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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200050026-6 ~ 1980 1 OF 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR ~FF(CIA1. USE ONLY JPRS L/8924 - 13 February 1980 ~ Latin ~r~er~ca Re ort - p (FOUO 3180) ~8~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I ~ - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news apency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the origa.nal phrasing and - other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text~ - or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was _ processed. Wtiere no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. - Unfamili~r namzs rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the - original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an ~ item originate with the source. Times w;_thin items are as = given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. For further information on report content calt (703) 351-2643. , - COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF ` MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION ` OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 r~ux ur~r~lCtAL USE ONLY ~ JPRS L/8324 - 13 Febrt.tary 19 80 LATIN AMERICA REPORT (FOUO 3/80) CONTENTS PAGE EIRGENTTNA 'DEFEPiSA' Special Correspondent Iiiterviews Viola _ (Roberto Eduardo Viola Interview; DEFENSA, Nov 79).. 1 BRAZIL ` = Orgariization, Nlat~~ iel, Unit Strength of Army Reviewed (Alberto Carbone; DEF'ENSA, Dec 79) ~3 CUBA Fore i gti Min-istry Replies to Vcnezu~lar~ StaLc>ment ~ (PRELA, 2g Jan 80) ~3 - Text of Castro Message on Rhodesian Situation (PRELA, 28 Jan 80) l6 _ _ a ' (III - LA - 144 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ARGENTINA 'DEFENSA' SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT INTERVIEWS VIOLA Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Nov 79 pp 16-19 [Interview with Lt Gen Roberto Eduardo Viola, commander in chief of the _ Argentine army and member of the ruling junta, by special correspondent ~ Vicente Talon: "Interview with Lt Gen Viola"; Buenos Aires; date not given] [Text] On publishing the interview with Gen Pavel Ivanovich Batov (see _ - DI:FENSA, No 13), chairman.of the Co~ittee of War Veterans of the Soviet - UniUn, we noted that it was our intention to publicize the thinking of the most prestigious military leaders, in the Weat and in the socialist world ~ and the nonalined countries, reproducing their answers without any editinq whatever. Today we interview Lt Gen Roberto Eduardo Viola. commander in chief of the Argentine army and member of the [rulingJ military ~unta which has governed that country since the armed forces toppled the constitutional president of the Argentine Republic. the widow of Juan Peron. As is known, Lieutenant General Viola is slated to replace Lt Gen Jorge Videla as head of state in 1981. On the basis of what has leaked out, following Viola still another military figure will occupy the [presidential] Pink Palace after which elections will be held for a return to constitutional life - through the election of the president of A.*eentina and the Congress of Deput3es. - [Question] What were the basic reasons which prompted the Argentine armed forces to assume power in March 1976? [Answer] The reasons which historically 3ustify the need that the armed forces experienced to assume power can be mentioned basically, asserting that the country's life had reached a situation in which, tTnere was no security whatever as regards the maintence of national integrity. I would say that the country was in the early stages of its dissolution. No one could accuse the armed forces of an ignoble appetite for power given that their action, in the midst of the crisis represented the supreme recourae to what a ri~tion in the throes of death tried in order to avoid total fragmentation. On the basis of this general situation it is easy to detect its component elements: Misgovernment, administrative chaos, corruption, _ 1 ' _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ subversion, an economy in full disarray and on the point of defaulting on its payments, and an unfavorable international environment. It is under these dramatic circumstances for the country's institutional life that the armed forces had to assume the responsibility to intervene so as to avoid - the tremendous moral and material crisis from leading to the dissolution of the Republic, and therefore to undertake the task of restoring the essential values needed for its historic continuity as a nation and the integral survival of the state. [Question] Were t~ere substantial differences between this seizure of - power and others witnPSSed in Argentina in previous periods? If this is the case, what were these differences? [AnswerJ It is our position to leave to history and future generations the task of passing value judgments and making comparisons with the actions - pertaining to the existing political life of the country. Nevertheless and - repeating what was said on various occasions, I wish to make it clear that this process is new, is unique, and that consequently its development and goal are also of this nature. It is new from the start given that a total breakdown of the country's structures and functions occur�red simultane- - ously on a scope never seen before while all the armed forces, in absolutely cohesive manner, were becoming aware of the need to inCervene in the polit- ical process. ~,dditionally, the country and its armed forces were at war against terrorist disruptions. This was an unwanted war but one recognized in every field and especially in military circles which is where it is seen with most objectivity. The situation mandated the diversion of , personnel and resources which, without a doubt, would have been committed to other functions to accelerate this initial stage of the process. - Finally, the process of national reorganization has set goals rather than deadlines for itself. It is not in search of excuses but rather.of political salutions. There are no constraints nor political urgency in decision making. We are merely concerned with covering a safe ground leading to a strong and - stable democracy, genuinely republican, representative, and federal, and - in which all the modernized and revitalized inatitutions constantly place the national interest above personalities and sectoral interests. _ [Question] What were the principal problems that faced the Argentine armed forces on replacing the civilian authorities in the circumstances that you have described? [AnswerJ Before intervening, and through systema.tic surveys, the armed _ forces had already clarified which would be the principal problems that they would have to face and therefore they were preparing the answers and treatment to give each one of them. Considering the gravity of the situation we can list the following problems: Lack of suitability and efficiency in the management of the state; the growth of terrorism on a very serious scale; the rule of anarchy, discord and fear; total moral and material crisis; _ 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY administrative, economic, business, and trade union disorganization orig- inating from dissociative, corrupt, dishonest, and terrorist acts; and . the distrust and fear of the peopLri. ~ In short, we can state that the ma~or uroblem that existed was of a moral- spiritual nature~ that it was checked appropriately through the development of a strategy based on balance and respunsibility which made it possible to change the situation that we inherited. [Question] The seizure of power by the armed forces was, from a given moment, an anticipated event and one which in the opinion of many observers was long overdue. Did the fear of international -repercussions such as ~ those generated by the toppling of Salvado.r Allende in Chile contribute to that delay? [Answer] Our view is that the seizure of power by our armed forces occurred at the oppo~tune moment even though contrary opinions may exist. Very often the context of a situati~n presents symptoms or indications that make people anticipate the adoption of some measures. The difficult thing is to be able to determine the precise moment. Only those who have all the infor- - - mation available, that is, a11 those eleme~ts making 3udgement possible, will be able to evaluate the timeliness of the decision adequately. We must establish clearly that our capacity of decision-making was not, is not, nor will ever be conditioned by ariy type of external considerations. ~ The armed forces took the decision to intervene when they arrived at the conclusion that a ct~itical point of no return had been reached. The possibility of corrections wit~in the framework of existing institutions was not perceived any more than the possibility of improving the [politicalj process through regular channels. It is in the face of this tremendous - power vacuum without the capability of reactivation evidenced by the - government, of a lack of global strategy, of a lack of solutions for the basic problems of the nation, of irresponsibility in the handling of the affairs of state, of a lack of greatness and faith that the armed forces had to fu1fi11 their irrevocable obligation to assume the governancP of " the Republic. � _ [Question] What did it meaz for the army to move away from its routine - tas~s in order to undertake the struggle against armed insurgency? On what experiences--its own or somebody else's--and on what methods did it base its action? [Answer] Beginning with the premise that the purpose ~f an army is to prepare to defend the nation from any kind of aggression, be it internal or external, the intervention of the Argentine army in the fight against subversion did not mean moving away from its routine ~r normal tasks but rather simply applying its skills and preparedness before the real fact in evidence which threatened the country's internal security and in the - last analysis pointed to the destruction of the values of the national entity and to the seizure of power through violence. Since subversive ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY war is one of the forms of.revblutionary war which international communism generates, its analysis has been undertaken as part of the tr3ining of - army cadres since 1957, including the particular characteristics that its " techniques, its goals, its courses of action, and so on could take. In particular, at the levels of study of the Advnnced War Acadt~y, an institute that had the honor to see visiting Spanish officers, pass _ through its classrooms at various times, an the basis of historic military writings, the experiences and teachings derived from the thorough study _ of various cases of war or operations against subversion occurring in the past 20 or 30 years across the world without concentrating exclusively on _ a given period have been taught. The basic method applied in the Argentine Republic has been that of - conducting operations integrally from the highest national level by the - political authority, applying its political strategy to the struggle against subversion and a military strategy to bs executed by the armed . forces, with the army having the primary responsibility~in the matter. [Question] What methc~d was used for the eradication of the urban guerrilla and what method was used in that of the rural guerrilla? [Anscaer] For the elimination of the urban guerrilla procedures, techniques, and operations were used that can be synthesized as follows: Intense information-gathe~ing activity; security operatione, especially the control ~ _ of populations and of communications; military operations, particularly encirclement or search operations when the presence of viable suspects was possible; "police-type" operations consisting of shadowing, surveillance, neutralization, and so on; support of the mass media (psychological warfare); support of the population. In contrast, for the annihilation of the r.ural guerrila in Tucuman Province, regular military operations were used for the struggle in the uiountains _ (surprise attacks, ambushes, incursions, encirclements, and so oil). - [Question] Is it certain that, as the Argentine analysts as~ert, victory over the guerrilla fighters of Tucuman Province was qualiCatively and - quantitatively much more important than the.smashing of the guerrilla which "Che" Guevara tried to establish in Bolivia? [Answer] It is extremely difficult because of the inherent characteristics of this type of oFerations, the geographic environanent in which they occurred, and the particular characteristics of the population to make a . comparison between what happened with the subversive elements in the rural environ~ent in the Argentine Republic (Tucuman Province) and in Bolivia for the purposes of a value judgment. But we can assert that in our - country the terrorist criminals made an important effort to try to secure a"c.ontrolled area" so that, from it, they could continue to strive for _ their goal, namely, the seizure of power. For that p~urpose the adversary ~ 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 FOR OFFICIAT. ~aE ONLY - engageci trained and selected personnel and in a number in keeping wit}i 1?is effort to secure the goal noted earlier. [Ques*_ion] Ar.gentina turns out some equipment which, like the TAM tanks or the Pucara aircraft, is really interesting. Does this represent a goal of growing autarky in the field of military equipm~nt, especially when _ the United States boycott of Argentina in this field is obvious? [Answer] Within the general context of the country and the specific goals set some time ago the arned forces have become aware of the need to move closer to self-sufficiency in terms of military equipment and which you characterize as "growing autarky." Among other things this is due, given ~ the relative complexity of the matter, to motivations of a palitical- ' economic nature and which, in the last analyeis, are reflected in acts of - sovereignty. The Argentina armed forces have cap~bility, and this is important, to produce a large range of military eqsipment and the ability - to incorporate modern technology for the production of weapons necessary for national defense and which additionally should allow them to compete successfully in the arms and equipment market. Furthermore, I believe it necessary to clarify the final part of your question. In truth what is involved is n~t a United States boycott in the field of arms sales but ~ rather of a new United States policy conditioning the sale of materiel and military equipme~t abroad. This has been appropriately evaluated and has received an adequate response as a function of the guidelines set for its handling by the competent organs. It is to be noted that the amounts that used to be assigned were usually small and therefore they were used to complement the acquisition of materiel and equipment already - in use, as was also the case with the procurement of supplies, rather than to purchase modern and sophisticated materiel. Furthermore, Argentina has kept on a permanent basis its freedom of action to make military - purchases wherever the~ are considered mast convenient, it being able to turn. as it has already done to the European market. [Question] Last year the tension with Chile became frankly alarming. What is the present situation and what does Argentina consider the limit of ~ what is tolerable in its dispute with Chile? [Answer] A:.gentina is a country that takes pride in having always fulfilled its international commitments. Similarly, it has tackled - peacefully its border problems with its neighboring countries whether through bilater3l agreements or by submitting the case of different areas in dispute to the decision of an arbiter. In all cases Argentina adhered to the arbitration decisions. Despite this analterable legal international tradition of Argentina our country found itself compelled to declare the validitity of the arbitral decision [regarding Chile] because ~f the gra~e errors and defects that it contained and in the face of the excessive power of the court of arbitration which made its decision unacceptable for 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY our sovereign rights. However, Ar.gentina subsequently sought a compromise in the positions held by both countries through direct negotiations, officially implemented through the provisions which the system approved by the agreement of PuerCo Montt establishes. Despite the grogresa made _ through said negotiations, the Chilean intransigence in ingoring legitimate . Argentine historic rights caused a worsening of tensions between the two - countries, a situation which was overcome opportunely by the intervention - of the ~ioly See through the Vatican's apostolic delegate, Cardinal Samore. His successful handling of the case made an agreement on mediation possible, the stage in negotiations at which the two countries find themselves at present. That is, for Argentina the dispute ir~ at a third stage of nego- tiations with the participation of the Pope as mediator and in fulfillment of what was agreed upon in Montevideo. Beginning on 4 May 1979 mediation got under way and began to pass through the anticigated stages according to the methods agreed upon for the evolution of the mediation _ effort. Moving to the second part oi your question, it should be made perfectly clear that our country does not claim anything tllat does not belong to it. It wishes the Atlantic-Pacific principle to be taken into account based on _ the consideration of the Cape Horn meridian as the division between the two oceans that is recognized historically and geographically. The application of the mentioned principle finds precise interpretation in treaties signed by both countries which attest to the permanent destiny of Argentina in the Atlantic and of Chile in the Pacific, the reason for which the former will in no way aspire to the Zatter and vice versa. This is the legitimate aspiration motivating Argentina which is fully confident in the mediation of the Pope for finding a just solution, one that is equitable and honorable for both counCries. [Question] How does Your Excellency see the Argentine army in the ideal - and not too-distaiit setting of the year 2000, in terms of both practical accomplishments and your personal hopes as a soldier an~ an Argentine? [Answer] We must stress that we shall be realistic in our evaluations. We are thinking of an objective Argentine army without formulating utopian plans tnat generate false expectations difficult to achieve. For that purpose we shall also be prudent in our conjectures. The Argentine army will follow a gradual, controlled path in keeping with the conntry's developemnt. ~Thus, we envision an army whose professional will be modern and efficient, promoting the harmonious development of the country's _ potential and who will simultaneously be in a position to participate in the application of military power to successfully face the external or internal conflicts which can threaten the country in the future. - Institutionally, he will together with the armed forces be definitively integrated among the Argentine peop~.e who are the source nourishing their _ ranks in order to fight foz definitive unity in search of a common destiny. We envision the armed forces as a stabilizing factor in a full, mature, and 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY integrated democracy. In this way we shall show to the world a capacity to shape a modern, pluralistic, and stable nation. PHOTO CAPTIONS 1. p 16. Lt Gen Roberto Eduardo Viola in his government office. On the basis of all indications he could become the president of the _ Argentine Republic in 1981. 2. p 16. The Argentine army has retained its predilection for old uniforms such as these, very reminiscent, worn~by the ~reradier Regiment. 3. p 17. An AM~C-l~ tank of the 8th Tank Regiment garrisoned in Magdalena. 4. p 18. A phase in the training of noncou~iasioned officer candidates of the Argentine army at the Sargento Cabral School. _ 5. p 19. Argentina has a sizable military industry which has developed, among other equipment, the TAM tank one of whose versions can - be seen in the photagraph. - 6, p 19. Our editor, Vicente Talon, with Lieutenant General Viola at the conclusion of the interview that they had in Bueuos Aires. _ COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A., Madrid, 1979 2662 CSO: 3010 ~ 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' URA'LIL ORGANIZATION, MATERI~L, UNTT ~TRENGTH OF ARMY REVIEWED Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish No 20, Dec 79 pp 14-17 _ [Article by Alberto Carbone: "The Brazilian Army"j [Text] The Brazilian Army (EB), which is charged with the defense of 9,000 kilometers of land frontiers is numerically the largest in Ibero-America, with a force of 182,000 men. However, in relation to the population of the - country (120 million inhab itants), it is one of the smallest, since Guba, with 10 million inhabitants, musters a land force of 13,000 men [as pub- lishedJ. But potentially, the EB is the largest army in that part of the world because it could recruit 1.3 million conscripts annually. However, - the annual mandatory draft is limited to 110,000 men. As in the rest of the of Latin America, the EB was created after independence, in March 1824, and its size was established at a-�force of 30,000 men, distributed among infantry, cavalry and artillery units, in 15 - garrisons spread out throughout Brazil. . The EB has had an active role in the most importar~t historic events in national ife, such as: The War of Independence (1823-1824); _ Defense of the borders, particularly the southern borders, during the war against Argentina (1825-1828), which culminated in the independence of Uruguay; the war against Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas (1851- 1852), and the war against Paraguay--allied wi.*_h Argentina and Uruguay-- that lasted from 1864 to 1870; Participati.on in the campaign that culminated in the abolition of slavery; _ Esta~lishment of the repub lic on 15 November 1889; _ Crushing the communist rebellion of 1935; Liquidat ing the fascist-type movement of the "Integra?.ists" in 1937; 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . ~ . Jl - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Participation with an expeditionary corps in World War II on the side of the allies. The Brazilian troops fought in Italy as part of the U.S. Fifth Army; Intervention at the end of World War II to bring about the fall of the dic- tatorship of Getulio Vargas; The 1964 Revolution to fight against the growing leftist tendency of the - government. ~ - _ Organization According to a document of the Army`s Public Relations C enter, the EB is organized on the basis of: "1) adherence to democracy, which constitutes the basic philosophy and soul of the arrny; 2) institutionalism, which serves as its juridical base and its law; 3) morality, which molds its character; 4) doctrine, which constitutes its intelligence; and 5) organization, its _ flesh and blood." - In the 10 years following World War II, the EB proceeded to restructure its large units, created other new ones--armored and parachute units--and modernized its training. _ In 1967, new reforms adapted the EB to fight subversion. The frontier - _ commands and two large military commands (Planalto and Amazonia) were creat~d. Planalto includes the new capital of Brasilia. Early in the seventies, it began to experiment with the prototypes of ~ nationally-built armored vehicles, the Urutu and the Cascavel--the first, an amphibious personnel carrier and the 3econd, for reconnaissance--that - permitted the formation of inechanized infantry units. A parachute brigade and an armored brigade are-~ased in Rio de Janeiro. The EB is made up of brigades that are formed by units of a11 brazches. The brigades are grouped into eight divisions formed into four armies with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre and Recife. Education of the Commanders Future officers are educated under the direction of the Department of Train- ing and Research (DEP). Under the DEP ar~ the Director�ate of Undergraduate and Graduate Education (DFA), Directorate of Specialization and Extension (DEE), Department of Technical Research and Training (DPET), Directorate of Prepatory and Auxiliary Training (DEPA) and Directorate of Special Affairs, Physical Education and Sports (DAED). - In the line of education of the ~uture commander are the Agulhas Negras : Military Academy, the Officer Graduate School, and the Army Command and � General Staff School, all of them under the DFA. Also within the sphere 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - of the DP'A are the Reserve Officer Training Center and the Noncommissioned . Officer School, anci the Reserve Officer Training groups. , - The Army Medical School and the Army Veterinary School are specialized ~ establishments that train medical officers, pharmacists, dentists and veterinarians. - The most recent ed.ucational establishment put into operation by the EB is the Center for Jungle Operations and Conanando Action (COSAC) with head- quarters in Manaus, in the middle of the Amazan. Its aim is to train officers anc~ men for jungle and commando operationa. - _ COSAC is characterized by the realism of its training based on the highly favorable conditions of the areas of in.struction--in the middle of the Amazon jungle--and for that reason, it i~ attended by military men of various armies. ~ Independence In addition to fighting in World War II, from which it gained invaluable _ experience not shared by any other country in Latin America, the EB inter- vened with contingents in the UN emergency force in the Suez Canal, in - observation missions in New Guinea, Kashmir and Yemen and in the Inter- American Peace Force which the Organization of American States (OAS) sent - to the Dominican Republic in 1964. Since 1964, when it assumed power together with the navy and the air force, the EB is engaged in a process of equipping itself with nationally manu- factured materiel which in a few years should give it absolute independence from the traditional suppliers of the Ibero-Elmerican armies. General Facts Population of Brazil: 120 million . Term of Military Service: 1 year Total Ar,my: 182,00~ men (110,000 from conscription) - Gross National Produce estimated for 1977: $177 billion - Defense Budget for 1978: $2.04 billion = Units 8 divisions, each with up to 4 armored, mechanized or motorized brigades 2 independent infantry brigades ' 1 independent parachute brigade - 5 battalions of infantry specialized in jungle warfare Materiel Medium tanks: 60 M-4 Light tanks: 220 M-3A1, 250 M-41, 50 XIA-2 (under construction) - 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ . . ~ - Armored combat vehicle~: 120 Ca~cavel~ M-8 Anooced perecnnel carriers: Urutu, M-59 end 600 M-113 Howitser~: 500 TS mm backpscked, 450 LOS mm (eome M-7 end M-108 ~elf- propelled) and 90 155 ~n ' Hortars: 81 mn = Rocket launchere: 108-R and 114 nm ~ Recoilleee rifles: 106 mm _ Cuided antitank veapone: Cobra = Antiair guns: 40 and 90 em 9urface-to-air mieeilee: Roland Light planes: 40 L-42 Regente, 0-lE, i0 AB-206 helicopters ' Paremilitary Forcee: Public Security Forces totaling eome 200~000 men; in sddition~ there are etate militiae Map of the Territorial Organization of the Brnsiliaa Army Nor Alherro CAR/10~\'!i . ~ i! ~ ~y ~ , ~ ~ 5 ~ r- , - 4~ ' ~ /.tAU1l1-. J 1~ ~ ~ . . i~' ('~I { 1 1 SAO WK i', i~ LEn~ i' ~ FORfAIE/~ T ~~z~A ~ _ . . _ ~ , . z ; . ji r OQ ~M yl ~ ' 1' ~ ~ _.Tr'. p'~r~d'~F ~I~ ~i a ~ f ? 1.1u W� ~ [OMANDO ` MACEIU ` ~ MIUTAR ~ ~i' ~R~u;u DO TLANA~ ~ ! ~ ~ SALVAUOR ~ _ ~ ~IP~ ` ...rl _ ~ . . 6~ASil1A ~ ~ ~_f CiYs~, 4Q " CO~~NIAO , 1~1 . .~t~ ~ ~n s f / R~{" ` 11� RM. j ~ ~ ~ , _ : ~~I~~X~RCITO ~ ; ~ - - ~~~L~~ .1~~�V YO~ ~ , ~ . s~`~g~~j~~if'" YIIC)PIA ~ ~'~t, ~�Y w~ 1.~~^, ;~,5. ~ - ~a RM ~ ~ ~ ~ S� RM ~ ~ , ~ - Q,~~~~E~R~~ ~ ~ , Y ~ ' . ~ ~ ~E lAN(ip~} ~ 4 CURRIBA p 't' . . . ~ 1~~II' 1.:�' a'~ r~ ~ TO ...."Y,r..~ ~F FtOANNOPOUS ' ~ ~ r`~ ' ~ ~ , : ~s r~, ;Y tsa3t~ v.a: ~ ~IOR OAIEC~E, ~ i~yT~ ~"~~;~�~R~I~' �-~r..;~ ~ - r, ,i~' � hfapa: orgenf:ac(on lerrltoilal dcl 6'!J. , - [Key on following page) 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 ~ - FOR O:FICIAL USE ONLY !l~ REGIAO MIIITAR I EXERCITO l.a 4.a ~ ~8~ (2) I11 EXERCITO 2.a 9�� (9) - 'lll EX3ERCITO 3.a S.~ (10) !IV EXERCITO 6.~ 7.~ . rr~ c11> 1 COMAN60 MIIITAR 8.~ ~Z a ~ 12 ~ IDA AMAZOMIA !COMAN~O MIIITAR ~~~a /13~ j DO PIANAlTO ~ - ~ ~ Key: l. lst Army 8. lst 4th - 2. 2d Army 9. 2d 9th 3. 3d Army 10. 3d 5th 4. 4th Army 11. 6th 7th lOth S. Amazon Military Command 12. 8th 12th 6. Planalto Military Command 13. llth 7. Military Region COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Denfensa, S.A,, Madrid 1979 ' 87Z1 = CSO: 3010 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - - . CUBA FOREIGN MINISTRY REPLIES TO VENEZUELAN STATEMENT PA291846 Havana PRELA in English 1815 GMT 29 Jan 80 PA [Text] Havana, 29 Jan (PL)--The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba issued a communique today in response to commentaries made to the press yesterday by the foreign minister of Venezuela, Jose Alberto Zambrano. - The text of the document follows: In response to the observations made by the Government of Venezuela through its riinistry of Foreign Affairs and in commentaries made to the press by _ Dr Jose Alberto Zambrano, minister of foreign affairs, in which he analyzes the position explained by the Government of the Republic of Cuba in a state- ment delivered by the minister of foreign affairs to the Latin American ambassadors accredited in Havana, representatives of those countries which recognize the right of asylum, the minister of foreign affairs feels oblige3 to specify: 1. That respect for the right of asylum, confirmed in that declaration by the Government of Cuba, stems from the consideration that this principle of political asylum by its own definition a~plies to persons being politically persecuted, as recognized by the Government of Venezuela. - 2. That this right traditionally honored by the Latin American countries - has not functioned nor could it ever function on the bases which the min- ister of foreign affairs of Venezuela attempts to pose in his statements, ' _ alleging the contemporary existence of a"psychological political persecu- tion" which he classified as "intemperance," which he attribted "to the internal conscience" and which thus, according to him, is not confirmable - from outside. This legal precedent which he is attempting to establish regarding which we abstain from any unpleasant comment, has nothing in common with the ae- finition of the right to asylum which appears in the agreements on this issue which Cuba has signed and towards which it feels bound. 13 FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 , rvi~ vrrt~te~t1 UJa V1VL1 - . ` 3. That Cuba recognized the right of those who have signed these agreements to classify a,~rson as "pol.itically persecuted" who seeks protection in the embassies of those cnuntries in the Republic of Cuba, that that, simultaneous- ly, it maintains its right to demonstrate to those governments the real na- ture of the situation they are trying to present as an act of political persecution. While that dispute persists, the Government of Cuba cannot be _ demanded to extend its safe-conduct passes to persons who blatantly lack any _ _ of the characteristics required to claim the status of "politically per- - secuted." = 4. That to that effect the Government of Cuba does not believe it point- less to remind the Government of Venezuela and explain to the Latin American and international public opinion that during the past several months, for the sake of friendship among the Cuban and Venezuelan peoples and responding to the request expressed by the Government of Venezuela, Cuba granted exit permits from the country to several persons who, as it has had to be grad- ually revealed to the Cuban authorities, were common delinquents who did ~ not fill the classificiation of politically persecuted. 5. That Cuba categorically refuses to collaborate in installir~g in Latir. American international relations the precedent of using the right to asylum as an instrument to violate the migratory laws, through which, in some cases, _ common delinquents, for whom the atmosphere of our society is suffocating, or in other cases, simple citizens moved like other hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans by the simple desire to travel to other countries, are transformed by their mere entrance onto the office of an accredited embassy in Cuba into politically persecuted. Cuba is willing to discuss, as it has = done to date, all the circumstances of each one of the cases brought to its consideration, and as it will do in the future with the most comprehensive _ _ spirit an.d the decided willingness to contribute to international relations. - ~ Finally, the Government oF Cuba categorically rejects the insinuation con- tai.ned in ~lie statements of the minis~er of foreign affairs of the Republic = of Venezuela that the references made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba regarding the danger to the security of those diplomatic representa- tives who get involved in this situation, constitute a covert threat and much less an "anticipated allegation exempting responsibility." The Govern- ment of Cuba has a clean record regarding all the accredited diplomats in Cuba and it is quite insulting to launch even a suspicion against it. We need only remind the Government of Venezuela, t~ illustrate the existence of the dangars to which we refer, that one o~ its diplomatic functionaries was forced through the use of the armed violance of a delinquent to allow _ him to enter the diplomatic office of Venezuela in Cuba. And this is one of the supposed "political refugees" wbich Cuba, only for raasons of Latin American relations, allowed to abandon ~he country under the protection of Venezuela. 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY We consider that mutual respect among countries demands from all parties in- volved the most rigorous analysis of the situation and requires that the responsible governments o� Latin America not ~eel pressured by press prop- . aganda stimulated and issued by those who were also guilty of the frusCrated attempt to isolate the Republic of Cuba in the past. = CSO: 3020 ' _ 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CUBA TEXT OF CASTRO MESSAGE ON RHODESIAN SITUATION PA281722 Havana PRELA in English 1540 GMT 28 Jan $0 PA [ Ttxt: ~ ua :~ana, 28 January (PL) tde will now transmit the text of the - message from the president of the movement of non-aligned countries, Fidel Castro Ruz, on the state of affairs in Zimbabwe: President Julius Nyerere, as requested by the presidents of the front line countries, and in agreement ~ with the meeting held among these countries on 10 January 1980, has sent to our country the minister of foreign affairs of the United Republic of Tan- zania, Benjamin Mkapa, to submit to us, as president of the movement of - non-ali.gned countries, the protest of the front line countries against the actions undertaken by the British authorities in Rhodesia which, in the judgement of those countries, violate the letter and spirit of the Lancaster House agreements. The front line countries have also addressed themselves to the Organization of African Unity, the general secretary of the commonwealth and the general - secretary of the United Nations, in accord with the January 10 decision. Depending on what happens during`the upcoming days and weeks, the front ~ line countries will uiidertake ulterior diplomatic actions, among which they have called on the United Nations Security Council to discuss this issue. - Consist~nt with the reports transmitted by President Nyerere, I am address- ing the members of the movement of non-aligned countries to request that, following the agreements of the sixth summit of heads of state or govern- ment, they act in support of the rights of the people of Zimbabwe and the Patriotic Front to demand [from] the British authorities the strictest re- spect of the Lancaster House agreements. . In concordance with the evaluation made by the presidents of the front line countries at the aforementioned meeting, the current situation in Rhodesia is characterized by the following circumstances: 1. The presence of South African troops in Rhodesia is directly contrary to the security measures offered in London during the conference. These - iroops are "protecting the Beit Bridge" as the British governor has now admitted, who claims to have authorized this intervention. = 16 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY 2. When it was proven that the leaders of the Patriotic Front were correct in stating that the seven days conceded for the concentration of their forces were in~ufficient, and that the number of c~ncentration points raas inadequate because the Patriotic Front had more than the 16,000 members estimated by the British, the governar did not act according to the given security measures. He did not increase the number of concentration points, nor did he act iLi a spirit conducive to the success of the cease-fire and - the preparations for free and just elections. Instead, while some several _ thousands of soldiers of the Patriotic Front were still outside the agreed points, he declared "amnesty" under the condition Lhat they surren~iered their weapons--as though graciously forgiving the members of the Patriot Front. Now a number of these freedom-fighters have been assassinated in - cold blood while trying to join their colleagues in the points of concen- tration. 3. During the period of concentration, the governor addressed the Smith- Muzorewa troops twice to inform them of what in his opinion constituted vio- - lations of the cease fire. Ttao or three days after the d~adline for the concentra.tion of the Patriotic Front trnops, and even less time after the off er of "amnesty," the governor "deployed" these same Smith-Muzorewa troops to confront those which are sometimes called "armed band" and sometimes "the three thousand members of the Patriotic Front who have not reported." The former forces are being used to maintain "peace," in direct breach of th~ Lancaster House agreement, which states that they are confined to their barracks according to company and that peace will be maintained by the ~ police force. It was a group of those Smith~-Muzorewa troops which killed the Patriotic Front soldiers who were heading for the concentration points. The British governor now claims that "they acted according to tlieir rights." 4. The "auxiliary forces" of Salisbury (that is, the armed followers of Bishop Muzorewa) who had supposedly been incorporated into the Salisbury army and likewise confined to their barracks, have been left to their free will and in fact are now moving into areas evacua.ted by the Patriotic Front _ forces and occupying them as the latter move into the agreed concentration points. Those auxiliary forces are now terrorizing and intimidating the people in those places. The Patriotic Front forces in the concentration points are gradually being surrounded by the forces of their racist enemies. The governor has taken no action against these racist forces. Neither the patriotic forces under his command nor any other have been used to rectify _ this situation and bring the "auxiliaries" under control. Furthermore, at no time has the governor turned to the cease-fire commission--in which both parties are represented--to consider the serious violation of the cease _ fire. Nevertheless, the agreement establishes this procedure, and says that the commission should be informed of any cease fire violation and should either act or advise the governor to act. All of these facts and other lesser violations prove the total lack of seriousness of the British authorities in Salisbury and equate a violation of the letter and spirit of the Lancaster House agreements. The British i 17 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200054426-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Government is not fulfilling the compromises reached under London's presi- dency and thus remove any guarantee that the elections will be free and ~ust, which is their main responsibility. There cannot be free and jiist elections if the mentioned conditions prevail, if the South African troops _ remain in Rhodesia and if the Smith-Muzorewa forces are allowed to move wi~th complete freedom and in;:imidate the people. - By denouncing this situation, at the request of the front line countries, we are sure that all the members of the movement of non-aligned countries, facing the seriousness of the situation, will joiri the denunciation and protest of the front line countries and offer all their support to the _ Patriotic Front and the cause for a free and independent Zimbabwe. [Signed] - Fidel Castro Ruz. CSO: 3020 _ ~ 18 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050026-6