 1976.
The Pentagon seems to have made a reasonable preliminary offer for the Trident sale, in
terms of.the proportion of development costs the }3ritish missiles would carry, but
there would be no question of repeating the generous terms on which the Polaris system
was handed over in the wake of~the embarrassing Skybolt cancellation.
Although the Ministry of Defence proposal has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
undex~ the chairmanship of Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, as chief of the defence staff, both the
- Army and the RAF are known to have some reservations about the prospect of spending perhaps
10 percent of our defence budget on a deterrent force during the peak four or f.~?.ve year~
of its development.
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'fiey would probably have been a lot more restive had this expenditure not fallen beyond
eten the long term, 10-year costing period. The submarines will not be under construction
unbil bhe early 1990s. None of the pro~ects currently being pursued by the generals and
�ir marshals, ouch as Rhine Ar~'~s new main battle rank or the RAF~s Harrier-Jaguar replace-
menb, will therefore be directly affeated. '
_ Hut if 1+~s Thatcher and her miniaters do endoree the Trident plan next week, its gublic
debate is likely to be vigorous both in Parliament~ where the defence secretary, N1r Francis
Pym. has already promised a debate~ and in the US Congress.
The gove.nment~is bound to be challenged as to wt~y Britain still needs an ~~independentr
nualear- deterrent, wt~y the deterrent force should to aonsist of much cheaper nuclear-armed
cruise missiles of the kind we are in ar~y case proposing to have based in this country--owned
and operated by the Americans--as part of the aollective plan to modernise NATO~s so-called
theatre nuclear weapons.
~ The vast amounts of money saved, some will argue, would b~p c~nventional forces giving far
more real '~independence~~ and f~ eedom of manoeuvre in NATO than nuclear ueapons that would
only be used as a last, suicidal resort.
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspaper I.imited, 1 November 1979
CSO: 5100 END -
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