JPRS ID: 8941 KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050043-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 43
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8941
22 February 1980
.
= Korean Affai rs Re ort -
p -
; CFOUO 2~%80)
.
~
F~IS FOREIGN BROADCAST IiVFORMATION SER~OICE
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JPRS L/8941
22 February 19$0
KOREA~1 AFFAIRS REPORT
(FOUO 2/80)
CONTENTS PAGE
SOUTH :COREA
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
'SANKEI SHIMBUN' Intcrviews DRP President Kim Chong-Pil
(Kin~ Chong-pil Interview; SAI~,'KEI SHIMBUN, 16 Jan 8Q),,,, 1
ECONOMY
, Problem Areas, Bright Spots in ROK Economy Pointed Out
- (Hoshino; SANKEI, 6 Jan 80) 3
hORTH KOREA
- POLITICS AND GO!~ERNMENT
North Korean Spy Techniques in Japan
(Ichiro Akashi; HIMITSUSEN, ZAINICHI CHOHOKIKAN
NO KATSiJDO, Aug 78) 5
~ FOREIGN TRADE
North Korea Offers To Sell Mideast Oil to Japan
- (JIJI PRESS, 19 Jan 80)....... . 31
- a - [III - ASIA - 109 FOUO)
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S.KORI:A/POLI'l'ICS AND GOVERNMIsNT
'SANKEISHIMBUN' INTERVIEWS DRP PRESIDENT KIM CHONG-PIL
OW181427 Tokyo SANKEI SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Jan $0 Morning Edition p 1-S OW
[Exclusive interview with Kim Chong-pil, president of the South Korean De-
mocratic Republican Party, held by SANKEI SHIMBUN Columnist Minoru Shibata
on 15 January at DRP headquarters in Seoul)
[Excerpts] [Question] F~.rst, how do you historically view the achievements
of President Pak Chong-hui's administration, which lasted for l~? years and
5 months since the 16 May [1961] military revolution?
Kim: In a nutshell, I think that there was no other leader in Korean his-
_ tory who bequeathed as many achievements as President Pak. There may be
various criteria to apply, but I think the fact that he laid the foundation
for the modernization of the ROK will be clearly recorded in history.
The military revolution became the motive and the starting point for the
modernization of the ROK. President Pak wanted to lay the foundation in
the 1960's, make leaps in the 1970's and bring about an era of democrati-
zation in 1980's in whic:: we would be able to enjoy as much fre~dom as we
want. At a stage where we succeeded in laying the foundation and making
_ leaps for the present as a result of successful implementation of four
5-year pZans in the 1960's and 1970's, President Pak passed away, There-
fore, I think that President Pak's achievements will be highly evaluated. -
[Question] At present a reform or a revision of the Yusin system is under-
way and the word democratization is frequently used. What do you think
of this democratization? At what pace and in what way do you think demo-
_ cratiza.tion should be promoted?
Kim: A deluge of the ward democratization means that the cornerstone is
laid for practicing democracy. It also means that every one has the desire
to apply it more deeply and broadly in his daily life. I think that it is
a sign of this phenomenon, Without the foundations laid in the 1960's
and 1970's, it may be impossible to even hope for those things. However,
since the foundations have been laid, we have arrived at a stage where we
can practice it. The president passed away on 26 October. The so-called
1
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Yusin system is one established temporarily to overcome the difficult
situation and it was not a pertnanent one. Therefore, I interpret that its
time limit expired with the death of the pres~dent and a new a~e hag ar-
r.ive~ .
[Question] Debates on constitutional amendments are very actively underway
now. What is the draft plan worked out thus far by the DRP like?
Kim: The party's final draft has not yet been worked out and a study is
stil~ underway. The assembly's ad hoc committee on constitutional anend-
ments has only recently started holding public hearings. I think that it
will tal;e several months. We want to get it over with by around this sum-
mer.
[Question] In case there is a presidential election, do you intend to run
as a presidential candidate? Have you made up your mind?
Kim: It is nonsensical to talk about next year. The only thing I can do
now is to do my best to fulfill my duty as DRP president. I am not think-
ing of anything else now.
[Question] Recently Narth Korea (DPRK) made a proposal by sending letters
to South Korea, a letter whose addressees include you. How do you evaluate
this? What is the North's aim?
Kim: 'rhe North's true motive is still unknown. What I can say now is that
it may be the North's reply to a call made by President Pak on 19 January
l.ast year for talks between the authorities in the North and the South.
I think that it is being studied by the authorities. I hope that sincere
talks will be held between the South and the North this year with new re-
solve. I believe that in ~11 circumstances we must avert the tragedy of a
fratricidal war. To this end, we must try to increase those things we have
~ in common one by one through talks. The severance between the two sides
has lasted 30 years, and there was a war in 1950. There are too many heter-
ogeneous things. We want to patiently find the root of homogeneitty through
dialog. My feeling is that toda;�, in the 1980's, we want to promote a
dialog with a clear-cut posture and without missing any opportunity.
[Question] South Korea today ushered in a new age and faces a new trial.
I)o you not think that there is a possibility or a danger in which the North
will take advantage of this opportunity and abuse it?
Kiin: I think that the possibility cannot be precluded. Unlike us, the North
has not changed its basic attitude in the least since 1947. It has not
changed in the least its basic design to communize the Korean peninsula by
force or arms. Therefore, I do not think that we can preclude all possi-
bilities.
COPYRIGHT: San;yo Keizai Shimbun Tokyo Honsha, 1980
CSO: 4105
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I
S. KOREA/ECONOMY
PROBLEM AREAS, BRIGHT SPOTS IN ROK ECONOriY POINTE D OUT
Tokyo SANKEI in Japanese 6 Jan 80 p 4
~Article by Special Correspondent Hoshino: .
~Text] W)nen the Republic of Korea's economy is looked at from the long
term point of view, many questions and difficulties can be pointed out.
The tirst of those is the modernization of industry. It can be said that
the key to industrial modernizaticn is not the importix?g of the newest
machinery piece by piece from the advanced countries and then exporting
the assembled machinery, but is whether the technology whereby Korea itself
- can build the entire machinery can be acquired in the 80's. It is hoped
this will be passible in the 80's.
The second problem is whether modernization of an enterprise's management
corresponding to the modernization of such technology can be realized or
not. No separation of management and capital is exercised in mu.ch of present
day Korean enterprise. It can be said that on account of that, variaus abuses I
have occurred and a national income differential has been formed. Total
modernization will come when a separation of management and capital is �
exercised along with an accumulation of capital and a rational management
_ oF enterprise takes root. To the extent that that cannot be d~one, Korean
enterprise will not grnw to an international level. But can long term
capital really be provided for that? It can be said that this is one of
the biggest questions to be resolved in the 80's.
The third difficulty is the pr~blem of resources, especially oil, and the
energy shortage. It is obvious that economic growth wiil be greatly hindered -
in this respect. This is not only a problem for Korea, but also certainly
a cammon worry of the advanced countries, including Japan. On the one hand, _
na:ional defense expenditures can be given as a primary factor hindering
Korea's own economic growth. They account for 37 percent of the total -
budget in the FY1980 budget, which is more than in 1979, and correspand to
6 percent of the ;ross national product. These national defense expenditures
are certainly inevitable as long as the situation of the north-south division
does not �improve; and it is certain these are a major factor restraining a
continuation of economic growth.
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Finally, the worsening of tlie export environment can be mentioned. The
~;lobal econo~iic cutlook is not at a~~ that bright, with the protectionist
- trend c>f the advanced nations piling up. Lcc~nomic growtt? cannot Le hoped
for globally given tliat tec.}inologir_al innovation is at a present lowpoint,
_ and a transition to some sort of stagnation cannot be helped. It will be -
diPEicult to get out cf this business sr.agnation, no matter at what point ~
it is, as long as the ultimate of the greatest technological innovations,
through which energy substitutes for oil are ~'eveloped, are not attained.
Korea is :~ot excepted from involvement in this.
Froc~ that p~int of view, it seems the 1980's will be quite difficult for
tt?e Korean economy, but should not necessarily be viewed pessimistically.
The main reason for not viewing it so is the possibility that Korea's
superior labor torce and its abundant man~,ower with its high level of
education and its nature will overcome the difficulties.
The incident of President Park's assassination was a~iajor turning point.
It cannot be denied that a new turning point in economic management wi:11
also come, distinct from political questions, arising from the incident,
s~.~ch as constitutional reform.
ldithin several years, the government leadership form of economic management
tliat t~as existed until noiv will gradtxally disappear. The compulsory drive
t~> c:;port and muney ~c~licies will gradually lessen in relative importance. -
_ 'Che economic measures so full of inconsistencies will also be improved.
Korea's economic character cannot help but change, even though gradually,
as a result of a11 of th.is. Instead of ttiat, the economy requires respons-
ibility and obligation, which are inseparable from freedom.
The "sweet honey jar" the government has provided until now must be sought
af.ter and produced itself. But the question is how much Korea's economy
- will adjust and accomodate itself to this new kind of environment. The
80's will. be ttie test the Ko:ean economy must pass in order for it to grow
- into a modern economy.
COPYRIGHT: Sangyo Keizai Shimbun Tokyo Honsha 1980
9400
CSO: 4105
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N. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
NORTH KOREAN SPY TECHNIQUES IN JAPAN
Tokyo i~IMITSUSEN, ZAI NICHI CHOHOKIKAN NO KATSUDO in Japanese Aug 78
pp 118-159
[Excerpt from book by Ichiro Akashi: HIMITSUSEN, ZAINICHI CHOHOKIKAN NO
KATSUDO [Secret War, the Activities of Foreign Tntelligence Agencies in
_ Japan]
[Text] If the reader who possesses a high performance short-wave radio
were to turn his dial late in the evening, he would probably hear many
peculiar sounds which are neither English nor Chinese, or Russian. The
music of "Ariran" and ot.her such Korean songs is often heard in these broad-
~ casts.
If you scan from one end of the dial to the other you will know how many
of these broadcasts there are. If you understand Korean, you will know that
these broadcasts are merely reading of numbers.
This is a mode of communication which is called "A3" in the specialized jar-
gon of radio broadcasting. The numbers which are read off are cipher taken
from a randomly numbered key. The person receiving the numbers only under-
stands what they mean after he deciphers them with a randomly numbered key.
There are also communications which are like telegrams being sent. This is
a transmission mode called "A2" and, of course, these communications report
only numbers.
= These communications are orders sent by the Fourth Bureau of the Department
of Political Security of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (the bureau
in charge of external operations) to undercover agents in Japan.
Ordinarily, it seems that only one or two set channels are used as the fre-
quencies for sending instructions to an intelligence organization; i.e,,
one unidentified sign~l carries instructions to only one organization.
Since the same frequency is not used by more than one organization, one can,
to some extent, calculate the number of North Korean organizations operating
undercover in Japan by counting these unidentified signals.
From this kind of rough calculation it would seem that there are roughly
several hundred North Korean operative organizations active in Japan. What-
ever the case might be as far as quality is concerned, quantitatively this
is the highest number for any of the national intelligence agencies operating
in Japan. 5
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Actually, from che first North Korean spy incident in September l_950 unt.il
the Han T'ae-hong incident in November .1976, there have been a total of 40 ,
cases i_n which Korean spies have been arrested in Japat
'L'he equipment witti which these radio spies are provided is fairly good
equipment. In the incident involving Kim Pang-chin who was arrested trying
to infiltrate from the coast of Aomori Prefecture on 23 November 1969, two
high performance transistorized radios capable of sending over 400 to 800
characters per minute, code charts, random numerical tables for deciphering,
and time schedules for receiving cipher messages which ttiis ;roup had hidden
- in the sand dunes of Noshiro City, Akita Prefecture, were disco~~ered and con-
fiscated. Reportedly, so:ne of the random numerical tables and code charts
were made very sma.ll and were written in very small letters on paper which
was aUout the age of cigarette paper. In the "Hamasaka case" (29 September _
1960) involving Kim Chun-gong about 1,000 numerats were printed on an extremely
small piece of paper 3.8 centimeters long by 2.7 centimeters wide. Kim had
a magnifying glass for reading this numerical key. In the "Mimura Case"
(26 June 1974) involving Kong Yong-sun, a random numerical table was placed
in a"Cherry" brand cigarette. Very small numbers were written compactly
on cellophane-like paper and this was placed inside the "Cherry."
Endless Traftic on Japan Sea Route
30-Ton High Speed Iioats
The infiltration rou~e into Japan for Norti-il~:ozean spies is the so-called
"Japan Sea Route" by ~ahich they come across the Japan Sea in higli speed
boats.
Usua.lly they come in high speed boats which are refitted 30 ton fishing -
boats; ~he boats come to abotit 500 meters offshore from the planned landing
site, drop off a rubber boat which unly the infiltrating agents and oarsmen
ooard. The rubber boat then heads for the landing site, After reaching
land, the rubber boat drops off only the infiltrating agent and then returns
to the larger vessel.
Sometimes the agents infi.ltrate into Japan in this manner by themselves and
sumetimes there are organizations ~oaiting to guide ttiem.
Any number of times in the past places where these high speed boats using
che "Japan Sea Route" have been frequenting along the Japanese coast have
been discovered, but never once has an arrest been made by the patrol boats
of the rtaritime Safety Agency. On the contrary, there have been incidents -
in whicli patrol boats pursuing the high speed boats have come under fire
Erom automatic rifles.
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About 0015 hours on 14 April 1970 in an area 1.8 kilometers east of Nekozaki
in Takeno-Cho, Sharosaki-gun in Hyogo Prefecture, a patrol boat discovered
an unidentified vessel which was moving without lights and ordered the vessel
to stop. The vessel, however, began to flee northward at the high speed of
20 knots. The patrol boat drew to within 300 meters and took photographs
but was Fired upon two or three times by automatic rifles from the unidenti-
fied vessel.
It was a very bold action indeed.
Let us look into an actual case of infiltration by the "Japan Sea Route"
by follo~oing the experience r~f Ko Yong-ho who was arrested for violation of
the directives governing emigration and immigration on 16 October 1974.
Ko Yong-ho is a former lieutenant of the South Korean Army who managed an
automobile repair business in Tokyo but, having accepted various assistance ~
with his business from Yi Tong-chun, organizational division chief of the
Chosen Soren, [General Federation o� Koreans Residing In Japan], he was sub-
jected to Yi Tong-chun's bra~r,washing oeprations. Yi's brainwashing and train-
ing extended over approximately 70 occasions.
As a result, in August 1967 Ko Yong-ho was ordered to return to North Korea
and on 10 August he returned by a boat going back to Korea from Niigata.
Having arrived at Chiongji_n, Ko Yong-ho was taken to Pyongyang.
After arriving there he was instructed by a teacher from ~:e Workers Party
- central cadre school in the Pyongyang International Hotel for about four
months trom October 1967 until the beginning of February 1968.
Then, For a long period of about 3 years, he received special lecturss and
training in politics, economics and military matters from teachers of the
~ North Korean Workers Party's cadre school in a separate house in Pyongyang
which is called "Reception Center No. 8". _
In addition to this basic training, he also received training as a secret -
agent.
Finally, on 6 October, he was given orders for underground operations for
a coup-d'etat in South Korea and he was to infiltrate into Japan to establish
a foothold for this coup.
Late on the night of 9 October Ko Yong-ho arrived by high spped boat at a
point about 500 meters off Iwasaki in Nishitsugaru-gun, Aomori Prefecture,
Japan. Along with four members of the crew he climbed down a rope ladder
- into a rubber boat and, using transceiver to keep in contact with their
reception party on land they rowed to the shore in about 20 minutes.
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Then two of the crew members who had come ashore with KO went ahead about 300
meters to a place where there was a large pine tree. They returned in about
10 mii~~utes. The two said that everything was done, led KO forward and turned
him over to the person who was to meet him. They spent the night tliere,
out of doors, and rose around 0500 hours the next morning. They walked to
. a unattended train station in the neighborhood and boarded the first train.
They arrived in Tokyo by way of Higashi Noshiro and Sendai.
After that he ~aas activP moving about between hotels in Tokyo and Japanese
style inns at Hakone, Nikko and such places. What could be the objective
, oF these North Korean spies who iafiltrate Japan by the "Japan Sea Route" ~
and communicate late at night with unidentified radio signals?
They come because of the peculiar geography and the peculiar demographic
composition of Japan.
To North Korea, the Japanese archipelago is a. rear base for people who would
invade the Korean peninsula. It is, in fact, a base ~vhich the U.S. Forces
in 3apan have developed.
If the U.S. Forces in Japan under General MacArthur had not inter.vened in
the Korean War which began in 1950, the North Korean army with its new types
.?F tanks and fighter planes provided by the Soviet Union would have succeeded
in overwhelming and occupying the entire Korean Peninsuia.
Conversely, if the U.S. Forces had not had bases in the .Tapanese archipelago,
ttiey would not have been able to advance into the Korean peninsula or would
have felt extreme inconveniences. At the least, they would have faced
_ difficulties in maintaining their supply lines.
Particularly since the recent decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from
Korea, the existence of the Japanese archipelago as a rear base has, one can
say, become even more important in case of major occurrence.
The:�e is, then, information in Japan which North Korea wants very much to
know, This would be information on trends in the U.S. Forces in Japan
- and the Japanese Self Defense Forces, information on the status of their
strategy in the Far East and their weapons, information of political, social
and economic trends in Japan and information on South Korea. `
Furth;~~more, there arP about 600,000 Koreans living in Japan. About half
of. these people are concentrated in the Chosen Soren in Japan which has
North Korean connections.
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One can probably say that it is indispensible to the national security of
Nc~rtti Kc~rea to send agents into this situation in Japan, to look for informa--
_ tion on and movements of the U.S. Forces in Japan and the Self-Defense For-
ces, which can probably be called auxilliaries to the U.S. Forces, and to
organize all of the Koreans in Japan into the Chosen Soren.
Furthermore, in post-war Japan there is no law to protect secrets nor is
there a counterespionage act. ~ven when exposed, spies are not tortured
or executed. They are, at most, charged with violation of immigration-
emigration directives or violation of ordinances governing use of radio
frequencies. And, since Japan sends out no jamming signals, Japan is ideal
for communicating with the home country by radio. Japan's capability for
loc~ting unidentified signals is weak.
A weak capability for maritime police work is also a problem. It is the
task of the Maritime Safety Agency to expose "the Japan Sea Route" on the
water but the agency has not succeeded in a single case. The high speed
boats which operate in secret are faster than the patrol boats. In addition,
it is nearly impossible to get information on this sort of thinp,. For the
present infiltration of Japan by North Korean agents by the "Ja~an Sea
Route" will probably go on.
North Korean State Department for Political Security Organization by Missions
The entity in charge of the intelligence operations against Japan which are
described above is North Korea's State Department for Political Security.
The State Department for Political Security was formerly a bureau in the
riinistry of Public Security but its status was raised by a"Special Directive
to Separate the Department of Political Security from the Ministry of Public
Security" which was issued by Kim I1-song in 1973.
The Department of Political Security is composed of 16 bureaus and four
offices in its central headquarters. They are as fallows.
First Bureau (Coordination and Guidance Bureau): Planning and coordination
of security affairs and counterintelligence operations.
Second Bureau (Escort Bureau): Mair.ly for guarding Kim I1-song and gathering
information relative to that task.
Third Bureau (Investigation Bureau): Interrogation of spies, persons con-
nected witl-, spies and political offenders.
Fourth Bureau (External Affairs Bureau): External intelligence operations
and counterintelligence operations abroad.
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FlCtli liureau (Tnterual A.Efairs Bux'e