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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200040060-9 ~ 1 ~ 1 aF 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/8891 29 January 19$0 - West E u ro ~ R e o rt - _ p p ' (FOUO 5/80) FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 NOTE JPRS gublications contain information primarily from foreign ~ newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristi~s retaix?ed. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ or [Excerpt] in the fir;,t line of each item, or following the " last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was - procPSSed. Where no processing indica~or is given, the inf~r- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. _ Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as - giv2n by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. - For further information on report content call (703) 351-2811 or 351-2501 (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey). COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF , MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION - OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ JPRS L/8891 29 January 1980 WEST EUROPE REPORT (FOUO 5/80) CONTENTS PAGE COUNTRY SECTION F'RANCE PCF Dissident Elleinstein Renews Criticism Over~Fiszbin Affair (Andre Lesueur; VAI,EURS ACTUELLES, 10 Dec 79) 1 UDF's Pinton Interviewed on Paxty Policies _ `(Michel Pinton Interview; I,~EXPRESS, 15 Dec 79) ....e.. 4 ITALY Commentary on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan - (Frane Baxbieri; I,A STAMPA, 13 Jan 80) 7 Allegations of ENI Bribes to PLO To Stop Aid to Terrorists (Marco Borsa; ~ STAMPA, 22 Dec 79) 11 Profiles of New Key F`igures in Aiititerrorist Unit (CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 16 Dec 79) 13 Industrial Development Projects for Calabria Described - (G. Greco-Naccarato; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 27 Dec 79) 15 , Text of Decree Law 438 cn Controlling Energy Consumption (ENERGIA E MA'.~ERIE PRIl~IE, Sep-Oct 79) 22 SPAIN 'CAMBIO' Reports on ETA Affiliated Groups, Persons - (CANIBIO 16, 16 Dec 79) 33 - a - [III - WE - ~.50 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C~NTENTS (Continued) Page Briefs Hours Lost to Strikes 1~7 Cuban President~s Visit L~7 Advisers to Equatorial Guinea 1~7 S~arez Refuses To Meet USSR Ambassac:or L~7 Royal Visits 47 ~ - b - , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 Foh or~~;:crnr. ~r,r orri.Y COUNTRY SECTIOI3 FRANCE PCF DISSIDENT'ELLEINSTEIN RENEWS CRITICISM OVER FISZBIN AFFAIR ~ Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 10 Dec 79 pp 26-27 - [Article by Andre Lesueur: "The Elleinstein Chronicle"] [Text] Barely back in the ranks, Mr Elleinstein renews his challenge to the Cotmnunist Party. Because of the Fiszbin affair. Where is Mr Jean Elleinstein going? In several public declarations made - last week, the communist historian accuses his party of being in process of re-Stalinizati_on;condemns its position on Iran, Kampuchea, the "Boulin affair;" and denounces anew the absence of internal democracy within the - PCF. Accusations iffi?ediately ~haracteri~ed as "absurd" and even "imbecilic" by Mr Georges Marchais. To wr.ich Mr Elleinstein replied Wednesday by scoffing at the "exotic insu'_~s" borrowed from Ayatollah Khomeyni by the secretary general of the PCF. It is the continuation of a story which has already had several episodes. The first occurred immediately after the legislative elections in March 1978. Until then a spokesman (approved by Mr Marchais) for the "liberal wing" of the PCF, Mr Elleinstein suddenly leads it into confrontation. Cause of the turnabout: the doctrinal and strategic "hardening" of the party. The second episode begins on the eve of the 23d Congress, last May. The elimination from the party secretariat of Mr Roland Leroy, the leading - figure of the "hard" wing, seems to be a gesture of appeasement to the liberals. The conflict cools down. Elleinstein agrees to collaborate e anew with the leadership of the PCF and to write in its publications. The third episode opens with the Fiszbin affair: the elimination in ~ January 1979 of the secretary general from the Federation of Paris (our issue of 26 November: "Fiszbin the Rebel") led, after a yearlong battle among Parisian communists, to the ~.ublic resignation of Mr Fiszbin from the 1 FOR OFFICIr'~L U5E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 Ee~ntral Committee of the PCF and from the presidency of the communist group at the Council of Paris. Gestures explained in a letter which HUMANITE has to this day refused to publish. Tt:e strife at the heart of the PCF thus acquires a new dimension. Until tFen, confined to the intellectuals and to certain isolated groups, it is he~nceforth relayed by an ex-member of the apparatus: a former deputy from - the capital city, Mr Fiszbin in 1977 had been the PCF's candidate for mayor of Paris. He is also ~ friend of Mr Elleinstein. For the lattPr, this affair signifies that the willingness to improve . internal �!amocracy proclaimed at the 23d Congress has not been put into _ e;.I~ct. It also dis~redits the positive gestures made toward Communist ir~tellectuals for several months by Mr Georges Marchais, gestures whose li.mits are shown by the example of REVOLUTION. REVOLUTION is the new weekly publication which the PCF is preparing to launch from the merger of FRANCE NOWELLE and LA NOWELLE CRITIQUE. "I.n this journal, free debate will be the rule," announced its manager, Mr Guy Hermier, a member of the Politburo of the PCF. Now, even before the ptiblication of the first issue, a conflict already pits the editorial board ' (composed of intellectual critics, including Mr Elleinstein) against the ~ Pnlitburo. The latter had, by its own prerogative, chosen the title of tt~e newsp~.per: "()ne can only condemn the manner in which it was done, and even the title i.tself poses problems," Mr Elleinstein observes. - However, he does not resign from the new weekly: "I will write, my friends will write. And we shall see whether my articles ar.e published," he maintained last week in the newspaper LE MATIN. - Conflicts may well appear quickly. And maintaining the ideas which he u~~holds at present (for example, condemning the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea), how long can Mr Elleinstein's collabora~ion REVOLUTION etidure? And for how long can he remain in the PCF? Qtiestioned by Mr Andre Harris and Mr Alain de Sedouy (for their book "Jews and French") on the treatment he risks should the PCF come to power, he responded: "I would be shot." Asked about the possible use of anti-semitic arguments within the PCF, a~ainst the opposition faction, he also observed: "Officially, certainly not. In private, they are probably being used. I have heard echos from it." - 2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 ~ Recently certain internal rumors in the PC~ were insisting upon the con~ sonance of the names of certain opposition figures. Such as E1leinstein, Goldring, Fiszbin. COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs Actuelles" 9516 CSO: 3100 ~ ; 3 I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE UDF'S PINTON INTERVIEWED ON PARTY POLICIES Paris L'EXPRESS in French 15 Dec 79 p 91 . [Interview of Michel Pinton by Sylvie Pierre-Brossolette: "Pinton (UDF [French Democratic UnionJ): 'Is Ranging Itself Further and Further With the Authoritar.ian Right"'] _ [Text] The RPR [Rally for the Republic] is questioning, the PS [Socialist Party] is divided, and the direction of the PCF[Communist Party] is contested. Yet, not everything is rosy for the President's party. Michel Pinton, prime mover of the UDF, explains. [Question] Eighteen months after its birth and 18 months before the _ presidential electiens, what balance does the UDF show? [Answer] Its assets include, first of all, its success 3n rallying all those who support the president. Under the Fifth Republi~c, the parties which matter are those which can become extensive rallying points around the person in the Elysee Palace or around anyone who stands a chance to inhabit it. Otherwise, they become like neglected chapels. The parties within the UDF were greatly count~ng on the zealous members before 1978. However, they failed to become the great rallying point I mentioned. That is why, in fact, the UDF represents far mc:e than their simple total: It is turning the entire French political game upside down. Another credit of the UDF is the fact that this unification we are estab- lishing is for the long term. That is why it should be balanced, harmon- ious, and organized. The others, RPR, PS, or PCF tend to consider polit- ical action as the energizing of huge masses directed against a more or less imaginary enemy: against the big monopolies, as is constantly being done by the PCF; against the multinationals, as the PS tries to act; and against the foreigner's party, as was tried, 1 year ago, by the RPR. As far as we are concerned, we are organizing a group where people, whether ~ right of center or left of center would be organized and accepted as such: They have rallied not against but for something. _ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 - FOR r)Fr IC fAl. tr51: ONI,Y ~(2ucs~ i~in ~ I~~>r pcrson. [Answer] Not exclusively. It is true, however, that we are for the per- son who is in the Elysee Palace. The crisis of the RPR is that Jacques Chirac is becoming an ever less credible candidate for the Elysee. The _ difftculties of the PS stem from the ever diminishing trust in its candi- date, whoever he may be. [Question] Are you relying on the weakness of others? [Answer] Is it forbidden to use it? [Question] What is troubling the UDF? [Answer] The UDF is always threatened by imbalance: Favoring or.ganized diversity, we accept the risk of rivalries, tensions, and even outbursts. Another danger is that in order to remain the principal support of the authority, the UDF must hold the center of the political scene. Yet, this center represents a delicate balance between security and reEorm and between order and justice. It would be dangerous today for those who think "security" far outweigh, in the eyes of public opinion, those who think "reform." [Question] Is such the case? [Answcr] The p~lls seem to indicatc ic. [Question] Is it not an additional handicap to be supporting a governmen[ which refuses certain daring suggestions, as was [he case with t~e tax on capiral? [Answer] To support the government is a responsibility. The government is restricted by caution and immediate effectiveness which we should realize. However, there i.s nothing that says that we must outstrip the - government in our suggestions concerning the Euture of. our country. We fully intend to do so at our congress, next March. [Question] On the topic of political morality? [Answer] I believe that on this topic we shall soon submit far-reachi~~g proposals. [Question] When will, Einally, the UDF lose its complex as far as the RPR is concerned? [Answer] After rhe European elections the UDF lost a11. its complexes. If. any complex exists it would be the one f.elt by the RPR toward us. Who 5 FOR OFFICI/~L U~E UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 FOR OFr ICIAL t1SE ONI.Y is complaininK ~f being unl.oved, of not assuming a deserved place, and of ~ being persecuted, even though refusing a confrontation? The RPR. Con- versely, who has called for calm and a direct di~logue wirhout claims? ~ The UDF. ((~uc~stion] Wh~ is rhe c~pponenr most fe~red by che Presidenr of [he Rc~pub 1 i c? [Answer] I speak only for myself. r~s things stand now, the best candi- date of the Socialist Party would be, in my view, Francois Mitterrand, far ahead of Michel Rocard. 7'he Rocard phenomenon, as shown by the polls, is a pleasant mirage which would vanish in [he face of rhe merciless realities of an electoral campaign. Mitterrand would make a far weightier - candidate. [Question] To what extent would a Mitterrand candidacy leave the UDF a percentage of "available" votes left of center? [Answer] Francois Mitterrand lets hims~_lf be carried by doctrines which are more to the lef.t than those of the socialist electorate at large. The authors of. the socialist plan make me think of theologians who spend a lifetime pondering over the same dialectics and dogmas without realizing that the world around them is changing. Francois Mitterrand's lyricism will not be sufficien[ to correct this fundame~tal weakness. Why should we n~t profit from it? (Quesri~n] Would you blame the RPR for the same? [Answer] No. The Socialist Party is mulling over theories and hiding behind a sentimenta] mask. The RPR is mulling nostalgia and passions con- cealed behinci a mask of rationality. ' [Question] Would you label the RPR as "rightist?" [Answer] Naturally. The RPR is the right the way the UDF is the center. To be more speci~ic, the RPR is restricting itselE more and more tc, the authoritarian right, whereas the UDF is spreading its influence ever further fram the liberal right to the moderate left. COPYRIGH.T: 1979 S.A. Groupe Express 5157 . CSO: 3100 6 ~ - FOR OFFICIl~L USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION IT~,y COA4IENTARY ON SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ~ LD160925 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 13 Jan 80 pp 1-2 LD [Article by Frane Barbieri: "Kabul Well Worth UN Sermon"] - [Text] Marchais' flight from Paris to Moscow via the Botteghe Oscure [PCI h eadquarters], which has been interpreted somewhat evasively by the parties concerned, is one of the keys to deciphering the movements of the contradictory Soviet strategy conducted simultaneously along Che lines of detente and aggression. ` The topic to which Brezhnev decided to devote both his unusually long meetin~s with the French para-Eurocommunist leader is illuminating. That is, we discover that Georges Marchais has, together with Polish leader Gierek, made himself promoter of a conference of communist party secretaries general designed to launch an appeal to European socialists, ~ social democrats and progressives to become, together with the com- munists, trustees and guarantors of the irreversibility of detente. Marchais and Gierek informed the various parties of their 3.nitiative, _ requesting support in a series of letters, even before the Afghan coup. At his dire~ct meeting with Berlinguer Marchais was keen to streas his initiative's increased importance following the outburst of the Afghan - crisis. The PCI's consequent call for Coseiga to act in this direction probab ly indicates that Berlinguer agreed with the Frenchman's idea, though their verdicts on Afghanistan do not coincide. Following his stopover in Rome Marchais prepared the entire plan with Brezhnev. It might be thought that the Soviet leader is trying, by backing Gierek's and Marchais' initiatives, to regain ground lost in an action impoaed on - , him by the Kremlin hardliners. This is what people thought after Prague, . too, after Khrushchev, after Budapest and after Berlin. But it was for this very reason that similar exceptions were imagined too often. We musz at last establish a rule and a logic to cover the instances where Soviet policy has been deemed to reveal only contradictoriness. Indeed, the rule must lie within this very contradictoriness. 7 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY If we reexamine the cases carefully, we discover that the Soviet inter- vention in Hungary took place when the cold war lack of communications - had already been resolved. Next came the building of the Berlin 4Ja11 at ~ a time when Khrushchev and Kennedy had already agreed to start dis- mantling the Iron Curtain. The invasion of Czechoslovakia coincided - with the most exuberant phase of the ~stpolitik pursued by Brandt, with _ whom Moscow conducted a preferential dialog while publicly accusing him of subversive plots in Prague. The go-ahead for the Vietnamese attack on Kampuchea came from Moscow at a time when all countries criticizing the Soviets had to take care not to jeopardize the detente initiated for the sake of the SALT accords. And so we come to the model intervention in Afghanistan. After so many instructive instances, could this latest one, though clearer in its - expansionist aspects, lead us to suppose that it marks a reversal of Soviet strategy or an emergency coup extorted from or imposed on Brezhnev, whose limited remaining physical strength is devoted to an effort to recover? There was no coldblooded coup d'etat or imposition at the Kremlin over Afghanistsn. Though sicker than ever, Brezhnev is stronger than ever. k~hat the leader cannot manage to do physically he has done for him by his trusted Politburo commanders--Kirilenko, Chernenko and Tikhonov. The "Dnepropetrovsk group" is also backed by Marshal Ustinov himself. Marchais' recall to Moscow to have him summon the detente conference sooner, while Soviet troops are sCill fighting in Afghanistan, does not indicate a contradiction, but in fact a rule in the USSR's strategic conduct. The rule could be as follows: The quest for global detente must be coupled with local coups carried out at the right time and in . the right place to avoid hindering the longer-term courae of detente itself. This rule leads one Co believe that there will be no Cotal nuclear war, in the sense of global suicide, buC that the world war, in the "classic" restricted sense, will be continuously waged. The nuclear superweap4ns - guarantee peace and the balances of power established aC Yalta. In the areas where Yalta did not introduce any demarcation lines, these lines are imposed and established through local coups outside the ma~or con- flagrations. The aim is to reach another de facto Yalta conference, with the red line drawn right across the globe. It is no coincidence . tl-~at PRAVDA, polemizing with Washington, claims to use "the same yard- - stick" when assessing U.S. and Soviet interventions and not "dual criteria." [LD160927] First let us try to establish the reasons for the coup. _ Some of them are obvious and widely ackr~owledged: penetration toward - the vital oi2 and sea areas, encirclement of China, erosion of PakiaCan, the strengthening of the already effective magnetic, not to say deci- sive, influence on Indian policy. Also, from Afghanistan it is much 8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ ~ ~J APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY easier to impose a halt to the apread of Islam--easier than waiting for it to overflow into the outlying Soviet Muslim ze~ublics. The lateat news is of nationalist unrest also in other areas of the USSR. The roads between Kiev and Minsk are closed to foreigners because of the _ subveraive activities of the Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalist groups. I�i~Georgia Stalin's 100th anniversary was transformed into an outright r.~aEionalist celebration. _ Over and above these individual reasons--all valid--there is one supreme ~ reason: Moscow could not accept in Afghanistan the collapse of a pro- Soviet regime,established by the Russians and modeled on their ~wn society. It cannot accept this anywhere. It was for these same rea- sons that it halted not the colla~se but the mere differences of the _ socialist regimes in Budapest, Prague, Phnom Psnh and now in Kabul. If just one of them had broken away or collapsed, it would have endangered - one of Soviet expansion's most ef.fective ideological tools. The world has now tacitly accepted the doctrine that every collapse of a pro- American or in general pro-Western regime implies a step forward for historical progress. In this conCext every link with the USSR implie~ the start of a new historical era. If the USSR forces an upheaval through its direct armed intervention, the essential point is the same: - It is merely a sudden acceleration in the historical procesa (though history is violated, the result is to shorten progress' gestation period). The collapse af such a system, though brcaght to life in an unnatural way--as in Af ghanistan, for instance--must seem antihistorical, - and a detachment �rom the USSR muat seem like a detachment from the dialectical development of socieCy and the nation. If one of these systems collapses, changes or is liberated, the doctrine would no longer work, the historical mystification would be revealed and _ the USSR would no longer pass as the motive force of history in its interventions. At this point one could assess to what extent it would be worth pa~ing for such a profit with the loss o� world detente. But Moscow has not faced this dilemma. If detente resumed its co~rsP so soon after Budapest, Berlix~ and Prague, in the wake of Khrushchev`s and Brezhnev's new initiatives, the Kremlin now has valid reasons to believe that this time - other countries will in fact relaunch detente. America's wrath will be abated until after the elections. And Moscow did not expect to secure from Washington before the elections more than it should have granted. Europe, through Giscard and Schmidt, has already let it be understood that it will move along the following parallel paths: "Solidarity with the United States and dialog with the USSR." Indeed, it was easy for Moscaw to offer the Europeans the opportunity to experiment and assert their new role as "trustees and intermediaries of detente." The only defeat which the USSR had to suffer was on the electronic monitors displaying the UN voting. But the nerve center of Afghanistan 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY was well worth a UN sermon. Perhape the Kremlin miscalculated only in its assessment of the forcea involved in Afghanistan itself. The invasion began with two divisions ~nd now there are 12. The number of paratroopers has risen from 10,000 to almost 100,000. To remain within the strict framework ~f the plan, the coup should have been quick and decisive. Instead, it is dragging on be~rond the plana of the auper- planned superpower. Obviously Brezhnev did not plan a Vietnamization. As far aQ on~ has been able to ascertain, as far as Moscow is concerned, this iP the only serious cause for concern. It is, however, counter- balanced by the belief that someone can always be found to maintain how "antihistoric" it would be to set a Vietnam-type trap for the USSR. In any case, tne Uni.ted States of the Vietnam war was not defeated in America itself. In the USSR, on the other hand, and in the inter- national movement which it heads, the enemy to defeat is still America. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A. CSO: 3104 l0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION ITALy - r ALLEGATIONS OF ENI BRIBES TO PLO TO STOP AID TO TERRORISTS ,a Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 22 Dec 79 pp 1,2 [Article by Marco Borsa) [TextJ Sensational disclosures by an authoritative British magazine. Was Pifano arrested as he was returning the missile launchers to the Arabs? Milano--A new reconstruction of the ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency]- - Saudi Arabia scandal appeared in the semimonthly letter, MIDDLE EAST NEWSLETTER [MEN], published in London by mi]:dly pro-Arab sources that are usually well informed on Middle Eastern events. This reconstruction-- = which has been given almost no publicity--is evocative because of the ~ reliability of its source. - According to MEN, the ENI-Saudi Arabia scandgl was artfully exaggerated for political reasons, since it turns out that the notorious commission that allegedly was paid to the Italian politicians did not end up in Italy, but with the Palestinians. After recalling that half of the $115 million commission (equal to 7 per- cent of the amcunt of the contract) really went to the Saudi personages - who from the beginning sponsored the negotiation, MEN went on to say: "It has become quite clear that the remaining 3.5 percent of the commission _ (that is, about $55 million, editor's note) after all did not go to the Italians, but to Parviz Mina and (according also to news reports that - have never been denied) to PLO Palestinians." "It seems," the review continued, "that the PLO involvetnent in the nie was part of a series of efforts aimed at gaining respectability and official recognition for. the PLO, itself, in Western Europe..." - In exchange for a series of steps toward recognitian (there was cited in this connection the visit to Italy of Foreign Affairs Minister Farouk Qaddumi, who was officially received by Minister Franco Maria Malfatti)." It is for a slice of the ENI commission," stated the London review, "that 11 � FOR OFFICIAL LTSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the PLO had promised to withdraw ita aubstantial arsenal of weapona that has been in Italy for years and that had occaeionally been made available to Italian terrorist groups." "And with the help of leftist terrorists," ~:oncluded the review, "the PLO had begun to take away some of its weapons, _ until in November things began to go wrong. In Ortona Daniele Pifano, leader of the autonomous Romans, was arrested with two missile launchers in his possession that he was to have put on board a Lebanese ship that was ready to sail for Beirut." That is, Pifano was not bringing the missile launchers to Italy but, on the contrary, was taking them away, on orders of the PLO. According to MEN's reconstruction, then, either there were no commissions at all for the Italian politicans or they received only a fraction of the share pocketed by the broker, Parviz Mina,who probably obtained $27 raillion (that is, half of the 3.5 percent divided with the Palestinians), but also he may have received much less. But MEN leans toward ,`.he exclusion of commissions for the Italian poli- ticians, citing ~he f;ict that the Pictet Bank, a quite extraordinary fact for a Swiss bank, has explicitly excluded that payments were made to Italians. Another previously unpublished circumstance, published in the same article, - concerns the contract proposed to Mazzanti by Riccardo Raciti (a friend nf Saudi Minister of Petroleum Zaki Yamani) which ENI re~ected, preferring the one proposed by Parviz Mina. Raciti in fact, according to MEN, not - only asked for a co~ission of 7.7 percent for the same quantity of oil, but proposed also that the crude be delivered through the international ~ oil companies (as is known, before the ENI contract, almost all of the Saudi crude was commercialized by ARAMCO, a consortium of American oil companies). The rejection of Mazzanti, linked by MEN to the aggr.essively independent policy of ENI's recen~ president with respect to oil supplies, would bring to light, if confirmed, the interest of the multinational oil com- panies in having the affair iail, in order either to nip in the bud the Saudi attempt to diversify the commercia~ization outlets of its crude, or to propose themselves as the only sure suppliers in Italy of oil to a government which, deprived of the ENI arm, is in desperate search of 20 million tons of oil that are lacking. COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A. ~s255 - GSO: 3104 12 ' FOR OFFICIAL LTSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION IT~Y ' PROFILES OF ~iEW KEY FIGURES IN ANTITERRORIST UNIT Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 16 Dec 79 p 2 , [Text] Rome--More than on the name of General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa-- one that is very well known to the public--the attention of observers turns to the figure of Edoardo Palombi, also a general; deputy commander in the army; with a long army career behind him. This is the first time, in fact, that a soldier has been appointed prefect, and from Genoa, a city where terrorism has spread, sowing fear and death. Palombi has the tenacity and the will of the people of Friuli. He is a native of Udine, is 63 years old, and has a law degree. His is one of the new faces in anti-terrorism. Palombi was in the military 39 years. He fought with the carabinieri in World War Il,on the Greek-Albanian front. Captured by the Germans and deported to Poland, he remained there for two years. Decorated with three military crosses for bravery, he was promoted for bravery iZ action. As a commanding officer, he commanded the legions of Palermo, Bologna, and Bolzano, the Padova Brigade, and the "Pastrengo" Division of Milan. Since July 1979, he has been at the disposition of General Headquarters. The new prefect of Milan is Vincenzo Vicari, not related to the former chief of police. A Sicilian, from Messina, 57 years old, instructor at . Bocconi University, Vicari has two children. It is in Milan, itself,that he gained professional experience, carrying out assignments of special importance for 10 years. Still in Milan, Vicari directed thP work of the Investigation Commission with respect to the spreading of drugs in schools. He was prefect first in Nuoro and then in Pavia. General of Brigade Alberto De Lellis was appointed as a replacement for Dalla Chiesa, as chief of external~security services for penal institutions. He was born in Gries, in the province 4f Bolzano, 68 years ago. He has a law degree; participated in three war campaigns; and earned a nilitary cross for hravery and a badge of distinctia:~ in connection with the Liberation. He carried out his main assignments in Pesaro, Como, Trieste, and with the internal group in Rome. Then he was in the Naples Legion; he . headed the llth Carabinieri Brigade; then that of Florence. Since this 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY past September, he has been at the disposition of General Headquarters. . Emanuele De Francesco, the new prefect of Turin, spent the second and moat important stage of his career in the south. He was chief of the secre- tariat in Catania and Palermo; provincial deputy chief of police in this same city; then chief of police in Cosenza ar~d in Catania. De Francesco - arrived in Rome in 1976 as chief of the secretariat of Chief of Police Parlato. In December 1977, he became chief of police of Rome and~.was still in that assignment during the dramatic days of the abduction of Aldo Moro. De Francesco left this assignment only a few days ago. Finally, Ferdinando Guccione, former deputy chief of the secretariat under Rognoni, whom the council of ministers sent to Pavia as prefect to replace Vicari. He, too, is a Sicilian; is 54 years old; and has a law degree. Guccione served in various prefectures in Emilia and in Lazio. In the Ministry of Interior, he headed the~police school division before becoming a staff officer during the Cossiga administration. COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s. ~ 8255 CSO: 3104 1!~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION ITALY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS FOR CALABRIA DESCRIBED Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 27 Dec 79 p 11 [Article by G. Greco-Naccarato: "Specific Prospects and Hopes After the Promises for Gioia ~auro"] [Text] The industrial crisis in Calabria: an "Italian-type" story." Of the 7,709 3obs foreseen in the Colombo plan, only a little more than 3,000 have been filled. However, 2,000 of the workers who benefitted from them are already in the integration fund. The ENEL [National Elec- tric Power CompanyJ thermoelectrical power plant and new initiatives in the tourist sector. Gaetano Greco Naccarato, an expert on problems of the South and the author of several articles on the South, sent us this article which we are glad to publish. According to Giorgio Ruffolo, "the South is a great incendiary lake. Concreteness is an urgent necessity." An unexceptionable synthesis into which the problem of Calabria is most acutely and painfully interwoven. - And it could not be otherwise. One has only to recapitulate the vicissi- - tudes of the industrial initiatives promised by CIPE [Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning] to Calabria on that distant 15 October 1971 (ColombQ packet), apart from the difficult situation of Gioia Tauro, to understand how ~ustified the present state of mind of the Calabrian community is. - Of the approximately 699 billion for investments foreseen in 1971, only about 519 were actually spent; 7,709 persons were to have been employed. Instead, only 3,180 were given ~obs; 2,080 of them are now in the inte- gration fund. In practice, the three biggest enterprises are in a state of crisis for various reasons. The Sud Italia Resine di Lamezia, of the SIR ~Italian Reseaxch SyndicateJ group--which built modern spacious industrial structures equipped with S service installations and 10 installations for general and auxiliar-~ services--has completed only 4 of the 22 15 ~ FOR OFFICIAL L'SE OIdLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 rUtc Urr'LI:IAi. USE ONLY production installations. Just when it ahould have made i.ta greatest ~ effort to fully implement the productive programs elaborat,~d in 1971 the well known ~udicial proceeding that blocked work on the new production _ plants occurred. This limited production to only one of the four completed plants. _ 'fhe crisis in the "Andreae Calabria," that built five of the seven p.tanned textile factories, is instead tied down by the weak financial situation of the promoters of the enterprise. Finally, the cessation of production in the Liquichimica di Saline factory goes back to the "synthetic bio-proteins." An Italian-type storv that is so absurd it deserves a - white book. It is sufficient to say that the Saline project was financed by an investment of a good 233 billion. The Saline Liquichimica brought lnto being a modern establishment, equipped with all the installations required for services, as well as general and auxiliary services, with xhe completion of three of the four production plants in the initial I~lan--without any governmental agency whose function it is to control industrial investments in the South having ascertained the answer to even the most basic of questions at the proper time: whether or not the planned Saline production of the "synthetic bio-proteins," had been approved by the Ministry of Health. Indeed, if this intervention had occurred in the proper manner and terms, the Saline establishment probably would never have been realized. Instead, it seemed preferable to go ahead in the expectation that iti the end the health department would grant a license to produce and sell the question- able "synthetic bio-proteins." This did not occur, which caused the Saline crisis and with it the addition of 580 person to the integration fund. To this depressing picture was added the moving story of Gioia Tauro. _ Taking everything ir_to account, never has the credibility of the "palace" descended to as low a level down there as can be reached in very aggravated centers. Not ~~y chance did 30,000 Calabrian workers this past - spring return to Rome the "cornerstone" that had been laid in Gioia Tauro by the Honorable Giulio Andreotti. "If one wishes to restore even a minimum of credibility," said the Honorable Giacomo Mancini, "one must reactivate the enterprises that are in a state of crisis and complete the _ realization of all of the production installations. Without this premiae discussions on new investment packages and packets make no sense." The request occurs at a time when the consortium that should assure the - reformation of the SIR group is having trouble getting off the ground. The Iron and Steel Center In its turn the ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency]--which has declared itself available to reconvert and to again put the Liquichimica di Saline 16 ; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INITIATIV~S UNDER STUDY FOR CALABRIA (as a, replacement for the Sth iron and steel center in Giola Tauro) - Estimates Estimates for realization - LIST romo- Loca- Produc- Invest- No. of No. of No. of ter tion tive ments in employ- years employ- rgan- poten- billions ees ees zation tial of lire 1. Cold IRI Gioia 225,000 ~.40 500 3 600 work Tauro tons yr. rolling mill for zinc- ~coated metal 2. Round IRI Reggio 3,200 9.5 175 2 100- rods for Cala- tons yr. 150 the mint- bria ing of prov. money 3. Auto IRI Reggio 28 541 2 150 compon- Cala- ents: ~ bria initia- prov. - tives 4. Anti- EFIM* Gioia 60 700 tank & Tauro anti- aircraf t missilc.~ , (Cont.) _ _ 17 FOR OFFICIAL i1SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ Estimatea Estimates �or realization - LIST Promo- Loca- Produc-- Invest- No. of No. of No. of ' ter tirn tive ~nents in employ- years employ- organ- poten- billions ees ees ization tial o:E lire S. Equip- INSUD Gioia 180 ment for Tauro & 350 thermo- ~ Cosenza uuclear & solar plants: 2 initia- tives INFOR- MATION 6.Region- IRI Reggio 300 ~ al infor- Cala- mation bria ~ystem prov. EXPANSION IRI Reggio 18 500 machine Cala- shop bria ELECTRIC ERER~Y- ' - 8. Ther- ENEL Gioia 15 1,200 600 6 600 moelec- Tauro million tric kilowat nower hrs. yr plant; - 2,000 mega- ~ watts * = Industrial Reconstruction Institute. - = Manufacturing Industry Holding and Financial Company. . 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY plant in working order--cannot operate as long as the fate of the Liquigas group ia not knowal. Finally, with reapect to the Andrese, the two biggest factoriea that produce woolen textiles could be reactivated if the GEPI [Industrial Participations and Management CompanyJ reaches an agreement with whoever now controls the property of the group. In any case, Calabria is confronted with problems the solutions of which are in the hands of those whose concern it is to undo the SIR, Liquigas, and Andreae knotty problems. Further delays will only aggravate the already serious social tension down there. The Gioia Tauro iron and steel initiative, that goes back to January 1972, is a story in itself, even if it must be considered as an ~ntegral part of the "Colombo packet." From then until now, one has witnessed the degrading evolvement of a polemic that concealed a real mess, which caused a group of deputies to officially propose a parliamentary investigation. As is known, up to now about 180 billion lire have been spent for infrastruc- tural pro~ects, the completi~n of which--incTuding the port--will require a further estimated expenditure of about 170 billion lire. In the face of this commitment, no industrial initiative. Only recently some ministers whose function it is to resolve the problem have indicated possible new industrial initiatives for Gioia Tauro and the province of Reggio Calabria, summarized in this report that we are publish- ing, with the observation that among other things there is p~esently a lack of information on the availability of executive plana concerning the various proposed initiatives. - Also, the possible realization o�r the anti-tank and anti-aircraft missilea plant is tied in with thP decisions that the Ministry of Defense will make on ~the types of missiles to be adopted and on the orders that it will be able to approve. Finally, the expansion of the Omeca plant of Reggio Calabria also depends on the orders that the Ministry of Transport will be able to give the enterprise in the years to come. ~ The ENEL Proposal The proposals of ENEL for Calabria deserve a separate discussion. They first of all propose a gigantic thermoelectric power plant, to be installed in the vicinity of the Gioia Tauro port under construction, having a potential of 2,500 megawatts and an annual production of 15 billion kilo- watt hours. During the construction stage, the estimated investment of . 1,200 billion lire should ensure the employment of 600 persons and an equal number for the management of the plant to be operated on campletion (6 years). ENEL also proposes the speedy realization of the LAO [expansion unknown] and ALACO ANCINALE [expansion unknown] hydroelectric plants, with an investment of 250 billion lire and an annual production of 300 million 19 FOR OPFICIAL L'SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY kilowatt hasrs. It is also ready to exploit jointly with the Fund for the South other Calabrian water resources (Menta, Alto and Saro, Metrano and Melito) and finally to reactivate some small,not very significant,p~wer plants that had been abandoned far some time. To have an idea of tt~e dimensions of the thermoelectric power plant that . ENEL proposes for Gioia Tauro it is enough to note that its production _ - will equal approximately five times Calabria's needs, when this region already now exports two-thirds of the electric energy that it produces. In presenting its plan to the Calabrian region and to trade union represen- tatives, ENEL also recalled that, in accordance with the new plan of the _ Ministry of Budget, which will reward the regions that export electric ~ energy, the Calabrian region alone could count on an annual profit of about 15~billion lire. There are many Aldo Ferrara, chairman of the regional council, made it clear that while Calabria is ready to open its doors wide to all hydroelectric initiatives, it is ~ust as reluctant to give an opinion on the thermoelectric megacentral proposed for Gioia Tauro. Others have added that instead of the 15 billion in annual charity, they prefer to have differentiated rates for the cost of electric energy for the social strata most in need of assistance. Essentially, the region first wants to know what the palace will do with respect to the fate of - the big firms that are in a state of crisis, the future of th,. 2,080 workers now in the integration fund, and at the same time i= also wants to - asczrtain the specific elements of the proposals intended for the replace- ment of the "Sth" Gioia Tauro iron and steel center before acce~ting, or not ac~epting, the ENEL thermoelectric power plant. The Hotel Trade To complete the picture we must finally mention two proposals regarding the utilization of Calabrian tourist resources coming respectively fro~m the Federation of the Italian Hotel and Tourist Associations and from the INSUD jManufacturing Industry Holding and Financial Company]. The first plan, recently explained by Counselor Cosentino in Milan, is a study, still to be considered in policy sessions, that estimates that in the next 20 years there will be an increase in the European clientele that travels on vacation, from the present 35 to 90 million persons a year. It is therefore estimated that there will be 800-900 million "annual guests" who will need 5 million bed accommodations, 300,000 of which could be provided in the next 20 years, in Calabria, involving an investment of 2,100 billion lire and direct and indirect employment of 100,000 persons. 20 FOR OFFICIAI. LSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The other plan, on the other hand, is the INSUD one, to be implesnented in a ahort time:"-20,000 bed accommodations to be realized by 1983 in Calabria, Puglia, Campania Lucania, and Sardinia, with an investment of 194 billion lire. _ COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s. 8255 " CSO: 3104 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 FOR OErICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION ITALY 'I'~.XT OF DECREE LAW 438 ON CONTROLLING ENE RGY CONSUMPTION Rome ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME in Italian Sep-Oct 79 pp 63-66 [Text] Decree-Law t:o 438, of 14 September 1979, GAZZETTA UFFICIALE No 254 - 15 September 1979 Regulations for Controlling 'r',nergy Consumption The president of the Republic, considering article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution; in view of the special need and urgency for issuing requlations for con- trolling energy consumption, by regulating, among other things, the uti-- lization of heating plants in 1979-1980 autumn-winter season; likewise in - view of the need and urgency for ascertaining the financial means required for achieving the goals pointed out above; after consultation with the Council of Ministers; . on proposal by the presidPnt of the Council of Ministers in agreement with the ministers of Budget and Economic Planning, of Finance, of Treasury, of Industry, Commerce and Handiaraft Industry and of Tourism and Public Enter- tainment; decrees: Chapter I. Regulations for Operating Heat Plants Article 1. Operation of heating plants identified in Decree No 1052, of - 28 June 1977, of the president of the Republic, from categories E1 to E7, _ with the exception of buildings classified under category E3 and buildings intended for the shelter and care of minors or the elderly, is regulated by tht present decree. The minister of Industry, Commerce and Handicraft Industry, on proposal by the minister of Foreign Affairs, may exempt from observance of the regula- tions contained in the present decree tlie headquarters of diplomatic re- presentations and international organizations not located in condominium buildings. _ 22 FOR OFFICIt~L USE UNLY % APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Article 2. The nation's territory is subdivided into six climate zones - described as follows: Zone A: Communes with a degree-day number not higher than 600. Zone B: Communes a degree-day number higher than 600 and not over 900. Zone C: Coznmunes with a degree-day number higher than 900 and not over 1,400. _ 7one D: Comm~anes with a degree-day number higher than 1,400 and not over 2,100. Zone E: Communes with a degree-day number higher than 2,100 and not over 3,000. Zone F: Communes with a degree-day number higher than 3,000. The degree-day values used to describe the climate zone of each commune are given in the accompanying table. For coinmunes not listed in the table, the value is taken for the commune listed in the table that is closest in a bee- line and on the same slope, corrected upwards or downwards by an amount equal to ane-hundredth of the number of days of conventional duration of the heating period for every meter of elevation above or below sea level. If the difference in level does not exceed 10* meters, no correction is made to the value for the commune involved. - Article 3. With the exceptiun of the provisions of article 6, below, ope- ration of heating plants is permitted in the following periods: Zone A; I'rom 1 December to 15 March. Zone B: From 1 December to 31 March. Zone C: From 15 November to 31 March. ~one D: From 1 November to 15 April. Zone E: From 15 October to 15 April. Zone F: No restriction. ~ Article 4. Duration of operation of heating plants is specified, for each _ zone, at the following maximum limits: Zone A: 6 (six) hours. * Corrected in the GA~ZETTA UFFICIALE No 271 3 October 1979 as follows: "If the difference in level does not exceed 100 meters." 23 FOR OFFICIr~L USE U1VLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY , Zone B: 8 (eight) hours. Zone C: 10 (ten) hours. Zone D: 12 (twelve) hours. Zone E: 14 (fourteen) hours. The duration is understood as referring to coritinuous periods of operation . that must be included between 0500 hours and 2300 hours each day. It is _ permissible to operate the d~ily heating schedule in two or more sections. Zone F, however, is excluded from any restriction. Article 5. Heating plants of type using radiant panels embedded in the walls may also remain on during the period included between 2300 hours and _ 0500 hours. These plants may not be operated, if they are not equipped with thermostat regulators of the type prescribed by Law No 373, of 30 April 1976. Heating plants serving several buildings by means of a primary circuit may also remain in operation in the period included between 2300 hours and 0500 hours for the sole purpose of maintaining the temperature of the water in the primary circuit at the value needed for ensuring operation of the sec~ndary circuits at the scheduled times. ~ In heating plants that also produce hot water, the regulation covered by the preceding articles pertains exclusively to the plant section concerned with space heating. Article 6. A region, after consul~tation with the cognizant territorial prefect and on proposal by the m~yor, may increase the duration periods and the operating times of heating plants both for inhabited centers and for individual buildings, with special attention to the requirements of nursery schools. The prefect may also authorize an increase in duration and daily times of operation of heating plants on verification of needs or owing to extra- ordinary climatic conditions. The provision contained in the first paragraph is valid for the season. � The provision in the second paragraph is valid for a maximum of 15 days. Article 7. Within 15 days after publication of the present decree, mayors publish the climate zone in which the comanune is located, the period of operation of heating plants and the daily times of their ope- ration. In every heating plant, the person in charge of heating will take care of - , displaying visibly the solution chosen from the two established by the commw~e . 24 `rJR OFFICIA,'.. USE ONLY i: APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 ~ Observance of the time scYiedule selected within the scope of a communal ordinance is the responsibility of the person in charae of heating whose name, address and business address should be obtainable from written in- formation bisible outside the heating plant. In every building, the manager or the person in charge of the heating ser- vice or, if there is no manager or person in charge of heating, the uaers jointly are obliged to post, oiitside the heating plant, the p~riod and ~ time schedule adopted, giving their own name, address and business ad- dress. , Persons subject to the preceding paragraph on heating ~lants with a furnace power greater than 100,000 kilogram calories an hour must note in the "plant log" provided by Law No 373, of 30 April 1976, and retain for 3 years documents pertaining to purchases of gas oil made after 1 October 1979. Persons responsbile for heating plants with a furnace power in- - cluded between 300,000 and 100,000 kilogram calories an hour are also obl~iged to retain those documents. This documentation mus~ be requested of suppliers who are obliged to release it. In case of failure to observe the rules covered by the present article and article;s 3and 4, an administrative fine ranging from 100,000 lire to 1 mil- - lion is applied to persons subject to the preceding paragraphs and, in the case of several users, to them jointly. The administrative fine is applied by the prefect as a result of a report by city policemen. Access to the place where the heat-producing plant is located must be per- mitted to inspection boclies at their request. Proceeds from the fines are turned over to the co~nunes. Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 of Law No 706, of 24 December 1975, are applicable. Chapter II. Regulations on Taxation - Article 8. The manufacturing tax and the related limit surtax on the fol- lowing petroleum products are increased as indicated: Special gasolines different from petroleum spirits, gasoline and oil dif- ferent f'rom kerosene, from 41,212 lire to 47,320 lire per quintal. Gas oil, from 15,000 lire to 18,000 lire per quintal. Lubricating oils diiferent from white oils, from 15,000 lire to 18,000 lire per quintal. - 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY , Aromatic extracts and products similar in composition, from 15,000 lire to ~ 15,000 lire per quintal. ; The reduced rate of the manufacturing tax and related limit surtax provided by section B.1 of table B accompanying Law No 32, of 19 March 1973, and subsequent modifications, for gasoline bought by tourists is canceled ef- , ~ ,:~ctive 1 January 1980. Tourist gasoline coupons can no longer be sold fron~ the date on which the present decree goes in force. The reduced rate of the manufacturing tax and related limit surtax provided by section D.3 of the above-mentioned table B for kerosine intended for lighting and home heating is increased from 2,200 lire to 3,000 lire per quintal. ~ The reduced rate of the manufacturing tax and related limit surtax provided by section F.2 of table B, appended to Law No 32, of 19 March 1973, amended recently by Decree-Law No 287, of 10 June 1977, enacted into Law No 492, of 1 August 1977, for gas oils to be used directly as fuel for space heat- ing and for other specified uses is canceled, For uses specified in the above-mentioned secti~n F.2, the rate provided ' by section F.1 and the pertinent tax treatment are applicable. The reduced rate of the manufacturing tax and related limit surtax provided by section G.1 of table B appended to Law No 32, of 19 March 1973, for gas oils and special fuel oils intended for use for experimental tests and for testing automobile, aircraft and marine engines, as well as for over- hauling aircraft engines, is canceled. The reduced rate of the manufacturing tax and related limit surtax provided by section E.[missing] of table B appended to Law No 32, of 19 March 1973, amended recently by Decree-Law No 691, of 8 October 1976, enacted, with modifications, into Law No 786, of 30 November 1976, for a product called jet fuel JP/4 intended for Defense Administration is increased from ~ 9,121.20 lire to 4,732 lire per quintal, with regard to the amount in excess of the annual allocation of 18,000 metric tons on which tax is due at tne normal rate specified for gasoline. The manufacturing tax and related limit surtax on liquefied petroleum gas for self-propelled vehicles and for combustion are increased, respectively, _ from 35,126 lire to 40,149 lire per quintal and from 2,000 lire to 2,900 lire per quintal. ~ Article 9. The excise tax and related limit surtax on methane gas used as a fuel in self-propelled vehicles and as a fuel for uses different from i.ndustrial and handicraft industry uses are increased, respectively, from 107.13 lire to 122.45 lire per cubic meter and from 30 lire to 36.5 lire per cubic meter. The increased revenue resulting from application of the present article and of the preceding one are reserved for the state. 26 FOR OFFICIr'~L USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY Arki.c:l~ 10. Tt~e r,ite increases established by articl.e R, aUovc~, are ~lso applicaY~le to products drawn from refineries, bonded warehouses and similar warehouses or. }mported with payment of the tax at the above rate and that are held, on tHe effective date of the present decree, in amounts greater than 20 quintals by retail storage facilities of minera]. oils for commer- cial use, service stations and highway fuel distribution establishmPnts. If necessary, holders must report the amounts of individual products held by them, even if in transit, to customs or to the manufacturing tax tech- nical office with jurisdiction in the district within 30 days from the ef- fective date of the present decree, Within that time period, persons obliged to submit reports must pay to the provincial. treasury department the difference in tax due on the declared stocks. The manufacturing tax technical office checks the correctness of the re- ~ port and of the amount of tax paid. If an amount paid proves to be less than what is owedr the pertinent difference must be paid within 20 days from notification or from the date of receipt of the payment notice sent _ by registered mail with return receipt. In case the amount paid is more than what is due, reimbursement is made in accordance with the procedures to be set up by the Ministry of Finance by means of authorization to draw, exempt from manufacturing tax, oiJ_ products in an amount permitting re- covery of the amounts for which entitlement to reimbursement is recognized. Interest on late payments is applied in accordance with article 16 0~ Decree-Law No 216, of 26 May 1978, enacted, with modifications, into Law No 388, of 24 July 1978, and the late penalty in accordance with legisla- ~ive Decree No 1286, of 25 November 1947, by the provisional chief of state. Article 11. Persons failing to submit the report covered by the preceding - article 10 or who submit an inaccurate or late report are punished with an administrative penalty from double to ten times the defrauded tax or that is attempted to defraud. The administrative penalty is reduced to one-tenth of the minimum speci- fied in the preceding paragraph, when a report, recognized to be in order, is submitted within 5 days after expiration of the 30-day period specified in article 10. Article 12. For purposes of the manufacturing tax, crude petrolatums and crude paraffin residues, both resulting from the distillation of paraffin- _ base crude oils and having a natural color higher than 8, in accordance with the Astm D 1500 method, are subject to the same tax treatment pro- vided for fuel oils different from special, dense fuel oils. Section N of table B accompanying Law No 32, of 19 March 1973, is can- celled. - For methylterbutylitic ether subject to the manufacturing tax and related limit surtax with article 10 of Decree-Law No 936, of 23 December 1977, 27 FOR OFFICIe~L L'SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY enacted, with modifications, into Law No 38, of 23 February 1978, the sys- tem of reductions provided for liquefied petroleum gas is applicable. Article 13. Concession for a pla.~t and for the operation of storage fa- cilities for mineral oils and their byproducts, including liquefied petro- - leum gas, for commercial use, may be granted only to persons who have ade- quate technical, organizational and economic capability suitable for guar- anteeing proper management of the plant and storage facilities. In connection with requests for the purpose obtaining the concession ~ covered by the preceding paragraph, the opinion of the cognizant command of the Customs Officers Corps should be heard, in addition to the opinions specified by article 8 of Decree No 620, of 28 June 1955, of the president of the Republic, and article 2 of Law No 460, of 7 May 1965. The provisions of the preceding paraqraph are also applicable to conces- sions under the jurisdiction of regional bodies and do not concern auto- matic fuel distribution plants for the use of self-propelled vehicles. Article 14. Article 3 of Decree-Law No 271, of 5 May 1957, enacted, with modifications, into Law No 474, of 2 July 1957, is replaced by the follow- ing: "Owners of mineral oil storage facilities, of service stations and of auto- matic fuel distribution equipment in general, covered by the first and second paragraphs of preceding article 1, must hold the pertinent license, subject to the single stamp duty and issued by the manufacturing tax tech- nical office, and they are obliged to keep a log of receipts and deliv- eries. The logs of receipts and deliveries, accompanied by certificates of origin of the goods, must be returned to the manufacturing tax techni- cal office as soon as they have been used up for replacement. "Owners of mineral oil storage facilities subject to the provisions of the customs law on privately owned storage facilities and storage facilities for liquefied petroleum gas for commercial use must also have the license referred to in the preceding paragraph. This license is issued by the customs district or by the manufacturing tax technical office, depending - on the pertinent jurisdiction. "The operating license covered by the preceding paragraphs is valid for 3 y~ars from the date of issue. Its renewal must be requested by the p~r~on concerned within the expiration term. In case of delay, an ad- ministrative penalty ranging from 50,000 lire to 300,000 lire is applied. In the case specified by the second paragraph of article 25 of the regu- lations on implementation of Royal Decree-Law No 1741, of 2 November 1933, approved by Royal Decree No 1303, of 20 July 1934, the license is issued to the tenant who is obliged to keep the log of receipts and deliveries. "A holder of a concession and a tenant are jointly responsible, for taxation purposes, for obligations resulting from operation of the storage facilities. 28 � FOR OFFICIr~L USE UIVI~Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY ''A license for operating storage facilities for commercial use is suspended by the head of the office issuing it concerning a plant whose owner or le- gal representative is brought to trial for violations committed in the ope- ration of the~plant constituting offenses punishable with imprisonment for _ not less than 1 year, under the terms of the present decree or of customs laws. Conviction, with final judgment, for one of the above-mentioned violations, entails revocation of the operating license and exclusion from issuance of a new license for a period of 5 years." Article 15. The following paragraph is added to article 12 of Decree-Law No 334, of 28 February 1939, enacted into Law No 739, of 2 June 1939: "Finished petroleum products can be transferred, undex bond, to other re- fineries with a complete cycle for the purpose of storage, in accordance with the procedures specified by Financial Administration." ~ Article 16. The blending operations specified by section H in table C ac- companying Decree-Law No 989, of 23 October 1964, enacted, with modifica- , tions, into Law No 1350, of 18 December 1964, are subject to observance of the procedures established by Financial Administration. Article 17. The last paragraph of article 13 of Decree-Law No 334, of 28 February 1939, enacted into Law No 738, of 2 June 1939, is repZaced by the _ following paragraph: "Financial Administration may allow petroleum products to be drawn from storage facilities covered by the present article, under bond, for export or for special uses granted tax facilities. Transfers under bond to other similar storage facilities may be permitted only if they are justified economically or operationally and subject to observance of the procedures established by the Ministry of Finance." Article 18. 'I'he fifth paragraph of article 4 of Law No 9, of 23 January 1970, is replaced by the following: "The manufacturing tax technical office or the customs district, depending on the pertinent jurisdiction, may allow, under constant financial vigi- lance, products covered by the preceding paragraphs, including products contained in oil blends and residues, as well as oil products and lique- fied petroleum gas, singly or contained in the residual materials from storage tanks or from petroleum or petrochemical processing, recognized as unusable, to be dispersed in a way preventing their recovery or to be destroyed by means of burning and without utilization of their heat. In these cases, the provisions of the pertinent tax obligations are regarded as inapplicable. If they are intended for burning to utilize their heat, _ the tiGatment prescribed in the preceding paragraph is applicable, with observance of the procedures established by Financial Administration." 29 FOR OFFICIt~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY Chapter III. Special Initiatives in the Energy Sector Arti'cle 19, A fund for initiatives in the energy sector is set up for spe~r~ial, lir~~eni: initi.atives to be car.ried out up to 31 f~ecember 1980. ~'ursua?it to dir.cctives established by the Interministerial Committee on - Economic Programing, the fund provides for appropriating grants: a. For promoting initiatives for the purpose of reducing civilian energy consumption. b. To industrial enterprises ~aking steps suitable for reducing energy consumption. c. For promoting experimentation and application of new technologies for - the utilization of energy sources alternative to oil, especially renewab]e sources. d. To communes or their associations located in territories covered by - article 1 of the single text approved by Decree No 218, of 6 March 1979, of the president of the Republic, for setting up methane distribution networks. - e. To communes or their associations for setting up networks for convey- ing and distributing heat obtained from plants producing both electricity and heat. f. For reactivating small hydroelectric powerplants shut down prior to the effective date of the present decree. On the basis of criteria and in accordance with procedures established by the Interministerial Com- - mittee on Prices, the fund also provides for compensating for the greater financial burden stemming from a need �or guaranteeing the necessary sup- ply of gas oil by means of buying it on the international market with pay- ment of sums not laraer than the greater expenditures incurred to specifi- cally author..ized companies. Procedures for organizing and administering the fund and procedures for granting the amounts will be specified with subsequent legislative pro- visions. - In anticipation of the legislative provisions referred to in the preceding paragraph, the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Handicraft Industry is authorized to grant the compensations referred to in the third paragraph pertaining to increased imports made in 1979 and subsequent to the effective date of the present decree up to a total amount of 50 billion lire, on the basis of the criteria and in accordance with the procedures estabalished by the Interministerial Committee on Prices, exclusively to those enter- prises that have met and are meeting the obligation assumed on occasion of the 27 July 1979 decision by the Interministerial Committee on Prices. 30 FOR OFFICIru., USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 ' FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY The expenditure of a total of 50 billion lire is authorized for those pur- poses, to be distributed in 1979 and 1980 and to be entered under the fol- lowing specia'1 heading to be set up in the budget of the Ministry of In- dustry, Commeree and Hand.icraft Industry: "Initiatives f.or the purpose of compensating for greater financial burdens resulting from extraordiriary importation of petroleum products." Article 20. The expenditure of 500 billion lire, to be entered in the bud- get of the Ministry of Treasury at the rate of 100 billion lire in 1979 and 400 billion in 1980, as the state's subscribed capital to the capitaliza- tion of the National Electric Power Agency (ENEL), covered by Law No 253, of 7 May 1973, and subsequent modifications. Article 21. For the purpose of improving dissemination and familiarization with heating rules, in order to save and conserve energy, item 3539 of the budget of Industry, Commerce and Handicraft Industry is increased by a to- tal of 5 billion lire, to be distributed in 1979 and 1980. Article 22. Installation and operation of electric generator sets for the production of emergency electricity on farms, in business, handicraft and industrial concerns, as well as in hospitals and nursing homes, are not subject to the authorization spec_fied by Law No 1643, of 6 December 1962, and subsequent amendments, provided the power of the plants does not ex- ceed 1,000 kilowatt-hours. Chapter IV. Miscellaneous and Final Regulations Article 23. Provision will be made, by separate legislative action for the establishment of an inspection corps under the Ministry of Industry, Com- merce and Handicraft Industry for ensuring compliance with the regulations covered by the first chapter. Article 24, The emoluments due the members of the Standing Technical Com- mittee on Energy and the members of the Committee on Nuclear Safety, ap- pointed by the minister of Industry, Commerce and Handicraft Industry by ministerial decree of 10 August 1979 and ministerial decree of 13 August 1979, are determined by the minister himself in agreement with the minis- - ter of Treasury. The pertinent expenditure is charged against fund covered by article 19. Article 25. The increased revenue resulting from application of the pre- sent decree estimated at a total of 1,050 billion lire for the period ending 31 December 1980 is allocated as follows: 555 billion lire for fi.nancing the burdens covered by articles 19, 20 and 21 and 495 billion lire as contribution to the fund referred to in article 19 at the rate of 45 billion lire in 1979 and 450 billion in 1980. The minister of Treasury is authorized to make the necessary budget chariges with decrees issued by him. 31 FOR OFFICIr~;. USG UIVLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR t)Fr ICIAL USE ONLY Article 26. The present decree goes in force on the day of its publication in the GAZZETTA UFFICIALE della REPUBBLICA ITALIANA, and it will be sub- mitted to the legislature for enactment into law. The present decree, bearing the state seal; will be incorporated in the official code of laws and decrees of the Italian Republic. It is made mandatory for persons responsible for observing it and for imposing compliance with it. Given in Rpme, 14 September 1979. Pertini, Cossiga, Andreatta, Reviglio, Pandolfi, Bisagli, D'Arezzo. Authenticated: Morlino, minister of Justice. Recorded in the Office of the Comptroller, 15 September 1979. Government Documents, register No 23, fol~o No 8. COPYRIGHT: 1978 "Energia e materie prime" 10,042 CSO: 3104 32 FOR OFFICIr~;, USE UIVLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN 'CAIrB IO' REPORTS ON ETA AFFILIATED GROUPS, PERSONS Madrid CA1~I0 16 in Spanish 16 Dec 79 pp 27-29, 3i _ [Article: "Secret Report: The ETA Complex"] [ Text] - DEI~ _ EMNAIC . � � � OMITE ~ ANTINU- BAT IEME EUBKADi � . A 5 K. PRE55 ~ LAB ~ �EZ� VRO~ � � � ~ � ESTON � VRO ~ i � MNISTI ~ EU � ~ � : ~ DITORI ~ Q ~ ESB�ANV ~ ~ EOIN DAG T ~ ETA ~ m � � ~ ~ : ~ �EV51fAD11(0 EMERM� � �HERIU BATASUNA� ~ � � . , � C~ a � ~ JUNT ~ AGOYO A~/~~ MB EU�STV OYO ~ �EIBAR. . � ALCAI . OESDE OMIS R6A LKI � � ~ ~ ~ ~ OMIT ES N a vESTK1A � � AUTODE� � ~pN ESEI . � ENS ETA jBasque Fatherland and Liberty Group] forms a complex aggre- gate of terrorist groups, political parties, trade union organizations, and communications media which, very probably, has had the support of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the KGB according to a classified document of the military secret services. _ That document, made up of three large dossiers to which DIARIO 16, alone in Spain, has had access, describes in its second volume what has graphically been characterized as the "ETA complex." 33 FOR OFFICIA'L IISE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ "The entire organization," the report of the Ministry of Defense dated April 1979 notes, "is focused around two principal centers: The political- military ETA and EIA [Party for the Basque Revolution] on one hand and the military ETA and its satellites, HASI [Popular Revolutionary Socialist 1'zrty--patriotic] and LAIA [Revolutionary Patriotic Workers Party], on the other. In another concentric circle are the EE [Basque Left] as the political outlet of the political-military ETA and Herri Batasuna LPopular Unity], wh ich performs analogous functions for the military ETA. Within the complex, the report of the Ministry of Defense states, even though they are at the margin of the centers, are the autonomous commandos "whose operations in the general interest it is still difficult to analyze." Human Resources Also not forming part of the complex but close to it and even integrated in it on occasion are the political parties, trade union organizations, and some news media, at the margin of what the "dossier" notes to be "mass organizations" with two distinctions, within the labor movement and within the mass movement. The ETA, the document states, can have available today human resources in a number larger than it is able to provide cadres for, train, and lead - effectively and safely. And it is those human resources which will make it possible to implement promptly the programs contained in "Insurrection in the Basque Region" published in 1964, 5 years ahead of the "Ms.nimanual of the Urban Guerrilla Fighter" of Carlos Narighella which lias managed to become the leading hand- book of all terrorist groups operating in the world. The goals of "Insurrection in the Basque Region" have not lost vigor follow- ing their 15 years of tryouts and even today their essence and form are eff ective. According to the exposition which the document of the Ministry of Defense makes of it, the publication is a tract which develops the concept of sub- version as a just war, the absurd nature of moderation in the implementa- tion of same, and the use of violence as a right. Additionally, it talks o� the revolutionary mystique, of hate as a motivating impulse, of the importance o~ psychological warfare, of the role of the people and the need to count on live individuals rather than dead patriots. 34 FOR OFFiCIAL IISE OIv`LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Techniques This last concept involves what the military calls the techniques which the ETA puts into practice: Simplicity, effectiveness, and adaptation to the milieu. As regards simplicity, the document notes that there is no question but that the organization "is in a position to acquire and use sophisticated means of a high technical level even though it pref ers to avoid this unless complications develop and makes use of ineans adequate for a moderate level of preparation." The effectiveness of the ETA stems from the ap~plication of an already tried - technique and the maximum level of security in the use ef the means and the movements to be realized. Its adaptation to the milieu is reflected in its urban guerrilla warfare in which the ETA has shown itself to be skillful and experienced. It has a level of capability which it has had to reach through training. An important chapter of the document is that relative to the connections of the Basque organization. To re~oncile the ETA's security with the agile functioning of its terrorist machinery the military inf ormants suggest that "its connection with its base in France, where its executive and supreme command resides," is certain. As far as the training and instruction of the terrorists is concerned the - , report asserts that it has been sufficiently demonstrated that activists of . the ETA have re~eived training and preparation for the armed struggle in Cuba, Algeria, and Uruguay, in addition to Eastern European and other Arab coun- tries. Reactions Against the Document "In addition to being confused, the organizational chart of the military services is full of inaccuracies. For example, our organization has never had anything to do nor is it in any way involved with the two branches of the ETA. Within this unusual scheme of things they could have included the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party_] or the PSOE jSpanish Socialist Workers Party]," Inaki Zabala, activist of ESEI jBasque Socialist Coordination Force], told CAMBIO 16. _ "For reasons of friendship, on account o� relatiyes or simply of the anti- Franco struggle, the Basque people assisted the ETA at the time of the dictatorship. It is inaccurate to claim today that those people who , fough t in the interest of democracy has anything to do with the ETA, even though the report places them outside the peculiar circle," Zabala added. Other sources consulted by this periodical likewise noted other inaccuracies in the report: 35 FOR OFFICIAL L'SE Oiv'LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1. HASI and L~,IA should be place~ in the orbit of Herri Batasuna and not in that of the military ETA. 2. ANV [Basque Nationalist Action] is an autonomous organization which is the heir of the old Basque Nationalist Action established before 1936. Accordingly, FSB jBasque Socialist Convergence] has nothing to do with the - . AN~V since it was established only 4 years ago. 3. LAB-ex [Patriotic Workers Party] does not exist as a trade union. 4. ELA-STV [Solidarity of Basque Workers] has nothing to do with the ETA either, given that it is a trade union with 80 years of Democratic Christian leanings represented in various international organizations and which has historically always had connections with the PNV. 5. Investigations cormnittees and BAT jUnion of Patriotic Groups] do not exist. As for the part that refers to the daily newspaper DEIA, one of the advisers of that newspaper said, as regards the report of the military: "I don't know what interests it serves but what it s~ates about our newspaper is gravely in error, is frivolous, or the military is very ill inf ormed." Who's Who - ANV [Basque Nationalist Action] It was established in 1930 as activists split off from the lef t of the PNV. It is a nonconfessional socialist party. Leaders: Valentin Solagaistua and Josu Aizpurua (the present general - secretary). ASKs [Patriotic Socialist Committees] _ They are an organ of the KAS jPatriotic Socialist Coordination]. The ASKs were established in 1975 for national and social liberation and the reunifi- cation of the Basque Country. These committees try to be "a mass organiza- tion integrattng all districts and towns in the context of the patriotic left with the purpose of establishing popular counterpower." Autonomous Co~tandos _ They claim to be anticapitalists, parliamentarians, antiparty, and national- ists. They state that they are pzepared to act i~ a near future against _ the members of the Basque Autonomous Police. Members o� these commandos trace their origin to the year 1976 ar.d recall that "some members of the labor front af the ETA, who did not join LAIA jRevolutionary Patriotic 36 ~ FOR OFFICIAL L'SE OIv'LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 ~ r.~, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Workers Par.ty], united with other individuals originating frnm the ppliti~al- military ETA, the "berezis" [special comuaandos], the military ~TA, and otl~er independen[s and constituted the firat autonomous camtnandos." These commandos are coordinated, but each of them has absolute freedum Co . choose and explain its actions. They clafm to have broken with Herri Batasuna and the KAS alternative. The armed struggle is an addizionaX element of strife. They also criticize the plans of the armed st~u$gle of the military ETA and the political-military ~TA and believe that wha~ must be done is to globalize these actions. The names of their members are not known. r' ~ Antinvclear Committees ' In 1976 strang opposition emerged to the location of same nuclear pcawer stations in the Basque country. Thus, the "Cotnn:ittee in Defense of a . nan-nuclear Basque Coast" emerged anc~ it won ~n initial battle when it prevented the construction of the Deva (Guipuz~.:oa ProvincQ) and ~a-IspasteX power plants. It is now fighting against the nu~lesr power plant at Lemoniz (Vizcaya Province). ~ This "Defense Comnittee" receives parallel supports from the "antinuclear committees" which have been organiaed by districts and tawns, during 1979. Self-Defense Committees These committees emerged in 1976 in the o].d ~eighborhoods of San Sebastian to protect themselves against the attaeks of extremists and f ascists. They can also be found in Bilbao now, i~ az~tas of the red-11ght district where they emerged to defend the.mselves fxom the "quinquis." They are not organized. "DEIA" (The Voice) , = This is a Basque daily which was established in July 1977 in anticipation - of the initial legislative electione. It belongs to the Iparraguirre, S.A. publishing house and ia connected with the ~asque Nationalist Party. Managers: Ignacio Iriarte and naw Al~onso Ysntura. According to tha OJD jexpansion unknawn], in January J.979 DEIA printed 50,000 copies. ; ' Hordago Publishing House r This is a legal publishing huuse located in San Sebastian which publish~s all types o� books, preferably of Basque authors and topics. � _ 37 FOR OFFICIAL LTSE OI3LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It is said to be close to the Basque Left. - EE [Basque Left] Juan Me~fa Bandr~s This electoral.coalition emerged before the general legislative elections of 1977 in which it won one senator--Juan Maria Bandres--and one deputy-- Francisco Letamendia. The EE consists of the EIA, MC jCom~nunist Movement], OIC [Basque Comnunist Movement] and of patriotic independents. EE has been supported in all its electoral and autonomist campaigns by the political-military ETA. Its most distinguished members are Juan Maria Bandres and Mario Onaindia. Az the general elections in 1979 EE polled 90,000 votes. "EGI N" ~ Mlrerrtxu Purroy This Basque bilingual daily made its appearance on 29 September 1977. When it was established it premised its news policy on presenting coherently the problems which the Basque region represents as a national reality. Its managers since its founding have been Mariano Ferrer, Juan Ramon - Martinez, and now Mirentxu Purroy. It is close to the military ETA. According to the OJD, in January 1979 EGIN printed 45,000 copies. 38 - FOR OFFZCIA'L LTSE ONLY ~ i, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EIA jParty for the Basque Revolution] Mario Onaindia This party was established in the summer of 1976 following the Sixth ' Assembly of the political-militaxy E'TA. It is the party which was defended by the missing "Pertur," Eduardo Mor~no Bergareche. - , It is a working class, socialist, and independent party. _ The majority of its members belonged to the political-military ETA. Mario Onaindia is its general secretary and other members are Eduardo Uriarte and Francisco Javier Izco de la Iglesia. Francisco Letamendia was this party's deputy in the legislative elections of 1977. _ The EIA was expelled from the KAS in 1977. ELA-STV "Eibar" [Solidarity of Basque Workers] Alfonso Echeverria This trade union was established in 1911 and was founded by a Basque nationalist priest. - A traditional Basque r_ationalist trade uniqn, it is a�filiated with the - ICFTU [International Con~ederation o~ ~ree Trade Unions]. Its general secretary i~ Alfonso Echeverria. 39 FOR OFFICI~L L'SE OIv'LY , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It I~i~s 100,000 membera (source: ELA-STV). I t l;~ clo:~e to the Basque Nationalist Party. ErIIC-OIC [BaSique Co~uunist Moyemen~] It originated from the initial splinter of ~he ETA in December 1~66 which called itsetf ETA-berri. In 1949 it assumed the~ n$me of Basque Cqmippn~,s~ Party 3.n order to divorce itself completely from th~ ETA and leaned toward the Marxist-Leninist line. In January 1971 it atarted to ca11. it- self Communist Movement and in order to differentiate itself from the other national groups, in the Basque region it adopted the designatjqn EMK. It consists of Maoists, of inembers of the "new left." It considera Navar~a Province part of the Basque caunZry. I~s pxpgram is sumated up ~.n the assumption of power by the workers, the socialization of resources, ~nd the organization of the state on a fedezal basie. Its most distinguished members include Rosa Olivares and Patxi Iturrioz. ESB [Basque Socialist Convergence] Inaki Aldecoa It was established in October 1975. _ It calls for a Basque state, reunited, free, aovereign, and socialist linked to the realization of a worldwide confederation of socialist communi- ties. The ESB was estarlished with the purpose of consolidating the entire uni- tary Basque left and providing the ,future bases of a broader front of _ Basque unity. 1~ao groups accounted for the establishment of the LSB; "Aintzina," a faction which origina,ted in the ETA in ~.96k with "7~cillardegi"; and the Socialist Movement o~ the Baaque Country, a splinter from the Solidarity of Basque Workers trade union in 1964. Its members include Inaki Aldecoa. In June 1978 Txillardegi, Mikel Garmenc~ia, and Sabin Irizar were expelled. 40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 ~ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Tn July 1978 the ESB merged with the ANV. ~SEI [Basque Socialist Coordination Force] It was established in February 1977. It characterizes itself as a Basque socialist party, Marxist, democratic, internationalist, and patriotic (nationalist). Its activists hail from the working class and similar mass classes. It includes former activists of the ELA jSolidarity of BasQue Workers], the ETA, the PCE jSpanish Co~nunist PartyJ, the PSE (PSOE), and independents. Leader: Gregorio Monreal. Military ETA jBasque Fatherland and Liberty] In 1952 nationalist youths formed EKIN, the core of the ETA. Among its founders were Julen Madariaga, Benito del Valle, and Jose Luis Alvarez Emparanza "Txillardegi." In Septemb~r 1975 disagreements relating to the relationship between the military activity and the political activity of the masses caused a split within the ETA and two branches were established: The military and the political-military ETA. ETA has defined itself a nonconfessional, patriotic, and democratic move- ment (1959), as a"Basque revolutionary national liberation movement" (1962). ETA began its armed operations in 1962 and the first fatality was that of the rural policeman Jose Pardines in June 1968. Among its more significant members are Aya Zulaico "Trepa," Miguel. Angel Apalategui Ayerbe "Apala," and Txomin Iturbe Abasolo. Political-Military ETA It surfaced in September 1975 as a result of disagreements regarding the connection between armed military operations and the politics of the masses. The "puli-milis" j"political-military"] followers feared that an organization dedicated exclusively to armed activism could easily lapse into "militarism," into action for the sake o~ action without the inclusion of political considerations in its plans. Subsequently the "poli-milis" have criticized various actions o~ .the "military ETA." The political-military ETA backs its political activities with violent "military" operations. 1.~7- FOR OFFICIAL L'SE OIV'LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Members who defended the splintering of the ETA were Jose Luis Echegaray "Mark" and Eduardo Moreno Bergareche, the missing "Pertur." _ Other members include Mugica Arregui "Ezquerra." Euskadi Press Ignacio P~rez Beotegui This is the news agency of the Basque country managed by Jesus Unzurrunzaga. Its financing was secured through bank credits and Euskadi Press was esta- - blished in the su~er of 1978.. In the summer of 1979 it was on the point of suspending its services because it was unable to settle its debts to the banks. But despite everything it has continued to function. Its head off ice is in Zarauz [Guipuzcoa Province) and it has branches in the Basque provincial capitals. During its initial stage the former ETA member, Ignacio Pere2 Beotegui "Wilson" worked as its public relations man. The _ ETA members used to choose Euskadi Press as a means of publishing their _ communiques claiming credit for their operations. ~ Movers for Amnesty At the close of 1976 they appeared in the Basque country with the purpose of achieving total amnesty without exc~eptions, the complete reintegration of prisoners and exiles, and guarantees of fundamental rights for both groups. Group of Mayors of Vergara This group of mayors made its appearance in July 1976 followtng the anni- versary of the Statutory Abolition. It used to demand the urgent democra- . tization of the municipalities. The nwmber of mayors increased to 67, nearly all of them from Guipuzcoa Province. Among the most distinguished were Jose Luis Elcoro, the mayor o~ yergara, and Jose Antonio Altuna, the mayor of Mondragon. 1~2 FOR OFFICIA'L L'SE ONLl' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY tlASt [Popular Revolution~ry Socialist Party, patriotic] - _ ; : _ Ttomin Zuloaga It backs the KAS alternative and belongs to Herri Batasuna. � The party was established in 1977 after the process of convergence-regroup- ing of the EHAS jSocialist Party of the Basque People], the Basque Socialist Party, and numerous socialist patriotic inder~endents. Despite its advocacy of the independence of the Basque Country, HASI has declared itself not to be against an autonomy process, fights for self- government and the establishment of a statute of a national type. It calls itself a pacific party--not identified with the armed struggle (even though it does not question the existence of any group of this type)--and favors the use of political means. It is socialist, revolutionary, pro-independence, and Marxist. Its members include Txomin Zuloago (general secretary), Santiago Brouard (president), and Alberto Figueroa. HASI refuses to disclose the number of its activists. HB [Herri Batasuna, Popular Unity] r4~, ' .r _ Francisco Letamendls . It was established as an electoral coalition in r~y 1978. It is made up of the ANV, ESB, HASI, and LAIA parties. 1~3 � FOR OFFICIA'L LTSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Its political program consists of the follawing: Democratic freedoms, - a national autonomy statute for the southern Basque country, Basquification, improvements in the living conditions of workers and mass classes, and tiiE~ normaliziition of. the Basc~ue counCry (umnesty ~nd th~~ wlthdrawnl uf Spanish law-enforcement agents from the Basque country). Its members include Francisco Letamendia "Ortzi,' Telesforo Monzon, Txomin Zuloago, Inaki Urrestarazu, Valen Solagaistua, Josu Aizpurua, Inaki Aldecoa, Xavier Anuz, Jon Idigoras, Jokin Gorostidi, and Patxi Zabaleta. In the general elections o� 1979 Herri Batasuna received 173,000 votes. Support Boards for HB Jos~ Angel Iribar The members of the Support Board for Herri Batasuna espouse the program, line, and goals of the alliance outlined in its constituent bylaws on the basis of a commitment to struggle for unity and the strengthening of the patriotic left. They have undertaken to contribute to the peace of the Basque country with the achievement of national freedoms. Members of the Support Board include Xab ier Anua, Jon Idigoras, 3ose Angel Iribar, Francisco Letamendia, Jose Luis Elcoro, Jokin Gorostidi, Telesforo Monzon, and Patxi Zabaleta. KAS [Patriotic Socialist Coordination] - Jon Idgores. It was established in August 1976 among the follawing political organizations: EEIAS [Socialist Party of the Basque People], the political-military ETA, ~ FOR OFFICIAI. i!SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - LAIA, LAB [Patriotic Workers Party], and LAK jPatriotic Workers Committee]. KAS w:~:~ formed a9 a mandr~tory discusaion forum among the organizstione wi~[c?i make it up, protecting the autonomy and the organizational and poli- ~icnl Independenccr of ench one af them, usin~ that political independence exclusively to the extent that a unanimous agreement within the KAS was not possible. At its meeting in 1978 LAB decided to leave KAS. When the EIA was formed after it splintered from the political-military ETA, it joined KAS in 1Q77 but was expelled a�ter a few months. ' EHAS became HASI following its merger with other minor groups, joining to - Eorm part of KAS. Ttie following no~a make up KAS: HASI, LAIA, and the military ETA as observer. The goals of KAS are an independent, reunited Basque state and its Basquification. KAS is the only group which the ETA considers to be a valid spokesman in possible negotiations with the Spanish Government (September 1978). Among ti~e conditions demanded by KAS for a cease-fire are the following: Total amnesty, full democratic freedoms, improvements for the workers, with- _ drawal of Spanish law-enforcement agents from the Basq~se country, an autonomy statute that would make self-government and self-determination possible, making the Basque language official, the democratic administra- tion of the "ikastolas," and the establishment of Basque-language public schools. LAB (Patriotic Workers Party] It is a patriotic party included in KAS. It calls itself a Basque revolu- tionary trade union. It emerged in 1974 as a mass organization. _ Its members include Jon Idigoras and Txutxi Corres. It has 20,000 members (source: LAB). LAIA [Revolutionary Patriotic Workers Party~ _ It was establ:ished in the summer of 1974 out o~ the workers' front of the ETA. It is affiliated with KAS and Herri Batasuna. _ This party subscribes to the alternative of independence, socialization, the reunification of the Basque country, and Basquification, these being its long-term goals given that in the short run it holds that advanced self-government in the Basque country is necessary. 45 - FOR OFFICIA'L LTSE Oh'LY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The military ETA emphasizes its goals and identity as a patriotic revolu- tionary woFlters' party. _ Its members include Inaki Urre~tarazu (general secretary). - LAIA-ez [Revolutionary Patriotic Workers Party-"No"J This party made its appearance at the close of 1976. It splintered from LAIA when the latter was preparing to participate in unitary opposition organizations. Obviously LAIA-ez said no. LAK jPatriotic Workers Coffinittee] It was established in 1976 as a trade union of LAIA (which, in turn, splintered from the ETA workers' �ront in 1973). LKI [Revolutionary Communist League] The ETA-Sixth Assembly emerged from a split of the ETA in 1970. In 1973 the LCR and ETA-Sixth Assembl.y began a merger process managing to unite and adopting the name d,CR-ETA ~I. In 1976, at its first congress, the - name was changed to Revolutionary Communist League, or LKI. _ Its goals are the following: The seizing of power by the proletariat through the destruction of the bourgeois state and the establishment of a Federal Republic of Workers' Councils. _ The Revolutionary Communist League (LKI), a Trotskyite ideology, claims to be the Spanish section of the Fourth International. Ttao of its members-- Andoni Arrizabalaga and Inaki Sarasketa--were sentenced to death during the Franco period. Its members include Ramon Zallo, Sabin Arana, and Patxi Elizalde. There are 1,500 LKI activists in the Basque country (source: LKI). COPYRIGHT 1979: INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A. 2662 CSO: 3110 46 FOR OFFICI~L LTSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044460-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN BRIEFS HOURS LOST TO STRIKES--According to the Socioeconomics Research and Studies Society, 1979 is reportedly a record y~ear in hours lost because of strikes. This group notes that throughout 1979 approxi- mately 175 million work-hours were loat because of labor conflicts in which 5 million workers took part. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 6Jan80p7] CUBAN PRESIDENT'S VISIT--Cuban President Fidel Castro's visit to Spain has once again been postponed. It will not take place until the end of 1980. Castro's visit has been pending since September 1978 when he was officially invited by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 6 Jan 80 p 7] ADVISERS TO EQUATORIAL GUINEA--By the end of January [1980] the number of Spanish technicians in Equatorial Guinea will have reached 150. Among them will be ministerial advisera (there two,Spanish advisers for each ministry), economics and banking experts, and foreign trade - specialista. [TextJ [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Sp~nish 6 Jan 80 p 7] SUAREZ REFUSES TO MEET USSR AMRASSADOR--Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez refused to receive Soviet Auabassador Yuriy Dub inin at the Moncloa Palace. Dubinin, who called on the Moncloa in ttie early hours of the morning to deliver an "urgent message" from Brezhnev, was courCeously sent to the Foreign Ministry where, the following morning, he handed over a note on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. [Text] [Madrid CAI~IO 16 in Spanish 13 Jan 80~p 5] ROYAL VISITS--The king and queen's program of visits to foreign countries has been completed. The 1980 program does not contain the announced visit to the Soviet Union which Moscow has been insisting upon and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko finalized during his official visiC to Spain. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Jan 80 p 5] CSO: 3110 END 47 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY O APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040060-9