JPRS ID: 8907 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050009-5
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• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8907 ~
6 February ?980
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Near East I`dorth Afroca Re ort
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- CFOUO 6/80)
F~~$ FOR~IGI~ BR0~4DCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8907
6 February 1980
. _
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRI~A REPORT
(FOUO 6/80)
_ CONTENTS PAGE
' AI,GERIA
~ Power Struggle Reported Brewing in Algeria
(AZ-WATAN AL-~ARABI, 28 Dec 79-3 Jan 80) 1
Briefs
SONATRACH-Lesotho Oil Agreement 8
Socialist Managem~nt in Banking 8
Contracts With Belgian Firm 8
Resumption of Oil Exploration 8
Liquefaction Plant Cons~~�uction 9
Agreement With Cuba 9
_ Cement Plant Contract 9
Contract With Japanese Firm 10
SNTF Modernization 10
IRAN
Royal Couple Review Recent Events
- (PARIS MATCH, 11 Jan 80) 11 -
Shah: Policies, Departure, Shah Moharranad
Reza Pahlavi Interview ~
Empress: Sh^.h's Hea1 th, Faxah Diba Interview
Shari'atmadari Schism Sp].its Movement
� (Michel Gurfinkiei; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 17 Dec 79) 20
Ex-Savak General Directs Pahlavi Killings `
(Bruno Riviere; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 17 Dec 79; .......o. 23
MAURITANIA
Economic, Political Afisirs Dominated by Saharan War
(THE MIllDLE EAST, Jan 80) 25
- a- [III - NE & A- 1.21 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page c
Saharan War~s Effect on Econo~y, Foreign Aid Discussed
(Muhanar?ad Ould Zamel Interview; THE MIDDLE EAST,
Jan ~0) 27
French, Libyan Experts Visit
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 Dec 79) 30
EIB Financing of Guelbs Project, Other Participants
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI.TERRANEENS, 21 Dec 79) 31
MOROCCO
French Financial Aid Pledged _
(MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Dec 79) 33
New National Solidarity Tax Described
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET M~DITERR,ANEENS, 11~ Dec 79) 35
Minir.~ Of'fice keports Expansion of Activities
- (MARCHES 'I'ROPICAUX ET MEDITERR,ANEENS, 7 Dec 79) 37 ~
- Grain Production Lagging Behind Consumption
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11t Dec 79) al _
= Brief s -
NEw Mining Agreement 1~3
- Earl~ Product~ Export Drop I~3
Citrus Contract With U~SR !~3 '
German I~oan 1~3 ~
New Sugax Refinery L~1~
Cooperation With Equatorial Guinea l.~Lt
New Commercial Eank l~J~
SAUDI ARABIA
- Bri ef s
Air Force Chief of Staff 46 ,
- I1~IITED ARAB EMIRATES
Brief s
Pipeline Rerouting 47
WESTERN SAHARA -
- POLISARIO Allowed To Use Chega Region in Mauritania
(Abdelaziz nahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 19 Dec 79) 48
- b -
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ALGERIA
.
- POWER STRUGGLE REPORTID BREWING IN ALGERIA
Paris AT~ WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Dec 79 - 3 Jan 80 pp 34~ 35 '
r
[Article: "Smoldering Fires on Eve of ~onvention of Liberation Front
Party: Secrets of Struggle Between Power Centers in Algeria; Rising
Fortunea of Taleb .T.brahimi Favor His Succession of Abdelghani; Director
of EL-MDUDJAHID Was Fired and Director of AL-SHA'B Is on Mandatory Leave"] _
- [Text] Although the disagreements between the centers of power in AlgPria
are not yet out in the open, they are becoming more intense.
This report sheds bright light on the struggle between the centera of
power on the eve of the convention of r.he National I.iberation Front
Party [FLN].
When Algerian President Chadli Bend~eaid appeared on the television acreen
in the evening of the first of November on the occasion of the 25th
anniversary of the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution to speak to the -
~ Algerian people by addressing the members of the National People's
Assembly (Parliament), Algerian citizens waited for something with which
their new president might surprise them. But for an hour and a half he
talked about nothing but the past, affirming that he would commit himself
to."continuity and [that he would] revise and not depart from" the policy -
of the late President Houari Boumediene. It was tlhen that the deputies
applauded him warmly for the first and the last time during that address.
Col Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui the executive coordinator of the party machinery
had spoken about "continuity" on several occasiona. Different agenciea ~
were reassured about the continuity of their interests if "they committed -
themselves to opposing all maneuvers."
Ta1k about "continuity" continued to be an interim front behind which
. different groupe hid so as to attend with all their ammunition an~3 with
minimal losses the party's emergency convention that is to be held early
in 1980. This would begin with the first meeting of the Central Committee
which is considered the real test for the blocs that are confronting each
other in various government agencies.
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This session will deal with several basic questions. The econcmic plan, ~
the problem of agriculture, Arabizatinn, culture, housing and the problem
of Algerians' immigration to Europe are among those basic questions.
In his recent meeting with the deputies of the National People's Assembly
President Chadli Bendjedid hinted that there were other questione. He
indicated that "the files of those questions will be considered at a
subsequent session of the meeting of the political leadership." This
session will be confined to a consideration of those files about which
Algerian officials had reached a consensus following several delays in
the meeting date of the Central Committee.
It is clear that the thick cloud of mystery that is prevailing over
Algerian life is an indication of the ongoing struggle between the groups
that are vying with each other for influence a~d control. Rumors abound
in the wake of such struggles, and it is being said that many changes have
taken place in administrative and media agencies. It is being said that
some power centers have begun to fall. Mr Nooreddin Nayit Mazi, director
_ of the French language official newspaper, EL-MOUDJAHID, was removed from
his position, whereas the director of AL-SHA'B "received" a"m~ndatory
vacation" over a month ago. It was said that some power centers were
being quietly liquidated. This was indicated by the recent meeting of the
Political Bureau from which five members were absent. Th~:re were some
who stayed away frcm tne meeting to protest the control that some "powerful"
forces were exercising. [They were protesting the fact] that collective
agreements about matters were not being implemented and that one group
had given itself exclusive powers and has been managing the Political
Bureau by itself.
Huusing: Crisis of All Times
There is occasional impatience and tension in the mainstream of Algerian
[life). Transportation in the capital is irksome, and people wait for ~
hours to return to their homes in the evening. Vegetables and fruits are
iiot available in the required quantities, and prices are unbearably high.
Ttae housing ~risis is the crisis of all times, and the problem in the
hotel sector is acute. Universities and secondary schools are engaged in
a continuing strike, and even some preparatory schools have begun to
strike to show their solidarity and to def~nd the Arabization of the
administration. The Union Agency for Algerian Transportation is on atrike
in the capital and is asking for a wage increase and for different changes
among the governors. Ttao weeb:s ago new assemblies were installed in the
communes and in the goverr.orat:es. The official newspaper AL-SHA'B had
focused on the notion that "the requirements of the xiew stage call for a
new method of action that would permit the elected assemblies to become
involved in the decision making and implementation process so that they
can share in the responsibility in a manner that is consistent witt~ their
representative capacity."
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~ This is the climate that is prevailing over the beginaing of th~ meeting ~
of the Central Committee. Naturally, the economic question ie of prime -
concern. How far has Alberia gone in thie area?
Algeria has a"model" experimeat of its own in the Third World. After the
coup of 19 June 1965 there was a sharp debate about the economic course
between the members of Ahmed Ben Bella's group, who were left in pow~er,
and the [members of the) Ou3da Group--and Belaid Abdesselam was among
them. Ben Bella's group defended the courae of perservering in the
agricultural field and providing the background and the structures that
- are necessary for proceeding on a self-directed approach to the stage of
agrarian reform and agricultural revolution. Ben Bella's group defended
the initial establishment of light industries to meet needs. The two
parties disagreed about basic beliefs. At that time some Algerians-- '
and Belaid Abdesselam was among them--expressed their admiration for the -
- French economic theorist, De Bernis. He had published during that time
several significant studies on applied economica in Switzerland between
1966 and 1968 in the periodical magazine, ECONOMIE APPLIQUEE. ~.'he
circumstances of "political fate" thus arranged for these studies to
ccnstitute one of the aignificant premises in the thoughts of Algerian
minister of induatry and energy at that time, Mr Belaid Abdesaellam.
Today, he has a position in the Political Bureau, and he is chairman of the
Economic Committee of the FLN.
And so it was that De Bernis was invited to Algeria and charged with the
task of settin~; up a comprehensive plan to induatrialize Al~eria. De Bernis
_ is one of the t.raditional Marxists who consider the Soviet Ur.ion's
_ experience to he the ideal example.
Therefore, he established his Algerian plan on three centers:
1. (He wanted] to establish a heavy industry that could also industrialize
the country over the long term with light and h~aavy industries. This
industry has cost AJ.geria exorbitant sums of money. What the theorist did
not take into account is the fact that this induatry is culturally and
technologically tied to the West and that it was no more than a tranefer
~f technology. To date, this industrialization [effort) has not yielded
more than 40 percent nf the required production.
2. There can be no farming and no agriculture without an industry to
finance [this agricultural effort] and provide it with all the necessary
capabilities. These include tillers, tractors _:nd fertilizers. This
industry which was supposed to complement agriculture did not succeed in
spite of the large sL:ns of money that were spent in the agricultural
revolution experiment. The results of the experimeat were unsatisfactory. _
_ Rece~t etatistics state that ever since 1970--the beginning of the
agriciiltural revoiution--Algeria's need for essentfal materials such as
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wheat and meat has risen by 6.9 percent. Algeria loat in two areas:
First, large aums of money were spent on the agricultural revolution,
and there Was no return. The error was in the organization and in the
production mechanism. ~uresucratic agencies are primarily responsible for
this flaw.
Second, the agricultural revolution had a great need for fertilizers,
agricultural tools and water pumping engines. These should have been
provided by local industry, but they were ultimately imported along with
grain and vegetables and paid for in hard currency.
It is the opinion of De Bernis that after an ~nduatrial system that would
develop farming is created, the development of the agricultural sector
was to become synchronized with that of the industrial sector. This would
come after the state establishes its control o~ver the means of production -
and carries out a collective agrarian reform. [effort] based on the fact
that the process would lead to raising the citizen's standard of living.
But what did happen is that no industry eucce~ded; no agricultural effort
produced; and no standard of living rose. De Bernis's product remained
alien to Algerian society in its values and forms. It brought about
- nothing but inflation on the economic acene and absolute subservience to
thp ~es*_ern *:rorld. On the cultural and social scenes it complicated
conditions and gave them the quality of a chronic crisis. It tied Algeria -
_ to Franre in a provocative manner.
Movement Advocating that Industry Be Ignored
There is talk amidst Central Coimmittee circles about a struggle between
two ambitious movements that are aspiring to monopolize power and control
in the next 5 years.
The first movement advocates that establishment of heavy induatries a~sl
also of a segment of light industries be suepended and that funds that
were earmarked for industry be invested in existing pro~ects so that these _
_ projects would yield the required results. [This policy] is to be sustained
for 5 years after which radical steps would be taken.
This means that the "continuity" of De Bernis's plan apparent and that
[the notion of] closer ties to western technology are still in con~rol of
, the situation. This view is ardently defended by the chairman of the FLN
Economic Committee. It is expected that this view will prevail.
The second movement advocates that heavy industry be ignored and that
- attention be paid to light industries and to agriculture so that the
consumer needs which the citizen is urgently calling for can be met. This
movement advocates that the social aspect of future plans be firmly
established by providing health, educational and housing facilities to the
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citizena, increased inflation and a riae in unamployment. Thia ie because
~ directing investmente towardo the induetriee that hav not yet met tha n~~de
which they ehould have met aeveral years ago will decreasa employment
- opportunities in the next 5 yeara. This view hae been adopted by a group
of young university professors and technocrats.
Some Algerian officials are saying that talk ab~ut contiauity will not last -
long. [TEiey ask], "Continuity for how long, and in whose interests?" If
- those who are defending continuity believe in socialism, there are 5,000
millionaires in Algeria today who are the result of the economic experiment.
If those who are talking about "continuity" are among those who do not
believe in the socialist solution in Algeria, they can see that the -
experience of the private sector in Algeria has been a failure and that -
it has not measured up to expectations. It is for this reason that the
government began to turn to the masses asking for he'n. During his first
_ meeting with the governors President Chadli Bend~edid was intent upon
"the need for dialogue and discussion oa all levels and especially between
the executive agencies and the popular organizations. It is in this msnner
- that the problems that can be solved locally can be aeparated from those
in which the central government mi:y interfere" in an effort to find a
sound solution to the serious problo~ms that are urgently thruating
themselves [on Algeria]. "We cannot import everything from abroad, in-
cluding the solutions to our personal problems."
This is what one of the senior military men ia saying. He adds, "The real
problen that we, the Algerians, have is the fact that we are still ~
experiencing the conditions and the legacy of French colonialism. You
cannot imagine that we have ministers and senior offlcials in the different
agencies of the state who cannot speak their own Arabic language. This
is 17 years after the independence of Algerial How can these peog~e have
a feeling for the problems and the needs of our people? It ia true that
they are nationalists and that they are earnestly concerned about their
- country, but they are in fact estranged from their people, and they did
estrange industry, the administration and the economy." .
The movement that is calling for intellectual, cultuial and economic -
independence has gained strength in army agencies. It represents a force
that must be taken into account in the development of future stagea.
Algerian universities and secondary and preparatory schools have been on
strike for weeks and are calling for resolute revolutionary action and
' for the complete Arabization of the adminiatration.
- Strike leaders are affirming that the strikes will not be called off before
' the meettng of the Central Committee ends, and unlesa ~lear decisions are
_ issued and guarantees are given, the strike will not be called off. This
_ is the first strike since 1971 when Algerian university students marched
in a silent demonstration to call for academic reform and comprehensive
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Arabization. But the police authorities confronted them at that time,
and many university students dropped out of sight for yeara. At that
time, the achools expreased their solidarity with the univereity~ a:~d some
reforme did take place.
But the picture is quite different at this stage, and the situation is very
sensitive. If the government does not comply with the national demande
thar are being made by the Algerian young people, other reactione and
strikes may strengthen the youths' demands. This is what is scaring the
bureaucratic agencies and is threatening their economic and political
ambitions.
Col Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui is one of the supporters of the step-by-step
- comprehensive Arabization ~f all facilities. His support is based on
- the most important of the mobilized forces within the party and also on
the Islamic expansion that is sweeping the Algerian mainstraam these days.
Those who think that it is necessary to keep the French 'language as the
language of the age, of science and of the administration are: Prime
Mini~ter Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani, Belaid Abdesselam, Kasdi Merbah,
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Ahmed Bencherif and Rabah Bitat. They are members
of the Political Bureau.
Sources close to President Chadli are saying that some thought is being
given te effecting a government change after the meeting of the Central
Committee. The name of Ahmed Talib Ibrahimi, the counselor to the presi-
- dent is b~ing circulated as a replacement for the present prime minister, -
MohamAd Benahmed Abdelghani.
. A univarsity professor told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, "The problera of negligence
in the .~rabization process affects the dignity of *.he Algerian c{zizen.
The Arabization process could have been carried out at the beginning ~f -
independence wnen the number of Algerians who had studied the French -
language did not exceed 10,00Q. But circumstances were nat auitable
then, and the matter remained tied up in numeroua promises unt~l the early
_ seventies and the Arabization Conference whose articlea and resolutions
had remained mere ink on paper [was about to convene]. Students whr~ were
graduating from Arabic [laaguage] department~ were not getting the jobs
and the responsibilities that those who had studied in French were getting.
Since the administration and the majority of government facilitiea use the
French language in their operations, the Algerian [citizen] found himself
compelled to study the French language so he can find suitable employment.
Anyone who does not know the French language waits for his turn and for an _
opportunity on unemgloyment row."
Differences Ben~ath the Surface
Observers in Algeria are saying that the differeuces between Algerian -
officials have not yet surfaced and that the group of former technocrats _
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are still controlling the agencies of the army and the economy.
Different groups are pelting each other with negotiations, threatening
to reveal them to the public, if their interests are affected. This
situation has begun to strengthen the ranks of the group that opposes
the release of former President Ahmed Ben Bella. The man in the etr~at
is now talking about Ahmed Ben Bella in terms of a maa who ie above
, suspicion, who served his country faithfully and who must be released
and [allowed] to practice his righta like any Algerian citizen. This is
_ what President Chadli had told .AL-WATAN-'ARABI. Bu~ Ben Bella's opponents
still consider his release from prison to pose a real threat to their -
interests. They are, therefore, spreading rumors against him in the street
that distort his polirical positions.
Those who vis ited Ben Bella recently in the city of Tebessa are saying
that Ben Bella is complaining about the harassment to which he has been
~ sub~ected. f~ person who visits him is now sub~ect to police observation
and investigation.
This is the climate in which the first meeting of the Central Committee
of the Algerian FLN is taking place. It seems that Ben Bella's shadow is
haunting the conferees in all the sessione. Will the future emergency
conference of the FLN take place without keeping Ahmed Ben Bella under
house arrest? This is what many people expect, but Algeria is full of
surprises.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4402
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- ALGERIA
BRIEFS
SONATRACH-LESOTHO OIL AGREEMENT--On 3 December, it was announced in Algiers
that SONATRACH (National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydro-
carbons) concluded an agreement with Lesotho for the direct supplying of
different types of petroleum products. Deliveries will begin at the begin-
nin~ of next year. Algerian sources emphasiae that the accord falls within
the framework of efforts made by Algeria to supply developing countries
with crude oil and refined products directly. It is in keeping with the ~
resolutions of thE, Sixth Summit Conference of Nonalined Nations. Other
agreements of thi:s same type are now being drafted by SONATRAC~1 and could
soon be concluded. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 7 Dec 79 p;~ 3337J 11,464
SOCIALIST MANAGEMENT IN BAN~CID7G--Socialist management of busines~es will
be introduced into eight orgdnisations in the banking and financial sector
on 2 February: the National Bank of Algeria (BNA), divided into 36 units;
the Algerian Foreign Bank (BEA), divided into four units; the Central Bank
of Algeria (BCA), divided into five units; the People's Credit Bank of
Algeria (CPA), divided into four units; the Algerian National Savings and
Insurance Bank (CNEP), divided into four units; the National Accounting
Firm (SNC), made up of a single unit; the Central Reinsurance Fund, made up
of a single unit; and the National Gold Agency, made up of a single unit.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3387)
- 11,464
CONTRACTS WITH BELGIAN FIRM--Transurb Consult, a Belgian railroad consulting
company, has asked the Belgian firm Tractionel to handle three contracts
which the National Railroad Transportation Company (SNTF) in Algeria awarded
to it: a study of the rail connection between Jijel and the SNTF system _
(about 130 kilometers); a study of the reorganization of rolling stock
maintenance units; and a study of rail service for M'Sila (about 60 kilo-
meters). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
7 Dec 79 p 3387] 11,464 =
RESUMPTION OF OIL EXPLORATION--Algeria favors increased participation of
other countries a~id foreign companies in exploring for oil in Algeria and =
intends to give export priorities to countries joining in the effort. This
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announcemen~ was made on 10 December by Mustapha Mekerba, secretary general
of the Algerian Ministry of Energy and Petrochemical Industriss. Mekerba,
speaking in Algiers ae the opening of a conference on oil exploration in
Algeria, a conference bringing together Algerian exFerts and representatives
- of f~reign oil companies operating in A1Reria, said that permits granted far
oil prospecting do not yet total 50 percent of the coun[ry's area and that
all the work covered by the permits has not yet been completed. [Text]
[Paris MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3453] -
11,464
LIQUEFACTION PLANT CONSTRUCTION--According to a dispatch put out by the
_ Economic and Financial Agency i~ Tokyo, Japanese industrial circles say that
- the export contract for d gas liquefaction plant signed at the end of the
year by SONATRACH and Japanese firms, will soon move into [he execution
phase. The contract provides for the construction of a plant in Algeria -
and represents an investment of some 120 billion yen. AGEFI emphasiaes
_ that the contract was signed between SONATRACH, Ishikawajima-Har.ima Heavy
Industries and C. Itoh, but execution was suspended because of political
changes following the death of President Boumediene. Representatives of
Japanese banks and industrial enterprises recently visiting Algeria were -
in�ormed by government authorities and ~ONATRACH officials that the ~ontract
would soon be carried out. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 14 Dec 79 p 3454] 11,464
AGREEMENT WITH CUBA--Last week in Havana, Minister of Commerce Abdelghani ~
Akbi, who led the Algerian delegation in the work of the Algerian-Cuban
joint committee, joined with Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade Marcelo Fernan-
dea For.t in signing an additional protocol to the commercial agreement set-
ting the *_erms of trade for 1980-1982 and dealing with the intensification
of bilateral cooperation in the maritime and air sectors. A list of new
products that could be traded by the two countries was drawn up. In the
cour~e of 1980, Algeria and Cuba will proceed to exchange commercial delega-
tions in order to study the ways and means.of strengthening bilateral eco-
nomic cooperation. [Text] (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 14 Dec 79 p 3454) 11,464
CEMENT.PLANT CONTRACT--Concerning the construction of a new cement plant, -
_ briefly announced by us last week (MARCHES TROPICAUXy 7 December, p 3387),
we are now able to state that the contract signed in Algiers on 26 November
by Belarbi, general director of the SNMC (National Building Materials Com-
pany), was concluded with the firms FL Smidth-France and FL Smidth-Denmark
for the construction of a cement plant with an annual capacity of 1 million
tons. The plant will be built near Sour E1-Ghozlane (in the governorate
of Bouira, some 100 kilometers south of Algiers). This new unit of the
_ SNMC, to be delivered "key-in-hand," should be finished by the end of 1982.
The total amount of the investment required is an estimated 1 billion francs.
In addition to construction of the plant, a professional training center will
be provided where 500 to 1,000 students w~ll receive specialiaed training
enabling them to work in Algerian cement plants. The contract for the
training center will be concluded later. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
L;T MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3454] 11,464
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CONTRACT WITH JAPANESE FIRM--The Japanese firm S~imitomo has signed a con-
tract with.SONATRACH far [he importation of 400,000 kiloliters (2,492,000,000
barrels) of fuel with a low sulfur content. The fuel will be imported over
a 5-year period~ beginning in .January 1980, according to an AFP dispatch
Erom Tokyo. Sumitomo has also stated that the price of the fuel, which will
mr~in.ly Ku Co ti~ermA1 powerplants and stcel mLlly, will be set annu~?11y on
_ the basis of international prices. It added that it could pay 18 billion ~
yen (some $80 million) for the fuel imports during the first year of the con-
tract. The fuel, which will have a maximum sulfur content of .3 percent,
will come from the new SONATRACH refinery located in Skikda. This refinery
will have a capacity of 300,000 barrels a day when it goes into service at
the beginning of next year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2877] 11,464 -
SNTF MODERNIZATION--The Skikda-Ramdane Djamal-Constantine-E1 Gourzi section
of the railroad, built in 1870 in the ea~tern region of the country with a
single track, can no longer meet the increase in freight, which in 1980
should exceed 7 million tons per year. Consequently, the SNTF (Algerian
National Railroad Transportation Company) has decided to modernize the
Ramdane-Djamal-E1 Gourzi section, so as to provide better conditions
for shipping iron and steel products from the E1 Had~ar and Jijel complex
and iron ore from the Bou-Khadra mine. FERINFOR, organ of the International
Railroad Union, adds the following details: "An initial phase of reconstruc- -
- ri.on therefore concerns the doubling and modernization of the Ramdane Djamal-
_ Constantine and E1 Khroub-E1 Gourai sections, which will be completed by ~
the restructuration of rail facilities in the Constantine area in a second
phase. Reconstruction of the Iine will involve a total of 85 kilometers,
with doubling of the track, improvement of the layout and the addition of
numerous engineering constructions. Automatic signals are also planned.
Finally, seven passenger depots will be partially or totally rebuilt. Be-
tween now and 1982, the Constantine station will also be rebuilt and a new
freight depot will be located in the Oued-Hamimine area. These projects are
part of the plan to restructure the system in the eastern region of the
country, a plan that will be instituted under the Third Development Plan
and that will enable railroad transportation to meet the industrial and min- -
ing growth in the region." [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRAI~EENS
in French 26 Oct 79 p 2878] 11,464 -
CSO: 4400
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IRAN
ROYAL COUPLE REVI~W RECENT EVENTS
Shah: Policies, Dea~arture
Paris PARIS MATCH in ~renc~h 1~ Jan 80 pp 44-46
[Interview with Shah Mohammad Reza Pak~lavi, in Contadora, Panama, on 30 De-
cember 1979, by J. DesaunoiaJ
[Te~t] [Question] ~o important events have occurred since 16 September,
the date you completed your book, "Reply to History": the seizure of the
U.S. Embasay in Tehran where "students" are holding 50 diplomatic personnel
hostage, and the worsening state of your health. What can you tell us about
these events?
[Answer~J i can fully understand why people have tried to link the two events.
And yet, the taking of the hostages occurred 2 weeks after my arrival in
= the United States for medical treatment. It is my belief that the hostage
operation had been very carefully planned as part of a confrontation with ,
the United States and that it would have taken place in any case, by using
some other pretext, if I had not required emergency hospitalization.
[Queation] What is your attitude towards this disease, this cancer of
yours?
[Answer] As you know, I have always been a mystic, a perAOn sub~issive to
the will of God. For me, my illness is no problem. Only one thing worries
me, the future of my unfortunate co~?ntry and of my �amily. My youngest
= daughter, Leila, is nat yet 10.
[Question] Toda~,~, oil has become a means of blackmailing the Western powers.
What future, in your opinian, does.this crucial problem augur for the West- -
ern world?
[AnswerJ Being removed from "affairs of state," I have been able to re-
flect on the West's energy problem. I have followed from afar the chang-
ing course of e�~ents, developmenta in this economic war, and the rising -
price of oil. Cn fact, some 10 years ago, I was already speaking;about
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these t:?inga. I foresaw these developmenta, but the West always chose to
close its eyes, like the ostrich that buries its head in the sand and be-
lieves that because it can see nothing, others cannot see it. So the West -
_ did not want to see the problems of its energy future, thinking that it
would thus avoid the crisis.
You are aware of the solution I advocated, namely finding alternate sources
of energy so that d.il could be reserved for the petrochemical industries.
At the same time, the price of oil had ta be raised, in increments, to a
fair lev~sl, in ~ther words to a price competitive with the other more cost-
ly sources of energy, such as oil shale, tar sands, winds and ocean tides,
_ solar snergy, and gecthermal energy. Cheap oil can only encourage waste.
Yet the world's oil reserves are not inexhaustible. What I wanted wa~ to
fix the price of energy by coiunon agreement, thereby ~aking it possible to
build the world's industrial future. This was not done. HEace the crisis -
not only occurred, but did so in a shattering manner. Together, we and -
the consuming countries--the i.ndustrial countries--;,ould have formed a large
association of producers and consumers, of "northern" countries and "south-
ern" countries.
- [Question] In the mass of articles and comanentaries written since your
- departure from Iran, there have been, inter alia, scathing attacks on the -
agrarian reform you initiated as part of the White Revolution, reform which
some critics claim was to blame for the ruination of Iranian agriculture.
What are your views on this subject?
[Answ~r] Much has been said and written about this, and some economic
"experts" are trying to sh~w that the agrarian reform, point one ~f the
White Revolution, destroyed Iranian agri~ulture. Not only is this ridicul-
ous, but it is a complete fabricaticn, because statistics show that since
the agrarian reform we have had an s~nnual growth rate of at least 5 percent.
Before that reform, we were producing 3 million tons of wheat per year. In
1977, we produced 6 million tons. I don't know the figure for 197~. And
that picture is equally true for rice, and equally true, if not even more
so, for sugar beets. As for sugar cane, from a crop that was practically
nil, we had risen to crops of hundreds of thousands of tons. Furthermore,
we had several refineries, one of them with a 250,000 ton capacity, which
in addition to producing sugar could also produce paper. No, the agrarian
reform was not a failure. All the figures, all the statistics prove that
it was not.
[Question] Yet imports of cansumable raw materials did increase consider-
ablq.
[AnswEr] But that's altogether normal. First of all, in 15 years, the
population increas~d considerably. At the start of the agrarian reform
we had a population of 19.5 to 20 million persons. In 1978, our population
was 35 million. That's an increase of 65 percent. And per capita income
rose from 160 dollars to 2,540 dollars. Consequently, people began to
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consume. Especially since we were subsidizing meat, flour, wheat, vegetable
oil, and rice. Thus not only were there many more consumers but they could
buy these food items at a relatively cheap price. For a population having
increased 65 percent, the per capita income had practically been multiplied
by 16. We were able to increase purchasing power by keeping prices low.
There may, however, perhaps been aome distribution problems.
- [Question] Nevertheless, many commentators have dwelt upon the "misery" of
the Iranian people.
[Answer~ You mustn't forget one thing: imQnediately after the war, before -
_ I assumed power, in other words, about the time of Moasadegh, small child-
ren in Baluchistan were eating grass. That cannot be said about my reign.
, It did happen under the government of Mossadegh's people. On the contrary, -
, during the last 3 or 4 years of my reign, among those same Baluchis, you
could see husband and wife riding on thefr motorcycle throughout the pro- -
vince where formerly a person could not take a step without fear of being
att~cked by bandits.
Furthermore, under my reign we not only had no unemployment, but thousands
of immigrant workers were employed on construction projects in Baluchistan. -
And it was not only the rich who were becoming richer. There were a million
immigrant workers in our countrp and all workers could buy household appli- -
ances and a car. Moreover, nobody can say that those well-known traffic
jams in Tehran were caused solely by automobiles belonging to the Iranian
upper middle class who were, after all, not numervus enough.
[Question] You are fond of reiterating that three principles have always
guided your domestic policy: participation, decentrali.zation, and democracy.
, As faT as participation is concerned, we are familiar with the decisions
mad~~ under the White Revolution, decisions that were actually implemented.
As for decentralization, nobody questions it today. But what about demo- -
cratization? You are ac~used, in fact, of having governed your country as
a chairma~r of the board rather than as a chief of state.
[AnswerJ When I did not attend to affairs of state, I was called a play-
boy. When I began to apply myself to such matters, I was said to be too
authoritative. But critics overlook the fact that each country has its
own needs, its own philosophy, its own ways of life. A leftist dictator-
ship is considered to be quite proper, and it is not critizied. But in a
monarchy, if there is a bit of discipline, some call it fFSCism, or even
worse, by comparing it to aberrations that I would prefer not to mention .
here. ~
[Question] In a climate of incredible hatred, you are now being accused
of "genocide." Edward Kennedy referre~' to your regime as "the world's =
most despotic." Aren't you tempted t~ respond to sueh criticism? -
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[Answer] It's so ~tterly .ridiculous. The figures speak more eloquently
than anything else, as I have previously explained. Even a clandestine
publication, CHRONIQUE DE LA REPRESSION, has given figures that tally with
my own information, namely 3,164 persons arrested from 1968 to 1977. Of
course, that is an opposition publicatian directed against Savak. My own
figures were some 3,200. And most of those prisonere were terrorists. It
_ wa~ when they were released that a good number of them began fomenting
riots in Tehran and setting fires in the capital and elsewhere. Well, if
- these 3,200 prisoners are the world's greatest crime, I should like to com~ "
pare that figure with the number of persons who were eliminated in the so-
called civilized Western countries during World War I~.
But all of these assertions are part of the game played by self-styled
"officials who will say anything, no matter what." Moreover, there are
- Savaks in every country, whether they be called the KGB, CIA, SDECE [in
France], or the Intelligence Service.
[Question] Do you consider your regime to have been somewhere between com-
munism and capitalism?
[Answer] Yes, if you want to put it that way. Personally, however, I
basically believe ti~at all "isms" do not exist. Everything must be based
- on social and human justice, on respect for man, for the individual, his
beliefs and personal liberties.
[Question] In his book "L'Iran Insurge," Paul Balta dwells at great length
on "corruption" and particularly on the imperial family's wealth. He men-
tions a ce~rtain number of companies, 120 I believe, in which he regularly
found the principal stockholders to be the Pahlavi Foundation and some mem-
bers of your family.
(Answer) First of all, how many companies were there in Ir.an? Tens of
thousands. I do not want to quote a more sgecific figure, because I could
_ be in error by a few hundred, more or less. I igave the Pahlavi Foundation
to the country. Sr~ much the better if the Foundation owned stock in many
companies, because it thus made more profit and could provide many more
benefits such as scholarships or grants to charitable organizations. The
Pahlavi Foundation also made up for the lack of private investors in in-
dustries vital to the country but entailing high financial risks. As for
the members of my family, I believe that, like any free person in our country
and many countries of the world, they had the right to own stock in a com-
pany, on condition that they obeyed the Iaw. I se~ nothing unuaual about
this. And I want to ma.ke it clear that if anyone had had a complaint, they
could have very easily submitted it to the commission I had personally
established to study the problem and report to me on its findings. Legal -
proceedings could have been instituted against members of my family, just
, as they could ~g~inst anybody else. And even if they had not been convicted
by a court, I would have compelled them to withdraw immediately from any
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busineas that would not have appeared to be a~ove-board and ethical in the
~o~iAeion'e opinion. In all democracies~ monarchical or otherwise~ all -
m~mberH ~f the r~yul t"~unily oc o[ Che f~milled oE poli [ irrtl ol' P1~~ Lelh l~+w~~
activities, and I have ne~er heard it said that they are restricted in any
way. The family of a president of France does not automatically lose its
rights as citizens and is not obliged to give up its business interesta after
the president's election.
[Question] One of your sources of income was that share of the "church
_ offerings" you were entitled to receive as protector of the holy places at
Meshed. Yet your governor, General Valian, was accused of having misap-
propriated part of the gifts the faithful were offering to the shrine.
[Answer] Misappropriated? How so? Imam Reza's shrine had never been as
prosperous as it was under the governorship of that poor man, and what was
done for Meshed's holy places was extraordinary.
I regret we were never able to make a large documentary film that would have
depicted Iran in three stages: as it was in 1941, and then in 1956, and
finally :Ln 1978 before my departure.
[Question) Sfre, you make frequent references to God. Do you atill be-
lieve in God?
[Answer] Yes, indeed, that has been the reason for my existence. And after
all that existence, I am certainly not going to change now at 60 years of
age.
[QuEStionJ In your thinkin~, would it not be a sort of divine in~ustice if
illness were now to deprive yo~i of the possibility of waiting for the out-
come of what may well be an "historical accident"?
[Answer] If I personally cannot s~e that, history at least will see it.
[Question] You once wrote: "if it is dangerous to tell the truth, it is _
- foolhardy~to defend it." Did you alwzy~ tell the truth in your memoirs?
_ [Answer] I perhaps ~id not say everything against Khot~ey~i. On that subject,
I refrained from telling the whole truth. But on the other sub~ects, the
truth cannot be hidden. One name, however, was not mentioned in my book.
It's the name of a religious dignitary who recommended to me that I do -
- something highly spectacular in August 1978. At that time, I made the
mistake of accepting the resignation of Prime Minister Amuzegar, a great
servant of the state.
[Question] Your departure surprised world opinion. Did a foreign indivi- -
dual possibly accelerate the process?
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[Answer) In January 1979, General Huyser came to Iran. He was an import-
ant peraon, the deputy commander of NATO forces, and I had had occasion to
receive him in Tehran several times, because each time he came to Iran, he
- requested an audience with~me. I was, in fact, head of the armed force.s and
Iran belonged to CENTO.
But this time, it was merely by chance that I learned he had arrived in
Tehran. My generals had not been informed of his coming. I immediately
thought of a military coup d'etat. In my behalf? Or against me? As it
turned out, General Huyser's primary concern was to neutralize the Iranian -
armed forces. When he finally did request an audience with me, along with
Ambassador Sullivan, they both were primarily concerned about the day and
hour of my departure. As for General Huyser, he remained in Tehran for
several days after I and the empress had left Iran on a long "vacation."
~ Huyser had met with my chief of staff, General Ghara-Baghi. It appears that
the latter had used his authority to prevent the principal military com-
manders from taking any action. It is hard to get close to the truth, given
the fact that all of the generals were executed and General Ghara-Baghi is
thE only one left. I should like to refer you, however, to one sentence I
quoted in my book. It was spoken by General Rabii, co~ander in chief of
the Iranian Air Force, before his execution: "General ~[uyser threw the
king out of the country." ~
[Question) Are you thus implying that this visit was part of an externally-
instigated plot? Are you actually saying that your departure was organized
. by the American administration?
jAnswerJ I prefer not to answer that question, because we have had no re-
action to the chapter of my book to which you refer. On this side, they
have said: "No co~ent." Consequently it is better to wait.
[QuestionJ Sire, if today you could turn the clock back 37 years, and know-
ing what you now know, would you do the same things?
[Answer] That would depend on what would be done during the same period by -
the countries who followed us or betrayed us.
Empress: Shah's Health
Paris PARIS MATCH in French li Jan 80 p 45
. [Interview with Empress Farah Diba, in Contradora, Panama, on 30 December
1979, by J. Desaunois]
[Text] [Question) What is the exact state of the shah's health ?
[Answer] The shah has been seriously ill since 1974, but I did not know it
until 3 years later. He has Waldenstrom's disease, an extremely rare form
of leukemia named after the Swedish professor who discovered it. It's a
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form of cancer. It was first diagnos~d by a French professor who had come
to Tehran to give the shah a routine checkup. Professors Jean Bernard,
Milliez, and Flandrin were bFOUgk~t in for consultation and confirmed the
diagnosis. Later, the doctors requested that I see them in Paris, in priv-
ate. And it was then that they informed me, naturally with a great deal
of tact,about the seriousnesa of the ahah's illneas. That was on 12 Novem-
ber 1977. I no longer remember whether it was on our way to or from our _
last official visited to the United States. This was really terrible news
for me, but they presented it to me in such a way that they left me some `
hope= while still very clearly explaining to me that the shah was not exact-
ly aware of what he had. That was a terrible period.
Until o;~r arrival in Morocco, the disease had not yet visibly marked the
shah. It was in Rabat that he began having pains in his neck. In Tehran,
he had already begun undergoing chemotherapy, taking a large number of -
pills every day. His spleen was also enlarged. '~.`._ts is related to the
lymphatic system and hence to his di$ease. A tumor then appeared in the
form of a:welling on his neck. We then went to the Bahamas where anoth~r
professor wa~ consulted. It was decided to supplement the chemotherapy
_ by intravenous injections. This treatment weakens the patient and may have
complica~ions.
_ 1~ao or three injections were followed by a month's rest. It was then that
we arrived in M~xico where a whole series of indispositions unfortunately
- prevent~d continuing this treatement: malari~a, amebic dysentery, and then
an he~atic disorder that was initially treated as infectious he~atitis.
The shah had become very jaundiced and had terrible abdominal pains. Pro-
fessor Milliez was then called in, along with Professor Garcia, a Mexican.
We visited a Mexico City hospital to see if, in an emergency the shah could
be operated on there. But various doctors said this could be dangerous,
in that the shah might possibly have a malignant tumor. They said he would
have to go to the United States, the last recourse in the most serious cases.
X-rays were taken and they revealed that the shah's abdominal pain was
- actually caused by gallstones. As you know, he was then hospitalized in
the Cornell Medical Center where surgeons successfully removed his gall
bladder. But subsequently it was necessary to remove, by means of a tube-
like probe, another gallstone that had not been detected earlier. ~.t that
tin?e, doctors also located a tumor under the arm, but it was not secious.
Lymphography was employed to see if there were any other tumors of the
lymphatic system in the abdomen. Fortunately, this examination was -.ega-
tive. The spleen remained enlarged but the surgeon decided not to remove
- it because of th~ shah's weakened condition. In the meantime, his doctors
had resumed chemotherapy and added a trying course of X-ray treatment in
an effort to check the growth of the tumor diagnosed on his neck.
[Question] Have you been told in werq specific terms how the shah's di-
sease will evolve and what prospects for remission medical science may
offer him?
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~Anawer] Tt's a slowly-evolving diaease, contrary to a widespread can- _
cer where doctors speak of weeks, or months when they want to be opti- -
mistic. In fact, its evoiution depends on the patient, his moraler his
- physical reaction. Hence if the examinations are favorable, doctors
speak of a remission period of several or even many years. Now, however,
the spleen has enlarged again and the doctors think it must be removed,
but other specialists believe it is still too soon, that the shah is too
weak.
[Question] If there is such an operation, where will be performed? Will
it be absolutely necessary for you to return to the United States?
- [Answer] It is out of the question for us to return to the United States.
There are excellent Panamanian doctors and surgeons, many of which, more-
over, have graduated frrnu American medical schools. If the shah does
have to be operated on again, it will be done in Panama. The shah is
very anxioua not to create an}r problems for the United States and Presi-
dent Carter.
[Question] The shah's illness was not your only problem in New York City.
During his operation, Iranian students were outside the hoapital praying
that he would suffer and die. What was your reaction and the shah's re-
- action to this outbu.rst of hatred that beggars deacription?
[Answer] The shah was too weak to react. But for me it was both a dis-
tressing and in~redible situation. I was in the operating room and was -
hearing the lies, ~he slander, which the radio stations were repeating,
namely that the shah was not sick. Yet I could see him stretched out in
front of ine, covered with bile, with blood. And to think that some per-
sons were praying for the death of a man!
[Question] Your majesty,. how do you feel about all the accusations cur-
rently being made against the shah`s regime, about Savak, torture, and
the misappropriation of funds, an accusation made, for the first time,
against you personally?
[Answer] With reference to Savak, I truly believP there has been an
enormous amountof lies and exaggeration in the press ~or many years, at
the ~instigation of certain opposition groups. The most incredible figures
have been advanced, as if it were not a question of victims, of human
beings. These lies still continue to be publiahed. Upon leaving Iran, -
I realized how this campaign had been organized for some 15 years, be-
cause I saw how the press reacted along with certain foreign organiza-
tions, such as Amnesty Internatioaal, the InternationaZ Commission of
Jurista, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
[Question] In your present adversity, some persons have remained close
to you, others snub you or want to snub', you. How do you feel about
- this reaction?
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[Answer] When we left our country, we knew indeed that we were going to -
live in another world, but I do hope we will not be surrounded by hatred.
_ People have to have courage, the courage of their friendship.
COPYRTGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse S.A.
8041
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IRAN
SHARI'ATMADARI SCHISM SPLITS MOVEMENT
- Paris VALEliRS ACTUELLES in French 17 Dec 79 pp 28, 30
[Article by Michel Gurfinkiel: "The Madari Schism"] -
_ [Text] Imam Khomeyni is no longer the absolute master of Iran by divine right.
Everything happened on 11 December at noon. The state radio and television
broadcast a message from Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, the primate of Qom. His
speech was an indictment of the Islamic Republic, on behalf of Islam. In
short, cold, ironic terms Kazen Shari'atmadari attacked the "legend," the
charisma of Ruhollah Khomeyni.
"The reasons for opposing the regime are not eliminated, "the Qom primate said,
"by excommunicating the opponents...The present gove~nment claims that every
person who rises up against it is acting on behalf of imperialism and Zionism; �
well, in that case I am an agent of imperialism and a Zionist...Khomeyni has
violated the agreements he concluded with me...I hope that from now on every-
_ one in Iran will have the courage of his opinions. A benediction on you and
on all Muslims."
To grasp the meaning of those few sentences, it should be noted that the
Khomeynist movement had been using for a year the politico-religious idea of
"djihad," of hoYy and merciless struggle against the "enemies of God:" the
shah, the i~est, the United States, Israel. And what has Ayatollah
Shari'atmadari done? He has affirmed that such a"djihad" depends~on decep-
tion. By applying to himself the two most "satanic" epithets, "Zionist" and
"imperialist," he has taken away their effectiveness. An exorcism.
Kazem Shari'atmadari is the principal dignitary of the Iranian schism. Seu-
eral years ago he was elevated by the college of ayatollahs to the rank of
"mardjaa takhlid," or "pope." But Shah Mohamed Reza then refused to ratify
his appointment. Less because of personal hostility toward him than because -
_ of political calculation: the preceding mardjaa takhlid, Haqim, had shown too
much insubordination. So the king preferred to leave the office vacant, and
even quoted a proverb in self-justification: "There is no need for a bandage
- when one has no headache. If the Shi~ites have no nope, I won't have to quar-
rel with the Shi'ites' pope."
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The sovereign was undoubtedly committing the most serious error of his reign.
Qu~tatio~i for qu~tation, he must have bcon inspixcd by thc "Ctiahnamch," the _
13ook of the Kings, t}ie k~ersian Iliad composed in the Middle Ages by Firdusi,
in which it is said that Iran rests on two pillars: religion and the monarchy.
And that if one falls the other also falls. Ayatollah Khomeyni never would
have achieved his influence nor dared to usurp the messianic title of "Imam"
if a regularly invested mardjaa takhlid had confro~ited him in 1978.
A very wise and very pious man, Kazem Shari'atmadari was hoping the Pahlavi
regime would undergo a peace�ul revolution toward a liberal religious monarchy. _
When the crisis exploded, he negotiated with the court. Those dealings had
no result. Then, taking a considerable personal risk, the ayatollah ordered
the clerical hierarchy to stop obeying the king; ultra-monarchist officers at-
tempted to assassinate him, and killed several of his assistants.
During that time Ruhollah Khomeyni launched his first calls for the "djihad" _
from abroad, first from Iraq and then from France. Much lower in rank and in
dignity than Kazem Shari'atmadari, suspected of having formerly been in league
with the monarchic regime and tnen with a Savak leader, the exiled ayatollah
quite soon became the religious backing for all milieus favoring an armed re-
volution: communists, Trotskyites, PLO agents, the "Islamic left." He ful-
filled his role all the better because he speaks a vulgar, vernacular Persian.
His sermons, recorded on cassettes, mobilized the crowds in the poor neigh-
borhood~ in the sauthern part of Tehran.
Shari'atmadari, kept out of sight by tne royal police, of course had no way _
of reacting.
In February 1979 there was revolution. While Ruhollah Khomeyni is working to
establish a theocratic dictatorship for his own advantage, Kazem Shari'atmadari
seems to be chiefly concerned about avoiding civil war. But he does not re-
main inactive. His native province, Azerbaijan, Turkish in culture but pro-
foundly Shi'ite, is endowed with. a powerful party, the Muslim Repiiblic People's -
Party (PRr;~). This organization is implanted in Tehran, where Azerbaijanese
constitt~,:e more than one third of the population.
This au~:wnn the Khomeynist regime is dislocated. Among the factions surround-
ing the Imam, Mr Ghotbzadeh's pro-Soviet group then decides to take hostages
in the United States enbassy. The goal counted upon: to create an anti-Am-
erican "national union" and win the constitutional referendum of 2 December,
which would definitely create an authoritarian Islamic Republic.
But Ayatollah Shari'atmadari calls for a"'No" vote. He thus becomes the de-
clared head of the all the Iranian opposition, from the right to the Trotsky-
ites and the "Muslims on th~ left." On 2 December the referendum is a fail-
ure, despite a rather crude ruse employed by Mr Ghotbzadeh: pictures of
Kazem Shari'atmadari had been broadcast on television the night before, with,
superimposed upon them, an appeal for a"Yes" vote by his son, who is simple-
minded.
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I
'Che Kl~omcynists, furious, attemptccl �o assassinate the Azerhaijanese aya-
tollah: lmmediatcly, on b Uecember, his province rose up. Violent c;ollis-
ons continued over several days. Mr Ghotbzadeh asked for the dissolution
of the PRMP. The reply: the bitter message of 11 December that the official
Iranian media did not dare to broadcast.
- Ayatollah Kazem Shari'atmadari, no doubt, will again make some effort to pre-
vent a"counter-rijihad." It is in his temperament to do so. But he has now
reminded people of what genuine religious legitimacy was, in Iran. Khomeynism
is in danger of collapsing in the same way it was imposed. In the name of
_ God.
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- 8946 `
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IRAN
EX-SAVAK GENERAL DIRECTS PAHLAVI KILLINGS
- Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 17 Dec 79 p 29
[Article by Bruno Riviere: "Terrorism: Khomeyni's Killers"]
[Text] In all probability it was Savak, the shah's former political police,
that assassinated Prince Shahriyar, the exiled sovereign's nephew, on 7 December
in Paris, at the Villa Dupont.
An intelligence and counter-espionage service, Savak (State Security Poli~e)
- was a rather complex organization, composed of several rival branches. At
the time of the revolution of iast February, many secret agents betrayed the
king for Khomeyni and formed a nucleus of the Islamic political police, the
Savama. -
Among these renegades was Gen Ferdusi. An intimate frien3 of the shah, whose -
_ schoolmate he had been, he became military adviser to Imam Khomeyni, and sits
on the revolutionary council. He was in charge of planning the systematic as-
sassination of all the members of the Pahlavi family.
W}:y begin with Shahriyar? There are three possit?le explanations.
_ Prince Shahriyar and his sister, Princess Azadeh, masterminded the most
active group of the Iranian monarchist resistance. Enjoying, unlike oth-
er members of the royal family, a reputation for complete integrity,
they gathered together a number of exiles and published a periodical in
French and Persian, FREE IRAN.
A former Iranian minister, Mr Nahavandi, who had recommended to the shah
that he engage in a process of democratization, explains in VALEURS AC-
- TUELLES:
These liberal monarchists want above anything else to arrive at a nation-
al reconciliation. To that end they are suggesting that once Khomeyni is
overthrown the 1906 constitution be enforced, which is also being demanded
by Shari'atmadari. Leaving suspended for several years the question of
the chief of state. Later on, a constituent assembly could be elected
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in a calm atmosPhere and if necessary a new regime could bc a~~~aoa uE~on.
Prince Shahriyar, a naval afficer, apparently decided to create a"Free
lranian Radio," broadcasting from a ship anchored in the Persian Gulf,
near a friendly emirate. lie also envisioned clandestinely entering Irari
and bringing together there in the underground, deserters from the royal
army. At least 80,000 men are believed to have fled their units after
the revolution, taking care to conceal part of their armamerit.
French authorities provided no protection for the Iranian emigres; they
, would have preferred to have them leave the territory. Until the drama
of 7 December they were sy~tematically refused the right to carry arms,
whereas, for example, the DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance]
supervises the protection of Ibrahim Souss, the PLO representative in -
- Paris.
On 27 November, in a televised interview, Mr Giscard d'Estaing stated in ad-
_ dition that if France had not welcomed Ayatollah Khomeyni in Neauphle-le-
Chateau, hostages might have been taken at the Frer.ch embassy instead of tliat
of the United States. Such words led Khomeynist agents to believe in a pro-
mise of absolution.
In the days preceding Prince Shahriyar's assassination, the presence in Paris
of several leaders of the Khomeynist regime were noticed, in particular
Gen Ferdusi himself and two other superior officers, Gen Farazian and
Gen Kaveh.
At the Iran embassy in France a special envoy from the imam, Reza Sadr (the
brother of Minister Bani Sadr), ha~ x.eceived dozens of "Islamic students."
Most of them were wearing a Castro beard and a khaki tunic. A description
~ that corresponds to the description of the Vi~la Dupont murderer.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs actuelles"
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MAURITANI~
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AFFAERS DOMINATED BY SAHARAtd WAR -
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Jan 80 p 14
[Text] Six months after ehe signing of a separate peace treaty with the
Polisario Liberation Front, Mauritania's economic, diplomatic and political
?ife was still dominated by the Saharan conflict. Prime Minister Khouna
Ould-Heyaallah made his Government's intentions clear when he declared,
"we did not come out of one war to get involved in a new one." But Mauri-
- tania's room to manoeuvre is limited by the intense hostility between its
_ more powerful Maghreb neighbours and the pressure which Senegal can exert
by exploiting racial tension between black and Arab communities.
Only in December, after appeal~ to the Arab League and the United Nations,
did the last 1,000 Moroccan troops evacuate the strategic base of Bir
Moghrein, and f~ars of Moroccan ambitions increased with Rabat's annexation
of the southern part of the Sahara.
*taurir.ania's ruling Military Coc~?ittee of National Salvation (CMSN) is seek-
ing to improve relations with Algiers. Thus diplomatic relations have been
reestablished after three years.
Not surprisingly relations with Morocco seriously deteriorated, especially
after Mauritania ended the military pact drawn up in 1977. The Ould-
� Heydallah Government expelled several Moroccan diplomats and arrested a
number of politicians closely associated with the pro-Moroccan lobby.
Morocco was especially upset by the imprisonment of the former Deputy from
Dakhla, Muhammad Ould-Hormallah.
To counter any Moroccan threat Mauritania persuaded France to station 200
craclc troops in the key port city of Nouadhibou. In exchange, ex-President
Mokhtar Ould-Daddah was al.lowed to rejoin his family in France, although
this caused considerable dissent within the CMSN, many of whose members
- want to bring Ould-Daddah to trial and avoid dependence on Paris. The
diverse factions inside the CMSN agree on only one major point, that sta-
bility is contingent on a rapid return to peace.
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I
FOR QFFICiAL iISE ONI,Y
Racial tension, which was pivotal in destabilizing the Ould-Salelc regime,
could be rekindled in the new school year. The CMSN has, therefore, post-
poned for f ive years educational reforms which would have made Arabic
mandatory. Black students are demanding equality for the ~'.ench language.
With an end to incessant guerrilla attacks against the 650-kilometre rail- -
way between Zomerate and Nouadhibou, iron ore exports--representing 35% of
_ nard currency earnings--are expected to increase f rom 6.4 million tonnes -
in 1978 to around 9 million tonnes in 1979. If production continues at
this level and iron ore prices do not fall Mauritania cou~ld register a
trade surplus this ~ear.
Continued peace is also essential for the success of the Guelb iron ore
scheme, which will make t4auritania an important iron ore exporter until
the end of the century. To finance the $500 million first phase, $360
million in soft loans have been arranged from international and Arab
sources. The capital of the state mining company, Snim, has also been
opened to an Amman-based Arab mining company, and the Islamic Development
Bank and Iraq have purchased $120 million of the company's equity.
A senior Mauritanian politician told THE MIDDLE EAST that the armed forces,
although redu~ed in numbers, would be kept in a state of readiness. "Diain-
taining a large army drains our slim rESOUrces," he said, "but we are
intent on guaranteeing our independence and sovereignty no matter ahat the .
cost. "
COPYRIGHT: 1980 IC Magazines Ltd. -
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MAURITANIA
SAHARAN WAR'S EFFECT ON ECONOMY, FOREIGN AID DISCUSSED
- London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Jan 80 pp 66-67
[Interview with Muhammad Ould Zamel, minister of industry and mining,
by Howard Schissel; date and place not givenJ
[Text]
u Now that Mauritania has If Mauritanix hesexperienced Mauritanian economy out of ita
ended ita pnrticipation in the one of the highest rates of in- p~nt trough. The Govern-
war in the wcstern Sahera, vestment in the past few years, ment intends to provide the -
will defence cosla be redw~ed it has little to show for it. In n~~~y ~~s,ytructure while
and the army cut down in gp~~ of our many economic pro- Mauritanian and foreign
_ sir,e? blems, I can assure you that the busines.9men will be called upon
O"I'hc wer ef~ort wes en iin- criteria used to determine in- ~~~~t in productive ventures.
bearable burden on ~estment priorities today are O Do you think that
Mauritania's fragile economy. yuite strict. Meuritanian buaireaemen
'I'his was all the more the case as For example, we now accept are ready to participate in
iron ore mining-- which leads to only long-term loans for in- development projects of this
85 0 of our exports - wes severe- frastructure projecta; medium- neture?
ly curtailed. AlSO more than half terxn loans are considered only O I believe thet local
of our budget was being ear- for projects which are businessmen can play s key role
mArked for defence. We do immediately vieble. in the country's economic
intend to reduce our armed O W i 11 y o u c o n t i n u e revival if they ere prepared to
forces but not to prewar levels. meaeures for economic undertake what I cell a
Our army must be kept in a liberalism? "cultural revolution".
9tate of readiness because of the O For Mauritania economic Until recent timee moet -
continuing tension in the region. liberalism is founded on two Mauritaniana were either
' o There hae been much principles. First, our major nomads or subsiatence farmere.
critic~9m of economic plann- economic schemea - the Guelb Within a very few years they
ing under the Ould Daddah iron ore project, 6sheries and the have been thrust into the
regime. Seriegal River irrigation projects ~i~~j~~~~~ ~~,;rl~l. 1'lre t1s.~k ~~f eic- -
O The economic strategy of the - are too costly for Mauritania quiring the ~c~phi~ticetrd entre-
Ould Daddah regime was one of to undertalte alone. prencuriel ment~lity neccwafuy
launching prestige projects. Secondly, if the mentality of to cnrry o~r eccmomy foru~ard ia
Development efforts were being the Mauritanian people ~s a n~~t ensy if cme's wfic~le life hxs
undertaken without e serious coUective one, born of the need h~en nti n~~rtty trader.
analysis of costs, long-term to survive es nomads in the U R'liet prngress hns bccn
implications and the harsh envimnTnent of the mede in rescheduling
relationship between the Sahare, it is also a highly in- Meuritnnin's furcign dcbt7
_ financing of these costly projects dividuelistic one. O When the Ould D,~ddnh
and the country's ebility to pey In my view, only a policy of regime fell in July 1978, our
for them. economic liberaliam can get the foreign debt 9tood et nlx~ut
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$750mn, a sum ec{~ral to 145 c of ~t,",~ t~~ .;.,u~~.n gramme near the port of
our grass domeatic prcxjiut. ~Ve b)' t1u~:~ iid of next ~ear. Nouadhibou ahould get under
- felt that it was in the immediate O But ~�ou ha~~c a continuinq Way thie year; thie will be
interests of the co~intry to trnde d~Scit. carried out by e consortium
reschedule $'104mn of this O F.~ en though our exEx~ris ~~f made up of Agip, Philipe, Eseo
_ amount. iron ore hnve incrcased andEspenoiL
By the end of 1979 we hed signifirimtly, it is unlikely thnt O Mauritania is eesentially
succeeded in rescheduling 80% c~ur 1979 trade hnlnnce will show an agricultural and peetoral
of the amount out,stxr~ding. We a aurj~lus; the best we can hope country. Whet are you doing
hope to be able to reschedule the to do is reduce our 1978 deficit to put an end to the eontinu-
belance over the course of the consider~iUly. This year, if the ing run-down of the rural -
next f~w months. I emphasise aitemetional price of iron ore economy?
that we are determined to remains et a eatisfectory level, u 1'~ ur h~~n~�~t, ,.~c rir~~l ~~�ctur
reduce the level of our foreign we have e good chance of of the economy hns yuffered.
debt; to do so is one of the basic moving into a payments sur- This w�as ane of the fi~ndemen-
objects of ~ur recovery plan. plus. tal ermrs of the Ould l~eddah -
? So the auslerity pro- O Is the Governmenz plann- (;o~�emment. Then tao, nf
gramme and a policy of ing to reopen the Akjoujt cour~e, our i~gricuhure K't19 hit
cleaning up the country's copper mine7 by the Sahel dn~ught.
economic life could well O The Akjoujt copper mine wea The coml~ined effect ~sas a
become permanent features shut down for two reasons. First, major upheeval in Mnuritiinia's
of postwar Mnuritania? the price of mpper hed fellen in ~~al system. A mejurity of the
o The austerity programme, 1978 to absurdly low levels and p~~pulation now lives in towns.
dating from the coming to power the mine was losing $lmn e Z'}1e countryside hes l~een ~
of the Ould Haydellah Govern- month. Second, the technology denuded of people. This trrnd
ment in June 1979, was in- employed was not suited to must be reversed.
tended to complement the Mauritanian conditions. It was 'I'hus we heve adui~ted
Government'e economic excessively capital-intensive measures to give us grrl+ter
_ stabilisation plan. We believed and used too much energy. We contml over our scerce weter
that Mauritania hed been li~zng are now planning to reopen the resources, to provide more and
well above its economic means. Akjoujt mine using a different better technical essistance to
Thus our intention hes been to technology which should make our farmers and herdsmen nnd
slash government expenditure. it a profitable venture. set up a more flexible pricing
If Mauritania is to get back on U The war brought pro- structure aimed at ~iving a
ita economic feet, then the specting for uranium and oil guAranteed fair retum to
austerity programme must be to a halt. agricultural producera. I should
- regarded ~n a long-term O We have already mede the elso mention two major
perspective. Similarly, we have neces.asry errangements to get irrigation schemes: the Gorgol ~
to "clean up" the country ~xploration started again. valley and Senegal river vt~lley
economically. We must put an Before the war in the Sahara, projects, both of which 9hould
end for all time to sloppy prospecting for uranium in the be under way this year.
behaviour in government, mis- northern pert of the country, in p Mauritania's coastal
management, corruption and nn area known as Dorsale watees are considered
general inefficiency. We insiat Reguibat, hed yielded pnsitive among the richest in the
that as much of the state's resulCs. We have just renewed world. How do you intend ta
resources as possible shall be the },rcr.~pecting concessions of a put an end to what many
ean~arked for pmductive in- ccr,s:,~.~ium made up of the consider as the pillage of
vestment in mining, industry French Commissariat e these watere by toreign in-
and agriu~)ture. 1'Energie Atomique (CEA), tereste?
D You have rescheduled the Total Nucleaire, Pechiney- O The term you use - pillage -
country's debts, but you still Ugine-Ku}ilmann (PLTK) and a ia eppropriate. Fishing is
have a debt-servicing Japanesefirm. potentielly one of the strongest -
obligation. As for oil, several concessiona eectors of our economy. We have
O This is s heavy burden, have been eaplored over the lest ~~d wHye to protect our
which we heve to reduce. We few yeara without aignificant fisheriea. We also intend to in-
hope to reduce thz annual results. An offahore drilling pro- troduce new atrategies for the
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exploitat ion of our deepsea coat. Once Arab aid is dis-
- re:+ourcea. This sector will he bur~ed, the recipient uyurilly has
open to foreign capi+al, but total discretion es t4 how it will
under revised conditions. be spent.
O Can you tell us about the I can give you an example of
chsnges you envisage? how tied eid wor}cs in practice.
- O The system of licences under When the Govemment decided
which foreign interests received early in 1979 to award a contract
the right to fish our waters in ex- worth $114mn for the con-
change for a fee and guaranteed struction of the second section of
supplies of fish to our canning the trens-Mauritania highway
industry in NoUadhibou was un- to a Brazilian firm instead of to
satisfactory. a French contractor, we were
In 1979 we let the fishing notified thet the EEC was no
agreements with the Soviet ]onger prepared to let us have a
Union, Japan, Spain, Portugal, loan of $lOmn.
Greece, Romania and South O But doesn't Arab aid have
Korea expire. Henceforth we political conditione?
intend to establish joint ven- O This is unfortunately the
tures in order to essure e steady situation in ~:ne cases. We are
supply of fish for the canning not prepared to accept aid that
factories and a feirer return to comes with a political price tag. -
us. We hope to reach an agree- ? What about economic
mentwiththeEEC. relatione with African
L: :~luw�i~,~niu is ut uncc un countrees7
.1ri~b ~~nd an Afric~n O Mauritxnia has developed
country. 1'ou rerei~�e aid economic relations with all
from both Arnb and R'etitcrn friendly countries in the Arab
- ~ourccs. 1~'h,it ~1iff~�rcne~�s world but we have not forgotten
ure thcre bcl~~�ecn the aid the African dimension in our
from these I~co sourccs? personality. We hope that our
o Unlike aid frr~m the ~'~'estem privileged relationship with the
iiations, Arub nid is gcnerally Arab nations will give us a mle -
untied.l~'hen Westem countries in building closer economic
- grent eici for dcvelopment pro- relations between the Arabs and
jects, such nid is uyunlly al~c~ in- black Africa.
tended to iielp their own in- For example, we have played
dustry by linking the aid to the a key role in securing finance
purchese ~~f gax3s and services. from Arab oil-producing nationa
In meny c,~se9 this tends to limit for the Senegel River develop-
the technol~~gicel c~hoices of inent scheme in which we have
'1'hird 1~'~~rld countries anc! t4 Senegel as a partner.
force up the cust of projects. Meuritania is also a member of
Arnb aid t~unurs tend to p1t~ce the West African Economic
the emphnsis on the econumic Community (~~AO) with five
ciahility of the prnject und it~g bleck African states. ?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 IC Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 4420
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MAURITANIA
FRENCH, LIBYAN EXPERTS VISIT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Dec 79 p 3617
[Report: "Two Experts Missions Visit Nouakchott"]
[Textj A French experts mission is visiting Nouakchott to study the
situation of public establishments and mixed companies in order to suggest
measures for the improvement of this state sector of the Mauritanian
economy.
Last October, another mission of French experts had been asked to study
the country's economic situation. The report it had submi[ted to the
authorir_ies included a plan for economic and financial recovery aimed ar -
eliminating the bud~et deficit which was reduced this year to 3.6 billion
ouguiya compared with 4.6 billion ouguiya the previous year.
- On thc other hand, ri delegation of Libyan experts, headed by Salem Jouali,
secretary general of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, began its mission in
Nouakchott on 12 December. The purpose of this delegation is "to proceed
to a review of projects in Mauritania which could be financed by Libya."
This f.ollows the visit which the head of the Mauritanian government,
Lr Col Ould Haidalla, paid to Tripoli at the beginning of December, as a
result of which he had announced that Libya was to assign a mission to
study on the spot the needs of the country. The results of ~his review
will be examined in the course of a meeting to be held in the Libyan
capital in December, attended by high officials of both countries.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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MAURITANIA
EIB FINANCING OF GUELBS PROJECT, OTHER PARTICIPANTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Dec 79 p 3617
[Repurt: "Guelbs Project: European Investments Bank Loan"]
[Text] In accordance with the first Lome convention, lhe European Invest-
ments Bank (EIB) granted on 11 December a loan of 25 million drawing units
(about 146 million 250,000 French francs) for the development oE the iron
deposits of Guelb E1 Rhein, in the Zouerate Zone in Mauritania.
_ The l.oan was granted to the National Industrial and Mining Company (SNIM),
a mixed ownership company engaged in the exploitation of ferrous minerals .
iri tne country. The loan is for a 15-year term at 7.4 percent interest
with a 3 percent interst payable to the European Development Fund (EDF). -
_ Investments in whose financing the loan will be used will involve the
commissioning of a strip mine and of a concentration plant: The minerals
to be extracted have a lower iron content compared with the presently
extracted ore. However, the modern concentration procedures planned will
make their utilization equally adequate. The opening of the mine is
planned for 1983. This will make it possible to gradually shift the
- exploitation from Kedia to Zouerate, deposits which, at the present pace
of exploitation, should be exhausted by 1986. The project will create
760 additional permanent jobs. The production of Mauritanian iron ore,
- 80 percent of which will be sold to the EEC, will mark a substantial
increase in output. The magnetic feature of the concentrates which will
be obtained on the basis of the exploitation of the new deposits will be
a further appreciated feature in the marketing of SNIM products.
The potential reserves of the Guelbs are estimated at one billion tons of
minerals; the Guelb E1 Rhein should provide 285 million tons. The open-
ing of. another mine is planned for the second stage, to begin production
toward 1.989, thus maintaining the production capacity of the SNIM to
about 14 million tons per year of marketable minerals despite the
exhaustion of the richest deposits which have been exploited since 1965.
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- The project will be of major importance to the country's development.
Its financing, considered model in terms of international c~operation, -
required the involvement of a substantial number of investors. In
_ addition [o the Islamic Republic of Maurirania and the SNIM stockholders -
(Islamir. Developmenr Bank, rhe governments of Iraq and Morocco, the Arzb
Mining Company, and [he Kuwait Forcign Tradin~ and Contrac~ing 1nveStment
Corporation), the following also participated in the financing of the
projecr whose total cos[ is estimated at about 350 million drawing units
(or 2 billion 47 million 500,000 French francs): the World Bank, the -
Central Economic Cooperarion Fund, the Af.rican Development Bank, the
Japanese government, the OPEC Special Fund, the Saudi Fund for Economic
Uevelopment, the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development, the Arab Economic
Development and Social Fund, and the Abu Dhabi Fund.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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MOROCCO
FRENCH FINANCIAL AID PLEDGED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3388
[Article: "French Financial Aid: Signature of a New Draft Agreement"]
[Text] Abdelkamel Reghai, Moroccan minister of finance, and Rene Monory, -
French minister of economy, signed a draft financial agreement in Paris on
29 November 1979, a communique of the French Ministry of Economy announced.
It noted that under the terms of this draft agreement loans from the
Treasury and guaranteed private credits will be made available to Morocco
to finance its purchase in France of capital goods slated for the
realization of the Moroccan development plan. The major projects approved
involve the phosphoras industry, the cement industry, the merchant marine, -
oil and lubricants, and telecommunications.
It was indicated in Morocc3n official circles, cited by the Moroccan news
agency MAGHREB ARABE PRESSE, that the agreement signed on 29 November falls
within the framework of economic and financial cooperation between Morocco
and France for 1979 and that it bears on the granting of loans and credits
for a total amount of 1.2 billion French francs.
The approved financing, it was noted in Rabat, includes long-term, low-
- interest government loans for an amount of 360 million francs to which
should be added private credits guaranteed by COFACE [French Insurance
Company for Foreign Trade] of about 840 million francs.
According t4 the same source these loans and credits will be allocated
mainly to cover the purchase of services and capital goods and secondarily
. the purchase of intermediate goods of French origin. Among the projeets -
likely to fall within the context of this financing are the realization of
� hydraulic, hydrogeologic, and industrial studies and improvements in radio
broadcasting, television, and teleco~unications.
Besides the implementation of some industrial pro,jects (sugar mills, cement
works), this financing will also involve the realization of mining projects
such as drying and washing facilities for the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates
Office], the outfitting of the Bleda copper mine, and the increase of
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maritime transportation facilities through the acquisition of new craft for
COMANAV [Moroccan Navigation Company] and MARPHOCEAN (see MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS [I~TM] of 9 November 1979, p 3012) and th~ purchase of new
locomotives for the ONCF [Moroccan National P.ailroad Office].
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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- MOROCCO -
~ NEW NATIONAL SOLIDARITY TAX DESCRIBED _
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 pp 3455, 3456
[Article: "Establishment of a National Solidarity Tax"]
- [Text) On 4 December 1979 the government filed in the bureau of the
Chamber of Representatives a bill amending the 1980 budget law bearing on
the establishment of a national solidarity tax. T'his measure strives to
give a permanent character to the national solidarity levy established in
1979 on an exceptional basis (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of _
9 November 1979, p 3013, and of 23 November 1979, p 3264). An analysis of
the amending bill was given by LE MATIN DU SAHARA under the signature of
Mustapha Sehimi. We reproduce long excerpts from it below.
The national solidarity tax will be payable by both individuals and firms. _
The government bill defines in this regard the categories of incomes "
subject to the tax. It considers first "levies on salaries and wages," in
other words, public and private salaries, allowances and emoluments, wages,
pensions, and annuities. The tax is also to be applied to prof essional
income, rents, and the agricultural sector. Finally, it will be levied on
"potential income from unbuilt land located within urban communes and their
peripheral areas." On this score exceptions are anticipated by the bill.
- They bear on built land belonging to the state or local collectivities and
on land where construction is prohibited or subject to the ur?~an tax. _
It should be noted that there are cases in which the solidarity tax is not _
- applicable, particularly to public of�ices and stores, enterprises in which
state participation accounts for at least 90 percent, and waqf property
with the exception of property held as a family waqf. Neither are military
- personnel of all ranks or personnel enj oying the special status of
auxiliary forces subject to the national solidarity tax.
The amount of the tax varies according to the taxpayer's income bracket.
First, on income from wages the annual amount of this tax is determined in
terms of daily wages as follows:
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1. One day's wage for an annual taxable base lower than or equal to 6,000
Moroccan dir~ams (1 Moroccan dirham equals 1.10 French francs,
- approximately).
2. Four days' wages for an annual taxable base higher t}ian 6,000 dirhamA
but lower than or equal to 60,000 dirhams.
3. Seven days' wages for an annual taxable base higher than 60,000 dirhams
but lower than or equal to 120,000 dirhams.
4. Eight days` wages for an annual taxable base higher than 120,000
- dirhams.
Second, as regards income subject to the tax on professional income, the -
urban tax, and the agricultural tax, the rate of the national solidarity
tax is set at 8 percent of the amount obtained by the application of the
tax shcedules. The base used for the computation of this levy takes into
account the expenses inherent in a position or job and deductions for
family allowances. It is reduced by the taxes deducted at source or
collected. However, for ta~cpayers subject to the real net profit schedule,
the government bill provides details. It states that this national
solidarity tax cannot be lower, whatever the tax status of the firm, than
1,500 dirhams (on sales under 1 million dirhams) and 3,000 dirhams for
taxpayers whose annual turnover exceeds this amount.
In the third place, as regards th~ potential income from unbuilt land, the
rate of the national solidarity tax is equal to 1.5 percent when the
taxable base is below 120,000 dirhams; 2 percent when the taxable base is
over 120,000 dirhams but belo`a 240,000 dirhams; and 2.5 percent when the
taxable base is above 240,000 dirhams.
Estimated revenues from the levy of the national solidarity tax for fiscal
1980 are put at 250 million dirhams. Flexible methods of payment were
approved in order not to burden the finances of households or the
treasuries of enterprises.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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MOROCCO _
MINING OFFICE REPORTS EXPANSION OF ACTIVLTIES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 pp 3389-3390
[Text] Following publication by the BRPM (Mineral Prospecting and Investment
Office) of its activity re~ort for the 1978 fiscal year, CEDIES [Socio-
Economic Research and Information Center] completed an analysis of it, which
we are reprinting in its entirety. According to that organ of the CGEM
(Moroccan General Economic Federation), the report shows that the Bureau's
activity during the 1973-1977 5-year plan was characteriaed by unprecedented
efforts that led to the discovery of several mining deposits and hydrocarbons
and the surveying of numero.us mineral deposits throughout the national terri- ~
tory. _
~ This intense action during the period of the last 5-year plan was followed
in 1978 by a slowdown of the Bureau's activitie~ in the fiel.d of petroleum
_ exploration, prospecting and specific pro~ects. Actually, the policy of
, austerity and economy resulted in a substantial reduction in~~allocations
to the Bureau for this first year of the provisional 3-yea~ plan for 1978-
1980.
- Nevertheless, in keeping with the government's directives and thanlcs to the
draconian measures that were required. the BRPM has succeeded in carrying out
a program that led to many achievements in its different fields of activi-
= ties. -
_ Petroieum Exploration
Petroleum exploration was substantially reduced because of budgetary restric-
tions. Seismic activity was deliberately sacrificed to drilling, �or which
more credits were allocated, with the disadvantage that the reduction in
seismic activity could have repercussions on research programs in the years
to come. Seismic activity involved only 334 kilometers (compared with
3,735 in 1977) of seismic profiles on land and 322 kilometers (compared with
~ 3,866 in 1977) of offshore seismic profiles.
Nevertheless, this made it possible for drilling activities to suffer a less =
severe reduction. Drilling was done at several sites on land and one offshore
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site for a total of 13,166 meters (compared with 16,000 in 1977). The work
essentially consisted of: the completion of two borings on the Karia and
Essaouira permits; the completion of two more borings on these two permits;
_ and the initiation of land-based boring on the Tissa permit and one maritime
boring on the deep Cap Sim permit off Essaouira.
In addition, the project to begin working the condensate-rich gas deposit
discovered at Toukimt in the Essaouira region in 1975 was the subject of a
feasibility study followed~by a call for bids for the purchase of a process-
ing and gas-condensate separating plant.
In 1978, expenditures for oil exploration activities amounted to 62 million
dirhams (compared with 124 million in 1976 and 141 million in 1977). For
their part, the BRPM's partners spent 24.1 million dirhams within the frame-
work of existing agreements. ,
Crude oil production rose slightly compared with the previous year, with a
total of 24,350 tons (22,000 tons in 1977), mainly taken from the Sidi
Ghalem deposit belonging to the SCP (Moroccan Petroleum Company). Gas pro-
duction practically remained the same, with 84.5 million cubic meters, com-
pared with 86 million cubic meters in 1977. _
Mining Exploration
Mining exploration also received fewer funds and suffered a reduction in
personnel. In 1978, it was mainly oriented toward the search for solid
energy substances and precious metals. -
Work and drilling at the different BRPM sites included the execution of
11,700 meters of const:ruction (wells, galleries, and so on) and 16,230 meters
of drilling, compared with 13,300 and 43,750 meters respectively in 1977.
This work was characterized by the exploration of a radioactive leve:l con-
taining uranium at Wafaga and the discovery of uranium ore in the Zgounder
silver deposit; continuation of lignite prospecting in the southern portion ~
of the Guercif basin and initiation of coal exploration at Minizla, north
of Taroudant; the startup of a sampling program on the deposit of bitumin-
ous schists at Timahdit for the purpose of technological tests; the confirma-
tion of lead and Linc reserves at Cadnar and hydrbus magnesium silicate
reserves at Boudkek and the measurement of antimony reserves at Khlot and
Knatar; the completion of objectives within the framework of specific pro- ~
ject, particularly at Sidi Lahcen, Zgounder and Tizert; and the completion
of exploration on sites belonging to certain subsidiaries aimed at increas-
ing their reserves: Imiter, Jbel Aouam, Bou Aater.
The number of geologists and geophysicists involved in mining exploration
_ went from 51 in 1977 to 35 in 1978. An average of ten drilling crews worked
at 19 different sites and 15 mining work crews at 23 different sites ~ere
active all year long.
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The expenses of the Bureau devoted to mining exploration amounted to 24 mil-
lion dirham"s, comparPd with 38.8 million in 1977. ~
, Mining Studies
Technical and economic studies were continued and updated, particularly in
connection with the execution of the Zgounder, Sidi Lahcen and Tiouit
pro~ects, development of the condensate gas deposits at Toukimt and the '
- N'dark gas deposits, development of the Timahdit and Tar.fayat bituminous
echists and completion of the Meknes Central Lead Foundry.
Contract Work -
This year and more than in the past, contract work represented a stabilizing
factor for the BRPM because it made it possible to absorb the underemployment
of personnel and material made available due to the reduction in the Bureau's
activities.
The volume of such work d~d not increase in 1978, however, and was about the
same as in 1977. It was done for BRPM subsidiaries, public administrations
and private parties.
- Marketing
Marketing was facilitated by the increasing demand for raw materials, whose
prices genera].ly rose. The direct intervention of the BRPM in the market
resulted in the marketing of the following tonnages:
- Iron ore 40,000 tons
Lead concentrates 47,816 tons
Zinc concentrates 11,328 tons
Copper concentrates 9,515 tons -
Manganese ore 8,230 tons
Silver precipitates 24,442 kilograms
Barite 62,000 tons
Bentonite 750 tons
Activi.ties of Subsidiaries
The activitp of subsidiaries went hand in hand with the levels of ore
prices. It was characterized by the following factors: Subsidiaries pro-
ducing lead and silver once again had an exceptional fiscal year (SODIM
[expansion unknown], SMA [expansion unknown], SMI [expansion unknown]).
In this favorabl~ situation, one should note the startup of the Imiter
underground mine for silver mining and the end of the equipping of the Draa
Sfar mine fc~r lead and zinc. Th2 substantial improvement in copper prices
on the international market was not sufficient to allow the startup of ~
pending operations (Talaat, Naour, Oumjerane). The remainin~ operations
still in activity (Ouansimi, Ta$alaght-Assif Imider) nevertheless continued
to generate a cash flow thanks to severe restrictions. Due t~ the
~ _
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persistent slump on the iron ore market, SEFERIF [expansion unknown] saw
its situation grow even worse and produced no pellets during this fiscal
year. On the other hand, the spectacular price of cobalt enabled the CTT
[expansion unknown] to double its turnover and achieve exceptional results.
- The quality of the fluor spar produced by SAMINE [expansion unknown] enabled -
- the company to strengthen its.position on the international market, while
other competing producers encountered insurmountable difficulties. Finally,
� subsidiaries working the other nonferrous ores (SACEM [Moroccan Mining
Studies Corporation] for manganese and COMABAR [expansion unknawn] for
- barite) experienced normal activity resulting in a good fiscal year.
Agreements
Concerning oil and mining cooperation, several contacts were made with spe-
- cialized foreign firms and led to the conclusion of agreements and accords
with the following companies: the American company Phillips for petroleum
exploration on the Tafrata permit (in the Guercif region) and the Ksabi
permit (in the Missour region); the American company Tipco for oil explora-
tion on the Jebha maritime permits in the Mediterranean; the Klockner Com-
pany for a program of tungsten prospecting in the Azegour mining area (ex- -
ploration is underway); the Metal Mining Agency of Japan for uranium explora-
tion in the Upper Moulouya project area (the first.phase of the work is done
- and results are being ir.terpreted);and a protocol with Rio Tinto Zinc,
- establishing the foundations for future cooperation on joint research pro-
' grams involving different ares.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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_ MOROCCO -
GRAIN PRODUCTION LAGGING BEHIND CONSTJMPTION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3456
[Article: "Grain Production Does Not Reep Up with the Growth in -
Consumption"]
[Text] Morocco's production of ma~or cereals (wheat, barley, and corn)
is witnessing slow and irregular growth because of often unfavorable
weather conditions, the BMCE [Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank] noted in a
recent study devoted to cereals in Morocco.
In the 1960's, the bank recalled, this production, which fluctuated
between 3 and 6 million tons, satisfied the needs of the market and at
times made it possible to have a surplus for export. Thus, in 1960
Morocco had exported 101,041 tons of hard wheat, 29,320 tons of barley,
104,965 tons of corn, and 380 tons of soft wheat.
~ Beginning in 1974 the share of imports increased steadily and in 1978 it
accounted for 26.5 percent of demand (as against 1S percent in 1974.) This
trend, which :Is reflected in a sizable outflow of foreign exchange
equivalent to 587 million Moroccan dirhams in 1977 and 856 million in 1978)
has been known to the government which is considering a whole series of
measures slated to increase the growth of cereals in Morocco. The steps
� are as follows: -
1. Increase in productivity by a rational use of fertilizers.
2. Pursuit of the hydroagricultural program.
3. Policy of assistance for the acquisition of tractors on credit. (The
20,000 available tractors made it possible to work only 3,150,000 hectares,
that is, 63 percent of the area earmarked to cereals. This stock of
tractors is growing only at the rate of 2,000 to 2,600 a year whereas
[total] needs are estimated to stand at 70,000 tractors).
The production of the principal cereals, the BMCE also indicated, was
4,593,000 tons in 1978, up by 13 percent compared to 1977. Particularly
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favorable weather conditions underlay this increase. Wheat accounted for
40.8 percent compared to 50.6 percent for barley and 8.6 percent for corn.
The breakdown of this production reveals a steady increase by 5-year
- periods owing to growing mechanization and a more ratianal use of
fertilizers. Thus, average annual production during the 1970-74 period was
4,379,000 tons, up by 13 percent and by 29.3 percent compared to the
1965-69 and 1960-64 periods, respectively.
Consumption of major cereals (from local production + imports + stocks)
totaled 6,241,000 tons in 1978, up 48.5 percent compared to 1977. In that
year demand was satisfied to the extent of 73.6 percent by local production
while imports accounted for 26.4 percent. Consumption per capita was also
up, increasing from 13.7 kilograms of wheat in the 1960-64 period to 16.7 ~
kilograms in 1975-79, that is, a rise of 22 percent.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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MOROCCO
BRIEFS
NEW MINING AGREEMENT--On 1 December, Moussa Saadi, minister of energy and
� mining research, presided over a ceremony in Rabat at which a new mining
agreement between the BRPM tMineral Prospecting and Investment Office) and
the West German firm Klockner was signed. The agreement follows another
accord signed by the two parties in December 1978 concerning mining research
and development in the Marrakech region. It expands the field of applica-
tion of the Aaegot~.r zone to the Sidi Azzouz regions in the Rhamma (see
MARCHES TROPICAUX, 22 December 1978, p 3494). [Text] [Paris I~ARCHES TROPI- -
CAUX ET MEUITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3390] 11,464
EARLY PRODUCTS EXPORT DROP--The evolution of Moroccan early products exports
to European markets during the 1978-1979 season did not totally meet Moroc-
can objectives for diversification of its outlets, according to the OCE
(I~arketing and Export Office). France remains Morocco's main customer but
its share dropped by 25,000 tons. Furthermore, its share has dropped stead-
~ ily since 1976, going from 81 percent in 1976-1977 to 77 percent in 1977-
1978 and 70 percent in 1978-1979. Morocco's share of the French market has -
stabilized at around 40 percent, while Spain has en~oyed a 7-percent increase,
� going from 43 percent in 1977-1978 to 50 percent in 1978-1979. The diversi-
fication efforts yielded good results on the German market, which absorbed
24 percent of the Moroccan exports in 1978-1979, compared with 18 percent in
1977-1978 and 15 percent in 1976-1977, the OCE concl.udes. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Bec 79 p 3390] 11,464
CITRUS CONTRACT WITH USSR--Morocco, the Soviet Union's main supplier of
oranges with nearly SS percent of the USSR's total imports, will continue
to furnish large quantities of citrus fruits during the 1979-1980 season.
Abdellah Lahlou, general director of the OCE, signed a contract to this
_ effect on 22 November in Moscow, according to which 300 million dirhams'
worth will be delivered. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 7 Dec 79 p 3390] 1i,464
GERMAN LOAN--Loan and guarante:. agreements were signed in Rabat on 28 Novem-
_ ber by virtue of which the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau of the Federal
Republic of Germany grants a loan of 93 million marks to the CNCA (National
Agricultural Credit Bank). Acting on behalf of Morocco, Hassan Lukash, ~
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secretary of the Ministry of Finance, signed the guarantee agreement and
Abdelkrim Kadiri signed the loan agreement. The accords were then signed
by Dr Becker for the KFW. This is the second loan which the KFW has granted
the GNCA. The first goes back to 1973 and amounts to 30 million marks.
l3y tlie gr~nt. the KFW joine with the World Bank nnd the InternationAl Agri-
cultural Levelopment Fund in providing the CNCA with substantial financial
resources (580 million dirhams) to be used to gran2 loans to farmers, parti-
cularly small farm.ers and Agrarian Reform cooperatives. "Actually," it is -
emphasized in Rabat, "these resources will make it possible to meet credit -
needs of.500,000 farmers over the next 3 years. Over 85 percent of these
farmers have very small operations." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3390] 11,464
NEW SUGAR REFINERY--On 30 November 1979 Morocco signed an agreement with
the French firm of Fives Cail-Babcock for the construction of a sugar cane
processing plant in the Gharb region north of Rabat. The plant will cost
230 million Moroccan dirhams (approximately U.S. $60 million) and will have
a processing capacity of 3,500 tons of cane a day and of 420,000 tons a
year. Also, an annual production capacity of 45,000 tons of white sugar. -
This refinery, the llth of its kind in Morocco, is scheduled to enter into
service in May 1981 and reach its maximum capacity in 1983. It will raise
Morocco's annual sugar production capacity to 420,000 tons, that is,
enough to cover two-thirds of the country's needs. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3388] 2662
COOPERATION WITH EQUATORIAL GUINEA--A basic cooperation agreement between
Morocco and Equatorial Guinea was signed in Rabat on 7 December 1979 by the -
Moroccan minister of interior, Driss Basri, and his Equatorial Guinean
opposite number, Felix M'Ba Mchama, on a visit to Morocco. Under the terms
of this agreement the two parties undertake to cooFerate, notably in the
- economic, commercial, and. technical fields. They agreed to strive to
encourage the realization of joint economic pro~ects. To this effect
organs of the two countries will determine the investments to be made in
the fields of tourism, energy, transportation, communications, fishing, -
and forestry. The agreement also anticipates cooperation in the training
of cadres, the granting of scholarships, and the exchange of experts. In -
the agricultural field the agreement calls for the sending of trainees from
Equatorial Guinea to Morocco to complete their agronomic training. -
Finally, a joint committee was established to insure the coordination of the
execution of the various provisions of the general agreement. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3456]
2662
NEW COMMERCIAL BANK--A Moroccan commercial bank may be opened early in
1980. This is what transpired from the report of a working meeting with _
officials of the SNI [National Investment Company] chaired by the prime
minister, Maati Bouabid. At the announcement of this forthcoming opening
and on the basis of this report CEDIES, the employers' association in
Morocco, provided a few details, notably, that the commercial bank, which
_ ~
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would be under the ~urisdiction of the SNI, will be established with the
participation of several Moroccan financial organs as well as of some
countries of the Middle East, the United States, and France. On the same
occasion some details on the activity of the SNI were released. The
capital of this public company may now reach 150 million Moroccan dirhams
while its interests reportedly total some 330 million dirhams so far.
These interests include every sector and more particularly cement works,
mines, energy, financial organs, metallurgy, and chemicals. The SNI group
would thus appear to own more than 70 different companies. In terms of
future prospects, besides the establishmen* of a commercial bank the SNI,
still according to CEDIES, will take part in the construction of two cement
works (in Casablanca and Fquih Ben Salah) representing aggregate investment
of 750 million dirhams, as well as the extension of the Carnaud Company
(metallic packaging) and the Moroccan Fertilizer Company. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3456] 2662
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SAUDI ARABIA
BRIEFS
AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF--Lt Gen Mohamnned Sabri has been appointed chief
of staff af the Saudi Air Force. [Text] [Paris AIR ~ COSMOS in French
12 Jan 80 p 12]
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UNITED ARAB II~IIRATES
BRIEFS
' PIPELINE REROUTING--In order to avoid the Straits of Hormuz, the UAE
expects to rely upon a pipeline from the F~nirate of Abu Dhabi, on the Persian
Gulf, to Ftiijayrah, on the Gu1f of Oman. Work ~on the pipeline], which will
begin in 1981, will take 27 months. ~Text] ~Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in
French 31 Dec 79 p 13]
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WESTERN SAHARA "
POLISARIO ALLOWED TO USE CHEGA ~EGION IN MAURITANIA
Paris JEUNE AF'RIQUE in French 19 Dec 79 p 35
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "The Secret Accord of S August: What Is
the Tension Between Morocco and Mauritania Concealing?"j
[Text] Nething is going well any more between Morocco and Mauritania.
The Nouakchott authorities have delivered an ultimatum to the Moroccans
to leave Bir Moghrein, a locality in the north of Mauritania where, it
has been confirmed, a thousand soldiers of the FAR (Royal Armed Forces)
are ready to start working to control POLISARIO infiltrations. Several
messages have been sent to the Moroccan prime minister, Maati Bouabib,
by his Mauritanian counterpart Col Khouna Ould Haidalla. The Mauritanian
demand was supported in Nouakchott by popular anti-Moroccan demonstra- _
tions. .
But since Rabat still has partisans, or at least fsiends, in its
southern neighbor, the tension led to a fratricidal confrontation between
Mauritanian soldiers.
It was on 18 November in Zouerate. Outcome: some 20 dead. The gravity
of the affair compelled Prime Minister Haidalla to cancel his departure
for the Arab Su~it in Tunis at the last minute.
The Moroccans responded that they would leave Bir Moghrein if Mauritania
returned to them La Guera, the southernmost city of the former Spaniah
Sahara and the nnly one that the Nouakchott troops did not relinquish
when leaving Tiris el Gharbia after the peace accord of 5 August. A
little market-town of less than 500 inhabitants, an enclave of the
Nouadhibou Peninsula, a village "of no importance," La Guera has the
interest of being located on the outskirts of Mauritania's economic
capital, its mineral port and its oil refinery (still not operationa~).
Whoever controls La Guera has the means to choke Nouadhibou...
Morocco does not want to let the POLISARIO get in there. And Mauritania
declared on 3 December t~rough its minister of information that it did
not intend to let belligerent troops insCall themselves in La Guera.
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' After the region's return to peace, iC was added, La Guera would be
- returned."to whomever it may concern."
Mauritania's poaition would seem more than understandable. But JA [JEUNE -
AFRIQUE] ie prepared to reveal that this "diplomatic [battle] over the
restitution of Bir Moghrein in exchange for La Guera has its origin in a
secret.accord between Mauritania and the...POLISARIO." Within the scope
of the solemn accord of 5 August, the Mauritanian negotiators--headed by _
Lt Col L~hmedou Ould Abdallah, the army chief of staff--and those of the
- ALPS (Saharan People's Liberation Army) worked on a new map of the region.
Mauritania gave the POLISARIO the use of its territory (within its 1960
borders) in the region of Chega, on the outskirts of the Algerian and
Malian borders. This is a region which had already been occupied by the _
Saharan guerrillas for more than 2 years and where the POLISARIO, having
laid out a runway there for cargo planes, puts down its essential mate-
riel. Some say that it is in Chega that the terminal of the "Qadhdhafi
trail," used by Libya when it does not want to have its military materiel
forwarded through Algeria, is located.
In exchange for the acceptance of the occupation of Chega, the POLISARIO
recognized a"security border" passing 15 km north of the southern border
of the Western Sahara. This 15-km band makes it possible to insure =
greater security for the Zouerate-Nouadhibou railroad which runs along
the borler. But I,a Guera is located in this security zone...
While insisting on recovering La Guera and moving its troops closer to
it within the framework of the "Ohoud operation," l~:orocco would like to
put this secr~t accord out in the open and show that Mauritania is not
"neutral" in this conf lict. For its part, the POLISARIO denies any
presence of the front within Mauritanian borders. It is up to the
Nouakchott authorities to produce evidence that Chega is under
Mauritanian administration.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
9380
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