JPRS ID: 8847 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L~%8847
- 7 January 1980
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NOTE
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JPRS L/8847
, 7 January 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO ~/so)
CONTENTS ' PAGE
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
- FRAI~CE -
Successful Launching of Mirved 'M4 MSBS` Missile
(AIR ET COSMOS, 8 Dec 79) 1
COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
New Wave of Student Radicals Is Core of Green Movement
_ (CAPITAI,, Dec 79) 3
Strauss Campaign Continues To Flounder
(CAPITAL, Dec 79) 7
FRANCE
Soviet Relations With Is1am, Iran Analyzed
_ (Helene Carrere d'Encausse; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
27 Nov-2 Dec 79) 10
PCF's 'L'HUMANITE' Criticized for Czech 'Charter 77' Coverage
~ (LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 5 Nov 79) 13
- Briefs
Labor Minister's Health 15
ITALY -
Budget Minister Interviewed on Inflation, Labor
(Nino Andreatr~a Interview; L'EUROPEO, 15 Nov 79)........ 16
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUd]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
SPAIN ~
~ F.ditorial Sc~res Khomeyni's Actions, Denounces Terrorism
(Editorial, Juan Tomas de Salas; CAMBIO i6, 2 Dec 79)... 20
'CAMBIO' Looks at Effects on Spain From Iranian Crisis .
(CAMBIO 16, 2 Dec 79) 22
Socialist UGT Begins To Disassociate From Communist CC00
(CAMBIO 16, 2 Dec 79) 31
PSOE's Positior. on Navarre,Basque Issue Seen as Ambiguous
(J~se Miguel de Azaola; CAMBIO 16, 9 Dec 79)............ 37
Henri Lew Continues To ChaZlenge PCE's Carrillo -
- (Bernard-Henri Levy Interview; CAMBIO 16, 2 Dec 79)..... 40
UNITED KINGDOM
'THE GUARDIAN' ~upports Negotiations With the PLO
(Editorial; THE GUARDIAN, 14 Dec 79) 47
'FINANCIAL TIMES' Comments on EEC Budget Rejection
(Editorial; TiiE FINANCIAL TIMES, 14 Dec 79) 49
U.S. Niilitary Viewed as Obstacle To Test Ban Treaty -
(Henry Stanhope; THE TIMES, 14 Dec 79) Sl -
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
SUCCESSFUL LAUNCHING OF MIRVED 'M4 MSBS' MISSILE
. -
- Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 8 Dec 79 p 51
[Text] The Ministry of Defense has just announced, in its 29 November .1979
information bulletin, that last July there were three successful experi-
mental launchings of the new French strategic ballistic missiles: "M20
MSBS" [MSBS = two-stage submarine-launched intermediate range ballistic
missile], "M4 MSBS" and "S3 SSBS" ~[SSBS = two-stage intermediaEe range
surface-to-surface silo-launched ballistic missile]. These launchings,
accor~ing to the Ministry of Defense, "indicate the good working order of
the missiles in use and under development for our nuclear forces." Speci-
fically,this is the first time mention has been made of a successful launch-
ing of a mirved "A14 MSBS" missile.
The July taunching of the S3 was a success, marking Lhe final milestone of
developmPnt of the S3 missile with which the installations of the Strategic '
Air Forces of the Plateau d'Albion will soon (between now and 1983) be
equipped. The good results of this test have confirmed the results of
previous experimental launchings. They have enabled favorable conclusions
to be drawn as to tlte operational capabilities of the S3, its equipment and
deployment procedures. � _
An M20 missile, identical to the ones which, from now on, are to be in-
cluded on all missile-launching submarines of the Strategic Oceanic Force,
was launched successfully from a submarine. This test makes more than ten
consecutive successes in launching M20 missiles most of which were launched
from submerged submarines.
The M4 system--an zxtended-range missile with multiple warheads --will be
_ included on the SNLE [ballistic missile-launching nuclear submarines],
beginning in 1985, gradually replacing the M20 system. An M20 missile
with an M4-type warhead was launched so that a study could be made of the
_ reentry into the atmosphere of the multiple heads of the M4 missile. This
� launching, which was preceded by two other experimental launchings in
December and in April to study the spacing and the reentry of the~M4 war-
heads, was successful. This test marlcs an important step in the perfect-
_ ing of the M4 multiple warheads and their guidance system.
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It will be recalled that the Aerespatiale firm is the prime contractor for
the "SSBS" and "MSRS" weapons systems, with the SEP [Etiropean Propellant
Company] in charge of the propulsion systems of the missiles.
COPYRIGHT: Air & (:osmos, Paris, 1979
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- NEW WAVE OF STUDENT RADICALS IS C6RE OF GREEN MOVEMENT
Hamb~irg CAPITAL in German Dec 79 pp 107-108
[Article: "Green Cells--Th~ New Radical Student Movement"]
[Text] The studEnt left tc this day daninates at
most universities. A majority of students, who
- regard even cou~unists and socialists as among
- the established, are turning toward a new radicalism.
Varicolored [environmentalism] is in demand.
In the fall of last year the Institute for Demoscopy in Allensbach
- reported it in pxecise terms: Only one in four students was opposed to
communism. The bottom line: Three out of five students polled expre~ssed
the view thac communism was "sound as an idea" or even that the
- communist couni~ries were superior to the capitalist ones. More ithan
- two-thirds of the million students were as red as can be: a considerable
_ revolutiona*y potential.
The opinion poll appeared to confirm what had~been feared by politicians
- of every stripe as well as by the people, intent on law and order, who
had voted them into office over since the en~ of the public student unrest ~
in 1968; that the coll.eges in the Federal Republic have turned into
foundries of leftwing cadres destined to embark, well educated and
well trained, on their march through the ~stablishment.
But it did not take long for an opposite diagnosis to be announced.
I,ike the West German conference of college presidents, Federal Minister
for Education Juargen Schmude 8aw fit to oppose the "sensationalist
news fxam Allensback" (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU), saying that a different
student poll had just shown that 8f~ percent of the students took a
positive view of parliamentary democracy. -
As a matter of fact, the oppositionist atmosphere at the universities .
is rather weak. An academic brain trust which, as under Herbert Marcuse
or Theodor Adorno in 1968, might render intellectual aid by way of a
_ radical reform of the system is not to be found anywhere. Most professors
who considered themselves promoters of the extraparliamentary opposition
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have gone into internal emigration. But this changes nothing of the
= basic climate. C anpared with the political attitude of the population
as a whole, the political spectrum at the colleges has moved to the
Ieft. The break is also visible in the participation in elections.
_ On the average, 30 percent of atudents participate in electing the
student parliaments--or, in Bavaria, the Student Congress. On the other _
hand, there are also extremes, such as all of eight valid votes--at the
Ruhr Pedagogical College in Dortmund--or a turnout of 66.93 percent--at -
the Zuebeck Medical College.
- Accordingly, the majority is silent, and the young popular front rules.
- No wonder that not only the opposition i.n the Bundestag or the CDU/CSU-
governed La.ender see red cells in the colleges, with the universities in
Bremen, Hesse and Berlin in the lead. Numerous professors, too, complain
about political pressure from the left, with 21 of them submitting proof
of it to the Hesse CDU, citing it as the reason why they were looking for
reaching positions in a difrerent land. From this the CDU put together
a report entitied "Flight of Professors From Hesse." -
There are other more momentous factors, according to the majority of
college professors: a general lack of tolerance, on the one hand, and, -
on the other hand, a bureaucracy which does not leave any time for
rPSearch and teaching any longer. For example, according to Professor
'rIans Baier, who took over the univeraity chair of Theodor Adorno, the Hesse
coll.ege law drafted in 1970 by Ludwig von Friedsburg, formerly minister
of culture, education and church affairs and now professor at the University
of Frankfurt, created intolerable conditions. For this reason, he
wrote, he had accepted a call to Konstanz. All there remained of
Baier's attempt to renew the sociocritical Frankfurt Sociological School
was resignation and flight to more peaceful pastures.
His case therefore could be regarded as confirmation of the following
diagnosis by the Allensbach pollsters: The pressure of opinion from
the left was so strong that the moderates, not to speak of the
conservatives, no longer dared open their mouths. But precisely this
today is no longer completely true. What is certain is *hat the
pohtical racket at the colleges since 1968 has been caused primarily by the
leftists among both students and professors. And it is indisputable that
the majority of the General Student Comm~ttees--student governments,
as it were--are furnished by leftists of varying radicalism.
The one-time ar,nzpotence of the leftists, howpver, is no longer. In 1976
- an administrative federal framework college law was passed, and this
law was used by the Laender for their awn legis lation. This led to new '
complaints. Since that time, professors have complained about growing
administrative burdens, instructors and tutors about the curtailment
_ of their work and research facilities, and atudents fr an left to right
- about the limitation of student self-gvoernment.
Bavaria and Eaden-Weurttemberg, for example, used the elbowroom provided
by the federal law, abolishing the classic student represent~.tion and ~
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replacing it with politically powerless organs. This was not an un-
qualified success, for, whereas the finances of the student representations
can now be checked carefully by the Land government, the students have
not been prev~nted from continuing to vote leftist.
And generally the leftists time after time get together again. Though
increa5ingly being able to claim victories at student elections, the
Christian Democratic Student Ring has not really managed to gain
coalition partners. Stephan Eisel, the chaiYtnan of the organization, ~
- complains "that the Young Socialists of the SPD rather go along with
the Spartakus Marxist Student Zeague, close to the DKP, or with one of
the leftist base groups than with us."
There is no getting around the fact that for the Young Socialists the
class enemy is on the right. Robert Weissmantel, college secretary
on the Young Socialists' federal executive, says: "The differing concepts
about questions of the political mandate of student representatives and in
the question of barring applicants from civil service jobs for political
reasons make a coalition with the Christi.an ~~udents impossible."
The basic political relationships--left power, on the one hand, and right
opposition, on the other--are also stable. Only in one point is there
something like and ideological grand coalition. Both Christian Democratic
and Y~jng Socialist student representatives agree that it will not be
possible in the foreseeable future to raise student political activity
- above che magic limit of 30 percent.
Both groaps also take a similar view of the reason for this: political
abstinence out of anger at college reality. For the study reform, invariably
praised amply by all politicians, has turned into a regimentation
reform. The threat of disqualification because of insufficient
certificates of at*_endance at practical courses and an excess of
- semesters deters students from becoming committed. Qverloaded -
curriculums which, with their rigid routine and thorough organization,
rather resemble high school schedules accomplish the rest. In mass
classes attended by several hundred participants, dialog or discussion
are no longer possible.
The administratively imposed c~nstraint to finish studies quickly has the
appropriate results. Most of the students worry about the minimum of
required education and about the necessary profession. A general study,
such as was still typical for the scholar early in the 20th century,
combined with political commitment, is sheer luxury for them. Nevertheless
such regimented students ~:ill protest--but not in college, according to
an anal~sis by the Mannheim social scientist Willi Buerklin. Buerklin
poin~s to the results of the la test Landtag elections, in which the greens
and caricolorPd scored considerable successes, particularly in university
towns. The second postwar generation, he explains, takes the material
security offered by state and society for granted, while missing the -
realization of nonmaterial values, such as.justice and humanity in politics.
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"This youth," says Buerklin, "has a very refined radical idea of democ:racy"--
which does not meet with an echo in the established parties. Hence its
attitude of protest to vote agains the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP and for
those who seem to correspond to its ideal.
_ To this extent the Allensbach student poll is confirmed indirectly:
the discomfiture about institutions such as parties, gov~~rnment or
colleges is great. Between 60 and 70 percent of the students take this
view. And this is also clear from detailed analyses of election results
in electoral districts with a strong student vote, with up to 70 percent
of the vote going to the greens and varicolored. If this,trend continues,
it looks like there will be a big change over the medium term at the
universities as weil, but with different protagonists. The greens and
varicolored, supported by the now still silent majority, would then be the -
alternative to the established in the student parliaments.
And among the established from this point of view is also the DKP Spartakus
Student League headed by Comrade Uwe Knickrehm.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner -1- Jahr AG & Co.
8790
CSO: 3103
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC GIItMANY
STRAUSS CAMPAIGN CONTINUES TO FLOUNDER
Hamburg CAPITAL in Gennar. Dec 79 pp 16-17
[Article: "Listless--Franz Josef Strauss in the Election Campa ign"]
[Text] Aczually, what he wanted was the right to set
guidelines. Now it turns out that he is developing
neither guidelines nor a comprehensive strategy for the
CDU/CSU election campaign. Franz Josef Strauss, minister-
president in faraway Munich, thinks he is sufficient unto
himself.
In the Salvator Cellar in Munich, Franz Josef Strauss, a native of
Munich, got down to business. The best thing, the CDU/CSU Candidate
for chancellor said jokingly to friends, would be to form such a
large election campaign team as to allow three governments to be tailored ~
from it.
The audience laughed, thinking it a capiCal joke. Only the jokester himself
probably realized that what he had done was to make a serious statement
in the form of a joke. For the problem of candidate Strauss was not
only the question of a possible shadow cabinet but above all the fact
~ that he was supposed to--and wanted to--please too many.
The result is that the allegedly so strong man fran Bavaria, who
actually is a hesitant person, since being nominated by the CDU and
CSU in the Bundestag, by and large has been content just to making a
good impression. If one considers that a year hence he intends long
since to have assumed office as federal chancellor, his activities and
propaganda successes so far have looked rather thin. -
Until the day of his nomination, he thoughts had centered solely on
what his f riends in the CDU Yiked to call his "crutch strategy"--to
reconquer power with the help of a f.ourth party. After his nomination
' these plana had become superfluous. As ever, the CSU squad gathered '
around Strauss had its sights fixed on the scoundrels in the CDU who
had not wanted Strauss to become the candidate.
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Even now the young go-getters gathered around Strauss who were out to make
him chancellor did not, as one might have thought, g o about developing a
CDU/CSU strategy for an electoral victory in 1980 in which everyone was
assigned his place and his task--Ernst Albrecht as well as Helmut Kohl,
Gerhard Stoltenberg as well as Kurt Biedenkopf or Walther Leisler Kiep.
Tailoring an election campaign ertirely to suit the person of Strauss--who,
while hardly having any chance with middle-of-the-road voters who
migh t switch party allegiance, out allegedly appeals to skilled workers
and young people (in Bavaria)--apparently made any major strategi planning
unnecessary but required the candidate t~r chancellor to be equipped with~ -
all rights and all means of power. ConsistenL- with this, the black guard
fram Bavaria claimed for its boss the "right to set guidelines." ~
Zn Konrad-Adenauer-Haus, the CLU headquarters in Bonn, they thought
they had not heard right. Hac? not the same right to set guidelines ~
_ been claimed for Helmut Kohl 4 years before by the then CDU Secretary
General Kurt Fiedenkopf, causing a medium-size earthquake in the CSU?
Thinking better of it, Strauss quickly dropped the plan.
In the months thereafter, however, it turned out that the CDU probably would
not have suffered any particular harm if it had ~ranted the CSU chief the -
right to set guidelines. Nothing was coming out of Bavaria which on~y
remotely looked like guidelines. Instead the people in Munich conr_inued to
to work out formalities, working on the f:ame of a picture that did not
er.ist as yet. The next demand, made by the CSU Land organization head in -
Sonn, Friedrich Zimmermann, was for an election campaign coordin�ator.
Now, there had not been a lack of bodies before which, each and every one,
was supposed to engage in coordination--the presidiums of both parties,
the strategy committee composed of an zqual number of CDU and CSU
members, the almost standing conference of Secretaries General Heiner
Geissler (CDU) and Edmund Stoiber (CSU). If there had been an additional
need for an election campaign coordinator, Kurt Biedenkopf, proposed by
' Zimmerma.nn, anyway was not the right person in the opinion of the CDU.
The result: Another stillborn child.
Instead, 1lowever, two new bodies were created--a committee for considering
election campaign strategy and a committee for drafting an election
platform. The raison d'etre n; both, above all, was to take on a
"northern light"--Schleswig-Holstein Minister-President Gerhard Stoltenberg
~ and Lower Saxon Y?ead of government, and almost candidate�for chancellor, ~
Ernst Albrecht. Another foitn of agreement to support him in the election
campaign, Strauss was unable to wrest from these two gentlemen.
Since the eler_tion campaign team is yet to be added soon to the previous
committees (its task will be, in lieu of a shadow cabinet, to put the
enormous personnel reserves of the CDU/CSU in a favorable light), even
well-meaning people probabl~r will soon again arrive at a di$gnosis of
"committitis." DespiCe the strongest imaginable candidaCe for chancellor, _
Christian Democrats critical of Strauss--with amazement rather than
schadenfreude--are already openly talking about weak leadership.' What may
be contributing to this is the candidate's absence from Bonn. The 1976
candidate for chancellor, Helmut Kohl, at that time minister-president
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in Mainz, almost spent more time in the federal capitai than in the capital
of his Land, thus being able to direct the apparatus of the federal CDU -
office in Bonn. Franz Josef Strauss, on the other hand, having no apparatus
in Bonn, prefers to hold court in the Prince Carl Palace in Munich.
Correspondents who want to hear what he has to say about current issues
have to go to the Isar, since for months Strauss has considered it un-
necessary fo hold a press conference in Bonn. Since his party executive,
too, is located so far away in Munich, the candidate for chancellor has
asked tha t steps be taken to establish a liaison office in the f2deral
capital. In a rented villa in the government district, his former personal
adviser Friedrich Voss and the onetime press chief of tile Munich Olympic
- Games Hans (Johnny) Klzin--both now CSU Bundestag dep~t~es--are to operate
- as their master's voice on the Rhine. As CDU concession chief, the Lower
Saxon Bundestag Deputy Dr Rudolf Sgrung is part of this picture, to in::ure
that the coordination effort of the other committees is not wasted.
So far, however, Che three have bean unable to explain, in a way that would -
have an impact on the public, what Strauss really wants--except, of course,
to become chancellor. Perhaps he thinks that if elected r
rbleo . ~