JPRS ID: 9027 USSR REPORT ENERGY

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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200040020-3 V 1 9 ~ ~ ~ 1 0 F 1. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/8854 9 January 1980 - Latir~ America Re ort p _ - (FOUO 1 /80) I Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 ~ NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals ~.nd books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials frora foreign-language sources are translated~ tt1GSP from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editori~zl reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- _ tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. For further information on report content ca11 (703) 351-2643. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATIGN OF THIS PUBLICATION B~ RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/8854 9 January 1980 LATIN AMERICA REPORT (FOUO i/so) CONTENTS PAGE ARGENTINA Incongruities of U.S. Foreign Folicy Toward Government (Editorial, Mariano Grondona; CARTA POLITICA, Nov 79) 1 Antarctic: Foreign Ambitions, National Sovereignty (Oscas J. Gomez; LA OPINION, 7, 8 Nov 79) 5 CU BA - 'PRENSA LATINA' Scores U.S. Use of Force as Instrument of Pressure (Ivonne Pastor Parra; PRELA, 14 Dec 79) 11 Briefs Chilean Labor Delegation 13 NICARAGUA Arce, Pastora Denounce Plots, Stress Anti-Imperialism ~ (PRELA; 6 Dec 79) ................o.................. 14 National Coordinator Gives Details of Literacy Campaign (PRELA; 10 Dec 79) 15 Brief s Cuba's Judicial System Praised 17 PERU Madrid Paper Gives Chilean View of Nation's Military Might (DEFENSE; Oct 79) 18 VENEZUELA Briefs ' Job Losses 20 - a - [III - LA - 144 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ON'LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' ARGENTINA - INCONGRUITIES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD GOVERNMENT Buenos Aires CARTA POLITICA in Spanish Nov 79 pp 76-77 [Editorial by Mariano Gr~ndona: "It Has a Mane, It Yas a Tail Like a Lion's, But Yet..:"] [TextJ Aside from the goverr~i.~ent, whose acti~ns are at times counterproductive precisely because they are taken by the govern:uent, several private groups have been engaged for eome time in defending Argentina's ~image in the cou*:tries of the North Atlantic, particularly the United States. Thi~ silent but effective campaign is based on the hypothesis that "the" United States is a pluralistic society with infinite variations and that just as some of its representatives _ seem irrevocably committEd to the enemies of our icnage, there are manv public and private sectors open to information and dialog. At times, the pro-Argentina campaign comea in contact with U.S. leaders who, despite being liberals and, therefore, backers of the human rights campaign, have tempered and shaded their views concerning us as a result of data and obaervations, or "experiences" when they visit our country. A visit is the best remedy., because the realities of our countrq lend credibility to pro-Argentine arguments, ~ which they were unfamiliar with. In contrast, it~ also comes into contact with Americans who are further to the right, conservatives or anti-communists or hawks, who are thus in complete and unqu~lified agreement with our arguments. To them, Argentina is not, as it is to the liberals, a country "with extenuating circumstances" in its human rights problems, but a country that was able to struggle and win for the West.. It is not paroled defendant; it ie a hero, a bastion, a model. On whom should we focus our action? On the liberals or the _ conservatives? This is one of the most discreet and moat interesting debates in Argentina today. What we would like to present to our readers on this occasion, however, is a succeasion of experiences that we had with two of t:~e American visitora who have been arriving here to see us close-up and who leave, without exceptions, with a more positive attitude than the one they brought. One of them is a young liberal (a moderate, almost a middle-of-the-roader) with 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY promising political ~rospects in the north. The other is a feiaty, veteran conservative. The same thesis was poaed to the two, and from differing standpoints they both react~d in a way that was ultimately similar. It was that aimilarity, as we wi11 see, that pro:npted this commentary. We were at a frank, lively and intimate gathering with the first of our guests. A longstanding friend for whom I feel admiration and esteem, aside from fondness, presented a vigorously-worded Argentine case against the image campaign in the United States. Several of his arguments impressed our guest. Things as harsh as this were said that night: Argentina is being attacked, among other reasons, because people think that it is a"Nazi" country, and it is thought to be a"Nazi" country because it admitted several refugees from vanquished Germany in the 1940's. Why don't people also remember that a decade prior to that Argentina welcomed hundreds of thousands of persons who were being persecuted by Nazi Germany? Why don't all of these persecuted individuals, who were permanently incorporated into the country, carry weight on the balance scale? And anyhow, what about Werner von Braun? He had invented the "V1" and "V2" that devastated London, and he later played a major role in man's trip to the moon. Did the fact that he went to Florida and not Buenos Aires perhaps make him democratic? Our American guest acknowledged these and many other things to his Argentine companions who were systematically expressing what, deep down, is a feeling of justified indignation. But there was one argument that prampted an objection. When the Argentine presenting the arguments pointed out that a number of the characteristics of the human rights campaign (which embraces victories like the Sandinists' in Nica- ragua and ignores situationa like Cuba's, for example) would lead us to suspect that Marxists might have infiltrated somewhere in the U.S. political and media system, our visitor retorted: "Don't ruin your magnificent plea with this particular argwnent. All you have - to do in the United States is say that there might be Marxists somewhere in the mass media or the goverrnaent, and they'll accuse of yon of being a McCarthyist, and that'll be the end of your plea." Our guest did not tell us that it was "untrue" that cases of "infiltration" could explain some of the attitudea of those who, from what we know, are receiving Argentine terrorists in their offices and attacking our country while remaining silent on Cuba. He told us something much more serious: that mentioning this is taboo, to use American political jargon, and that, therefore, it was inadvisable to expose oneself to the consequences of violating it. This episode could have been regarded as an isolated incident, but a few days later we were in the midst of a special feature interview 2 r FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FGR OFFICIAL USE ONLY with the second ~nerican guest of this story, this time a staunch anti-communist, a?ailitant conservative. After he had explained in full the eroding U.S. pcsition throughout the world vis-a-vis Marxist aggression and commented in depth on the details of the - West's retreat and the injustice of a human rights campaign that punishes anti-communist countries and exempts communist countries, I let him know that the next question would logically concern infiltration: How can we believe that a political system like that of the United States has tak~n the path of "hara-kiri" without believing at the same time that at least some of the men and women , pushing it in this direction are agents from the other side, not just naive, misinformed individuals? Moreove:r, why shouldn't they exist? Is it so absurd to think that coaununiam infiltrates and penetrates its enemies' political systems? This is what he told me in private: "Please don't ask me that question in public. If I tell you what I think, that there is infiltration, they'll call me a McCarthyist. That's what my enemies are waiting for. Once they can accuse me of being a McCarthyist with specific quotes, they'll drive me out of the _ political struggle." This confirmation confronted us with an unavoidable fact: regardless of whether they believe it, regardless of whether they do nat know what they should think of it, Americans "cannot" discuss the - possibility of a Marxist infiltration of the ?.eft-wing of their political system (among the activists in the human rights campaign, in certain media that are particularly militant and c?ne-sided in this area), because if they did so, they would immediately be branded McCarrhyists, with all of the violence of a violated taboo. Our suspicions that there "is" in fact significant infiltration in the system do not stem, moreover, from a mere political deduction, from the common sense argument that when a political system operates in systematic opposition to its interests and friends and in favor of its enennies, someone in that system knows what is going on. They also stem from literature that, despite everything, is beginning to reach an audience. In this regard, we would refer readers to a detailed study by Allen Brownfield that the Council for Inter- American Security has just published in Washington: "The Washington Lobby on Latin America." It contains a list of names that are well- known to us (some of them very big, others that became known through the human rights campaign) and whose links with the U.S. Co~nunist Party and other parallel organizations are minutely detailed. Where thers is smoke...But taking up these accusations would be acting like a McCarthyist. Why?, we might ask. McCarthyism was an exaggeration of a defense mec?~anism that, in itself, was 3 FdR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY perfectly healthy. Americans, however, proceed from trauma to trauma in their political life, and each trauma generates a taboo. Today, they cannot engage in any war because in Vietnam they carried forward their previous ~ietermination to fight in all of them, and they ~ supposedly went to Vietnam because Munich and Pearl Harbor had traumatized them in the opposite direction. Similarly, they now have , a weak president because Watergate brought the trauma and taboo of a strong president. Now, of course, they are suffering the Carter trauma, which will have its own consequencea. Will the reversal of the McCarthy taboo be among them? Only when the silence that they have imposed on themselves in uncovering their real internal and external enemies punishes them with evidence of a disturbing, obvious and intolerable regression, will the McCarthy trauma be fAllowed by trauma "X." With it the eurtain of anti-com~?unism will be lifted once more. Then and only then wi.11 this animal with the mane, tail, claws and head of a lion again be called, surprisingly, a lion. COPYRIGHT: CARTA POLITICA, 1979 8743 CSO: 3010 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~ ARGENTINA ANTARCTIC: FOREIGN AMBITIONS, NATIONAL S(?~/EREIGNTY Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 7, 8 Nov 79 ~ [Article by Oscar J. Gomez: "The Antarctic: Argentina's Frozen Territory"] [7 Nov 79, p. 8] [Text] On 17 September 1979, the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations at the Argentine Foreign Ministry, Commodore Carlos Cavandoli, received cable number . 2836, which originated from Washington and was labeled "urgent." Under the title "The Falkland Islands-Press-Politics-Nortn-Legal," Ambassador Angel Maria Olivieri Lopez was sending the complete text of the speech that he _ was to deliver moments later at the opening session of the Tenth Consulta- tion Meeting, where the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty were awaiting our country's opinion. Signed by the Argentine ambassador to the United States, Jorge Aja Espil, the telegram, which took up three legal-sized sheets of paper, stated in its second paragraph that "It is a secret ta no one that the Antarctic problem has become increasingly complex in our day, as a re- sult of the development of its natural resources that we are jointly under- taking during this stage. This is unquPstionably a challenge, inasmuch as it involves reconciling positions that are not always in agreement, even on basic points, under terms that are satisfactory to all. It would be illusory and futile to embark on such an exercise without always keeping in mind and recognizing the poLitical realities that are at work in this area." The ~ deliberations of this Tenth Consultation Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty were to last 18 days, and it was n.~t in vain that the participating coun- tries, pursuing their geopolitical ~ims, took up the first point on their agenda, the "exploration and development of minerals" on the frozen conti- nent: Parallel to this major ~opic, informal consultations were undertaken on a draft conservation agreement and on an ocean project in the Antarctic. The situation was becoming especially delicate because the signers of the Antarctic Treaty were not recognizing Argentina's sovereign rights in the region. Thus, the dangers lie along a pendulum path charted and regulated by the countries that own the technology needed to undertake projects in the Antarctic region and that possess the capital to bring in th.eir own sources of development, which would trigger a new string of conflicts. 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY There are two aspects to the aforementioned complexity of the Antarctic is- sue that run directly counter to Argentina's interests. On the one hand, there is the refusal to recognize sovereignty, and on the other, there is the underlying intention of the 13 treaty nations to convert the area into a source of natural and ocean resources for their own utilization. The cur- rent efforts of the Foreign Ministry are therefore designed to balar..ce out this difficult mosaic with a view toward the future, because the United States is thinking about applying pressure with one of its last tactics, extending territorial waters in arder to cut off the always-difficult access to natural resources to some and to make it available to others. On the other geopolitical extreme, we must not forget the designs of the Soviet Union, r~hich is going to be after just as much as its powerful rival. Caught in the middle are Australia, Chile, South Africa, Great Britain, - France, Japan, Norway, Belgium and Poland, the other signers of the Antarctic Treaty, along with the FRG, Brazil, and other claimants. Meanwhile, the area that the Argentine Republic is claiming is bounded by the 25th meridian west and the 74th meridian west, the South Pole and the 60th parallel south, and we are the only country claiming sovereignty based on the so-called "sector" theory, which is sim:.lar to the one applied in the Arctic to demarcate frozen surface areas. Moreover, the Argentine Antarctic Sector is marked by the geological continuity of the mainland territory up to the frozen continent. Seven countries have claimed territory in the Ant- arctic, and another country has made claims in the islands near the Antarctic. - They are: Great Britain in 1908 (20� west to 80� west, south of the 50th paraliel south); New Zealand in 1923 (150� west to 160� east); Australia in 1933 (45� east to 160� east); Norway in 1939 (20� west to 45� east, a coastal sector, and it had also claimed the island Peter I); France in 1938 (136� east to 142� east, and the Kergeulen, Crozet, and Amsterdam Archi- pelagoes); Chile in 1940 (53� west to 90� west); South Africa in 1948 (the Prince Edward Islands and Marion); and Argentina in 1957 (25� west to 74� west). Although our country was the last to make claims, we should point out that this was merely a formal declaration made by the government that year, nur- suant to the creation of the Administration of the Territory of Tierra del Fuego, the Antarctic and South Atlantic Islands. In reality, Argentina's claims originate~, with the birth of our country in 1810. Now that we have explained the main characteristics of the Argentine Antarctic sector and how the claims of Great Britain and Chile overlap ours and impair our sov- ereignty, we will take up this issue in the second article of this series. To document the history of this prominent geopolitical issuP, we should men- tion that the current baselines stem from the Antarctic Treaty that was signed in Washington in 1959 and that took effect in 1961. The International Geophysical Year had been held in 1957 and 1958, and 12 countries had worked in the Antarctic, exchanging scientific information that would lay the groundwork for future efforts. Those countries were Argentina, Chile, 6 FO12 OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y ~uo ~ i~u rr~, lM�u.,1 ftlr4Y,~a'laat G~aE&~y! '~Cm'ASAr.9~ ~ H~^� .[QtdtfSlJk� _ [ /iCml ~!~l17 ~QavR~ah'! lOrtll I~ OCfAAO AILCN1k~Q S(p ~~`Qbdl A~rifara ~ ~ ~.~d~oldd.4~; A6o drlbnwr P~ .iiCd~ , � . dGa.9M6~loMS/y ~ ~Qr~~Sv ~ ~ j � ' � 6+is/~Fd/9? ANTAIIfqA MfyOes i ' y~8rnr~QeNaht[a~r . ~ ...3 ~ ~ ~ '~T! AROENTMIA ~4~~ \ w .ro''Bns~drHekaFwbhu `f. '�i, ti, `:i _ ,,~a - . . ~ ' Mapa de A/ejandro ~l?s/o~ CnptT;!ht La Opinl6n. 19i9 f Two claims infringe on our sovereignty. - 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ _ _ _ _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Great Britain,�Norway, France, New Zealand, Australia (territorial claim- ants) and the United States, Japan, Belgium, South Africa and Russia (non- claimants). Under this treaty Antarctica was made a natural laboratory and a w~rld reserve; the life of the treaty was set at 30 years, during which no sovereignt~ would be recognized. [8 Nov 79, p 8] [Text] During 1960, nine countries ~atified the Antarctic Treaty, while three consulting members (Argentina, Australia and Chile) did so in 1961, on the last day of the year, to be exact. The reason was that these are the three countries clai.ming territory that most strongly defended and still defend their claim to sovereignty. Why, then, did Argentina ratify a treaty that ran counter to its stand regarding sovereignty? Argentina would have been ostracized and thus unable to utilize international forums to assert its position; neither would it have been able to prevant other countries from entering its Antarctic sector, and much less could it have declared that it owned these areas. Moreover, the passage of time has shown that to many of the c~untries it is more important to share in the development of their natural resources than to claim a portion of territory. This has a direct impact on the political situation in the Antarctic, inasmuch as seven countries claim large portions of territory, while another six make no such claims but do not recognize the sovereignty of the others either. This entire situation has arisen under the s~-called Antarctic Treaty, whereby 13 nations have jurisdiction over and deal with - the problems stemming from the sector of their agreement. Now then, as we had mentioned in the first article, when the Antarctic Treaty was ratified - and its articles taken as a reference point for interpretation, individual sovereignties in the Antarctic were not recognized. Meanwhile, three of the territorial claimants have overl~.pping claims: Great Britain, Chile and Argentina; and the demarcation of their jurisdictioris has not yet b een resolved. Great Britain has in its favor that four claimants have come out in her support; in turr, there are six treaty signers that have not recognized anyone's sovereignty. As far as the overall political picture is concerned, we should emphasize that the rest of the world's nations (some 150) are not involved in the Antarctic, but they can ask to be associated, although several of them advocate internationalization. In view of the picture that we have outlined, we would have to agree that the word "uncertain" must be attac}ied to our country's future ambitions in the region. The arguments of Great Britain and Chile should, therefore, be of interest because their ambitions are the ones that most affect Argentine sovereignty. According to the Chilean claim, voiced in 1905 by the newsman Fagalde, all of the waters of the Beagle Channel are Chilean, and Argentine jurisdiction _ ends along the southern coast of the large island of Tierra del Fuego and Staten Island. The two countries have taken on the common defense of the _ 8 - FOF: OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY sector, which Great Britain also claims, and have made joint declarations in this regard since 1947. They have thus decided to wait for a better op- ~~ortun i ty to dem:ircntc rhe respectivo s~ctors , liowever, we must a] so t,iko into account Chile's cl~~im of sovereignty in the sector bounded by the 53rd and 60th meridians west. This sector does not stop with the 60th parallel, though; it continues on to the mainland, uninterrupted by the Drake Passage. This, then, is Chile's Antarctic province, with its capital in Puerto Williams on the northern coast of Navarino Island. The eastern part of this claim is based on the Tordesillas Treaty of 1R94, since the western part constitutes South American AntaretiCa, a limit established by the 1927 Reciprocal Assistance Treaty. - To gain a better understanding, on Chilean maps the Cape Horn meridian does = not mark the end of the Pacific Ocean, which extends up to the Southern = Antilles. The British base their claim on the alleged discoveries they made and on the successive explorations that they undertoaic from that point on. Great Britain presented its case in 1955 and accused Argentina and Chile of being usurpers at the International Court Justice. A map attached to the claim shows the territory starting from the SOth meridian west and including the South Georgia and Sandwich Islands. The document is signed by Dr Fitzmaurice, who, incidentally, presided over the Arbitration Tribunal that ruled against Argentina and in favor of Chile in connection with the Beagle problem. There are currently more tl�ian 30 foreign bases in the Argentine sector; Chile has 6, and Great Britain 24. There are also two Soviet bases (Bellingshausen _ ~ and Druznaya). Argentina's claims to sovereignty over the same sector that Great Britain and Chile claim have several grounds. For example, even though the British contend that they discovered the terrxtory in 1819, historians have demonstrated that prior to this, sealer vessels from the River Plate - (the "Spiritu Santo" and the "San Juan Nepomuceno") frequented the frozen continent in the search for marine resou.rces. Moreover, the geographical - continuity of the AndPS mountain range is clear-cut and well-recognized, as is the geographical proximity to our mainland (1000 kilometers). We should also stress that our country has, in fact, occupied the terri- tory since 22 February 1904, when it took over the observatory that had been established on Laurie Island in the Orkneys. It has operated uninter- ruptedly to our day and was 30 years ahead of the next regular base. Lastly, there is the essential issue of heritage. Based on the "Uti possidetis juris," all of the lands that belonged ta Spain and to the Viceroyship of _ the River Plate belong to Argentina. This goes back to the bulls of the 1493 discovery and to the Tordesillas Treaty of 1494. 9 FOIt OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 ~ FC~R OFFtCIAL USE ONLY � 1 w~u n.,�'t ~ ~ ~ 1wr~.w , Q ~Ol1N" ~ ~ ~ . . - - - _ ii _ _ r~wr ~ . . - 5;;;~-:`::~:^?,FE ..l.i:.: .~rw~y!~r:fli:"dic:iii: iiiii'~'~.--'.~=:ii?::~Ei~i: ==CHILf ~ - :~i:u ~~~..`7:~ry~ un~ ~r - :::::a:_..._::::.:.... - - ANGENTINA ~ :~:::"T~ , = - OCfAM~A7lAN/1C~0 _'~IC~~ . ' = _ _ _ I~ ~rr~r ~v , - - _ w~ ' -:=a ~!.�'~eti-~~-- e~~rs. � OCfANOH~IUi/C0 - -'�..~:.~.r�y,~~+~... rMatiw~r w -~~=3 =~=4i.~ ~ytre~.~ 4r ~ - _ : ~ 'VItM~ 7~~lr..~wfr - l: ~:~}iw~awrma~ 4 = a ~ r _ ~w.a.mt d ~AfohodrAl~jondoMobfi4 Chile's theory and its pretensions in our territory. COPYRIGHT: LA OPINION, Buenos Aires, 1979 - 8743 CSO: 3010 10 FOk OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044420-3 FOR OFFICIr~I, USE OD1LY CUBA 'PRENSA LATINA' SCORES U.S. LTSE OF FORCE AS INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE PA142230 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0025 GMT 14 DE~c 79 PA [PL feature by Ivonne Pastor Parra] [Text] The decision of U.S. President James Carter to proclaim the govern- ment's policy which states that positions of force are essential to U.S. national security constitutes in the opinion of analysts a serious threat to the progressive goverriments and to world peace. ' Carter said Wednesday that the U.S. military budget for fiscal year 1981 will be increased by 5 percent and will amount to $157 billion. He added that in the following 5 years, the Pentagon's budget will be increased yearly _ by over 4.5 percent. - The U.S. President affirmed that the foundation of the U.S. "national secur- ity," as in the past, is its military might and claimed that "only from posi- tions of foree" can the Washinoton goverim?ent and nation maintain negotiations with the Warsaw Treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. ~ The 5-year military program submitted by the U.S. head of state at a meet- ing in the White House with U.S. businessmen, representatives of the U.S. industrial military complex, includes the following measures: The reinforcement of strategic forces. (Carter announced the construction in 1980 of Cruise missiles and said "The United States needs a new MX stra- tegic missile capable of attacking many objectives in the territor~ of the Soviet Union.") The reinforcement of strategic submarine forces through the development of "Trident" submarines for the Navy and the Army. The construction of new naval units--aircraft carriers and others--(a mea- sure that will insure, according to Carter, that in 1990 the U.S. Navy will possess 550 warships.) s 11 FOR OFFICIA�,., USE ONl~Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY U.S. military reinforcement in NATO. "Carter stressed that Washington's commitments within the framework of the Alliance continue to be "permanent and changeless." Military reinforcement of U.S. forces in the Pacific. (According to the U.S. President's statements, the U.S. military force in that area insu:es the framework of "mature friendship"--with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand, and he indicated that Washing- ton's allies in Asia and Europe must assume a proportionate responsibility in military expenditures.) - The creation of army and navy "quick reaction" intervention forces to act in ; areas not covered by the military blocs created by the United States. (Car- ter noted that in this respect there are plans for the creation of a new - military transport fleet which will store weapons and provisions for three marine brigades and which will be fo~und in "the aclvanced regions" in which "their services may be required.") The troops participating in U.S. intervention operations in the Caribbean, Africa, Latin America, Asia and Oceania will be transferred by air. (Ac- cording to the U.S. head of state, a new military aircraft transport fleet will be built which, together with the C-130 and 141 Hercules and the C-SA Galaxy, will transfer tanks and other war materiel to intercontinental di- stances.) In his speech Carter also said that "the 1980's will be riotous and un- stable politically, particularly in the area of the developing nations. He claimed that "the United States must be prepared, together with its al- lies, to turn back the threats of political instability." Referring to the current Iranian-U.S. crisis, which has served as a pretext for the Pentagon to expand its military forces in the seas around the Arab- ian oil peninsula, Carter claimed that "these incidents have accutely shown his country's "need for might and unity." "We have learned that it is a mistake to intervene militarily in the inter- nal affairs of another country," Carter said, "but we must understand, he added, that a demonstration of the use of firm power does not imply a po- , tential Vietnam." Observers note that the United States, in an open challenge to world public opinion, which rejects the increase of the arms race and favors interna- tional detente, in 1979 increased its military presence in the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania. - . - CSO: 3010 12 ` FOR OFFICIl~I. USE ONLY . . y:... . ~ , . ~ . . . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY CUBA BRIEFS ~ CHILEAN LABOR DELEGATION--Havana, 8 Dec (PL)--Roberto Veiga, secretary general of the Central Union of Cuban Workers (CTC), has met here with a delegation of the Chilean Trade Union Confederation (CUTCH) in exile. The CUTCH delegation is headed by Executive Committee Chairman Mario Nararro. During the meeting they discussed the labor situation in Latin America and the struggle ~f the Chilean people and workers against Gen Augusto Pinochet's military reg~e. The Chilean delegation also includes CUTCH Vice President Eduardo Rojas, Secretary General Rolando Calderon 3nd representative in Cuba Calvarino Melo. President on the Cuban side were Jesus Escandel, CTC ' executive secretariat member, and Antonio Lopez Lama, chief of the CTC Americas section. [Text] [PA091929 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0031 GMT 9 Dec 79 PAl CSO: 3010 13 FCR OFFICIt~:. USE OPJLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NICARAGUA ARCE, PASTORA DENOUNCE PLOTS, STRESS ANTI-IMPERIALISM Havana PRELA in Spanish 1530 GMT 6 Dec 79 PA [Text] San Jose, 6 Dec (PL)--At a rally held to salute a Nicaraguan _ delegatian that arrived here on an official visit, Sandinist Commanders Bayardo Arce and Eden Pastora denounced the foreign maneuvers being _ plotted against their count*_y. Arce affir'med that the Sandinist leadership is seeking the solidarity of ~ the geoples of Costa Rica, Latin America and the world, who are strug- gling for their freedom in order to advance and overcome all obstacles. He also referred to national sovereignty and dignity, which the Sandinist revolutionary process have turned into one of the most important popular banners. He noted that if any effort is made abroad to impose a single condition on the aid given to Nicaragua, the revolution is willing to abstain from receiving a single dollar. He also stressed the people's broad support for the new Nicaraguan Government's measures. In this - regard, he underscored how the workers en masse have given up their Christmas bonus, thus permitting the formation of an employment fund. Elsewhere in his speech Arce insisted on the anti-imperialist nature of the Sandinist revolution and said the greatest ideals of the revolu- tionary process are aimed at the formation of a new man in Nicaragua. He recalled and highly valued the participation of Costa Rican combatants in the Nicaraguan struggle as well as the broad and significant solidarity shown here to Sandinist revolutionariea. Commander Eden Pastora said the attacks and maneuvers against the Nicaraguan revolution can be explained by the vigor of the measures aimed at the formation of a new man, like Commande~+_- Ernesto Che Gu~vara wanted. "We are being honest when we say the Nicaraguan revolution is anti- imperialist. We remain alert to keep the revolution from being betrayed or interfered with," he stressed. Commanders Arce and Pastora are members of a Nicaraguan delegation that includes Commander Tomas Borge, government 3unta member Alfonso Robelo and Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto. CSO: 3010 ~ 14 � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NICARAGUA NATIONAL COORDINATOR GIVES DETAILS OF LITERACY CAMPAIGN PA102227 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1800 GMT 10 Dec 79 PA [PRENSA LATINA special feature: "Nicaragua: The Second Liberation War"] - [Text] The national literacy campaign has a great so~ioeconomic and poli- tical significance for Nicaragua because it will permit the people's full integration into and participation in the country's social and productive process. For Fernando Cardenal, general coordinator of the national literacy commit- tee, "it means the second war of liberation of the Nicaraguan revolution.'.' In an interview with the new Nicaragua News Agency, Cardenal stressed that the first proclamation of the junta of the government of national reconstruc- tion included among its emergency measures the eradication of illiteracy, the establishment of adult education programs and the organization of an ' educational system in line with the national liberation process. "This struggle was begun from scratch virtually during the first few days of the government," he added.. ' The organization and planning phase in undertaking this task began on 15 Aug- ust. An initial census was conducted and the structures which will permit the campaign to begin in March 1980 have been created. The results of the national census indicate there are 900,000 illiterates out of a population of 1,809,242. This amounts to a general illiteracy rate of 49.6 percent among those over 10, but there are areas where the rate reaches 87 percent. According to the studies undertaken by the national committee, there are 196,570 illiterates living in the urban areas out of a population of 977,923. There are 704,430 illiterates in the rural areas out of a population of 831,319. 15 FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Cardenal said this shows the Somozist dictatorship's marked interest in keeping the people ignorant in oxder to guarantee a supply of cheap and _ semislave labor. This enabled him to control the resources and revenue. - "The elimination of this situation means the liberation of man," the nation- al literacy coordinator stressed. But it is not solely a matter of learning how to read and write. It is also a matter of being politically and ideologically aware, he added. This aware- ness will lead the popular masses to active participation in the national reconstruction and the country's development, Cardenal said. The Nicaraguan man, who for almost half a century has been subjected to oppression and repression, must regain his human dignity, integrity and cul- - tural identity and become part of the goverimnent's overall socioeconomic plans. Cardenal said it is an attempt to break the system of domination through division which the dictatorship had imposed. "Our objective is the integra- tion of the urban and rural areas, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and the re- gions which were neglected for many years. It is also an integration of di- spersed and forgotten cultural elements, folklore and myths." The national literacy coordinator announced that the literacy campaign be- ginning in March will also be used to gather accounts of the insurrection with the cooperation of the culture ministry. "This will enable us to learn about the complete history of our people's struggle in the most remote places." - CSO: 3010 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NICARAGUA BRIEFS CUBA'S JUDICI.~I, SYSTEM PRAISED--Judges of the Supreme Court and the Superior Labor Court w zo visited Cuba recently have stated here that they are very impressed witi the good judicial system in that country. Humberto Solis Barker, president of the Superior Labor Court told the press yesterday that the Cubans are very advanced and have a good ~udicial system. The Cuban judicial system, he added, is a guarantee for the citizens as well as for state institutions. The president of the Superior Labor Court said that he and his companeros have acquired a positive experience in Cuba "which we feel has helped us in our idea of what a revolutionary judicial structure in line with the present needs of our people should be like." For his part, Judge Hernaldo Zuniga Montenegro said, "The Cuban legislation does not ex- clude the existence of a limited form of private property and this contri- butes to the economic and revolutionary progress of the Republic of Cuba." Zuniga Montenegro and Solis Barker returned from Cuba on Tuesday where they stayed for several days accompanied by judges Roberto Arguello Hurtado, Aquiles Centeno Perez and Santiago Rivas Haslam. The other Nicaraguan Supreme Court members--Rodolfo Robelo Herrera, Rafael Cordoba Rivas and Vilma Nunez de Escorcia--left for Havana on the same day. [Text] [PA100112 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1507 GMT 9 Dec 79 PA] CSO: 3010 17 FOR OFFICII~L USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PERU MADRID PAPER GIVES CHILEAN VIEW OF NATION'S MILITARY MIGHT Madrid DEFENSE in Spanish Oct 79 pp 69-70 [Text] Peruvian and Chilean Military Might _ The Chilean Government is accelerating its strategy in the face of the military might of Peru which has 13 divisions, 953 tanks, 80 ships and 568 planes of every kind. According to Peruvian sources, "Peru~s military potential presents a threat not only to Chile but to peace in the southern cone of Latin America." The sources said among the 24 countries in Ibero- America, Peru is second in spending per soldier annually and fifth in in- vestments in arms, supplied to a large extent by the Soviet Union. General Mercado, Peru's minister of foreign affairs under former President Velasco Alvarado, recently said that for the first time in the last 100 years, "we have succeeded in eliminating the strategic imbalance that al- ways favored Chile.�' For this reason, Pinochet's government has found it- self forced to adopt "a defensive military policy, mining its border zones," according to Mercado. Still according to Chilean sources, the Peruvian land army has 13 divisions, 9 of which are infantry, 2 cavalry, 1 paratroopers and another commandos specializing in jungle guerrilla warfare. It also has six battalions of engineers and artillery with 75 mm, 105 mm, 130 mm and 155 mm cannons, and four reconnaissance squadrons with 580 armored vehicles made in the United States. The complement of tanks the Peruvian army has is impressive: 950 in all, 733 of them acquired from the Soviet Union, 140 from France and only 80 from the United States. Of those made in Russia, 33 are T-54 tanks, 400 are T-55's and 300 are T-62's, the most perfect model, weighing 37 tons with 115 mm cannons. Peru leaned toward the Soviet T-55 which cost 130,000 dollars each. Between Russian and French tanks, the Peruvian army has spent some 200 million dollars. As for its naval strength, the Peruvian n.avy has a total of 80 ships, 30 helicopters and 12 antisubmarine missiles. The ships include four destroy- ers--two with 16 rockets each--two escort destroyers, 12 frigates, 3 cruis- ers, 2 corvettes, 9 patrol boats, 7 gunboats, 30 landing craft, 8 torpedo boats, a mine layer and 8 submarines. 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240040020-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Notable among the air force`s 568 planes are the 140 French Mirage aircraft. Four other squadrons have 12 U.S. F-86 planes and three others have 10 Hunter F-52 pursuit planes. Moreover, the Soviet Union sold Peru some 60 planes of all kinds in addition to 18 Mig-21 and ground-to-air missiles. The Peruvian armed forces comprise some 60,000 men and Chile's about 75,000. Both countries figure among the world's top 30 with a per capita income of between 500 to 2,000. Chile's is higher with 1,100 dollars income per per- son per year, while Peru's is not quite 800 dollars. ~ Of the 24 Ibero-American countries, Peru, with a population of 15 million, is in 15th place among those with the highest military spending, 422 mil- lion dollars annually, after Brazil (107 million population and 1,872,000,000 dollars), Argentina (26 million population and 800 million dollars), Mexico (60 and 581), Venezuela (13 and 569). Chile is seventh with a population of 11 million and 300 million dollars. As for the annual spending per soldier, Venezuela is the first country in Ibero-America with 13,000 dollars and Peru the second with 7,356 dollars. Brazil, 7,370; Mexico, 7,085; Trinidad-Tobago, 6,000; Argentina, 5,970, and Chile is in seventh place with 4,110 dollars. New.Missile Frigate The Peruvian navy has incorporated into its fleet a new missile frigate built in an Italian shipyard and which, according to the official version, "is considered the most advanced of its kind in the Latin American coun- _ , tries navies. The one that came into E1 Callao, the first Lima port, last 7 September was christened "Villa Visencio," in honor of one of Peru's naval heroes in the war with Chile 100 years ago. With this vessel Peru's navy increases its power and efficiency to fulfill its national protective mission of national security in the first line of defense, which is the sea. The frigate has been called "extremely modern and sophisticated"; it is armed with missiles, rocket launchers, torpedoes and rapid-fire can- nons, besides carrying antisubmarine helicopters. Among the main charac- teristics of the ship, it has a 2,500-ton displacement, is 112 meters long, has a beam of 12 meters and a complement of 150 men including officers and crew. COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A., Madrid 1978 11937 CSO: 3010 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 PPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 STATINTEL APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3 STATINTEL