JPRS ID: 9038 CHINA REPORT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040031-1
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8864
14 January 1980 , Near East/North Africa Report
(FOUO 2iso)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8864
14 January 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 2/so)
CONTENTS
ALGERIA
PaGE
Algerian-Soviet Cooperation in Technology, Economic Matters
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERFtANEENS, Q Nov 79) 1
Air Algerie Expanding Its Equipment, Operations
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR,ANEENS, 16 Nov 79) 5
Briefs
_ Algerian-GDR Joint CoTnnittee 8
Agreement With Jamaica 8
, I,oan to SONATRACH 8
Loan to SONELEC 9
Cooperation With Madagascax 9
Jijel Port Traffic 9
Cooperation With Benin 9 -
I,EBANON
Economic Blockade Revivec Speculation About Paxtition
(AL-WATAN AL-'AR.A.BI, 22, 28 Nov 79) e..... 10 `
Brothers Vie for Zeadership of Phalangist Paxty
(AL-WATAN AIr-'ARABI, 22-28 Nov 79) 16
- MAURITANIA _
Nation's Withdrawal From Sahara I,eaves Dangerous Void
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFR_?QUE, 28 Nov 79) 22
MOROCCO
Effects of Wax on Economy Discussec
(Francisco Vergaxa; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Nov 79) 25
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOliO]
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^ CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
TUNISIA
Belgian-Tunisian Cooperation To Develop in Several Areas
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI'i'ERRANEEDiS, 2 Nov 79)
27
New Postelectora-1 Changes Viewed
(P.bdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE,, 21 Nov 79)
29
-
Brief s
31
Priority to Irrigation
31
Saudi Loan
31
Zoan Form BAD
Medical Cooperation With PRC
32
Solar Energy Seminax
32
32
Saudi Loan for COFIT
32
Contract With French Firms
STIA-RVI Agreement -
- 32
New Ports
33
UNITED AftAB IIMIRATES
ty
UAE Is Concerned About Federal Assimilation, Gulf Secur:L
34
(AL-WATAN AL-'AR.ABI, 30 Nov-6 Dec 79) 0008009000000000
WESTERN SAHARA
Qperation 'Ouhoud' Unlikely To Attain Military Objectives
(Hassen Zenat,i; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 Nov-9 Dec 79)
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ALGERIA
ALGERIAN-SOVIET COOPERATION IN TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC MATTERS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 pp 3009, 3010
[Article: "Algerian-SovieC Cooperation Extends to Various Sectors of Tech-
nology and the Economy"]
[Text] The ceremonies of the 25th anniversary of the initiation of the armed
revolution of 1 November 1954 included a sizable military parade in Algiers,
all the more noticed as there had been none of them for the previous 10 years. -
- The commentators did not fail on this occasion to note the Soviet origin of
most of the materiel outfitting the Algerian army and to stress the scope
of Soviet military cooperation in Algeria.
In the civilian sector Soviet cooperation certainly does not have this quasi-
exclusive nature. Rather, Soviet cooperation is in competition with that of
several industrialized countries, of the East as well as of the West, without
having pre-eminence. Soviet cooperation is however sufficiently important and
diversified for economic, scientific, technical, or social events to often
recall its existence. Thus, last week, in connection with the agreement for
the-supply of alumina which Algeria signed with Jamaica, we had to mention
the cooperation agreement signed by Algeria with the USSR in 1976 for the
building of an aluminum plant at M'Sila (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS [MTM] of 2 November 1979, p 2942).
An over-all survey of Soviet-Algeriar. technical-economic cooperation was made
by Andrey Slivinsky, counselor for economic affairs at the USSR embassy in
Algeria, and released by the local office of the Novosti press agency on the
occasion of the 16th International Fair of Algiers in September 1979. We
reproduce below this interesting document almost in its entirety.
Soviet-Algerian cooperation is premised on an intergovernmental basis whose
principal instrument is the Permanent Intergovernmental Soviet-Algerian Com-
mittee for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation (established on
7 March 1969). The resolutions approved by this organ find their embodiment
in the concrete realizations of Soviet-�Algerian cooperation.
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In accordance with intergovernmental agreements, draft agreements, and ottier
documents, the Soveit Union lends Algeria its economic ahd technical assistance
in construction, the expansion and reconstruction of nearly 100 different
projects involving several fields of the Algerian economy among which the
piincipal ones are the following: Iron and steel, mechanical construction,
the chemical and gas industry, geological prospecting, hydraulics, agriculture,
the training of Algerian cadres, and public health.
Iron and steel holds the most important place in the technical cooperation
between the two countries. The E1 Hadjar complex built with the assistance
of the USSR is an excellent illustration of same, the annual capacity of one
converter plant totaling 1.1 million tons. Projects anticipating the increase
of this plant's annual capacity to 2 million tons of steel are being completed.
The first of the projects falling within the framework of the expansion of
E1 Hadjar--the rolling mill with a capacity of 540,000 tons of rolled steel
a year--was started up in 1978. The exploitation of other units of the plant
will enable Algeria to hold one of the leading places in the iron and steel
sector in Africa.
With the assistance of Svoiet organs a number of units in the mining sector
were built and put into service: The Algerian "Ismail" mercury plant whose
production is more than twice that of the plan (317 tons of inercury a year)
and thanks to which Algeria is now one of the leading producers and exporters
of inercury; the lead-zinc buddle at E1 Abed, the only mining industry enter-
prise of its kind in the country.
In the energy field the Annaba III ttiermal power plant which plays the prin-
cipal role in the electric energy supply of the eastern regions of Algeria is
the most important project of Soviet-Algerian cooperation in this field.
The plate glass unit in Oran is the only producer of sheet glass in Algeria.
Its products are greatly appreciated in Algeria.
The Soviet Union also lends its technical assistance to Algeria in prospecting
and exploration of primary metal and refracLory materials, rare metals,
celestite, and other minerals as well as of underground water tables.
Nineteen Soviet facilities were involved in oil and gas drilling projects.
In hydrology 170 water wells were bored with the assistance of specialized
Soviet organs and four dams with a total capacity of 8.5 million cubic meters
were built--enough to irrigate 2,000 hectares of land.
Education is another sector where Soveit-Algerian cooperation has yielded
excellent results. Three advanced schools were opened with Soviet assistance.
Thay have trained 5,000 highly qualified engineers and technic,ians. Thirty
other schools Qf profession.al tra.ining are operating in the country. These
schools, established with Soviet aid, have turned out more than 18,000 skilled
workers for the Algerian economy during the years nf cooperation.
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In the field uf public health Soviet-Algerian cooperation has grown consider-
ably. Today nearly 500 Soviet physicians are working in 40 haspitals in 30
Algerian cities. In 1978 alone they cared for more than 2 million Algerinn
' citizens in dispensaries., hospitalized 200,000 pa':ients, and performed
120,000 operations.
Soviet-Algerian technical-ecenomic cooperation involves all fields as can be
seen. It is growing successfully and has good prospects. New trends have
appeared in the past few years: The construction of the complex o� heavy
mechanical construction pZants, metallurgical aluminum units, enPrgy prejects,
and the construction of rant:al housing.
Numerous and Significant Examples
The NOVOSTI press agency followed Andrey Slivinsky's article with a few
examples slated to illustrate the joint efforts of Algeria and the USSR.
,-~.�~Iron and steel.--The metal complex of E1 Hadjar is the principal project of
Soviet-Algerian cooperation in this field. It is the leading industry in
Algeria. The core of the complex is the iron and steel mill built with Soviet
assistance and which produces 410,000 tons of steel a year, that is, 10 times
more than Algeria was producing in a year before its'-independence. The putting
into service of tht sec_nnd stage of the plant will have special imporiance,
for it will make it possible to increase production fivefold. By virtue of
that fact Algeria will be one of the top-ranking countries in Africa in terms
of development of the, iron and steel sector. Let us note that the share of
the S-oviet Union's participation in the establishment of capacities for various
_ types of production is 100 percent for coke, 70 percent fo.r cast iron, 93 per-
cent for steel, and 45 percent for rolled steel.
Geological prospecting.--Soviet experts have contributed to the establish-
ment of the national geological service of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria. As a result of joint efforts, doaens of new deposits have been
explored. Many of them are already being exploited or are about to'be so.
Among them are mercury deposits,--estimates of whose reserves are not being
increased sixfold--zinc and lead deposits, baryta deposits, and those of
antimony, wolfram, and other useful minerals. Promising supplementary pros-
pecting has been undertaken in the zones of already Exploited deposits. This
has made it possible for mining enterprises on the point of closing for lack
of reserves to resume profitable operations.
Nonferrous metallurgy.--The putting into service of the "Ismail" mining oper-
ation with Soviet assistance has made Algeria one of the largest producers
of inercury. In the village of EZ Abed located in the extreme westerly region
of the country a lead enrichment plant with a capacity of 2,000 tons of ore
a day was built. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, an agreement was signed
between the ITSSR�and Algeria bearing on cooperation in the construction of an
aluminum plant at M'Sila with an annual capacity of 140,000 tons susceptible
to be increased to 300,000 tons. New horizons are also being discovered on
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this score in bilateral economic relations with the drafting by Soviet entities
of a technical-economic report on the development of the nonferrous metallurgy
of Algeria. ,
Oil and gas industry.--For more than 10 years there has been cooperation be-
tween the two parties in this very important branch of the Algerian economy,
the branch supplying enPrgy and petrochemical items and providing Algeria
with the largest amount of its foreign exchange. Soviet experts of SONATRACH
have organized prospecting projects in geology and oil and gas deposits in
Algeria's Sahara and Atlas regions.while Soviet oil workers participate di-
rectly in improving the deposits. A large amount of Soviet equipment has
been shipped to SONATRACH, including about 20 powerful pieces of boring
equipment for drilling for oil at great depth.
Hydraulics and agriculture.--Within the framework of Soviet-Algerian cooper
ation,:.Plans for about 20 irrigation dams have been drafted and four dams have
been built making possible the regular irrigation of fertile lands in the
mountainous Kabylie region. The important work accomplished in the field of
water distribution by the Algerian organs with the active assistance of Soviet
hydrogeologists has made it possible to use the immense reserves of fresh
water located under the sands of the Sahara.
Training cadres.--The National Institute of Petroleum, Gas, and Chemicals has
been in operation for more than 10 years in the city of Boumerdes. A sizable
group of Soviet professors has been teaching 2,500 Algerian students. The
diploma-holders of the Boumerdes school (and they already number more than
2,000) now lend their assistance throughout Algeria. There is another
national institute in Boumerdes--that of light industry. Also established
with the assistance of the USSR, it almost entirely meets the needs in skilled
specialists of the textile, footwear, and food industries of Algeria. There
has been added to the advanced and secondary systein of Algeria--again with
the assistance of the Svoiet Union--a mining-metallurgical institute in Annaba
where cadres intended to be assigned to the rapidly developing metallurgical
and mining industries, and for geological prospecting, are being trained.
Let us add to that, the NOVOSTI agency went on, more than 20 technical-
professional centers wth a contingent of several thousand students and we
shall have an idea of the considerable aid provided by the Soviet Union in
solving the problem of cadres training, so important for Algeria. In the
recent past the institutes and technical schools set up and operating within
the framework of the cooperation program between the two countries have grad-
uatied some 5,000 engineers and technicians while the study centers have
turned out more than 18,000 foremen and skilled workers.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
2662
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ALGERIA
AIR ALGERIE EXPANDItdG ITS EQUIPMNT, OPERATIONS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 pp 3197,3198
[Article: "Air Algerie Has Expanded Its Network, Fleet, and Traffic Con- ~
sideralby"]
[Excerpts] The existing network of the national comp?.ny Air Algerie [Algerian
Airline] has reached close to a total length of 83,000 km of which 13,000 km
represent domestic lines. The airline calls at 51 cities of which 20 are
in Algeria, involving mainly the large cities of the north and south.
At present the basic equipment of the Air Algerie fleet consists of 19 superjet
aircraft and one turboprop plane in addition to small aircraft slated for
agricultural work (14 Grumman planes) and commercial activity (18 Beechcraft
planes). It should however be noted that considering its traffic which is
constantly increasing and before launching its new program for the expansion
of its means of exploitation the Algerian airline chartered during 1978 three
Boeing 707-320 planes including one cargo version while in 1979 it chartered
one Boeing 747 and three DC-8's.
Marking time in the first 5 years following the nationalization of Air Algerie,
beginning in 1969 the passenger traffic witnessed remarkable growth in the
sense that there was an unprecedented increase in the number of passenge'rs
using Air Algerie.
First Development Plan (1970-73): 3,314,322 passengers including 3,097,094
passengers on the regular lines (1,007,512 of these in domestic traffic).
Second Development Plan (1974-77): 7,000,000 passengers of whom 6,321,542
passengers on the regular lines (2,785,601 of these in domestic traffic).
1978: 2,411,682 passengers of wham 2,161,962 passengers on the regular lines
(1,116,157-passengers, or 49 percent, in domestic traffic).
It should be mentioned in this cor.nection, the company notes, that the fares
applicable for domestic destinations are modest and have not been increased
for more than a decade.
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A unique means of promoting trade, Air Algerie has assum ? an increasingly
important role in freignt transportation. From 14,928 tons during the First
4-Year Plan for 1970-73, the latter rose to 65,672 tons during the Second Plan
for 1973-1977. On its part the year 1978 saw the transportation of 25,628
tons of freight and for the year under way a projection of a minimum load of
24,687 tons is made.
At the present time a regular freight network is in existence in addition to
possibilities of charter flights serving several large cities such as Paris,
Marseilles, Lyons, Brussels, Geneva, London, Rome, Frankfurt, and Madrid.
Full-time employment and the promotion and training of workers have con-
stituted the cornerstone of personnel policy at Air Algerie from the start
of Algeria's independence. Whereas in 1965 foreigners "still held certain key
positions in the company, the Algerianization of the personnel is today in
process of completion: Out of 5,703 employees 5,523 are Algerians, that is,
97 percent of the total (f igures effective as of August 1979).
The breakdown of operating personnel was as fol.lows in August 1979: Pilots,
_ 81, including 51 Algerians; copilots, 121, including 116 Algerians; mechanics,
31, including 28 Algerians; conveyor belt operators, 6 Algerians; radio oper-
ators, 2 Algerians; noncommercial positions, 393 Algerians.
In connection with its passenger and freight transport operations, Air Algerie
has been active in the agricultural-industrial sector since 1974 through the
DTA [Directorate of Air Projects]. This directorate is charged with providing
diversified air services and notably services of an agricultural nature, the
evacuation of patients, and the transport of light freight or small groups
of passengers.
To accomplish these missions the DTA has a fleet of 18 Beechcraft and 14
Grumman planes used in the industrial sector in the case of the former (air
taxi and ambulance, permanently available on call for Algerian companies) and
in the interest of the Ministry of Agriculture in the second case.
About 80 Algerian pilots and highly qualified personnel insure the operation
of the aircraft which, in the year 1978 alone, logged 5,755 flight hours on
account of industrial activities and covered 161,000 hectares of agricultural
land in connection with the agrarian revolution.
Considering the strategic role of transportation facilities in nation-building,
Air Algerie has assigned itself as its principal tasks the following: The
extension of its network through the opening of new lines to towns of the
Algerian hinterland that are not yet endowed with air service and countries
that are truding partners of Algeria; the expansion of its fleet by the
acquisition of new aircraft adapted to its network (the use of large-capacity
aircraft on high-density traffic lines is anticipated); pursuit of the training
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program to complete the Algerianizati_on policy relating to technical flying
personnel and ground technical personnel; and finally increased assistance to
the agricultural-industrial sector in orcler that it may fully participate in
the agrarian and industrial revolutions.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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ALGERIA
BRIEFS
ALGERIAN-GDR JOINT COMMITTEE--Mourad Castel, general secretary at the Algerian
Ministry of Heavy Industry, held talks in Berlin on 23 October 1979 with
Horst Soelle, minister of foreign trade of tha German Democratic Republic.
The talks bore on the growth of economic cooperation 'Lletween the two countries.
Mourad Castel had arrived that same day at the head of a delegation in order
to participate in the second session of the working group on industrial co-
operation of the joint committee for econornic, L-echnical, and scientific
cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
2 Nov 79 p 2941] 2662
AGREEMENT WITH JAMAICA--Under the terms of an agreement signed in Algiers on
29 October. 1979 by Richard Fletcher, Jamaican minister of planning, and
Mohamed Liassine, Algerian minister of heavy industry, Jamaica will supply
to Algeria anuuall} 150,000 tons of alumina for 10 years. These shipments
are slated to supply the propspective electrolysis plant at M'Sila 250 km
southeast of Algiers. A draft agreement for this purpose had been signed in
Algiers on 8 February 1978 (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS [MTM] of
17'February 1978, p 532). It will finally be recalled that under the terms
of a cooperation agreement signed in Moscow on 27 April 1976 by Belaicl
Abdesselam, at that time Algerian minister of industry and energy, the USSR
must build at M'Sila an aluminum plant with an annual production capacity of
140,000 tons of aluminum (see MTM of 7 May 1976, p 1206). [Text] [Paris
MAP.CHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov iy p 2942] 2662
LOAN TO SONATRACH--The National Company for the Transport and Marketing of
Hydrocarbons has just borrowed U.S. $SOQ million on the international capital
market. The loan and guarantee agreement was signed in London on 24 October
1979 by Mr Benguerra, representing SONA1'RACH, and Mahfoud Aoufi, president-
general manager of the Algerian Development Bank on one hand and by the
representatives of a banking consortium headed by Citicorp International Bank
Limited on the other. It is noted in Algiers thst "this loan of $500 million
granted for a period of 10 years including a 4-year grace period and bearing
an interest rate 1 percent above that of the LIBOR [London Interbank Offered
Rate], evidences the trust which the major banks place in Algeria's develop-
ment." This financing, which bears on projects included in SONATRACH's in-
vestments budget for 1979, is the largest loan in Eurocurrencies ever granted
to SONATRACH. The major sponsors of the loan are the following: Abu Dhabi
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Investment Company, Arab Investment Cc+mpany, Arab Petroleum Investments
Corporation, Bank of America International LImited, Chase Manhattan Limited,
Citicorp International Group, Continental Illinois Limited, Gulf International
Bank/United California Bank, Midland Bank Limited, National Westminster Bank
Limited, Societe Generale, and The Sumitomo Bank Limited. [Text] [Paris
rIARCHES TROPZCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 29421 2662
LOAN TO SONELEC--A loan of U.S. $20 million was granted by a consortium of
international banks represented by the Banco Arabe Espanol SA (Aresbank)
(Arab-Spanish Bank] to SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture
and Installation of El.ectrical and Electronic Equipment]. This loan, under-
written by the Algerian Foreign Bank, is slated to cover the purchases of
equipment necessary for the start-up of a telephone complex which has just
been built in the Tlemcen region with the cooperation of a Spanish firm.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3011]
2662 COOPERATION WITH MADAGASCAR--Mohamed Ben Yahai, Algerian minister of foreign
affairs, and his Malagasy opposite number, Christian Remi Richard, signed
in Algiers on 4 November 1979 an economic cooperation agreement between
Algeria and Madagascar. "This agreement falls within the framework of the
- strengthening of the relations of friendship and militant solidarity linking
the two countries. Furthermore, it constitutes a new milestone in the de-
velopment of bilateral cooperation and has again concretized the resolve of
the Algerian and Malagasy Presidents affirraed at the time of their latest
- meetings in r4onrovia and Havana to provide a decisive impetus to this cooper-
ation," APS wrote, commenting on the signature of this agreement. [Text]
[Paris MEIRCHES TR:fPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Frei:^i; 16 Nov 79 p 3198] 2662
JIJEL PORT 1'RAFFIC--From year to year the operations of the port of Jijel _
have shown a substantial reactivation. The port traffic in this eastern
.
coastal region of Algeria has had a tendency to increase, especially since
the upgrading of Jijel to the rank of "wilayah" [governorate]z the APS noted.
It added that in 1978 109 vessels flying various flags docked in this port.
Their total reached 92,396 tons compared to 70,000 tons in 1977. Imports--
consisting mainly of cement, semolina, clay, leather, and miscellaneous
equipment--aggregated 239,556 tons of which 121,673 tons represented semolina
and 115,254 tons cement. Exports involved cork for the most part, 5,428 tons
of this product being shipped to the Soviet Union, the major purchaser. The
port of Jijel, which has only two docking stations, is now in the midst of ~
extension and improvement operations. In future it coill be able to accomo-
date five vessels of 8,000 tons each. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 31981 2662
COOPERATION WITH BENIN--An economic and financial cooperation agreement was
signed in Cotonou last week at the conclusion of the meeting of the third
joint Algerian-Beninese committee. It calls for a sizable increase in the
volume of trade between the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 29421 2662
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LEBANON
ECONOMIC BLOCKADE REVIVES SPECULATION ABOUT PARTITION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22, 28 Nov 79 pp 24-26
[Article: "Number of Small States Almost Grew by One in Definance of
Franjiyyah's Blockade; Lebanese Band Sounds the Partition Beat"]
[Text] The partition tune is being heard again. The small, independent _
Lebanese states came close to having another small state that would have been controlled by the Lebanese Front. Why? This is because the northern
state imposed a.n economic and an oil blockade on the central state, whereas
the state of Ba'abda remained neutral.
Everything is ready for proclamining the divided state. "Legal, ""cons ti-
tutional," financial, legislative, administrative, security and cultural -
measures ancl all the articles that derive therefrom are now ready for imple-
mentation with a degree of efficiency that cannot be ignored. These mea-
sures will be carried out when the time is suitable for making a specific
political decision in that regard.
The aforementioned political decision must be made by the political leader-
ship of the Lebanese Front, and it should then be supported by a military
decision made by the military command which is controlled by al-Shaykh ~
Bashir al-Jumayyil. This is in accordance with the political decision of
President Camille Sham-um.
The argument which partition advocates offer as an excuse for going back
with such vehemence and urgency to a discussion about partition and the
proclamation of "independent entities" l:.es in the measures of the eco-
nomic blockade that President Sulayman Franjiyyah imposed on the areas
of the Lebanese Front in Jabal Lubnan because of the intransigence of
the Phalangists and their refusal of a11 efforts that were made to
settle the question of those who had been kidnapped in the Cedars area
and also because of the conditions they imposed for negotiating this
matter.
- During the last 2 weeks Lebanon came very close to a catastrophe, and it
did come close to facing a proclamation of the establishment of a sectarian
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entity independent of the Lebanese state whose borders would extend from
the eastern area of Beirut to the borders of the areas of Bsharri, Tripoli,
and Zharta in the north. This entity would include a section of the 'Alayh
Hills, of northern al-Matn, of Kasrawan, a section of Jubayl, a section
of the Batrun territories, in addition to the coastal strip that extends
from the port of Beirut and the port of Jiniyah till the private ports in
the area of Jubayl.
A map of this partition was presented at a joint meeting that was held by
the leaderships of the Lebanese Front an,i the United Militias Force 2 days
before al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil unexpectedly entered the Hotel Dieu
Hospital.
Geography experts affiliated with the front drew red lines on this map to
define the general borders of the aforementianed independent entity.
Partition is Reply to Blockade
Then there was a sharp debate around this subject in which it was said that
President Sulayman Franjiyyah was in agreement with the legal authority and
the Syrian government about tightening the economic scraws on the areas
of the Lebanese Front for the purpose of eliminating its influence. One
can acquiesce to anything except the fact that thP oppor?'unity be made
available to such a plan which would create an econ social
tion that would destroy all the influence and the power
Front had built in its own areas.
Some of those who were present asked if the proclamation of the estab-
lishment of an independent entity will be a final proclamation of sepa-
ration from the Lebanese state or whether it will merely be a temporary
measure that would be revoked when the reasons that had led tfl it cease
to exist.
The reply was [as follows]: when this step is announced, it may be said
that it was merely a temporary measure and that it would ceas e to exist
when the reasons that required it cease to exist. The measure may continue
- in fact until all the trends of the Lebanese crisis become clear. There
- is nothing to prevent the actual and the continued implementation of this
measure until these trends do become clear. This measure cnay be the
actual alternative to the existing regime and to the status quo that
- is sanctioning the new formula of the Lebanon of the future.
In the face of the wave of immoderation that prevailed over the meeting,
Camille Sham-un and Pierre al-Jumayyil found themselves compelled to
agree to the proposed suggestions and to ask that [officials] wait for a
suitable time to announce the dec3sions.
According to their point of view, and this is based on what their circles
stated, world public opinion would not accept partition in this sense t
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simply because gas delivery to one of the areas was interrupted. Parti-
tion in its deep sense requires justifications that would be more convinc-
ing to world public opinion than the mere interruption of gas delivery to
one of the areas or to one of the streets.
Retaliatory Measures
Extremists responded to this logic by saying that when such an economic
blockade is,imposed on the eastern areas, it is no longer important what
method must-lie-:used to convince public opinion of the partition. Wars in
the world.bpgqn and:continued for economic reasons, and when a person is
given. a ctioice betiteen diplomatic means, self-determination, life and
death, the rhoice he'makes would be one that favors his own life rather
than any othet'.consideration.
Responding to this statement Sham'un and al-Jumayyil said that they did
not totally reject this logic and that they did support it since it was
inevitable that the eastern areas would arrive td it sooner or later. But
Sham'un and al-Jumayyil emphasize the importance of choosing the sui.table
time. This, in fact, does not prevent confronting the economic blockade
operation with vengeful measures which in any case need not come to the
- point of announcing partition. _
This was the trend before the Lebanese Front resorted to its vengeful
measures of interrupting water and electricity [services] and flour
[deliveries] to al-Shamal and to the western areas of Seirut.
There caas a sharp dispute around these points; it ended with Ea decision
to] postpone investigation of this subject to a subsequent session. Then
al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil had a heart attack that required his hospi-
talization. It was said that he prolonged his convalescence so he could
contribute to changing the atmosphere of urgency that was putting
pressure on him to proceed in implementing decisions that he himself
neither approved of nor endorsed, at least not iinder these circumstances.
The militias of the Lebanese Front did, however, carry out a significant
portion of the disciplinary decisions. During the past week they imposed
restrictions on exporting wheat and flour to the western areas ' ind to
al-Shamal, especially since they control the wheat transport routes from
the granaries in the harbor. They also control the locations of most of
the major flour mills which supply the city of Beirut with its food needs.
Then they drew up a military plan whose purpose was to control the sta-
tions that pumped drinking water to the different sections of the western
area of Beirut and to control the power transmission lines that trans-
mitted power to those areas and to some areas of al-Shamal.
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The State: A Neutral ObservEr
The ministers confessed that as of the beginning of last week, the mea-
sures of preventing the arrival of wheat and flour to al-Shamal and to
the westerci section of Beirut have actually been implemented, albeit in
a gradual manner. [The ministers said] that the failure to deal firmly
with the situation will lead to the application of the remaining proposed
resolutions that are being investigated.
Official voices were heard calling for the neutralization of consumer
and livelihood questions and for keeping them away from the political
struggle. It was the opinion of those ministers that the mere success
_ of separating the economic part [of the situation] from the political
part would keep Lebanon away from confronting the dangers of partition
during these fateful stages that Lebanon and the area are facing.
A suggestion was made in the presidential palace that efforts be made to
draw up a"national pact" that would require all political and party
- leaders to abide by the principle af separating the economic and liveli-
hood aspects [of the situation] from the aspects of political strife.
There was a stipulation that the solution begin with a step that was to
be taken by the Phalangist Party. The party was to release all the citi-
zens of the north that it had kidnapped and was holding.
It was stated here that there were new communications with his Holiness
Pope John Paul the Second at the Vatican to ask him to intervene again
- in this crisis and put a firm end to it among the Maronites. This is be-
cause the political and economic fallout of the crisis has actually begun
to threaten the Lebanese entity and the unity of the territory. _
Then prominent parties in the western section [of Beirut] began to criticize
sharply the use of livelihood means to achieve political gains.
Mr Walid Jumblatt discussed this subject at length at the meeting that was
held last Monday evening by the leadership council of the Socialist Pro-
gressive Party. He observed that offering justifications to the extrem-
ists who are seeking partition for the purpose of announcing their steps
for partition was a matter that should not go by in this manner and under
this circumstance. In order for conditions to straighten out, the
- Maronite parties to the struggle have to abandon the methods of economic
pressure. President Sulayman Franjiyyah is to suspect his-economic
measures against the eastern areas, and the leaders of the Lebanese Front,
on their part, are to suspend their retaliatory economic measures against
west Beirut and the areas of al-Shamal.
One of the ministers said that the continued application of these economic
measures will bring about a change in the political positions, and the
cards will be mixed. It may create an opportunity for the leaders of the
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Lebanese Front to bargain with the residents of Beirut over political
positions and to attempt to establish an alliance or a dialogue that would
be based on opposing the economic boycott that was originating from the
north.
And now, does the spectre of partitior, loom anew, disguised this time in
economic garb?
All the evidence indicates that the project of small sectarian states,
which Israel is planning i:u carry out, is still present and can be im-
plemented when Israel fin3s a suitable opportunity to implement it. If
it is not carried out because of the economic struggle in Lebanon, there
will be an attempt to carry out this project in the future for other
alternative reasons.
Sham'un: We Want This Matter Settled
President Camille Sham'un himself had spoken repeatedly about the inevit-
ability of partition. Addressing a political delegation that had
visited him, he spoke about the inevitability of going back to action in
accordance with the 1943 Pact: "Let us settle this matter! I want you
- to understand that the past is gone forever ever since the beginning of
the events of 1975. The 1943 pact is no longer the subject of investiga-
tion or application. We have spent 200 years cutting each other's throats
once every 10 years. We want to settle this matter. The Lebanon of the
future is the Lebanon of independent states and not the unified Lebanon
that you know. Why are we wasting our time?"
~ Some officials from Western Europe and the United States who had visited
" Lebanon were inclined to accept Camille Sham'un's point of view, and
they submitted reports to this effect to their governments.
Today, there is open discussion in Beirut about a new proposal for a
Lebanon that is mada up of independent states. This would come about in
case the Summit Conference that is in sessioii in Tunisia fails to reach
a solution.
The aforementioned discussion does not constitute a threat or a war of
nerves. It is a factual, an open and a specific discussion which reveals
the reality of the intentions that are being harboreri against Lebanon.
By itself the state is powerless in front of these proposals because it
is in fact too weak to preVent a power like that of the Lebanese Front
from leading Lebanon, if it wishes to, into the direction of partition
or towards the projects of small states.
I
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COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-ti'ATAN AL''ARABI
8592 15
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LEBANON
BROTHERS VIE FOR LEADERSHIP OF PHALANGIST PARTY
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Nov 79 pp 25-26
[Article: "Cain and Abel Compete for Phalangist Leadership Following
Health Crisis of al-Shaykh Pierre"]
[Text] The acute heart attack that al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil (75 years)
suffered has once again raised the question of the Phalangist leadership.
Since leaderships in Lebanon are inherited, the only two candidates are
the sons of al-Shaykh Pierre, Amin and Bashir. Which one will win the
leadership of the largest, the most organized and the most powerful of
T.ebanese parties?
What will happen to the Lebanese Phalangist Party if its president, al-
Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil (75 years) were to suffer a health crisis simi-
lar to the heart attack he suffered from early this June? This heart
attack required that he be moved swiftly to the Hotel Dew Hospital.
~ Who will rule the Phalangist Party with all its militias and its cadres
if Pierre al-Jumayyil were to disappear for any reason whatsoever from
the scene of events?
Will the leadership of the party be transferred in a democratic fashion
from the al-Jumayyil family to ane of the members of the Political Bureau
without subjecting the structure of the party to destruction or to cracks?
Last week these questions and others prevailed over all other questions
and concerns. They controlled the thoughts of most of the members of the
Folitical Bureau who had worked in the pa�rty with Pierre al-Jumayyil
ever since the early stages of its establishment.
The party's concern with this matter was not imminent prior to the onset
_ of the bloody events in Lebanon. Before that, discussions during the
sessions of the Political Bureau were conducted within a framework that
favored democracy and sought to portray the party as "sound democratic
organization" which would not worry lbout its survival as long as it
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relied on democratic principles in bringing about changes and development.
That was in spite of the fact that al-Jumayyil, Sr has been its president
for almost 40 years.
At that time the party's concern for showing its democratic [character]
came to the point of making the statement that the reelection of al-Shaykh
Pierre al-Jumayyil must be subject to the principles of democraCic elec-
tions, even on a superficial basis.
At that time the party's elections board was invited to attend a session
to elect a president from among the members of the Political Bureau. All
the members of the Bureau were eligible for nomination so that al-Jumayyil
would not win the elections by approbation.
Alternative Candidate Failed
To impart democracy to these elections further, a young movement emerged
presidency
within trcaieterag inst movement
Deputy Edmond Rizq to comp
of the party.
The elections were held, and, naturally, Pier.re al-Jumayyil won. After-
wards the party came out in political and party circles saying, "Look
how democratic we are! Look how careful we are about fair competition ,
within the party organization! There~eland eandsfamilyioandeliberating
party slogan tha~: is based on 'God, hO
the party leadership from hereditary considerations."
Following this experience about whose earnestness 'doubts were raised at
the time, matters began to return to their natural course within the party.
Subsequent experiences later confirmed that it was "the family" that ruled
the Phalangist Party and that the hereditary transmission of leadership
and command between father, son and grandson was the accepted practice.
Everything else was mere "icing on the cake" upon which no decisions or
judgments were to be made.
During that stage the legacy of the al-Jumayyil family for the parliaminWas
tary seat that was vacated by the death of the late Maurice al-Jumayy'
firmly endorsed. This seat was automatically given to al-Shaykh Amin
al-Jumayyil, the oldest son of al-Shaykh Pierre.
This fact became even more evident when oal-Shaykh
Hawiirthe commandersof,
came upon the scene and took the place
the Philangist militias. He appointed himself the party's military chief,
and then he started a party organization that was semi-independent of his
father and his older brother. He strengthened his organization wiCh arms
and men and added to it the remaining militias of the parties that fall
under the banner of the Maronite Lebanese Front. His strength grew to
the point that he became capable of ignoring the resolutions of the
party's PoliticBeielse ofnthe arresting
brother, Amin, and anYone
_ arrest if he thought he needed to i7 take such a measure.
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Bashir al-Jumayyil made light of organized party activity to the point
~ that he described his father's colleagues in the party's Political Bureau
as "incompetents and failures." He affirmed that their decisions always
came too late and were unrealistic.
A secret struggle developed betwePr Bashir and Amin al-Jumayyil. In some
cases the struggle turned into conflict because their ambitions regarding
the political future were incompatible.
When Amin al-Jumayyil thought of having a dialogue with the Syrians, Bashir
threatened to kill him i_f he were to do so.
When Amin was nominated to represent the Phalangists in a national coali-
tion government, Bashir said that he was ready to go into government and
to have a dialogue without weapons with the other party. When Bashir
al-Jumayyil visited the United States, Amin rushed to make a similar tour
from which he returned firmly convinced, unlike Bashir, of the benefits
of having a dialogue with the Americans. Even when the party established
its own radio station which is known as the Voice of Lebanon Radio, Bashir
established his own radio station which is known as the Voice of Free
Lebanon Radio. This is the radio station that broadcasts from al-Kaslik
and is supervised and financed by the party mar.iinery which assists Bashir
in his operations.
Since the family has forced itself on the capabilities of the Phalangist
Party, some members of the Political Bureau did express last week their
deep concern over the dangers of a sharp struggle between Bashir and Amin
over the party command as soon as a1-9haykh Pierre disappears from the
scene.
Those people are saying that the outbreak of a struggle this time will
subject the party as a whole to an explosion that may lead to its dis-
solution and to its transformation, like other parties, to several par- ~
ties and reform movements that would retain nothing of its [present] ~
structure but its name.
A1-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil seems to be the most concerned party member
awaiting the develogments and the one who is looking the hardest for a
formula that would ensure continuity for the party with the least possi-
ble losses.
Embraced by Fascist Ideas
But how did the Phalangist Party come into existence? What is the poli-
tical history of this party whose Maronite character and sectarianism
are ancient?
The file of al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil states that he got the idEa of
establishing the party in 1936 to protect "Lebanese youth" from alien
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political trends. The Lebanese Phalangist Party came into existence on
21 November 1936 when Pierre al-Jumayyil met with some of his friends,
among whom were Emile Yarid, George Naqqash, Charles Hilu and others. He
_ presented to them the idea of establishing for young people an organiza-
tion whose first objective would be I.ebanon; the organization wauld not
lean towards the West nor towards the Arab countries.
The organization was given the name Phalangist because Pierre al-Jumayyil
wanted it to be a semi-military organization whose character, values and
objectives would be military.
But contemporary Lebanese political historians are saying that al-Jumayyil,
who was a pharmacist fond of playing soccer, suddenly turned to being fond
of playing politics. He was very much influenced by the Nazi and the
Fascist movements--of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco--which had terrorized
the world in the thirties. His "chivalry," his propensity for power and
his sectarian "ideali.sm" came together and evolved into the Lebanese
Phalangist [Organization].
While the party was making preparations to celebrate its first anniversary,
the mandatory government surprised the party with a presidential order in
1937 which required its dissolution. The Phalangists refused to comply
with the order, and they decided to stage a protest demonstration. The
demonstration proceeded towards the al-Shuhada [the Martyrs] Square--
Beirut's principal square--where the demonstrators clashed with the
authorities. A1-Shaykh Pierre and some of his companions who are key
f igures in the organization were wounded.
A general strike was announced to protest this action. This made it in-
- cumbent upon the authorities to release those who had been arrested.
The mandatory authorities closed down the offices of the Phalangist
- Organization three times between 1936 and 1943. The newspaper,
AL-'AMAL whose publication had begun in 1939 was banned seven times until
an order was issued in 1943 recognizing the Phalangist Party as a legal
organization with the right to engage in legitimate party action.
On 18 July 1949, that is, 6 years after independence, officials of the
administration of President Bisharah al-Khuri proceeded to dissolve the
Phalangist Party and to close down its offices. The dissolution, however,
lasted no more than 3 days, and the party returned to its activities after
changing its name from the Phalangist Party to the wishes of the Lebanese
"to change the rulers." The Phalangist Party supported the revolution,
and that led to independence in 1943. Pierre al-Jumayyil was arrested
several times early in the age of independence and prior to that.
Resisting Arab Character, Becoming Allied with the Government
The facts in the party's political history state that the Phalangists
opposed the Arabization of Lebanon and Arab unity plans. In addition,
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the party opposed leftist ideologies--and chief among them was communism--
and it even opposed liberal movements also.
The other part of the party's political history is that which includes its
contemporary history. In 1958 when the popular revolution in Lebanon was
breaking out, the Phalangist Party adopted a special position that was
characterized by sectarianism and by support for the administration of
President Camille Sham-un who was making preparations to renew his term
of office against the will of the national forces. The Phalangist Party
had ties with the Baghdad Pact and with the course [of action] that was
led by the United States. It facilitated the process of landing American
military forces on Lebaziese territory following the coup that overthrew
the royal regime in Baghdad.
During the administration of President Fu'ad Shihab, which was considered
the golden age for the Phalangist Party, the Phalai.gists acquired a prin-
cipal role within the framewo rk of the politi~:al garle. The party had sev-
eral representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, and it took part in
successive governments. It was able to establish ~ts narty and political
foundations firmly, and it was gradually represer.cing the Maronite side
in the game of sectarian balance whose features became evident since the
early sixties.
The Phalangist Party's attachment to the legitimate authority grew in the
aftermath of the unsuccessful coup that was carried out by the National
Syrian Party early in 1961.
In 1969 it was al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and the late Maurice al-Jumayyil
who represented the Phalangist Party in the government when it agreed to
the Cairo Pact which regulated existing relations between the state and
the Palestinian Resistance.
But the Phalangist Party has been deliberately changing its positions
ever since the early seventies and has tried to refuse taking responsi-
bility for agreeing to the Cairo Pact. Then it turned rather intensely
toward strengthening its military capabilities. This included training,
purchasing weapons and cooperating with the other Maronite parties to
establish the militia machinery which nas led and is still leading, in
the name of the Maronite$, the war against the Palestinian Resistance,
against Arab presence and against the Arabization of Lebanon. The party
is thereby opening the field for all difficult possibilities, beginning
with the possibility of partitioning Lebanon and accepting the notion
of cooperating with Israel. It is paving the road to the scheme of
establishing small sectarian states in the area.
At any rate, the story is still beginning.
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Lebanese Facts: From Soccer to Politics
A1-Shaykh Pierre is the son of Dr Amin al-Jumayyil, the prominent Lebanese
figure who early in this century sought refuge in Cairo to escape Turkish
persecution.
'Phe Cairo journey broadened the horizons of this Lebanese man of noble
descent and stretched his vision beyond the horizon of the estatQ and the
mountain. It also granted him a dear gift, the favorite of his affections,
his son Pierre.
The son studied pharmacy and became fond of soccer. At first, it was a
modest game, but then he was distracted by politics which progressively
drew him away from his father.
J The Phalangist Party is his favorite team where he is sometimes goal
keeper and other times team cantain. Recently he has shown a preference
for the role of umpire. Sometimes when he plays that role, he uaes a
policeman's whistle; other times, he uses a warning siren.
His problezn lies in his language. He does not understand, like or speak
Arabic well unless he gets irritated; then he speaks it fluently.
He is described as a saint, but the devils of civil war have exorcised
all saints and left all leaders unveiled--dear God, just as you created
me. In Lebanon, Lebanese citizens prefer to see their leaders without
cover.
The Phalangists have had "flies in the ointment" every happy occasion.
These have been Sham'un, Franjiyyah, and the Shihabists. Everyone lost,
but the Phalangist Party always scored goals for itself.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8592
CSO: 4802
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MAURITANIA
NATION'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SAHARA LEAVES DANGEROUS VOID
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 pp 18-19
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Besieged on All Sides"]
[Text] At the end of October, Dr Ba Oumar, minister of rural development,
called newsmen together in Nouakchott to declare Mauritania a"disaster
area." The agricultural situation is as catastrophic as it was during the
big drought in 1973. Paradoxically enough, it was the early rains in June
that destroyed the plantings, while the Senegal River, which has always irri-
gated the south, the country's primary agricultural region, experienced one
of the lowest floods of the century this year.
This harsh test worsens a financial situation that is always cause for con-
cern and joins a malaise in interethnic relations that delayed the opening
of schools until the beginning of November. In order tu restore calm, it
was decided to "radicaliae" the teaching of Arabic solely in the r.3rth,
where there are practically only Arabic-speaking people. In the south, -
Arabic will be the second language after French, for a transitional period
of 6 years. This decision fits into a vast program of decentraliaation
marked by the establishment of regional councils which are to take over a
large share of the management of their district. These measures were drawn
up by the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) at marathon
meetings from 8 to 18 October, meetings devoted to the country's essential
problems and to the real or supposed threats facing it. Along the same
line of ideas, in the month of October, upper-level personnel and former
- ministers were arrested, transferred and assigned to places located some
distance away from Nouakrhott. Tl:e most spectacular arrests were those _
of Ahmed Ould Mohamed Salah, several times minister under Mokhtar Ould
Daddah, and the former head of diplomacy, Hamdi Ould Mouknass. The former
was apprehended inside the Chinguetti Mosque. The second, already under
house arrest in Nouadhibou, was transferred to the region of Tidjikja,
in the central region of the country. His friends are seriously concerned
over his health because in recent months, he had been under medical care.
The arrests took place the day after the departure of Mokhtar Ould Daddah,
who left Nouakchott on 3 October to receive care in France (JEUNE AFRIQUE,
No 980). Supporters of the old regime must not harbor too much hope. At
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any rate, these arrests are linked to the climate of incertainty reigning in
the country, made worse by foreign interference in national politics.
It was usaless for Mauritania to stage the coup d'etat on 10 July 1978 in
order to extricate itself from the affair in the Sahara. It was useless
for it to sign, on 5 August 1979 in Algiers, a peace agreement with the
POLISARIO. It remains mired down in the tensions hanging over this entire
region of northwestern Africa, tensions which since the fall of Mokhtar
Ould Daddah have caused three coups d'etat or palace revolutions in Nouak-
chott. The fact is that the military men themselves had divergent opinions:
- Some wanted to join the search for an overall peace without going back on
friendships or alliances; others wanted to go it alone, at the risk of
passing into the "other camp." The supporters of the second solution won
out after the tragic death of Lt Col Ahued Ould Bousseif in a plane crash
near Dakar at the end of May 1979. There resulted a new shakeup and new
competition between foreign influences,with everyone trying to get Mauri-
, tania trying to line up on his side. -
The Algiers agreement, which gave to the POLISARIO Tiris el-Gharbia, that
part of the Western Sahara attributed to Mauritania by the tripartite Madrid
agreements (14 November 1975), was called "capitulation" by Morocco and even
by many Mauritanians, who were quickly accused by the government of being
"agents" of Morocco. Whence the arrests, including that of the former
deputy from Dakhla, Mohamed Lamine Ould Hormallah, who was imprisoned at
Salibaby in the far south of Mauritania. Since Morocco occupied Tiris el-
Gharbia in order not to give it to the POLISARIO, Hormallah's arrest created
more tension between Rabat and Nouakchott.
It was at the time of this new crisis with Morocco that the Mauritanian
prime minister, Lt Col Khouna Ould Haidalla, arriving in Paris in September, _
made an appeal to France. The result was that at the beginning of November,
- it was decided to send to Nouadhibou, a port in the north, 200 French para-
troopers to protect the "1960 borders." ~
They would immediately have to deal with the Moroccans, it would appear,
but the actual situation is more complex and the arrival of the first French
soldiers was followed by the replacement of the governor of Nouadhibou,
Ahmed Ould Bneidjara, pro-POLISARIO ar..d one of the brains behind the coup
d'etat of 10 July. It is true that he had certain difficulties with the
- local population and some tribal chiefs. France's objective was mainly to
destroy the growing influence exercised over Mauritania by Algiers and the
POLISARIO, the latter having followers and sympathiaers within the Mauri-
tanian government, even among the military.
The appeal to the French nevertheless gave rise to serious controversies
among the members of the CMSN. For some, a step had been taken 10 years
backward, to the time of the unequal military agreements, the reign of
MIFERMA [Iron-Mining Company of Mauritania] and the CFA franc. Since 1972,
Mauritania has gradually freed itself from that subordination, tut without
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an abr.upt break with France. It has also drawn closer to the Arab world,
while avoiding excessively strong tensions with countries in the Southern
Sahara, such as Senegal.
But the map of the region has changed greatly and Mauritania has been caught
_ up in an enormous whirlwind it did not foresee and whose consequences it
cannot always predict. An essential piece on the playing board of this _
narthwestern Africa by virtue of its million square kilometers and its
vast Atlantic coastline, despite the precarious Algiers peace accords,
Mauritania today is besieged on all sides, by the "greats" and the "not so
great."
As a result, certain leaders, including those who have negotiated with the
POLISARIO the most since 10 July 1978, have not accepted the S August accord
because Mauritania has stated that it no longer "had anything to do with
the Sahara." And yet, that same Western Sahara is, because of the whims of
the colonial borders, pract2cally imbedded in Mauritania and, from the
Zouerate iron mines to the port of Nouadhibou, runs the richest part of the
country.
In 1976, the POLISARIO took Zouerate as its target in order to make Mauri-
tania capitulate and better isolate Morocco. By abruptly leaving the Sahara,
Mauritania has created a dangerous void. The evacuation of Tiris el-Gharbia
has even brought the battlefield closer to Zouerate and Nouadhibou, two cen-
ters of vital importance to the country's economy. Will it remain outside
~ the war, when the POLISARIO continues its steady buildup and constantly
harasses the Morr,ccan Army further and further south?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1979
11,464
CSO: 4400
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MOROCCO
EFFECTS OF WAR ON ECONOMY DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 p 30
[Article by Francisco Vergara: "Zero Growth"]
[Text] In spite of its affirmed desire to stimulate the economy the govern-
ment appears to be forced to follow a poiicy of austerity. During the im-
plete2ntation of the plan 1973-1977 investments increased annually by 46
percent. In 1977 they reached 35 percent of the national income. A histori-
cal record. Just as