JPRS ID: 9059 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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25 JANUARY 19~0 FOUa 1 OF 4
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JPRS L/8883
- 25 January 1980
- Translati~r~
~ S. V. II'yushin: ~cientist ar~d Designer
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JPRS L/8883
25 Januar~~ 1980
S, V~ IL'YUSHIN; SCIENTIST AND DESIGNER
Moscow UCHENYY I KO~STRUKTOR S. V. IL'YiISHIN in Russian 1978
signed to press 4 Dec 78 pp 1-207
Book edited by A. Ya. Kutepov et al., "Nauka" Publishers, 20,000
copies
CONTENTS PAGE
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Part I. Academician S. V. Ilyushin's Creative
Work and the t~3rcraft He Designed -
Chapter 1. Sergey Vladimirovich I1'yushin
(by A. S. Yakovlev) . . . . � . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -
- Chapter 2. S. V. I1'yushin's R,~ale in the Development
of Domestic Aviation (by G. 'il. Novozhilov) 15
Chapter 3. Some Special Features of.3. V. I1'yushin's
Creative Work (by A. I. Makarevskiy) . . . . . . . . 35
Chapter 4. The Aerodynamic Efficiency of S. V.
I1'yushin's Aircraft (by V. V. Struminskiy) 41 -
Chapter 5. Engineering Commi~tee Chairman
(by 0. K. Antonov) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~ � 48
Chapter 6. From Training Glider to Airliner '
(hy V. S. Eyshnov) . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~ 51
Chapter 7. "The Flying Tar.ks" (by A. N. Yefimov) 65
Chapter 8. The IL-2 Ground Attack Aircraft
(by A. V. Minayev) . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . i`~ g .
- a - III - USSR - FOUO]
[III - USSR - 4 - FOUO)
[III - USSR - 38 - FOUO]
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Chapter 9. Touching-up a Creative Portrai~ of
Che Designer-Ceneral ~by A. N. Ponomarev) 117
Chapter 10. Civil Aviatir~n Aircraft Designed by
S. V. I1`yushin (by R. V. Sakach and N. V. -
Shklyarov) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Chapter 11. Aircraft Designed by S. V. I1'yushin
_ (by Ya. A. Kutepov) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Chapter 12. I1'yushin and His School of Aircraft _
Yroduction (by V. M. Sheynin) . . . . . . . . . � � � 141
Chapter 13. I1'yushin's "Handbook for the Designer"
(by R.I. Rokityanskiy) . . . . . . . . . . . . � � � 185
Chapter 14. Academician S. V. I1'yushin's Role in
the Development of Scientific Design Methods
(by A. A. Badyagin) � . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Chapter 15. The I1'yushin Designers (by
V. F. Leont' yev) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2~p
Chapter 16. Some Aspects of the Designer-General's
Creative Work (by A. A. Maslennikov) . . . . . . . . 2p9
Chapter 17. Son of the People: A Short Biographical
Sketch (by V. I. Yegorov) . . . . . . . . . . . . . � 213
Part II. Selected Articles by S. V. I1'yushin
Chapter 1S. IL Aircraft Serving the Motherland 223
Chapter 19. Ground Attack Aviation in the Patriotic -
War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
APP~NDICES _
Chronology of Important Events in S.V. I1,'yushin's -
Life and Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
List of World Records and Outs~anding Flights Set ~n -
Aircraft Designed by S. V. I1'yushin . . . . . . . . 268 _
Basic SFecifications For Aircraft Designed by S. V. I1'yushin. Z72
Illustrations of Aircraft Designed by S. V. I1'yushin 28~
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 _
Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29~ �
_ _ b _
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PUBLICATION DATA
English title , S. V. IL'YUSHIN: SCIENTIST
AND DESIGNER
Russian title ; UCHENYY I R~NSTRUKTOR
S. V. IL'YUSHIN
~
Author (s) .
Ed:Ctor (s) , A. Ya. Kutepov et a1
Publi~ishing House . Nauka
Place of Publication ; Moscow
Date of Publication . 1978
Signed to press . 4 Dec 78
' Copies , 20,~00
COPYRIGHT . Izdatel'stvo "Piauka", 1978 _
, ~
, -
_ ~ .
~ ,
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INTRODUCTION
[Text] The name of the prominent aircraft designe~ Ii'yushin, _
became well known in the 30's, years ~ahich were notedi'.s-n the,:
hiGtory of do~nestic aircraft production for the swift develop-
ment of all types of. aircraft equipment. He acquired a wide-
spread reputation after the CDB-26 [Central Design Bureau]
aircraft he designed set a number of world records and accom-
plished a long-range, nonstop flight from Moscow to North
America. It was noteworthy that all the records were not
set by an aircraft specially built for this purpose but by
one of the operational aircraft.
The beginning of S. V. I1`yushin`s creative work is linked to
, the devESlopment of fundamentally new types o.f aircraft: the
- IL-2 ground attack aircraft and the IL-4 lon~-range bomber.
The former was a new type of combat aircraft which was able -
~o accomplish tactica~ missions which were not typical of the
aircraft in service with the Soviet and foreign air forces
at that time. It naturally brought about new tactics f4r the `
combat operations of ground attack ~viation.
The development of the design for the LRB-3 [long-range bamber]
(IL-4) was based on new - engineering concepts in aerodynamics,
design and technology. ~t was one of the aircraf~ which caused
the next qualit`ative leap forw~rd in the development of domestic
aviation. With its significantly smaller dimensions and weight,
the IL-4 had a� greater range and speed than its predecessors;
in maneuverability, it could perform aerobatic maneuvers, such -
as the normal ~ilside ascending loop.
S. V. I1'yushin's design tiureau built numeruus different air~c'raft
and various modifications to them. They included the IL-2,
IL-4 and IL-28 military a3rr,raft and the IL-12, IL-14, IL-18 _
and IL-62 civilian air.cr.aft, which were not only stages in the _
creative wor~ of I1.'yushin's desi.?.n organization hut also in the
- develc~ment of dor~estic aircraft nroduction. In their technical specifications
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rincl ecii~iamic perPorm:incc, rel.i:il~.il.ity ,ind cnmP~irt, th~y were not
inferior to the best foreign aircraft in the corresponding classes,
, while the IL-2 knew no equals. It was not by accident that a
memorial to it was built on the approaches to Moscow, in whose
defense it played such an important role.
The following traits were typical of S. V. I1'yushin: a search
for simple and rational soluti,ons to various design problems,
a desire to create the most efficient aircraft based on a
harmonious combinatien of all parameters and the dev~lopment _
of aircraft designed for mass production and large-scale
operational use. S. V. I1'yushin believed that it was not
enough to create an improved aircraft; it was necessary to
ensure the production and ~perational technologicai efficiency -
of its design as well as simplicity in controlling and handling
it.
S. V, I1'yushin's sLCCess was achieved due to his solution of
engineerin~ Problems based on the latest scientific achievements,
his bold introduction of the new and, which is extremely important, _
his exceptional farsightedness.
It is well known that a relatively long period of time passes
between the appearance of a new idea or new theoretical develop-
ment and the creation of engineering syste~s. The sdm2 thing
happens with the introduction of new materials or new indust~ri~al .
processes. Therefore, when developing designs, among the numerous
~ other problems which must be resolved is the one of selecting _
between the tried and true, on the one hand, and the new and
progressive, on~the.other. Determining the degree to which the
realization of various innovations is feasible while a specific
aircraft is being created is a rather complex task. S. V.
Il'yushin's scientific erudition, designer's intuition and _
invariaLle sense of reality helped him solve this task.
- In solving many of the difficult problems, S. V. I1'yushin pro-
ceeded from the requirpment for compromises in ~resolving planning
and design problems and for an optimum combination of parameters.
- He was the enemy of preconceived routines and obsessions and
also of repeating previously selected configurations if better
solutions could be found for new conditions.
S. V. Il'yushin had many students and followers who make up the _
backbone cf his design organizations. Sergey Vladimirovich
developed t~umerous design principles and methods and created _
his own style of design and his own school of aircraft production.
~ We should also point out something elae. The organizational and
engineering methods and work style and, perhaps, the traditions
of many aviation plants and oper.ational organizations were mblded
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under the influence of S. V. I1'yushin's engineering policy
which was reflected in his aircraft designs, blueprints and -
other technical documentation; he attached exceptional importance
to the development of these documents.
Sergey Vladimirovich Il'yushin.was a prominent aircraft designer
and scientist and he occupies a worthy place in the history of -
aviation. During each phase of aviation development, his ground
attack aircraft, bombers and airliners were innovations in
- engineering thinking. Sergey Vladimirovich made an invaluable -
contribution to the country's defense, the development of air
transport and progress in the engineering sciences and techno- ~
logy of the aircraft industry. The pLblication of this book
by the USSR Academy of Sciences, a book devoted to Academician
S. V. I1'yushin, is another recognition of his great talezt
and his exceptional services to the motherland.
This book tells about the director-general's creative records,
= his aircraft and the environmen(i in which hic work took place, _
beginning from his days as a student at the Academy imeni
Professa�r N. Ye. Zhukovskiy where he ndt only studied but
also built gliders. V. S. Pyshnov's article is devoted to
this period and to the development of the academy itself.
V. V. Struminskiy devoted his article to the joint work between
I1'yushin and the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute in
the field of aerodynamic design, especially during the postwar _
period. _
Supplementing V. S. Pyshnov's article, 0. K. Antonov has reflected
I1'yushin's work as one of the leaders in gliding during its
initial period of development.
G. V. Novozhilov, A. I. Makarevskiy, Ya. A. Kutepov and R. I.
Rokityanskiy devoted their articles to the designer-general's
creativity and his dev~lopment of the large family of IL a;tr-
craft.
- A. S. Yakovlev's article vividly describes S. V. I1'yushin's
character traits as the creator of fundamentally new aircraft
" and as the manager of a large creative group.
V. M. Sheynin's article te11s about the design group established
by S. V. I1'yushin and about the school he founded.
V, F. Leont'yev te11s about the historical phase in aircraft
, development when S. V. I1'yushin created his group. He has
devoted his article to the famous galax;~ of I1'yushin designers.
An analysis of the historical aspect of the creative process of -
. aircraft design is provided by A. A. Badyagin and A. A.
Maslennikov.
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- The problems of engineering and combat efficiency of aircraft
and the operational efficiency of the civilian aircraft designed _
by S. V. I1'yushin,as well as trie problems of testing these
aircraf~ are covered in the articles by A. N. Yefimov,
A. V. Minayev, A. N. Ponomarev, R. V. Sakach and N. V. Shklyarov.
- Thus, this anthology shows S. V, I1'yushin's multi-f.aceted,
creative~work and provides an analysis of the engineering
efficiency and effectiveness of the aircraft he designed. -
The authors--specialists in various fields of science and _
engineering--provide an evalu~tion of the advantages of his
aircraft. :~lthough the articles sometimes cover the same air-
craft, they cover them in different ways and from various
points of view.
The editors considered it advisable to include sele~ted art3cles
by Academician S. V. I1'yushin in this anthology; these articles
were published at different times in the magazine AVIATSIYA
I KOSMONAVTIKA and the newspaper PRAVDA. These ar~ticles
are inte-rrelated in subject matter and they set forth, in
sequence, the developmental history of the aircraft designed
~ by S. ~V. I1'yushin and the creative work of the group which , -
developed them.
The editors express their gratitude to A. A. Kobza.rev, doctor
of engineering sciences, professor, ~tate Prize Winner and
Hero of Socialist Labor, and M. M. I~ulik doctor of engineering
sciences--who took upon themselves the work of reviewing the
manuscript--and also all our comrades who ~ook part in preparing
this anthology for the press. _
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PART I. ACADEMICIAN S. V. IL`YUSHIN'S CREATIVE WORK AND
THE AIRCRAFT HE DESIGNED -
CHAPTER 1
SERG~Y VLADIMIROVICH IL'YUSHIri
A. S. Yakovlev, designer-gener�~1, academician, twice-honored ~
Hero of Socialist Labor and Lenin and State Prize Winner
I met I1'yushin in the fall of ].923 at the glider competitions
in the Crimea. At that time, he was a student at the Air Torce
Academy and the designer of one of the first Soviet gliders,
Workers' SchooT Student, while I wa~s a Moscow school student,
hopelessly infatuated with aviation.
, I don't know by what signs Sergey Vladimirovich saw a future
designer in me, a 17-year-old young man, but I am greatly
obligated to his assistance and continual attention. During
a period of four decades, I1'yushin and I were very close, nat
only as professional colleagues but also simply as great friends.
Once, at the beginning of our friend~hip, I was very concerned
_ about him. In 1935, our plant built a three-seat liaison aircra�t -
which was good-looking, comfortable and easy to control. This
aircraft participated in a Sevastopol'-Moscow sports flight and
received a prize.
I1'yushin liked the aircraft a lot. At that time, his vehicles ~
were no;~~,being built in Moscow. He frequently had to fly out
of Mo~r~vw. Flying himself in a slow-moving PO-2, Sergey
Vl~iiim~i(rovich lost a lot of time; therefore, he requested that
~~;e giv`e`,him ou~c aircraft.
~ i
~ Several t'~mes, upon returning to,Moscow, Sergey Vladimirovich
- j thanked us\~~.for the aircraft. But, once, in the evening, a call
% came from Ry~,vicher, the aj.rfield controller, and he said:
~ ),E - 5 -
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, "We just received a report th~t the de~i~ner I.l'yushin was
smashed up in a red aircraft enroute to Moscow... Isn't that
y ouur aircraft`!" (The aircraf~ I,gave to Sergey Vladimirovich
was red.) I froze from fxight. I was upset. I1'yushin,
smashed up! What had happened?! F`inally, the report arrived: .
the aircraft was smashed up b ut the pilot was alive.
I saw I1'yushin several days later. His head ~~ras bandaged up.
With a feeling of inexpressible joy, I embraced my friend.
"Sasha," he said, "I don`t have any grudge~against you. It's -
a remarkable aircraft but it turns out that the motor doesn't
work without oil; this 'small detail' should not be overlooked."
~ The accident was the mechanic's fault; he forgot to fill the
aircraft with oil. I1'yushir_ had to put the aircraft down at ~
_ night in unfamiliar surroundings. Sergey Vladimirovicr had a
scar on his forehead for life. _
- Sergey Vladimirovich was a man with marvelous good fortune. In
his youth, he was a peasant ~liepherd in one r~f the northern
provinces of central Russia and then he was a soldier in the
tsarist army.
After watching the flights of the first Russian aviators at
Peter~sburg Airfield where Aviation Week was in ;~rogress , he
~ became a fan of aviation and decided to learn to fly at any
cost. I1'yushin achieved h.is dream and,became a pilot. In
1918, he became a communist. S. V. Il'yushin was an active
founder of the P.ed Air Force, ; a commissar of an aircraft
.repair train at the front duri.ng the Civil War and, finally,
in 1922, a student at the recently established Air Force .
Engin~ering Academy imeni Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy. An
enormous amount of work was required for him, a man with
hardly any education, to get ready to enter the academy within
a short period of time; but, he successfully passed the com-
petitive entrance examination.
Like many other students at the academy, I1'yushin combined
his studies with practical, voluntary work on building gliders
of his own design: the Mastyazhart [Concentrated Heavy
Artillery], the Workers' School Student and the Moscow.
These gliders participated in the glider competitions at
Koktebel';''on numerous occasions.~ Upon completing the academy,
he served in the Air Force and, at the beginning of the 30's,
~ S. V. I1'yushin left the Air Force for a design job~which had
been his cherlshed dream for, a long time. From that time forward,
he became the designer of the world reknown aircraft which bear ~
his name.
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The yedr 1931~ when he was in charge of the Central Design
Bureau, marks the beginning of Sergey Vladimirovich's design
work. In 1933, he was the chief designer of the independent
Experimental Design Bureau which was organized according to
a governmentai decision.. The creative work of the Experimental
Design Bureau developed in three basic directions: the develop-
ment of bombers, ground attack aircraft aZd airliners.
_ The first aircraft built by Il'yushin's design bureau was the
CDB-26 long-range b~mber. During aircraft testing, good flying
perfc;rmance was obtained; this performance was not inferior to
_ the performance of the same type of foreign bomber. In his work
to improve this model, I1'yushin developed several versions:
the LRB-3 and the LRB-3F; the tatter was called the IL-4.
~ The LRB-3 was built in the beginnino of 1936. The first flight
tobk place in March of the same year. The flight tests were ~
conducted by test pilot V. K. Kokkinaki. On 1 May, the 'LRB-3 _
J was among the aircraft which took part in the flyby. While
flying the LRS-3 over Red Square, Kokkinaki did several inside
ascending loops; this made a very strong impression on everybody.
Nobody believed~it was possible to do acrobatics in a large two-
engine bomber. ~
. ,
The next day, 2 May, I1'yushin and Kokkinaki w~re summoned to ,
tht: Kremlin. Party and government leaders congratulated the
designer and pilot, questioned them thoroughly about the aircraft
and made a decision to put it into series production. -
Of course, the inside loops over Red Square were not the decisive
- factor in putting the LRB-3 into series production. This aircraft _
had a higher speed than the similar-role Tupolev LRB-2, which had
recently been put into series production. The LRB-2's speed was
- 343 km/hr while the LRB-3's speed was 403. As a result, production ~
- of the LRB-2 stopped and the LRB-3 went into mass production.
To check out the range, V. K. Kokkinaki and A. M. Bryandinskiy, ~
his navigator, made a long-range, nonstop flight in the LRB-3
with a full rombat load along the route Moscow-Baku-Moscow. The
next day, Kokkinaki was invited tn the Kremlin where he reported
on the details of the flight. After this flight, the LRB-3 -
gained a firm reputation as an outstanding long-range bomber.
While continuing to develop this successful design, I1'yushin's -
Experimental Dnsign Bureau group .produced a new version of the -
~ aircraft in 1938--the LRB-3F. In 1940, with the designation
IL-4 and equipped with more powerful engines and enhanced armament,
- this aircraft replaced the LftB-3, which had been creat~d in 1936, ~
in series production.
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_ But,'it was another of his combat aircraft which un3oubtedly
- brought true �ame tn S. V. I1'yushin--the IL-2 ground attack ,
aircraft.
Prior to this, unsuccessful attempts to develop a ground attack
aircraft had been undertaken on nume'~oas occasions in the pre-
war years, both ir~ our country and abroad. I1'yushin was able _
to solve this pro'~lem. Essentially, ground attack aviation--
as a new branch of aviation which cooperated closely with land
forces--was establishe~l on the basis of the aircraft designed
by S. V, I1'yushin.
_ The large role of the IL ground attack aircraft in flefeat~ng
- the fascist armies was pointed out on numerous occasions both _
in the Soviet and in the foreign press. This was the most -
mass-produced aircraft in the Great Patriotic War. ~
The IL-2's destiny was astonishing. ~ -
At first, I1'yushin,made a two-seat prototype version of the -
IL-2. The aircraft crew consisted of a pilot and a gunner- ~
radio operator who, sitting behind the pilot, took care of radio -
communications and, with the machine gun mount at his disposal,
he defended the aircraft against enemy fighter attacks from
the rear. `
A powerful for�ward-firing cannon r-~eapons Gystem Was installed on
the� II:-2. Therefore, it d~d not have to fear an attack from the
front either.
This aircraft underwent State Tests ar.d was put into series
production before the war. However, while series production
was in progress, I1'yushin was forced to convert the two-seat -
_ IL-2 ground attack aircraft into a sing.le-seater. The m3litary
believed that the IL-2's speed and ceiling were tao low. In
; their opinion, by eliminating the second compartment with the
gunner-radio operator and the defensive machine gun, it would
be possible to lighten the ai;ccraft, enhance its aerodynamics
and obtain a certain increase in speed and ceiling.
However, from the first days of the war, the single-seat version ~
of the IL-2,without the defensive machine gun .in the rear, was -
~ defenseless against enemy fighters. The Germans naticed this
weak spot in the ground attack aircraft. Ground attack units
began to sustain heavy losses during the first months of the
_ war.
Then, in the beginning o~ February 1942, I1'yushin and the -
People's Commissar were summoned to a meeting where the issue
of returning to the two-seat version of the ground attack
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aircraft was raised. Moreover, they agreed with the designer
- that the ground attack aircraft did not need a high speed and
~ high ceiling since the lower ~.t flew the greater the damage
it would inflict on the enemy. "
J I1'ysuhin asked for three days,to think it over. Three days
later he was summon~d again. I1'yushin brought a blueprint
and reported that an extremely successful solution had been
~ound: almost without any alterations and wi~haut any loss in
scheduled production of the aircraft at the series plants, it
would be possible to restore the second comPartment for the gunner-
radio operator and install the machine gun to fire at enemy air- -
- craft in the rear. hemisphere. He promised to have the first
aircraft ready by 1 March and the second by 10 March. The two-
seat version of the IL-2 ground attack aircraft was approved
and the dPCision was made immediately to put it into series -
production, even before the aircraft was flight tested.
From then until the end of the war, the ground attack aircraft `
were produced in the two-seat versior~. Their 1�osses in air
battles sharply declined. ~
While deveioping the IL-2, Il'yushin waG able to i'esolve many
envin.eering problems for the first time, including using
armor as a load-carrying structure, finding the technology
to make the armored skin with highly ~cambered contours, etc. _
- The story of the IL-2's deve'lopment clearly shows the exceptional
- personal qualities of its creator:~ the designer's talen~, his
~ conviction and persistence in achieving the assigned goal and
his exceptional gift of foresight. '
In spite of critici~m from several shortsighted specialists,who
, believed the I1-2's speed and ceiling was not sufficient, I1'yuGhin -
correctly saw its primary role and he established the "character"
of the ground attack aircraft. PRAVDA wrote in this respect:
, "Il`yusrin's aircraft is not just an achievement of aviation
science. It is a remarkable tactical discovery. It is based on
an idea which is profound and accurate." :
There �,aas a total production of more than 41,000 IL-2 and IL-10 -
ground attack aircraft. The~ were the most mass-produced aircraft �
in our Air Force.
During the war, the primary efforts of the Experimental Desi.gn
Bureau were thrown into improving the ground attack aircraft;
but, I1'yushin also continued his work on developing new bombers.
Thus, in 1943, the new twin-en~ine IL-6 bomber wa5 tested. This
aircraft was somewhat larger than th,e IL-4 and had a more powerful
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armament system. However, the ACH-30V diesel d~;:~Lalt ~ngines
used on it and designed by A. D. Charomskiy, with all their
positive data especially in ec~nomy, were not brought up to an
operational status and the aircraft was therefore not built on
a series basis.
At the end of the war, I1'yushin`s Experimental Design Bureau ~
began its work to design the first jet bombers. In 1946, the
IL-22 underwent flight testing. This experimental aircraft
with four TR-1 turbo-jet engines desj.gned by A. M Lyul'ka was
used to check out certain design decisions and to accumulate
the experience necessary to dPVelop future dE~signs.
The II,-28 was ths first Soviet tactical jet bomber which entered
~ service with the Air Force. I~ike all I1'yushin aircraft, the
IL-28 was di.stinguished by its tactical and flying performance _
and by its technology,which was auite well adapted for large-
- scale series production. Suffice it to say that the labor
intensiveness for building this 22-ton bomber approximated the
labor intensiveness for building fighters.
The IL-28 tactical b~mber was modified a number of times and -
~ the following were developed: the IL-28R reconnaissance aircraft,
' t'ne IL-28U trainer and the IL-28T torpedo bomber. Howevery the -
ZL-28, just like the LRB-3 and the IL-2 and later the IL-18, ~lid
not immediately receive. reco~,mition.
In subsequent years, the IL-46 and IL--54 were built and tested;
. they continued the line of I1'yu~hin bombers. The IL-54 bomber
had a swept wing and bicycle landing gear. The IL-40. jet
ground attack aircraft was p~oduced and successfully underwent
- State Tests at approximately the same time.
For various reasons, reasons which were not always justified, '
these new aircraft,just like the IL-6 and IL-22 which were -
- ~ discussed above, were not put into series production. But,
- the vaTuable experience of working on them provided invaluable
experience for the designer in his future progress; soon afterwards,
this was very convincingly confirmed by pracCical experience.
The third direction in S. V. I1'yushin's design work was, as already
mentioned, the development of airliners.
By the end af 1943,. things were proceeding successfully at the
front. Our aircraft had complete air supremacy. The aviation
- industry was working at full capacity and aircraft production
continued to tncrease. The urgency in supplying combat aircraft
_ for the front had been eliminated.
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Now, they began to talk about transports and airliners. It was
now possible for our industry to accomplish this task without
any detriment to combat aircraft.
IlYyushin was already. working on the two-engine IL-12 transport-
~ airliner; a prototype of this aircraft had been built with diesel -
engines. There was a requirement to develop, as quickly as possi~-
- ble, an aircraft which was able to fTy faster and further than the
LI-2 airliner which was the Civi1 Air Fleet's primary aircraft
_ at that time.
In this connection, we and the People's Commissar were summoned ~
to the Kremlin on a January evening in 1944. We were asked `
, about a passenger.express capable of carrying 10-12 passengers
4;000-5,000 kilometers nonstop.. We were asked whether it
would be possible to convert any of the current bombers for this
- purpose. It was difficult to say right .offhand whether the
fuselage of a bom~er could accommodate 12 passengers and provide
them the comfort necessary for an extended flight (10-15 hours).
Therefore, we requested time to think it over.
We gave a report on I1'yushin's work on the IL-12. The develop-
_ ment of the IL-12 was approved but they still asked us to
_ think about the possibility of'using 'Yermolayev's ER-2 bomber.
As is well known, soon afterwards, the IL-12 went into mass
production,but not with the diesel engines--with tu~o ASH-~2
air-cooled engines. As far as converting the ER-2 into an
airliner goes, it did not seem advisable.
As a result, during the firs.t postwar qears (beginning in 1947), _
the twinpiston-engine IL-12, and ldter the IL-14 (a modif:ication
of the IL-12), plied their way on USSR civil air routeG.
~ For their time, these were outstanding aircraft, extremely
- economical and very safe in flight.
After the IL-12, I1'yushin's design bureau developed a new, "
large airliner, the four piston-engine IL=18. Vladimir Kokkinaki
tested the aircraft; he gave the aircraft's flying per.formance
a very high rating. But, the first version of the IL-18 did not
_ go into mass production. It was believed that Aeroflot did not
require any large airliners at that time.
By the mid-50's, it had become obvious that piston aircraft had
- had their day and the future of civil aviation belonged to turbine
- engine aircraft.
HowPver, the first.Soviet TU-104 airliner with the AM-3 turbo-jet
engine designed by A. A. Mikulin was o.nly a successful modification
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. of a ~r~iiitary aircrart--the TU-16 bomber. It could not c~mpletely
satisf.y Aeroflot's requirements, p~rimarily in economy.
The state of the art in aircraft engine construction for those
years did not make it possible to develop sufficiently economical
engines with a pure jet thrust; therefore, the turbo-prop engines
were believed to be the most efficient for civil aviaCion.
The issue of the requirement to develop civi~:ian aircraft for ~
Aeroflot's routes, aircraft with all the specific special features
inherent in airliners, was discuss~d at a governmental meeting ~
in which the aircraft designers 0. K. Antonov, S. V. I1'yush3n
~ and A. N. Tupolev participated. A requirement was advanced on
- the feasibility of using the aircraft in a transport version with-
out any serious modificativns,
Such an aircraft could undoubtedly be buil,t; however, its perform-
ance as an airliner would inevi'tably be degraded. Sergey
Vladimirovich immediately stated that he thought it was not
advisable to make a general-purpose aircraft. A mass-produced
airliner must be a special-purpose aircraft--only then would it
, be possible to avoid large losses during its operational use. ~
I1'yushin firmly stood his ground and finally refused to make
such a general-purpose aircraft since he believed it was a big
mistake.
A. A. Antonov met these requirements halfway--After this, the
development of the aircraft was assigned to Antonov's Experimental
Design Bureau. However, they were convinced by Sergey
Vladimirovich's case and the assignment to built a special-purpose
- airliner was given to I1'yushin's Experimental Design Bureau.
Soon afterwards, two new aircraft arrived almost simultaneously .
at the airfield for testing: the IL-18 and the AN-10. The
IL-18 was a 100-seat airliner with four AI-20 turbo-prop engines
� designed by A. G. Ivchenko--it successfully passed all the tests
and became Aeroflot's primary, most hi~h-yolu~^e aircraft. The
correctness of I1'yushin's ideas on the need to develop a
special-pur.pose airliner without any attempt to combine the in-
compatible was completely corroborated. This small but principled
_ episode is all I1'yushin. His conviction that he was right and
his uncompromising nature in questions of principle did not per-
_ mit him to agree with the requirement to devel:;pe a general- �
purpose airc.raft.
I1'yushin's aircraft brought him world-wide fame, aircraft like
- the IL-2 ground att.acic aircraft, the I',~4 bomber, the IL-12 and _
IL-14 airliners, the IL-28 jet bomber, th~ IL-18 trunk-route _
airliner and, finally, the intercontinental IL-62. Each of
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these aircraft did not immediately receive recognition and they
were not put into service immediately; this only came about due
~ to the designer's unbending will,, persistencQ and conviction that -
he was right.. I1'yushin's entir.e creative history provides the -
_ most convincing evidence that there is no victory without a
struggle.
Then, in 1957, another IL-18 appeared--I.1'yushin's first trunk- _
route airliner with turbo-prop engines; within a short period _
of time, it became the most high-volume aircraft in USSR';~,civil
-
- aviation. .
The IL-18 was produced in different versions: the IL-18A, IL-18P,
IL-18V, IL-18D and IL-18E; 3t outlived the first-generation -
gas-turbine aircraft in series production, thereby proving the
productive nature of the very idea of a special-purpose air- `
liner, the idea which the designer used as the basis for ~the
design.
The IL-62 and the IL-62M modification to it (accommodations for
198 passengers and a maximum range of~10,.500 km),�which became
Aeroflot's flagship, were further stages in I1'yushin's creative
work. It is noteworthy that even this very large aircraft has
preserved Chat simpli~~ity and ease of handling which are inherent
in all the IL aircraft. This is one of the manifestatians of
S. V. I1'yushin's creative style, a.style which is typifi~d by
his`''desire for an optimal design and his. persistence in achieving
maxi'mum aircraft reliahility and safety combined with a high
level of economy or cr.;mbat efficienc~. "
D~signing any moderr~i/aircraft is a multi-faceted, creative pro-
cess. It is distin~;vished from the creati~e work of the artist
or writer by the fac:t that, in addition to a knowledge of the
subject, a range of interests and, of course, talent, the
production designer must a~~so be a E~od production engineer. He
- must know how the design can best be accomplia}ied:in production.
The.designer must also be able to manage the people who implement
his ideas throughout all the stages of design, construction and
testing since, in the fina�1 ana5.ysis, the success of the entire
job does not 3ust result from the design bureau mana~er's work
but from the work of the entire group as a whole.
The designer must c.onsider a multitude of various factors and
be able to design economically, without any waste,by using just
the amount of material required for operational enduranre and
convenience. ~
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~ The designer must look for the simplist engineering solutions
so that the manufacturer of aircr.aft requires minimal labor -
inputs. Such solutions are the result of persistent, painstaking
wurk and they are not immediately clear and simple but only
become so after long and frequently torturous attempts.
S. V. I1'yushin is a master of+simple solutions. All of his -
aircraft testify to this fact. It is well known that it is
difficult to develop the simple. '
The designer must be firm, strong willed and able to patiently
and persistent?y overcome the obstacles on the way to his
assigned goal. The designer must not be self-satisfie~ or
conceited. And, of cour~e, the designer must be a dreamer.
It is in dreams that new id~as are born. Fulfilling a dream
is the greatest meaning in life for a Soviet man and especially `
- for a designer. -
- The combination of traits required for a.great designer are not
frequently encountered in a single person. Designer-General
and thrice-honored,Hera of Socialist Labor Sergey Vladimirovich ~
I1'yushin was amor~g the few who possess.ed all these trairs.
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~ ~~I
- CHAPTER 2
- S. V. IL'YUSHIN'S ROLE IN THE~~DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC AVIATION
G. V. Navozhilov, designer-general, doctor of engineering
_ sciences, Hero of Socialist Labor and~Lenin Prize Winner
~ The famous group of I1.'yushin designe,r.s has been in existence ~
for four decades. Throughout this time., the skies of all the
earth's continents have lieen traversed by the aircraft developed -
Uy the pr~minent aircraft designer, Academicfan Sergey ~Uladimirovich
_ I1'yushin, thrice-honored Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin and Stat'e
Prize Winner and colonel-general of the Aviation En~zir.eering Corpc.
First, I would like to point out that an aircraft designer'~s ~
work is not si~nply free and easy crea.tivify and the flight of
thought based on scientific and technological achievements and
directed at designing aircraft; it is primarily the ability to
combine design feasibility (in the broad sense of the word) and
the missions which arise during the develupment of a new aircraft.
The high degree of efficiency of the IL aircraft specifically
show that an in-depth understanding of the purpose for developing
an aircraft made it possible for I1'yushin to discover correct -
and optimal planning and design solutions which~ensured a long
flying life for his aircraft. ~
Each newly designed aircraft which is intended to accomplish
specified missions must meet new, higher requirements. Aircraft
dimensions, configuration, layout, design and, finally, a11 its
~ .
systems must meet these requirements to the maximum possible
extent. The ability to achieve a simple engineer3ng solution
to these c.omplex and at times contradictory prot+lems made it
possible ~ior. S. V. I1'yushin to develop aircraft which have
played a signif.icant role in the development of the USSR Air
Force and which have ensured the accompl3shment of a large share
of the civil air transport. These aircraft occupy a worthy
place in the histo~ry of domestic aviati~on.
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_
Each d~signer usually has his own special field. There are ' _
num~rous different types of aircratt injaviation and thP -
development of each type t~as its own special features. The
group whicli was establlshed and molded by S. V. I1'yuahin can
rightfully be called a multi-skilled aviation group. Ground
attack aircraf.t, bombers, airlfnera and numerous modifications _
' t~ them--this is what Academician S. V. I1'yushin and hia group
worked on for many years.
As soon as military aircraft appeared, the first attempts were
made to use them to counter enemy land forces. For this purp~se, _
various types of aircraft were used. However, the :~d~a gradually
arose of developing a special-purpose, low-altitude aircraft
designed to participate 3:n operations over the battlefield,
an aircraft which would make it possiblP to ensure a high ,
degree of accuracy in aiming at and, consequently, a hi~h degree ~
- of effectiveness in destroying enemy land forces.
The ground attack aircraft was such a special-purpose aircraft.
A high~ degree of effectiveness in destroying ground-based
targets combined ,with maximum invulnerability from the ground
and air--this is the brief formula (far from complete) for the
' ground attack aircraft. In spite of the fact that it was ob- -
viously ~adviseable to create such an aircraft, there was no
serious experience in designing,ground attack aircraft in the
practical activities of world aircraft production until the
- 30's. At various times, individual attempts were made to solve
the problem of developing a ground attack aircraft; but, only
experimental aircraft appeared and they did not become wide-
sFread due to numerous deficiencies.
The solution to the probl~m of developing a ground attack aircraft
encountered a number of difficulties. The trade-offs were too
high: destroy with ~aximum effectiveness but remain invulnerable
to all types of weapons wnic'h might be employed against you. The
ground attack aircraft was a direct partic3pant~in the land battle;
it would undoubtedl,y feel the effectiveness of all the weapons _
currently in service with enemy infantry and mechaniz~d units. ~
The ~iblem of defending th~ aircraft took on the utmost ~importance,
no less important than its ability to destroy targets. This may
sound somewhat paradoxical but it was precisely in the feasibility
, of protecting.the aircraft and oi ensuring its operational
survivabila.ty that the des3.gner encountered his primary difficul-
ties. ~
' Aircraft designers understood the requirement for armor nr.otec- -
tion of the crew and vital aircraft parts long before the idea
' appeared to develop a completely armored ground~attack aircraft. ~
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K~_:.-a great extent facilitated by the .
aggressive operations of our air forces. '
The effect of the IL-2's combat. employment was staggering.
~iring their guns, machine guns and rockets and accurately =
dropping hundreds of kilograms of bombs, the ground attack
aircraft destroyed enemy manp~wer and equipment~
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A situation frequently developed w}iere it was nct advisable
to carry out combat operations in large formations of ground
attack aircraft. For example, under adverse weather condi-
tions when it was impossible to operate in large formations, ~
small iorces ot ~round attack aircraft inflicted significant
d3mage on the enemy. Thus, at the beginning of 1945 in
Eastern Prussia, two 6-ship formations of ground attack ~
� aircraft detected 30 enemy tanks under low cloud cover and
limited visi~ilit~ and destroyed eight of them. -
- When attacking tanks or self-propelled guns, varicus methods
and tiactics were used depending upon the lo~ation of the
enemy tanks at the time of the ground zttack aircraft's
strike. We usually tried to attack from the rear where
the armor was thinner and where the most vulnerable components .
- of the vehicles were located: the engines and gas tanks. ~
We took int~o account the tanks' anti-aircraft cover which
usLally corrsisted of self-propelled automatic anti-aircraft
guns.
We usually attacked tanks on the march (in columns) from a
straight approach or we used S-turns and sometimes a circuit.
In concentration areas or during refueling, we usually used
a circuit or, rarely, a figure eight. We usually operated
against combat formations of tanks from a circuit in formations
of 8-12,�,~'.;L-2's. The greatest effect was achieved by using
anti-tarik bomhs dropped from an altitude of 100-150 m.
Thus, in the summer of 194,3, an 8-ship formation of IL-2'S
commanded by Guards Capt Smil'~kiy dropped anti-tanlc,bombs
- on 70 enemy tanks which were defiladed and massed ':or a
counter attack. The ground attack aircraft burned more than
ten tanks and disrupted the anemy's attack.
Ir. October 1944, a formation of 1S II.-2�s flew out to destroy
enemy tanks which were preparing for a counterattack near
one of the stations on the Shaulyay-Memel' Railroad.
Capt Karpov, the formation leader, detected about 60 hay-
stacks or bushes dispersed in checkerboard fashion in the
target area. Tracks led up to each of these 'bushes' and _
disappeared under them. Gun flashes could be seen from
the 'bushes.' The leader understood that these were the
tanks. During their first attack, they dropped HE bombs
and during their second attack, they dropped ar.ti-tank
bombs; then, the ground attack aircraft descended to -
lower altitude and attacked the infantry on the tanks.
As a result, 12 tanks.were set on fire. The enemy's counter-
attack was disrupted. - '
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In the summer of ~944, the enemy had prepared a counterthrust
in the ShauZyay-Me~nel' sector and he intended to make use ot
the adverse weather conditions which inhibited the employment _
of our air f~r.ceG. To deli~t~er the counLer.thrusta, the _
~ fas~~isra hnd moved forward a lar.ge formation of ground forces
reinFo,a:ced by several dozen tanks.
In four-ship farmations ef IL-2's, the ground attack aircraft
delivered a number of conseciitive str~kes~ a~ainst the enemy
tanks. Because of the low cloud cover, the at~acks were con-
- ducted from straight and level flight at altitudes below
100 m. They delivered a strike using anti-tank bombs against
the area occupied by the tanks and strafed the enemy infantry
with their machine guns and cannons. In spite of the adverse
conditions, the ground attack aircraft destroyed and
- da~.sged 15 tanks and more than 10 motor vehicles; thcy
sur~ressQd 2 artillery batteries and inflicted heavy damage ~'t
_ on the enemy's men. Exploiting the results of the strikes
by the ground attack aircra;'t, our ground forces went over
to the offensive, disrupted the enemy's counterthrusts and
_ occupied ~ number of popula.ted areas.
The superior combat capabilities of the IL-2 ground attack
aircraft not only made it possible to wage successful combat
against enemy tar.ks liut also to destroy ar~,:,red trains.
~ T.n July 19~,~3, an enemy armored train at Tereben' 9tati.on
~ *aas delaying the advance of our forces with its fire. ~
, Twd flights of IL-2's commanded by Lts Belyakov and Ry~hov
flew out to destroy the a.rmored train. It was detected at
Buki Station. It was made up of four armored cars with ~
' an engine between them. Four ammunitic,n flatcars were
located 300 m from it. Everything was thoroughly camou-
flaged against the background ot the surrounding woods.
- To make ~ure that the target they had detected w~s,the armoxed
train, the ground attacic aircraft mac~e a dry run. The enemy
upened up with anti-aircraft fire. Then, the ground attack ~
aircraf; reformed into a circuit and began sequential, single-
ship attacks from an altitude of 2C~Q-5~0 m. Encountering
no further apposition from the enemy az~mored train, our
f~rces continued their offensive.
The following episode, zahich was very well k.no~an among front
~ line soldiers, testifies to the effectiveness of the ground
_ attack aircraft operations. A 7-ship fL-2 �or.mation _
c~mmanded by Lt Dolgc~v delivered a strike against'3nepet.ovka _
- railroad junction where 14 trains were massed. Tha ground _
~ attack aircraft opera:ted without fighter cover since there
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was dense cloud cover at an altitude of 400 m and above and
the visibility was approximately 2 km; this precluded any
opposition f~om enemy fighters. The forma'~ion arrived at
the target and they all delivered a simultaneous gliding
strike. `About 30 cars were destroyed or damaged and
there were severe explosions and fires among the trains.
- The ground attack aircraft did not sustain any losses. The
fires and explosions at Shepetovka Station continued without
~nY let up for 3 1/2 hours; as a result, all 14 ene~y trains
were destroyed. The explosion of th:~~ ~ars with explosives
on board destroyed five adjacent tracks, the railroad repair
depot and other buildings. A large crater was formed at the
- site of the axplosion. The entire railroad junction was
put out of commission. -
The destruction was so great that the enemy was not able to
bring the damage from the ground attack strike under control
and by the time the station was occupied by our forces only -
two tracks had been restored for trains to move along.
In October 1944, while trying to stop the subsequent advance
_ of our forces, the enemy concentrated a large number of _
infantry, tanks and artillery, as well as an armored train,
near Mazheykyay. Whi1e moving within a sector of the
Kurmanitse-Mazheykyay Railroad which paralled the front line,
the armored train was interdicting the 4th Shbck Army's
advance with its fire. As a result of thQ very first attack,
,there were several explosions on the armored train and the -
engine was surrounded by clouds of steam. During the third
_ pass, there was a severe explosion on tne armored train and
� the fire from this explosion extended to a great height. -
. The ammnnition flatcars were also blown up. The ground
attack aircrai~t returned to their airfield without any losses;
the ground forces command element reported that the armored
train was not firing and our infantry was successfully advanc- _
- ing. -
For a short period of time, the ground attack reconnaisssnce
aircraft were not able to detect the armorecl train. The
enemy moved its location frequently and thoroughly camou-
_ flaged it into the surrounding terrain. It was Lt Kuznetsov, -
the Ieader of a four-ship formation of ground attack aircraft,
who noticed th~ armored train. While flying at an altitude of
100 m, he detected a break in the roadbed which was over-
grown by branches of trees. Kuznetsov decided to fir~e at -
the suspicious-looking bank. After opening fire, he paid
attention to the bursts caused by the shells hitting the ban~.--
the branches iaere camoufiaging the armored train. During
their first pass, the ground attack aircraft destroypd the
tracks an both sides of the armored train; du~ing subsequent
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attacks they damaged the engine and smashed up the armored
tender, the artillery platform and the anti-aircraft gun.
In 1943, the ground attack aircraft began to be used more
frequently, not only for operations on the battlefield but -
also in the enemy's rear. One of the difficult operations
- was attacking airfields. I remember when our 233rd Ground
Attaclc Division was assigned a responsible mission: destroy
the fascist aircraft at Shatalovo Airfield. From tk~is base, -
the fascists were delivering strik~s against Soviet forces
and conducting reinforced reconnaissance flights in our
rear. In addition, our reconnaissance r~ported that there _
were many fascist bombers there and over 10 POL and ammuni-
tion trains.
_ ...It was still not light when the duty officer got us up.
The pilots and air gunners assembled within a few minutes.
The technicians had already prapared the aircraft for flying.
During these difficult four years, the engineers and technicians -
work was made easier by the aircraft design which had been
thought out ver~, well down to the last detail. The large
hatches quickly gave free access to the primary aircraft and
engine systems and assemblies. Not a single aircraft besides
the IL-2 could be repaired so quickly under front line airfield
conditions. A bent propeller was straightened out with a
sledge hammer, the engine was tested on the ground and the -
aircraft was launched. It turned out that this ai~craft would
' subsequently fly dozens of combat sorties. Wings, half a
fuselage and tail sections were replaced under field conditions.
During a single cold night, they could put in a new engine and ~
launch the aircraft in the morning. The simple gear design was
rel;:,,able. If you taxied along a muddy taxi-way in any other
modern aircraft, the gear would not retract later. The gear
on the IL-2 withstood everything: crude landings, any roughness,
punctured wheels and the �'rolling" during the landing run. The
pilots joked: `~You can begin taxing the IL-2 at an altitude of
_ 50 m." Moreover, there were forced landings without airfields,
without gear, belly-in and, moreover, in the woods',
ravines or hills! It seemed like only a miracle had saved the
crew when it was painful to even look at the aircraft. But,
both the aircraft and the crew were. usually returned to forma-
- tion. This was a miracle made by man: by the designer'~s talen*_
multiplied by the selfless work of our engineers and technicians
_ and the expertise of the pilots who were able to bring a'wounded'
aircraft back to friendly territory under the most difficult
conditions. ~
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An aircraft's invulnerability is a very valuable characteristic ~
during war. The IL-2 ground attack aircraft was completely
invulnerable. Was this considered the most important thing -
in develoging a battlefield aircraft?
Even in February 1940, when everything was ready to put the
new ground attack aircraft into series production, skeptics
were saying that the IL-2's speed and altitude capabilities ~
were too low. However, even then,~the designer was convinced
_ that the ground attack aircraft was not a fighter and it had
- other distinctive characteristics. A ground attack aircraft
required cannons, machine guns, rockets, bombs and,'.~nost
- importantly, armor,which�would make it possible to employ
alI these weapons on the battlefield. But, the skeptics
' declarQd that 6-12 mm thick armor was poor pro*_ection. The
designer proved that the armor would not function alone but
in combination with the specific configuration of the entire
aircraft, with sufficiently high speed and high maneuverability.
It was this totality of the most diverse design solutions which
provided the IL-2's unsurpassed survivability,which had never
been seen in riomestic or foreign aircraft productiono..
...Now, we Werein the cockpits of our combat aircraft. The _
primary mission of the ground attack aircraft w3s to penetrate
to the target through enemy fighters and anti-aircraft fire, -
= deliver their lethal cargo to the objective, deliver it on
the enemy, smash his will power, crush the Hitlerites military
hardware and de~troy the enemy. Everybody knew his mission
_ and everyb4dy was ready to carry out the operations order to
tb.e best of his ability.
A single opinion on the location of fighter cover had not
been developed at that time; but, I always stuck to the
principle that the fighter cover leader knew where they should
be located. =
Our low-aitit~de, surprise attack tactics were successful for
us. The Hit3.erites were not expecting our raid. The airfield-
was just beginning to stir. TheLe were aircraft ~acked close
_ together on the hardstands. Evidently, the enemy anti-aircraft
gunners were 'sleeping through' our arrival. They did not ,
fire a single shot whiJ.e we were making our passes on the
target. But, now, the first formation of ground attack aircraft
~ had dropped delayed-action bombs directly o~n the fascist bombers.
A few seconds later, there was a powerful ~xplosion~, The eneu~y
aircraft were burning. The airfield was shrouded iii bl~~ck smolce.
A fPw seconds later, the second formation made a pass on another
hardstand. From a distance, they opened up with their cannons and
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machine guns against the closely packed fascist aircraft. -
~ After getting closer, they dropped bombs from a single
pass. These aircraft were transformed into a large pocket
of fire. The fascists were not able to save a single air-
craft. Everythin~ was enveloped in smok~; only large tongues
of flames were visible through it.
_ Fiery chains stretched out in pursuit of the departing aircraft--
Hitler's anti-aircraft batteries had finally opened ffre. -
- This time, the anti-aircraft gunners had guessed our maneuver
and they knew~~that we were returning for a follow-on attack;
They put up a curtain of fire in front of us. Our air gunners
counted 5~0-600 bursts in the sky through which we had to fly.
It was not easy for the flight leader and his wingman to
direct their aircraft straight into a tongue of fire. It
was even morz difficult to do. this with an aircraft which
was photographing the post-strike results. The enemy was
' naturally trying to get revenge for the damage done. He
was directing all his fire at the airborne photographer.
_ But, an Qrder is an o.rder: the results of the raid had
to be recorded. After turning on the camera, I tried to
fly precisely over the aircraft hardstands wnich were
enveloped by flames.
r;
Suddenly, I felt a severe impact~on the fuselage and, 5-10 -
seconds later, another. ~ne on the left w~ng~
But, the aircraft~N4s flying and I was maintaining the pre-
~ scribed course. I could not see ariy smoke or fire. That
meant I was not burning. The gunner shouted something, but
it was impossible to make it out in this ~haos. Our
ground attack aircraft jerked again se~~erely--a third direct
. hit. This time, smoke burst into the cockpit. My throat =
was dry and I couldn't breath; but, I decided to endure it
and f1y straight ahead several more seconds and accomplish
_ the mission before jerking the aircraft to the right or ~
left, down to the side ia order to somehow attempt to get
out of this fiery hell. ' -
Through the din of the engin,e, I heard the machine gun
_ chatter. It was JrLt Smirnuv, my gunner, firing at the
anti-aircraft c~rews. 'Good show!' I praised him over
the intercom system while I pushed the stick forward and
put the-aircr.aft into a slipping descent. But, for some -
reason, it was hesitantly reacting to the change in the .
, position of the controls; it was banking to ti~e left. I -
looked at the left wing. Jagged edges bristled on the wing
tip.,; The port aileron had ~ gaping hole in iC and, the canvas
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- sCrlps were fluttering in the airstream like they were alive.
't`I~e ~unner reported that the fusela~e had a large hole in it.
i cautiously tried the controls. Although sluggishly, the
aircraft responded. My wingman was sticking with me. I
asiced him:
'Babkin,.how are you?'
'Okay, commander; only, for some reason, my gLnner is silent.
~ I will fly ahead and you look and see what's wrong with him.' `
I throttled down and let my wingman go ahead. Although white -
as chalk, his gunner was smiling and giving a thumbs-up sign. `
The other formations took no losses while Hitler's primary
airfield was put out of commiss~on for a long time. This
was co:~firmed by our post-attack photography and by a
reconnaissance report which arrived later.
As is well known, the YL-2 ground attack aircraft began to
enter line units at the beginning of the war. It was
mastered and ground attack tactics were developed during
, combat operations. In Che beginning, each commander taught
his subordinates what he himself knew based on his awn
personal experience. But,.gradually, the best tactics became
- accessible to everybody. Thus, common efforts led to the
discovery of the 'circuit' combat formation. The ground
- a.ttack aircraft formed up in single file over the objective
and dived on the enemy one after the~other. Then, the first
aircraft caught up with the last one in the file and the
aircraft again took turns assaulting the ene~y., We had a
- closed loop and not a single enemy fighter dared attack our -
combat formation and run into the concentrated fire of Che
gunners from the other aircraft. We formed up into this -
'circuit' while we were flying,in 4-ship, 6-ship, 8-ship and
larger formations when attacking Messerschmidts and Focke--Wulfs.
The enemy anti-aircraft gunnelrs gave the ground attack aircraft
a lot of trouble. They tried t~ hit our aircraft at the in-
sCant we transitioned into a dive or when the aircraft were
climbing while recovering from a dive. When conducting raids
' on enemy ob~ectives with good anit-aircraft cover, our
squadran began to form a two-group combat formation. The
covering group suppressed the anti-aircraft guns wh~le the
~ inain group assaulted the assigned ob;ective. This simple
tactic was very effective. ~
To provide greater safety'for ~urselves against possible losses
from ~he anti--a.ircraft guns, we also introduced maneuvering
= in information'Which gave each pilot the opportunity to
~ ~E;~
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continually change his altitude (fly higher or lower than
the flight leader), reduce and increase intQrvals between
aircraft and even turn slightly away, within permissible
limits of course.
_ This was facilitated by the exceptional ease in flqing the ~
IL-2 and the simplicity in operating it. The process o�
~ flying it was not difficult. When operating over the target
or in air combat, the pilot's attention was not distracted
by any difficult manipulations of instruments or equipment
- in the cockpit. The aircraft even made it possible to make
gross flying errors~which was very important when the~pilot
was carrying out an attack or engaged in combat and aid not
have time to watch the instruments. I do not know a case
where an aircraft lost its controllability or went into a
spin due to errors in flying procedures. This aircraft was
a godsend for training new flying and technical personnel
under the most difficult wartime conditions; it ensured the
uninterrupted reconstitution of combat losses.
Throughout the entire war, the combat operations oi ground
_ attack aircraft usually took place under strong opposition
from fascist fighters. The ground attack aircraft's ability
to get through them was just as important to us as suppressing
anti-aircraft fire. _
It was difficult for a heavily loac~ed ground attack aircraft
enroute to the target to compete with a Messerschmidt in
- maneuverability. But, if forced by the situation, we also
were not inferior to them. I personally engaged in 47 air
battles and our aircraft was not damaged in a single one of
them. I am bbligated to my air gunners for this, especiall~
Yuriy Dobrov.
- There were numerous examples where I1-2's waged successful air
battles against enemy fighters. Thus, a 6-ship formation of
Messerschmidts ~umped SrLt Vasil'yev's aircraft when he was
flying weather reconnaissance. Maneuvering skillfully, our
pilat directed precise ~tire against the enemy aircraft. The
gunnE~.r, MSgt Ponomarev, did not lag behind the commander.
' They shot down one of the Messerschmidts and got away from
the others by flying at low altitude:
In September 1942, a six-ship formation of IL-2's commanded by
Capt Anan'in flew out to destroy enemy reserves south of
Sychevka Station. The ground attack aircraft arrived at the
target and delivered an accurate strike against it. While re-
covering from the attack, Lt Zhigarin noticed that two enemy
fighters were attacking the lead element while two other
Messerschmidts were covering them from above. Zhigarin warned ;
,
.
-86- p'';,a
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the flight leader, turned quickly and beat off the enemy fighter
atrack with cannon fire and rockets. Five ground attack air-
- craft quickly formed up into a'circuit' to repel the enemy
fighter attack. The sixth pilot, Sgt Karbash'yan, whose
aircraft had been hit by anti-aircraft artillery fire over
- the target, had broken away from the formation and was not
able to form up with it. The Messerschmidts pounced on the
damaged aircraft. Zhigarin hurried to his assistance and
shot down one of the Messexschmidts with long burats from his
cannons and machin2 guns. The enemy fighters left the damaged
IJ,-2 and began to attack Zhigarin's air.craft. Making use
of this opportunity, Karbash'yan descended and headed for
friendly territory. While engaged in high-G maneuvers,
Zhigarin was evading the Messerschmidt attacks and he
was approaching the rest of the aircraft in his formation~ ?
which was withdrawing toward the front 1ine. The Messerschmidts
cut off Zhigarin and did not give him a chance to link u~
with the formation. While already over the front line,
_ Capt Anan'in saw three Messerschmidts attacking Zhigarin's
aircraft and he led the remaining aircraft in the six-ship
formation to his assistance. Approaching from the side
and then from below, he shot down the enemy aircra~t which
had come especially close to Zhigarin's aircraft:' Having -
lost two aircraft in the air battle, the enemy fighters
broke off the attacic against the ground attack aircraft.
In June 1943, a six-ship formation of IL-2 ground attack
aircraft commanded by Capt Greben'kov, and escorted by
� ten YAK-7b fighters, delivered a s~rik:e against railroad
trains. One of the IL-2's was shot down by anti-aixcraft
artillery fire. At the same time, the formation came
undF.r attack by enemy fighters: about 40 Fockke-Wulf-190
fighters joined the escort fighters in combat while ten
I'ockers pounced upon the remaining five ground attack air-
craft. Employing the S and scissors tactics, the ground
attack aircraft successfully repelled all the enemy fighter ,
attacks and withdrew to the east along the Orel-Yelets
`rail line. During the defensive battle, Greben'/kov saw
the trail aircraft in his formation atta~k two F'okker�s.
With a combat Curn, Greben'kov took up an advantageous
position above the enemy and, from a dive, shot down the
_ fascist figi~ter eJ.ement leader. At that time, Greben'kov
himself was being fired upon by an element ;of .Focke-Wulf-190's.
_ Hz fell behlr~d, the formation and was forced to rep'el the -
enemy fights~ attacks by himself. The fascist fighters were
continually attacking his aircraft but ~hey wer~ unsuccessful.
i', By making skillful use of his aircraft'a man~uvering capabil-
ities and i*_s fire power, Greben'kov ~roke away from Che ,
Fo:ckers' pursuit and returned to home base.
-87- -
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' ~ ~ ~ _
11~
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~
, ~ ~ - `'z ^
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f i . L
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S. V. I1'yushin and V. K. Kokkinaki, test pi].ot fi~r all types ~
of I1'yushin-designed aircra~~'t.
-88-
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x,.~_,
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t,
The IL-2.ground attack aircraft--"the great workhorse of
the war."
` ~ ~
-89- -
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~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
J,; , ;
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1. T;te Mastyazhart glider de~igned by S. V. I1'yushin.
2. The Moscow CDB-26 atrcraft which made a nonstop flight
~ from Moscow to North America: -
- -90-
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~ ~,i~
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1. An IL-2 ground attack element on its way to carry out a
combat mission.
2. A se~~erely damaged IL-2 which returned to its home base.
-91- ~
FOR 0'`'FICIAL USE ONLY
-
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IL-2 ground attack aircraft attacking the`>anemy froin a dive.
" -92- -
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~'T~ s :y~, ry,~ .~~.,$iti n`~a +f' ' - ..:~�-z~7{
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1. The IL-10 ground attack aircraft with rockc~ts. '
2. The IL-20 ground attack aircraft.
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_ The I1'yushin family of ground attack aircraft.
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_ 1. The IL-4 lo~g-range bomber.
2. The IL-4 torpedo bomber.
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1. The IL-22 .~xperimental aircraft.
2. The IL-28 tactical jet bomber.
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~ L9'`t�'~ff ~ ~he two-seat version was supposedly a modification
of the single-seat version. This is not so. S. V. I1'yushin
immediately proposed an aircraft with a second crew member--the
gunner. He believed that passive defense (the armor) alone was
not enough and that active defense, like a gun turret to cover
the aircraft's tail section, was required. The single-seat ver-
sion was built in the beginning. The first days of the war
confirmed the correctness of the desigrer's position and they
began to build th~ two-seater vers~on of the aircraft. Another
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~
I
I
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mistake is also made sometimes in viewing the IL-10 as a
- modification of the IL-2 ground attack aircraf.t. With a
large or small modification, the appearance of the initial
version nevertheless remains. The IL-10 is an aircraft
with the same role as the IL-2 and it is a further development
of it but it is not a modification of it. All its dimensions
are different; it also has different aerodynamics, a different
power plant and, of course, entirely different weight and flying _
performance.
The forefather of the IL family--the CDB-26--gave birth to advanced
modifidatio~s--the CDB-30, the LP.S-~ and the LRB-3F (the IL-4).
Moreover, efficiency was increased in a somewhat different way
than in the cases reviewed above. In those cases, when the
aircraft wer~ modified, their combat (for military) and economic
(for airliners) effectiveness was enhanced by improving the
weapons systems or commercial efficiency. In these cases,
the aerodynamics of the aircraft (specifically, the fuselage) _
were improved, the air foil was redesigned, there were changes
in production technology, the mix of materials being used
was revised, etc.
There is something singularly outstanding in the creative work
of people, ~~ven people who have developed a lot of important
items. For S. V. I1'yushin, it was the IL-2. If he had not
developed a single aircraft besides this one, it alone would
have been a sufficiently large contribution to the victory over
- rhe enemy and to the hiGtory of military aircraft development.
Among domestic and foreign aircraft, there were a lot of
really good ones and a lot which quickly died away; but,
aircraft which were great events were encountered infrequently.
The IL-2 ground attack aircraft was a great event. Great or
small events are frequently associated with particular facts or
subjects in people's minds. Thus, for many people of the older
generation, their memories of the past war are linked to air �
raids, the song "This is a People's War," Erenburg's articles--
he wrote over a thousand of them--and Simonov's poems. For
those who spent their time on the front lines of the fatherland
_ and the liberation of Europe, their memories are linked, in
addition, to the Katyusha and mortars, the IL-2 groun3 attack
aircraft and the T-34 tank. These were the main types of
weapons which guaranteed our. victory.
So, it became a custom--the people gave their own names to ev2ry-
thing they liked: the rocket-launching artillery was Katyusha _
and the mortars were Vanyusha. The IL-2 ground attack aircraft
had various names: "The Avenger," "The Work Horse of the War"
and even "The Hunchback"--which carried a significant share of
the burden on its hump. It was not by accident that a monument
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was erected to the IL-2, as well as to certain other types of
weapons, on the tactical approaches to Moscow; this monument
enshrines the wisdom of its developer, the creative work of
his group and the heroism of the ground attack ~ircraft pilots.
A special place in the history of domestic aviation belongs to
the aircraft designed by S. V. I1'yushin. This universal
recognition has been expressed by making awards to the designer-
general, his leading personnel and the group as a whole for
their outstanding services to the development of aviation.
Many aircraft with the IL emblem have been awarded 5tate
Prizes and the IL-18 and the IL-62, Aeroflot's flagship,
were singled out for the highest decoration--the Lenin Prize.
We have already written about how the aircraft designed by
Il'yushin have also invariably receivEd high marks abroad.
_ His talent and exceptional servi~es also enjoy world-wide
recognition. A vivid expression of this recognition is the
case related by LtGen I. N. Kozhedub, thrice-honored Hero
of the Soviet Union:13 "Two candidates were submitted to the
FAI [Federation Aviation Internationale]--the U.S. delegation
_ submitted Pennel for the award. But, when J. F. Nilds, presi-
dent of the U. S. National Aeronatiqtie Association found out that
we were suggesting that S. V. I1'yushin's services be singled
out, he immediately withdrew his submission. 'I defer,' he said,
'to aj,rcraft-designer I1'yushin; he deserves the Grand Gold
Medal first.
It is said that a creative person's record of many years can be
, clearly se~n from the top. The crowning glory and apex of
Sergey Vladimirovich I1'yushin's creative work, the triumph
of his engineering skill was the IL-62 intercontinental airliner.
It was the last aircraft developed according to his plans and
desi~ned under his leadership. It was the culmination of the
45-year creative path from the IL-2 to the IL-62, a path measured
by a large standard. All the aircraft on this path--both
military and civilian--were aircraft on the cutting edge.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. A. N. Mikhalevich. "Bud'mo," IZVESTIYA, 30 December 1967.
2. Ya. Golovanov. "Studies on Scientists," MOLODAYA GVARDIYA,
Moscow, 1970.
3. Ye. Lifshits. "Landau's Lively Speech," NAUKA I ZHIZN',
No 9, 1971.
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4. A. S. Yakovlev. "Tsel' zhizni" (The Purpose of Life),
Politizdat, 2d ed., Moscow, 1970.
S. L. I. Brezhnev. "Learn, Work and Fight like Lenin,"
in the book "Leninskim Kursom. Rechi i stat'i" (Following
Lenin's Course: Speeches and Articles), vol 3, Politizdat,
1972. _
6. B. N. Kedrov. "The History.of Science and Principles for
Studying It," Proceedings of the 13th International
Congress on the History of Science. Plenary Meetings.
Nauka, Moscow, 1974.
7. S. V. I1'yushin. "IL Aircraft Serving the Motherland,"
AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, No 5, 1968.
8. A. N. Tupolev. "People and Wings," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, -
22 April, 1970.
9. "Soviet Aircraft Engineering," MASHINOSTROYENIYE, Moscow,
1970.
10. M. S. Arlazorov. "The Frontlines Run Through the Design
Bureau," ZNANIYA, Moscow, 1969.
11. M. V. Keldysh. "The Right-of-Line in Scientific Progress,"
PRAVDA, 21 April, 1970.
12. V. V. Struminskiy. "Soaring in the Skies," KOMSOMOL'SKAYA
PRAVDA, 12 March, 1970.
13. "Light Wings" (interview between V. Gubarev, KOMSOMOL'SKAYA
PRAVDA reporter, and :~tGen I. N. Kozhedub, thrice-honored
Hero of the Soviet Union), KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 18 July,
1969.
14. MajGen Gearge B. Simler, Director of Operations, USAF
Hg, Russian transport wares looking up?--AUSTRONAUTICS
AND AERONAUTICS, October, 1969, p. 36 [sic].
r
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CHAPTER 13
IL'YUSHIN'S "HANDBOOK FOIt THE DESIGNER"
R. I. Rokityanskiy (deceased), design engineer
Designers in I1'yushin's bureau have been working for more
than 40 years now, guided by the "~rief Handbook for the
Designer (Basic Issues in Designing Aircraft Components,
Assemblies and Parts)" developed by the designer-general.
The very fact that the designer-general wrote thi~ document -
testifies to his high evaluation of the importa^ce of the
working design and the rank-and-file designer's contribution
to the job of developing such a complex machine like the modern
aircraft. -
In his introduction to the handbook, S. V. I1'yushin wrote:
"After the aerodynamic and overall configuration of the aircraft
has been turned out--after it has been shaped and sized, after
the layout of the gear, controls, power plant, fuselage, wings,
equipment, etc., has been clrawn up--and also after the ba~ic
direction of the design has been determined, the second creative
stage begins--designing the aircraft components, assemblies and
parts."
Whi1e the design is being developed for any component of the
aircraft--from a part to a unit--it will be nec.essary for the
designer to consider numerous, as a rule, contradictory require-
ments which determine the shape, materials, weight and other
characteristics of the item being designed. The value of _
I1'yushin's handbook lies in the fact that it helps the designer
conduct an analysis (consider factors) on a methodical basis
and be �ully confident that nothing has been left out; as a
result, it facilitates consideration of th~se factors during the
developmental stage (formation) of the item. ~
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Thc t~andho~k not ~nly provides a complete list of all the
requirements wl?ich have an effect on design work but it also
points out the requirement for a systematic npproach to pl.an- _
ning (i.e., considering the requirements for the item as a whole
while designing the parts, assembly or unit) and it points out
' the value of a comprehensive analysis of all factors.
In his handbook, Sergey Vladimirovich wrote:
"Although these issues are set out as individual paragraphs,
- they are closely related, have a mutual effect on each other
and a change in the process of designing any one of them ~aill
cause a change in many of the others which are related to it."
S. V. I1'yushin's advice to the designer was a very important
supplement to the handbook; he gave this advice to his students
on numerous occasions before they began to develop a design:
--look and see how a similar assembly was made on previous
aircraft;
--look and see how this job was done on articles with
approximately the same features;
--check to see how similar designs held up in operational
use;
--study the new solutions which have appeared in fields
which touch upon the operation, technology, etc., of. the item
which you are designing.
When reviewing the problems included in the har.dbook, it is
methodologically advisable to divide them into s~veral groups,
combined according to their specific nature. In this article,
I have used the latest edition of "Basic Issues in Designing
Aircraft Components, Assemblies and Parts," which Sergey
Vladimirovich prepared in December 1969.
/1. Purpose of the component, assembly, part or system.
Ensuring their operation./ Sergey Vlad~mirovich always said
that design work begins with these issues and the designer
must take an especially careful approach to an analysis of them
since the designer's work will be in vain if the design he ia
developing does not match the purpose and will not function.
While working on the problems of establishing the functional
purpose of a part in an assembly, the designer must:
--precisely formulate (S. V. I1'yushin required that
this be done in wr~ting) the purpose of the item being
designed;
--get acquainted wit~~ all the documents which formulat~ _
requirements (engineering specifications, engineering require-
- ments);
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--study, or compile if this was assigned to the designer
t~imself, tasks f~r the item's design;
--~+tudy tfie "Ftight s~~ttahiiity St~ndards" and ctieck
t~~~ ~~~c 1 1' i~ I t the requirements have bec~n included in the
enginecrin~; tasks;
--consider the operational experience with previous,
similar items, to the extent that it may make ad~ustments to
the tasks obtained from outside;
--if the assembly being designed is related to the air-
craft's aerodynamic shape, you must make sure that the shape
is maintained when any load is placed on it or when the
assembly (unit) is placed under stress and throughout the
item's entire operational cycle;
--develop several versions of a functional diagram, evalu-
ate the pros and cons of each version and 3ustify the rationale
for the diagram selected.
/2. Strength--weight./ The problem of providing the required
strength for�a given weight literally faces the designer
throughout the entire design process. Sergey Vladimirovich
devoted continual attention to the "strength-weight" problem; _
as a result, the load figures for his aircraft were always
very high. The search for any optimal solution, from choosing
the power plant t~ desi~ning fasteners, includes a solution to
this problem as a basic elemen~t of it. These two members of
the well-known aviation formula: "aerodynamics--strength--
weight" are so related to each other that problems concerning
them must invariably be solved ~ointly.
While working on this group of problems, the designer must:
~ --obtain the weight limit and evaluate (statistically or
according to an estimate) the feasibility of realizing it;
--select the correct criteria for 3 preliminary evalua-
tion of the weight;
--distribute the total weight limit obtained over the
components;
--make sure it matches the loads in the "strenath standards";
check to see if all the estimated cases have been taken into
account; ma'~ch t;~e minimal margin of strength which must be
provided in the sCructure being designed;
--develop a load-carrying design (as a rule, do not
limit yourself to a single alternative; develop several -
designs and conduct a strength anal;�sis of each one~.
The designpr mus;r provide an evaluation of each alternative
from the pa~at of view of weight, reliability and feasibility
(while providing an evaluation of its technological effective-
ness and econo,-~y at the same time) and he must formulate the
advantages of the selected alternative:
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--when analyzing the load-carrying design, evaluate its
rigidity (by considering the effect of stress on the initial
forces and moments);
--find structural shapea for the selected load-carrying
design; conduct a compreheneive evaluation of tlieir efficiency;
--determine (select) the most e.fficient material to build
the structure; analyze the extent to which it has been tested
by operational use in existing structures or through special
research projects;
--familiarize yourself with the en gineering requirements
for the material and all its technological, operational and
strength features; conduct a thorough analysis of the feasibil-
ity of using materials which are ~apab~e of sign3_ficantly in-
� creasing the structure's load efficiency; when using new alloys,
thoroughly consider their special features.
The material is not simply sel~ected based on the strength re-
quirements. It is necessary to check the fit between the
material selected and the functlonal system or unit require-
ments, i.e., there must be a study of the probZems of harm-
ful contacts (chemical and electro-chemical), fire safety,
etc.
Special attention must be paid to service life and strength
safety (fatigue, low-endurance fatigue, safety when partially
damaged, acoustic strength, etc.), i.e., this entire package
of problems, including the selection of allowable stress which
will guarantee the required service life; the elimination of
stress concentration; duplication in important areas, etc.
Three of I1'yushin's basic rules should be added to this list
of problems which the designer should cover while resolving
the strength task; Sergey Vladimirovich always reminded his
students of them when he was analyzing the design solutions
they submitted:
--if you want to develop a light structure, absorb the
force where it arises; 4on't let it "travel" along the
frame for a long time--this will lead to excess weight;
--while testing the strength and reliatility of the
utiit, assembly or part you designed, pay special attention to
the spots where the "flow of force breaks off"--the possibility
of a mistake is greatest at these points;
--always take structural stresses into account; they can
lead to an unforeseen redistribution of forces.
/3. Extended unit or system operations. Operational problems./
Although these problems are related to ensuring operations and
strength and although their accomplishment is always anti~ipated
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throughout the entire period of operational use, it is methodo-
logically advisable to single out operational problems in a
special section, as S. V. I1'yushin did in his handbook.
They have occupied and continue to occupy one of the top,
if not the top, priority in the Experimental Design Bureau's
work. This guaranteed a high degree of maintainability,
and, consequently, reliability for I1'yushin's aircraft.
Sergey Vladimirovich himself always solved any problem which
arose during operational use first and he demanded this from
his subordinates.
In solving the problem of fulfilling all the requirements levied
on a unit for a period of extended operation, the designer
must do the following:
--precisely define the service life which the unit must
have;
--check again to see that all the requirements related
to the task of ensuring a lasting service life have been -
accomplished;
--check the item's testability, i.e., the possibility of
approaching a11 the spots which are vital to service life and
safety for an inspection while the item is operating;
--for areas which cannot be visually inspected, design
fail-safe meth~ds of instrument tests using optical or other
special-purpose eqnipment; make sure there are non-destructive
testing proc~dur~s for the structure;
--cher_k tiie item's repairability, i.e., accessibility to -
disassemble the unit, replace individual parts and lubricate
it; analyze the structure's maintainability;
--make sure industrial safety requirements are met for
� conducting all repair and periodic maintenance work;
--ensure reliable rust protection and check to make sure
there are no harmful chemicals or electro-chemical contacts;
develop a chart of the most reliable protective coverings;
--check to be sure tne pressurization is protected against
humidity, dirt and condensation and check to be sure there is
sufficient ~iraina~e and the pocsibility of drying out (blowing
out) the unit;
--develop optimal (by considering safety and economy) time
periods for and the scope of preventive maintenance and periodic -
maintenance (the time periods for periodic maintenance must
guarantee the serviceability of the systems and their units in
accordance with the service life requirements).
The following also belong to this section:
--the determinarion and design of special tools and devices
required in production and operational use;
' --instructions for operational maintenance, including
transportation and storage of units.
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/4. Economy and production engineering./ During design work,
- the designer primarily takes economic efficiencey into account
by looking for the most advantageous industrial engineering
soluti~ns. The design he selects must meet the requirements
of series production and it must guarantee:
--convenient assembly and disassembly;
--unit interchangeability (complete or partial);
--maximum overall standardization and standardization
of all components (their use in other parts of the item is
preferred);
- --maximum possible use of inechanization, especially for
riveting and assembly jobs;
--that the princ'iple of a low level of detailed work is
maintained, with suffieient ruggedness to ensure survivability; _
--the least possible number of operations to make parts
and assemblies (for m3chined parts, provisions must be made to
select economical intermediate products which approximate as -
much as possible the part's final form).
�
The designer must evaluate the feasibility of using modern
industrial methods for manufacturing parts (casting, stamping,
deep etching, welding, splicing, adi~esive welding) by
considering the volume.
It is necessary to thoroughly review the design of tolerances
and requirements for clean parts surfaces; reliable maintenance
for u;~its must be taken into account since it has a relationship
to the problem of parts deterioration and the possibility of
so-called scores appearing which may reduce the service life
and cause an operational malfunction. This also includes pro-
visions for reliable lubrication.
Recently, the designer is also faced with additional problems
of patentability and patent protection for designs; it is
necescary to take these into account when developing new de-
signs or using previous design solutions.
/5. Safety and reliability./ Although the basic requirement
for an aircraft design--safety--must be taken into account by
the designer throughout the entire design process, S. V.
_ I1'yushin always recommended devoting the final stage of design
work to a special analysis of this problem.
To check up on the accomplishment of safety requirements, the
designer must direct his atter~tion to the following problems
again:
--the validiryo uf the designed-in service life and period- ~
icity of preventive maintenance and periodic maintenance =or
important air frame components and primary systens;
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--the strength and serviceability of the basic load-
carrying components of the airframe and control unit and '
systems, not only under normal conditions but also in extreme
regimes as well as during malfunctions and partial damage;
--the accomplishment of all the requirements in "Flight
Suttability Standarda" and c~ther. similar documents, especially
on fire safety and survivability during combat employment;
--test results of engineering solutions used in previous
designs and similar items and shortcomings uncovered during
operational use;
--have all the finished items been completely matched up,
have all the requirements for their installation been fulfilled,
have steps been taken to completely eZiminate the gossibility
_ of incorrectly installing them during operational use of the
_ aircraft;
_ --have steps been taken to prevent mistakes in assembling
parts in the aircraft flight control system during operational
use and maintenanca, mistakes which may lead to malfunctions
in the flight control system.
To manage the designer's work in analyzing designs, especially
when checking reliability and safety, S. V. I1'yushin introduced
a system of "unit and system design certificates" at the
Experimental Design Bureau.
According to S. V. I1'yushin's concept, the purpose of the
certificates was "to ensure that the aircraft did not have a
~ingle system or unit which had not been inspected or analyzed -
and that there were not any areas which would cause any doubt
abaut their operatio~:.a1 reliability."
For a visual demonstration of the analysis, provisions were made
to make "pos*_~rs of load-bearing designs which graphically
depict the effect of forces" and composite blueprints which
would facilitate the analysis of those areas where there was
an overlap in the operation of several systems and where
several units came together.
Let's cite the content of the standard "Unit Certificate" (for
the blueprint design group) which was put into practice at
the Experimental Design Bureau based on S. V. I1'yushin's
instructions:
1. Unit schematic.
2. Engineering specifications for the design work, which
must include the requirements for 1) operations; 2) strength
and rigidity; 3) service life; 4) maintenance; 5) industrial
engineering and economy; 6) interchangeability; and 7) repair-
ability.
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i

I . S. LL : _ AND ~ .
JANURRY 1980 - FOUO 3 aF 4
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3. Basic design principles adopted.
4. Materials being used (with a justification for tiieir .
selection).
5. Load-bearing designs.
6. Estimated load diagrams. -
_ 7. List of strengtr and functional tests required.
8. Weight tabl.e, including the prescribed weight limit.
9. Table of increases in design weight (based on indus-
trial engineering requirements, customer requirements, etc.
10. Test results.
11. Operational results.
12. Design changes resulting from the construction and
use of prototypes and series vehicles.
The compilation of the certificates disciplined t:ie designer's
thinking and led to a situation where the design analysis,
which was previously conducted unsystematically and incompletely,
began to be conducted in an organized manner and, most impor-
tantly, c~�ith a scope that precluded the possibility of mistakes
to the maximum p~ss~ble extent.
In conclusion, I would like to talk about the traditional
desigr. principle adopted by S. V. I1'yushin`s Experimental
Design Bureau. When solving any problem which arises during
his work, the designer will encounter a group of contradictory
requirements. The correct solution is not simply a"suitable
- compromise." The basic problem must be singled out, the
problem which is ::specially important for the given a3rcraft,
unit, system or assembly--the requirement which determines
the basic characteristic of the item being desigr_ed. All
other requirements must be subordinated to this one. -
Examples of such designs with a sense of purpose:
--I1'yushin's IL-2 armored ground attack aircraft;
the entire design of this aircraft was subordinated to the
problem of developing its invulnerability;
--the IL-28 wing which had a horizontal joint along the
chordwhich made it possible to develop the precise, external
contours for high-speed jet aircraft and made it possible to
make maximum use of panels and niachine riveting; -
--I1'yushin's IL~18 and IL-62 airliners; their shape,
configuration and parameters were selected on the basi5 of the
primary requirement--guaranteeing efficient passenger transpor-
tation.
This principle--it can be called design work based on goal-~
directed compromises--form the foundation ~f S. V. I1'yushin's
activities (when solving problems ~oncerning the aircraft as
a whole and its primary systems and units). His students use
it on a widespread basis.
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CHAPTER 14 �
ACADEMICIAN S. V. IL'YUSHIN'S ROLE IN THE AEVELOPMENT OF
SCIENTIFIC AIRCRAFT DESIGN METHODS
A. A. Badyagin, professor and doctor of engineering sciences
Based on examples from the development of general aircraft
design methods, it is interesting to follo~ Designer-General
S, V. I1'yushin's �role in establtshing the principles for
optimal (rational) design at the end .of the 30's and beginning o~f
the 40's when the statistical method was dominant.
= As is well known, the first aircraft design :aethods were those -
of copying and sim~ilarity. For example, Clement Ader's Aeolus
(1890) was a large-scale copy of a bat. The Gakkel'-9 (1912) '
was reminiscent of a soaring predator. The first passenger
- aircraft bui.lt by Louis Bleriot (1912) was similar to a postal
coach with wings and a tail section. Later, these methods of
copying and similarity were used, for example, during the
developrent of the TU-104, the TU-114 (whose prototypes were
military aircraft), the TU-124 (a smaller-scaxe copy of the
- TU-104) and others.
- The use of these methods during the height of aviation was
explained by the lack of information and experience. During
the later stage of aircraft production, the methods o� copying
- and similarity were used to save time and reso~,rces durin~
aircraft development. At present, methods of copying and similarity
are hardly used at all to select aircraft parameters; they
have become the property of history, not to mention the fact
that the systematic employment of these methods leads to ~
being constantly behind and to a loss in economy in the~aircraft _
copy.
~ The fact is that the conditions for employing an original aircraft
are, as a rule, significantly different from the conditions
for employing an aircraft copy. Therefore, the parameters of the -
aircraft copy are not optimal and, while th~y exist, the entire
aircraft fleet loses a lot more in the way of resources than it
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saves with t.he development of an aircraft copy. Here is
what Designer-General A. A. Tupolev wrote in this respect:ly
"The engineering requirements for military and passenger air-
craft are different. A high degr.ee of ~reliability, comfort
and economy are the requi.rements for an airliner which are
s�ometimes hard to fulfill based on a bomber.
"So, it turns out that it is better to spend more time and
resources to develop a new aircraft than to pay for all the
advantages of reconfiguring an airliner with poor commercial
performance." _
In the 20's--30's, the statistical method of selecting an
aircraft's basic parameters appeared in the tracks of the
methods of copying and similarity; the statistical method
was based on using a number of prototypes and not just one.
While, in their scientific leve~, the methods of copying and
similarity correspond to ~he stage of active contemplation
(a term from the theory of knowledge), the statistical method
is characterized by some analysis. Based on the task and
� with statistical data on aircraft with similar roles, the
designer tried to design an aircraft with the best performance.
. The first Soviet aircraft weight engineer, P. M. Kreyson,
was one of the creators of th~ statistical design method and
~ an ardent proponent of it. 2~ P. D. Samsonov was a follower
- of this method.4
At that time, it was recommended that the aircraft's basic
parameters be selected using Everling Numbers.5 The designer
had to establish the Everling Numbers for his aircraft and
compare them to the same numbers for th~e best aircraft. If
the parameters selected were not successful, they were changed
"by considering the statistics or personal experience" and
then a new estimate was made.
At that time, aircraft were evaluated and compared according to
~ their individual specifications. Compared to its prototypes,
` the best aircraft had greater speed, better load efficiency
far the same range, etc. However, under the statistical design
method, this evaluation only pushed the designer toward a
quantitative increase in the figures and, essentially, slowed =
down the development of qualitatively new aircraft.
The statistical method for determining the aircraft's basic
parameters and flight performance received �urther develop-
ment in the works of A. L. Gimmel'farb.6~~ He sugges.ted an
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original method of "modifying aircraft statistics" and he
pointed out situations where a particular aircraft parameter
satisfies several requirements, for example, when the wing
loading per square centimeter simultaneously meets the require-
ments for maximum speed and landing speed.
The statistical design method hypothesizes a task of extrapolat-
ing aircraft performance data and parameters so the aircraft
is not obsolete by the time it is put into series praduction. ,
The design problem is believed to be completely determinate:
a single value is established for each of the parameters, based
either on the statistics or the assigned requirements (limita-
tions). This method is based on the assumptions of a continu-
ing, smooth (without any sudden changes) change in aircraft
parameters in performance and a sufficient number of proto-
types. There was a developmental period (prior to jet aircraft)
when these kinds of assumptions were warranted. However,
during the present, swift, uneven development in aviation,
the statistical method for select~ng parameters and perform-
ance is not on firm ground since there either are not aircraft
prototypes at all or there are not enough of them.
Two facts have a large effect on the developmental nature of
modern aviation: the increase in the aircraft developmental
cycle, from the beginning of design work to series production,
and the colossal increase in the cost for building a modern
aircraft. Whi1e this cycle (up to series production) was an
'average of four years in 1940, it has presently increased to
6-10 years. It is obvious that extrapolating statistics for
6-10 years is an extremely risky business. The cost of
building certain foreign aircraft is shown in the table.
It is significant that none of these aircraft had any prec~ecessors
- and each was a sort of one and only copy. No matter how rich
a government is, it is not able to concurrently build a large _
number of such unique aircraft whose construction costs are
comparable to the government's annual budget.*
Aircraft designs were now being thoroughly studied and, as a rule,
one of them was being selected. Thus, the statistical performance
on each type of aircraft was becoming lower and lower while ~
the attempt to use them to build a similar model inevitably led
to a lag. It is necessary to emphasize the metaphysical nature
of the statistical method which is based on cases that do not
* For this reason, certain foreign governments were forced to -
cooperate in building aircraft (the Concorde, the A-300 Airbus,
the Jaguar fighter, the Panavia-200 and others).
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2 3 Cma e
~ PaevsmHO~ Ba~umx~4 r,oaBaxun gcmov~~~ix
Ca~wo~t~ v~u:.io M No caato.uma, caMO~tema.
nonema T Mnpe.Baut.
SH-7i (CIIIA) 3 y5 ~,p IQ~Qrania. ~9e~, No. ed~s,
( 7)&70 rBanbfcnpusir (CmA) 3 250 1,5 Flienr, No. raaa, saae
TSR-2 (A~rnNS) 2,2 45 1,0 A�iar{on Week. r! loe3
( 9)�HosxopA~ (mpaaRAS - ~-2~2 175 2,8 Aoiaf{on Week. �~a, ~r e
Agrnas~)
~ Key:
1. Aircraft ~
2. Estimated Mach number
3. Take-off weight
4. Construction cost, ~.in billic,ns of dollars
5. Source
6. (U.S.A.)
7. Valkyrie (U.S.A.)
8. (England)
9. Concorde (France-England)
explain their nature and that do not take into account the inter-
- relationships and interdependencies of a~l the aircraft's
characteristics and their conCradict~~ry nature.
The optimal design method in aviation began to develop with _
attempts at an analytical, rigorously justified solution
to the problem of selecting the most advantageous aircraft
parameters and with attempts to eliminate the c~ntradictions
characteristic of aircraft parameters and performance.
N. N. Fadeyev's work, "An Investigation of Rational Aircraft
Dimensions,"8 was the first domestic work devoted to the
optimization of aircraft parameters. Then, between 1940-1942,
similar works appeared by other authors. From that time, the
problem of criteria for evaluating aircraft became especially
ac.~ite and imp~ortant since optimization is not possible without
criteria.
S. V. I1'yushin was one of the first designers to understand
that it was wrong to simply~ evaluate aircra.ft according to the~r
engineering statistics. As is well known, the ~L-2 ground
attack aircraft~which hy conceived in the mid-30's and built
_ in 1938~was not distinguisred by high speed, long range or -
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high altitude. The designer believed that the most important
thing for a ground attack aircraft was its firepawer and
survivability. And, if it was necessary to sacrafice flying
performance to achieve these new traits, then this had to
be done. As far as speed wa~ cortcerned, it was not beneficial
to a ground attack aircraftt it was detrimental. According to
S. V, I1'yushin's idea, the ground attack aircraft had to have
the highest possible combat efficiency and the greatest
probability of accomplishing i.ts combat mission.
In the 30's, not enough people recogni~.Ed that new aircraft
traits were not "free" and that the inexhorable equation
for the aircraft's existence*, which included all the
component weights and flying performanc~,would require a
cost in worse flying performance for firepower and armor.
The designer had to solve the problem of compromising between
weight and flying performance so that the aircraft's com-
bat efficiency would be as high as possible. The II-2
was undoubtedly not just the first effective ground attack
aircraft but also the first aircraft in which S. V. I1'yushin
implemented the principle of optimal design based on a
single, comprehensiv~ crite~ion--combat efficiency.
S. v. I1'yushin was the first aircraft designe~ to set out
on the path of scientifically based methods for overall
aircraft design; his practical work facilitated the intro-
duction of a dialectical approach to defining the aircraft's
configuration; with this approach, all aircraft characteristics,
including the contradictory ones, were considered interdepen-
dent.
- Certain military specialists did not understand S. V. I1'yushin's
new approach to designing the IL-2 ground attack aircraft and
they believed the aircraft was a failure based on its flying
performance. The IL-2.'s employment in the Great Patriotic
War demonstrated the aircraft's outstanding combat features.
It was not the aircraft which was a failure but rather the
criteria they tried to evaluate it with.
These criter~a not only delayed the development of effective
aircraft, as was the case with the IL-2, but they also
provided an incentive for the appearance of aircraft which
were subsequently rejected through practical experience. A
high-speed fighter was designed at almost the same time as
the IL-2. They had high hopes for.it due to its superior
flying performance: speed, altitude, etc. The fighter was
developed based on the "war in the stratosphere" doctrine.
However, practical experience demonstrated that the air war
* This is what V. F. Bolkhovitinov called the equation for the aircraft's
weight balance in the 40's.
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of 1941-1945 was not in the stratosphere but primarily at
low altitude. This fighter was not used very much at high
altitudes and it was inferior to enemy fighters at low alti-
tudes.
The American supersonic B-70 Valkyrie bomber met a similar
fate in the 60's. This aircraft was designed for a speed
of Mach-3 and an altitude of 20-25 km. But, after several
aircraft had already been built, it was discovered that the
"high-speed, high-altitude" concept was not effective. The
"mistake" cost 1.5 billion dollars (see table).
It should be pointed out that S. V. I1'yushin did not retreat
from the optimal design principle in his po~twar design
work. The parameters for each of his new aircraft (the IL-18,
the IL-62 and others) were thoroughly based on the criterion
of overall effectiveness; their operational environment and
developmental prospects were taken 3nto account. Therefore,
it is not surprising that the IL aircraft have better weight
efficiency, are more economical and are better adapted to
modifications in comparison with similar aircraft.
~ As is well known, the aircraft is part of a combat or trans-
portation system. Weapons systems and all types of airborne
and ground-based equipment are bein;; continually modernized
in military aviation. In civil aviation, transportation
volume is growing and requirements are increasing for trans-
portation time, level of comfort and noise and reliability
and economy. As a result of all this, the aircraft's design,
parameters and performance must undergo fundamental changes
over time so the system as a whole will have the highest possi-
ble effectiveness. This rather complex problem can be solved
in two ways: 1) by replacing the aircraft fleet more frequently,
or 2) by modifying the initial aircraft. At present, the
first way cannot be considered efficient when you consider
the colossal cost and extended developmental period for a
new aircraft. It is more feasible to modify the basic aircraft
by tailoring it to new operational environments.
The theory of modification, as part of optimal design theory, ~
has recently been in the design and developmental stag~.
However, it is already clear that, while designing a new
aircraft, the designer must show an interest in the most
advantageous method for extending the aircraft's life via
modifications to it and he must draw up a plan of the most
efficient modifications over time.
S. V. I1'yushin played a large role in developing this theory,
The aircraft developed under his leadership, the IL-4,
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- the IL-14, tt~e IL-18 and others, have had the greatest number
of modifications compared to other domestic aircraft.
A characteristic feature of S. V. I1'yushin's design work
- is his interest in primarily obtaining the highest possible
effectiveness for the aircraft system and his in-depth
understanding of the interests of the government and nation.
BIBILOGRAPHY
1. "Catching Up with Time: Nine Questions for the TU-144's
Chief Designer," TEKHNIKA-MOLODEZHI, No 4, 1969.
2. P. M. Kreyson. "Samolety za 20 let" (Twe.nty Years
of Aircraft), Moscow, Gosmashizdat, 1934.
3. P. M. Kreyson. "Vesovyye kharakteristiki samoleta"
(Aircraft Load Characteristics), Moscow, Gosmashizdat,
1935.
4. P. D. Sa mson ov. "Proyektir~vaniye i konstru~tsii gidrocamo]etov"
(Seaplane Planning and Design), Moscow, Gosmashizdat, _
1936.
5. E. Everling. "Improving Aircraft Statistics," ZFM,
No 10, 1926.
6. A. L. Gimmel'farb. "The Analysis and Use of Statistics
During Aircraft Design," TRUDY MAI, No. 2, 1946.
7. A. L. Gimmel'farb. "The Design Estimate for Required
Fuel Reserves and Maximum Aircraft Weight," TRUDY MAI,
No 108, 1959.
_ 8. N. N. Fadeyev. "An Investigation of Rational Aircraft
Dimensions," TRUDY TSAGI, No. 421, 1939.
,
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CHAPTER 15
THE IL'YUSHIN DESIGNERS
V. F. Leont'yev, doctor of engineering sciences
and member of the ~board for the Ministry of the Aviation
Industry
A lot has been written in various i~orks and in this book about
Designer-General S. V. I1'yushin's creative work and his air-
craft, like the IL-2, the IL-4, the IL-28, the IL-12, the
IL-14, the IL-18 and the IL-62, have gone down in the history
of domestic and world aviation with gold stars. In this
article, I will try to talk about the group which I1'yushin
set up and developed, about its workstyle about the people
who proudly bear the name of "I1'yushin designers" and about
their subsequent work under a new manager. -
- Sergey Vladimirovich once said that it is incomparably more
difficult to develop a capable group of enthusiastic people -
who think alike than it is to develop the best air~raft. This
- is indisputably true. Therefore, Il'yushin deserves a great
deal of credit for e~tablishing a group which can handle big
~obs. -
First, I would like to say several words about Sergey
~1ladimirovich I1'yushin himself; he had a long, d~fficult and -
_ remarkable life filled with searching and godsends, struggles
and victories. It would be appropriate to remember the time
when I1'yushin came into aviation.
Only the victory of the Great October Revolution made it possi-
_ ble for the son ~f a peasant to traverse the path from worker
to designer-general and academician. As one of the stars in a
galaxy of famous creators of Soviet aviation, he, like no other,
was completely linked to the Communist Party throughout his life;
he entered the party in 1918. Therefore, carrying out the
missions assigned by the party became the meaning of his life,
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an inner need and his life had a sense of purpose. During the
establishment and development of the Soviet state and during
- the first five-year plans, I1'yushin was among the ranks of
Che builders of a new society in our country (and one of the
most talented aircraft builders).
Nature lavishly bestowed on Sergey Vladimirovich a rare talent
and marvelous human traits. He was not only a talented
designer and scientist but also a remarkable manager with
the ability to instill enthusiasm in everybody around him.
His enthusiasm and conviction, high principles and caurage,
humanity and rigor and the breadth and depth of his ideas
not only brough*_ him respect but also the true love of
everybody who knew him and worked with him. Therefore,
it is completely natural for Sergey Vladimirovich I1'yushin's
colleagues and students to want to commemorate his precious
nature and carve out a place for Sergey Vladimirovich in
the history of Soviet aviation.
While talking about S. V. I1'yushin's place in the history _
of Soviet aviation, I am automatically struck by the persis-
tence and steadfastness with which he proceeded toward his
assigned goal because he recognized the country's need for
aircraft. This was not an easy path. There is an element
of luck in the fact that S. V. I1'yushin began serving in
an Air Force unit at the end of 1915. But, while citir.g this
and while saying that he was lucky, we can now assert that
aviation was also lucky.
The very great importance aviation has in the national economy
and in defending the country against all kinds of encroach-
ments is now obvious and generally recognized. Moreover, the
rapid annual growth in passenger and cargo transportation
convincingly confirms this. But, this was not so clearly
foxeseen during the first years of the establishment of
Soviet authority in our country. Aviation's role in the
weapons arsenal was insignificant at that time. However,
the technical feasibility of aviation made it possible for
military specialists to hope that it wou?~d be employed on a
more widespread basis in the future and that a formidable
air weapon would be developed in the future. The young
~ Soviet Republic did not inherit an avi