JPRS ID: 8882 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040051-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 51
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~4 JANUARY 1980 C FOUO 3f 80 > 1 aF ~
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~ ~ JPRS L/8882
24 January 1980 �
USSR Re ori~
~
MILITARY AFFAIRS
- (FOUO 3/80)
_ FBIS F'OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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I
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JPRS L/8882
2 4 January 19 8 U
U~`.'R REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 3/80)
CONTENTS PACE
Contents of 'FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW~
(ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRE~I2YE, Sep 79) 1
Cormnunications: Soviet Review of U.S. Defense System
(B. Yushakov; ZARIBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Sep 79) 3
Nuclear Weapons: Soviet Review of U.S. Storage Facilities
(Ye. Fokin; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYEPINOYE OBOZRENIYE, Sep 79) 6
NATO: Soviet Review of I,and Mine Systems
(N. Zhukov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Sep 79) 10
NATO: Soviet Review of Aircraft Service Life
(L. Leonov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Sep 79) 16
U.S. Anti-Air-Defense Aircraft: Soviet Comment
� (I. Chistyakov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Sep 79). ?_2
NATO: Soviet Corranent on Naval Training Exercise
(V. Kaminskiy; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Sep 79).. 25
NATO: Soviet Corrmient on Use of Black Sea Straits
(A. Korablev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Sep 79).. 28
First Steps Toward Soviet Space Engines
(A. M. Isayev; VOPROSY ISTORII, Jun 79) )2
Bri ef s
Reaction Force Formed ~~2 -
New Combat Vessels ~2
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOt10]
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CONTENTS OF 'FOREIGN MII.ITARY REVIEW'
rioscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to
_ press 4 Sep 79 pp 1-2
[Indicated in the table of contents below are the fu11 text translations
and the excerpted translations which will be published in this
series and a full text translation which will be published in the
JPRS FOUO series of the CHINA REPORT: POLITI.CAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY
AFFAIRS.]
[Text] CONTENTS page
GENERAL MILITARY PROBLEMS
Ideological Conditioning of British Armed Forces Personnel--
V. Katerinich 3
Status and Prospects for Organizational Development of the FRG's
Armed Forces--V. Begla~~ 8
U.S. Derense Department Budget for FY 1~i80--L. Nikolayev 11
**U.S. Defense Department Joint Communications System--B. Yushakov 14
*Protection of Nuclear Weapons Storage Facilities--Ye. Fokin 18
GROUND FORCES
***China's Ground Forces--A. Marov and V. Timofeyev 21
The Bundeswehr Tank Battalion in Basic Kinds of Warfare--V. Semenov 27
*Remote Mining Systems of NATO Armies--N. Zhukov 32
_ Characteristics of Tanks or Armies of the Capitalist States--
V. Titov 36
AIR FORCES
Israel's Air Force--V. Sergeyev 37
*Survivability of Warplanes and Way~ to Increase,It--L. Leonov 41
*J.S. Air Force 'Wild Weasel' program--I. Chistyakov 46
Onboard Radar of the F-16 Fighter--I. Aleksandrov Qg
'Adur' Aviation Engines--V. Yurtsev 51
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NAVAL FORCES
Italy's Navy--M. Gerasimov 53
*NATO Navies in Exercise 'Dawn Patrol-79'--V. Kaminskiy 59
**The Black Sea Straits (Physical Geographic Conditions, Regime of
Navigation, Elements of Infrastructure)--A. Korablev 61
Ttew Shipboard SAM Systems--Ye. Nikolayev 67 -
The American Guided-Missile Frigate "Oliver H. Perry"--A. Ivanitskiy 72
INFORMATION, EVENTS, FACTS
NATO Naval Exercise 'B1ue Harrier-79' 75 _
China is iaking a Previous Course
New U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Program
West German Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle
Mortar Unit for Amphibious Landing Craft
Federal Emergenc} rianagement 9gency
New NATO Assignments
- FOREIGN MILITARY NEWS ITEMS 79
ARTICLES i13 FOREIGN JOURNALS 80
COLORED INSERTS (unnumbered pages)
Belgian Air Foxce F-16B Trainer ~
Primary Tanks of Armies of Capitalist States
American Guided-Missile Frigate FFG7 'Oliver H. Perry'
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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COMMUNICATIONS: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. DEFENSE SYSTEM
- Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to
- press 4 Sep 79 pp 14-17
[Article by Col B. Yushakov: "U.S. Defense Department Joint Co~munications
System"]
[Excerpts] The Pentagon is placing reliance on waging war using mass
destruction weapons and is attempting to create a system for control of
staffs and troops scattered acr~ss the entire globe which would permit
providing to them orders and instructions for unleashing aggressive actions -
or shifting them to a higher degree af combat readiness in short periods of ~
time(pr.actically in real time). The primary problPm here is considered to ~
be the increase in survivability, reliability and flexibility of control of
the armed forces on the part of the supreme national military-political
leadership.
An important role in resolving this problem is given to communications
forces and facilities, and primarily those belonging to the joint communi-
cations system of the U.S. Defense Department, the DCS (Defense Communica-
tions System), which takes in practically all points on the globe where
American headquarters and troops are located. It is primarily intended
for pr~viding communications for the supreme national mi.litary-political
leadership (the president, secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff), joint and special commands, and the main directorates of
the Defense Department. As reported by the foreign press, 15-20 percent of
- DCS channels are used in the interests of a global system of operational
control, while some of them are assigned for transmission of intelligence
and data on ar.'enemy nuclear missile attack.
The DCS system makes wide use of all the primary forms of communications:
radio, radio-relay, tropospheric, wire, cable and satellite. The Defense
Communications Agency is responsibie for its organization and normal func-
tioning. _
Zonal communications agencies also have been set up at the headquarters of
main command elements of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, in the Pacific, and
with the joint North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) for providing ~
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instructions of the military leadership more rapidly. Several regional
divis~ons are subordinate to each of them. Their primary mission is to
provide reliable and uninterrupted aperation of communications systems 3nd
facilities in their own "zones (regions) of responsibility." The opera-
t~tons center of the Defense Communications Agency exercises immediate
control througti operations centers of zc?nal communications agencies and
regional communicat~~n~ divisions.
There axe over 130 primary and alternate relay centers in the DCS, some of
which are outfitted with automatic switching gear. The overall length of `
cable, wire, radio-relay, tropospheric and satellite communications lines
is 67 million channel-kilometers. They connect ov2r 3,000 control points
scattered across the entire globe.
The foreign press emphasizes that the aggressive war of tha United States in
Vietnam, where a number of essential shortcomings were revealed, served as
impetus for accelerated development of communications in the higher echelon
of comimand and control of the armed forces. The national military-
political leadership demanded that the Pentagon achieve that operating
status of communications systems and facilities in wtiich data would pass
from t~p to bottom and vice versa in real time or near real time. Foreign
specialists identify the following important directions in development of
U.S, communications systems in recent years: a broad introduction of new
satellite systems (military and leased from other departments), special DV
[long wave] and SDV [ultra-long wave] communications systems and encipher-
ment gear; further automation of digital communications systems; and an
increase in their noise stability. .
The primary components of the presently existirg DCS are the AUTOVON,
AUTODIN, and AUTOSEVOCOM automated communications systems and the DSCS-2
strategic satellite communications system. In addition, the DCS includes
long-range communications centers and equipment belonging to branches of
the Armed Forces and channels leased from private companies by the Defense
Department.
In 1978 there were up to 150 different control points among the system's
subscribers, of which around 40 were part of the GSOU [global operational `
control systemj, 20 in the Navy and the rest in the Army, Air Force and
Marines~
At the present time the system is in the next phase of development (DSCS-3),
which will last until 1982. When it is fully deployed, four primary earth
satellites and two alternate satellites are to be activated as a s~ace
element. The operating frequency range is 7-8 GHz. Each satellite provides
communications over four trunks (1,300 telephone channels each). In case
the American satellites are disabled, the system can operate through commu-
nications satellites.of the NATO and British systems.
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Around 500 ground terminal stations will be deployed by 1982, when it is
planned to place this system in operation. Of these, 80 will be part of"
GSOU, 40-50 for the Navy, 300 for the Army, Air Force and Marines, and the`
rest for the Diplomatic Service.
Other satellite communications systems functioning in the interests of the
Defense Department's DCS are the AFSATCOM and FLTSATCOM. In contrast t'o'~the
DSCS, they operate in the 225-40G MHz band and have considerably fewer
channels (several dozen).
The foreign press emphasizes that the U.S. Defense Department joint communi-
cations system basic311y supports the needs of the armed forces and the ~
supreme national military-political leadership even at the present time.
47ith the final introduction of the AFSATCOM and FLTSATCOM satellite systems,
the capabilities will expand considerably, especially with regard to
instructions provided to strategic offensive forces.
In the assessment of American military specialists, the presence of several
global, autonomous communications systems considerably increases the
survivability, reliability and flexibility of the armed forces command and
control system or its individual components and permits providing the
necessary instructions and directions of the supreme military command to
headquarters (control points of separate commands) and large and small
units in real time or near real time.
All this shows once again that the forces of imperialism are preparing
actively to conduct war in different parts of the world.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. STORAGE FACILITIES
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYF OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to
press 4 Sep 79 pp 18-20
[Article by Col Ye. Fokin: "Security of Nuclear Weapons Storage Facilities"J -
[Text] Militaristic circles in the West are unwinding the arms race spiral
more and more strongly. Appropriations for militar~ purposes grow with each
passing year, the development of military sectors of industry is being
forced, and stockpiles of mass destruction weapons are building up.
According zo estimates by foreign military specialists, there already are
over 30,000 weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, of which around 7,000 are
located in the zone of the aggressive NATO bloc in Europe and over 1,000 at
American military bases in the Pacific area. There are tentatively up to
1,500 different installations for the storage and accommodation of American
nuclear weapons in various parts of the globe, of which over 100 are in
Europe and around 130 on U.S. territory (Fig. 11 [Figure not reproduced].
Broa3 layers of world public opinion, including American public opinion,
~are being alarmed by the scorn shown by militarists of the United States
and NATO allies toward demanris for banning the production and stockpiling
of mass destruction weapons. Facts of the recent past indicate that the
irresponsible attitude toward sucr problems abroad more than once has
threatened the lives of many thousands of people. For example, that was
the case in 1966 in Spain and in 1968 in Greenland, when strategic B-52
bombers with.nuclear bombs aboard suffered catastrophes over their terri-
tories. In the estimate of foreign observers, the total npmber of such
instances is over ten.
The foreign press reported results of a 1973 check of the status of
security of American nuclear weapons storage facilities in Europe. The
official report of the inspection group sent to the U.S."Secretary of
Defense stated that some of them did not have the appropriate security,
were kept in poorly equipped facilities and, in addition, requirements of
the checkpoint conditions and rules for security of the facilities were
violated:
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According to the western press, in recent years the Pentagon allegedly has
conducted a number of ineasures to beef up security of nuclear weapons. In
particular, military storehouses for special kinds of weapons are being out-
_ fitted with special security equipment. It was reported that at the present
time such equipment has been installed in 50 Air Force installations,
including nuclear weapons storage facilities, air bases for B-52 strategic
bombers, and airfields for American tactical air duty subunits located in..
Europe and the Pacific. In addition, in 1980 it is planned to outfit still
another SO installations with more sophisticated security equipment, and in
1982 to begin deploying an automated security system being developed under
the BISS (Base and Installation Security System) program. It represents a
s~phisticated electronic system which includes an electronic computer,
security signalling devices, television and illumination equipment,
employee identification instruments (Fig. 2) [Figure not reproduced] and so
on. The coinposition and acr.ommodation of this system at a nuclear weapons
storage facility is shown in Fig. 3[Figure not reproduced].
- Along with the introduction of this equipment, the U.S. Defense Department
planned the reorganization of the nuclear weapons storage facility security
service in 1978-1979 and a simultaneous increase in the size of its units
to 20,000 persons, providing them with more sophisticated small arms,
, armored vests and other gear.
By carrying out these measures, the American command is attempting to pre-
vent a sudden surprise seizure of nuclear weapons by the enemy in case of
war or by extremist groups of terrorists in peacetime.
As noted in the foreign press, stores of special shaped charges of high
explosives intended for rapid destruction of weapons have been supplied to
all American nuclear weapons storage facilities in Europe. According to a
Defense Department directive, around 1 hour is given �or destruction of
25-30 nuclear weapons located in one fixed storage facility.
Western military specialists believe that outfitting nuclear weapons with
coded security devices known as PAL (Permissive Action Link), intended for
preventing~unauthorized detonation, is one further step in increasing
the security of American nuclear weapons. This ensures relatively reli-
able interlocking of the weapon's main electrical circuits, which can be
removed only by two American service personnel authorized to do this,
acting in sequence and separatel.y from each other. Another variety of this
device is used in some types of munitions, the unlocking of which is done
prior to combat use also by two specialists by dialing a prearranged
digital combination on a locking device.
In addition, measures are being taken under a program f~r checking the
reliability of persons working with nuclear weapons. According to foreign
press data, considerable contingents of military and civilian specialists
are brought in for servicing American nuclear we~T~ns. They undergo a
check both before entering service and periodically while performing
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service. If a specialist does not meet the demands placed on the state of
health, conduct, social origins or political views, he is not authorized to
work on these objects.
According to 1972 data, around 14,000 persons were used for various types
of work wit h r.uclear weapons in the American ground forces in Europe.
During the year 213 of them were disqualified for reason of neuropsycho-
logical illnesses, abuse of drugs and alcohol, and for poor performance of
official duties, disciplinary infractions and amoral conduct.
_ The western press notes that measures being conducted in the United States
for the security of nuclear weapons also touch on the sphere of production
and stockpiling of special fission materials (plutonium-239, uranium-235
and uranium-233). According to the assessment of foreign specialists,
there is an annual loss of approxir.iately 25 kg of plutonium and 45 kg of
uranium in the United States because of deficiencies in record keeping,
supervision and storage. The possibility is not precluded that such
materials will get abroad or will fall into the hands of criminal terrorist
groups.
In the estimate of foreign scientists and specialists, persons having the
ner_essary supplies and connections can prepare their own nuclear weapon
from the aforementioned radioactive substances (termed a"homemade" or
~ "crude" bomb in the United States) and in the absence of such conditions
can use it for subversive purposes.
The U.S. Defense Department together with the Department of Energy is
carrying out a number of supplementary measures to close the channels for
loss of fission materials. In particular, they include creation of a
special bure au for security of fissionable materials under the Energy
Department's Commission on Nuclear Security and Licenses, and the partici-
pation of the FBI and CIA in their security and investigation.
In assessing the measures being conducted by the U.S. military department -
to secure special types of weapons, the foreign press notes that no matter
how sophisticated the means being developed, they will not efisure reliable
protection o f persons against possible chance happenings. Only cessation
of the production of nuclear weapons, a subsequent cut-back in stockpiles
and complete elimination of the stockpiles are the real ways for assuring
international security and stable peace. The Soviet Union and other coun-
tries of the socialist community repeatedly have pointed this out.
PHOTO CAPTIONS
1. p. 18. Fig. 1. Diagram of location on U.S. territory of facilities
intended for the development, production and storage of nuclear weapons
and special fission materials, from the journal BULLETIN OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS .
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~ 2. p. 19. Fig. 2.. Checking em~~loyees arriving at a nuclear weapons
storage facility by comparing fingerprints, from the journal
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW.
3. p. 19. Fig. 3. Nuclear weapons storage facility equipped with the
BISS automated security system, from the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE
REVIEW.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voy~nnoye obozreniye", 1979
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NATO: SOVIET REVIEW OF LAND MINE SYSTEMS
rTOSCOw ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to
press 4 Sep 79 pp 32-35
[Article by Col (Res) N. Zhukov: "Remote Mining Systems of NATO Armies"]
[Text] Active work continues in armies of the leading countries partici-
pating in the aggressive NATO bloc to create new types of weapons and combat
- equipment. Much attention is being given to antitank weapons. Foreign
military specialists consider the wide use of minefields laid on probable
routes of enemy movement to be very important and effective for maximum
limitation to the mobility of highly mobile enemy units.
Methods for laying minefields which existed up to the present time were very
laborious and required a large number of mine$ and minelaying equipment. In
this connection, foreign specialists performed research for a long while to
develop new mining systems. As a result they succeeded in creating quali-
tatively new equipment which allowed a sharp reduction in laboriousness of
- work, a decrease in ~he expenditure uf mines and a reduction of time for
laying minefields,, '
The creation of ne:~ antitank mines differing su},stantially from mines of the
old, classic type by reduced weight and size ~without reduction in the effi�-
cacy by using a charge with a special directional-action shape) also con-
tributed to the solution to this problem. The new mines are equipped with -
an electronic (influence firing or contact-firing) fuse and are capable of
functionin.g under the entire pro~ection of the tank. Because of their
small size, these mines are difficult to detect visually and so can be
scattered on the surface of the ground.
The most effective means for laying mines have been developed simultaneously
with the new mines in NATO armies. The small dimensions and use of high-
strength, eliably operating electronic and.mechanical components permitted
the creati, : of mines capable of withstanding very heavy loads. As a
result, use began to be made not only of ground minelayers which scatter
mines to distances of several tens of ineters, but also artillery, missile -
and air systems. The new equipment, which is designated "remote mining
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systems," are becoming more and more widespread at the present time in the -
armed forces of leading NATO countries.
As noted in the Loreign press, these systems should substantially increase
troop capabilities for high-speed laying of minefields. It is emphasized
that remote minelaying e~Lipment at the cammander's disposal allows him to
make more flexible and active use of them during a battle not only on the
defensive, but also i:i the offensive. Special attention is given to the
fact that, thanks to the extremely compressed time periods for laying
obstacles using these systems, there is no longer need for min~laying ahead
of time, whicY! usua?ly tied one down previously to terrain conditions (such
as mining sectors accessible to tanks).
In addition, the remote mining method permits laying mines directly ahead
of a moving enemy or directly on his combat formations. Foreign special-
ists emphasize that this means that the new minelaying equipment permits
~ action against 3 specific enemy, which should ensure greater effect through
the element of surprise.
The first models of remote minelaying systems already have been accepted
into the inventory of some NATO armies, while a considerabl.e number of
systems are in the concluding phase of development, which should be com-
pleted in the next two or three years.
The basis of remote mining systems in the United States are antitank and -
antipersonnel mines being developed under a program for creating a family
of remotely laid mines known as FASCAM (Family of Scatterable Mines), and
intended for laying by means of ground-based minelayers, tube and rocket
artillery, and aircraft. According to American press reports, the mines of
this family are characterized by compactness, light weight, and the
presence of a self-destruct device by which they self-destruct after a
given period of time after being laid on the terrain so as not to hinder
the maneuver of friendly forces, and an antidisturbance device which
initiates the mine when there is an attempt to move it from its place.
American specialists have developed several models of mines which differ
slightly among themselves chiefly by the minelaying equipment.
The GEMSS (Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System) is considered to be
_ general-purpose. It is intended for ].aying the XM75 antitank mines and tha
XM74 antipe~sonnel mines using the XM12$ towed minelayer towed by the
M113A1 tracked APC or a 5-ton truck. The XM128 (Fig. 1) [Figure not repro-
duced], produced on a modified M794 double-axle trailer, consists of two
interchang~able cylindrical cassettes loaded with~ mines and a launcher, by
which the mines are thrown from a rail to the sides a distance of a few
tens of ineters. As the minelayer moves, mines are scattered in a strip of
a given width. The density of t;~e minefield being laid is determined by
the speed of the prime mover and rate of mine ejection, which can change
within the range of one to fotir mines per second. The c:apacity of one load
is 800 mines. It is planned to complete development of this mining system
in 1979.
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The RAAMS (Remote Artillery Antitank Min~ Sy~Cem; and ,~DAM (Area Denial
Artillery Munition) antipersonnel system are representatives of artillery
minelaying systems. Both of them are intended for use by authorized 155-mm
howitzers (the M109A1 self-propelled and the M198 towed howitzer), the unit
of fire of whicl: includes cassette roundsi with mines. These rounds are
produced in the M483 standardized casing and ha~~c a common M577 point aerial-
burst fuse. The a+~nuuiti~n enu~~erated below have been taken into the inven-
tory and are in mass production.
The M718 and M741 rounds, which contain nine M70 and M-73 mines each respec- .
tively, are used in the RAAMS antitank mine system. The round's M577 point
aerial-burst fuse is activated on a given leg of the tra~ectory and the
mines contained in it are ejected, drop in the necessary area anc~ are auto-
matically armed after a given time. The mining area when firing a salvo _
from 12 pieces is 350x250 m. The M629 and M731 rou~ds are used in the ADAM
antipersonnel system. Each of them contains 36 M67 and M72 antipersonnel,
fragmentation-type bounding mines each respectively. After falling to the _
ground, the mines are armed after thin trip wire-ser;sors are thrown from -
their casings to the sides with the help of springs. The mines detonate .
when one of the wires is touched by a person moving by. _
The SLU-MINE (Surface Launch ~nit-?~iine) missile m~ning system is being
created for the engineer troops and is intended for rapid laying of anti-
tank mines. It is a self-propelled, 30-tube launcher similar to that used
for clearing minefields (the SLU-FAE mineclearing systeml). Using it, it -
will be possible to lay minefields at a distance up to 5 km within r'
extremely compressed time periods. The duration of a full launcher salvo is
around 15 seconds. Firing will be by a NUR [free-flight rocket] with
cassette warheads equipped with the M70 tank-killing mines. The projec-
tile's payload opens up at a given point in its flight trajectory, the
mines drop to the ground and are armed after a certain time interval. Mine-
~ laying can be done immediately in front of moving enemy tanks (Fig. 2)
.[Figure not reproducedJ or directly on his combat formations. A salvo lays
720 mines.
The M56 helicopter mining system is intended for laying the M56 explosion-
proof tank-disabling mines. It was taken into the inventory in 1973 and
belongs to first generation equipment, Minelaying is done from heights on
' the order of 30 m and a mine strip 20 m wide is laid with one pass of a
helicopter. The mines (a total of 160) are in cassettes and are fired in
pairs from rails using a propelling powder cartridge. Then they separate
and their fins open. After falling to the ground the mines arm automaCi-
ca11y after a certain delay period (1-2 seconds) and function when tanks or
vehicles drive over them. Three versions of the M56 mines usually are con-
tained in a single set: with a fuse which functions from the first effect;
1. For more details see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2, 1979,
pp 51-52.--ed. ~
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w3th a fuse to counter minec?.ea~ing rollers, functioning from the second
effect (it is armed when the minec:tearinQ roller passes over the miue and
- functions when the tank on which the roller is mounted influences it); and
with a nondisturbance device by which the mine detonates in an atter~pt to
remove it from in place or change its position. It is recommended that two
passes be made or two helicopters be used simultaneously to obtain a mine-
_ field of the requir~a depth. The table compiled from American press data
gives the required number of hell.copter sorties (with the expenditure of
one mine load) as related to a given mine density and minefield length.
_
- - - - -
QUANTITY OF HELICOPTER FLIGflTS REQUIl3ED FbR LAYIPIG A
MrNATTTT~ nF RFA[ITRP:D TFNC,TH ANn 1~F.NS~y ~
Density Len th of m ne ]�~,[meter~
~ o~ mine- loo I ~oo aoo I aoo I soo I soo 1~oo I eoo I soo I iooo I zooo
field m2
~
o,oi i i i 1 z ~ ~ a 3 3 s
0,03 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 30
0,04 1 2 3 4 5 8 7 8 9 10 20
0,08 2 3 5 I 8 8 9 11 12 14 15 30
Primary attention in development of remote mining systems in the FRG is
being given to the creation of antitank systems of various types using a
limited number of kinds of mines. For example, according to reports of the
West German military press, two antitank mines (AT-1 and AT-2) have been
de~eloped for the Bundeswehr intended for scattering using remote equip-
ment. The former already has been accepted into the inventory and its ~
production has been arranged, while the latter is in the final stage of
testing. According to statements by West German specialists, the second
type ~f mine, which possesses greater efficacy, should receive widest use.
It is planned to use it in several minelaying systems.
The MSM (Minenstreumitte?_) mine system will be in the inventory of
Bundeswehr engineer units at the beginning of the eighties. It is planned
to have two versions of it: ground-based and helicopter. The former (Fig.
3) [Figure not reproduced] is being made on the basis of the American M548
tracked transporter and will include sl.x cassettes consisting of packets of
tubular rails. Each has 20 tubes containing 100 AT-2 antitank mines (five
in each). The cassettes are detachable, mounted on joints and can change
elevation. Mines are fired from the tubes by means of explosive cartridges.
The rate and range of fire are regulated depending on the requisite mine-
laying density and minefield length. In the helicopter version of the MSM
minelaying system it is planned to mount two cassettes with mines, just as
in the ground version, along the sides of an authorized Army rlviation heli-
copter.
The rocket minelayi_ng sys~em is represented in the Bundeswehr by the 36-tube
110-mm LARS [Light Artillerv Rocket Sy~*_em] volley-fire rocket system, which
has in its unit of fire a NUR with c~G:sette warheads equipped with the AT-1
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antitar.~k mines. 'i'he maximum range of fire is around 15 km and the salvo
length is 18 seconds. If necessary it ss possible to fire half a volley.
In the future it is planned to include pro~ectiles with AT-2 antitank
mines in the unit of fire of this RSZO [salvo-fire rocket system]. Some of
the NUR's also will be loaded with these mines for the RS$0 salvo-fire
rocket system being developed in the FRG.
Reports have appeared in the foreign military press of late about a projec-
ted unification of ezforts within NATO to create a common standardized
salvo-fire racket system. It is planned to make the American GSRS [General
Rocket Support System] system its basis. It was reported in particular
that the FRG would assume responsibility for the task of developing a NUR �
with a cassette-type pay?oad loaded with the AT-2 antitank mines.
Military specialists in Great Britain are also working to create remote
mining systems. The first model of such equipment (the "Ranger" antiperson-
nel mine system) has been accepted into the inventory and is being placed in
series production. This system is intended for high-speed laying of anti-
personnel blast mines chiefly for tY?e purpose of strengthening antitank
obstacles. Its primary components are tl~e launcher (PU) and 18 cassettes
with mines. A li~ht frame fastened to a removable rotating platform serves
as the launcher. The platform can be mounted on the top o~ an APC or on
the bed of a standard truck. The cassette is a packet of four tubes con-
taining 18 antipersonnel mines each. The cassettes are loaded with mines at
the plant and those which have been used are quickly replaced with others
ready to fire, There is a total of 1,296 mi.*~es in one load. They are fired
to a range up to 100 m using explosive cartridges.
In the opinion of British specialists, it is most rational to use the new
system together with the towed minelayer which lays distributed antitank
mines. The PU of the "Ranger" system (Fig. 4) [Figure not reproduced] is
accommodated on the roof of the F.V.432 "Trojan" tracked APC, which tows
the minelayer. In this instance it is possible to lay mines of both types
simultaneously. British military specialists have given a positive
appraisal of the new minelaying equipment and consider it advisable to begin
iievelopment of a new, small antitank mine which could be laid using the very
same "Ranger" system. In addition, an opportunity is envisaged for accommo-
dating this system on other mobile equipment, particularly on the recently
created multipurpose "Centaur" wheeled-tracked vehicle.2
In recent years Italy has developed and begun production of a number of
antitank and autipersonnel mines intended �or la}ring by remote mining
systems. The DAT helicopter mine system already is in the inventory of the
Italian ground forces. Work is continuing on the creation of ground-rocket
and ar.tillery systems.
~ 2. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 8, 1979, color insert.--ed.
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~
The DAT helicopter minelaying system (Fig. 5) [Figure not reproduced] has a
packet consisting of several standard~.zed cassettes with antitank or anti-
pereunnel mines (or a combination of them) and is suspE~.nded on the external
t~uepension of a helicopter. One or mor.e cassettea open at the pilot's
comma~d and the mines fall to the ground. Depending on the type of helicop-
ter, it is possible to use various sets of cassette packets and the quantity
of mines in. one load changes respectively. For examplE, the AB205 helicop-
ter is capable of carrying one packet with mines in the following combina-
tions: 128 MATS antitank mines; 1,280 MAUS-1 antipersonnel mines; 64 MATS
and 640 MAUS-1, or 96 and 320 respectively. The CH-47 helicopter can carry
three such packets.
i
At the present time Italy is conducting advanced development of the SY/AT
helicopter minelaying system similar to DAT, but differing only in the type
of mines used. The SB-81 antitank mines and SB33 antipersonnel mines are
used in it.
PHOTO CAPTIONS
1. p. 33. Fig. 1. The XM128 ~?inelayer of the GEMSS ground minelaying
. system, From the journal MARINE CORPS GAZETTE.
2. p. 33. Fig. 2. Laying minefields with the American SLU-MINE rocket
system, from the jc,urnal MI.LITARY ENGINEER.
3. p. 34. Fig. 3. The MSM West German ground minelaying system, from
the journal WEHRTECHNIK.
4. p. 34. Fig. 4. The British "Ranger" remote minelaying system on the
FV432 "Trojan" APC ;with towed minelayer), from the journal INTER-
NATIONAL DEFENSE P;,VIEW.
5. p. 35. Fig. 5. S~he Italian DAT helicopter minelaying system, from
the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW.
COPYRIGHT: "ZarubezhnoyA voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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NATO: SOVIET REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT SERVICE LIFE
Moscow ZARUBEZI~TOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to
press 4 Sep 79 pp 41-45.
[Article by Engr-Col (Res) L. Leonov: "Survivability of Warplanes and Ways
to Increase It." Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]
[Text] In continuing preparations for war against the USSR and other states
of the socialist community, aggressive circles of countries of the North
. Atlantic Alliance are attempting to increase the combat capabilities of
their air forces, which are determined by the capability of aircraft and
their crews to perform the missions assigned them under conditions of oppo- -
sition by active air deiense weapons.
In connection with this, as the foreiga press notes, the efforts of military
leaders of the United States and its NATO allies are aimed at accomplishing
measures to reduce aircraft lo~ses duriiig combat operations, including to
increase the survivability of warplanes. For example, a special ~oint
technical group has been operating in the United States since 1971 with the
primary function of coordinating work being performed in the armed forces
and other interested departments and establishments to increase the surviv-
ability of aviation equipment.
The views of western experts and certain practical measures to resolve this
problem which are being conducted in capitalist states are examined below.
/Aircraft survivability criteria/. In evalua.ting the survivability of air-
craft in past wars and conflicts, foreign military specialists proceed from
the following criteria: number of aircraft lost per 1,000 aircraft sorties
or level of losses (the percentage of aircraft shot down per 1,000 or the
total number of aircraft sorties for a c~rtain period of combat operations
is calculated); average number of weapons (projectiles, missiles) expended
by the enemy to destroy one aircraft; duration of an aircraft's flight after
receiving various damages.
Level of losses. In studying results of air combat operations from 1939
~ through 1973, foreign experts obtained the following results.
-1
,
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In Europe alone during World War TT allied aviation lust around 40,000 air-
craft, with the average level of losses being 2 percent, but it was consid-
erably lower in major air operations. Foreign specialists expl~in this by ~
the high effectiveness of mEasures performed to overcome the opposition of
enemy air defense weapons. In particular, in major air operations against
fascist Germany, the U.S. Air Force flew 4.4 million a;'.rcraft sorties (1.7
millian for bombers and 2.7 million for fighters and ground attack aircraft).
There were 18,000 aircraft shot down, i.e., four aircrait for every 1,000
sorties (a level of 0.4 percent). On the whole, however, their losses to
air defense weapons in the war equalled nine aircraft per 1,000 sorties
(0.9 percent).
In the Korean War (1950-1951) the average losses ~f American aviation were _
4.4 aircraft per 1,000 sorties (0.44 percent).
During the aggressive war unleashed by the United States against the Viet-
- namese people, the American Air Force lost an average of three aircraft for
every 1,000 sorties (0.3 percent). But this level reached 3 percent or
more during raids against objectives located on the territory of North
Vietnam, which forced the Air Force command to assign approximately 25 per-
cent of the aircraft to perform REB [radioelectronic warfare--EW] and to
suppress air defense weapons anu only around 50 percent were used for
immediate performance of the primary combat missions.
There were eight aircraft shot down (0.8 percent) for every 1,000 sorties
by Israeli aircraft in the Near East (1973), while the level of losses of
the A-4 "Skyhawk" ground attack aircraft reached 1-1.5 percent.
In analyzing the experience of past wars and taking account of the contem-
porary status of aviation and air defense weapons as well as the possible
nature of combat operations, American military experts concluded that the
use of aviation becomes unpractical if 20 or more aircraft (2 percent) are
los~ for every 1,000 sorties.
In the opinion of foreign specialists, the number of weapons expended per
aircraft.characterizes the survivability of its airframe, flying qual-
ities, and the effectiveness of tactics used by the crew in penetrating
enemy air defense, as well as the effectiveness of weapons which they
employ. ,
As reported in the journal INT~RNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, at the beginning of
_ ~dorld War I around 11,600 AAA rounds were expended to shoot down one air-
. craft, with approximately 5,000 used toward the end of the war as a result
of an improvement in air defense weapons and the tactics of air defense
forces, while an average of 6,800 were used to shoot down one aircraft in
World War II. ,
Under present-day conditions, according to foreign military specialists'
estimates, an average of 8,500 rounds (of 35-mm, 40-mm and 57-mm cannon)
will be needed to shoot down an aircraft flying at a speed of 300 m/sec.
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On the basis of data processed by A~erican experts on the use of ZUR
[surface-to-air guided missiles--SAM's] during combat operations in Vietnam,
it was established that an average of 3-6 missiles are required to destroy
- one low-flying aircraft. The expenditure of ammunition for each aircraft
shot down in aerial combat in the Korean War was 1,000 rounds from 20-mm
- cannon, and in Vietnam it was 500 rounds or 11 AIM-9 "Sidewinder" air-to-
air mi.ssiles.
The length of time an aircraft flies after receiving damage basically
characterizes the survivability of the airframe. The United States and
certain other capitalist countries subdivide aircraft damage into five
categories (given in Table 1).
Table 1- Aircraft Damage Categories
Categories Aircraft Flight Time After
Sustaining Damage
lst (serious) Up to 2 seconds
2d (serious) Up to 15 seconds
3d (medium) Up to 5 minutes _
4th (medium) Up to 30 minutes
Sth (light) Aircraft returns to air-
field, where it is repaired
After generalizing the experience of past wars, foreign experts concluded
that serious damages occur more rarely than medium and light damages. In
particular, they note that damages of the 2d, 3d and 4th categories were 3
times, 8 times and 15 times more frequent respectively than that of the lst
category, while up to 24 percent of all American aircraft which returned
from a combat mission had damage of the 5th category during World War II.
These conclusions then served as the basis for projects to increase the
survivability of airframes and for training crews to fly damaged aircraft. _
/Factors affecting aircraft survivability./ According to views of foreign
specialists, the primary factors are considered to be: probability of the
aircraft's detection by air defense facilities; vulnerability of the air-
frame, aircraft systems and crew members; effectiveness of ineasures to help
penetrate the enemy air defense system.
Probability of aircraft detectiQn. The enemy can detect air target~ visu-
ally and with the help of IK [infrared--IR] and radars.
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The first depends on weather conditi~ns. For example, according to calcu-
lations by NATO specialists, the range of visibility and recognition of a
contemporary warplane under conditions of Central Europe does not exceed ~
3.5-5 km on the average, while a fighter flying at low altitude can be
- recognized only from a distance of 2.7 km, which considerably limits the
capabilities of air defense facilities and thus increases the aircraft's
survivability. The size and coloration of air targets has a great influence
- on the possibility of their being detected visually. The smaller the size
and the more successful the coloration, the more difficult it is to detect
and shoot down such a target.
IR equipment also is used to detect an aircraft both day and night. The
range of detection with such equipment under Central European conditions is
greater than that by visual means, and on the average is equal to 5-10 km.
The primary sources of thermal radiation of an aircraft when flying at sub-
sonic speed are the hot parts of the engines, streams of exhaust gases, -
electronic gear, and also the leading edges of the wing and air intakes.
The range of radar detection of a~ aircraft depends not only on its tactical
and ~echnical characteristics, but also on the area of the aircraft's effec-
tive reflecting surface, which in turn is determined by its size as well as
by the shape and properties of structural materials and covering.
Vulnerability of airframe, aircraft systems, and crew members. Research
performed abroad has shown that the vulnerability of any aircraft and its
crew is determined by the effectiveness of weapons being employed by the
enemy and features of the airframe and its protection.
The foreign press quoted selected data on effectiveness of damage to air-
craft by AAA rounds and fragments of ZUR (it is considered that a direct hit
by a ZUR leads to destruction of the target).
In particular, the journal INTERNATIONAL DEEENSE REVIEW published a chart
for determining the number of hits by various caliber rounds needed to shoot
down a specific type of aircraft (Fig. l, on left) [illustrations 1 and 2
and Table 2 are not included in this translation]. It also includes a table
w~tii.ch shows the amount of explosives in a round needed to destroy an air-
craft with a direct hit (Table 2). Fig. 1(on right) shows a chart for
determining the effective distances for detonation of missile warheads of
varying yield which ensure damage to ar_ aircraft. It is calculated for
altitude (under conditions of standard atmosphere). It is noted that the
effective distance reduces by 50 percent at an altitude of 10,000 m and by
85 percent at an altitude of 20,000 m.
Eut the journal stipulates that it is giving only estimated data, which may
differ sharply from reality depending on the vulnerability of airframe
elements of a specific aircraft.
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Foreign military specialists include the pilot, the aircraft's fuel system,
flight control system and engines ~nong the mo~t vulnerable elements, and
durable elements of the fuselage and wings among the most long-lived. In
their opinion, damage to weapons and electronics may lead to nonaccomplish-
ment of the mission, but the aircraft and crew will return to base.
Airr_raft survivabil.ity is linked closely with its so-called restorability,
i.e., the opportunity for repairing damages within a certain time interval.
In the opinion of foreign specialists, repairs will contribute to an
increase in aircraft combat readiness only when they can be performed under
field conditions. The foreign press gives the A-l0A ground attack aircraft
- as an example of a modern warplane with a low vulnerability and good
restorability indicators. Accommodation of elements of its airframe from
the standgoint of time periods for their restoration is shown in Fig. 2.
~:easures to ensure the penetration of enemy air defense system. According
to views of foreign experts, the primary measures i.nclude u~e of the most
advantageous altitudes and flight speeds; proper selection of routes and
directions of approach to target; antiradar, antimissile and anti-AAA
maneuvering; using active and passive jamming of radars, infrared sensors
- and other equipment for the detection of air targets and control of air
defense forces and weapons; and the destruction or suppression of the most
important objects in the enemy air defense system.
/Increasing aircraft survivability./ Military specialists of the United _
States and other NATO countries believe that it is possible to increase air-
craft survivability through a reduction in the probability of their detec-
tion, a reduction in the vulnerability of the aircraft itself and of its
crew, an improvement in onboard EW gear and weapons, and development of
operating tactics. According to their views, it is possible to reduce
range and probability of detection by flying at low altitude, by limiting
the use of afte~burner power settings, by shielding the hottest parts of
engines, and by using camouflage paints and radar-absorbing materials. -
_ An increase in survivability of the aircraft and crew is provided by
armor-protection of cockpits; accommodation of crew members one after the
other (in tandem), separated by a transp�rent armored partition; increasing
the number of engines in the power plant; redundancy of aircraft systems; -
providing self-sealing fuel tanks; equi.pping the aircraft with special
firefighting gear; and proper selectio~a of a location for ammunition.
These measures are especially effective, in the opinion of foreign special-
ists, when they are conducted in an integrated manner and are implemented
in programs for creation of new aircraft. For example, the pilot's cockpit
in the A-10 ground attack aircraft is protected by titanium armor capable
of withstanding hits by 23-mm rounds, the aircraft's hydraulic control
system is duplicated by a mechanical cable system, each of the two engines
provides for flying the aircraft in case one of them is disabled, the fuel
tanks are n~~I-sealing and so on. The "Tornado" aircraft has a relatively
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small size, two engine~, two crew cockpits separated from each other, two
independent hydraulic systems, triple redundancy in the control system,
self-sealing fuel tanks and diversified weapons.
To increase their survivability, aircraft are outfitted with guided missiles
(bombs) which can be launched (dropped) before entering the enemy's air
defense coverage; with special gear which warns of radar illumination of�
the aircraft; and with systems for creating active and passive jamming of
detection, guidance and control radars and of missile ho?r~ing heads. In
order to destroy enemy radar used to control ZUR fire, aircraft are
equi~ped with "Shrike," "Standard" ARM and other missiles which home on a
source of electromagnetic radiation.
Aircraft operating tactics also are being improved. Primary attention is
beign given abroad to mastering flights at low altitudes, creation of
jamming of detection and guidance radar and IR equipment, the use of anti-
AAA and antimissile maneuvers, and assignment of combat support forces for
reconnoitering air defense weapons, for their suppression, destruction and
confusion through deception measures, and for screening attack groups of
fighters.
, COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyenT.oye obozreniye", 1979
~
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U.S. ANTI-AIR-DEFEN~E AIRCRAFT: SOVIET CO~NT
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to
press 4 Sep 79 pp 46-48
[Article by Co1 I. Chistyakov: "U.S. Air Force 'Wild Weasel' Program"]
[Text] Viewing tactical aviation as one of the most important means for
achieving its aggressive goals in a future war, the Pentagon is constantly
increasing its tactical capabilities, especially for use in a TVD [theater
of military operations] under conditions of heavy opposition on the part of
enemy air defense.
To this end, the U.S. Air Force leaders envisage tha conduct of specific
activities, primary among them, as attested by the foreign press, being the
suppression and destruction of active air defense facilities. Having
studied the e:~perience of combat operations in SoutheasC Asia and the Near
East, Amer ican military specialists continue to regard control entities,
particularly radar, to be the most vulnerable spot in modern air defense
systems. It is planned to concentrate primary efforts of forces and
facilities supporting combat operations by tactical aviation at putting them
out of act ion.
~ A program conducted by the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command under the
codename "Wild Weasel" is an examp le of this approach to resolving this
problem. According to foreign press reports, the refitting of series-
produced tactical aircraft into aircraft sFecially designed for suppressing
and destroying air defense systems is being done in conformity with this
program (in the foreign press these aircraft are desi~nated according to
the name of the program, such as the F-4G "Wild Weasel"). According to the
views of western military specialists, depending on the situation, such
aircraft may operate independently from an air alert status or as part of .
strike groups performing direct air support of ground forces. In each of
these inst ances, they accomplish the mission of combating enemy ground con-
trol facilities for fighters, ZRK [SAM sysCems] and ZA [AAA] through the ~
detection, identification and position-fixing of emitting detection, target
designation and guidance radars, as well as through their destruction using ~
onboard ordnance. According to calculations by foreign military speciatists.
this should reduce the effectiveness of the air defense system.
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~
According to foreign press reports, the practical implementatian of the
program began in 1966 with the conduct of combat operations in Southeast
Asia. F-105F fighter-bombers equipped with REB [electronic warfare--EW]
gear controlled by an operator from the second cockpit, were used as "Wild
= Weasel" aircraft. In addition, RB-66 reconnaissance aircraft made on the
basis of the B-66 bomber also were used.
Somewhat later, during barbaric bombings of the territory of the DRV, the
_ American aggressors emgloyed specially equipped F-105G and EB-b6 aircraft
with EW gear and weapons aboard. In particular, every F-105G aircraft had
a detection receiver aboard and carried a suspended pod with electronic
countermeasures [ECM] gear and four "Shrike" antiradar UR [guided missiles]
or two "Standard" ARM missiles. According to foreign press infornation, a
total of around 40 F-lOSG's were equipped under this program.
- Beginning in 1970, the U.S. Air Force used a portion of F-4C fighters (two
squadrons, 34 aircraft) equipped with special ~ear and weapons for
suppressing and destroying ground air defense facilities in combat opera-
tions in Southeast Asia. Installed in them were reconnaissance receivers,
jammers, chaff dispensers, and antiradar UR's. The foreign press noted
that the "Wild Weasel" aircraft demonstrated a rather high degree of effec-
. tiveness and successfully accomplished the missions assigned them.
In the opinion of American military specialists, the role of "T~Tild Weasel"
aircraft in supporting tactical air operations will increase immeasurably
under conditions of thz European Theater of War, saturated with electronic
emitters. This spurred the U.S. military leadership Ca continue raork to
improve onboard equipment and weapons for the "Wild Weasel" aircraft. The
F-4E fighter, which was des~gnated the F-4G after modernization, was chosen
as such an aircraft. Modernization consists chiefly of removing the
"Vulcan" 20-mm gun and replacing it with appropriate electronic gear--the
APR-38 system. It includes a detection receiver, signal analyzer, elec-
tronic computer, situation display, antenna system and auxiliary equipment.
The receiver is designed for use in a sonhisticated electronic environment
and so its operation and the processing of data received has been sutomated
using a digital compurer. The antenna system provides a~anoramic view.
The direction-finding of radiation sources is done with high accuracy,
which makes it possible to employ not only antiradar guided missiles against
detected targets, but also other ordnance (the "Maverick" air-to-surface UR,
guided bombs and bomb clusters). Data on signals being sought and inter-
cepted are displayed on scopes located in the cockpits of the pilot and
operator of the electronic gear.
In addition to the APR-38 system, the F-4G aircraft is equipped with
built-in ALQ-131 EW gear and suspended pods with ALQ-119 jammers, the
"Sparrow" or "Sidewinder" air-to-air UR's (for aerial. combat), as well as
various antiradar UR's ("Shrike," "Standard" ARM or the HARM, which is
under development) and other ordnance. In this regard the Air Force
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command is presenting higher demands on pilo~s: They must have a suffi-
ciently large numbe~~ of f lying hours aboard F-105 or r-4 aircraft and be
capable of conducting aerial combat and delivering strikes against small
ground targets using both guided and unguided weapons.
The plans of the American command envisage having 116 F-4G aircraft in the
Air Force inventory (96 in combat units and the remainder for pilot train-
ing and for the reserve). Some of them will be deployed in Western Europe
(according to the foreign press, the first aircraft already have arrived at
the disposal of the U.S. Air Force command in Europe).
At the present time the United States is c~nducting investigations to select
a prospective "Wild Weasel" aircraft to replace the F-4G. Thus, according
to foreign press reports, the General Dynamics firm is studying the possi-
bility of creating a variation, which has received the codename F-16 "Wild
Weasel" and intended for identification and destruction of enemy ground air
defense facilities, on the basis of the twc-place F-16B fighter (see color
insert). As the firm's specialists note, some countries which are members
of the NATO bloc and which are purchasing the F-16 fighter have shown
interest in this modification. ~n addition, in choosing the F-16B as a
"Wild Weasel" aircraft, American experts referred to its advantages: rela-
tively low cost with, at th~ same time, the capability of carrying a sig-
nificant payload on external attachment points (over 6,000 kg) and a fuel
reserve sufficient for performing assigned missions (2,620 kg in internal
tanks and around 2,200 kg in auxiliary tanks).
In addition to special onboard electronics, particularly the AN/ALR-46
electronic intelligence set, the F-16 "Wild Weasel" aircraft will be able
, to carry diverse weapons in various versions. mhe pages of foreign military
journals provide some variations of its payload: two pods with antennas at
the wingtips (instead of the "Sidewinder" UR), a pod with EW gear under the
fuselagE, two auxiliary fuel tanks, and the "Shrike" and "Standard" ARM
antiradar UR's on wing attachment points (see illustration) [Illustration
not reproduced] or two HARM UR's and three "Maverick" UR's. -
Reports have appeared in the foreign press that the American firm of
McDonnell-Douglas aiso is examining the possibility of creating a"Wild ~
Weasel" aircraft on the basis of the F-15 fighter. The firm's specialists
cite as the new aircraft'~s advantages its high thrust-to-weight ratio and
considerable fuel reserve, which can almost be doubled by installing
~uick-detachable fuel tanks which protrude little beyond the fuselage
lines, i.e., the "Fast Pack" system.
The nature of woLk being dorie in the United States to improve "Wild Weasel"
_ ~ircraft in the inventory and to create new such aircraft attests to the
unremitting attention of American strategists to a search for tactical air
;support forces and means for penetrating enemy air defenses, by which they
unambiguously take to mean the Soviet Unioti and other countries of the
;socialist community.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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NATO: SOVIET COA'Il~4ENT ON NAVAL TRAINING EXERCISE
Moscow ZARUBF.Z>~IOYE VOYENt30YE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to
press 4 Sep 79 pp 59-61
[Article by Capt 3d Ran~. V. Kaminskiy: "Navies of NATO Countries in Exer-
cise 'Dawn Patrol-79"'] ~
[Text] Ideas of detente are :aaking themselves known more and more percepti-
bly in the international arena; but certain imperialist circles are setting
_ � every means in motion to retard this ob~ective process. These forces are
pursuing just such a goal in conducting exercises and maneuvers of varying
scale. As pointed out in the foreign press, they are used to practice
various versions for unleashing armed conflicts primarily against countries
of the socialist community, and to train staffs, troops and naval forces to
conduct combat operations under near-real wartime conditiona. The annual
exercises of joint NATO armed forces in the Sou.thern European TVD [Theater
of Milit~.ry OperationsJ under the codename "Dawn Patrol" are devoted in
particular to the accomplishment of these missions.
~ An exercise of this sort was conducted in 1979 from 12 through 24 May in
the western, central and eas~ern Mediterranean, as well as on the terri-
tories of Italy and Turkey. Its primary objective was to work out problems
of converting NATO armed forces in the Southern European TVD from a peace-
time to a wartime footing, to reinforce them by moving air force subunits
and naval ships of the United States and Great Britain from the Atlantic,
and to conduct operations of the initial period of a limited war without
the use of nuclear weapons.
The command elements and staffs of ~oint and national armed forces, units
and subunits of the ground forces, the 5th and 6th OTAK [~oint tactical air
_ commands], attack and joint naval forcea of NATO in the Southern European
TVD, N~arine subunits, and forces and facilities of the southern zone of
NATO's joint air defense system were used for the exercise. As noted in
the foreign press, a total of around 90 warships and auxiliary vessels of
navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Italy,
Turkey and Greece took part in it, including American and French multipur-
pose carriers ("Dwight D. Eisenhower," "America" and "Clemenceau"); over
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400 strategic, tactical, carrier-based, coastal patrol and reconnaissance
aircra.ft (of. which up to 250 were carrier-based aircraft and helicopters);
and 3,500 American, British, Italian, Greek, Turkish and French marines. -
The following problems were worked in the exercise: formation and deploy-
ment of ta5k Curces and groups for various specific purposes in areas of
combat missions; coisbating "enemy" naval groupings in the interests of win-
ning sea supremacy; conducting amphibious 1.anding operations; giving direct
air and ship (gun) support to ground forces operating on maritime axes; and
organizing the defense of sea lines of communi~ation.
~ Overall leadership was exercised by the commander in chief of joint NATO
armed forces in the Southern European TVD, while immediate control of opera-
tions of the forces at sea was exercised by commanders in chief of the
~ attack and joint naval forces through the commanders of t~ask forces and
groups.
Forces iii the exercise were broken down into "Blue" (NATO Joint Armed
Forces) and "Orange" ("enemy"). Participating on the "Blue" side were
surface ships including the multipurpose carriers "Dwight D. Eisenhower,"
"America" and "Clemenceau" as part of NATO's naval attack forces in the
Southern European TVD, Marine subunit~, strategic, carrier-based, tactical
~nd coastal patrol aircraft, and personnel and facilities of the southern `
zone of NATO's joint air defense system; and on the "Orange" side were
nuclear-powered ar_d diesel-powered submarines, a few surface ships as part
of :;hip attack groups, guided missile and torpedo boats, and separate units
= and sub;:nits of the ground forces and tactical aviation.
Taking place in the first phase of the exercise was the deployment of forces
. in tactical mission areas (western and central Mediterranean); formation of
task forces and groups; hunting, pursuit and "destruction" of "enemy" subma-
rines in parts of the Adriatic, Tyrrhenian and Ionian seas and on antisubma-
rine barriers; a practice amphibious la.nding in Teulada Bay (island of
Sardinia).
Th~ amphibious landing of a total of up to 2,500 Marines was conducted from
one Italian and seven American amphibious warfare ships by means of ships'
landing craft. It was supported by ship hunter-killer groups deployed in
the Tyrrhenian Sea, Gulf of Tunis and southwest of the island of Sardinia.
Coastal patrol aircraft and ship-based helicopters performed a hunt for and
_ "destruction" of "enemy" submarines. Deck-based aircraft from the carrier
"America" and "Clemenceau," located up to 100 nm from the island of
Sardinia, provided air support to the landing force and its operations
ashore.
The following missions were accomplished in the second phase: winning
supremacy in the Ionian Sea, Sea of Candia and Aegean Sea; supporting the
passa~e of a joint amphibious landing force from Teulada Bay to the Turkish
coast; escorting a convoy with reinforcing~troops and combat equipment from
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s-
the western Mediterranean (Strait of Gibraltar) to Italy; conducting an
amphibious landing operation on the Turkish coast; and providing direct air .
support to a_.grouping of ground forces in Northern Italy and to Che amphibi-
ous landing force during its landing and operations ashore.
The winning oF sea supremacy was aesured through the ~oint efforts of ehip -
attack and hunter-killer groups and carrier-based and tactical aircraft.
Carrier-based aircraft opErated in groups from several directions simul-
taneously in delivering strikes against "enemy" surface ships. , _
The: passage of the joint amphibious landing force from Sardinia to the
T_urkish coast took place in the presence of active "enemy" submarine and
fighter-bomber aviation operations and under conditions of mine danger in
straits and narrows. The force was screened by carrier-based and tactical
aviation, with deck-based fighters opera~ing as part of combat air patrols
on threatened axes at a distance up to 30 nm from the carriers.
The amphibious force was landed in Doganbey Bay (Turkey) with the help of
ships' landing craft and helicopters. Its landing was preceded by air and
artillery support by carrier-based and fighter-bomber aircraft as well as
ships of the fire support detachment. Ship hunter-killer groups isolated
, the landing area and provided antisubmarine support to the anchoring of
landing ships and transports. Beach defense was conducted jointly by units
and subunits of the ground forces and fighter-bomber aircraft of Turkey.
A convoy escort was organized from the vicinity of Gibraltar to the Italian
coast under conditions of mine danger and opposition on.the part of "enemy"
submarines and aircraft to practice problems of defending sea lines of
communication in the western Mediterranean.
Other missions also were accomplished in the exercise: patrol of all-arms
forces, interaction of naval forces with tactical aviation for delivering
strikes against "enemy" ship groupings coordinated by place and time,;
performance of reconnaissance, organization of all kinds ~f defense of ship
forces during the sea passage and at anchorages, mine warfare support to
force operations and to Ghips behind ,,~~:c~, ~cdL auu logistical support of
ships at sea. Special attention was given to the use of REB [electronic
warfare) facilities to disrupt the cor.trol and communications system, to
confuse the "enemy" and to suppress his detection and fire control radars.
Exercise "Dawn Patrol-79" once again shows that the champions of .such
ventures clearly attempted to poison the international atmosphere and pro-
vide a new impetus ~o the fanning of tensions in this uneasy part of the
world.
- COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye 1979
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NATO: SOVIET CO1~Il~SENT ON USE OF BLACK SEA STRAITS
Moscow ZARUBEZIiNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to
press 4 Sep 79 pp 61-67
[Article by Capt lst Rank A. Korablev: "The Black Sea Straits (Physical Geo- ~
graphic Conditions, Regime of Navigation, Elements of the Infrastructure)."
Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]
[Excerpts] The Black Sea Straits is the overall name for the Bosporus, the
Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara situated between them (Fig. 1) [Figure
not reproduced], which form the only route of communications between the
Black and Mediterranean seas.
The /Bosporus/ (Fig. 2) [Figure not reproduced], which separates Europe and
Asia, represents a winding strait with high, precipitous banks.
7~he /Dardanelles/ is the strait connecting the Sea of Marmara with the
Aegean Sea. It is over 60 km long, 4-7 km wide and around 1.3 km wide in
the narrowest place (near Canakkale). The banks of the strait are low and
monotonous, formed from sandstone and limestone and covered by sparse vege-
tation. There are no bays or inlets. The water turnover through the Dar-
danelles is determined by the difference in water density of adjoining seas.
A surface current from northeast to southwest takes freshened water with a
lesser density (1.018) from the Sea of Marmara at a velocity of 2-6 km/hr.
A deep current with the reverse direction carries saline (38 parts per
thousand) and dense (1.029) waters from the Aegean Sea.
The /regime of the Black Sea Straits/ presently in existence is determined ~
by a convention concluded in 1936 in Montreaux (Switzerland). It provides
for free passage through the straits by any number of inerchant vessels of
all states both in peace and in war.
The transit of warships of non-Black Sea countries in wartime is prohibited, _
and in peacetime it is limited by the class of ships, their period of stay
in waters of the Black Sea, and by tonnage (only light surface ships can be
taken through for a period up to 21 days, and their overall tonnage must
not exceed 45,000 tons).
The transit of warships of Black Sea states in peacetime is declared free if
the Turkish government is informed of this at least 8 days ahead of time and
on condition of.the fulfillment ot',certain requirements. For example, it is
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authorized to pilot surface ships of any tonnage equivalent to a class of
battleships (they must proceed singly escorted by no more than two destroy-
ers), as well as submarines (by day, singly and in a surface condition).
According to the Convention, in wartime, if Turkey is not a participant,
the transit of warships of the bc~lligerents is prohibited; and in case Turkey
enters the war or is threatened by direct military danger, the Turkish ~
government has the right to authorize or prohibit the transit of any war=
ships through the straits. It is generally known, however, that during
World War II the country's leaders declared their neutrality after Germany's
attack on the Soviet Union and granted the fascist invaders an opportunity
to make use of the Black Sea Straits for their own purposes, in violation
of the aforementioned provisions.
/Elements of the infrastructure./ In the estimate of the foreign press, the
J strait zone has a ramified network of naval bases, ports, convenient bays
for basing and anchorages for warships and vessels of practically any dis-
placement. [Brief description of the most important infrastructure elements
follows, Not translated.;
/The Black Sea Straits and the NATO bloc./ The NATO bosses, and American ~
, strategists above all, attempt to explain the heightened interest in the
strait zone by the very same imaginary "Soviet military threat," particu-
larly "to Turkey and her straits," which long ago set people's teeth on
edge. As the foreign press has written, "defense of Western Europe is
inevitably linked with security of the Mediterranean area. But Russia's
egress to this sea lies through the Turkish straits,." Therefore "inclu~s.ion
of the Mediterranean in the zone of protection of the Atlantic Alliance" and
Turkey's entry into NATO increase "United States interests in their
defense" and give the straits "primary importance in Washington's geostrate-
gic approach." Turkey's proximity to the Soviet Union and the presence of
the Black Sea Straits zone within the country's limits forces the United
States to undertake any measures to keep Turkey within NATO, in the opinion
of western observers.
Judging from foreign press reports, Turkey's territory, air space and
coastal waters have been included in the "zone of responsibility" of the
Supreme Command of NATO Joint Armed Forces in the Southern European TVD
[Theater of Military Operations]. Defense of the strait zone within the
framework of the alliance is made the direct responsibility of the command
of NATO's joint ground forces in the southeastern part of the TVD (headquar-
ters in Izmir), the command of the 6th OTAK [Joint Tactical Air Command)
(same location) and command of joint naval forces in the northeastern part
of the Mediterranean (headquarters at Ankara).
In the views of foreign military specialists, in case of war the Turkish
Armed Forces "will not be able to hold the Thracian Front and the strait
zone by themselves against strong enemy attacks from the land, air and sea."
Therefore "to give rapid assistance in defending the straits in a local
,
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conflict," so-called "mobile forces" have been set up within the framework
of the bloc. But the Sixth Fleet, which the American press openly terms
the "guardian of the straits," is the primary "defender of United States
interests in this region." The role of "a screen of the strait zone" is
given to tl~e Turklsh Armed i'orcea in NATO pluns: reaponsibility for coverin~
it in Eastern Thrace is given to forces of the lst Field Ar.my (headquarters
at Istanbul), to fo~ces and weapons of the lst Tactical Air Army
(Eskisehir) from the air, and to the command of the Northern Naval Zone
(Istanbul) from the sea.
According to foreign press reports, the lst PA [Field Army] includes four
army corps, which include ten divisions and four separate brigades. Units
of the lst PA are stationed in eastern Thrace and on the Kodzhaeli Penin-
sula.
The lst TVA [Tactical Air Army] is associated with four air bases: Eskisehir
(two F-100D and F-100C fighter-bomber squadrons and one squadron of F-4E
aircraft), riurted (two F-104S and F-104G fighter-bomber squadrons and one
squadron of F-102A fighters), Bandyrma (two F-SA fighter squadrons) and
Balikesir (one squadron each of F-100D and F-104G fighter-bombers and one
squadron of RF-5A reconnaissance aircraft). Along with fighter aviation,
air defense facilities of the strait zone also include two groups (four
squadrons each) with 72 "Nike-Ajax" and "Nike-Hurcules" ZUR [SAM] launchers
located in the vicinity of the Bosporus.
Four naval regions are subordinate to the command of the Northern Naval
Zone: Black Sea, Bosporus, Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara. They are consid-
ered operational and have no ship forces under ordinary conditions.
Depending on the nature of operations (exercises) being planned by the
command of this zone, the required number of ships is assigned from the
fighting forces of the Navy.* Naval region commanders bear responsibility
for performing the following missions: blockading the stralt4, supporting
all kinds of coastal defense, supporting the maritime flank of ground
forces, and moving personnel and combat equipment through the strait zone.
i)uring World War II, in order to screen immediate approaches to the straits,
the Turkish command created the Bosporus and Dardanelles.fortified areas
;now the commands of the corresponding naval regions) with the mission of
preventing the transit of surface ships and submarines through the straits
f:rom the Black and Aegean seas.
Batteries of 100-240 mm coastal artillery and sea-search radars were set up
j.n the vicinity of Rumelifeneri (on the European bank of the Bosporus) and
~tnadolufeneri (on the Asiatic side) for combating large surface ships, and
batteries for defense against motor torpedo boats were set up at the water's
edge. The latter also are situated in other areas along the straits. There
*For the order of battle of the Turkish Navy see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE
OBOZRENIYE, No 6, 1979, pp 59-64.--ed. `
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is a basing point for minesweepers, minelayers, netlayers, small combatants
and auxiliary vessels of the Turkish Navy and stores of mines and boom and
net defenses in the vicinity of Beikoz. There are also stores of mines and
net and boom gear in the Dardanelles (Canakkale). Special stations are
situated at the entrances to the straits for monitoring and observing the
movement of foreign ships.
"Protection" of the str~it zone is constantly being practiced in various ~
exercises both of the Turkish Armed Forces and of Joint Armed Forces of the
NATO bloc. NATO exercises such as "Deep Furrow," "South Express," "Marmara
Express" and others conducted in recent years have had the purpose of work-
ing out problems of reinforcing the grouping of bloc member country ground
forces in the zone of the Black Sea Straits. During the exercises there
was a practice landing of airborne and amphibious forces on Turkish terri-
tory and its coast, and a move by subunits of mobile ground forces and air
forces from the Central European TVD to regions of Eastern Thrace. These
forces took part in "combat operations" together with national forces of
Turkey. The foreign press even reported that "tactical nuclear weapons may
be used in defending the strait zone in Thrace." According to the concepts
of NATO strategists, this should provide "rather effective protection of the
straits."
All this profuse talk about "protection" of the strait zone is intended for
cloaking the true intentions of leading circles of the NATO bloc to use the
Elack Sea Straits for carrying out their aggressive plans in the Black Sea
basin.
The American press has emphasized repeatedly t~hat this region has decisive
significance for all NATO strategy in the Southern European TVD. Therefore
the NATO countries headed by the United States presently are using all means
of pressure, including economic and military-political levers, to consoli-
date their military presence in Turkey--an important NA~O str~ngpoint con-
trolling routes from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and to activate
this country's military role on the bloc's southern flank.
It is generally known that any state is viewed by American imperialists
primarily from the viewpoint of an opportunity of using its territory for
actions against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist
community. And Ti~rkey, to which the United States is applying "arm-
twisting" tactics in order to include her more completely in the Pentagon's
aggressive plans, is no except3.on. As the foreign press attests, such
intentions cloak a threat to peace and security for nations of the
rlediterranean area and in no way correspond to the spirit of the times.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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FIRST STEPS TOWARD SOVIET SPACE ENGINES
Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 6, Jun 79 pp 86-95
[Article by A. M. Isayev:l "First Steps Toward Soviet SpacQ
Engines: 1941-1947")
[Text] In November 1941, a train approached a sma11 railroad
station in the Central Urals. This,was one of the many trains
stretching from west to east at that time, trains with people
and equipment to forge weapons in the heartland to right the
enemy. The designers and workers who had disembarked at the
sma11, old pipe-casting plant had to finish developing a new
type of fighter as quickly as possible. This was the first
Soviet propellerless aircraft. A liquid-propellant rocket
engine would give it a tremendous rate of climb. Such a
fighter would not have to flyon patrol while waiting for an
enemy bomber; moreover, it wouZd not have enough propellant
for this. It would wait for the enemy on the ground. It
would launch when the enemy was already overhead. There would
be 2-3 minutes of almost vertical flight and a single, com-
, pletely unexpected, unavoidable attack with its two aircraft
cannons. With empty tanks, it would descend for refueling
and for a new sortie-shot.
At the station, Chief Designer V. F. Bolkhovitinov's Experi-
mental Design Bureau disembarked. The originator of the ~
idea2 of a rocket-propelled interceptor, A. Ya. Bereznyak,
worked in this bureau. At the beginning of 1941, he had
already suggested the development of a design for such
a vehicle to Isayev, his friend. Together, they began to
develop intercept charts and to center and configure various
versions of the strange vehicle; they established contact with
the engine specialists. The group headed by L. S. Dushkin3--
the designer of liquid-propellant rocket engines--was located
in small, round buildings behind a green fence on a quiet lane.
They showed Isayev and Bereznyak their entire collection of
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r
steel vescels with their narrow throats and conical funnels:
"This engine here has a thrust of 150 kg; this one is a little
bigger, 300 kg; this engine is S00 kg and this one over here
(we haven't finished it yet) has a thrust of 1,100 kg." They
also showed them the thick-walled bement bays where the strange
vessels were put into operation by injection kerosene and nitric
acid into them. The 1,100 kg thrust was suitable. DuRhkin's
specialists were also developing a turbo-pump unit for this
engine; it would take the unconventior.al propellant from the
tanks and pump it to the engine under a pressure of 50 atmos-
pheres.
While hiding it from their boss, Bereznyak and Isayev drew
Dushkin's combustion chamber into the tail of their vehicles;
they put in the tanks and the turbo-pump unit. Of course,
such strange behavior by the two designers could not help but -
be noticed by Viktor Fedorvich Bolkhovitinov When the job
assigned to them was obviously not progressing but both of
them were working like mad at the sanie time. But, he decided
to wait until his colleagues came to him and told him them-
selves. Then, he appreciated their idea and from that time
on they worked in the open under the chief designer's super-
vision and management. The vehicle's outline was taking
shape and its tactical capabilities were emerging.
Meanwhile, at Dushkin's, the chamber appeared to begin work-
ing but the development of the turbo-pump unit was lagging
behind. Once, Isayev held a meeting on a version of the ~
vehicle without this unit. He decided to try other alterna-
tives: what would the vehicle be like if the propellant was
forced out of the cylinders by compressed air instead of by
the turbo-pump unit? What if the vehiele were scaled-down
by half: make it a ton and a half vehicle instead of a three-
ton one? A ton and a half vehicle would work. There would
~ be less fuel, engine operating time would be reduced and
the trajectory would be steeper but enemy pursuit and inter-
cept would be guaranteed since the intercept zone remained
rather large. During the night, the rough drawing was com-
pleted. Sunday morning arrived. Isayev turned on the radio....
It was 22 June 1941.
In three weeks, the preliminary design of an interceptor with
a liquid-propellant rocket engine--which was designated the
BI based on the initial letters of Bereznyak's and Isayev's
last names--was completed. This design, signed by aircraft
- designers Bolkhovitinov, Bereznyak and Isayev and by the
engine designer Dushkin,. was sent to the chairman of the State
Defense Committee. The authors were rather quickly summoned
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by the People's Commissar for the USSR Aviation Industry,
A. I. Shakhurin, and told that the design was approved and
they had a month to complete it. The entire group.began
working feverishly. The designers made rough drawings and
went to the shops. The design work was still not ~finished
when the wing wa.~ taken out of the jig. The monocoque fuse-
lage was covered with a veneer sheet and the equipment was
installed in it ~cight on the spot. The gear struts had
already been raade, the canopy was attached and the cannons
were installed. Caught up with the enthusiasm, the small,
cohesive group of workers and engineers rolled their first
vehicle out of the assembly shop 30 days later. It was sent
to the Central Aero-hydrodynamic Institute's new, large wind
- tunnel for tests. The vehicle was so small that it com-
pletely fit in the tunnel. Another vehicle was made to
be towed behind an aircraft. Then, the first engine was
delivered to Bolkhovitinov's Experimental Design Bureau.
lt was installed in a steel truss made from the propellant
cylinders; the pilot`s seat and the throttle were in front
of the cylinders. They began to check out the propulsion
system.
Now, it is even frightening to recall what this propulsion
8ystem was liice! The nitric acid cylinders were made from
Ctomansil. The thrust control throttle was also made from
simple steel. A small, oxygen pressure reduction valve from
a welding machine was installed to reduce the pressure of
the compressed air delivered to the prorellant cylinders.
The entire assembly was made from 20-mm aluminum-magnesium ~
alloy tubes. The throttle was jammed in, the Cromansil
cylinders were badly corroded and the joints on the external
cone were scored. Why there were no unfortunate incidents
is a complete mystery. Dressed in oil-skin jackets, flight
helmets and with their gasmasks at their side, Dushkin's
mechanics worked mysteriously near the tai1. Bolkhovitinov's
~ first "liquid-propellant'engine" mechanics--A. M. Smirnov
and 16-year old Oleg Shtin--were beginning to get used to Che
nitric acid vapors,whic~ rose in clouds over the bench when
there were spills. Sometimes, test firings were made. Fire,
smoke, stenc'h and a frightening roar. Then, the mechanics
leaned into the nozzle with a long scraper and swept out the
pool of black liquid, which had accumulated in the chamber,
on to the ground and they counted the holes in the nozzle
thr~at. The spark plugs in the injection head were only
sufficient for the first firing. Week after week passed and
engine development was not progressing.
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At that tin~e, the fascist air raids on Moscow had begun. Bit3ng
their lips, the designers and mechanics stood around their
smelly, firing unit and watched the Moscow skies being cut
by the beams of search lights and anti-aircraft tracers.
Squadronc of combat aircraft were already based at the plant
airfield. The plant had received an urgent front line order
to install new cannons on the MIG's. Preparations were under-
way to destroy the entire production unit if the criCical time
arrived. They received the order: load on to trains and leave
for the East. Within a few hours,on 25 October, the plant
equipment was removed and loaded along with the BI vehicles,
the engine test bench, tanks, cylinders and tubes. The em- ~
ployees and their families got on board. The Bolkhovitinov
group left for the Urals.
The intensely desperate work led to the situation where test
pilot G. Ya, Bakhchivandzhi had alreadyaccomplished the first
flight in the history of av.iation in the first Soviet rocket-
propelled fighter on 15 May 1942. Severa.l other test flights
were conducted later.
With the understanding that they could no longer rely on future
joint work with the Jet Propulsion Scientific Research In-
stitute to develop the engine, Bolkhovitinov suggested that
Isayev transfer his interests in a fuel system to another
person arid~work closely on the engine to support~the Experi-
mental Design Bureau's future work. Z'he first days were
especially difficult. He had no literature or teachers. But,
Isayev was able to find out about a certain V. P. Glushko
(now an academician), who was working in this field,
Bolkhovitinov and Isayev immediately set out to see him.
At the aircraft plant's design bureau, they found a man who
knew engines. V. P. Glushko willingly showedthem his bench
areas and his production and design sections; he gave them
a thermo-dynamic cooling design. Under his guidance, they
received a thorough explanation which could not even be com-
pared to t~~eir previous amateurish work. Isayev elatedly
returned from Glushko's shop and began to operate more boldly,
both on paper and on the 3ob.
The first designs of individual units appeared. A new combus-
tion system began to take shape--using a precombustion chamber
and an aircraft spark plug which ignited the mixture of
benzene and air. This precombustion chamber was attached to
a birch tree which grew on the bank of the glant pond. It
noisily spouted fire and was the first article for firing tests.
Isayev was extremely interested in future firing benches at
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that time. At the Pervouralsk New Pipe Plant, Isayev pulled
stainless steel pipes out of the dump buried under a pile of
rubbish. They put everything into the ~ob that could be
~ found. Meanwhile, after mastering Glushko's design methods,
the designere refined them further.
In May 1943, the Experimental Design Bureau returned to its
old facility from the Urals; they began to set up an engine
division. The following people worked in it: L. A. Pchelin,
A. A. Tolstov, V. F. Berglezov, I. I. Raykov, G. G.
Golovintsova, V. G. Yefremov, N. I. Korovin and others.
Three walls of an unfinished hangar towered above the northern
part of the plant's territory. They built a 300 square meter
cinder block facility attached to the center wall; in the
summer of 1943, the entire engine division moved here. The
northern end accommodated a firing bench with two work areas.
The central area contained the compressor, the instrument room,
the storeroom and a hydraulic bench for nozzle flow tests.
Then, there was the design bureau and, further on, a workshop -
with two lathes. Everybody was very satisfied with the facility:
they were comfortable, self-contained and complete! In the
winter, it was even warm there. Two stoves had been built;
due to the lack of wood, they were heated with bricks soaked
in kerosene. It was not clear why these stoves filled up
the rooms with soot. Overall, from the modern point of view,
the experimental facility was extremely primitive both in its
- engineering parameters and in its measuring systems and, it
was simply intolerable in safety procedures, san itary condi-
tions an d fire safety.
By the spring of 1944, the~ benches were basically a11 set up and
the division felt that it was capab~le of serious, independent
work. Bolkhovitinov decided to make their first assignment
official through the government: "Develop a multiple-firing,
aircraft liquid-propellant rocket engine for a thrust envelope -
from 400 to 1,100 kg, with smooth control, with a specific im-
pulse of at least 200 seconds and 'a total burn time of 30 minute~; .
and present it in October of the same year." It was designed
to replace the engine designed by the Jet Propulsion Scien-
tific Research Institute on the BI aircraft in order to con-
tinue the vehicle's development which was interrupte~i by
Bolkhovitinov's death in 1943. The primary employees of the
design group were G. G. Golovintsova and A. S. Gvozdeva
while L. A. Pchelin and V. F. Berglezov were the primary design
force fo r the combustion chambers. They reviewed the previous
design and came up with a number of original solutions both
for the design and for technology. N. I. Novikov had acquired
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some skill in designing various types of throttles and he
developed the first air pressure reduction valves and the -
check valves. Experiments were conducted on igniting the
propellant components during engine firing. This was the _
beginning of the development for the first engine which
received the identifier RE-1 [rocket engine].
It was under development from the spring of 1944.until
October when it was submitted for State Bench Tects.
It passed tliem with outstanding marks. A total of two
engines were used during development. Engine No 3 was
submitted to the State Commission while Engine No 4 was
flight tested. The program for the State Bench Tests made
provisions for ten firings without approaching the engine.
This requirement was strictly accomplished. During the
entire test period, nobody approached the engine with a
wrench. It worked for the prescribed time and then was
disassembled and studied for defects. None were discovered.
The measured performance confirmed mission accomplishment.
The designers celebrated their victory; the group was gi~en
a large monetary award and, a year later, everybody in the
~ group received orders and medals. At the same time, govern-
mental decorations were awarded to the designers of the
liquid-propellant rocket engine--Glushko and Dushkin, col-
laboratorsto the Experimental BESign Bureau.
With the RE-1 engine on it, the BI carried out a seriea
of flights. The official document signed by Chief Designer
Bolkhovitinov stated that the engine operated steadily during
flight testing. The transition from one regime to another
proceeded smoothly following the engine control quadrant.
The automatic engine start was accomplished without failure
and the transition from the starting regime to operational
regime was smooth. ~ngine control, the electrical circuit,
the automatic equipment and power system units functioned in
a satisfactory manner. The engine performance obtained
during the teGts met the design performance as did the
data obtained during the State Bench Tests. ~
At the end of the war, the German Jumo-4 and BMW-003 turbo-
supercharger engines were Y~rought from Koenigsberg. In the
Soviet Union, A. M. Lyul'ka had already been successfully
working on these kinds of engines for many years and the
captured engines only confi�rmed the feasibility of his work.
It became clear that aviation would have to be based on the
turbo-supercharger engines. Without having time to develop _
at all, manned platforms with rocket engines now had the grcund
_ knocked out from under them. But, I3olkhovitinov's group would
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still build its second aircraft with a liqui.d-propellant
engine. In the spring of 1944, a new Scientific Research
InGric~~c.c~' Was organized with the facilities of Bolkhovitinov's
enterprise and the Jet Propulsion Scientif.ic Research
Institute. ~olkhovitinov became the institute's scientific -
manager and left d~sign work; the second rocket-propelled
aircraft (with the 02 identifier) was built under the Guper- -
vision of I. F. Florov. The engine division of Bolkhovitinov's
plant, which had been designated an Experime~ttal Design .
Bureau for the new Scientific Research Insfitute, would build
the engine for thi.s aircraft. Of course, the RE-1 engine
could have b2en used on the new aircraft but the engine
specialists had a tacte for their work and were not able to
restrain themselves from modernizing it. Although they in-
tended to develop something else, something in the area of
pure rocketry, they essentially developed a new RE-1M re-
usable aircraft engine. The development of it stretc:hed out.
Not until July 1946 did it undergo bench tests, this time
without any pumps, and in December the 02 aircraft :~;ith
the RE-1M engine made its first test hops.
- In spite of the seemingly outstanding performance of the RE-1
engine, there was roam for modernization. It was heavy
(almost 100 kg), complex and expensive; it had too many com-
ponents in the automatic equipment, an extremely complicated
electrical circuit and a total burn time which was not very
high for an aircraft engine--a total of 33 minutes--and the
, pressure for supplying the propellant ~zas too high--43.5 ~
atmospheres with a pressure of 16 atmospheres in the chamber.
The RE-1M appeared aft~r the improvements: tne *aeight was
reduced, the design was simplified, total bur.n time waG
increased and the supply pressure was reduced. Only the
specific impulse did not increase for some unknown reason.
The figure 196 was in the report on the plant tests, that is,
the specific impulse of the RE-1M had declined by several units.
Perhaps it was necessary to pay for the harveGt they reaped
with these units? The designers believed (evidently, correctly)
that this was necessary.
Ir, the fall of 1944, the Experimental Design Bureau began to
define its current engineering course and its prospects for
the future. It became more and more clear that its prospects
did not lie in reusable engines but in single-use engines.
In accordance with this, a search got underway for solutions
which would meet this mission. Therefore, other. work was
conducted concurrently with the development of the RE-1M: work
on developing a promising, simplified, welded engine with
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a thrust of 1,250 kg (the U-1250). This job er.tirely ab-
sorbed all the group's creative efforts.
In the summer of 1944, they were br.ou~;ht a pile of twicted i.ran
- intermixed with electrical wires and flattened boxes of
tightly-packed, glacs-insulated electrical equipment. These
were fragments of a German V-2 brought from the liberated
part of Poland which the Eascists had previously u4ed as a
range. For two months, the conference room was transformed
into a workshop-laboratory where the designers restored Hitler's
secret weapon using the broken pieces of the sheet iron and
aluminum and the smashed units and cathode tubes (like the
paleontologist Georges Cuvier who restored the skeleton of
a brontosaurus bone by bone). They were successful. The
team--made up of I. F. Florov, K. D. Bushuyev and others--
established the missile's ballistic characteristics, its
purpose and geometry. The designers even made overall blue-
prints, made a hydraulic diagram of the power system and
studied the control system. After this, the Experimental
Design Bureau's engine specialists had an even Gtronger ~
desire to develop their ow.? rocket engines which they con-
` ceptualized as the simplest in design, single-use and non-
adjustable. Work on a simplified design of a single-use
engine began immediately after the RE-1 was developed.
tiy June 1945, they were able to get approximately 2 liters
of an li.auid igniter from Glushko. This trifling amount
did not make it possible to develop the firing work as
required. They were only able to establ.~sh that the fine
liquid igniter did not ignite in the air, that a screen
soaked in the liquid ign~~e~ was required for ignition and
that a detonatio~ did occur when the liquid igniter came into ~
contact with an acid inside a closed chamber. The experiments
ended with the detouation of ai~ injection hEad in one of the _
chambers; due to t'ne lack of pressurization in the diaphragm
valvec in the chsmber, the components were mixed. Later,
there was a break in the work on the U-1250, which.extended
to December 1945. This break was cauaed by a trip to Germany
by a group of supervisors. After this trip, it was clear to
Isayev that therr_. was no reason for us to copy the design of
the German engines; our models were more promising. After
spending 3 1/2 months there, Isayev left Germany in order to
continue the job he had already started. The other member.s
of the group left for home behind him. By the end of 1945, -
everybody had returned home and began working on the develop-
ment of the U-1250 with renewed force.
,
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The next stage of the Experimental Design Bureau's work was of
~ special importance. This stage confirmed our general engineer-
ing course by guaranteeing future output of series engines and
it developed a firm reputation for the Experimental Deaign
Bureau. The external environment had a large effect on the
development of the general course, new traditions and the
development of our school. If the Experimental Design Bureau
had had good production facilities at its disposal, if it
had provided its best employeec with the opportunity for
reliable series production and if the employees had been _
trained a~ good plants with a high state of the art in tech-
nology, our designs probably would have been different. But, _
they had an extremely small number of general-purpose machine
tools,make-shift types of welding at their disposal; they had
difficulties with forging and did not have any casting at all,
_ not even the simplest type. Each production order was re-
stricted to the minimum and accomplished 1ate. Therefore,
- the designer's first task in an Experimental Design Bureau
like this was to achieve maximum simplicity and to develop
a design which would not require any special equipment, which
could be made from the materials at hand and which would not
require the start-up of any new industrial ~.-ocesses. Simpli- `
city in production was supposed to lead to operational reli-
ability. Concurrently with the maximum simplification of the
units themselves, they tried to reduce the number of them.
Every superfluous link or blockage was considered a mortal sin.
" Each unit "was drained" to the maximum extent and simplified
to a primitive level. This is how the first designs were de-
veloped and this is how the traditions were developed, tra-
ditions which were cultivated throughout all the subsequent
years of the Experimental Design Bureau's history in spite
of the continual growth in production capabilities and the
incrQasing concentration of new industrial processes.
Although its acquaintance with the captured equipment did not
throw the ExperimenCal Design Bureau off its design policy~
which had been selected before the trip to Germany, the
knowledge of the German equipment did expand its horizons
and force it to look at many things in a different way.
One of its componants could have been copied immediately:
the hypergolic propellant. Isayev did not intend to use this
synthetic liquid as the primary propellant; he maintained the
point of view which we had had for many years: the primary
propellant must and should be a petroleum deri~ative, kerosene,
and not synthetic. It would be reasonable to use the
hypergolic propellant as a liquid igniter.
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Development of the cooling system got underway, that is, work
on the engine's injection head. While designing the en gine
head for the U-1250 in the spring of 1945, they proceeded
further in the direction taken in the RE-1M engine and in-
creased the number of injecCors, bringing them up to 120.
The first firings of this injection head in an uncooled
chamber demonstrated an extremely high average thermal flux.
Uncooled, thick-walled chambers were used to measure them.
The cylindrical part of the chamber consisted of several
circular sections connected by flanges so that chambers with
different lengths could be put together. Threaded seats were
made along the circular cross-sections and along the resulting
sections; "calorimeters"--small, steel cylinders with thermo-
couples welded to the outer side--were�screwed into the sec-
tions. The experiments in an uncooled chamber made it possi-
_ ble to immediately obtain a curve for the thermal flux along
the length of the chamber in the nozzle for various resultants
characteristic of the injection head being tested. This
method was rather precise and it immediately provided a
picture of the performance.
' By the spring of 1946, there was a second increase in the
work on the U-1250 engine. In the winter, the production
- capabilities were extremely limited and all the parts were
made with our own resources; after the assignment was received
from the government to develop this engine, the job evolved
completely and the high tempo did not drop off in the future.
The engine design was completely reviewed again. A complete
kit of ea:perimental engine components was produced and put
into production; these components made it possible to test
a series of versions. Whi1e the new parts were being manu-
factured, we were able to develop the firing work on the
articles which had been made in the spring and cummer of
1945 and which had been improved during the winter.
However, after testing the new parts, it was necessary to com-
pletely redesign the engine again. Only the new version of it
succeG~fuI1y Passed all the preliminary tests. Meanwhile,
after becoming the scientific manager of the scientific insti-
tute he set up, Bolkhovitinov established a division which
would pursue scientific work on liquid-propellant engines.
Scientific researchers from the Central Boiler and Turbine
Institute--G. F. Knorre, A. A. Gukhman and L. A. Vulis--were
hired for the job. Their in-depth knowledge in the field of
combustion and heat transfer helped the designers. However,
Bolkhovitinov�s organization at the Scientific Research Insti-
tute laboratory was detrimental to the Experimental Design
Bureau since I. I. Raykov and G. G. Golovintsov transferred to
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it. The Experimental Design Bureau lost its chief tester and
c~ne of its theoreticians. Other people were promoted; the
work process did not slow down and the U-1250 was developed
r3ther quickly; it became the basic model for an entire
tamily of engines. It was the first chamber design with
c:omposite casings. Since that time, this principle has
become firmly imbedded in domestic engine production.
Tn September 1946, the U-1250 passed the plant tests; this
t~rought a great deal of moral satisfaction since everybody .
understood the importance of the U-1250 for subsequent
designs. After all, the U-1250 had resolved the problem -
af chamber stability and it opened up the possibility of
increasing the thrust in a single unit. New articles, similar
in design, could now have a broad thrust envelope. The
F.xperimental Design Bureau subsequently made progress in
1:he search for the best power system configuration and it
established standard designs for units of it. By the end -
af this period, flushed with a certain amount of success,
the designers began to state that they had already learned
how to make rocket engines. Moreover, the U-1250 was not
tied down to a definite article; it was made "for the soul"
~ind was educational in nature. After all, in 1946, there
~~ctually weren't any arti~:les of space rocket equipment.
Rocket exper.imental desi~n bureaus had not yet been set up.
~Iowever, there was a feeling that they were ~ust over
the hill. Everybody got ready for the future, large orders
which Isayev believed would encompass all classes of rockets.
The U-1250 combusCion chamber made it possible to establish
an engine system which, in their opinion, would provide
power for rockets in any class more economically than the
German systems and would also provide greater reliability and
t~e used more on an operational basis.
The Experimental Design Bureau had not only established its
policy in rocket engine production but it a1Go began to
promote it. Here are the primary principles of thi~ policy:
- 1) Propellant. Of course, there was no special chemical, only
kerosene and nitric acid. A special chentical was only used
l~or ignition. 2) Propellant flow. There was only pressurized
flow. It was the simplist and most reliable. Rockets with
~ completely suitable weight were obtained with it.
3) Engines. At that time, the concept engine essentially
e~mbraced a single chamber. The Experimental Design Bureau had
developed a chamber with a flat injection head with centri-
f"ugal injectors reasonably located on it. The injectors
e:nsured a low "conductivity" in the layer near the wa11; the
conical chamber with its connected sections (the most important
L~2
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thing was precisely the connected sections, the chamber's
totally welded design) could be produced in a single type
for the entire thrust envelope possible at that time--from
400 kg to 9 tons. In an industrial sen~e, these chambers
were elementary or, as they use~ to say, they were easy to
make in any workshop. 4) Accessories. The resua~ e or
~ single-use designed-in units of automatic equipment were
simple, reliable and made it possible to implement the de-
signs for rocket propulsion systems--both single regime, -
and controllable ones with follow-on firings. This was
the engine specialists' creed in 1946. They did not suspect
a lot at that time; the above-mentioned propositions were
partially repudiated by future developments in rocket
engineering. But, others were the foundation of domestic
engine production and it is still based on them up to the
present.
On 17 July 1946, before the official hand-over of the U-1250,
a document which was touching in its naivite and openness
was sent to M. V, Khrunichev, Minister of the USSR Aviation
Industry. In this document, the designers wrote about their
~ ~ achievements in developing ngw models of liquid-propellant
rocket engines and they provided a report on the chamber
for the U-125Q, the first totally welded chamber made from
sheet metal with connected, spot-welded sections, which they
had developed. This chamber was a qualitative leap forward
in liquid-propellant rocket engines since it made it possible
to manufacture thin, light inner casings due to the rigid
connection between the sections. In turn, this made it
possible for unlimited reheat of chambers for pressure and
thrust. Based on the U-1250, a number of chambers with a
thrust up to 9 tons were designed and estimates of the
weights and ranges of rockets equipped with them were cited.
The designers requested assistance in building benches and
production fac~lities for the Experimental Design Bureau.
The letter did not have the expected impact. Soon afterwards,
the branch of the Scientific Research Institute where the
Experimental Design Bureau was baced was resubordinated to
another Experimental Design Bureau; the former bureau, was a
foreign body in the new organization. By that time,
Bolkhovitinov had left to direct the aircraft design
department at the Air Force Academy. M. V. Keldysh, the
future pxesident of the USSR Academy of Sciences, became
the chief of the Scientific Research Institute. The insti-
tute began to develop more and more along the lines of pure
science in the field of gas dynamics and the processes within
liquid-propellant rocket engine chambers. Experimental design
, 1~3
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work was not promising at the scientific institute. Therefore,
the institute was not able to provide the Experimental
Design Bureau the support it required.~
In order to remain at our previous location, we had to get
the new chief designer interested in our presence. Thic is
what we did. We very willingly accepted an order to develop
a propulsion system for a flying model of a supersonic air-
craft. The work proceeded in the same shop with the same
aircraft designers with whom the engine specialists had
worked previouslg; only the management changed. The U-400-10
engine (with a thrust of 400 kg and a nozzle altitude
tolerance of 10 km) had already passed plant bench tests
in Februay 1947. Somewhat later, the entire propulsion
system was completed and the flying model began operating
at the range in the same year. Its flights were of value
to transonic' aerodynamics at that time. There were no major
failures in this job. Literally from Che first try, everything .
proceeded smoothly. N. I. Novikov worked on the system's
improvemenCs and its range operati~ns. The design of the
automatic equipment systems belonged to him. The snapshots
which were preserved provide a clear representation of this
work. Later, in the beginning of 1948, Keldysh submitted
Isayev for the State Prize. This was the first State Prize
in the USSR for this kind of engineering.
:Meanwhile, in 1946, the Experimental Design Bureau had
started a new job: an order was received from the Air Force
for a rocket to assist aircraft take-offs. The as~igned
task was difficult: a RATO [rocket-assisted take-offJ
unit with an impulse of 30,000 kilogram-seconds (1,500 kg
for 20 sec) with a weight of 100 kg (empty) and 300 kg (take-
r~ff) which had to be dropped by parachute after take-off,
reloaded and used again (up to 60 times). Work on the
~tATO-1500 stretched out for a long time. Of course, the
combustion chamber turned up immediaCely: the U-1250 chamber
was already a very good foundation for it. But, the develop-
mental work was labor intensive since it was related to flying.
At the end of 1945, a group of officials from one of the
~~eople's commissariats had arrived at the Experimental Design
1lureau with a proposal to develop an engine for a naval
L-orpedo. This proposal was accepted willingly. Again, they
cieveloped an engine with a thrust of 1,400 kg without any
difficulty and designed the propulsion system. On 18 July 1946,
t:he engine was fitted with impulse flasks f.or fiv~ seconds
of operaCion, capped with a sheet of rubber, tied to a rope
with the nozzle up, lowered into the fire pond and fastened
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down in it at a depth of approximately one meter. When the
engine fired, a brief churning, given off by the firing
regime, was noticeable. After the second command pu1Ge, which
provided full propellant consumption, the water behind the
engine swelled up to a height of 2.5 meters and a length
of 15-20 meters. The water was black from the sediment
raised from the bottom. The characteristic noise of the
engine could not be heard. Eight seconds later, the swell
subsided, the water became calm and the system was extracted.
The rubber hood had been discarded but it was still in one
piece and was hanging on the rope to which it had been
fastened. It was used a second time. The follow-on firing
completely reproduced the entire picture. No changes were
discovered in the engine or the system.
In the fall of 1946, Isayev had his first conversation with
people representing "big" rocket engineering. After all,
the RATO unit, the flying model and the naval torpedo could
not be considered "bi~" rocket engineering. The organiza-
tional work on developing production of rocket equipment was
. concentrated in the Party ~entral Committee. Isayev was
summoned tn the Central Committee and the Experimental
Design Bureau was assigned the development of a kerosene-
nitric acid engine for an anti-aircraft m issile. This determined
the destiny and field for the Experimental Design Bureau's
near future. The Experimental Design Bureau had to relocate
to an institute which had been set up in order to develop
the engines with this design for the guided surface-to-air
missiles which had been developed at the institute.
_ A year passed before the first group of researchers moved to
the new location. An experimental shop had been set up
there but there were still no benches and they had to maintain
their old facilities until the spring of 1948. The old
facility only ended its existance after a new eight-tion
rocket shook down the roof of the neighboring hangar where
the assembly shop was located. Before that, the director of
the new Scientific Research Institute and the chief designer
for surface-to-air guided missiles and his deputies visited
the plant. The director was struck by the piteous sight of
their facilities and he assured the Experimental Design Group
that he would build a palace for them on the institute's
territory. The palace was later enclosed by an earthen mound
into which cannons were fired for many years. Near this
mound, the Experimental Design Bureau be~an to build its
first bench in its new territory; the bench was made out of
a sort of artillery tower which they drug out of a ravine and
out of iron which was scattered ~bout.
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Thus, their previous work continued. A propulsion system
was developed for the naval torpedo and five engines for it
were delivered to the customer who coordinated further pro-
ductian of them. They set up a bench for them at the old
fias plant anci tr.ained test pergonnel. During sea trials,
the torpedo trav~ll.ed a~ an unheard of speed but did not go
very far; because of this, it was not put into service. The
development work on the RATO unit for the RATO-1500 proceeded
for a very long time. It was endlessly "crashing" into the
ground or the sidewalks during tests. A batch of 100 units
were made later (in 1950) at the institute and delivered to
the AF. But, they did not earn any fame for themselves with
this item either since the success in producing turbo-
supercharger engines reduced ~he requirement for it and it
did not go any further.
Then, an order was received for a naval rocket engine from
another organization. This article lived a little longer.
The engine specialists handled their part right away but
the flight tests took several years and, in the end, this
article sank. They were doing more interesting work at
that time with the National Councii of the Scientific
Equipment Engineering Society (NCSEES). A design bureau
had been set up within this public organization; its
goal was to make a surface-to-air guided missile. The
enthusiasm of the young people who had gone this route
attracted skilled people from aviation and people who were
knowledgeable in electronic support and guidance matters.
With a great deal of willingness an~, as before, extremely
- quickly, the Experimental Design Bureau developed a two-ton
engine and a propulsion system design far the NCSEES.
However, this job could not be completed without a facility.
Other jobs followed this one (not counting the primary ~ob
which brought about the Experimental Design Bureau's trans-
fer to the Scientific Research Institute). But, this was
already after the Experimental Design Bureau's move to the
new Scientific Research Institute. Actually, during the
last year spent in their old area, the Experimental Design
Bureau did not lose its engineering growth. During that
year, in addition to expanding its contacts and distributing
"its" equipment on a widespread basis, it was able to make
something basic.
As strange as it may seem, it was in the field of chemistry.
In spite of the simplicity of the de3igns developed for the
one-time propulsion systems, the designers continued to be
bothered by a nagging doubt. They were not able to reconcile
themselves with the requirement to provide two sequential
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impulses for firing. The current firing components--xylidine ~
and a 4-percent solution of ferric chloride in nitric acid-- .
required a consumption for firing which was 25-30 percent of
the propell.ant load. This is why it was necessary to separate
tiie forwar.d cylinders, make the compressed air drive more
complex and install a timer. It was sickening to do things
like this! It was necessary to achieve a"full-flow" start
at any cost. Beginning in 1946, chemists began to visit the
Experimental Design Bureau. When they arrived, they heard
conversations like this: "A synthetic hypergolic propellant
is a luxury. Kerosene is sufficient. But, give us a good
pair of igniters which will make it possible to do a'full-
flow' start." The chemists watched closely, stared hard
and got ready for something but, meanwhile, there weren't
anv results.
" To study starting problems, the Experimental Design Bureau
made a special unit which they called the "the chemist's
chamber": two propellant cylinders, a twin component triggering-
shut off valve, a monolythic injection head with screw-in
, injectors to which the thick-walled chamber and the nozzle
were attached with four calihrated bolts. The small cylinders
were filled one-third full with the components being studied.
Compressed air was fed to the sma11 cylinders~ then the valve
was opened abruptly. At this point, the chamber either
stayed in place or flew into the Gand after breaking the
bolts. If the bolts didn't break, that was good; if they
broke, it was bad! This was their engineering. But, after
all, inertia-free pressure meters did not exist then.
A lot of things were tested in this unit until the M-50 mixture
appeared--a marvelous liquid oxidizer which guaranteed a
"full-flow" start. The M-50 mode looked like this: at first,
a gray smoke was silently discharged. A second later (the
time depended upon the amount of the mixture), the noise
increased smoothly and the gray smoke grew brighter before
your eyes and changed into an actual high-speed flame with
Mach ringG. Not for a single moment did the pressure in the
chamber exceed the value for that mode (they found out about
this later when they began to u~e inertia-free pressure meters).
This was a truly brilliant achievement! It is surprising that
it was a purely home-grown invention which the chemists did
not parti~ipate in. M-50 began to be widely introduced
into all propulsion systems. Not a single bench start was
carried out without the mixture. The mixture continued in
e~istence for man~ years. Its importance only began to
decline with the transition to a pump-feed which guaranteed
a smooth increase in consumption as the pumps opened up. But,
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the mixture continued to be used on the benches during the
development of combustion chambers. The unit for mixing
it was only removed from the bench in 1958. For ten years, �
M-50 reliably and faithfully served rocket equipment.
A short time later, the designers "began to develop an itch"
again. They began to invent an igniter propellant ~ahich could
get along without the igniter oxidizer--the mixtura. This
time, with assistance from the chemists (the propellant
specialists), this propellant was invented based on the
sodium metal, carbon tetrachloride and other additives:
a so-called "stew." When cooked with fresh ingredients,
it handled the job in an outstanding manner. However,
it was not stable and did not go into use. There were also
other suggestions from the chemists: acti~vators in the form
of cloth impregnated with a special compound (the so-called
"foot-cloths"), chemical throttles--cartridges with a hole
in the line washed by the oxidizer--and other "clever tricks."
But, nothing came of them, and later, we were still able
to make it wiCho~at the mixture in items with a pressurized feed
system--using a mechanical, automatic throttle. This happened
in 1952.
In completing the section on the Experimental Design Bureau's
"ancient history," it would be appropriate to evaluate its
results by providing an overall rating for the activities
of this small group of engineers during their first years
of joint work. What kind of resources did they bring to the
new Scientific Research Institute? They had had to learn to make
extremely simple and reliable one-time, single-regime propul-
sion systems. They had some outstanding bench equipment.
They had firmly resolved not to permit synthetic, hypergolic
propellants in Soviet rocket equipment and they proved the
feasibility of accomplishing the mission with simple petroleum
der.ivatives. They developed a number of propulsion systems
which made use of the above principles: systems for the
flying model of a transonic aircraft, for a naval torpedo,
for an air-to-surface naval rocket, for the NCSEES surface-
to-air missile and they made the RATO unit for aircraft.
What didn't they know yet? Primarily high frequencies. The
parameters of tha current chambers had not pushed them up
against this "wild animal'r which had been scaring engine
specialists for many years now. In complete ignorance of the
danger awaiting them, they had no doubts that they could make
a chamber of 10, 15 or more tons in pri~ncipie ~ust as simply as
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a two-ton chamber; they believed the entire problem was one
of production capabilities. Therefore, with a light heart, "
they drew up an S-ton chamber and made the first models in
ChE~ new experimental shop at the Scientific Resea~rch Institute.
'I'hen, the previously hidden "monster" roared in such a faehion
during the first firin g that the glass flew out and the roof
of the assembly hangar was almost shaken off. The "animal"
chased the Experimental Design Bureau out of its old territory
and followed it to the Scientific Research Institute. How
they looked for an approach to the "animal" and the bait they
left for it while trying to cajole it and gain its position
is a special topic.
What could the resources accumulated by the Experimental
Design Bureau in its old facilities support? A lot. Surface-
to-air, air-to-air, air-to-surface, naval air-to-surface and
even tactical surface-to-surface missiles with 100, 300 and
500 kiiometer ranges. Why was it that up until 1952, the
Experimental Design Bureau was not able to boast about the
fact that it had made a practical contribution to the
r country's rocket equipment and had, thereby, justified its
existE~nce to the motherland? The problem was not with the
Experimental Design Bureau or with high frequencies. U:Z-
fortunately, missiles and rockets are not just made from
engines and tanks. To obtain missile and rocket systema,
radio electronics, gyroscope systems, high-quality electronic
equipment components, telemetry, ranges, rocket and missile
personnel and "ground crews" are required. A lot had to
occur in industry before it was able to make everything which
was required. Due to the selfless labor of a small group of
- people, "engine affairs" were ahead in the sense of developing
models and in the sense of the level of knowledge. But,
harvest Cime had still not arrived.
The Experimental Design Bureau's designers were acquainted with
certain models of German rocket equipment. But, they did not
proceed to reproduce them. The captured equipment`s very
heavy chamber and ~large turbo-pump unit were not to their
llking. It was precisely due to the influence of this Experi-
mental Design Bureau that not a single German rocket, besides
the V-24, was reproduced in the USSR. Domestic rocket equip-
ment outfitted with engines designed by this Experimental
Design Bureau were used; they did not have anything in common
with foreign systems. So, we have arrived at the most impor-
tant stage of this Experimental Design Bureau's activities,
the bureau which raised the curtain on the period when the
shapes of engines for space ships were already vaguely
emerging on the horizon.
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~ FOOTNOTES
1. Aleksey Mikhaylovich Isayev (1908-1971), prominen~ rocket
engine specialist, one of the founders of domectic rocket ~
engine production, doctor of engineering sciences, Hero of
Socialists Labor, proj~ct manager for developing a series of -
engines for the manned space ships, Vostok, Voskhod and
Soyuz and the unmanned space probes Luna, rlars, Venus-.
Lenin and State Prize Winner. Pages with particularly.special-
ized content are omitted here from~the memoirs he wrote.
The author writes about himself in the third person.
2. The originator of the overall idea for a rocket-propelled
fighter interceptor was S. P. Korolev who was in charge of
the project for experimental rocket-propelled aircraft which
~aas conducted beginning in 1931 by the Jet Propulsion Study
Group and beginning in 1936 by the Jet Propulsion Scientific
Research Institute.. The ground work for the idea of a
rocket-propelled interceptor was provided in 1938 in the
article "Summary of a Report on Subject 318: Scientific
~esearch on a Rocket-Propelled Aircraft," which was published
in the anthology, "Pionery raketnoy tekhniki. Vetchinkin,
Glushko, Korolev, Tikhonravov," (Moscow, 1972). Although
r_he idea of developing a rocket-propelled interceptor arose
with A. Ya. Bereznyak independently of the Scientific Research
Tnstitute's work, successful progress in this work and,
specifically, flight testing of the RP-318-1 rocket glider
with a liquid-propellant rocket engine in 1940 created a
:Eavorable environment for making the decision to develop
a rocket-propelled interceptor at V. F. Bolkhovitinov's
F.xperimental Design Bureau.
3. L. S. Dushkin's group was part of the Jet Propulsion:.
Scientific Research Institute and it devel~ped the liquid-
propellant rocket engine for a rocket-propelled interceptor;
the work which was begun by S. P. Korolev on developing
this interceptor was continued at this institute.