JPRS ID: 8829 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030046-6
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• Document Page Count: 61
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ 1979 70~ 1 0F 1
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JPRS L/8829
, -
= 26 December 1979
- ;
- West Euro e Re ort -
, p f~
CFOUO 70/79~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE _
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JPRS L/8829
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. 26 December 1979
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 70/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION -
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FRG~s Voigt Sees Energy Policy as CSCE Topic ~
~ (Karsten D. Voigt; EUROPA ARCHIV, 10 Nov 79) .........o. 1
= FRANCE
Marchais' Presidential Campaign Tactics Discussed
(Andre Lesueur; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 29 Oct 79) .....oa... l0
Former PCF Member Garaudy Candidate fc_ Presidency
(Roger Garau~y; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATL'UR, 29 Oct 79) 14
PCF Purges Party Press; New Weekly To Appear
= (Andre Lesueur; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 29 Oct 79) ..o....... 28
r~
Views on Soviet Eurobank Operations,_G~~als Reported
- (Pierre Beaudeux; L'EXPANSION, 5 Oct 79) .,.........o... 30
_ Brie~s ~ -
- Clandestine Stations Planned 35
_ ITALY ~
Unidentified Terrorist Leader Interviewed
(Chiara Beria; PANOREIMA, 1 Oct, 79) o.o.;,.o.....o......o, 36
Milan Union Leaders Againsti Factory Terrorism, Violence
(Pier Giorgio Tiboni, Sergio Soave Interview;
~ CORRIERE DELLA SERA,, 13 Nov 79) ...............o.ooa... 50
SPAIN
- Briefs
Korea To Buy Aircra#t 57
- - ~ - _[IYI - WE - 150 FOUO] ~
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COUNTRX SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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FRG'S VOIGT SEES ENERGY POLICY AS CSCE TOPIC
_ Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV in German 10 Nov 79 pp 645-652
[Article by Karsten D. Voigt, SPD Bimdes~ag member, Bonn: "Cooperation by
CSCE (Conference an Secuxity and Cooperatian in E~urope) in the Energy Sector"]
[Text] On Tuesday, 11 November 1980, delegates of 35 countries will meet in
Madrid to disGUSS the continued pursuit of detente. At this second succes-
sor. conference of the CSCE we will have an opportunity to provide new impetus
to ~ast~-West cooperatian and prepare constructive proposals for that purpose.
Possible topics for the expansion of deten~te may be found at all levels of
- CSCE agreeffienfis: In the area of building canfidence in military matters as .
~u~h as that of h~an rights and economic coaperation. The scope for the re-
i:`uction ~f restrictive practices is not even fully exploited in a~reass which
- arA mcst subject to political controversy--such as freedam of movement or
the exchange of infozmation and optnion. That it is possible even here to =
arrive at some settlements is demonstrated by the improve~ments in the field
of family reunions, the easing of West-East marriages, the ~reater freedom
of movementi enjr~yed by Western reporters in some East European countries
(despite the setbacks suffered in some others), and so cm and so ~orfih.
' Of course it will not do to overestimate these advances. T'he agreements can- -
= cluded up to naw aze unsatisfactory in many respects: They still refer to
_ far too small a group Qf peopl.e, continue to be far fram Western concepts of
' freedam an~d freedam of move~ment. Nor,can anybody deny that setbacks occur- _
= r~d and will continue to occur in this rather difficult process. Neverthe-
less efforts at agreement are meaningful even in small dimensions. It would
in any case be quite unrealistic to expect detente to wipe out all antago-
- nism between East and West ~nsofar as fundamental ideas are concerned. The
social orders, the governments and political intereats in~ the respective sys-
tems are far too different, in fact quitE hostile to one another. Confront-
ed with this fact detente sets out gradually to defuse the conflicts in Eu- -
rope. It asstnnes that the opportunities for agreement on particularly dif- f
fi^ult problems--for example in the defense and h~anitarian aceas--are -
baund to increase if contractually settled relatians are entered into in as
many areas as possible, and if the European countries a;.CQ more closely rela-
ted by long-term and intensive types of cooperation. Reciprocal relatior:s
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create caamon interests, and, common interests are a good founda~tion for re- ~
ducing the threat of military confrontation as well as for d~ealing with sucn
politically explosive topics as himman rights or freedom of mavement.
Though the antagonism between the syatems is not ciirectly removed thereby,
- it is easier to check its security-threatening effects. For this policy to
succeed it is important that the various levels of cooperation should be con-
- stantly extended. One of the sectors which might be suitable has become par-
ti~ularly topical in recent months: The energy sector. ~
Starting Situatian: Energy Shortage ~
Here we have the following starting situation:
The shortage of energy raw materials, especially oil, has increasingly con- _
fronted all CSCE countries w=th serious problems. The shortage has differ-
ent dimensians and different causes in Ea~tern a~d Western Europe. While the
Council for Econanic Mutual Ai~ (CII~lA) , far example, lacks the irnestment re-1
saurces to develop azid exploit existing but fairly inaccessible oil deposits,
, the West European countries--with the exc~ption of Norway and Bri~ai.n -have _
- either no damestic reserves at all or reserves which are seriausly li.mited.
The consequent energy gap compels a11 CSCE countries to develop en~ergy con- -
servatian techniques and to seek alternati.ve possibilities for producing
~ energy. This in turn cal].s for an enormo~.is investment expenditure.
- The development of nuclear po~ner is inadequate to meet t~ne long-term energy
needs in either East or West.~ The reservations especially prevalent in
Western Europe with regard to the expansion of nuclear energy have made th~
search for alternative energy srn.u~ces even more urgent.
_I
Even with respect to less scarce traditirnial types of energy (such as coal)
- the European countries are c4nfront~d witki coa~on and as yet unsolved prob- r
lems. In additian to the need �or developing new technologies we are here ~
concerned especially with having to r~concile the demands of energy proci~ic- _
tion and those of envirornnental control and health preservatian. ~
The rising foreign exchange costs of energy i.mports are adding to the diffi-
culties of the ~~l.ropean econaaies: They ob~truct the development of products
and cons~ption, make it hazder to maintain the various peoples stanclard of
living and absorb resources ahich, to a large extent, would be needed to re- _
structure energy supplies. ~
' It follows fram this situation that the problems and tasks related to the -
preservation oi' energy supplies i.n East and West are quite similar and that,
consequently, all CSCE countries have about the same interest in resolving
the energy issue. To realize this interest w~e might consider various ap- -
proaches, including two which deserve pazt~.cular attentian fram the politi-
cal aspect:
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1. The various ~overnments couid try to improve their countries ene�rgy situ-
ata~on by going it alone. Such a decisi~n would be bound to initiate a se-
=ious struggle for the distributian of increasingZy scarce resaurces--espe-
- ciatly in the oil sector. Added to this would be the risk that the econami-
cally more powerful countries might carxy their demands without consideration
for the needs of the weaker nations. Nor could we exclude the possibility
that the struggle fbr the remaining oil reserves might be fought out by mili- _
tary means--either to campe]. the producing countries to yield their oil or
eliminate the competition. -
_ 2. The governments may decide to cooperate in the expectatian that it would �
~ be easier to find a way out of the energy bottlsieck if the parties affected -
wer~ to join to pursue their interests. The energy sector is particularly
suitable for cooperation. between E::;~t and West not only because ideological -
factors and ideological differences are relatively unimportant in this con-
- text, but also because the material cand~tions for cooperation are relative-
ly favorable, and the various countries ma~r meaningfully complement one an-
other by deploying their various resources. One look at the raw material -
situation in GEMA ill~inates the fields where ~portunities for a joint ap-
proach could arise.
Currently Eastern Europe is still one of the energy exporters. This is due
primarily to the Soviet Union which sells 14 percent of its energy produc-
tion abroad, including 25 percent of its entire oil production. Half its
oi.l exports ga to its allies, the other half earns foreign exchange from the
West. Despite this starting situation ~nich ~.s so much better than that of
_ Western Europe, the energy problem is causing increasi.ng arixiety in CEMA.
_ The reasons are as follaws:
Per capita consumption of energy is well above the average, in fact it is
9 percent above that of the European Communities. According to estimates -
Soviet reserves of coal will last more than 100 years, natural gas 80 years
and oil 20 years. But CEMA energy cons~ption is rising faster than output
and--unless the i.ndustrial and consumer attitudes of East European countries
were to change by then--the current surplus will have turned into a deficit
by 1990. An indication of this trend is the fact t'~at, according to the Of-
fice for Statistics, the daily production of oil has been stagnating or even _
slightly declining in the Soviet Uni.on for a little more thazi 6 months.
- At the same time investment costs of energy productivn are steadily rising,
" especially for oil and natural gas; by now they absorb nearly a third of a11
- Soviet industria]. investments. The reason: Soviet oil and natural gas ciepo- -
si.ts are located in inaccessible regions and deep belaw graund. _
The more investments the Soviet Union must deploy in the energy sector to
maintain its curre:~t production vol~e, the less money is available for oth-
er branches of the economy. This sets quite rigid li.mits to any further in-
crease i.n oil and natural gas production, because in that case even more ~
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additional resources wo uld be needed and then unavailable to other and also
important ir~dustries. The result wauld be serious losses in t~ta1. Sovist -
econc~mi.c growth.
On the other hand the curtailment of energy investments is not a way out of
- the dilemma either, because without increased energy use the Soviet planned
ecanamy would also stagnate. Even naw the forecasts for the Saviet Union's
econamic development in the 1980's are based on Qbviou:ly reduced growth
rates (belaw 4 percent).3 _
A slow down of oil aud natural gas development would also have the clisadvan-
tage that the Soviet Union would be unable to meet the growing needs of its
allies. Although this expectatian is occasionally heard, it would be a mis-
take for the West to assume that any exacerbation of the energy conflict
within Eastern Europe might fuel the efforts ~t ~atonomy of the smaller CEMA
countries naw dependent on the Soviet Union. These countries lack the for-
~ eign. exchange to purchase the necessary raw materials on the world market.
; (Even R~ania which has its awn natural gas and oil deposits, must increasing-
~ ly rely on oil i.mports). .
~ Any neglect of ~oviet energy investments would also mean that the Soviets
- would be less able than hitherto to pay by energy supplies for imports fram
- the West (for example pipes for natural gas). Currently the Soviet Union ob-
tain~ 50 percent of its foreign exchange from the sale of oil and natural
g~�
The Soviet Union also uses its purchases in the West~to build up a more ef-
ficient export industry. It thereby pursues the aim in future increasingly
- to earn Western currencies by the sale of products other than oil and gas.
If it were to be compelled to reduce i.ts energy exports to the West in the _
- next few years, it would no longer be able to finance the appropriate i.m- -
= ports. Consequently the planned restructuring of Seviet exports would be
even more difficult than it is already. It is quite possible that the -
Soviet Un~on might react to such a situation by a renewal. of isolstionist
policies. A decline in contacts with the West, hawever, w~ould do more than
deepen internal bloc dependencies: It would also threeten the ~rogress of de-
tente.
The problems of East European energy developments here touched upon are par�~
- ticularly acute as long as the Soviet Union and its allies are left to their
own devices. That is why we have here a suitable starting point for the ac-
- t~al cooperation of all CSCE countries. If the East European shortage of
foreign exchange and investment resources were less acute, broader coopera-
tion in the energy sector wauld not really have a proper base.
In the conditions nrna prevai.ling East and West cou~d he1P one another at
least in some fundamental points: More than ever naw th~ West is interested
in the expansion of the worldwide energy supply, and Eastern resources might
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contr.ibute thereto to a substantial extent. On the otlzer hand the East needs
technologies to conserve energy, loans to meet the existing trade deficits
and capital to develop the raw mai.erial sources. All this could be made
available by the Western countries. _
Reducing the Shortage of Energy by Cooperation _
Such a cooperative approach wo~il.d therefore provide several benefits: 1. The
_ available voltmme of energy would be increased; 2. international competitian
for scarce resources would be reduced; 3. the inclination to protectionist
isoldtion would lessen and the market kept open to all--including the coun-
tries poor in energy resources; 4. cooperation between the antagonistic sys-
tems would be strengthened; 5. econamic interests would be linked to detente;
6. readiness to long-range considerations and steadiness in East-West rela
tions would be encouraged.
~ In addition a cooperative resolution of the energy problem would lessen the
dan.ger of renewed hostility between the systems and help avoid the campeti-
tion for oil fram }~ecoming a confrontation threatening world peace.
Moreover detente cc~uld do with same new impetus. That appli~s especially to
' the field of econanic cooperation which has tended to slow down in recent
year;~, if not actually to reverse. In 1976, for example, firms in the Fed-
eral Republic of Gennany sold the CII~1A member countries 1.1 percent and in
_ 1977 2.1 percent less goods than in the respective previous year, nor did the
0.5 percent growtii achieved in 1978 indicate a real change in exports to the
East.5 Mainly responsible for this negative trend is the import restraint
exercised by th~ Sov.iet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union
and Poland especially have very large debts in the West and are trying to xe~
duce their trade and balance of payments deficits by lowerin.g imports and
raising exports. Yet this policy also puts a brake an reciprocal exchange, _
a trend which affects not only trade but is likely also to exert an adverse -
inf.luence on detente in general. _
It is therefore in the interest of all CSCE countries in fact to use all the
potential available to reverse this stagnating trend. The energy sector pra-
vides one of these opportunities, especially because the first preparatory
_ steps towarcl cooperation have already been taken. In May 1978, for example,
the F~deral Republic of Germany and. the Soviet Union negotiated an "agreement
on the development and deepening of long-range cooperation in the field of
~ business and industry" with a term of 25 years, which al.~o involves coopera-
tion in the energy sector and the grant of government guarantees for loans
extended. This agreement was intended pri.marily to er~~ure the con.tinuity of
- exchange relations and the opportunitie~ for ca~nunication resulting there-
from; it might well became the basis for a more camprehensive a11-European
settlement.
The involvement of all Eur~pean countries would be desirable, because a prob-
lem such as the security of energy supplies extends well beyond the scop~ of
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bilateral agreements. Multilateral cooperation in the energy sector could
- draw on the experiences and preparations of the Economic Commission for Eu-
rope (ECE) in Geneva. At the same time it would be advisable not rigidly to
- confine ourselves to the orgariizational framew~rk of the ECE but also to
study other possibilities for multilateral discussions and subsequent poten-
tially more binding methods of cooperation.
On the other hand, though, some objections are raised in Western Europe re-
garding an unduly great co~itment in this matter. The most important refers
to the fear that the West might Uecame dependent on Eastern energy supplies
and consequently suffer restriction of its foreign political scope. In fact
no meaningful cooperation is feasible unless both parties are prepared for -
an intensive exchange, that is lcmg-rmnge agreements. It is impossible joint-
ly to develop major fuel and energy c~plexes, create new i.nternational sys-
tems for the transportation of oil and natural gas, install trans-Continental
- high-voltage lines and agree on a camprehensive finar,~^ial program calculated
in deca~es--only for short- term political considerations later to decide on
rescinding everything. Insofar it is true that an effective all-European _
energy cooperation presimmes the will to long-range cooperation and calls on
us to be ready for and interested in steady lon~-range cooperation.
I~Iatters take on a different aspect i.f the argument of the risk of dependence
relates to the defense situation of the West. Here any Eastern prospects for _
exerting political pressure on the West would be exceedingly sma11. Current-
ly the countries of the European Cownnmity obtain fram the Soviet Union only ~
3.9 percent of their o~l needs and 4.3 percent of their natural. gas require-
ments.6 Even if these percentages were to double, the critical limit would
- be far from reached; experts have calculated this limit at 13-15 percent for
oil and 15-20 percent for natural gas. Incidentally, the member countri.es
of the Internatianal Energy Agency (IEA) have made co~pensatory provisions
for the case that one of them should not receive any oil deliveries for any
length of time .
The danger of dependence has so far emerged mainly in relatians with the OPEC
cvuntries which cover more than 50 percent of West European oil consimiption.~
~ An expansion in the Eastern share of energy imnorts w~ould in fact have the
advantage that there would be more suppliers, thus reclucir~g the unilateral
dependence on the OPEC cartel. Moreover we shauld not forget that any dis--
ruption of East-West cooperation would hit the CF~tA countries at least as -
hard if not harder. Central plaiming would be upset, leading to serious sup-
p1y problems and major investmen~ gaps. _
:
~ An oil embargo by the Soviet Union, whil~ nat crippling West European sup-
plies, would therefore have serious i.mplications for Eastern Europe. At the
same time, for defense political reaso~s, we must reject any reservations
about more ~ntensive econamic cooperation. Reciprocal interlocking provides
a stabilizing factor which should not be underrated, espe~ially if economic
relations are so beneficial to both parties that the short-term profit of a
supply boycott would in every case be substantially less than the long-term
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loss consequent upon a break in these relations, Interlocking may clearly
strengthen the interest in the continuity o:E the exchange, and that in turn
- is likely to ha.ve beneficial effects on the readiness to defuse potential
conflict si tuations.
We must also consider that it is precisely long-range ~nd more comprehensive
types of cooperation (reasonable in the energy sector), which encourage the
evolution of confidence. That also is a pos:.tive security factor. Parallel
. to the corresponding measures at military level (such as the exchange of ob��
- servers at military exercises) and in tourism and culture (such as the ex-
change of youth groups, scientists, artists, and so on), economic ccoperation
- contributes to greater transparency and more information about the social re-~
ality in East and West. An intensive exchange requires both parties to ac-
quire greater knowledge of the partrier's eeonamic decisionmaking processes,
his economic aims and his potential for carrying them out. This prestffies
that the systems open up to one another, that they are more ready to co~muni-
cate and overcome the current "fear of touching." At the embassy level, for
example, the trade promotion of~ices in Mosc+~w, Warsaw, Buchazest and lately
Budapest are important aids for such more ir..;.ensive types of cammmication
in the realm of economic exchange.
By developing this kind of basis for confidence we will also take a step for-
ward to the develop~ent of East
West partnership in defense matt~a:s. Among
the various types of cooperatian soane are particulazly suitable for the furth-
- er pursuit of this goa1. They include:
1. Cooperation by firms: Involved here is cooperation in the development,
manufacture and sale of products. The closer and longer such busin.ess rela-
tions, the more necessary do peraonal contacts becorme at all levels of the
_ co�m?on operations .
2. Direct investments abroad (joint ventures): Here Western fiims invest ca-
pital in East European enterprises, for example fox the modernization of some
produc ts or manufacturing processes. This requires the extensive exchange of
data and the expansion of freedom of movement f~r all those involved.
, 3. Cooperation in basic research: Joint caammissians would handle supra-enter-
_ prise research tasks (such as enviror~ental cor~trol, raw material development
or earthquake prediction). , ~
The dimension of the reciprocal co~nurilcation to be achieved by ~tliese types
of cooperation w:ill largely depend on tlie volume, duration and cou?prehensive-
ness of the respective agreement as well as on the personnel inwlved, the
kind of kna~how required ancl the difficulties of the assigrrment.
Increased cooperation in the energy sector would be particularly promising
fram all these aspects. Of course no intensive co~mitment on the level of
econonic cooperation can possibly replace needed a,greements in the sectors
of defense security and k~tmman rights. All the "baskets" agreet at the
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Helsinki Canference on Security and Coo~,eration t~ strengthen detente have
equal value, and their problems cannot be removed by undue e~mphasis on a
_ particular basket. Nevertheless, progress in the econamic sector may well _
have beneficial effects on other areas of negotiations--especially if such
progress pranotea not only business but also reciprocal confidence, security
- and coa~unicatian. -
Further efforts at cooperation will need l~gely to follow up general declar
rations of. intent by practical application--for example in the energy sector.
TY~e CSCE Conference set for November 1980 in Madrid might provide a good op-
portunity in the caming months to use a11 three baskets to develop coopera-
tive proposals and projects in the interest of a11 those involved in the
CSCE process.
Foo~ro~rES ~ r
1. F`riede~marm Mueller, "Die Sawjetische Energiesituation als Ausgangspunkt
fuer Gesamteuropaeische Kooperationsmoeglichkeiten--Ueberlegungen Nach
der Belgrader Kanferenz" [The Soviet Energy Situation as the Starting ~
Point for Possible All-Europear: Cooperation--Reflections Follawing the
Belgrade Canference], Ebenhausen 1978 (SWP-AP 2186), pp 13 f.
2. In the Soviet Union also nuclear technology, especially mastery of the
~ast breeder reactor, has not advanced far enough for its long-terw in-
dustrial use to be considered certain at this stage. A prototype of the
fast breeder reactor is currently being tested in Shevchenko, another
one is under construction in Beloyazsk. 5ee DIW [Gezman Institute for
E~onomic Research], "The Expaaision of Nuclear Energy To Secure the Self-
Sufficiency of CEMA Energy Sypplies," DIW-WOCHE~iBERICHT No 35/1979, p 36$.
~ -
- 3. Friedemann Niueller, "All-European Cooperatian in the Energy Sector,"
EUROPA ARCHIV No 11/1979, p 317.
4. Friedemarm Mueller, "Produktion tmd Aussenwirtschaftsbeziehtmgen der RGW- -
Laender i_m Energiesektor bis 1990--Voraussetzungen Einer Ost-West Zusam-
menarbeit" [Pzadu~ction and FQreign Trade Relations of the CEMA Countries
in the Energy Sec~tor Through 1990--Prerequisites for East-West Cooperation-
Ebenhause~1979 (SWP-AP 22~1), p I4.
- 5. DIW, "Stagnation of Exports to the CEMA Countries Cantiriues," ~IW-WOCHE[~T-
BERICHT No 13/1979, p 149. The da~a on $xports to the CEMA countries do
not take inner-German trade into accaunt.
6. See United Nations, "World Energy Supplies 1972-1976," New York 1978.
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7. In fact the Federal Republic obtains more than 75 percent of its oil im-.`=~
ports fran the five major OPEC countries. See Achim von Heynitz, "Struk-'
turentwicklung der Internationalen Energiebeziehungen und Ihre Konsequen- -
_ zen fuer die Sicherheit der Energieversorgung" [Structural Development of
Internatio~nal Er.ergy Relations and Their Consequences for the Security of
Energy Supplies~'], Ebenhausen 1979 (SWP-F 271), p 180.
COPYRIG~iT 1979 Jerlag fuer Internatianale Politik GmbH, Bonn ~
11698
CSO: 3103
_
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:
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
� MARCHAIS' PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN TACTICS DISCUSSED
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Oct 79 pp 34-35 -
[Article by Andre Lesueur: "Marchais' Standard"]
[Texr,] Everything is ready: the man, the campaign, the strategy. The
communist party, which wiltingty denounces in others the "presidential ~
obsession" thus becomes the first party already prepared to f.ace the 1981
elections.
The candidate is obvious. It will be Georges ~Iarchais. Of course, on
several occasions, the communist party secretary general has disclosed thar
he was not the only person who could represent his party in a competiton on
~ such a scale. Yet no one, neither in his circle nor in the preceding gene-
r.ation could hope to achieve a better score. Georges Seguy alone could have
aspired to play this role but the difficulties he is facing in ensuring the -
cohesion of the CGT are arguing him out of it. "
For the past thr.ee years, first allied to the socialists and then fighting _
them, Marchais has gained the stature of a star. Thanks to intensive train-
~
ing provided by television technicians close to the communist party, he has
_ become one of the most watched attractions on the small screen, to the point _
that, after a particu~Larly spectacular performance, in February 1978, one of _
his "coaches" to?.a-iiim that, "a little more effort, Georges, and you would
be ready f.or a variety show."
This is true: Mr Mar~hais is making a part of. France laugh, a part which
has difinitively stopped considering him a serious man. However, his per-
formance is aimed at the other part of the country, with his silent mimic,
broad gestures, exclamations, and ungrammatical speech as much as political
� arguments. _
Considered the star of an electorate which identiEies itself with Gui Lux's
customers, Marchais has finally become a leader. In effect, his party's 23rd
congress noted by the removal of Roland Leroy as secretary general,
established his authority over the communist party. Hence we have witnessed
- a personalizing of power within the party, comparable to that of Maurice
,
Thor.ez in the past. _
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This could be illustrated by the "1Votebooks oE the Struggte" operation. _
With the help of. these notebooks, whose distribution was announced on
8 Oc:tober by Charles Fiterman, the communist party intends to learn "the
needs, claims, and suggestions" of. the workers. It is a question of making
_ an extensive inventor.y oE discontent, in the light of which the communist _
candidate would be abl.e, subsequently, to formulate his speeches.
These "notebooks" come from a�ile bearing the name of Georges Marchais.
Mr Fiterman himself acknowledged thaC this detail had been conceived with an
- eye to the 1981 elections.
Finally, these "notebooks" ask their recipients questions covering rhree
topics which, undoubtedly, will be the axis of Marchais' campaign. First,
"the struggle against injusrice and inequality;" then, "struggle against real
waste;" finally, "the struggle against the selling of France and for "produce
= French."
This third topic woutd extend the rather nationatistic campaign waged by the
communist party on the occasion of the European elections. At thaC time the
party had balanced its losses in its traditional strongholds by taking over
a national electorate which it had lacked until then. -
- Actually, the diversification of its electorate faces the communist par.ty
with a problem. It is not certain that the new voters who joined it in its
fight against European integration would follow suit, specificall.y in the
- case oi a presidential election. That is the reason for the ef.forts under.-
- taken in the course of a national council (a mini-congress) attended by the
leaders on 20 and 21 October in Bagneux to put the party back on the basis
of its traditional electorate.
Cautioning the workers as much against the "supporters of class cooperation"
- (meaning the socialist-s) as against "the class opponents," Marchais claimed
that the purpose of the communist party was to be more than ever before the
'bnly pari; of the working people." Jean Colpin, in charge of the Enterprises
, Sector, was to make the following remark:
"The strengthening of our activities in enterprises will be of great impor- -
- tance to the succes of a party candidate in the 1981 presidential elections."
Theref.ore, in 1981 Marchais will be the candidate of the workers and the
"neglected." This implies an aggressive strategy toward those who try to
f.ight on the old grounds, i.e., the socialists.
The communists have made their cho~,ce among the possible candidates of rhe
socialist party f~~r the presidentia'i elections. They prefer Michel Rocar.d.
His image as a social democrat will enable them, actually, to benefit f.rom v
Che workers' vote.
Co~~versely, Francois Mitterrand has been twice the sole candidate of. the -
- '~e`ft (in 1965 and 1974). The communist voters have hecome used to voting
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for him. Furthermore, the political line which Mitterrand has imposed on
_ the socialist party, which unanimausly votecl, last Wednesday, in favor of
the "socialist plan" clearly puts him on the left. Therefore, in the first
round he ::?1.1 be a mo*_-e feared opponcnt of the communist party, what~ver his
chances in the second round mi.ght be.
The purpose of. the communists in the next few months, therefor~, will be to
destroy the good image of the socialist party and, above all, that of Mr
Mitterrand. Hence, th.e personal attacks launched against him. Thus, on
26 September Mr Fiterman stated on the subject of Europe the following in
_ L'HUMANITE: "Would Francois Mitterrand like to take France back to the time
of the cold war policy practiced 30 years ago by Che governments of which he
was a part?" Again, on 1 October, reporting on a meeting of the board of.
the socialist party, L'HUMANITE stated: "We were taken back 25 years, to
= the time of the cold war, the time when Francois Mitterrand, together with
~ the socialist party and the right, within the government, was waging the war
- in Algeria."
The socialists retaliated by focusing on the topic of. freedoms. On
- 16 October Mr Mitterrand, speaking at the Porte de Pantin, hurled the follow-
ing at the communist party:
"It is impossible to build freedom starting with concentration camps." _
_ This explains the clarity with which the communist party denounced on
Wednesday the "iniquitous sentences" passed at the triat of thF dissidents `
in Prague. Yet, it did not question the legitimacy of. those who passed this
verdict.
This aggressive strategy on the part of Mr Marchais is accompanied by an
eff.ort to recapture the party on the ideological level. -
The weekly which the party is planning to start (see below) is par[ of an
eEfort to regain the objecting intellectuals. The emphasis put on the idea
af self-management, previously rejected by the communist party, ~aims at
seducing this fringe of critical intellectuals which has developed to the _
left of the party, as a reaction to the pragmatism of the politir_al line ~
followed for the past three years.
In this respect, the purpose of a book by Felix Damette, Central Committee
member, and titled "Pour une strategie autogestionnaire" [For a Sel�-Manage-
ment Strategy] (Editions sociales) is to explair, that the "union at the
basic level" promoCed by the communist party ~s nothing but a call to the
workers to "self-manage" the union of the ?eft.
The CGT has been assigned a role in the campaign already launched by the
communist party. Marchais pointed out at the national council in Bagneux
that, "It is not the ro.1e of the trade unian to explain in the enterprises
the socialists' turn to the right."
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~ 1
This was an appeal f.or activism by the party members in enterprises. It was =
also, and above atl, an ackr~owledgment of Che specific mission of the CGT. _
Whereas the communisC party rejects the unifica~tion of the lef.t, the CGT,
conversely, should seek an agreement with the other. unions, in order to
"rake more widely." In this sense Georges Seguy exptained in Bagneux the
need to open more the leaders of the CGT to political currents other than
the communist party, it being understood that, at the proper time, the CGT
will know how to choose its candidate, as was the case in 1978. "
All the parts o� this machinery are no*_ aimed, clearly, to take Mr Marchais -
to the Elysee Palace. It is simply ;i question of press closely the sociatist
candidate in the first round or even to outstrip him. This way, should -
. Giscard d'Estaing be reelected as presicient of the republic, and the
socialist party left to the centrifugal forces which would tear it apart,
- leftist unity could be reborn in a new ratio of forces which, naturally,
would favor the communist party.
- COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs actuelles"
5157
CSO: 3100 ~
f~'
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~I
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FRANCE
COUNTRY SECTION
- FORMER PCF MEMBER GARAUDY CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENCY
- Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 29 Qct 79 pp 111-112, 122-123, 130, 1~
132, 138, 146, 152, 154.
[Interview of Roger Garaudy conducted by Catherine David: "Garaudy, Une Who ~
Has No Regrets. .
[Text] Philosopher, professor, art historian, for the
past eight years;Roger Garaudy has stood on the margin
of active politi~~'al life. Al1 of a sudden he has now -
~ announced his ca'ndidacy for the presidency of the
republic. ExpeL~led f.rom the PCF [French Communist
Party], he clair~s to have been vaccinated against the
temptations of. i+ntolerance. It is true that his last
book "1'Apel`aux~,vivants" [Call to the Living] (Seuil)
could be conenidered an impassioned indictment of. all
dogmatisms. Yet--as will be seen from the interview -
he granted to Catherine David--this beautiful thrust
does not lead him to self-criticism. Stalinist purges,
the German-Soviet pact, or the events in Hungary? No, he
has no regrets. His certainties were shaken up only by
the attitude taken by the communist party in May 1968. _
Here is, therefore, what this confusing witness is:
- Marxist, Christian, ecologist, and zealous def.ender.
of Ayatollah Khomeini.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVAT~.UR: Your entire book is a defense of. modern prophesy.
Then, in your last page, you announce your intention: to be a candidate at ~
the 1981 presidential elections. Would you be, therefore, the prophet of
- France of the year 2000? _
ROGER GARAUDY: No, naturally, one should not play fast and loose with words.
Mohammed, Zarathoustra, and Jesus Christ were prophets. Actually, my
book pleads f.or a new growth. To me prophesy is ar~ attempt to provide =
answers to a probl.em which cannot be encompassed either by politics or
economics but which applies to man in his entirety and which goes beyond the
limits of a specific time. We are currently following such a way that any
drifting of the system would be suic?.dal.
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- We are being told that the clost of~energy will double every eight years.
This means that even if. we were to find an arrx~unr~ of oil equal ro rhe one disc~vered
sinc�~~ ihn c~~~;innin~ c~f mankind this would po5tp~ne thc end by no m~rc~ Ch~n
eight years. We will have used up uranium even faster than petrol.eum. All
curves showing food shortages in the Th~rd Fi~~ld converge around the year;
2020 or 2030: only 40 years! That is'':why, entering the frey, I claim that
any continuance of the growth system under which we live would mean the
assassination of our grandchildren. I have three of them, aged 2, 5 and 8.
I ask myself whettier they would be able to live to be 50. Yet, should
matters continue in the current dir.ection and wiCh the current rhythm, I
_ would be forced to answer in the negative. What does prophesy have to do
- here? It is an act of. faith, of trust as such, even if the facts seem to
contradict.
N.O.: Your first chapter 3escribes an apocalypse`.
R. G A 2AUDY: Yes. Yet, it is the shortest in my bo'i~k. In my view, the
critical part is the least important. It is a question of showing the -
direction in which the drifts of our age woutd be taking us should we do ~
nothing to avoid this. However, I am an optimist: This is not to say that _
~ everything is alright but that we must find the means to surmount a given
situation. Atl the criticism I hear is pertinent but I see no solution _
emerging. Unquestionably, this is because this model of growth is linked
with a cuttural model which I have actually described as Faustian, since it _
is basei;.on individualism and on the narrow scientific concept of reason as _
a means of. power, as a means ~or dominating nature and other people.
It is within this Faustian perspective that we are marching to catastrophe.
We are very far from Marlowe's hopes for the Renaissance, as expressed in
his initial "Faustus:" "Become a God through your powerful mind." This -
model. has perverted the ties between man and nature considered a reservair. _
oE raw materials and a dump for our offal. From this viewpoint, exhausting
resources or polluting one and the same. From the birth of Faustian man to
the Renaissance our societies have vacillated between a jungle individualism
and an ant heap totalitarianism. However, we have never proceeded f.rom the
- idea of. the community. We have never tried to conceive of another relation
with divinity in which the divine would appear as an addition of strength in
the world.
Yet, cultural model and modus of development are connected. The reason far
which our system is suicidal is that we have become attached to this Faustian,
this Western model. In the first part of my book I try eo perceive the -
wisdoms~;of three worlds, wisdoms which we have rejected when we have not "
- destroyed=~hem: that of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. I then ask myself
what could such wisdoms teach us, i.e., essentially the est.ablishment of a
different link between man and nature. A similar impression is gained by a
Chinese painting of the song age, a Persian carpet, or an African dance:
Nature does not belong to me, it is I who belong to nature. As to ties
among people, such countries have had real cor~munities which were not based
on dominat.ion, rivalry, or power.
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-
N. 0.:' However, domination, rivalry, and power are not Western monopolies.
R. GARALiDY: Essentially, they are Western, if we consider that the mind is
an instrume~~t for domination. A concept is a way f.or manipulati.ng objects
and people to the extent to cahi.ch they are assimilated with these objects. -
I consider the term "human science" very dangerous: The only science is
tnat of the alienated man. Science could teach us a great deal of things
abour man except for. the essential, what makes him avoid the laws governing
objects. A person who makes a free choice is na longer. the object of this
type of observation. Naturatly, he could be used and manipulated through
economic, psychological, and sociological techniques, but only to the extent
_ to which one has the concept of reducing what one is. It is true that in
daily behavior everythin~ takes ptace as though man were merely a consumer,
- a user, a worker, or vacationer; these are an entire series of functions
- which could be reduced to relations among objects. They want to make a
science out of that. However, should such a person exercise his right to
_ regain control over his own destiny, this could be predicted by no science.
N. 0.: That is what you describe as the "presence of the divine in man". .
R. GARAUDY: Yes, it i.s this additional ~orce which allows us to outstrip
our conditioning, and our atienations, and to open us to a transcendance in
terms of nature, and to possibilities which are not the extension of our.
f.ormer determinisms. . .
N. 0.: You are rushing ahead, you ar.e moving without transition from trans-
cendance and phi.losophy t.o urban matters, to probl.ems of. employment or
petroleum. You mix everything together, as though there had been no separa-
tion between church and state.
R. GARAUDY: It is not a question af the church. The church, no mor.e than'
political parties, could resolve our. problems. If it is a question of
~ philosophy, throughout the world philosophy is a style of. lif.e. It is only
in the West that it has been reduced to merely a way of thinking, to a
conceptual phenomenon. A way of life? If. so, it is a strictly human way of ~
life. What is strictl.y human in man is what is divine in him: the
possibility to not be burdened by his past. Hence my cr.iticism of the =
positive concepts of specialists who tell us, each one in his own area, rhat
we are the prisoner.s of our determinisms, whether biological, instinctual,
- or. cultural. Naturally, atl this has a great. influence on my life.
However., what makes a man out of ine is the possibility to break with all
this.
You are still speaking of transcendance. Actually, I believe that the most -
concr.ete point is achieved by tearing ourselves loose. It is in this sense
that growth is not simply an economic or political phenomenon but, above all,
_ a phenomenon of. faith, in the broadest meaning of the term. I do not regret
t.he separation of. the church from the state but wish for the reintroduction
of the transcendental di.mension in economic and political life. Political
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I
~~oii orrlc:T~L U5E orrzv
economy is based on the postulate that society is a working body and that
;~ian is here to wor.k ~nd co:~sume. This is the definition of the alienated
man.
_ That which is called scientific socialism is the extension of this alien~ted
economy. However, the reasons for which I am a socialist, ready to givc my
- life for socialism, are outside such reductions. I cannot force you to
snar.e them through demonstrations. Actually, all of. us stem from a postulate,
_ both positivists and mystics. The only difference is that the believers are
aware of their postulates. The others, unaware of them, go inta dogmar.ism.
N. 0.: You know quite a lot about dogmatism, after all these years spenr in
- the communi.st party in the most Stalinist period.
R. GARAUDY: Yes, precisely. The reason that I can understar~d faith is that _
I have lived dogmatism. I could not have crossed this step had I been a ~
skeptic. One does not switch from skepticism to faith. Dogmatism and faith
share the will to rest one's entire life on one's belief.
N. 0.: Yet, is it not because of faith that one is immune to dogmatism?
. R. GARAUDY: The danger is that faith degenerates into reli.gion. I do nut
identify Christianity with any shape it.may assume at a given time in its
history. Faith is a means for making things relative. To be a dogmatic -
means to settle within the being, to state what it is, to formulate an _
- absolute, difinitive, complete truth. It is at that Qoint that inquisition
begins to grow. If you do'not share my opinion, it is either because you
are sick for which reason you should be sent to a mental. hospital; or else,
it is because you ar.e malevolent, and you witt end your days in prison or on
rhe scaff.ol.d. Inquisition is engendered by dogmatism.
- N. 0.: You have been quitp a conscientious inqui.siCor.
R. GARAUDY: I could have been. All this is based on a postulate. It is nnt
illogicat to support Hitl.er. It. is not il.logical to wish for nuclear
extermination. It is not a question of logic but of a primitive c.hoice.
One could very well be an absolute nihi.list and consider that any destruc-
tion is worthwhile. It depends on the concept one has of man.
N. Q.: Is this temptation you once had to engage in dogmatism that is a
safeguard f.or you today?
- R. GARAUDY: This was more than a temptation. I was in it up to my neck.
- N. 0.: ...Which helps you to determine the risk of faith. Howevei-, the
others, those to whom you would like to impart faith, they have no such back-
ground to protect them. . .
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R. GARAUDY: You know, fait.h does not come when on~ wishes it, the way one
- could call a dog. All I can do is feel that all my certainties are rel~tive.
In my youth I was impressed by the fol'iowino statement made by Protestant -
~ theologian Karl Barth: "A1.1 that I tell God is told by a man." What is -
dangerous is slogans such as "Gott mit uns". Currently the same prnblem
is found in Islam. . .
N. 0.: In your book you say a great deal of good things about Ayatollah
Khomeini. . . _
R. GARAUDY: Yes, I.acknowledge that we owe him a tremendous debt. He had _
- the ~rierit of questioning the Western growth system which was not only -
destroying the cultural traditions of his country but also was leading it ta
bankruptcy, a system which was profitable only for an infinitesimal minority
- of the population. His second merit is to have seen that this questioning
would have a validity only if it was based on a religious paint of view.
N.O.: Actually, he is converting his religion into ideology, for which you
congratulate him. However, this is a stance which is even more "dogmatic,"
- to use your own term, than that which consists of converting an ideology--
Marxist for instance--into a religion. This enables the Ayatollah to
convert the mixing of spiritual with temporal powers into a basic principle. _
R. GARAUDY: No, a few weeks ago he passed the word to his komitehs thar, in
- the future, he would no longer deal with problems pertaining to governmental
activities. . .
N. 0.: He has said many other things as well.
R. GARAUDY: But this is something he has just. said. No, his contribution
has been considerable: His objection to the model of growth and his propheCic
role.. . Furthermore, it is no longer possible, thanks to him, to analyze
- force ratios as in the past. It is no longer sufficient to count the number
of rifles and cannons. Already Lenin mistrusted this kind of reasoning, and
when Trotsky was telling him that objective conditions had not developed i.n
Russia for a revolution, he answered that one can easily become an oppor.tunist
by being too objective. Iran had an untra-sophisticated army, the f.ifth
' most power�ul in the world, which had at its disposal all the means of
repression, ranging from torture to missiles. It was faced with a people
with bare hands. Yet, until the time of the seizur.e of power it was a non-
violent revolution. After that things occurred, some of which may be _
deplorable. There is mention of. 500 dead. This is too much, even one would
be too much. In Che finai account, however, I do not see in past hist~ry a
revolution which has cost so little.
N. 0.: In the beginning of your book you give a vibrant praise to feminism.
, it would be somewhat embarrassing to praise Khomeini to the skies after rhat.
R. GARAUUY: This does not bother me in the least. We must not judge other
cultures through our Western glasses. The wearing of. the chador is the -
business of Iranian women. During the war in Alger.ia a number of. women were
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wearing thc vcil as a sign of rebellion against the West. It is not a _
_ question of imposing thc veil to ?rench women. Actualty, no one is forced _
the chador, it is simply recommended. It is said that women must dress
decently. However, this could apply to a mini-skirt.
Hearing Chapour Bakhtiar say, "The mutlahs to the mosque! It mcans that he _
is only transposing in Iran a slagan of the Third Republic.' In the Moslem
- perspective, in which the Koran dictates a way of life, this idea has no
meaning whatever. Man is an entity. One cannot slice him into oarts, here
the spiritual and there the materiat. That is what I describe as the intro-
_ duction of a transcendental dimension in political and economic lif.e.
- N. 0.: Specifically, what would the introduction of such a transcendental.
dimension mean in I'rance in 1981?
R. GARAUDY: First, Fosition oneself outside the four big parties which, -
regardless of apparent divergences, reason ever;~thing on the basis of a few
~ common denominators. All of them agree on a con~ept of growth which presumes
an endless growth of production and consumption. The right emphasizes pro-
duction more. . .
N. 0.: Yet, Giscard d'Estaing has sounded the alarm on the subject of a
consumer society. . . -
R. GARAUDY: Yes, I have heard him say so; he says a great de.al of good
things which are not seen in nis politics. Well, the left emphasizes =
distribution. However, tbe principles remain the same. The diff.erence
between Mr Barre's Blois program and the "Common Program" was that of one -
percent in the evaluation of the growth rate! 'Furthermore, they all agree
on the need for nuclear armaments, inctuding the communist party. Last night
I pointed out to Marchais that the fact of accepting nuclear armaments, if
one bears in mind that French missiles have a range not exceeding 2,800 kilo- -
~ meters, means to align oneself in the camp of those who considcr the USSR _
tt~e only possible enemy. On the other hand, the missites would not go
beyond the Azores. It is not very serious to talk of deferse from all _
sides under such conditions. . . .
N. 0.: Your relations with Marchais seem to have improved since you lef.t
his ranks. . .
- R. GARAUDY: Oh, they ar.e quite intermittent. I have seen him only twice,
once at a Theodorakis concert and the second time at the Algerian Embassy. -
I am not dead set against the communist party. In my view it is not the ~
main enemy. However, I have no desire whatever to rejoin it. To me parties
are a form of obsolete organization. They were very progressive in the 18,th
and 19th centur.ies. Today, however, they are merety machines f.or ciphonin~ -
off the initiatives of the masses. They pr.oceed on the basis of the organi-
zation of classes like a parliament operates on the national tevel: through
= the de?.egatir~n of. power. All of them agree on growth, nuclear armaments,
and nuclear energy, w'nich is an aberration: A country with nuclear po~aer -
plants is militarily indefensible.
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What enemy would make himself hated by launching atom bombs when the same
result could be obtained with conventional bombs aimed at a nuclear power
plant--two or three times more powerful than Hiroshima? All this is illus~r_y.
I was startl.ed to r.ead in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR the debate between General
Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti, two men I know and hold in esteem. However,
_ saying crazy things such as "If Cambrai is destroyed we could bomb Kharkov,"
- may 5e the truth but they f.orget to add that if we bomb Kharkov there would
be no Paris, no France! Then, one of them answers "We would have nucler
submarines'le,ft." This vengeance of. a dead man is poor consolation.
The basic error is the same which was committed i.n the past with the Maginot
Line: the belief that a people could be def.ended without this people. Thc
- only true dissuasion is to make the opponent understand that he could rety
on any cooperation of the people. In 1968, in Czechoslo,vakia, before that
poor Dubcek lost everyr.hing through naivete, the people wanted to resist.
Tney proved it for a few days. ~dha[. matters is concensus. Even Michel Debre
- writes in his white paper on defense that there are no "possible defenses ~
without popular consensus." What I say on the subject of de�ense I atso say
on the subject of the parties which, I am afraid, are nothing but the techno-
cratic form of politics. I vnte, t delegate. One speaks in my name.
, That is what must be changed urgently.
N. 0.: Do you have an alternative?
' R. GARAUDY: The only source of power is popular consent. It could be
achieved through force. Such was Hitler's technique. That is nAt what we
are looking f.or. The problem is how to obtain this consent on the basis of
a common project. If. France is indefensible the reason is not because it is
short of one or another weapo~~ but because every Frenchman asks himself what
_ is it that he must defend. In the old agrarian society this was very simple.
- The peasant was defending his land. The 19th century bourgeoisie ha'a its
markets to defend. Today, however, there is such an economic breakdown,
such a disintegration of the social fabric, that were Fr.ance to be attacked,
the situation would be far worse than in 1940.
What I suggest instead? Basic communities, economic, political, and spiritual
units sufficiently small to ensure the participation of. everyone. It is
being said that this is impossible in large-scale industry. Yet, look at _
the cooperative in Montdragon, in the Basque country. It is one of the
_ biggest Spanish enterprises with 25,000 workers, manufacturing household
equipment. Its structur.e is interlinked. One workshop supplies another so
that each has its share of responsibility. This is working quite well. We
also have the example of the Migros enterprises in Swirzerland, which accaunt .
for 40 percent of the Swiss food output. They have existed f.or the past 30
years as f.ed.erated independent units. It is not a question of abolishing the
representative system but of eliminating outside, professional representa-
tions.
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I was in parliament for 14 years. For 14 years I have looked at the same
people, those who make the politic.al caste, alienated f.rom the population,
but which make decisions in its behalf. This is a caricature of democracy.
= The party in power is elected with a small. majority. In all liberal
democracies there is a tremendous potitical entropy, everything is being
- decided on the basis of confused laws. Ther.e is no resultin~ project, there
= is no reason, bz.sically, to vote far the left rather than far the right.
Their plan is the same: to preserve the status quo.
N. 0: Is it from yaur seat in the Elysee Palace that you will or.ganize such
base communities in the enterprises?
It. GARAUDY: Self-management cannot be granted, it must originate at the
base. Al1 that one could do is to eliminate the obstacles. The essential
task of a president of the republic is to abolish as quickly as possible the
presidential system. He must restore the power to its true repository: the
- basic communities. It is always believed that there is nothing between
private enterprise and nationalization. Yet, there are other formulas such
as municipal and regional systems. The essential is for the workers,
rather than the owners of capital, to answer the four basic questions in the
enterprise: final output, organization, responsibility, and distribution of
results. However, in the age of multinationals the problem of. nationaliza-
[ion does not seem to me essential. The problem is to know who sets wortd
prices.
In Dakar colonialism imposed a monopoly on peanuts. President Senghor
natianalized the peanuts. But who sets the prices? The Huiles Lesieur.
For a long time the United States used the following means af blackmail in
Cuba: to overthrow a government it lowered the price of sugar. ~4arx cauld
not have conceived of such problems. Today to be a Marxist does not mean Co
repeat what Marx said quite accurately when he studied 19th century English
capitalism. . .
- N. 0.: Do j~ou remain a Marxist?
R. GARAUDY: I should hope so! Only it is not a question of repeating after
Marx but o� using his method for t.he sake of. discover.ing the contradictions
of. our age and for developing a plan capable of surmounting them. That is
wt~at Marxism is. It is entirely ative, it is a methodology for historical
initiative.
- N. 0.: Before reaching Marxism you went through Christiani.ty.
R. GARAUllY: Neither my father nor my mother were religious. In my youth I
~aanted lif.e to have a meaning. rrom this point of view I was, perhaps, some-
what of a Boy Scout. I stitl am. I continue to believe that lif.e has a
meaning. The day I shall no longer believe this I shall kill myself.. I
found this meaning in Christianity first and, subsequently, in Marxism. I
have always been concerned with holding both ends of the chain. Even at the
peak of my dogmatism, in 1948, at the peak of Stalinism, I was engaged in
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writing a book entitled "Church, Communism, and Christians." As member of
- the communist party politburo I wrote "From Anatheme to Dialogue," prefaced
by a German theologian. Friction develops only when a party tends to become
a church and when a church claims to turn inCo politics. -
I came to Christianity as a result of ineeting exceptional neople. I knew
several ministers who radiated joy. I have always been impressed by joy and
it is the only thing which could be taught. I taught philosophy f.or a l.ong
- time and all that I could teach my students on ehe subject of kant or the
ontological argument is of no great importance. The only thing one could
_ share is joy. Several days ago I visited Father de Foucauld's retreat in
the Hoggar. Those people, who had been living up there for 28 years were
- radiant. . . .
_ As to Marxism, it took place through writings. I read Romain Rolland and -
Jaures. I then plunged into Marx, systematically. Having reached the 22nd
volume of the old Coste edition, I went to the party to become a member.
Actually, I warned them that, "I am the president of the Christian students."
That was in 1933 and I was 20 years old. They accepted me as I was. It was
, my Christian f riends who asked me to make a choice. However, I have preserved
very profound bonds of friendship with them.
In 1933 the choice was obvious. It was a time when the crisis which~had come Ili
f.rom the United Srates had hit Europe. It was the time of the success of.' ~
the first five-year plans in the Soviet Union. It was the assumption of'~ I _
power by Hitler and the apotheosis of Mussolini. There were 80 million un-
employed in Europe, milk c.ows were being butchered, and one could drown in
coffee while, at the same time, people were fighting for bread in the port
of Genova. Facing us, there was hope. We did not know the cost of such
accomplishments. We became Manicheans, seeing the world in two colors.
That is the way one becomes a Stalinist. Subsequently, there came 1936 with -
- the Popular Front, and the first vacations. One took one's bike and pedaled
to the Riviera. It was stupendous.
N. 0.: Did you have a bike?
R. GARAUDY: Oh, I was graduating in philosophy. But in my family. my _
mother was a milliner and my father was a low-l.evel white collar worker. Al.l
_ my uncles were workers. All of them experienced this. It was extraordinary.
Une cannot imagine the enthusiasm of that time, and its cultur.e. All
French intellectuals were on the side of the Popular Front fr.om Gide to
Malraux. Looking back this seems funny. Then, there was Munich. The
communist party was the only one to oppose this surrender.. This enthusi.asm
- was justified. . . .
- N. 0.: Had you not heard about the Moscow trials?
R. GARAUDY: We heard echoes. However, it was so clear that they had been
falsified. I infinitely admired Bukharin, for example. However, far
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latFr, reading Arthur Koestler's "Zero and Infinit;~," I was able to compare _
the novel with the minutes of the trial. Everything that Koestler says -
about it is loaded with cuts and he says the opposite of what was factually
said. After the war there were books manufactured from A to Z by the _
CIA. . . _
N. Nevertheless. after Munich there was the German-~~viet pact. Did
this :eave you stone'cold as well?
~
R. GARAUDY: At that time I was an army private stationed in Toulouse. I
remember people spitting on me. I was asked to denounce this pact. Yet,
those who asked me to da so had been my perenniat enemies. Even had I becn -
worri.ed, this fact alone would have r.eassured me.
N. 0.: Yet, there were also people who were not on the other side. There
were socialists, democrats, and all the true antifacists of the time, who
were overwhelmed by the fact, who were indignant. Above all, there were -
some communists such as Nizan who considered the USSR the last bulwark
against Hitter. For them it was the world turned upside down. _
R. GARAUDY: Nizan is dead. I do not want to discuss him too much. Yet,
~ while I was mobilized, he went to see my wife to ask her to make me sign a
r.epudiation. She threw him out, Back homa, I told her that she had acted
properly. . .
N. 0.: Why?
R. GARAUDY: It seemed evident to me that those are really to bl.ame were the
people who had set the trap of the Moscow agreements wi.th Fr.ance and Great
Britain. They demanded of the USSR ta assume obligations while forbidding
, it to cross Poland. It was scary. The German-Soviet pact was the only
possible answer left the USSR. Actually both the memoirs of Churchill and
Paul Reynaud, who are crypto-bolsheviks, clearly state that the Soviets had
no other solution. No, this did not bother me. At that time I was fighting
quite willingly, I must say, I liked that, I volunteered for all missions.
N. 0.: Tr~is is ~gain the Boy Scout talking.
R. GARAUDY: No, no, it was for the love of it, to cross the German lines -
and come back at dawn bringing people back, I liked that. I was always a
= simple pr.ivate but quite properly dacorated considerir.g my rank. It was then
- that I was able to gain a close view of treason. Gn the Somme front there
were untouched units who wereforbidden to fight. This strengthened my
belief that the traitors were indeed facing us.
Then, in the midst of the war I caas arrested. In September 1940 I had set
up the first resistance group. I was detained on the basis of a ewo-
year old decree promulgated by Daladier, considered "an individual dangerous -
- to national defense and public safety," even though I had earned my military
cross and several stars. At the Djelfa (Algeria) camp, where I was
interned, a passing generat asked me, yet once again, to denounce the
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pact: "After. all, however, you, a veteran, with your citaeions, are you
going to r.emain in prison f.or the rest of your days!" This general =
- strengthened my belief. even f.ur.ther. Ta us, in the camps, it was obvious
� that when the Red Army was advancing Frecdom was advancing with it. Larer
I SpenC one year in the USSR, after Stalin's death.
N. 0.: How did you accept it?
R. GARAilDY: As a great tragedy. However, the tragedy became even greater
when Khrushchev denounced Stalin. I went home thinking, "Thermidor all over
again." Then I had ro accept the truth. The report had been draf.ted badly.
It caas a display, a settlement of accounts. Basically, however, he was
- ri.ght. Yet, I have never f.elt for Khrushchev the admiration I felt for
Stalin. I had known Stalin closely, I had shared a meat with him. He did
not give the impression of being'a dictator. He did not wear his decarations.
He kept wearing his old soldier's overcoat and the fatigues. He was
surrounded by his comrades who were thumping him in the back. He looked
_ like a Cantal peasant. I could r,ot conceive of his as a dictator..
- Krushchev's speech was what killed the dreams. It was not the personality
- cult which was at the bottom of. the matter, rhe tragedy was deeper. If all
the evil comes from the fact that a person is bad, it wauld suffice ro _
_ replace him with someone else for everything to go well. Yet, Stalin was
more a consequence than a cause. When Lenin started the revolution, the -
working class accounted for no more than three percent of t.he active popula-
t~ion. The number decl.ined to one percent after the civil war and foreign
invasion. The dictatorship of the proletariat started with one percent
proletarians! A party began to speak for a class which was not existent yet.
The apparatus began to speak in the name of a party and, finally, one man
began to speak in the name of all others. That is what Stalinism is. _
Stalin's personal faults did play a role but a secondary one. All this led -
me to a global view.
- N.O.: Did the 1956 events in Hungary make you think?
' ~
R. GARAUDY: They bothered me less than Krushchev's speech. I could hear
- Admiral Horthy, this old dictator who had sought refuge in Salazar's -
- Portugal, applauding loudly. Then, seeing LE FIGARO praise the "Budapest
= Commune," I f.ound this suspicious... At thaC time I was as cautious as
de Gaulle. He did not protest either. In Czechoslovakia, in 1968, the
worst was a return to a Masaryk-type democracy, whereas in Hungary what was _
at stake was the return ofreal fascism.
N.O.: Actually, assuming rhat it was truly a question of a return to
fascism, which is more than doubtful, to this day you deny to the Hungarians
~ of 1956 the right to choose their own nationalism, whereas you grant the
same right to the Iranians in 1979, displaying an inexhaustible toterance.
As to Czechoslovakia, actually, what was new was your way of lookin~ at
things: The Soviet tanks were the same in both 1956 and 1968.
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:Z. GARAUDY: No, in my case everything became cle~r in 1968, when the -
communist party rejected as a whole everything which ~aas coming out in rhe
streets, when Mar.chais wrote the famous article in which he spoke of Cohn--
Bendit in terms of a"German anarchist," and considered that eve?~ything that ,
- was going an in the streets was absolutely alien to the wor.kcrs' struggle.
i~e was entrapped by the old systems. At that point the communist party
. began ta tumble out of. history. History does not forgive anyone who is one
revolution toa late.
Then, there was Czechoslovakia, and the Dubcek-Brezhnev dialogue. Dubcek,
very poor and very naive, told Brez'nnev that, "You are not omnipotent. We
are supported by the Western parties, the Italian, Fr.ench, Spanisn, ~
While Brezhnev answered, "We have the means to crush r.hem." Then llubcek:
"Then witt tnere ever be socialism in Western,~urope?" Brezhnev: "There
will not be, there must not be. Everything became clear to me.
N. 0.: Yet, you ~id not ~'3m the door. You let yourself., as you say, "be
expelled." . . .
.
R. GARAUDY: I had told the potitburo that I will never resign. This would
'nave been an acknowledgment that I was not following the party line. Yet, I =
continued to believe that I was following the right line, even though I may =
nave been the only one to think so. Actually, I was not alone, as 15 per.cent
of the communist party shared my thoughts. This lasted two years.
N. 0.: Your lifelong friend Aragon did not help you very mcuh at that
- point. . . .
.~t. GARAUDY: My relations with h'im were excellent and have remained so. On
the e~-e of the day when the congress removed me from t:ze politburo and from
: all my functions, Aragon telephoned me sayi.ng that he agreed with me on
everything but that I had put~mysetf in an untenable position, for I'nad
been published by the external press and that, consequently, he would be
_ forced to oppose me. While later he sent me onE~ of his books inscribed _
- Louis to Roger, as always.". He is now a ver.~ ol.d man who has lived
through a major disappointment. He has thr.own terrible fits against the
communist par.ty, absolutely terrible. rurthermore, this man who, like
- many others, was looking f.or a way out, �ound it in stiffening. He began ta
_ sculpt his own statue wishing to see it as the statue of loyatty. This is
an attitude which I understand and I do not blame Aragon. A thousand
attempts have been made to make me speak out against him. However, I would
do this today less than ever. Considering his state he would be unable to
answer.
In "Word of Honor," I address rnyself directly to him on the subject of a
sentence in his "Theater.-Novel:" "Any woman I have loved I have loved her.
only as a mirror. of myself.." I wrote to him: "But, Louis, that means that .
you have been misleading us throughout your life. Are you sa despairing
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_ because of politics thar you ar.e transferring your disappointments to the _
personal level," In such a case, al1 that he had written about Elsa
would be total.ly meaningl.ess. . . .
~
Af.ter writing "Du sur.realisme au monde reel" [From Surrealism to the Real
World], a book on Aragon, I had given him the manuscript to read and he had
told me twa things: "Discussing me, you always speak of hope. You must
del.ete this word. I have no hope other than a historical hope but not for
this life." This occurred some 15 years ago. . e. And than he added:
"Elsa plays in my life a f.ar greater role than you mention it in your bonk."
He rook me to his windmill and for ;,even consecutive nours he talked to~me
a5out El;;a the way I had never heard a man speak a~out a woman. At ~
that time he was almost 70 years old. Then~; he ended with a statement
that, "I have told you all this knowing that you;would not use it, but I
would like you to know it." This was not a tite'rary pose. It was infinitely
moving, respectable. No, I shall never say a w'a'rd against Aragon.
N. 0.: Do you believe that you have a chance of. being elected in 1981?
_ R. GAitAUDY: It does not depend on me.
_ N. 0.: Essentially, why are yau a candidate?
R. GARAUDY: To do what I say in my book. To do it specificatly. This is
not utopia. It is a set of very specific measures which range f.rom setting
the price of leeks to the f.unction of the president. Consider unemploy-
ment. Two mi?l.ion addi.tional jobs could be opened in rhree years. Assume
t.hat we abandon the use of nuclear ener.gy. Using all types of. geothermal
energy we could heat the entire France. It is not I who is saying this but
Har-oun TazieEf. For. example, the entire requirement of r^rench agriculture
f.or eriergy (four percent) could be met through biomass, through the manu-
facturing of inethane based on organic waste, ~aithout burning down forests.
There is atso wind at~d hydr.aulic power. There are all these types of
energy which we neglect. Their utilization would make it possible to create
jobs spread throughout the territory and at all skill levels, from the manual
worker to the engineer.
- Take food prices, inf.lated by advertising. In five years they could be
reduced by 20 percent through the use of. the railroads and by establishing
cooper.atives, short-circuiting the middlemen.
Take social secur.ity. Discussions are useless as long as the question is
how r.o raise payments. The real problem is how to lower. expenditures. We
have pharmaceutical companies which have more money than they know what to
do with, and are forced to postdate some of their. revenue. Let us not con-
. sider advertising costs, cruises taken by doctors, or. conditioning costs.
Such prices coul.d be lowered by 20 peprcent. The cost of inedical certif.i-
_ cates could be reduced. This would be too bad for. the physicians but what -
matters is not the privilege of a caste but the health of a nation. The
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same could be said of. hospitalization and clinical costs. The problem cou?d
be resolved wit.hin one year without increasing payments. As to the enter-
prises, legislation could be passed which would make it possible to set up
community companies, regardless of size. These are merely a few
examples. . . . -
N. 0.: All such measur.es assume a president with a great deal. of power.
- R. GARAUDY: This power could be retained only if. he is not elected by a
party or a group but by a big movement of pu'olic opinion. Without this all
he could do would be to handle current affairs, as is the case with the _
current president.
- COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
5157
CSO: 3100
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FRANCE
COUNTRY SECTION
~
_ PCF PURGES PARTY PRESS; NEW WEEKLY TO APPEAR
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Oct 79 p 36
[Article by Andre Lesueur: "The Party Cover; The Creation by the Communist
Party of a New Weekly Also Corresponds to a Purge of the Entire Party Press"]
[Text] "We want Co create a true weekly. Not a journal in which communists _
would be talking about communists." It was thus that Francois Hincker,
former editor in chief of LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE (the theoretical review of
the communist party) describes this publication which will be started by his
party in November. It will replace FRANCE NOUVELLE, the currently weekly
of the Central Committee, and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE. Its planned edition will
be 100,000 copies. ~
The f.act that Mr Hincker has accepted to be associate ediC-or in chief of this
periodical reveals, by itself, the intentions of the political bureau.
In the last congress he lost his seat in the Central Committee because of the
sympathy with which he had considered the criticism of questioning
intellectuals within the communist party last spring.
However, the fact that the administrative management and the potiticat
- management of this weekly were assigned, respectively, to Jean-Michel Catala
and Gui Hermier outlines the boundaries of the opening of the party toward
its inCellectuals.
Former secretary general of the Communist Youth;~ and Central Committee member,
Catala is loyal to Marchais. As to Hermier, formerly promoted by Roland
Leroy (the present director of L'HUMANITE and dcopped from the party sECre-
tariat at the last congress), he has been able to serve adequately the
present leadership to make his way in the political bureau and be assigned,
as of the autumn of 1978, the heavy responsibility of reorganizing the
publications sector of the communist party.
It was he who closed down the Center for the Distribution of Books and the
Press (CDLP), the distribution organ of the party, and the regrouping of the .
~ Editions sociates du Livre Club Diderot (the sales department of the CDLP).
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IC was this, in fact, that led to the resignations of. Antoine Spire and
Lucien Seve, the directors of. Editions sociales.
Yet, Che communist intellectuats wetcomed quite favorably the project of
launching a new weekly. After some reticence, most of the old objectionists
accepted to coltaborate. This included, for example, Jean Elleinstein,
- Marcel Bluwal, Francis Cohen, and Claude Frioux (co-authors of the book
"L'Urss et nous" [The USSR and We]), and the writer Raymond. Jean, of the
opposition cell in Aix-en-Provence.
However, many of them admit that they agreed only providing that the entire _
official party press would be changed. One of them stated:
"That which we intend to do in this periodical could not fail te affect the
line of L'HUMANITE."
Within the communist daily a major reorganization has already been under-
taken. On 18 September, addressing the party deputies, Marchais voiced the
foltowing harsh criticism:
"At the highest level of L'HUMANITE, there has not been, there is no, and
there will not be any desire to implement the entire orientation of the 23rd -
congress."
This was a condemnation of the role which Mr Leroy plays in guiding the
communist daily. The appointment of Francois Hilsum, formerly in the
Communist Youths, and a Marchais loyalist, at the end of September, as
associate director of L'HUMANITE, confirmed the threat which is currently
menacing Mr L2roy: Having been removed from the communist party secretar.iat,
he could now lose the directorship of the daily.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs actuelles"
5157
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRADTCE -
- VIEWS ON SOVIET EUROBANK OPERATIONS, GOALS itEPORTED
Paris L'EXPANSION in French 5 Oct 79 pp 97-99
[Article by Pierre Beaudeux: "Incursion by the Red Bank"]
'~[Text] W'hen GL~y de Boysson crossed the threshhold of the Commercial Bank
for Northern Europe (BCEN) in 1952, he was quite aware that he was gene-
trating into a veritable Fort Chabrol. The virulent attacks of Jules Moch,
minister of the interior at that time, accusing the Soviet bank of financing
the Communist Party, were succeeded by permanent guerrilla warfare with the
authorities and the parties of the right. A Parisian banker recalled "The
BCEN Reds were like lepers as far as we were concerned. They were never
invited to professional meetings." The Soviet bank more or less kept body
and soul together through funds it go* ~rom some Eastern European central
- banks and then loaned back.
Total assets in 1952: 12 billion old francs. Poverty level. In 1978
the total was 18 billion, a 150 percent multiplication in current francs!
The hole in the wall office has become a first rank foreign bank in Paris
- with an enviable reputation as an international bank. It is still accused
of being Moscow's major financier by French Communist Party and in the world
of international finance. In March 1979, Jean Montaldo's book "The Secrets
of the Soviet Bank in France," restates the polemic about the role of the
BCEN in financing the PCF and its satellites, especially in the media.
Indignation from communist leaders and the Soviet bank directors--but in _
the world of finance? Not much stir--the French bankers have seen it all
before and hurry to do business with the BCEN as usual.
. "This is certainly one of the biggest financial successes of the past
years," a French banking official in international finance stated. "In the
early sixties, BCEN directors were wanting to get out of their ghetto: at
that moment when East-West exchanges were developing they were well placed ~
to finance exchanges on their private grounds." Then, divine surprise, it
was not militants wanting to gobble everything up that appeared on the scene, -
but knowledgeable bankers who told us: 'There is a place for you in our
financial operations--we'll be happy with 10 or 15 percent."' Gilbert
Lasfargues, deputy director general, summed it up laconically: "We rejected
monopoly." -
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But that's n~ot to say that ~.n-house this pola.cy was unani,mous. But 61-year
old Guy de Boysson, succeeding ~resident Charles Hilsum in 1965, was able to
override the "hardliners."
Boysson's team showed its calculations to be paying off in a profession where
it's the rule "to send the elevator back down." Little by little the BCEN
appeared modestly but regularly in the tallies of credit-export of equip-
ment where it was not the initiator. These credits themselves gave BCEN
an opportunity to set up ffnance deals more remunerative than the traditional _
export credits guaranteed by COFACE [expansion unknown].
The other Soviet breakthrough with its diversification of financial sources,
was the development of a considerable and traditional "commercial base":
fund management for the central banks of socialist countries.
Already by 1953 it had tripled its money base by 'inventing' Eurodollars.
The banks of the socialist countries transferred their dollar holdings to
BCEN, dollar holdings that they didn't want to return to the U.S. for polit-
ical and financial reasons (the American banks do not pay interest). The -
BCEN loaned the money in the west in the peak period of the 'dollar gap'
at a comfortable margin.
Thanks to operations of this sort, the Parisian money managers of the BCEN
quickly carved out enviable reputations for themselves with their colleagues
of the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank, Gosbank (its principle shareholders) and
other central banks of Eastern Europe. Dollars, marks, and Swiss francs came
flowing into Paris and were put into longer term placements on the interna-
- tional financial markets. The whole talent of BCEN directors is to play in
various ways on their reputation as knowledgeable money market technicians,
on the French bank statutes (the discipline imposed by the Banque de France
inspires confidence) and sometimes on the Soviet nationality of the back.ers,
to enlarge the clientele of banks depositing a part of their reserves in
foreign exchange. So, first, the central banks of developing countries began _
beating a path to their door, then, later, commercial banks of the industri-
alized nations followed.
~ Still today the majority of the bank's resources come from these deposits,
usually at short term. But the socialist countries are no longer the principle
source. The USSR represents 20 percent of the resources, other socialist
countries 12 percent, the Third World 5 percent, industrialized countries
41 percent, and France 22 percent. The BCEN thus receives almost two-thirds
of its funds from the capitalist world: cash reserves are 60 percent in _
- dollars, 20 percent in marks and Swiss francs together, and French francs
- only 20 percent. An extraordinary strategic turnabout which has its counter-
part in loan activity: in diversifying its sources, the Soviet bank can
multiply its loans, lengthen the term, and thus realize more sizeable margins.
_ Principle borrowers are banks. This is why Guy de Boysson, who applied
the rule of "non-monopoly," formulated the second rule of his policy: "We _
are a ba:ik for banks. We do not seek to compete with other banks for their -
clients."
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"Basically, we favor banking consorti,ums," it was.a~firmed at Blvd. Hausmann.
"We alrnost always operate with others, wTthout demanding ~o be the more
remuneratiVe leader of the group." And by inaugur�.ating such new actfvzties
as commodity financfng, brokering barter operations or compensation, fac~li-
tating the work of industrials exportin~.ta Easrern Europe, BCEN is opening
the way, which doesn't offend anyone.
Among their clients are banks and governments, but in spite of a few bad "
risks (Zaire, rlorth Korea, Peru) the profitability of BCEN is such as to
make some Parisian colleagues pale with envy: 40 milli~n francs net profit
for 1978, earnings which the shareholders have wholly reinveste~i during the
- past years. The secret of this profitability: the BCEN deals "wholesale."
Yes, its gross is a tenth that of the BNP [Banque National de Paris] but with
a hundredth fewer personnel.
_ And how do the very prudent high Soviet officials view this financial team
which as seen from Moscow must appear somewhat like a dance of apprentice
- sorcerers. Guy de Boysson replies: "Our backers place great confidence in
us. We probably have greater freedom of action than the American and English
bank subsidiaries in France."
This idea of "great freedom of action," warring with the theory of "the hand
- of Muscow," nevertheless has, within limits, some credibility. It seems
that some of these limits seem to have been set by the current management
group themselves. For example, they deal on1} with countries which have
relations with both France and the USSR. "There is no question of cabling
Moscow about every move," they said at BGEN. "Every one of us is an expert
in Sovietology and pretty well knows what they can aim for. This is why we -
have ourselves held back a little on Egypt." A sign of this attitude: the
Soviet frowns when they learned of BCEN's involvement in the troubling Zaire
affairo "Our big risks in the Third World," said Gilbert Lasfargues, "are
Brazil, Mexico, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco." With the exception of Algeria,
nothing in these commitments reveals a policy of systematic support for
- countries 'friendly' to the Soviet Union. "Political banking," concluded
Lasfargues, "is the worst way of doing banking."
The theory of 'interior control', meaning through Vice President Vladimir
Ponomarev, and full-time Soviet directors sent by the backers, has a more
solid basis. "However," Guy de Boysson told us, "our shareholders have
never ordered us to take action against our will. Things are evaluated better
when on the spot."
But autonomy of decision is not complete where the socialist countries of
CEMA are concerned. The French banks are we11 aware that Moscow sets limits.
"The BCEN is our pilot fish there," a French banker declared. "If it hesi-
tates on credit to some socialist country, then we know Moscow'S position."
For the rest, for those who find the "sleeping partner" theory hard to
swallow, the international director of a major French. bank has this to
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say: "Very simply, the Sov~.ets know tha.t a bax~k is only an instrument for
the equalization of short-term money and for txansflorming short to inter- _
mediate and 1ong-zertus."
In this respect, the interests of the Sovi:et backers c7.early are satisfied.
Socialist cauntries, the USSR included, loan the BCEN 32 percent of their
resource~ di short term, and get back equivalent loans of which two-thirds
are intermec;~ate and long term--about 20 percen.t of the total loans. No ques-
tion but that this 'transformation` is one of the services most appreciated
by the backers who have a sizeable need for western funds supplied in a stable
and sure fashion. Wouldn~t this be one of the true secrets of the "Red bank"? -
But in spite of the advantages of the French subsidiary, nothing indicates
that one day the Soviet bankers will play it off against other considera-
tions just as "strategic." In this respect, the misfortunes of another
= of their banks, the Singapore subsidiary, insuffic3ently supervised, whict?
plunged into real estate speculation and lost, it is said, $400 million,
rang like the Kremlin clocks through the vaulted rooms of Gosbank. Even
more than their Western colleagues, the Soviet bankers are impressed by
' the perils of the international money markets increasing since 1974. Guy
de Boysson's analysis is certainly not much different from that of the
backers: "Many banks," he said, "have plunged into international opera-
- tions, but their profitability decreases while their risks go up. Those
countries which since 1974 have borrowed to cover their oil costs, are
beginning to reach their limits in commercial banks, and with the new price _
increases in oil these countries will want to borrow more. The risks will
_ thus go up...."
And high Soviet officials have a panic fear of risks! They have already
intervened, exhorting the BCEN management to more moderation in the risky
game of "transformations" (those not directly profitable to them). ,They
could be tempted to tighten controls until now fairly loose.
Thougri the Soviets have let the BCEN internationalize its operations on a
large scale and without special selectivity, their bilateralist penchants
are known: it is a constant temptation to increase use of this tool for
the development of East-West relations. This could come to replacing the
BCEN locomotive on the narrow Paris-Moscow track. And the consequence could
be to break the commercial position of the BCEN, seated on the rule of "non-
~ monopoly," a minor consequence as seen from Moscow. It does seem that cur-
rent French management would not accept such a strategy well. Will it
happen like this? The 61-year old president de Boysson must be re-elected
each year. "A Russian president at the BCEN? I don't dare even imagine it,"
shuddered a French banker. "A bank is made with money, but even more so
- with men."
Comrade Banker -
Diiring 4 long hours of the interview, there were a few confidences, but no
cracks: at no time did Guy de Boysson lose his calm. Sidestepping elegantly
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questions he wished to avoid, he p~.ayed ma.rvelous],y on half-tones and an
incontestable gift fox persuas~veness and charm, As to the wi~di,ng road
that led him to thepresidency of the BCEN, Guy de Boysson remains discreetly
silent. For example, what crisis o~ conscience 1~d the scion of an o1d
southwest Catholic conservative family to the ~TP? What ambition pushed
him to get Plected deputy from Aveyron under the communist banner? Then
why did he suddenly abandon politics, where a brilliant career seemed in
the cards, for an obscure role in a then marginal bank?
These zon~s of shadow make more precious those rare moments when he lifts
a corner of the veil. "Yes, there was an ideological commitment associated
with my entry into the bank. Those who say they are apolitical are childish _
and hypocritical. But its been years since I engaged in any militant
~ activity. My current political convictions? I am against the defense
~ of privilege.
"What makes quality in life? It's the quality of human relationships. -
I like;'for people to express themselves in good faith. ~
, III
"As f`or.!my profession, it's not just a means of earning a living. My
acti~Ji;ties support my convictions.
"What have I been reading lately? "Les 30 Glorieuses" by Jean Fourastie.
My favorite authors? (A long silence). Montaigne, Montesquieu, Bertrand
de Jouvenal. Marx? Yes, I discovered Marx and read him during the Occu-
pat,;~.on." The tone was not that of an enthusiastic reader.
COPYRIGHT: S. A. Groupe Expansion.
8860
CSO: 3100
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_ COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
CLANDESTINE STATIONS PLANNED--The CGT is planning some 30 clandestine
radio stations [radios libres] for the end of the year; they will
broadcast beginning with the [trade-unionJ year-end struggles. [Text]
[Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 26 Nov 79 p 6]
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
UNIDENTIFIED TERRORIST LEADER INTERVIEWED
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Oct 79 pp 60-74 -
[Report on interview: "Who I Am and Why I Kill" by PANORAMA editor Chiara
Beria in Rome 7 September 1979; name of interviewee not given]
[Text] How To Read This Interview -
A new armed party exists in Italy. It coordinates the
terrorist groups that are scattered throughout the country,
which have operated independently of each other in the past
under the most~disparate identifying symbols. Unlike the
Red Brigades, this party does not have a strictly vertical
structure: Rather than issuing orders, the central
executive limits itself to supplying "services" ranging
from information to weapons. It does not even have a name.
But its membership is numerically comparable to that of
the Red Brigades, according to the affirmations of one of
its leaders; and its openly declared aim is to establish
itself as a central checknoint for the entire area of diffuse
terrorism.
This is the most significant and disturbing of the revela-
tions contained in the interview PANORAMA publishes on
the following pages. Up to now, armed struggle in Italy
has been the appropriated privilege of the Red Brigades,
undisputedly the leading terrorist organization; the other
groups have either confined their activities within
localized limits or, when they have tried to expand them,
have been unable to withstand the state's counteroffensive.
A new terrorist organization is now displaying its creden-
tials by revealing that the stage setting behind seemingly
unconnected actions is in fact one and the same, and
claiming credit for the "fireworks nights" and barracks
attacks; and it would appear, from the murder of Fiat
_ executive Carlo Chiglieno on Friday 21 September for
_ which a Prima Linea [Front L3ne] commando claims credit,
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that "competition" with the Red Brigades is likely to
develop along more bloody lines over the coming months
than heretofore.
The interview~s significance, however, does not end
there. It includes also a number of details concerning
_ the most tragic episodes in the terrorist escalation: _
The murders of Aldo Moro, Emilio Alessandrini and
Antonio Varisco. According to the anonymous leader _
interviewed by PANORAMA, the timing of the Christian
Democratic Party chairman's assassination was advanced
- by a practical consideration, namely, the Red Brigades
fear that the forces of order were on the verge of
discovering Moro's prison; and similarly concrete con-
cerns were behind the killings of Varisco and
Alessandrini, not as symbols of a powerful enemy but
as dangerous adversaries in their own right. These
affirmations can contribute substantially to thi.:
deciphering of acts of bloodshed that are still shrouded
in mystery, and can be of some use to the investigating ~
magistrates concerned. ~
The question arises as to why the mysterious "~uerrilla"
sought to reveal these details; as does also the question
as to why he alludes, in purposely general and hence more
disturbing terms, to the fact that the membership of his
terrorist organization includes representatives of
Autonomia as well as persons in contact with the tradi- -
tional leftist parties. These questions are not easily
answered. It is probably in the crisis the armed move-
_ ment appears to have been undergoing the past several
months, and in the spiral of internal polemics, reciprocal
disownings, and low blows generated by that crisis, that
an explanation is to be sought.
Unexpectedly, a"guerrilla" comes out of hiding just long enough to say what
is on his mind. The result: the first interview in the history of terrorism,
given to PANORAMA by one of the underground leaders of the armed struggle.
It all started with a telephone call received by editor Chiara Beria on the
internal system in the head office of PANORAMA in Rome. A question: "Are
you the one handling the story of the Asinara document and of Scalzone's
response?" A request: An appointment, for a few hours later, in the early _
afternoon of Friday 7 September, near the Villa Borghese zoo. Purpose:
_ "Revelations on the 7 April arrest," in other words, on the inquiry opened -
by Judge Pietro Calogero at Padua.
Arriving at the appointed place in her metallic blue Renault, as agreed (the
interviewee had refused to gitie her any indications by which he might be
recognized), Chiara Beria found herself before a thin blonde man, about 35,
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In ri blue wnlytcotit :~we~iler. despltc~ the oppxeasive herit, ~ind Ray-I3~in sun-
glasses, who in a sligtit Diilanese accent (or at least with a Milanese open
"e"), and without the slightest hesitation, offered her an exclusive inter-
view with a leader of the armed struggle, "one whom Curcio knows well." In
other words: himself. And to prove that he was not a mythomaniac he
suggested that the content and details of the story he proposed to tell be
_ thoroughly checked out, absolutely refusing, at the same time, to set up a
new appointment: "It Is now or never," he said, asking the PANORAMA reporter ~
to hurry up and take her notes.
- Thus began the conversation, by the end of which, some 2 hours later, Chiara
_ Beria had filled many pages with explosive statements, but also with silences,
deliberate reticences and ambiguous allusions--a genuine report on the
political and military situation of the armed struggle in Italy issued from -
_ the shadows of the underground--an interview that opens a new chapter in
the tragic story of terrorism and that signals a breakdown in the conspiracy
of silence in a universe that appears more and more in crisis and more and
more to be hitting out wildly.
[Question] Who are you, what is your name?
[Answer] I can only tell you that I am a physician and that, politically, I
am a laborite.
[Question] Are you in hiding?
[Answer] Yes.
- [QuestionJ Since when?
[Answer] Do you recall when the Carabinieri circulated the story of the Red -
_ Brigades surgical operating room and Sergio Adamoli was named as the doctor
who had equipped the Red Brigades hospital? I will tell you the whole story.
The police, the Carabiniere, I am not sure why, circulated the name of
~damoli, either because they suspected him of terrorism, or because he is a
big name and conjures up the PCI [Italian Communist Party] family album, or
perhaps because they wanted to lull the real doctor: meaning myself. At
least, that is the way I have thought of it. Thus, when I learned that
_ someone had been asking about me at the hospital, I made my decision; in 12
hours I went into complete hiding. I abandoned everything: home, work, -
sentimental and social relationships.,,
[Question] But this would indicate you belong to the Red Brigades.
_ [Answer~ That is not entirely true. I only cooperated with the Red Brigades
as an irregular, as a fello~;-traveler, to use your terminology. But for some
years now, I have been a member and leader of another underground organiza-
_ tion. And from the time I went into total hiding, I have broker~ off my
relations with the Red Brigades and devoted myself entirely to the activities
_ of my own organization.
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[Question] Which one is that?
~ [Answer] We have used several "trade names," Sometimes that of Front Line,
sometimes other names containing the term "workers." We have sought in this =
manner to underscore our ties to the working class, and to press our polemic
against those who, like the Red Brigades, insist more on the concept of
being a political party, a revolutionary vanguard, external to, distinct and,
if necessary, remote from the working class. -
[Question] Why, then, did you cooperate with the Red Brigades? ,
[Answer] Because they are comrades, they are revolutionaries, because I feel _
bound to them by a form of militant and communist solidarity. And because .
I believed and still believe in the unity of the communist fighters.
[Question] In talking with me, in granting me this interview, are you not
breaking that solidarity of which you speak?
[Answer] That solidarity has certainly not been broken by me. We have
certainly not been the first. I would never have talked with a bourgeois
reporter 2 years ago, not even 6 months ago. But everybody has now started
blathering, f rom Curcio to Morucci, from Negri to Piperno. At this point, I
~ do not ser why w2 should let them monopolize information and debate.
[Questionj But in whose name do you speak? In that of Front Line?
[Answer] Front Line no longer exists. What I mean is that Front Line is
� virtually routed. The organization was already decapitated with the arrest
of Corrado Alunni; then came the arrests in Florence and others here and _
there. Front Line no longer exists as a structured and articulated organiza-
tion. It could srill claim credit for actions because there are still some
of its members a~ large, but the organization as such is finished. -
[Question] Ir.~ whose name then do you speak? _
[Answer] In that of a clandestine executive ~hat coordinates--I say
coordinates, and not commands--nizmerous local armed organizations.
[Question] Which ones?
[Answer] The list is very long: Armed Struggle for Communism, Workers
Organization for Communism, Armed Workers Brigad~~, ~~.-a:ed Communist Proletar-
ians, Fighting Co~nunist Ce11s, Armed Proletarian Squads, an.d then other
organizations that have grown out of the activities, the splits and in some
cases the collapse of the NAP [Armed Proletarian Nuclei), the Front Line,
and the Red Brigades.
~ [Question] in substance, are these organizations now federated?
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[Answer] No. These organizations decided about 1 year ago to coordinate _
and link their forces, to unify some services and some structures, to plan
- some actions jointly: genuine joint political campaigns.
[Question] For example? . ~
[AnswerJ We are building and will soon have in operation an articulated
network linking various cities to help the regular underground militants, _
as well as those who are not regulars but who find it necessary occasionally -
to go into hiding. In sum, common supply channels for the provision of -
passports, identity cards and personal documents. A centralized file of
information that can be consulted by the various groups and enriched by their
contributions, and a centralized arsenal...
[Question] An arsenal?
~AnswerJ~~; Yes, jointly owned weapons available for their use. _
[Question] But is the executive a centralized command?
[Answer] No, z repeat. It i~ a gi�oup of persons that administers this
resource, that suggests and counsels� that links the various groups to enable
them to operate in the most homogeneous manner possible, and that proposes
and coordinates joint actions.
[Question] Which, for example?
[Answer] The Veneto "fireworks nights" were concerted actions repeated on
at least two occasions, the second of which, I should point out, was after
7 April when the presumed leaders of the scattered terrorist groups were
already in prison.
[Question] And which others? -
[Answer] Targets like those hit 1 year ago. Men and headquarters of the
Carahinieri. -
[Question] Who, together with you, forms part of this execritive?
[Answer] Six others besides myself. And only one of them, besides me, lives
~ in absolute hiding. He is habitually thought of as a member of the Red
Brigades, and cited by the press and the Carabiniere as a member of that
organization's strategic executive, but, on the contrary, he left the Red
Brigades 5 or 6 years ago. Still another one may be considered the only
survivor of the NAP. I assume you are familiar with the story of the NAP.
Between mistakes, trustfulness, delations and infiltrations (like that which
cost Martino Zichitella his life in December 1976), traps, arrests and _
unsuccessful escape actions, the NAP has been completely routed. 'those who ~
survived and are under arrest joined the Red Brigades (Abatangelo, De11i
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Veneri, Panizzaxi, Mauro, Sofia, De Laurentiis). The very few (three or
four) who remained free have dispersed. One of them has organized other
underground groups and, as their representative, is part of our executive.
[Question] And who else?
~.~[Answer] Four other comrades.
[QuestionJ Yes, but who are they?
[Answer] I can only tell you that one of them is a lawyer. Biit he is not
one of those you are thinking of, that is, not a member of Red Assistance,
nor is he a member of the more influential colleges for the defense of the -
political processes. He is simply a young pY~gressive lawyer.
- [Question] Go on, who else...
[Answer] I cannot tell you any more because they are persons living within
the law. Within their environment they are considered extreme le.ftisits,
but they have never been in the limelight. They live and operate unobstrusvely.
One of these three is a registered member of the PCI...
[Question] But does he hold a position of importance in the PCI? =
[Answer] I know he has been a member for 10 or 12 years. But only a member
with no important role, and in fact treated with a certain distrust. Within
the party, I mean. For reasons of security which it would be useless to
explain, I can say nothing about the other two.
[Question] And what is the numerical strength of this coordinating organiza-
tion for underground groups?
[Answer] I must first say something about the situation of the armed struggle
in Italy. I can say that the present ~tcture is extremely simple, or, better
yet, is now "simplified." First, let us take the Red Brigades. The Red ~ -
Brigades have taken some hard blows, but their strength is substantially
unchanged. l: shall clarify, and it is an extremely important clarification:
The Red Brigades have not been set back, nor have they pulled back; they
have not suffered any decisive b1owG nor any irreversible defeats. But
they have not advanced, have not grown, have not strengthened themselves, -
and have not further radicated themselves. And this is the point. In the
- field of armed struggle, this is at least the equivalent of a serious defeat.
To remain at a standstill is like falling back. Therefore, it can be said
that this is a pullback phase for the Red Brigades. This is not to say that
Red Brigades actions are to be excluded from further consideration, and even -
actions on a ma~or scale and of major political and emotional impact. On the
contrar,y, in the absence of any sign of self~.criticism on their part concerning
_ past actions and the ideology that has sustained``them to date, it is to be
expected that they will intensify, even more than now, the antistatal thrust _
- of their program and that their militaristic tendencies will also be intensi-
fied.
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[Question] You were saying that the Red Brigades are in a pullback phase...
[Answer] Yes, but it must not be forgotten also that the Moro action was
carried out during a phase that for the Red Brigades was anything but an
offensive. The action had the effect, among others, of masking and almost
of overcoming their difficulties, considering that for the Red Brigades
the publicity aspects of their actions are their determinant factor. Since
then, the situation of the Red Brigades has not improved, even though there
have been no defeats nor any truly lost battles. So much then for the Red
Brigades. I have already spoken summarily of the NAP and the Front Line.
Revolutionary Action was already virtually routed even before Faina's arrest, -
and by now can be considered nonexistent. This leaves only us, then, with
the advantage of being mobile, unpredictable, fluid, decentralized, scattered
and diffuse.
[Question] Yes, but how many are you?
~Answer] I believe this will be the first time anyone in my position will
have responded to a question like yours. We, on the one hand, have always
exaggerated, until now, to convey the impression of power, while the govern-
ment, on the other has always scaled down its estimates in an effort to
convey the impression of an inevitable and even imminent extinction of
terrorism. Well, for the first time, here is a figure you can take as being
absolutely reliable.
_ [Question] Well, go ahead...
[Answer] The militants operating within the coordination orb of our groups _
total between 150 and 180, probably closer to 150. A more exact figure would
be impossible for anyone to give you. These militants are spread out over -
_ some 10 localities. Some of them live in absolute hiding, meaning with _
false identity documents and living entirely outside the law; others live
habitually in a semilegal kind of status, and still others enjoy an absolute _
and irreproachable cover. They are laborers, students, employees, and _
members of professions who engage in no political activity publicly, and
who clandestinely take part in armed struggle actions. The latter are a
minority. The majority consists of comrades who are linked to the masses -
and who engage publicly in political activities, some taking part in the
activities of the reformist left, and others in the sphere of Autonomia.
[Question] And, in your opinion, what is the membership of the Red Brigades?
[AnswerJ About the same as ours.
[Question] Do you mean that the two armed parties have about equal forces? _
[Answer] As regards regular members, meaning those ready at all times to
- take up arms, yes: We have about 150, and they have about 150. But the `
Red Brigades also have many irregulars and fellow-travelers; these, when
- added in, double or triple their total, which we can say then reaches 450 and
even 500.
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[Question] Besides your organization and the Red brigades, how many others
would you say are engaged in armed struggle?
[Answer] Impossible to say. There is an untold number of ~norganized,
unsystematic, dispersed communist fighters: those--so that we understand
each other--who arm themselves in a bungl3ng way for a one-time action.
They do it alone or together with a close friend, schoolmates, fellow workers,
street companions or bar companions. After completing their action they put
their weapon away and go back to their pinball machines or to their job on
the production line.
[Question] There has been a split in the Red Brigades. How many dissidents
have followed Valerio Mol-ucci and Adriana Faranda?
[Answer] Only a few, a very few. Perhaps five or six, perhaps one or two
- more. In any case a very small minority.
[Question] But the document sent to RADIO ONDA ROSSA in Rome indicates the
existence of a dissidence that is not limited to Morucci a*~d Faranda, as
Curico tried to make believe...
[Answer] Not at all! In our opinion, that document is false,
[Question] Why?
[Answer] We are convinced it was written by some member of Autonomia who
shares Morucci's views and who thought this would help the "workers movement
and activism" wing of the Red Brigades. In my opinion, its results were
poor and its credibility nil.
[Question] Meaning?
[Answer] The overwhelming maj~ricy of the Red Brigades are and will remain
close-knit. The notion of spl3.ti.ing them is a pile of manure that could
occur only in the minds of Morucc~i and his companions. The Red Brigades'
own fundamental natures prevent tltem from indulging in positional d.ialectics,
or in a diversification or even a~~classification of sectorial viewpoints,
or a disaggregation as decentraliz~d groups. One can leave the Red Brigades
only as an individual, as Morucci and Faranda have done, trying, even though
weakly, to invest it with the dimensions of a split. And please note care-
fully that I am in agrPement with many of Morucci~s reproofs against the -
Red Brigades, but it is a mistake for anyone to think the Red Brigades can
be defeated by nurturing or inventing possible internal cracks. It is a
simpleminded illusion.
[Question] How is it that you know so much about the internal situation of
the Red Brigades?
[Answer] T know what you are driving at. I repeat: Until some months ago,
I ha~ contact, personally and as a nonregular, with the leaders of the Red
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Brigades. Then, when I went undezground, and by a joint decision, I inter-
rupted my relations with them~ Moreover, political relations among the
various organizations have deteriorated since then, the climate has become
bitter, and the ideological struggle has intensified. The brigatisti have
now maximized their precautionary measures; they have become extremely
discreet and extremely suspicious; they are accus3ng us all of fickleness
and superficiality. They prefer to err all alone.
[Question] You insist that you have had contact with the leaders of the Red
Brigades. Do you know who they are and which of them are members of the -
- strategic exe~utive?
[Answer] I know the names of some of them, not all of them, and I do not
know exactly how many they are. However, I can say that, generally speaking,
they are those named in the press...
[Question] Namely, M~rio Moretti?
[Answer] Yes.
[Question] ...Prospero Gallinari?
~ -
Ce'
[Answer] Yes. -
~
- [Question] Susanna Ronconi?
[Answer] Absolutely not! Tn no way!
[Question] And who else?
[Answer~ You will have to find that out yourselves.
- [Question] Let us change th,e subject. Can you talk about',some of the armed
- party's most recei~t actions that might appear to be based on any rationale
whatever, even the most twisted? I refer, for example, to the Piazza ;
Fontana murder of Judge Emilio Alessandrini. Was he perhaps a"class-war
enemy symbol" that had to be eliminated?
[Answer] By executing Alessandrini, in my opinion, ~ront Line eliminated a
personal enemy of its own, an obstacle to the unfolding of its own activities.
Not a class-war enerny, therefore, but someone who concretely and for a precise -
and specific represented an immediate danger: There was somthing that
Alessandrini knew or was about to discover.
[Question] What? -
[AnswFr] I will not answer that. However, a similar rationale applies in
the case of Varise~TS elimination...
[Question] In what sense?
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[Answer] He was not the cruel jailer the Red Brigades portrayed in their
document, nor was he the meek servant of the state the newspapers wrote him -
up to be. He was an active, expert, intelligent man of the counterrevolution,
as~igned to the highly significant and sensitive tasks of verifying informers'
reports and coordinating infiltrations and delations. Varisco had discovered
something of major importance and was eliminated for this reason. _
- [Question] Several times and on many occasions, members of the PCI, in par-
ticular, have spoken of sanctuaries, of places or persons that have protected
or are protecting the armed struggle. Can you say something on this point? -
[AnswerJ Neither Cefis nor Sindona have protected or financed the underground
groups; these are idiocies, good only for election campaigns. But let us~be
clear, and I do not think I am making some stunning revelation or delation
when I say that there are representatives of the PSI [Italian Socialist Party]
and the PCI who help us.
[Question] But these allusions have all the flavor of a prov~cation...
[Answer] Not at all! What makes you think so? I have only said, and it
does not seem to me there should be anything astounding about it, that there
are some memb~~rs, local leaders and representatives having limited public _
presrige, more intellectual than political, who provide us marginal aid in
the form of essential facilities for hiding and expatriation: living
quarters, shelters, documents. But there is no godfather, no major figure,
no backer of high public standing.
[Question] Let us talk about Moro~s assassination. Can you tell us something
' about that?
[Answer] I know for a fact that a factor that has not been considered until
now actually entered into the decision to kill Moro...
[Question] Which one? -
[Answer] Haste and the fear of imminent discovery. On the Saturday before
9 May, the Red Brigade:; had decided to postpone the execution, not by a few -
hours but by several weeks, They had also decided to suspend alI communica-
tions with the outside world, to effect a real news blackout. They wanted
to create an atmosphere of total suspense conducive to anticipation of the
worst, in which the politicians, they hoped, would make their final and
definitive offers, clarifying their r~al intentions. Not only that. They
also wanted to draw up an alternate stragegy, a set of objectives to replace
that of obtaining the freedom of the political prisoners. They further had
in mind demanding the suspension of all current search activities and
investigations.
[Question] What happened instead?
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~AnswerJ What happened that se~.trrh activ~.ti.es wexe inter~sified at ,just about
that time. '1'he police succeeded, wittiout even realizing it, in searching ~zn
apartment that was the headquarters of a Red Brigades nonregular forces
base and was on the verge of discovering the zone in which Moro was being
- held prisoner. It was this, rather than a clearly thought out decision, that
impelled the Red Brigades to take hasty action.
[Question] But was there or was there not a clash w3_chin the ranks as to
~ the success or f ailure of the kidnaping?
[Answer] There was, but it d3d not concern Moro after the state's refusal
to free the political prisoners. Rather, it concerned the desirability of
setting forth a substitute objective. Of course, in the event of a refusal
of this second objective as well, Moro's fate would have been sealed.
[Question] During the Moro kidnaping, as well as in other cases, suspicions _
were voiced regarding intervention by foreign secret services...
[Answer] In the Moro case, I would say absolutely not. In the past--I speak
now of the early beginnings, I speak of the GAP [Partisan Action Group] and
of the Red Brigades' first steps--there was a form of indirect support from
the Soviet secret service in Italy. By indirect support I mean facilitations _
and advice on lines of action, on proposed links and infiltrations within
t}le trade unions and within the PCI; and, in sum, facllitations with respect
to international links, principally with the Palestinians, to the supply _
of weapons and other needs. But there it ended. Now it is nonexistent.
It is quite possible, however, that some of the effects of the armed struggle
will coincide marginally with the effects being sought by the secret services
of the Eastern countries in their own operations aimed at destabilization.
Tr~is could lead them to support certain actions, even though in an extremely
= secandary manner and in any case without the leaders of the armed struggle
being aware of it. ~
[Question] Let us now discuss the question of relations between the crime
underworld and terrorism. Have you also had help from that underworld?
[Answer] I would say, no. Let me explain: Some individuals have, by -
personal choice, come over from criminal activities to join the armed
struggle, generally after having gone through a prison experience. This was
the case many years ago with out NAP comrades and more recently with persons
like Carlo Casirati and Guistino De Vuono, who came from organized crime
who have since then followed other pursuits that have differentiated them -
- from their earlier enz~ironment. This has certainly created some doubts and
has actually led some :nilitants to believe their relations with organized
common criminal gangs were justified, I repeat: only marginally and by
way of personal decisions, On1y Revolutionary Action throught for a time it
- could have stable relations with common criminality, but paid dearly for
this mistake. As far as we ourselves are concerned, things have gone
differently and more tritely. The weapons and false documents were there,
and there they had to be procured; it was a compulsory choice. Recently we
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have decided we made a mi.stake in accepting that choice and that we will now
do everything possible to abandon it. We have similarly decided to cease all
self-financing actions from now on, that is, robberies and kidnapings, both .
because they create doubts and are incomprehensible to the working class and
because they require one to have close working relations with organized crime.
[Question] What do you, rather all of you, think of the amnesty proposal
advanced by the representatives of METROPOLI, Franco Piperno and Lanfranco
Pace, as well as by Marco Boata, representative of Lotta Continua and elected
deputy by the radicals? Do yo u share the contempt shown for it by the Curcio
group?
[Answer] The proposal in no way concerns the sectors and areas of primary
interest to the party and the armed movement! Certainly the most inane
- response to this proposal was that of Curcio: he rejects and scorns it on~y
because it is evident that never and forever not can an amnesty be granted
to people li~~ nim and ourselves. How stupid is his understanding of the
role of the vanguard! The real danger is that the amnesty could end up
transformed into a cage that could limit the initiative of the armed movement.
[Question] Listen, there is something that continues to prevent me from
being convinced: Why have yuu, rather all of you, decided to talk, to tell
so many things...
[Answer] It was certainly not we who broke the tacit understanding whereby
" these r~atters were discussed only in certain environments. And PANORAMA is ~
certainly not part of those environments. Furthermore, three considerations
are uppermost. First: We think it necessary to put a stop to the circulation
of false images of the armed struggle, such as mythical organizations similar
to shadowy secret services, made up of supermen and infiitrated by agents
of all kinds. Secondly: We have become tired of Scalzone, Negri and Piperno
being the only ones talking, in the manner of academic bonzes, about this F
broad and hiohly differentiable area. I want to be very clear on this point:
~ Our attitude toward them is not the same as that of Curcio and his companions.
They are for us not class-war enemies. We do not seek their death, not even
their arrest; we want all arrested communists to be freed. But neither do
wp want them to represent us, on the one hand, because to assume to themselves
this representatior~ is an undue appropriation of authority, and, on the -
other, because they represent us in a false manner...
[Question] A nice way to exonerate them..� ~
[Answer~ Let me be clearer. Scalzone is a very fine fillow, he is impetuous
and he can get as hot under the collar as a manager at a meeting of new
arrivals, but this does not make a political leader. Piperno is a mediocre
physics professor; I say this because I know physics and I have listened to
- some of his lectures at the university. Negri is too vain to be even a
~ sworn patrolman; imagine him as a military political commander! These persons _
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should remain silent and let the directly involved persons talk. Modestly
speaking, I am one of the directly involved onea. This is ~ahy I am talking
and why, in so doing, I am challenging others to talk..,
[Question] Whom?
[Answer] Other leaders and members of the armed struggle. Because--and this
is the third point--there can be no question about it that the political and
ideol.ogical struggle within the armed-party sphere has no~a been joined. We
cannot escape it. It is a struggle that pits all of us, the sphere of the
diffused armed struggle and of the workers, against the Red Brigades and
their retrograde Leninism. Wa too must fight in this struggle, with clarity
and modesty. To do this, we must change style and method...
, [Question] Just what does this signify? What is your program of action?
[Answer] I am previewing nothing; we are not the RADIOCORRIERE program guide!
Our actions will flow from the cJ_ass-war itself, in step with its develop-
ments, meeting its requirements, supporting its struggles, We will return
to the factory, to the social factory. But enough for now; we shall talk
about this another time, if your boss, and above all General Dalla Chiesa,
will allow it.
[Interview ends above]
The 'Who's Who' of the Armed Struggle
- As a supplement to the foregoing interview with a leader of the armed struggle,
PANORAMA publishes below a brief glossary of the "trade names" and persons'
names cited during the interview,
- Sergio Adamoli: Surgeon, 43, son of Senator Gelasio, communist, first mayor
of Genoa after the Liberation. According to the DIGOS [Directorate for
General Operations and Special Operations], he is one of the masterminds of
the Genoa branch of the Red Brigades, He disappeared in April.
. "Fireworks Night": A series of similar attacks carried out reiteratively
(eight times since January 1978) in the Veneto. The last and worst of them
took place in April of this year, 22 days after the capture of the Negri
group. Twenty-seven explosive devices were set off against Carabineri
barracks and vehicles, and against party premises and headquarters, in 17
different localities, with epicenter in Padua.
Martion Zichitella: Arrested for common-law offenses, he .joined the Nap while
~ still in prison. In August 1976, he escaped from the Lecce prison with -
Graziano Mesina and others. Four months later he was killed during the
ambush laid by the NAP for Alfonso Noce, director of antiterrorism in Rome.
_ Pasquale Abatangelo, Domenico Delli Veneri, Giorgio Panizzar, Aldo Mauro,
Pietro Sofia, Pasquale De Laurentiis: The NAP'S original leader group which
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transferred over as a body to the Red Brigades in 1976. The ex-Nappi~ti
being held in the Asinara prison signed the Curcio document of August, -
cc~uched in orthodox Leninist terms.
Revolutionary Action: An anarchist guerrila faction. It has operated mostly
in Tuscany, Piedmont and Liguria, with attacks, kidnapings and the wounding
of UNITA reporter Nino Ferrero. It is made up mostly of former "commontisti,"
a group wt?ose program was "criminal struggle against capital."
- Gianfranco Faina: Considered the ideologue and leader of Revolutionary Action.
Forty-three years of age, former schoolteacher. Under two orders of capture
issued in 1977, he was arrested in May of this year in Bologna. He is accused
- of wounding Ferrero and of other crimes. His name appears also in the inquiry
into the murder of worker Guido Rossa.
RADIO ONDA ROSSA: The Autonomia broadcast station in Rome. On 2 September,
it broadcast a document from the "Moruccj,in" wing of the Red Brigades, in
which strong positions are takpn in disagreement with the Red Brigades leader-
ship.
Mario Moretti: Organizer and putative father of the Rome branch, and most
wanted of the Red Brigades, he escaped arr.est by a hairbreadth at the
printing-establishment hideout discovereu in Rome in the Spring of 1978.
He is believed to be a member of the hard core.
Prospero Gallinari: One of the founders of the Red Brigades, he was the
last of the original nucleus to go into hiding. Captured in 1974, he escaped
from the Vicenza prison 2 years later. He is being sought, among other
things, as a prime suspect in the Via Fani massacre.
Susanna Ronconi: An early member of the Red Brigades, she is believed by
many to have left the organization with Corrado Alunni, opting for Front
Line. She is also being sought in connection with the Via Fani massacre.
GAP: Founded by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, it was the first major clandestine
group. It had proven ties with the Eastern European countries and those of
the communist Third World, particularly Cuba. It was routed after the death
of the publisher-guerrilla in the Spring of 1972. The remains of the GAP
found their way into the Red Brigades for the most part, mainly the Genovese
branch, strengthening its Stalinist, neoresistance and "third worldist"
rigidities.
- Carlo Casirati: With previous convictions for common-law offenses, he was -
one of the leading culprits in the kidnaping and murder of Carlo Saronio,
- which was planned in political extremist circles of the left. .
Giustino De Vuono: With the Red Brigades in hiding, he is considered one of
the organization's high-rank3.ng leaders. His capture has been ordered for
common-law (double r.omicide attempt during a quarrel) and political (kidnaping _
and murder of Saronio, kidnaping and murder of Moro) offenses.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Arnoldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A.
9399
Cos: 3104 49
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
MILA1~ UNION LEADERS AGAINST FACTORY TERRORISM, VIOLENCE
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 13 Nov 79 p 15
[Interview with FLM-CISL's Pier Giorgio Tiboni and CGIL's Sergio Soave by
Giancarlo Pertegato on terrorism in the factory; in Mi1an; date not given]
_ [Text] Pier Giorgio Tiboni (FLM-CISL) [Federation of
Metalworkers-Italian Confederation of Zabor Unions]:
"Dismissals do not serve to restore control; th~e target
is the union." "There is a desire to deny the right
to make a mistake." "Institutions should concern
themselves with the fight against terrorism." "Even
Seveso is violence." Sergio Soave (CGIL) [Italian
General Contederation of Labor]: "Excesses are not
justif iable." "Traveling the path of the law." "No
to one-way guarantees." "The police are on the side
of the union."
Milan--Why are the BR [Red Brigades] mailmen ringing at the door of Milanese
factories such as Alfa Romeo? This question is addressed to Pier Giorgio
Tiboni, secretary of CISL and FLM. Tiboni was an operator at Falk di
Vobarno in Brescian Province and became a full-time union leader after
6 years on the shop committee. Now, at 41 years of age, he directs one of
CISL's largest provincial federations; his voice is rather often the primary -
element in confrontations with the CGIL, but there is no lack of discussion
as a result of his critical interventions even at the top of the ~anion -
corporate structure to which he belongs.
"The mailmen are returning," Tiboni says, "because the BR are trying to get
back into the factory. It may be an attempt at survival after the setbacks
suffered and even the indication of a plan: that of taking part in plant
discussions. In Turin the BR reappeared at a critical moment. Open con-
tractual problems are not being resolved, four workers are being dismiss~d
- and the union lacks the initiative to see that they are taken back; this is
what the BR members are bringing up. Companies are not taking this situation
into consideration; they are trying to make the union the focal point of
discussion, thus paving the way for dangerous initiatives."
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[Pertegato] However, Fiat has indicated that it must dismiss 61 employees;
it explained that this action is being taken to make the factory controllable
again.
[Tiboni] Fiat entered a crisis stage 10 years ago. A certain amount of
organization died. The role of the department head or supervisor is
- finished. And there is no other role for those heads; this is the crisis.
[Pertegato] But there are violent episodes. No one has denied the existence
_ of excesses, particularly in internal procedures. In any case, there was
discussion about the actual degree of responsibility of those who we.re dis- -
_ charged. The union offered legal assistance to those individuals on con-
dition that they sign a-statement con3emning violence.
[Tiboni] I do not agree with the condition imposed. In this manner, con-
demnation and discrimination are made on the basis of opinion.
[Pertegato] Let us return to the cause of the Fiat case. How do you think _
factory control can be restored?
[Tibonij~ I admit that this is the objective, but I do not believe that dis- _
missals serve the purpose.
[Pertegato] Do you think that the purpose of the firings was different from
what was stated? -
[Tiboni] Yes indeed. I believe that the real target is the union's role.
If that role is made insignificant or if there is a tendency to reduce union
representation, the way is paved for terrorism. After the Fiat firings in
Milan, there were other signs. Supervisors who walk around in given
departments, regardless of its having beeYi forbidden to do so by the workers'
statute, and union publications being placed within the plant. What does
this have to do with the fight against terrorism?
[Pertegato] According to statements made by some workers, there is at least
one department at Alfa Romeo where production is going on at a reduced rate.
This is occurring because of the atmosphere of violence created by an
extremist group. Whoever sees what is going on closes his eyes; whoever
- known about it keeps quiet. In this specific case, what can the union do? -
[Tiboni] We are not aware of a situation of that kind at Alfa Romea. I do
not think such a situation exists. Instead, I maintain that there are
homogeneous groups of workers who, with their company counterparts, determine
a given production level through bargaining.
[Pertegato] Let us approach the discussion from anr~ther angle. You said
recently that certain excesses in confrontations with supervisors are up to _
- you to settle. There are things, you said, which Agnelli must not resolve; _
you are resolving them within the labor movement. How?
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[T:Lboni] Certainly not with the definitive condemnation wYiich occurs with
the firing of a worker, a measure which is not aimed at rehabilitating or
correcting the one who errs in a plant. Rather, it tends to expel, efface
and alienate. That is why I have maintained an~i maintain that it should be
the labor movement in general and, in particular, the union movement which
- should assume the responsibility for the political discussion which might
ensue and, with persuasion and discussion, crack the hard nuts of which we
are speaking.
[Pertegato] In your opinion, what can be done to restore stability? What
_ is the dividing line at which, if crossed, violence should be handled by E
- institutions and not just discussed within the labor movement?
[Tiboni] One of the significances of the Fiat firings is a desire to deny
- a right which belongs to all citizens, except the producer who works in
a factory. I am speaking of the right to make a mistake. Therefore, I am
speaking of error. Moreover, I think that institutions should concern
themselves with the fight against terrorism, if only because the unian cannot
do its job and, at the same time, replace the police or courts.
[Pertegato] But you include the excesses perpetrated against the supervisors
among the problems whose onus is traceable to the union. Is this not
violence?
[~iboni] Violence, violence. Certainly it is. But would it not be better
to set aside a week to speak of violence in stadiums, the following week of
violence against women, still another of violence in the metropoiis, like
the massacre in Moncucco, and then, a week later, of violence in the factory?
Do we want to bear in mind that it is an entire social fabric which produces
violence? If ~ worker dies in the factory, is this not violence? Seveso,
the highly productive plant which gave us dioxide poisoning; was this not
vic,lence perpetrated on the workers and the Seveso area? And forb~dding
the operator to calculate the amount of his production; is this not violence?
- I say that one cannot consider the problem a one-way street; even the .
department head who will not strike is committing a sort of violence compared
with one who is struggling, that is, participating, paying with his own
- wages for a battle which is advantageous also to the one who remains at the -
window.
[Pertegato] How then do you think you can tackle the problem of violence _
as a whole?
[Tiboni] I do not have the answer to that; we do not have the answers. But
to return to the union's role, I say that only one labor organization which
does its job well, and not others, can gather marginal social strata around -
itself and prevent them from becoming "water for terrorist fish" or fertile
ground for maneuvering or recruiting individuals for destruction.
[Pertegato] What do you mean by a union which does i:s job? _
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[Tiboni] That is perhaps an oversimplified expression used by Bentivogli,
, national secretary of the FLM: "The union must be in the social sphere what
the lawyer is in judicial proceedings, institutionally guaranteed defense."
- The inebriation of sacrifices to be supported is passing; on the so-called
- EUR [Universal Exposition of Rome] Iine many are considering that we are
right in maintaining that it was in error. There you have the union
reestablishing its ewn identity.
[Pertegato] A final question. You associated the Fiat event with that of -
- the individuals imprisoned on 7 April. Why?
[Tiboni] First, I recalled some facts; second, I interpreted the signs. I
believe we are experiencing a great restorative wave. There is a tendency
to reduce the amount of freedom in factories, while in the country, again
due to the ineffectiveness of institutions, Negri and the others have been
in prison for months without knowing when they will have the court trial to _
_ which they are entitled. And let me say that our system of guarantees is
= not just coming into being; we have been concerned about freedom in factories
- for years, when it was not the autonomists who were defendants in the court- -
- room but, rather, the communists. And I add that we, unlike the others,
have neither a guilty conscience nor an embarrassing family album to hide,
in terms of terrorism. -
The BR Member Should Not be Fired but Arrested
- "To expect a declaration like that which the unions requested from those _
who were f ired by Fiat means to use discrimination and prosecute ideas.
Certain excesses, of which we obviously do not approve, are traceable to
us." These and other statements made by Pier Giorgio Tiboni involve the
CGIL directly or indirectly. Sergio Soave, 32 years old, was union leader
in the Alfa Romeo area, worked a few years in the engineering office at the
Corso di Porta Vittoria branch and, for the last few months, has been a
part of the union headquarters Provincial Secretariat. We questioned him `
about some of Tiboni's answers. This is what he told us. `
Free Association
"With regard to the employees discharged by Fiat, I find Tiboni`s concept
of the union somewhat disconcerting. We are n~t a neutral organization.
We are not an institution which has the duty of indiscriminately assuring
everyone's official defense. The union is a free association. Whoever is
not in agreement with its policy belongs to other organizations. Because
we are a force with specific objectives and also with an ideal heritage
_ which associates itself with the Constitution and which does not share our
positions, one can very well choose other representative associations. This
is the gist of the declaration made to the employees fired by Fiat as a
condition to assure them the union's legal defense. Whoever has not approved
or subscribe~r to this declaratian has made a choice: he is not in agreement
with us; he has preferred another type of policy and defense neither of which
is ours."
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[Pertegato] In your opinion, is there a problem of control in the factory? ~
_ [Soave] Ten years ago the plant structure was based on a hierarchy, one
backed up by the role of the supervlsors; this no longer eYists. But at
the same time there is s~i11 no other kind of structure. And it is unthink-
able that L-his situation could be maintained over the long term. We are
concerned about this, because we are not just the workers' union but also
that of the clerical employees and therefore of the supervisors. In the
case of the supervisors, we do not have, as the saying goes, "any bone to
pick." It would be absurd for us to have problems of this type with workers
who, moreover, are union members. If we want to be everyone's union but
not a relief organization which provides welfare protection ir: the wa_~ ~NAM
[National Health Insurance Institute] supplies medical and medicinal services,
" we must be the full-fledged union of the workers, clerical employees and
_ also supervisors. What does this mean? That, among other things, we
are concerned about the fact that the purchasing power of industry's clerical
employees and supervisors has, for the first time, declined during the first
7 months of 1979. This is one of the accounts with which we should reckon.
Moreover, that is why we are concerned about control in the factory, which _
~ is also a problem of agreement and role playing.
[Pertegato] And also of situations of violence.
[Soave) I want to be very clear on this point. If there is a terrorist in
a factory, his place is neither inside nor outside the plant. The BR -
member must not be fired; he must be arrested. If Fiat is to justify its
firings on the~basis of terrorism and violence, it must pursue the path of -
the law. One is denounced for an offense; a perpetrator of violence or a
terrorist is not transferred from inside the factory to the outside. I
rid my plant of violent individuals, presumed or real; for the remainder I
do not concern myself. This is not right. I repeat, the path to use is
that of the law. This must be valid for everyone. Just as it is not fair ~
- to associate people who have been dismissed with an attack on society.
- The Problem of the Youth
- [Pertegato] What do you mean by attack on society?
[Soave] The large number of assumptions. What do the jobless have to do
- with those whom Fiat accuses of violence? What does it mean that companies
- want to keep the young generation out of the fact~ry? Here you have another _
problem: the conflict between reality in the plant and the external
reality.
Discipline and Consumption ~
[Pertegato] What conflict?
_ I _
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[Soave] They want productive discipline in the factory and, at the same
time, unlimited consumption outside. The first condition, plant discipline,
to support the second. But there is danger that the second coridition
might make the achievement of the first difficult. On the contrary, we say
_ that il does make it diFficult.
[Pertegato] But there is also the r~uestion of control of union conflicts.
What do you think of internal processions during which episodes of violence
sometimes occur? There are those who say that even supervisors who do
not strike are committing violence.
[Soa:*e] This is bad sociological literature and I am amazed that such -
things would be said. The union controversy is an instance of conflict
and tension. A strike is the most acute phase of the controversy. Whoever
supports the demands and stays away from work is paying for his participation
in the union conflict from his own pocket. There are various levels of
tension. Excesses can occur more easily when the one involved in the con-
fl~ct is on his own, or else, when the problems are of a more serious nature.
_ Being excesses, they are not only unjustifiable bu*_ also should be counter-
acted on the basis of policy. We cannot�accept the contention that they
are a part of our history, for, among other things, they do not pay and are
an indication of another line, not that of the union. I am not speaking of
an isolated case. I am speaking of violence perpetrated where it is preached
and practiced.
Reflections on Agreement
[Pertegato] Therefore, we can consider that there are two types of situations.
The fi.rst is the isolation which surrounds one who strikes because the contro-
versy has been imposed in a defective manner. The other, that of resorting
to violence, is a matter of choice. In the first case, what can the union do?
[Soave] It must ask itself and, in fact, it does ask itself to what extent
it should reexamine the mechanism of agreement on which the union is based.
I mean that no one should close his eyes to the danger of the parliamentari-
zation of the shop committee, of the repetitiveness of assemblies and of
- insufficient representation by the delegates. Shop committees arose as -
- exponents of a reality, of a situation: that which they are experiencing
in the factory. But if during the meetings little is spoken, if 80 percent
of the delegates remain silent, what does the one who speaks know of the
reality of which those who remain silent should be speaking? These are some
necessary reflections. This is different from equating violence with "one -
- who does not strike." The union must not pl~ce the problem of agreement
in superficial terms, precisely because it must do its job thoroughly.
Constitutional System
[PertegatoJ And when violence is a matter of choice, what does the union
say?
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[Soave] That is a question to be asked: Does Italy have a constitutional
system which can resolve genuine questions without resorting to violence?
I say it does; the union says it does. But we must be very clear; no room
can be given to the ideology of subversion.
Union Members Threatened
[Pertegato] What action can be taken by the labor organization against
terrorism?
- [Soave] There is a saying which goes: "A terrorist in the plant says it
better than an innocent person who has been fired." This is an incorrect -
way to state the problem. There should be no terrorists in the plant and -
likewise no innocent people fired. The problem of guarantees exists but
_ certainly not as a one-way street. At Alfa Romeo, union leaders and
departmental delegates are being threatened; threatening telephone calls -
are not lacking. Unfortunately, in that factory there has not yet been a ~
unified expression of solidarity for the union members threatened by ter-
rorists. Nevertheless, Alfa Romeo is a plant which has isolated its small
number of violent persons and where awareness of the need to combat sub-
version and its ramifications has obtained noteworthy results. I ask: If
we do not give a guarantee of solidarity to one who is attacked by subversive
blows, who will protect the union leader, the departmental delegate, "guilty"
of doing their job? We give assurance that whoever is accused of terrorism
will obtain the guarantees which our law provides; but meanwhile, let us
not forget that terrorism is trying to reduce the physical presence of the
union in the factory. Do we want to be safeguarded? Very well, but let
us not forget who is at the front line. -
And f inally, a few words to the ef.fect that the union must not play the
role of policeman. Quite clear is the tone with which some individuals
utter these words with a mixture oi self-sufficiency and scorn. I ask: Are
the police not on rhe side of the union? Are they not the ones who, more
than anyone else, receive on their hides many of the blows terrorism
inflicts on the forces which are defending the republic? Let us imagine
_ what would happen in Italy the moment the police forces would be deprived
of solidarity with other workers; would they collapse morally as is happening
in the aspirations of terrorism? Is not this also a guarantee with which we
_ should be concerned, without, to be sure, forgetting the others?
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8568
CSO: 3104
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
BRIEFS
KOREA TO BUY AIRCRAFT--South Korea has shown an interest iri purchasing .
several C-212 Aviocar airplanes being built by the Spanish firm CASA
(Aircraft Construction Campany, Inc). As of now two aircraft have been
sold to Malta and three to Indonesia. [Text] [Ma.drid CANIBIO 16 in
Spanish 2 Dec 79 p 7~
CSO: 31I0
END
i'
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