JPRS ID: 9114 WORLDWIDE REPORT NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

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POLIT _ . _ RF ~

~6 FEBRUARY 1980 CFOUO 5180) 1 OF 1
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JPRS L%8948
26 February 1980
~ USSR Re ort -
~
POLITICAL AND SOCiOLOGICAI ~AFFAIRS
= CF~JUO 5/80)
- ~
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- JPRS L/8948
26 February 1980
USS F REPORT
- POLITICAL AND $OCInLOGICAL AFFAIRS _
(FOUO 5/80)
CONTEN7S PAGE
INTERNATIONAL
Soviet Views on Current U.S. Foreign Policy Concepts
(SOVREMENNYYE VNESHNE-POLITICHESKIYE KONTSEPTISII, ~
1979) 1
N. N. Iiiozemtsev on Soviet Foreign Policy
(N. N~ Ir.ozemtsev; LIIVINSKIY KURS MEZHDUNARODNOY
- POLITIKI KPSS, 1978) 39
RE~IONAL
Book Analyzes Contemporary Muslim Preaching
_ (MUSUL'MANSKAYA PROPOVED', 1978) ~1 _
Book on 'Survivals' of Islam in Dagestan Reviewed
(A. F. Tsyrkun; OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR, -
_ No 6~ 1979) 4G
Book on Working Class in Kirgiziya F~eviewed
(A. N. Vinogradov; OBSHCHESTVENNYyE NAUKI V SSSR,
No 6~ 1979) 49
6
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, INTI~;RNATI ONEIL
SOVIET VIEWS ON CURRENT U.S, FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTS _
, Moscow SOVREMENNYYE VNESHhE-POLTTICHESKIYE KONTSEPTISII (Current U.S.
Foreign Policy Concepts) in Russian 1979 signed to press 10 Jan 79 pp 1-47,
382 pages
[Annotation, preface, table of contents and ~hapter I from book published
- under auspices of the Institute of the USA and Canada, edited by G. A. -
Trofimenko, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, Moscow, 1979, 3,450 copies, 365 pa~es]
[Text] Annotation
- The book gives a critical analysis of current concepts in American foreign
p4licy and international relations. It cor.siders the link between these -
concepts and the practice of American foreign policy, including relations
with the USSR.
Contents
Preface---by G. A. Trofimenko, Doctor of Historical Sciences............ 3
Chapter l. American Ideas on International Relations in the '80s and'90s
by A. A. Kokoshin, Candidate of Historical Sciences........ 11
- l.l. Ideas of a"Five-Po1ar" Wor13 Structure 15
1.2. Ideas of a"Tripartite Community of Developed Countries"........ 24
1.3. Variants of Systems of "Regional Multipolarity" 32 -
1.4. The Polyarchaic Mode1 38
Chapter 2. The Search for New Approaches to Foreign Politics
by V. V. Shimanovskiy, Candidate of Historical Sciences.... 48
= 2.1. In the Face of New Problems 48
2.2. Ideas of U.S. Adaptation to Real Conditions......... . 57
_ 2.3. Ideas on Force in International Relations 66
2.4. The Evolution of Washington's Official Platform 74
Chapter 3. The Evo~.ution of American Military-Political Thought =
by G. A. Trofimenko, Doctor of Historical Sciences......... 85
3.1. Basic Characteristics of U.S. Military-Political Strategy...... 85 -
3.2. The Development of U.S. Strategy After World War II............ 90 ~
1 -
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3.3. The Realities of the '70s and U.S. Strategy 98
_ 3.4. U.S. Attempta to Achieve Partial Advantages in the Framewnrk of
Parity 102
~ 3.5. Strategic Ideas of President Carter's Administration........... 117
3.6. Factors that Destablize the Strategic Balance 124 -
3.7. Limitation and Reducti~n of Arms as a Real Alternative to the
Use of Force 131
Chapter 4. American Ideas on Detente
by P. T. Podlesnyy, Candidate of Historical Sciences....... 138
~ 4.1. The Clash of Differing Ideas on Detente 138
" 4.2. Some Characteristics of American Ideas on Detente in the Second
Half of the '70s 152 -
Chapter 5. New Trends in the American Policy of "Crisis Reaction" ('I'he =
Use of Force in Conflicts)
by V. V. Zhurkin, Doctor of Historical Sciences............ 169
5.1. Causes & Essence of Changes 169
5.2. Corrections of the Mid '70s 172 =
5.3~ The Positive Influence of Detente 177
5.4. Opponents of Detente & International Conflicts 179
_ 5.5. The Fight in Scientific Cir~les 180
5.6. Ideas on the "Selective" Use of Force 185
5.7. Ideologists of Negativism 192
5.8. Advocates of a Constructive Approach 195 -
- Chapter 6. Non-Military "Elements of Force" in U.S. Foreign Policy -
- by I. L. Sheydina, Candidate of Historical Sciences........ 199
6.1. American Capital Abroad.o 209
_ 6.2. The Role of the U.S. as a Source of Innovations &."Know-How"... 212
6.3. E~ort of Management 217 _
- 6.4. The Foreign Policy Role of Transnational Corporations.......... 224
6.5. Ideas on "Political `rrade" ....................................0 233
6.6. Ideology as an "Element of Force" 240
Chapter 7. Changes in International Relations & the Evolution of U.S.
Bourgeois Ideologists' Approach to Questions of the Ideolo-
gical Struggle ~
by D. V. Yermolenko, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences...... 247
7.1. The Crisis of Bourgeois Consciousness as a Reflection of the
_ General Crisis of Capitalism 247 _
7.2. Revitalizing Ideology in Foreign Policy 251
7.3. Plans for Exporting Anti-Cormnunist Ideology Under Detente...... 258
7.4. Efforts to Create a"New Foreign Policy Image" for American _
Capitalism 272
Chapter 8. Current Trends in Studying Problem~ of Securing Peace
by V. S. Anichkina, Candidate of Historical Sciences....... 279
8.1. The Search for a New Conceptual Base for U.S. Foreign Palicy... 286
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8.2. Some "Findings" of U.S. �~esearchers in the Beginning of the
'70s 290
.
~ 8.3. Reversal fro~ the "Cold War" to Detente & the "Theory of .
Peace" 297 -
8.4. Working Out Paths to Peace Under Detente 304 ~
Chapter 9. Global Problems of the Scientific-Technical Revolution & _
Their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy
by G. S. Khozin, Candidate of Historical Sciences......... 324
_ 9.1. Food, Resources, Energetlcs 330
9.2. Environmental Protection ~38
9.3. Conquering Space & the Pacific Ocean 345 -
Footnotes 365
~ Preface
_ Z't~~ goal the author's collective has set for itself in the present work is ~
_ to give a critical analysis of the latest concepts ~f U.S. foreign policy, -
their strategy and U.S. approaches to the competition between the two social
systems, to conflicts and their regulation uncler conditions of detente in
international relation.s and the continuing deep restructuring of these
relations. This restructuring is related to a weakening of the positions
of imperialism and the stronger forces of s~cialism and the revolutionary
and natio*?al liberation movement, to a deepening of the overall crisis of
capitalism and to the aggravation of interimperialist contradictions. It
= is characterized by the increasingly widespread establishment on our ~lanet
of the principle of peaceful coexistence as a norm for interrelations among
states with various ~ocial structures. ~ -
- It is noted in the decree of the CPSfJ Central Committee, "Qn the 60th Anni-
ver~ary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," that "In recent years
we have managed to achieve a positive change in the development of inter- -
nat~onal relations, a change from Cold War to detente, to the establish- -
� ment of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with various social
structures in the pra~tice of intern~3tional life. The threat of a world- ~
= wide thermonuclear war has been avertEd. International conditions have be-
come more favorable for peaceful socialist and communist construction and
for the development of the peop~.es' struggle for social progress. The
Soviet people have been working under peaceful conditions for more than -
thirty years. The international position of the USSR is firmer than ever.
The intern3tional authority of the Octobrist homeland and of other social-
ist countries has become even greater."*
*"On tiie 6Uth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," de~ree
- of the CPSU Central Committee of 31 January 1977, Moscow, Politizdat, 1977,
p. 19.
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It ~aas not out of good will or th.eir own inclinations that the leading
capitalist states and the most powerful of them, the United States of _
America, came to a recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence
which the Soviet state had been steadily advancing since the first days of
its existence, but because of the failure of the Cold War Policy which the
United States and its allies consj.dered to be an alternative to peaceful
coexi.stence.
But this so-called alternative amounted to attempts to impose on t~:~ whole -
world a oae-sided, ~urely imperialistic solution to problems, a solution
which satisfied only the United States and its main allies in the military
blocks. It not only did not solve a single truly world wide problem, not
only did not strengthen foreign political positions o~= the proponents of -
this policy, but placed the world on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe,
The belated recognition of this circumstance by the leaders of internation-
al, particularly American, imperialism led to a situation in which they =
turned from a policy aimed at remaking the world in keeping with their own
' ideas to a more realistic policy of adapting to the surrounding reality.
One of the first acts of this adaptation was the recognition by France, the
_ FRG, Gr~at Britain and the United States of the obvious circumstance that
in a i~uclear century there is no other basis for maintaining relations among
states with various socia'1 structures than peaceful coexistence. This point
has now been established in a number of bilateral agreements between socia~-
ist and capitalist countries and in multilateral international documents,
particularl.y in the final document of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe which was signed in Helsinki by the heads of states and
governments of 35 countries. _
The adaptation to the new world situation, which was noted at the 24th CPSU -
Congress as an important feature of modern capitalism, is taking place both =
in the area of pract~.ce and in the area of theory, including in the con-
cepts of foreign policy relations.
- Analyzing the causes and effects of the failures of U.S. poli.cy in the world _
arena, American theoriticians of these concepts try, by inventing new reali- -
ties, to work out principles, methods and means o� U.S. foreign political
ac~tivity which would contribute to increasing the American states' "ability =
to compete" in the new ~ituation or would at least prevent a deterioration
of its international positions.
= As a result of the activity of U.S. experts in international affairs who =
are employed in hundreds of scientific research institute~, universities -
and colleges, a certain "pool of ideas" regarding foreign policy questions
has been formed. The ruling elite draws from it the concepts that suit them
and seem promising. The enrichment of the state leadership with takes �
place not on'ly this way but also as a result of the fact that in recent
years experts in international relations are increasingly being enlisted
directly -in state service. This is more evidence of the fact that the
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- ruling circles of the modern American bourgeoisie are trying as never before
to take advantage of science to search for formulae for preserving the capi-
talist system by increasi.ngly turning to social�reformist activity within
the country and to revision of their entrenched traditional foreign policy -
- dogmas and conceprs.
But the U.S. ruling class p~aces bourgeois science in a truly irresolvable
dilemma: it must develop proposals for adapting best to the new alignment
_ of forces in the world arena and at the same time it must envision guaran- -
tees which, during the process of this adaptation, would make it possible
- to continue to pursue previous imperialist goals. It turns out, on the one
_ hand, that bourgeois science in ordEr somehow to approach reality, must
- recogniz~ the weakening of the possibilities of American imperialism in the _
world ar~na and, on the other hand, it must give this same imperialism new -
instruments, new foreign policy "levers" which would strengthen its possi-
bilities. And since various schools of theoreticians are working on various
_ aspects of this dilemma, based on various approaches to its resolution which
are to be found in the ccmmon "pool of ideas," foreign policy theories and
_ concepts are distingi~ished by an unusually contradictory naturt and some- _
- times are simply mutually exclusive.
= The groupings of bourgeois theoreticians who think more realistically are =
- trying to interpret more deeply the lessons of the recent past and are re-
commending that U.S. political leaders show restraint in foreign nolicy
behavior, drawing attention primarily to the ways and means of peaceful
- regulation of disputes. Theoreticians of a more adventuristic and militant
- type (and, unfortunately, these are in the majority since the U.S. "scien-
tific establishment" is strongly connectzd with the military and industrial F
complex and depends on i.ts generosity) are stubbornly clinging to the past
political practice of American imperialism and are trying to find instru- -
= ments of "politics of force" which would give the ruling circles the hope
of restoring lost U.S, positions. -
_ A large group of scientists who could justifiably be called "illusionists"
(they include many sociologists and workers in the area of international
= relations) try, by abstracting from dominant tendencies to araw pictures of -
a bright future with the "renewal of western civilization."
One must say that the cor.tradictions in American foreign policy, the zig-
zags in the direction of detente, are explained not only by the internal
= political struggle within the United ~tates itself regarding questions of -
restructuring their for.eign policy, but also by the fact that the American
leadership frequently moves from one foreigti political concept to another,
- more "fashionable" on~~ in the hope that the 1.atter will ensure results that _
are more favorable for the United States.
Investigating the new foreign policy concepts of the United States, the
authors of the monograph tried to single out precisely those problems which
= most fully reflect the development of the theoretical views which are re-
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- flected or c~n be reflected in the practical policy of the United States.
_ Here the authors proceed from the conviction that regardless of the degree
of continuity in the U.S. foreign policy (since, in principle, this policy
of theirs is formed on the broadest possible interparty basis), the very -
fact of the change in governmental administration in 1977, the transfer of
executive power from the hands of the ~t~publicans to the hands of represent- -
- atives uf the Democrat~c party, makes inevitable a certain ad3ustment in the
course of U.S. foreign Policy. And the events of 1977 and the first half of
1978 clearly confirm this. In the process of adjustment American foreign
policy theory exerts no small influerice on the development of Washington's
practical foreign policy. This pertains especially to President Carter's
administration because of two factors:
In the first place, ma.ny of the present high leaders of U.S. foreign and
military policy are themselves representatives of the American academic -
elit~: or are close to it;
In the secand place one should keep in mind that the American school of
theoreticians of the so-called realistic policy which has been most fruit-
_ ful in recent years has been closest to this present U.S. government which
represents the Democratic Party.
The chapters of the present monograph give something like "cross-sections"
of American foreign policy theory: concepts that pertain ta the interpre-
tation oi the current condition of the world, including primarily relations
between the United States and the USSR as well as their prospects and their
future development; other global problems facing mankind and the passibili-
- ties of American influence on ttieir resolution; ideas pertaining to norms-
tive statements .of U.S. foreign policy which still foster the hope of the
possibility of directing certain events along a pro-American course; and,
finaliy, the latesC propositions concernin~ instruments of U.S. influence, _
their degree of correlation among une another, and their practical uti.~iza-
tion in various foreign political situations of the last quarter of, the
20 th centuzy .
A number of_ points shared by the entire collective of authors runs through
- all chaFters of the work. These include, above all, the authors' convic-
- tion that the main direction of the theoretical research of American ex- -
- perts in international relations now amounts to fir..ding and implementing
_ concepts which would ensure the "survival of western civilization" in t'ne
- circumstances of the general crisis of capitalism, the colossal growtY! of
the forces of socialism, the eliminat;on of colonialism and th~ consr~lida-
tion of the international positions of developing countries.
The majority of formulas of this kind suggested by western theoreticians -
revolve around the idea of organizing some kind of western "club" of indus-
trially developed capitalist powers. According to these formulae, such a
"club" would be responsible primarily for solving its own problems (inter.-
nal economic and social instablity, international finances, coordination of
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- foreign and military policy, and so forth), and then to develop a coordi-
_ nated solution to problems of interrelations with developing countries and -
with countries of socialism. In order to provide for the creation and
functioning of such a"club " the majority of American theoreticians consider -
_ it necessary for the United States to change not only in words, but also in
deeds its hegemonic approach to its capitalist allies and to demonstrate its
readiness to act as equals with them in solving critical problems of the -
cpaitalist world. .
Another idea that is always present in the work of many [lmerican theoreti-
cians is the idea of the undesirability of nuclear war under modern condi- ~
tions. Bourgeois theoreticians arrived at this conviction by various paths:
some through the recognition of the barbarian, inhuman nature of such a war;
others on the basis of pragmatic calculations which show that the strategic
parity between the United States and the USSR which exists at the present _
time makes it hopeless and suicidal for the United States to use an instru- ~
ment of nuclear war.
On the basis of the more or less unanimous opinion about the undesirability
of nuclear war and the need to avoid it, academic circles of the United
States are formulating and actively and broadly discussing a promising zp-
_ proach to problems of detente. The majority of American theoreticians con-
sider detente a postive phenomenon which not only does not conflict with the ~
interests of the United States, but, on the contrary, is the only possible
= course, the only realistic one for them in the modern "multipolar world."
As for the specific ways and means of implementing the policy of detente,
the limits of detente, the spheres of cooperation and the spheres where ~
ideological, economic and other kinds of oppositions between the two systems _
remain, there is a wide range of opinions which is reflected in the corres-
ponding sections of this book.
_ Very many U.S. foreign policy theoreticians see a pana*~ea for saving and
even strengthening U.S. foreign political positions in the so-called iion-
= military factors of force engendered primarily by the results of the scien-
tific and technical revolution. It is precisely w~th the help of su~:h "fac-
tors of iorce" as exporting technology and "know how," modern managerial -
skills, the occupation of strong positions in the area of moder_r ~ommunica-
tions systems, transnortation, information processing equipment and large
- undertakings in the area of mastering space and the world ocean that Ameri-
- can leadership hopes to obtain a disproportionately great influence in
solving global problems which are becoming increasingly crucial for mankind
--problems of energy resources, raw materials and foodstuffs.
In essence the thought of western theoreticians is tending more and more
toward finding some form of coordinating the strong positions of the United
States, western Europe and Japan in the area of the latest technical equip-
ment and technology with the strong positions of developing ~ountries which
have natural resources that are in short supply and colossal res~rves of
manpower. Here American foreign political thought persistently point~ to
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the need for immediately stepping up the activity of the West in t.his area
and imposing i~s own solutions on the world while it still has the technical
and industrial might, before the increasingly strong unity of world anti- ~
imperialist forces makes the implementation of these plans impossible. _
Another favorite idea of American theoreticians is that, despite a certain
devaluation in the modern "geopolitical situation" of :nilitary force (inclu-
ding the military force of the United States itself), despite certain inter-
national documents that make it incumbent upon the states to refrain from
using force or the threat of force in international relations, the factor of
the threat of force must still remain in the arsenal of American foreign ~
- policy as a most important instrument of influence. Since the ruling cir-
cles of the Unit~d States think that when there is strategic parity the ba-
sic strategic nuclear force of the United States is not effective enou~ht to
be used directly against those who are still called the "main potential ene-
my" in the works of American theoreticians, the United States is steadily ~
- developing complicated conceptual schemes that are to reveal the process
- for using partial, "marginal" advantages of ~ncreasing this force or of
using it for diplomatic "trade" pressure at the negotiations table. If
Washington's policy which gave the United States the role of the world po-
liceman is bankrupt (because of Washington's excessively zealous and "ill-
- considered" attitude toward the fulfillment of this role), is there not a
possibility--American theoreticians think--of "selectively" acting with the
help of "mino r force" in various "peri~heral" regions in order to accumulate
certain strategic advantages.
Such are the general fundamental concepts that are most frequently encoun-
tered in the essays of modern U.S. foreign policy theoreticians. -
The authors of the monograph think that, despite the "innovation" and "rea- _
listic nature" of a number of concep ts, ve,:y many U.S. foreign policy theo- -
reticians still live with the baggage of p~tst years and are sustained by
ideas of "Ame~ican excellence", "imperial America" in a word all that that
_ so typically embodies thE "American dream" which is now having a kind of
_ second birth in the United States, despite the complete lack of correspon-
dence between surrounding reality and this chauvinistic "dream."
Zfiis illusion of "American excellence" and American omnipotence is, perhaps,
_ the main obstacle to strengthening a truly realistic, sober approach to
reality both in American theory and in U.S. foreign political practice.
But, as the monograph shows, in American political science a certain amount
of progress has still been made in the direction of a realistic stance as
compared to those positions which the majority of its representatives held
- in the 1950's and 1960's.
" The authors of the monograph hope that the research offered here will serve
to provide the Soviet reader with a more profound famil~.arity with the pro- _
cess of the formation ot modern U.S. foreign policy.
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Chapter l. American Ideas on International Relations in the 1980's and
_ 1990's.
= It is not only the position ~.t occupies in the system of existing inter- -
national relations that is important for a state's foreign policy. A cor- _
rect idea of the prospects for its evolution as well as of the general
- directions of change within ~he system of worldwide relations itself is ~
also important. ~
Because of the fact that the United States is the leading state in the capi-
_ talist world, accounting for about 30 percent of the gross national product
of the countries of the capitalist world, the question of the position and
role of the United States in the future system of international relations
as well as the interpretation by American scientists and politicians of this
role and the prospects for its evolution are extremely important fnr pre-
dicting the foreign policy of the United States.
The goal in the area of a state's for~ign policy, as in any other sphere of
human activity, is the result of sub~ective ideas about the dESired condi-
= tion of one system of relations within whose framework this activity takes
place. Additionally, when investigating the foreign policy of the American
state it Ls important to reveal the true, and not simply the officially
_ declared goals since these declarations frequently serve only as a decorous
camouflage for the policy that is really being conducted.
In order to revea.l these true goals and desires it is necessary first to
analyze carefully the state's practical activity in the international
arena. As for long-range goals, in addition to analyzing the general ten-
, dencies arising from the practice of implementing the bourgeois state's
foreign policy, a good deal of advantage can also be gained by studying the
_ views of bourgeois theoreticians of foreign policy. This is related to the
fact that in the stage of the formation of the foreign policy under condi-
tions wtiere certain concepts have not yet become official doctrine and prac-
tice, theoreticians of the bourgeois state when determining its "national
goals" must come to a fairly frank and frequently fairly pointed discussion -
in order to find the variants of the optimal strategy. ~
It is possible to single out the most representative directions from the
totality of ideas, concepts and predictions of the development of the system
of internaticnal relations that are presented in the works of American re-
- searchers. This can be d,~ne, first of all, in keeping with the prir.ciple
of the attitude of one author or another ~r groups of authors toward the
- future role in the system of international relations of individual states -
that are participating in this sytem. When the analysis is more detailed it
- is important to classify various views with respect to the states and the
various combinations of them whi~h, according to these views, will determine
the basis of the structure of international relations and the hierarchy of
these relations.
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In this stage the following approaches of American bourgeois authors to the
= future system of international relations are outl3ned:
variants on the theme of the "five-power" structure which presupposes the
existence in the world of five main "centers of power" which determine in-
- ternational relations;
- variants on the structure of ir..ternational relations which divide ~tates
:tnto two major groups of three;
various variants of a"multipolar" with a significant number of "regional -
- centers of force" and a developed "multilayered" hierarChy;
variants of the "polyarchichal system" of even more complex and confused -
configurations with ties and interests of an ever increasing number of
subjects of international relations which overlap and interweave with one
- another. =
- In addition to the classification of predictions and concepts concerning the
_ development of a system of international relations based on differen~ces in
the structure of the system, there is also another approach. It presupposes -
separating out the main axes of opposition in the world policy around which _
various groupings of states 3rrange themselves. In the works of bourgeois
= s~.holars there are, in particular, such lines of confrontation as the oppo- ~
si.tion between capitalist and socialist states ("East-West"), the struggle
_ within the capitalist camp i~self ("West-West"), analysis of the confronta-
tion of "industrially developed powers" with developing countries on a non- -
ideological basis ("North-South"); a more complicated variant of this as-
- pe~t of relations is the description of the situation in the form of a =
"triangle": "industrial democracies of the G1est" (including Japan)--"the -
communist world"--developing countries. ~
As for the role and position of the United States itself in one configura- _
- tion of the future system of international relations or another, they are =
- revealed in these constructs both directly and indirectly; the latter means
that the future role of the U.S. can be determined by the role assigned to
other subjects of world policy in one variant of the international system
= or another. This is expressed more directly in the evaluations from spe- -
cialists of the degree of desirable activity of American foreign policy on =
the global and regional levels, the volumes of resources that can be alot- _
ted for implementing the foreign policy and also the evaluations of the re- _
lationships among various means and methods which can be used by the coun- -
try's political leadership.
_ When considering these constructs of American foreign policy theoreticians
it is most expedient to take as the initial axis the approach which is
based on the classification of possible structures of international rela-
tions--differences in ~ietermining the number of major subjects of these re- -
lations, their relative power, degree of influence and so forth. The point
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_ is that it is precisely one or another structure of the syst~~m of inter-
national relar_ions that basically determines the processes and phenomena
' taking place in this system.
When analyzing these concepts, which a~ first glance seem extremely far
- from the daily routine of American policy and diplomacy, one must also not
- lose sight of the chain of intermediate elements that link the vision of ~
_ the future world (and thus, as was already noted above, the long-range
goals of the U.S. foreign political s~rategy) with the political goals and
tasks of a lower level (in terms of both temporal and spatial parameters)
and with the entire totality of the state's activity that is called foreign
- policy.
Proceeding from a Ma.rxist-Leninist materialist understanding of history
(including politics), when analyzing American predictions one should con-
- stantly keep in mind that ~hey are subjective and arbitrary, based on
bourgeols methodology, and, consequently, they are a distorted interpreta- -
tion of those objective processes and Thenomena which are taking place in
international relations. At the same cime the ideas of American scholars "
concerning the future of international relations and the condition of the
world are still not a direc~ indication of what the U.S. foreign policy
= will actually be. So when approaching the subject of investigation of this `
chapter one should constantly be aware of the distinctions between: .
th~ objective development af international relations (including the evolu-
tion of the economic and military potentials of individual states;;
Che reflection of this evolution in the awareness of bourgeois scholars
_ and political activists who try to guess the future of international rela-
tions of the basis of analysis of objective tendencies; ~
the long-term foreign political planning, that is, the activity of the
- normative policy which consists, to a significant degree, in that, on the -
basis of sslection of the optimal (from the point of view of one or another
~ concrete grouping of the ruling class or leading circles as a whole) con-
figuration of the future system of internati:onal relations they earmark and -
carry out goal-directed efforts of the state in the world arena which are
intended to contribute to the evolution of international relations in the
direction of the formation of precisely this c~nfiguration.
In addition to all tl:at has been said once you take into account the fact
that the ideas of the future system of international relations advanced by
- various American authors are in the stage of development it is as though -
they are being superimposed on one another. It frequently turns out that
the authors of these ideas claim that they will be applicable for American r
foreign policy for a period of 7-10 years, but the ideas become outdated
rapidly and can not keep up with the development of events even after 2 or
3 years.
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_ An effect is also pruduced by the struggl~ ainong various influential groups
concerned ~~ith foreign political problems in the political arena within the
United States--a struggle during whose course one idea or another is formed _
not as a re:>>ilt of opposition concerning questions that really relate to
- content and principles, but largely under the influenc~ of competitive pro-
pagandistic influenc~s.
Ideas of a"~ive-Palar" World Structure
During the first third of the 1970's in the ~?n=;.~ed States the prevailing
discussion revolved around the idea advanced by certain bourgeois political
scientists (in particular such as M. Kaplan, W. Kintner, H. Kissinger and
others) concerning changing the system of international relations from a
condition of "bipolarity" (that is, a stru~gle between the USSR and the
United States ar_d the groups of states headed by them) to a Gondition of ~
, "multipolarity." These authors assigned the roles of the main "characters"
in this new structure to the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Western
~urope (usually the nine countries forming the European Economic Community)
. and Japan. Around the variants of the "distribution of force and influence"
- amon~ ~hese major "centers of force".(taking into account their ability to -
' attract developing countries to their side) a considerable number of Ameri-
can theoreticians also constructed their own variants of the future system
of international relations. r
One easily notes t'nat this statement of the ptoblem of the structure of in-
ternational relations manifests the initial theoretical and mett?odological
~ premises of many bourgeois political sci~~ntists who are following the tradi-
tions of the so-called school of political realims. It is typical of this
area of bourgois political theory to bring to the fore such a category as ~
a state's "power" even though this concept is used separately from the main
content of any political process. In other words, these scientists do not
show a desire to look far anough beyond political phenomena to the patterns
of socioeconomic development and class contradictions in the world and in .
individual countries.* All this is inevitably reflected in their specific
predictions and ideas as well.
* For a more detailed critique of the ideas of the school of "political
realism" see: "Amerikanskaya istoriagrafiya vneshney politiki SShA. 1945-
1970" [American Historiography of U.S. Foreign Policy. 1945-1970J, Moscow,
- Nauka, 1972, pp. 56-90; "Sovremennyye burzhuaznyye teorii mezdunarodnykh
otnosheniy. Kriticheskiy analiz�1 [Modern Brougeois TlZeory of International _
Relations. A Critical Analysis], Moscow, Nauka, 197F, pp. 24-30; V. F.
Petrovskiiy, "American Foreign Political Thought," '~~EZHDUNARQDNYYE OTNO-
SHENIYA, 1976, pp. 74-92; H. S. Ytogimrnlco, "SShA:' politika, voyna, ideo-
logiya" [The U.S.A.: Plitics, War, Ideology], Mos.,~ow, Mysl', 1976, pp 121-
127.
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The differences that exist in the research of bourgeois authors concerning
the future role of the United States in intErnational relations pertain, -
- first, to the number of "centers of power" that are singled out; second,
- their distribution in terms of their degrees of influence in various regions _
of the globe and third, th~z evaluation of the predominant form and means
of foreign political influence of each of the main sub~ects of international
relations.*
As the first variation of t~,ie possible new system of international rela-
tions (whose appearance, in the views of a certain group of American poli-
tical scientists, was projected approximately for the second half of the
1970's) one can consider the scheme of the five aforementioned counter-
- balancing "centers of power" which, according to the authors of this scheme,
- were to have had approximately equal influence in international affairs.
_ The relative comparability of the influence of each of these major subjects
of international relations was arrived at on the basis of predictions by a
number of bourgeois authors concerning the strengthening of the military
and political positions of Japan and Western Europe.** For example, as
_ W. Kintner (Director of the Institute of Foreign Political Research, Phila-
delphia) tries to show in his work, the aforementioned variant would signify
a greater degree of stability in the entire system of international rela-
tions than it now has.
Supporting W. Kintner's reasoning, a professor at Chicago University, M.
- Kaplan, considers it a condition of the stability of this "five-polar"
system of the world for each of the main "centers of power" to have suffi- _
ciently reliable strategic forces. This author supposes that this means
that such strategic forces should be uncoordinated so that there will be an
unconditional possibility of causing the enemy "unacceptable harm" through
- a counter ("second") attack. Still M. Kaplan recognizes that it will be an
*It should be stipulated that the variants of the future system of inter- _
national relations and the roles of the United States in them which are be-
_ ing analyzed in this work are presented in general form and do not include
the directions of evolution of individual subsystems of the system of inter-
national relations.
**It should be taken into account that these predictions were made back when -
Japan had initialed but had not ratified the Agreement on Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Arms and the questions the creation of Japanese nuclear forces ~
in the medium-range or long-range future was discussed with varying degrees
of frankness not only in the U.S., but in Japan itself. True, the over-
whelming majority of specialists, when evaluating Japan's scientific-tech- -
nical and economic capabilities, expressed serious doubts and even an un-
doubtedly negative attitude toward the strategic and foreign political ex-
pediency of such a step. See, for example: Kasak, M., "Japan's Nuclear -
Option" in Superpowers in a Multinuclear World, Lexington, 1974, pp 91-103.
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- extremely long time before the creation of such strategic forces for all
three potential "centers of power" (Japan, Western Europe and China, es-
- pecially if they ~ievelop independently without support from outside) and
- that only the Soviet Union and the United States will have such forces for
a l~ng time to come.l
Those who hold this view think, not without reason, that in such a system
of international relations both Japan and the combined Western Europe would -
_ deoend much less on the U.S. and therefore certain additional political -
problems would arise for the latter. Nonetheless such theoreticians think
that under these conditions many elements positive for the U.S. would ap-
pear: these two ''centers of power," with the corresponding American policy
could remove part of the "burden" which the United States claims to bear
throughout the world and would make it possible to reduce the degree~of `
direct confrontation between the U.S., on the one hand, and the Soviet
. Union and China, on the other. This is what M. Kaplan writes in this con-
_ nection (particularly about the future role of Western Europe which would
have combined nuclear forces): "this Europe would undoubtedly play an inde-
pendent role which wou].d create both economic and political difficulties -
for the United States. On the other hand, such a nuclear Europe would
lighten the U.S. burden of expenditures on the arms race, would help the
Americans to solve a number of problems throughout the world and would re-
duce the possibility of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the
_ United States. Moreover, such an independent and powerful Europe could be-
- come t'.::: only guarantee of Israel's survival and an important obstacle to
trar.sforming the Mediterranean Sea into a Soviet lake."2
These A~nerican authors actually do not camouflage their desire to achieve
- (with the help of the formation of the structure of international relations -
_ they propose) military and political encircletnent of the Soviet Union.
~ Interpre*inn tn their ocan way the ~rowing night and influence of the Soviet -
_ Union, they are achieving a return (althou~;h in changed, less Americanized
form) to the idea of "restraining" the USSR.
This kind of task is also being set with respect to PRC. W. Kintner, in
particular, asserts that in a"stable five-polar world," the "ambitions" of
the Soviet Union and China will be limited because of a deep and all-perva-
sive conflict bet~�een them and also because of the fact that other "centers ~
of pok*er" w:ill be located next to these countries: Western Europe--next t~ -
the Soviet Union; Japan--next to China and the USSR. "In the event of a
bilateral conflict between Western Europe and the Soviet L)r~ion, China and
Japan, the Soviet Union and Japan, both Western Europe and Japan will try
to gain the support of the United States," asserts Kintner.3
_ From this idea of Kintner's it follows that in sui.h a"five-polar" configu- _
- ration of the world they intend to retain for the United States the role of
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_ the major "center of influence" among the other conflicting and competing
"centers of power."*
The same role is also alloted to the madel of th~, "tri-polar" structure of ~
international relations which is supposed to be cnaracteristic of the period �
from the end of the current decade until the beginning of the next one (USSR
--USA--PRC). �
During the:period of transition from the "tri-polar" to the "five-polar"
condition, American authors foresee the possibility of increassd inter- ~
national instability which is fraught with new conflicts and critical situa-
tions. But this instability, according to their convictions, will be tempo-
_ rary and should not irspede the transition of international relations to the
more stable "five-polar" condition. Here they reco~end only that one recog- -
nize the inevitability of a"transition period" and ddapt American diplomacy
to it as well as possible. Moreover certain American researchers try to em-
- phasize that the main source of the instability during the "transition
period" will be the strained relations between China and the Soviet Union.
It should be noted that on the whole the judgements of American theoreti-
cians and specialists concerning relations in the "triangle" and the "pent-
angle" are based on the idea that the confrontation between the PRC and the -
USSR will continue during the predicted period and they fairly consistently -
count on taking this into account as much as possible when implementing
- American foreign policy. -
In this regard, the statement of the influential American senator R. Taft
on the pages of the NEW YORK TIMES seems quite frank: "We must make it
clearly understood that in the event of a struggle with the Soviet Union we
will be prepared to render active diplomatic and material support to C:zina
with 'the present alignment of forces in the world it is extremely nec-
essary for divisions of the Chinese army to remain on the Soviet border."4
- At the same time the shortcoming of the "tri-polar" balance of powers, in
the opinion of a number of American researchers, consists in that the en-
listment of the United States in "tri-polar" diplomacy can lead to under-
- mining the "special" relations between the U.S. and their "natural al:lies."
- This U.S. policy, as J. Newhouse writes, will contribute to a peace similar
to the peace of Palmerston's Great Britain, which "had no allies, but only
*It should be stipulated immediately that the various American authors cer-
_ tainly do not all have the same attitude toward "stability." For example,
the group of authors of the annual report of the Brookings Institute con-
cerning U.S. national priorities draw the direct conclusion that the acqui-
sition of nuclear arms by Japan and the FRG would undermine the influence of
"moderate political groups" in these countries and would contribute to the
growth of nationalism, which can disturb the stability of the international
system in a direction that is clearly disadvantageous for the United States.
(See, for example: Setting National Priorities, FY 1974, Washington, 1973
p 393) .
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interests."5 He thinks that under these conditions irreparable harm could
come to U.S. relations with Japan and Western European NATO countries.
ThP lack of confidence on the part of tne main American allies in the "tri-
pclar" diplomacy conducted by the U.S., in the opinion of certain research-
ers, can be eliminated if the United States offers these states active as-
sistance ~n the matter of creating powerful "independent" armed forces and
also takes advantage of' a complex of broader political-diplomatic and eco-
nomic measures.
With respect to Japan M. Kapan wrote in 1973 that her indepenrlent acquisi-
tion of strategic offensive nuclear arms "will seem politically less useful
- i*~ the next ttve years, unlikely in the subsequent ten years and almost
natural in the following twenty years when the second postwar generation _
comes to power."6
Les~ categorical in his conclusians is the eminent specialist in Asian
problems, R. Skalapino, who considers such a reversal in Japanese policy
~ to be only one of the alternatives of what he calls the "policy of Gaulism -
- on Japanese soil." He recognizes this policy of a Japan that is natxonal-
i~tic, more active and independent of U.S. international activity to be ex-
tremely probable (although not at all necessarily related to her acquisi- .
- tion of nuclear weapons}. Skalapino writes that with such a policy the
~?uestion of nuclear arms can remain open for a long time if the Japanese
government adopts the formula "acquisition of nuclear arms minus two."
This means that, if necessary, Japan could create these weapons two years .
after a final decision about this has been made.~ ~
American authors base the possibility of Japan's changeover to st~ch a poli-
cy primarily on the idea that for her a military and political union with
the U.S. is gradually losing importance and there are increasing doubts '
~ about the readiness of the U.S. to meet its commitments in Asia, especially
after the defeat in the Vietnam war. It has also been pointed out that in
the foreseeable future Japan can no longer continue to carry out its own
economic expansion without creating significant armed forces.
In this connection Kintner wrote: "In the distant future it seems unlikely
_ that Japan will rely exclusively on the United States in questions of her
security. Is it possible for Japan to become even more powerful without
acquiring coiamensurate armed forces. The alternative of unarmed neutrali-
ty is unlikely; it is considerably more possible that, with time, Japan -
will try to win an independent military position." Kintner also thinks
~ that nuclear weapons could become the most important element of these in-
dependent forces of Japan."8
But what can be said about the degree of probability of the realization of
the prediction about the formation in the 19$0's and 1990's of a"pent-
angle" with a domi.nating role in the military and power relations among the
- "centers of power" that constitute it? -
I
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~ One can assume that the idea of su~h a"five-polar" system of world politics
is rather the result of imagination than of even a slightly scientific ;even
on the basis of bourgeois methodology) analysis of the future of interna-
tional development and the de~elopment of individual countries participating -
_ in the worl.d system of states.
The events of 1973-1977 showed that the predictions of the establishment of
a"pentangular" world were not justified. In the 1970's, despite great _
difficulties and fairly frequent diversions, there has been development of
_ the process of international detente, which leads to a redsction of military
= and political tension among the leading states of the world. Japan has not -
only not advanced along the path of acquiring nuclear arms, but, on the
contrary, in 1976 ratified the Agreement of Nonproliferation of Nuclear -
Weapons. In terms of its rates of development, western European economic
~ and political integra~ion is far behind all projections that were made
= earlier. It should be considered unlikely (no matter how desirable for
many bourgeois scientists and U.S. political activists) that present Peking =
leaders will maintain such an unrealistic approach to Si:ZO-Soviet relations
~ --an approach Which opposes the essential interests of the Chinese nation.
� In the policy which American authors, from the standpoint of desirability
of creating a"pentangonal" world, recommend for the United States can not
be seen as anything but extremely irresponsible. Such a policy would un-
_ doubtedly ogpose the interests of the Soviet Union which would be bound by
~ another hostile encirclement and a more intensive strategic arms race.
i Taking into account the growing power and influence of the USSR, one can
_ consider that the Soviet state would not allow the development of inter-
national relations to proceed along such.a path.
Predictions.of the establishment of a"five-polar" world and the correspond-
ing recommendations for U.S.~foreign political strategy, from the moment of _
their appearance, met with active criticism on the part of many eminent
American international relations specialists. ~
The most well known were the arguments of Stanley Hoffman, a professor at
= Harvard University. His polemics with the autltors considered above is so
~.~ell developed and interesting that it deserves to be presented in detail.
Hoffman thinks that a,system of political equilibrium based on several ap-
_ proximately equally si~7nificant "centers or power" was justified in the
18th and 19th centuries., "It was sufficiently flexible for maintaining
100 years of world peace~ after the Congress of Vienna, despite significant
changes in the relative power and fates of the main active forces," writes
Hoffman.9 And here he considers the question of whether or not it is pos-
- sible to create such a system under modern conditions, whether at the pre-
sent time there is a tendency toward the formation of a new "balance of
powers" on the "five-polar" basis discussed in the predictions considered
above.
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Hoffman thinks that the "balance of forces" doctrine is a model of "stra-
tegic-diplomat{c behavior" in which the core of the foreign policy of each
of the main states participating in the system of international relations
- is milita~y force. Moreover this military force should be more or less
- equally distributed among the states. ~nly under these conditions can
- there be a balance of the "centers of power" when there are about five of
thc~m. But Hoffman goes on�to note only two states--the USSR and the USA--
are "world powers" which are involved in various kands of problems every-
where in the world; and China is "still a region~l power" and, because of
- tier internal weaknesses, it will still be many years before she gains the
= ability to act in world politics on a level with the USSR and th~ USA al-
though, in the eyes of certain people, she will be a potential superpower.
y In iIoffman's opinion, there are no serious indications of the fox~ation of
two other "poles." Both Japan and Western Europe depend on the United
States for military support. Despite their immEnse economic power, not a
single one of these poles conducts itself on the strategic-diplomatic
- chessboard as it would if it intended to play a world role under the Ameri- -
- can "nuclear umbrella." Japan does not even have a clear-cut regional
policy. Western Europe as a"consolidated center of power" is a"promise
and not an actual political formation."10 -
- Hoffman explains the impossibility of creating a mechanism of the "balance
of powers" similar to the mechanism of the 19th century also by the chang-
ing nature of the foreign p4litical power of the state under modern inter-
national conditions as compared to any other period in the past (which, in
- our view, is more important than the circumstances enumerated ~bove).
Hoffma.n thinks that military force with opposing parties acquiring nuclear
weapons has lost its significance as a basic instrument in political ex-
pansion. It can not serve as a"regulator of balance" since to avo3.d an _
all-destructive nuclear war has become one of the main goals of the state's
policy. Moreover, in Hoffman's opinion, in the foreseeable future the
USSR and the USA will retain their overwhelming military superiority over
all other states of the world. "The main mechanism of restraint," writes
- Hoffman, "will apparently retain its bipolar nature for a long time to _
come. Only the iJnited States and the Soviet Union have the capability of
destroying one another, while France, England and China can only cause -
- serious harm to a superpower, but in so doing they will either subject
themselves to complete annihilation or will cause irreparable losses."11
The danger, according to Hoffman, is that such a"five-polar" world could
hardly be any more stable. He notes that perhaps on a strategic level of
"five strategic foxces," comparable in terms of this level could be
"stable." Each "potential aggressor" would be restrained if not by the en-
_ tire coalition, then by some third party that would provide a guarantee -
for a possible "victim" and by the forces of the "victim" itself. But, in
- Hoffman's opinion, the situation has this appearance only at first glance. -
When carefully considering this potential world one must take into account
the fact that in strategic planning and military-political activity of -
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the States there is a good deal more indetermination which will constantly
urge them to step up the arms race.
Ideas of a"Trilateral Community of Developed Countries"
Many other American authors have expressed and cor_tinue to express doubts
= about the probability of the realization of pr,enictions concerning the a.-
pearance of a"five-polar" world vhat w~.th the daminating influence of r~F
military and strategic factor. Several other ideas about the future sj?s-
= tem of international relations are advanced in this connection. A certain
_ part of the critics thus reject the idea of the appearance of five main
"centers of power," but emphasize the lack of uniformity in the distribu-
tion of individual components of "power" among ~hese centers. Thus, for
example, a professor at the University of California, Robert Skalipino,
Zbigniew .Brzezinski --current dssistant to President Carter for questions .
of national security who at one time held the post of director of the Ir..sti-
tute of Problems of World Development (Columbia University)--and several
other American authors have advanced the idea of two "power trianglE~":
- "military-political" made up of the USSR, the USA and the PRC, and the
"political-economic," including Japan, the European Economic Community and
the USA.
As was noted in the predictions at the beginning of the 1970's, Japan and
the western European countries that are members of the EEC are capable of
achieving a status of leading "centers of power" without exerting any sig- ~
nificant efforts in the area of creating a strategic arms potential compar-
- able to that of the USSR and the USA primarily on the basis of accelerated _
economic growth. It was asserted that the United States, even though it e
_ would surpass Japan and the EEC countries in terms of its economic power, -
- would nonetheless gradually lose its dominating position in the economy of
the capitalist world and would assume a position of "first among equals." _
Represen~atii*es of this approach to the prospects of the development of the
~ system of international relations have noted that a reduction of the eco-
- nomic disparity between the USA and the two other "centers of power" iri the _
capitalist world will lead to significant changes in their political rela-
tions. With respect to Western Europe, for example, Z. Brzezinski wrote
~ in 1973 that "it is being established as a political force," "is developing
its own political view of the world," and there i~ no reason to think it
_ probable durin~ the next ten years Western Europe will be able to become
a source of great source of "great tension and more significant conflict _
_ with the United States than those states with which we now have primarily
antagonistic relations."12
Points of view like this led to the corresponding goal-directed recommenda-
tions regarding tasks of U.S. foreign political strategy for the 1970's.
These recommendations from this same Z. Brzeziaski and also from such
specialists in international affairs as, for example, Henry Owen (Brookings -
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= Institutej and George Ball, Deputy Secretary of State in the governments of
Kennedy and Johnson, consisted primarily in that the United States must make
= a much greater impact on the development of relations with western Europe
as a potentially politically integrated unit and Japan whose influence is -
increasing.
The ~aonograph of the Brcokin.gs Institute entitled "The Next ~hase in
Foreign Policy" formu'_ated the main long-term goal of the United States as
follows: "To create an active ~community of developed nations which would
include the Unite~l ~tates, ~destern Europe ancl Japan should be our primary
task. Economics is the are3 in which such a community would most probably
take on certain features."13
This empasizes ~~ow impor~ant it is for the United States to concentrate
farpign political efforts within the framework of precisel.y this "political -
' and economic triangle" and not in a"military and political" one. More-
_ over, during this period of time American proponents of such an approach
- thought that the United States should not be against a"natural" relative
_ redur_tion of the U.S. political role within the framework of this "tri-
angle." In all of the starements on this subject by Z. Brzezinski, H. -
- Owen and people with similar opinions they relied consistently on raising
the level of equality of Western Europe and Japan with respec*_ to the U.S.
in the development and adoption of the most important foreign political
decisions and on the creation not only of a mechanism of regular political
consultation within the "triangle," but also on "general political plan-
ning."14
Such an approach on the part of the aforementioned specialists kept in mind
both the actual alignment of forces which existed in 1973 between the U.S.
_ and its main capitalist competitors and those predictions that were made
at that time concerning~the medium-range and long-range future. At that
time many American politicians were impressed by Japan's growth rates
which were unusually high for the capitalist world and also certain
achievements on the part of countries of the European Economic Community
(whose members increased 6 to 9 in 1973). These American political scien- ~
tists were more ready than ever before to recognize the equality of their
allies. This was also a result of the consequences of those defeats (the -
- greatest was in Vietnam) which the U.S. sustained on the world arena when
claiming the role of the single leader of the capitalist world. But with-
in several months events took place which were in no way anticipated by
any predictions of American specialists in international affairs.
The war in the Near East in October 1973, the energy crisis, the world
crisis of the capitalist economy of 1974-1975 and a number of other impor-
tant events (mainly in the political and economic sphere), on the one hand,
contributed to further concentration of the attention of American special-
ists on relations among leading capitalist countries and, on the other,
led the United States to regard the possible hierarchy of these relations
in a different way. It became obvious to them that, despite a certain
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reduction in the disparity in economic might and political influence be-
tk*een the United States and the leading countri~s of Western Europe and
Japan, these countries could not do without reliance on the United States
in situations that are most critical for the capitalist world both econo- ~
mically and politically.
In 1976 this same Brzezinski emphasized that neither Western Europe nor
- Japan was prepared to deal with either traditional or new global pr~blems
as "equals" with the Un.i*ed States.
_ ' He noted that of all the developed capitalist countries only the United
States could submit far-reaching proposals to the UN regarding the crea-
tion of a"new economic policy," while France, trying to take the initia-
tive in 1976-1975 in solving the problem of providing the world capitalist
economy with raw material, was forced to look constantly to the U.S. "The
economic difficulties experienced by developed industrial (capitalist-- -
- A.K.) countries, especially because of the rise in p~ices of oil produced
by OPEC, emphasized in the important economic and political role of the
United States, assigning it an undoubtedly more fundamental position than
it had during almost 20 preceding years."15
Such an eminent American specialist in the area of economic strategy as
Fred Bergsten considers this problem in the same foreshortened time seg-
ment. He thinks, in particular, that since a period of stagnation has
- come in the development of integration processes in the EEC because of the
collapse of the notion of creating a"currency finance union," the United
States will again break out in front* as compared to other "centers of
power" of the capitalist world.i6 On the whole the idea that the United
States will emerge from the crisis with relatively fewer losses than the
other countries and thus strengthen its positions vis a vis its partners-
competitors is being advanced ever more frequently by American political
scientists.
~J. I~ye, for example, notes that in the second half of the 1970's the dollar
= remains the "key currency" of the western world, despite the fact that the
entire currency and financ~ system of capitalism has undergone significant
changes and is no longer controlled, as before, by the United States. Nye
also emphasizes that the U.S. economy is three times more powerful than
*At the same time Bergsten draws attention to the marked strengthening of
th e economy of the FRG within the framework of the Western European econo-
my. Economically, West Germany has become not only a European, but a -
world power," he emphasizes. Because of this Bergsten recommends stabili- -
z~.ng the situation in the world capitalist economy and in political rela-
tions of the capitalist world--primarily on the basis of cooperation: the
American dollar and the West German Mark. (Bergsten, C. F., New Era, New
Issues Economic Impact, 1975, p 17).
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that af Japan and four times more powerful than the conomy of the FRG--
their closest competitors and that the superiority of the United States _
- over. other capitalist states in the military and political area remains
- absolute.
~
All this enables J. Nye to draw the conclusion that, although the "tradi-
_ tional hierarchy of s~ates has weakened," the U.S. can remain at the top
of this hierarchy (of states ~f the nonsocialist world), even if it is no -
longer "capable of hegemony."17
- One should recognize that there is a certain amount of justificati~ri for ~
such hopes. What with the increased dependency of all developed,capitalist
countries on foreign sources of raw material and the sharp increase in
prices of raw materials, the position of the U.S., which has its own raw
material base, looks relatively more favorable, particularly in the Iong-
range future. American political scientists also note that under the con-
~ ditions of the militar.y and political crises, the United States will be
less vulnerable to interruptions in supplies of imported raw materials -
than western European countries or Japan will be.
Thus is the American economy depends on imports to satisfy only one-third -
of its need for oil, Japan imports almost 100 percent and the c~untries of
western Europe--an average of 97 perc:~nt. Even with accelerated develop-
nient of petroleum deposits of the North Sea, this will cover no mere than
15-20 percent of the needs of western Europe by 1980. The picture is ap-
proximately the same with respect to other main ki.nds of raw material for
industry: while the United States depends on imports for an average of
15 percent, western Europe imports 75 percent and Japan, 90 percent.
There are also certain differences in the geography of the sources of im-
~ ported raw material: most of the petroleum for Japan and western Europe .
- comes from the Near East; for the U.S. a considerable proportion of the =
imported petroleum comes from Venezuela and Canada. Canada and the coun-
tries of Latin America are also sources of many other kinds of raw material
for American industry. The main region for importing non-energy raw
material for western Europe is Africa and for Japan--Asia and Australia.
- At the same time American authors emphasize that of all this group of de-
veloped countries only the United States has the corresponding armed
forces (primarily naval) which could "ensure the protection of sea coramuni-
cations" during wartime. This thus emphasizes the direct dependence of
the countries of western Europe and Japan on "military support" from the _
U.S. even under conditions of one regional conflict or another and not
just a"central" conflict directly on the European continent.* It is
_ *It is significant that it is precisely in the U.S., with the selective
y petroleum boycott and the sharp increase in petroleum prices, that there
is public discussion of the probability of armed seizure of the petroleum
deposits of the Arab countries.
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~
_ natural that all these kinds of predictions and calculations play into the
hands of the hegemonistic ideas of American foreign policy.
Everything that has been ~aid clearly shows that the idea of creating a
"community with equal rights" in the form of a"political and economic tri-
angle"OOthe.U.S.-the EEC-Japan--is gradually subsiding into the background.
Moreover the "triangle" itself is looking increasi.ngly doubtful (as was
noted above, Bergsten, for example, talks about strengthening U.S. ties not
with all of the EEC, but primarily with the FRG).
In all American ideas about predictions of establishing a"community of
developed industrial countries" there are also many weak places. But the
central problem which is not solved in any of these variants of such a
policy, regardless of how skillful it may be, is the problem of inter-
imperialist contradictions in both the economic and political spheres. _
The Marxist-Len~nist approach to the problem of interimperialist contra-
dictions under conditions of increased power of the forces of socialism
requires a concrete accounting for the relationship between centrifugal and -
centripetal tendencies in the capitalist world which are an objective fac-
tor in the policy of any imperialist state.
Considering the specific international politi.cal situation in the middle
of the1970's, one can state that U.S. relations with their major partners
in the capitalist world stabilized to some degree (when Western Europe and
Japan did not have enough strength to decisively challenge the United
States). At the same time it seems that such a stabilization is particu-
larly temporary and unstable to the degree that not a single serious Ameri-
_ can reseracher can now bring himself to predict the possibility of radical
improvement in future American-Western European or American-Japanese rela-
tions.* Moreover, many of them note that a number of new problems have
appeared in the international arena, in terms of which western European
countries and Japan are adhering to a line that is at cross purposes with
the course of the United States.
~ Under these conditions the very idea of a"political and economic triangle"
with equal rights was deprived of any real political or economic basis.** _
*See, in particular: Atlantis Lost: U.S. European Relations After the
Cold War, N.Y,, 1976. Not one of the ten eminent American theoreticians
represented in this collection (including S. Hoffman and Z. Brzezinski)
believes in the probability of a cardinal improvement in American-West
European relations.
_ ~*In this connection one cannot but pay attention to the predictions that
have appeared recently which depreciate the future economic role of Japan
which, as a result of the world crisis of the capitalist economy in 1976- -
1975, lost much of her "dynamism" and had to face fully the most critical
economic problems. (See, for example: Ranero, R. The Pacific Basin. An
- Overview of Economic and Political Factors. RPA Series, N 3/75, May 1975,
pp 35-36. -
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Tr~ie, some U.S. theoretir.ians, havir.g undersCood the hastiness of their
ideas of this "triangle" of the U.S.--the EEC--Japan as a system of tri- -
lateral political and economic cooperation still try to insist on the idea -
of this "triangle" if only in its ideological aspect, emphasizing the need
for "solidarity of actions" of the main representatives of "western civili-
zation" in the face of the "attack of international communism." This idea
- was developed very persistently in 1975-1976 by the U.S. Secretary of State
_ at that time, Henr;~ Kissinger. But even on this plane where the community
of clas~ interests of the countries of capitalism is undoubtedly manifested
with special force, the partners of the U.S. are no longer displaying their
former zeal to render unconditional support to the U.S. which would make it
- easier for the latter to manouver in the political "triangle" or, as it is
called, the "triangle of rivalry" (USSR--USA--PRC).
The rebuff with which Washington's policy of detente was met in the capi- _
tals of a number of countries of western Europe, the clearly expressed
readiness of the governments of these countries to implement the provisions
of the Final Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
_ Europe, the development of contacts between the EEC and the CEMA, the nega-
tive attitude of many influential factions in the ruling circles of western
European countr~.es toward Washington's intervention in the intrapolitical
struggle in these countries--all this shows the stronger independence and
initiative of the foreign policy of these countries. And this, in turn,
r~akes the implementation of hegemonistic American schemes presented under
the label of "equal rights" even less realistic.
= Variants of the Systems of "Regional Multipolarity"
In connection with the U.S. loss of a number of international positions and
the manifest crisis in their global strategy, many American international ~
affairs experts are turning their attention to the need to strengthen U.S.
positions in individual regions, trying this way to find a combination of -
forces in one region of the world or another which are most advantageous
_ for the U.S. ruling circles.
On the whole this variant of the future system of international relations
= could be called (in keeping with the classification presented at the begin-
ning of the chapter) a sys~em of "regional multipolarity." _
U.S. academic and political circles began to discuss most actively various
variants of the development of this system and especially of its subsystems
- in 1972-1973. Tn the first stage of the appearance of predictions of
"regional multipolarity" they first turned their attention to the appear-
ance of regional "balances of forces" comprised mainly of the same compo-
nents that comprised the global "pentagonal" structures considered above.
Thus, in particular, in keeping with this approach it was predicted that '
- China would h3ve an extremely appreci.able role, although not a world role
- but a regional one with Japan's necessary participation in the "~ocal
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balance", "strengthening its position vis a vis the Soviet Union and the
United States which would gradually lose their influence although it would
- remain on a fairly high level for sometime to come."18
Japan's influence in tliis zone, as predicted by American specialists,
should spread in the 1980's not only because of economic and other kinds of
penetration into the countries of this region, but also as a result of the
formation of someth3ng like the European Economic Community under the
aegis of Japan. Thus Japan's influence in the Pacific Ocean-Asiatic re-
gion (as predicted by H. Kahn, for example) could surpass the influence af
the United States even in the next 10-20 years.l9
From the standpoint of U.S. interes~s the undesirability of the evolution
of the situation in Asia in this direction is obvious and many American
researchers have turned their attention to this dreums'tance. They have
- warned U.S. political leadership about this. The eminent American politi-
cal scientist, Morton Halperin, for example, stated: "American officials
must recognize that American-Japanese relations are more important for -
them even than relations between the U.S. and China. Japan's hostility
toward the United States in the 1970's will be a greater threat to Ameri-
can security than the policy of China. And economic relations between the -
United States and Japan are considerably more essential than anything that
can be achieved on this plane with China." Therefore Halperin insists
that all "future meas~ires on the part of the U.S. with respect to China
should be undertaken only after consultation with Japan and should include
an evaluation of how the problem of China affects Japan's intrapolitical
situation."20
American researchers assign the same kind of role of "regional balancers"
for the other region of the world to countries of Western Europe where
they, together with the USSR and the U.S., are to form another "regional
political configuration." Thus proponents of this view of the future
- structure of international relations recognize the preservation of the
global role of only the SovieL Union and the United States in international
- affairs. `
But while recognizing this kind of role for the Soviet Union (along with
the U.S.), American theoreticians still try to combine this recognition
- with recommendations to Washington which are directed toward preventing
the Soviet Union from increasing its strength both in the European-Atlantic -
= and in the Pacific Ocean-Asiatic region. In particular, while estimating
highly the possibilities af strengthening the role of the Soviet Union in
the Pacific Ocean zone not only in terms of military-political, but also
- in terms of political-er_onomic parameters,* certain U.S. specialists are ~
'i *'Phrough the development of the resources of Siberia and the k'ar East and
the activization of foreign economic t3es between the Soviet Far East and
Japan, Canada, the U.S. and count~ies of Southeast Asia. ~
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making a number of recommendations for U.S. foreign policy which would li-
cnit Soviet influence in this region even by strengthening the positions of
- the main competitor, U.S.--Japan, and also through developing relations
~ along the line of U.S.--PRC.*
_ !~n increasing number of U.S. bourgeois s~ientists in their investigations
of the role of "regional forces" in future international relations go even '
further and think that, in a number of regions of the world, the influen-
tial "regional forces" along with the major five "centers of power," will
be states that are capable of exerting essential influence on the situation
in their region, including influence on the positions of the leading powers.
Among these countries they include India--for Southern I~,sia; Iran, Saudi
_ Arabia and Israel--for the Near East; Brazil and Argentina--for Latin
t~merica; Australia--for the southern part of the Pacific Ocean basin; the
_ Republic of South Africa--for South Africa, and so forth.21
As one can see from this list, the majority of the new regional "centers of -
power" are developing countries. So that an analysis of the ~,redictions of
~ the growth of these new influential su~~~~ts of international relations is
of considerable interest from the standpoint of understanding the U.S.
apprnach to the role of developing countries in future international rela-
- tions as a whole. -
The number of predictions on this subject in American research has in-
creased considerably in recent years, especially sincF: the end of 1973.
And while before this time certain bourgeois scientisl~.s in the United
States criticized with some justification both political scientists and
American foreign political leadership for underestimating this problem, at
the present time it is clearly one of the primary ones in the process ~f
conceptual interpretation of long-range problems facing the ruling, circles
of the U.S.
The most serious bourgeois researchers are increasingly considering these
problems not so much on the plane of a transfer of the center of gravity
of "world confrontation" from the axis of "West--East" to the axis of
_ "North--South" as, to an eve~ increasing degree, on the plane of a more
differentiated attitude toward various regions and individual countries
that are included in the category of developing countries.
, In this connection it is significant that they divide developing countries
into the "third world" and "fourth world" and even the "fifth world," as
J. Ba1122 did in his last work, instead of including all these countries
into the single category of "third world" which was the case in bourgeois
political literature up until recently. -
~~For more details about this see: "Politika SShA v Azii" [U.S. Policy in
' Asia," Moscow, "Nauka", 1977.
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- In keeping with the new classification, a number of bourgeois political
scientists include among countries of the "third world" those developing
countries which have large supplies of minerals and the corresponding hu-
: man resources. On the basis of exports of raw materials, which are becom-
ing increasingly advantageous what with the rise in prices or the estab-
lishment of new prices for raw materials, these countries are capable of
accelerating their economic development and, in a number of areas, "chal-
lenging" developed capitalist countries. These political scientists assert
that the most typical example of this category of countries is provided by
the developing countries that export petroleum--OPEC members. _
- The "faurth world" includes the remainder of developing countries which
are extremely varied in terms of their socio-economic and demographic indi-
cators but which are united by the fact that on their territories there
are no large supplies of minerals that are of significant interest to the
world capitalist economy, primarily the economy of the U.S.* Therefore
the economic development of this group of countries is a considerably more
difficult matter for bourgeois scientists than the development of countries
of the "third world."
c_
, Therefore in the majority of prognosticatory investigations it is recom-
mended that the main attention be devoted precisely to the emerging "cen-
ters of force of the middle level" and that they be considered while they
are being utilized in an area that is advantageous for the United States.
G. Liska, for example, recommends that American political leadership create
regional "balances of power," relying precisely on these kinds of "centers
- of power" in the corresponding regions, even helping them (within certain
limits) to increase their influence in the region by suppressing other
_ smaller states which are thus less important for U.S. interests.23
The most indicative approach on the part of American political scientists
to the future "center of power" of the middle level consist in their lon~-
term predictions a~~ut the development ot Brazil and their corresponding
recommendations.
The immense territory of this country, its rich natural resources, its
_ large population and its high rates af economic development--all these
place Brazil in a special position not only among the Latin American
countries, but also in all of the "third world." Evaluating Brazil's -
*J. Howe, a leading worker of the research organization called "Council
Eor Overseas Development," includes in the "fourth world" 46 developing
countries, of which 25 (according to UN evaluation) are among the least
developed in terms of their level of per capita income, illiteracy and
Ievel of industrialization (see: Howe, J.W. "Power in the Third World,"
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall, 1975, pp 114-115).
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future, Z. Brzezinski wrote: most likely Brazil will enter or al-
ready has entered the process of transformation into a leading force in -
Latin America and, obviously, into a source of future tension in this
= region. Brazil will crowd the United States out of Latin America in the
extremely near future. So this element should be an important considera-
tion in determining American relations with Latin American states."24 ~
When developing his ideas about Brazil in the more distant future, Brzezin- .
- ski noted that this country has greater chances of becoming a new "super- -
power" than Japan because of its optimal combination of population, re-
= sources, geographical location, and so forth.
Other American specialists in Latin America also rate Brazil's potential
role highly. Thus Robert Alexander, President of Rochester University,
~ writes: "At least by the end of the century Brazil will be one of the
leading powers of the world. Its population will reach 200 million and it
- will be one of the main industrial countries of the world. In all proba-
bility it will become a nuclear power. It is unlikely that Brazil will
refrain from using her economic, political and military might."25 The -
director of the Center for Latin American Studies of John Hopkins Univer-
sity, Riordin Roett, considered it necessary to note that in his opinion
Brazil is a"serious candidate" for becoming one of the great powers. He
thinks that historically Brazil is already prepared for her future role -
and that the growth of this country's power will most likely be accompanied
by a"more aggressive and autonomous foreign policy."26 _
What conclusions do American specialists draw on the basis of these pre- -
dictions of Brazil's development? .
The most commonly shared conclusion consists in the need for the political ~
leadership of the United States to recognize the growing role of this
state in Latin America and also more broadly in the region of the South
Atlantic before Brazil herself forces the United States to do this. And
- having recognized this, the U.S. must contribute to a certain degree to
strengthening her influence in the region in areas which, in the final
_ analysis, are most advantageous for the U.S. One of these areas can be
considered to be the newly advanced idea of creating a kind of NATO in the
South Atlantic--a regional military and political organization without the
direct participation of the U.S., in which Brazil would play a leading
role. The direction of this idea is fairly obvious: the projected block
would be called upon to serve as a means of suppressing national liberation
movements in South America and South Africa.
Those in the U.S. who defend this idea clearly have in mind primarily the
_ community of class interests of American and Brazilian monopolistic circles
and of a number of other Latin American countries and the UAR which would
be included in the new block.
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_ It seems, however, that if this union were ever to be created in one form
or another it does not at all follow that it would necessarily be fully
responsible to American intentions. The community of class interests of
potential p~rticipants in the new block and those of the United States does
not preclude the possibility of the appearance of situations o~ critical
conflict in their interrelations, related primarily to the competition for
regional influence and, apparently, the cor.flict between ~3razil as the
proposed "regional leader" and the United States could become much more
complicated and critical than, say, the situation which exists in the
relations between the U.S. and Japan and the U.S. and Western Europe.*
It is quite obvious that the predicted U.S. reliance on new "centers of
_ power" of the Brazil type in and of itself will in no way contribute to an
overall reduction of international tension. Such a policy, on the con-
trary, is more likely to be an impetus for stepping up the regional arms
race.
And taking into account the possibility that certain regional "centers of
power" will acquire their own nuclear weapons, one might fear that new
centers of the most critical international conflicts will appear to the
degree that their danger goes beyond regional frameworks.
The "Polyarchic" Model
Even during that period of the 1970's when many American international
_ affairs specialists were discussing the future structure of the "multi-
polar" world, in the U.S. there appeared works which drew attention to
other aspects of the development of the system of international relations
in the 1970's and 1980's and beyond.
_ The authors of these works, recognizing that since the end of World War II
the structure of relations in world politics has undergone large changes,
thought that international relations of the future would be neither "bi-
_ polar" nor "pentagonal" but would gradually take on a less clearly defined
configuration. This system of international relations with many active
subjects whose interests with respect to a large group of problems are
interwoven is called "polyarchic" by a number of American authors, that is,
*Regarding this problem in a broader, social content, one can fully agree
. ~;~ith Prof. G. Mirskiy, who writes that "the formation even of capitalist
relations in a number of countries of the 'third world' will not lead auto-
matically to the strengthening of the world capitalist 'center'; 'centers'
_ of international capitalism will still have to deal with the problems of
- the 'periphery,' even that part with itself is proceeding along the capita-
list path." (Mirskiy, G., "The Changing Face of the 'Third World'," KOM-
MUNIST, 1976, No 2, p 115).
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uncler the influence of a number of independent "centers" and their diverse
- interests. -
This group of American scholars thinks that the persistent tendencies in
the changes of the concept of "power" in international relations is the
source of the "erosion" of the hierarchical structure of the relations
among states.
= Simon Brown, one of the leading.workers of the Brookings Institute, con-
siders the relative reduction of the role of the military factor in the
state's foreign policy to be one of the essential features of the emerging
new international system. In the opinion of this author, military force
and its direct application in this system of international relations will
_ play an important role in local conflicts and its application in these
_ kinds of conflicts will be increasingly short-lived with increasingly
_ limited (tactical) military and political goals. Qn the whole, S. Brown
concludes, "Military force will not have any practical application in ~
daily political transactions."27
The eminent American investigator, Stanley Hoffman, who was already men- -
tioned above, considers the changeover to the new nature of political re- -
lations to the changeover in foreign policy from a game on one strategic
and diplomatic chessboard to a game on many chessboards at the same time.
Tn his words, this is partially the result of the "nuclear blind alley"
and also a product of economic and social processes and scientific dis- -
- coveries in a world which is "interested in economic growth."28
A reduction of the role of the military factor in the future, not only on -
the nuclear level, but also on the level of ordinary armed forces, is re-
lated by certain American investigators to the fact that the Soviet Union
is "expanding its global possibilities in subnuclear military technolo-
gy�"29 And just as the USSR has managed to equal American strategic forces '
with the might of its nuclear missile forces, thus changing the signifi-
cance of the military factor in international relations, so in the area of
ordinary nonnuclear armamemts it will be able to achieve the same thing in
- the near future. These authors have in mind primarily the Soviet naval
fleet which has entered ocean expanses and "shown its flag" in regions of
the world which in the past were under the exclusive control of naval
forces of the U.S., Great Britain and ot~ier capitalist ~ountries. In this
connection, these authors continue, the growing possibilities of the use
of Soviet military power on a global scale have a tendency to impede poten- ~
tial American military action at various points on the globe; for example,
the Soviet naval presence in the Meditteranean Sea forces the United States
government to think twice before taking any action like the landing in -
Lebanon."30
- These remarks show new features of the thinking of a number of serious
bourgeois international affairs experts who have been able to rise above
_ 30
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the propagandistic cliches about increased "Soviet military threat," which
are still widespread and are constantly being renewed in U.S. academic and
political circles, and arrive at an evaluation of the existing parity of
the military potentials o.f the two leading powers as a factor contributing -
to the stabilization of modern international relations.
_ Relying to a certain degree on such ideas about neutralizdtion of American
= military power by the military power of the Soviet Union, these authors
_ justifiably speak about the extremely probable increase in the role of non-
, military fa~ctors in international relations--multifaceted trade and econo-
mic activity, scientific-technical and cultural ties.
These authors and also many other specialists, with a certain amount of
justification, draw attention to the growing role in c~orld politics�of -
global human problems which in their essence require large-scale coopera-
_ tion among countries, including countries which represent various socio-
economic systems and political groupings. These problems include rational
utilization c.f natural resources, protection of the environment on a world
wide and on a regional scale, the assimilation of the resources of the
_ Pacific Ocean, the fight against diseases, the solution of the world food
problem, and so forth.
"Recent years have demonstrated the growth of the number and spectrum of
- problems on the foreign policy agenda. Moreover, traditional ideas about
national security do not correspond to the new conditions. Protection
- from military threats will remain a major problem 3n foreign policy, but
national security can also be threatened by events outside the military
and pol~tical sphere. The melting of the Arctic ice cover, the destruc-
tion of the ozone layer, the leakage of radioactive wastes or the relent-
- less growth of the world population can threaten the security of Americans
(and other peoples) just as seriously as events which might arise in the
traditional military and political area," write Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye. 31 -
S. Brown thinks that the increased importance of these problems and prob-
lems like them will lead to an erosion of all existing coalitions that
have been organized on the principle of coincidence of military and poli-
tical interests of states. In this connection he takes a stand against
ideas of global or regional "balances of power." He also warns against
overestimating the potential of various combinations of countries that
export raw materials and are formed to a considerable degree after the
example of OPEC. Brown thinks that these cartels will not be formed
stabily enough to take on the role of consolidated subjects of interna-
- tional relations since each me~ber of such coalitions will have strong
ties with countries beyond its borders (political, economic, scientific-
technical, and so forth) which will literallp dissect the unions formed on �
the basis of any ki.nd of particular interest.32
31
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Brown predicts a general growth of interconnections among individual na-
tions and states in terms of an increasing group of problems, both tradi-
tional and new ones. Taking this into account, he calls upon American
diplomacy to be more flexible and refined, to pay attention to the entire
- complex of scientific and technical factors, and to rely less on crude
military force.
The growing interdependence among states and the diversification of their -
international activity, mainly under the influence of the scientific and
technical revolution which leads to a transformation of the structure of
relations in the world, are also noted in the works of a number of other
bourgeois American researchers. This subject is the leitmotif of the
works that became known in 1974-1975 in the U.S. and other capitalist
countries such as "The Management of Interdependence" by P4ariam Kemps,
the speech of the American Association for Assistance to the U.N.,
"Science and,Technology in the Age of Interdependence" by Richard Falk,
"Modernization and Transformation of International Relations" by Edward
Morse, "Goals for Mankind," and a number of others.33
All of these works of bourgeois international affairs experts recognize the
increased vulnerability of the United States with respect to the external
- world and contain suggestions regarding optimal defense strategy, from the
_ point of view of the interests of American imperialism, and'in many cases
also anti-offensive strategy, which under all conditions is oriented to-
ward at ~east the retention of the socioeconomic and political status quo
in the world. Moreover, in the majority of the aforementioned works the -
authors mask ideas about retaining or restoring U.S. "leadership" with
concerns about "general human interests in an irterdependent world."
In particular, in a speech entitled "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence"34
a professor of the P~assachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Bloom-
field, emphasizes the impossibility of cardinal changes in the area of eli-
minating U.S. dependency on the outside world. As a result, L. Bloomfield
concentrates attention on the way the United States could most painlessly .
- adopt to the existing situation and euen take advantage of it for a certain
- improvement in its international positions.
T. Bloomfield sees a threat to the long-range interests of the U.S. in the
attempts on the part of certain American circles to achieve self-sufficien-
cy. He calls upon the American government to be guided by "norms of modera-
_ tion, cooperation and reduction of tension." He comes out against those
postulates of foreign policy which were advanced by the Republican adminis-
tration of President R. Nixon and oriented the U.S. toward a struggle for
obtaining unilateral advantages, toward conducting "trade wars with allies,"
confrontation with countries that produce raw materials, and so forth. -
In Bloomfield's opinion, counteractions by interest countries would cause
significant harm to American interests what with the increased vulnerability
oF the U.S; moreover, this course would threaten the proceas of detente
- 32
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which is vitally necessary for the U.S. if it understands, finally, the
limitedness of its possibilities in the world arena, particularly with
_ re~pecC to the confironta~ional aepects of ite.policy.
L. Bloomfield is in favor of taking the following measures:
- "modest" and gradual elimination of those political circumstances in the
U.S. which most greatly threaten the enlistment of countries in any new
conflicts, including a certain (already partially carried out) reduction of
the U.S. "naval presence";
a reduction in the level of the overall U.S. "limited presence" in the eco-
nomic sphere (both state and private) through the exercise of direct govern-
mental control over all kinds of limited investments, similarly to the way
American foreign economic ties with socialist countries are regulated; on
the whole--to spread the system of state regulation of the activity of mono-
polies that exists within the U.S. to the sphere of international activity
of transnational cooperations; -
_ the conclusion of a series of international agreements for trade in raw
m~terials which fix the prices, volumes and conditions for sale, which
would mean a departure from the present practice which relies on purely
_ market mechanisms in international trade in raw materials;
expansion of ties between the U.S. and major exporters of petroleum by en- _
listing them in portfolio and even direct investments in the American eco-
- nomy and increasing the sales of American machines, equipment, and "know
how" to these countries.
Bloomfield does not stop at calling for more active consultations among
leading developed capitalist countries on a permanent basis (as other Ameri-
can political scientists have done before him repeatedly); he also con-
siders it inadmissable for the United States to talce unilateral uncoordi-
nated steps. He is in favor of strengthening direct and indirect support
- from the United States for Japan and major Western European countries in
order to reinforce the regional influence of the latter by taking advan-
tage of the "diplomatic aktivs" of these countries in the corresponding
spheres of international relations.
S. Brown also devotes much attention to U.S. relations with developing
capitalist countries "under new conditions of interdependence." He should -
apparently be considered to be one of the main proponents of the idea of
the "polyarchic system." He emphasizes that during the entire foreseeable
~ future the U.S. should proceed from the idea, that despite a possible im-
provement in the economic indicators of its major capitalist partners in
the future, the main source of international political influence of the
latter will continue to be their position in world trade wnile the United
States will remain the ma.in source of capital, the country wi~:: the largest
gross national product, the most advanced technology and "k:now how" and,
consequently, the actual leader of the "western world." Bu* Brown, like
33 ~
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Bloomfield, considers this "leadership" not from the standpoint of strength-
ening one hierarchy or another in international relations, but from the
point of view of new nonmilitary "parameters of force and influence," whose
acquisition and development should become the primary task for the U.S.
- Thus they are speaking about taking into account as much as possible all
aspects of relations in the new "polyarchic world" and the best way of
utilizing them in the U.S. "national interest."
When evaluating the predictions and ideas of the development of the system
of international relations that are considered in this chapter, one can
note that in a relatively short time interval (approximately since the end
of the 1960's) extremely marked advancement has been made in the leading
directions of American bourgeois research on the problems under considera-
tion. The evolution of these ideas proceeded, to a significant degree,
along the path of complication of ideas about the future system of inter-
national relations both in the sense of the possible organization of the
system itself and in the sense of accounting for an increasingly broad
group of factors that influence its functioning. A decisive influence on
the formation of these ideas was exerted by further advancement in the
alignment of forces between capitalism and socialism in favor of the lat-
ter, successes of developing countries in strengthening not only their po-
litical, but also their economic role in the world arena and also the cri-
sis of the world capitalist economy in 1974-1975 which was the most pro-
round in all of postwar history.
- "The sharp reduction of production and the increased unemployment in the
majority of capitalist countries," noted L. I. Brezhnev in his accounta-
bility report to the 25th CPSU Congress, "were interwoven with serious
repercussions for the world capitalist economy as the currency, energy
and raw material crises. Inflation made the processes of the crises even
more acute. Activated by constantly growing military expenditures, it
reached dimensions that were unprecedented in peace time."35
The circumstances of this crisis again clearly reveal the essence of the
imperialist foreign policy which is determined not by any diffuse "national
- interest," but by the class structure of the cap.italist state and thP in-
terests of the ruling monopolistic circles. .
The greatest shock to the world capitalist economy during the entire post-
war period along with the weakening of U.S. international political posi-
tions almost everywhere and the considerable erosion of their positions as
_ an economic leader of the capitalist world caused the ruling circles of
the U.S. to deal more seriously with the problem of coordinating economic,
political and military aspects of the foreign political activity of the
American state, devoting increasing attention to central economic problems.*
*In this connection, the former U.S. trade minister, P. PetersonT rephras-
ing a well-known statement of Clemenceau ("War is too serious a matter to
34
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The ideological basis of the U.S. foreign political strategy also was
given a nsw impulse (for more detail about this see chapter VII). -
As a result, in the U.S. academic elite that is closest to the country's
ruling circles, if there was no real unity of views (incidentally, inter-
nally they are fairly contradictory and much is still unclear), at least
the differences in the ideas of the emerging new structure of international
relations were reduced somewhat. Here it is worth gi~~ng special mention
to the rebirth of ideas about the "inevitability of the U.S. retaining
leadership" with respect to Western Europe and Japan although, of course, ~
this leadership is now interpreted in a different way than it was in the
1950's. American theoreticians also achieved a certain unity of opinions
regarding the i.ssue that within the system of international relations of
the United States priority should be given to relations with states of the -
"same type of civilization" and, as was noted above, actually on the basis
of American superiority.
Still, the picture of future American relations that is drawn by official
American political scientists is such that it automatically leads to the
idea that the main way of supporting U.S. foreign political interests
should be the policy of a"balance of forces," that is, a policy based on
_ the traditional imperialist principle: "divide and conquer." Such an
approach is especially typical of predictions of the evolution of inter-
national relations (in keeping with U.S. policy) with countries of the
"third world."
On the whole, the normative aspect of the majority of American predictions
of the evolution of international relations is subordinated to the goal of
retaining the socioeconomic status quo in the world by allowing a certain
restructuring of the hierarchy of relations in the capitalist world. This
restructuring is envisioned in the form of its complic.~tion, the appearance
of new levels and elements (in particuiar, division of c.~eveloping countries -
into the "third world" and the "fourth world"). American forecasters also
allow the possibiZity of a certain reduction in the distance between the
U.~, and individual states or blocks of states of the nonsocialist world,
alttiough it is not as significant as imagined by many American political
scientists even two or three years ago. -
But the most typical feature of American analysts engaged in predicting the
, evolution of international relations in the future up to the end of this -
be left to the generals."), stated: "Trade is too important a problem fcr
- its solution to be entrusted to ministers of trade, and finances are too =
important their their problems to be solved by finance ministers, and, no
- doubfi, energy problems are too important for their solutions to be left ~
only in the hands af minister.s of energy." (Peterson, P., The New Politics
of the Emerging Global Economy Pacem in Terris III, Wash, Wash., -
October 8-11, p 6).
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century and beyond consists in that they essentially always try to circum-
vent the problem of the development of relations between the two social
systems--socialist and capitalist--and in their predictions the least atten-
tion of all is paid to precisely the social and class future that is re-
lated to the competition of these two systems. And of course they remain
in the positions of their class; especially its monopolistic elite.
But, obviously, it is precisely because of the need to construct "variants _
of the future" that are purely optimistic for this class that bourgeois
` theoreticians deal completely abstractly with those aspects of the world
class antagonism which comprise the axis of modern international relations,
since a realistic account of these factors would inevitably reveal how far-
fetched and unilaterally tendencious their schemes anii constructs are.
~ FOOTNOTES
- 1. SALT: Problems and Prospects, N. Y., 1973, 23-25. _
2. 0~. cit., p 23-24.
3. W. ICintner, "Arms Control for Five-Power World," In: SALT--Implica-
tions for Arms Control in the 1970's, Pittsburgh, 1973, p 172.
4. NEW YORK 'rIMES, 1974, July 30.
_ S. J. Newhouse, Cold Down. The Story of SALT, N.Y., 1973, p 271.
- 6. SALT: Problems and Prospects, N. Y., 1973, p 25.
7. R. A. Scalapino, Asia and Major Powers. Implications for Interna-
tional Order, Washington, 1972, p 18.
8. W. Kintner, Op. cit., p 173-174.
9. S. Hoffman, "j~~eighing the Balance of Power," In: The Great Nixon
Turnround, N. Y., 1973, p 272.
_ 10. Ibid., p 275.
11. Ibid., p 276.
12. Z. Brzezinksi, "The International Community in the Next Two Decades
~ (June 1973)," In: Appendicies. Commission on the Organization of
Government for Conduct of Foreign Poli~cy, Washington, Vol 1, 1976,
p 15.
13. The Next Phase in Foreign Policy, Washington, 1973, p 356.
36
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14. Z. Brzezinski, "The International Community p 724.
15. Z. Brzezinski, "American in a liostile World," FORFIGN POLICY, No 23,
_ 1976, p 93.
16. C. F. Bergsten, "New Era, New Issues," In: Economic Impact, 1975, �
p 16. -
- 17. J. S. Nye, "Independence and Interdependence," EOREIGN POI,ICY, Spring _
1976, p 142-143.
~ 18. W. Wilcox, "Forecasting Asian Strategic Environments for National
Security Decision-Making," RM-6154-PR, The RAND Corp., June 1970,
p. 11.
19. H. Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, N.Y., 1972, p 2G6.
20. The Next Phase in Foreign Policy, Washington, 1973, p 24.
21. CM.: "Second Sinoptic Context for Discussing the 1970's and 1980's,"
Hudson Institute, 1972; FOREIGN SER9ICE JOURNAL, March 1973, p 8; G.
Liska, "The Third World: Regional Systems and Global Order," In:
Retreat from Empire?, Baltimore, 1973, p 286; R. Alexander, "The
Growing Gap," In: National Strategy in a Decade of Change, N. Y.,
1973, p 86-87.
22. CM.: C. F. Bergsten, "The Threat from the Third World," FOREIGN
POLICY, No 14, 1973; World Politics and International Economics, Wash-
ington, 1975; B. Manning, The Conduct of U. S. Foreign Policy in the _
Third Century, N. Y., 1976; G. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World.
An American Foreign Policy, Boston, 1976.
- 23. G. Liska, States in Evolution. Changing Societies and Traditional
" Systems in World Politics, Baltimore, 1973, p 153. `
24. Z. Brzezinski, "The International Community in the Next Two Decades," -
In: Appendicies. Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, p 14.
25. R. Alexander, "The Growing Gap,r'tdational Strategy in a Decade of
Chan e, Lexington, N. Y., 1973, p 87.
26. R. Roett, "Brazil Ascendant: Internatiozal Relations and Geopolitics
in the Late 20th Century," JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall .
1975, p 139.
27. S. Brown, "Changing Essence of Power," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1973,
_ p 290.
37
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28. S. Hoffman, "Choices," FOREIGN POLICY, No 12, 1973, p 5.
'L9. ORBIS, Vo~ XIV, No l, Spring 1970, p 25.
= 30. V. Basuik, Technology, World Politics and American Policy, N. Y., -
1977, p 13.
" 31. R. 0. Keohane and J. S. Nye, "Organizing for Global Environment and
Resource Interdependence," In: ~pendicies, Commission on the Organi- ~
zation of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Washing-
ton, Vol VII, 1976, p 40. -
32. S. Brown, "The Emerging World Polyarchy," In: The Next 25 Years,
Washington, 1975, p 93.
_ 33. CM.: M. Kemps, The Management of Interdependence, N. Y., 1974; Sci-
ence and Technology in the Age of Interdependence, N. Y., 1975; R. A. ~
_ Fa1k, A Study of Future jdorlds, N. Y., 1975; Goals for Mankind, N. Y.,
1977.
34. CM.: "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence," The Department of State
Special Report, No 17, July 1975.
35. "rlaterialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of tha 25th CPSU Congress],
Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 28.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "NauY.a", 1979
11772
cso: isoo
38
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~
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTERNATIONAL
N. N. INOZEMTSEV ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
M~oscow LEIJINSKIY KURS MEZHUUNARODNOY POLITIKI KPSS in Russian 1978 signed
to press 10 Oct 78
' [Table of contents and brief description of book by N. N. Inozemtsev] _
_ [Excerp~s] Title Page:
Title: LENINSKIY KURS MEZHDUNARaDNOY POLITIKI KPSS (The Leninist
Course of CPSU Foreign Policy)
Publisher: "Mysl
Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1978
Signed to press date: 10 October 1978
Number of copies published: 42,000
; Number of pages: 206 -
Brief Description:
- In this wor.k N. N. Inozemtsev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences'
Institute of World Economics and International Relations, examines the
main directions of foreign policy taken by the CPSU and shows its indis-
soluble connection with the basic aims worked out by V. I. Lenin. `t'he
grow~h of the world revolutionary procesa is analyzed. Questions af the -
further realization of detente, the reinforcement of political detente
with ~iilitary detente, and the strengthening of international cooperation -
in the field of economics are examined.
Table of Contents:
- Introduction 3 -
Chapter 1. Leninist Theoretical Bases of CL~S~ Internationa~l
- Policies 10
39
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, Chapter 2. World Socialism--The Decisive Factor in Social
Progress. The Growth of Fraternal Friendship,
Strengthening of UniCy and Solidarity of the
Socialist Coun*_ries 28
Chapter 3. The Soviet Union and the Fight for Freedom and ~
Independence for the People 56
Chapter 4. The Policy of Peaceful Coexistence of States !
With Different Systems in Action. Normalization
of the International Situation. The Growth of
' Soviet Cooperation With Capitalist and Developing
Countries 91
Chapter 5. The Soviet Union in the Vanguard of the Fight for -
Strengthening International Security, Realizing
- Detente and Ending the Arms Race 146 '
Chapter 6. Socialism and the Growth of International Economic
Cooperation 181
_ COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl 1978
CSO: 1800
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REGIONAL -
_ BOOK ANALYZES CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM PREACHING
Moscow MUSUL'MANSKAYA PROPOVED' (t~uslim Preaching) in Russian 1978 signed to
press 22 Aug 78 pp 1-4, 77-80
[Annotation, table of contents, author's comments and conclusion from book
published by Politizdat Publishers, 100,000 copies]
[TextJ Every year the ministers of the Muslim cult de-
liver hundreds of sermons in rhe mosques. Their subject
varies, but the goal is the same: to inspire believers -
with religious ideas, to convince them of the co'rrectness
of the Islamic dogma. In the book, Candidate of Philo-
sophical Sciences N. Ashirov critically analyzes Muslim
picaching of the last few years. Revealing their character
_ ancl ideological trend, the new tendencies in the preaching
- activity of the Muslim ministers of the cult, the author -
makes concrete recommendations with regard to the methodology
of the study and the criticism of the preachings, with regard
- to the neutralizatiori of their influence on the conscious-
ness of the people.
The work is written in simple, easy-to-understand language.
It is intended for propagandists of scientific atheism, all
those wtio are interested in the problems of contemporary
Islam.
Table of Contents
From the Author 3
Muslim Preachment in the Past and Present 5
Explanation of the Islamic Dogma ~ 20 -
Substantiation and New Interpretation of Cult Actions 37
Socio-Moral Precepts Sg -
Conclusion , -
41
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~
From the Author
On~ oF the main tasks in the building of communist society is the education
oE the new man. His philosophy of life ~s formed on the basis of Marxism-
Leninism as an integral and harmonious system of philosophical, economic,
and sociopolitical views. The atheistic orientation is an important component
part of the scientific world view of the new man, and~scientific-atheistic
work is an integral element of communist education.
The conception of a comprehensive approach to the organization of the entire
enterprise of education, which was advanced and substantiated by the 25th
- CPSU Congress, opens up new perspectives for the system of atheistic education,
- sets tasks for its perfection and increases its effectiveness. It is im-
possible to solve these tasks without a deep knowledge of contemporary
religious ideology and adaptive tendencies, characteristic of the various
confessions. Adaptive tendencies are manifested particularly clearly in the
sermon. In it both conditions of social life that have undergone change and
advances ~n the consciousness of believers and religious leaders find dis-
tinctive reflection.
_ The special sermon is viewed in Islam as an integral element of the Friday
and holiday worship services. However, the preaching activity of the Muslim
clergy is by far not exhausted by this. In many mosques, sermons are given
- daily during the month of Ramadan (the month of fasting). The execution of -
such r.ites as name-oiving, circumcision, marriage, and funeral also involve
_ the teachings of mullahs. The Muslim ministers of the ciil.t attempt to make
use of every opportunity for the propaganda of religion and the strengthening
- of its influence on their people. Human happiness and grief, fasting and civil
holidays, the beginning of the harvest and the preparation of the kolkhoz
cattle for wintering--all may serve as a point of departure for the giving of
a sermon by the mullah. Not only in the mosques, but also in the homes of _
believers, and even at the cemeteries one can hear the words of priests
glorifying Allah. ~
The sermon is the most dynamic element of the religious complex, which opens
up a broad field for maneuvering, for the perfection of argumentation and the -
mastering of the new problems. It is precisely with the aid of the sermon in
the first place that modernistic ideas are disseminated among the mass of
believers. Hence it is clear: In order to acquire a concept of the real, -
- living Islam, it is not enough to know o*~ly the teachings of the Koran.
_ Academician I. Yu. Krachkovskiy in his time very correctly called the attention
of researchers to this. He wrote in 1918: "It is a great mistake to char-
= acterize Islam primarily or exclusively on the basis of the Koran. It hardly
covers the first two decades in the development of Islam,"*
This thought is even more justified when we talk about the organization of -
_ scientific-atheistic work in our time in the regions of the traditional dis-
semination of Islam. It is completely insufficient to subject to criticism
*"Koran". Translation and commentaries by I. Yu. Krachkovskiy. Moscow,
- 1963, p 654. -
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only the teachings of the Koran; one can be taken in, tiit wide of the mark,
and even call forth distrust of atheist propaganda. The atheist must have a
good knowledge of contemporary preaching, the forms and t~iethods of the activity
of religious organizations and the clergy. Only in this case can one count
on the effectiveness of scientific-atheist education.
The present work is the reuslt of an analysis of hundreds of sermons pr~sented ~
_ in Muslim religious associations in different regions of the country during
- the last two decades. The greater part of them was heard by the author him-
_ self, the other part was studied by scholars and propagandists of scientific
atheism who are engaged in criticism of the Muslim ideology. To all of them -
the author expresses his sincere gratitude.
- The research that was conducted, as presented, made it possible to expose
cliaracteristic traits of the contemporary Muslim, its direction and ideological
content. And this, in turn, must be of help in the elaboration of effective
ways of overcoming religious survivals.
Conclusion
The study of the preaching activity of the Muslim clergy shows that the range -
of questions touched on in the speeches of the preachers is rather broad.
The interpretations given to the propositions of the dogmas and rites in dif- -
ferent regions of the cou~try have their peculiar features, whi_ch depend on
the existing traditions as well as on the level of preparatior~ of the spiritual
teachers. Hundred of thousands of people daily listen to the sermons given
in the mosques, to the talks in the homes of the believers given by the min-
isters of the cult, The preaching activity of the clergy is an important
factor promoting the preservation of religion's influenca on a part of the
- population, since for the majority of believers the preaching by ministers of
= the cult,~their religious-moral directions, are the basic source of religious
information. The content of the oral presentations by the ministers of the
cult is frequently discussed in the domestic circle, which cannot but exert -
an influence on non-believers as well. All of this makes it incumbent upon
ttle atheist public to have a good knowledge of the preaching activity of the
clergy and to counter it with well-argued materials which reveal the real. harm
_ inflicted on the individual and society by religion in our age.
- The analysis of contemporary Islamic greaching makes it possible to show to
propagandists of scientific atheism the character of the modernistic inter-
- pretation of social phenomena, the ways of modernizing Muslim moral teachings,
the newest methods of defending religious dogmas against the blows of scien-
tific progress. However, one can carry out this task effectively only by
comparing the contemporary practice of the clergy with the foundations of the
dogmas laid down in the Koran and interpreted by the theologians of past
epochs.
The demonstration of the incompatibility of many aspects of contemporary
preaching with the propositions of the Koran makes it possible for propagan-
dists of scientific atheism, too, to bring believers to the conclusion that
~+3 =
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supernatural forces have nothing to do with the development of the tenets of
one sort or another of the dogma and rites of Islam, that they are created
by people and are changed by them in conformity with changed circumstances.
Sucl~ ar~;uments in the final analysis help believers to become convinced of the
fact tli;it tlie Koran is not given to people from above, but that its content
� reflects the views of people who lived in the 7th century in Arabia and, con-
sequently, are limited by the framework of the time. Therefore, it does not
_ make sense to search in the "clear book" for the ~rinciples of socialism or
the norms of conduct that correspond to the demands of the moral code of the
builder of communism, and it is all the more senseless to see in it the pre-
_ diction of the contemporary achievements of science and technology.
An analysis of contemporary Muslim preaching in comparison with the tenets
of the books of dogma and the theological elaborations of the past makes it
- possible for the propagandists of scientific atheism to show that the mod-
ernization of Islam is the result of a discrepancy between its dogma and _
cult practice and the structure of life in a socialist society, and is an
attempt to adjust to this structure even at the price of rejecting a whole -
series of statutes.
Such an analysis convincingly reveals the antiscientific essence of religion,
no matter to what changes and innovations its ministers resort, no matter
liow they "embellish" it.
_ In modernizing Islam, "erasing" and "perfecting" it in conformity with
changed circumstances, some of the ministers of the cult honestly propose -
that it thus helps the building of communism. Acting in that way, it at-
tempts to find "its place" in the struggle of the masses for the construction
of the new society. It must be underscored that this is precisely how many ~
believers perceive the activity of religious organizations and ministers of
the cult. At times they regard with bewilderment the scientific criticism
oF the religion's modernization, its being brought up to date. The duty of
tiie propagandists of scientific atheism is to introduce clarity into this
qt~estion. It is very possible that some of the ministers of the cult, in
adjustix~g Islam to the conditions of socialism, are guided by good intentions, '
SC'C'.1I1~', in it a means of strengthening the socialist social order and the ~
instrument for securing moral progress. However, we judge the efforts they
are making not by their subjective desires, but the object:ive results of
their activity, which is aimed at the preservation of the influence of an
antiscientific ideology on the consciousness and the conduct of Soviet peo-
ple. "One must judge philosophers not by the signs which they hang on them-
selves," noted V. I. Lenin, "but ~iy how they in fact solve basic theoretical
questions, with whom they walk hand in hand, what they teach and what they -
_ taught tlleir students and followers."* 4
One can be an honest and conscientious person, striving to live in the
name of one's people, for the sake of the prosperity of one's native country;
but, all other things being equal, most in the way of the realization of this
*V. I. Lenin, "Polnoe sobraniye sochineniy" [ComplPte Collection of Works]
Vol. 18, p 228.
_
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goal will be attained by the individual who has the best knowledge of the
regularities of social development, who has deeply assimilated the scienti-
fic basis of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state--the decisions
and documents of the CPSU, who has developed an active communist position of
life. Biit can religion, including a modernized one, b e the ally of an in-
dividual in the study of the regularities of social development? Can it -
help in the development of a scientific basis for the advancement of the
country? Can it contribute to the development of an active communist posi- -
tion in life? There can only be one answer to these questions: No!
And what is more, The material set forth in this book convincingly, in otir
view, testifies to the fact that, in the solution of the questions enumerated
above, religion plays the role of an obstacle, incl~uding its modernized
variant. To bring this into the consciousness of the believers on the basis
of a concrete analysis of the contemporary ideological and cult activity of
rluslim religious organizations and ministers of the cult--that is the import-
ant task of the propagandists of scientific atheism, who are working in the
regions of the traditional dissemination of Islam in our country.
A well-argued demonstration of the negative role of religion in the social
development and education of the new man is a contribution to cleansing the
consciousness of believers of incorrect, illusory conceptions, which opens
up enormous possibilities for the formation of a scientific world view in
them.
COPYRIGHT: Politizdat, 1978
89 70 -
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RF~IONAL
BOOK ON 'SURVIVALS' OF ISLAM IN DAGESTAN REVIEW~'D
Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 117-120
_ ~Review.by A. F. Tsyrkun of the book "Ateisty v Nastuplenii: Preodoleniye
~ Perezhitkov Islama v Natsional'nom Samosoznanii" (Atheist s on the Offensive:
_ Overcoming the Vestiges of Islam in National Self-Awareness) by I. A. Makatov,
Izdatel'stvo Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, 1978, 1~+3 pages] -
[Text] The book consists of an introduction, three chapters ("The Historical,
Ideological and Social-Psychological Prerequisites of the Relationship of
National and Religious Awaxeness," "The Dialectics of the Development of
National Self-Awaxeness and Islam," and "The Unity of Processes of the Inte-
gr~.tion of Nationalities, International and Atheistic Indoctrination") and . -
- conclusion. It draws on materiels from sociological research in Dagestan
and the Checheno-Ingush ASSR.
- During the period of its spread in the Northern Caucasus, Islam put down very
~ deep roots in the awareness, customs, and in all spheres of the social and
personal lives of the mountain peoples. Aaving assimilated the previous be-
- liefs, Islam not only took over their ethnic functions, but also substantially
broadened them. National feelings and ideas in the spiritual world of the =
mountain dweller were most closely intertwined with the religious, creating
_ a common psychological base. For the believers Islam represented an essential
_ attribute of the given national community. The leadership of the national
liberation movement was often concentrated in the mosque. The national libe-
ration war of the mountain people in the [18]20's-[18]50's conducted under
the banners of muridism a.nd a ghazawat [Holy Wax] was led by the imams Ghazi-
1~4agomed, Gamzat-Bek and Shamil'.
With the incorporation of the Northern Caucasus in Russia and the develop-
ment of commodity-monetary relations here, the processes of social differen-
tiation were accelerated and these also marked the formation and deepening
of a split between Islam and the working masses, and Islam and progressive =
national self-awaxeness and the national liberation movement. The revolu-
tion radieally accelerated this process. But the intermingling.of the na-
tiona.l a.nd the religious in awaxeness was so strong that it has survived .
up to the present among a portion of the population, comprising a most im- _
- portant basis for the viability of Islam. '
~ ~+6
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In portraying itself as the most essential and cheriahed aspect of national
existence, Islam endeavored to use any exacerbation of national ~eelings for
its own consolidation. For example, the author has pointed out that "the
intensifying migration process is one of the factors contributing to the
growth of national self-awareness among the Northern Caucssus peoples....
_ As sociological research has shown, in towns and rayons with a heterogeneous
population there are two fold more persons who observe the Moslem holideys
because they are considered a national traditions than in towns with an
ethnically homogeneous population" (pp 46-~+7). This "to a certain degree
- alienates and isolates the people of different nationalities and different
beliefs, particularly in the spheres of fa,mily, marriage, moral and domestic
relations (p ~9). This is a temporary negative aspect in the general, un-
doubtedly progressive, process of the internationalization of the population -
in the region. In the given instance, religious customs axe associated with
national ones.
In talking with persons who demanded that a mosque be opened in.their locality,
the author established that the absence of such, with places available for
celebrating other rites, was viewed directly as a"national in~ustice" (p 52).
As a whole in the balance of the national and the religious "there is an ob-
servable trend of an ever-growing strengthening of the national component,
when the religious more and more is given a national cover, and this to a =
certain degree intensifies the feeling of Moslem exclusiveness" (p 55)� From
- this viewpoint "Islam among many believers in Checheno--Ingushetia and Dages-
tan operates not so much as a religion as a system aithin which the national,
collective, family and moral relationships of people axe shaped" (p 56). To
a significant degree this explains the influence of the leaders from both
the old and new Murid groups whicY~ have formed during the Soviet period and
which dPvote a great deal of attention to organizing various aspects of the
life of th~ believers,as well as a portion of the nonbelievers in a"national
Moslem" sty1,~.
One of the sFheres of the intermingling of national and religious awareness
is the tradi'cional rites and rituals and also the surviving adats [traditional
law]. They have been very tenacious since they"still satisfy certain vital
- needs of people" (p 68). Islam endeavors to give a religious content to a
mF~,jority of these rites. Such are the rites of burial, marriage and so forth -
to which nonbelievers also resort in their canonized Islatnic form.
In this regard the author has emphasized the need for a.n improving of the
socialist rituals which would incorporate in them the old popular elements
- of the traditional ritua,ls freed from an Islamic interpretation. Attempts to
break abruptly with the traditional rituals often produce an undesirable .
effect. For example, a burial accompanied by music is viewed by Moslems as
Christianization, and so forth. It is also essential to strip away the in-
_ fluence of Islam and support the positive adats such as respect for elders,
the cult of motherhood, blood payment to prevent feuds, and so forth.
- ~+7
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Another sphere of the existence of Islam is the national and family-kinship ~
ties. Islam endeavors to act as their controller and protector. Many modern
unregistered religious groups (for example, the Murid fraternities in Checheno-
Ingushetia) are basically cree.ted along kinship lines. Islam also holds a
position of mutual support for certain still found traditions (according to
the given data, not only an absolute ma~ority ~f the believers sub~ect their
children to the sumnet (circumcision), but also a ma~ority of the vacillators
and nonbelievers).
Islam also tries to play on patriotic, internationalistic and national feel-
ings. Islamic activists have proclaims as "saints" certain leaders of the
national liberation struggle, particularly those exiled to Siberia or who
have "fallen for their faith," they build mausoelums, vaults and even in
certain instances (when such are l~cking) monuments t6 those who fell in the
Great Patriotic War, they protect historical monuments, and so forth. Some-
times the negligence of the local authorities contributes to this. The
author gives examples when unique historical monuments such as mosques and -
_ churches of the 8th-lOth centuries have been destroyed, used e,s warehouses
and so forth. Their repair or use as clubs, museums would, he feels, have
a substantical atheistic effect.
In the concluding chapter the author shows that the grounds for nationalistic
and reli~ious pre~udices are constaxitly being naxrowed. In addition to the
change in the ob~ective conditions of life, here an important role is also
played by the unity of internationalistic and atheistic indoctrination. The
local authorities are seeking out new forms a.nd methods for such indoctrina-
tion. "The rural assemblies a.nd councils of the aksakals have become natione,l
forms of combatting the vestiges of the past" (p 113) and here these have
a traditional authority. They "ere called upon the initiative of the party,
soviet and social organizations when it is cassential to mobilize public opin-
_ ion against various antisocial phenomena or to condemn the conduct of indi-
_ vidual fanatical believers" (p 11~+). With their help an offensive is being
made against the old rites. For example, "realizing that it would be hard to
immediately change all the old obsolete burial rituals, the aksakals, having
consulted with the party organization...decided first to work for the halting
of funeral feasts and the distributing of food at burials. And this was.
- achieved" (p 120).
In conclusion emphasis is put on the need for greater tact and respect for
the national and religious features of the believer, and certain recottmien-
dations are given.
COPYRIGHT: INION AN SSSR
_ 10272
~ CSO: 1800
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REGIONAL
BOOK ON WOIdKING CLASS IN I{IFtGIZIYA REVIEWED
Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR in Russian No 6, 197.9 Fp 76-82
[Review by A. N. Vinogra.dov of the book "Rabochiy klass Kirgizstana v
usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma." [The Working Class of Kirgizstan Under
the Conditions of Developed Socialism] by Sh. Kh. Sh3riyazdanov, Institute
of History, Kirgiz~ SSR 4~cademy of Sciences, Frunze: Ilim, 1979~ 395
P`~~eS~ -
[ Text~ The book consis~s of an Introduction, five chapters and a Conclusian.
The fisst cha.pter is entitled "Industrial Progress and Im~moving the
Economic Base for the Development of the Worki.ng Class of Kirgizsta.n, dur- _
ing the Period of Developed Socialism". From 1960 - 1970, the fixed indust-
rial and production capital of Kirgiziya grew 3.4-fold (on the whole for
the USSR it was more than 2.5-fold), and the ovex-all volume of industrial
production more than threefold. In the republic, such branches of
industxy as automobile, instrument making, electxotechnical, tool-making,
gas, and glass, ha.ve s~ung up. The shaxe of the prroduction of the means
of production in the over-all volume of industxial p~oduction increased from
53 to 68 percent, significa.ntly approaching tha all-union level (73.4
percent). Labor productivity rose to 69 percent. The proportion of indust-
ry in creating the republic's national income increased from 40.1 percent
_ in 1958 to 41.6 percent in 1970, and in gross social product from ~9�5 -
percent to 55.2 percent. Kirgiziya's share in the creation of the USSR's -
national income grew by almost x0 percent~ and in the country's industrial
complex--from 0.~ to 0.6 percent (pp 103 - 107).
The second chapter is entitled "Quantitative Changes in the Composition of -
Kisgizstan's Working Class." During 1959 - 1970~ the number of people in
the republic increased from 2,065,800 to 2~932~800. During these years,
- just as in grevious periods~ Kirgiziya was the axea of the most (although
- constantly decreasing~ intensive foreign migration in the Central Asian
- region. To its share fell 17 percent (150,000) of ~the republic's over-all
population growth. However, the de~iding factor in the increase in the
number of people was the high natural increase. The dynamic levelopment of _
- ~+9
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- the national economy provided for fuller emp}.oyment of the able-bodied
population. Its level rose from 80 percent in 1959 ~ 91.3 percent in 1970
- (pp 113-11~~ .
The role of the peasantry as the replenishment source of Kirgiziya's work-
- ing class is gradually decreasing. The number of kolkhoz workers, engaged
in agriculture,decreased during the period 1959-1970 from 352,400 to
24~,100 people, and the number of sovkhoz woxkers grew from 45,500 to
100,400 people. Almost 50 percent of those released from kolkhoz production
_ joined the ranks of workers and employees in industxial branches (p 117).
The fact that--unlike previous periods--significantly more production install-
ations were placed in average-size and small cities and in rural areas
contributed to raising the employment level and changing its structure. The
number of kolkhoz members, working in state industrial enterprises~ grew
_ from 5,500 in 1958 to 18~200 people~ and the number of industrial workers
- in r~xral areas from 47,600 (1959) to 100~400 (pp 118-119). In 1968 villag-
ers by birth were ~8 per~ent of the work force in the machine building and
metal working industry, and ~5.5 percent in light industry (pp 118-119~.
A considerable number of able-bodied. people are arriving in Kirgiziya fror~~ -
the RSFSR (primarily from the Ura1s~ from western and eastern Siberia, and
the Far East). The immigrants, the majority of whom were village dwellers~
settled mainly in cities.
The proportion of thos~ working on home and private subsidiary farms in the -
republic decreased from 20 to 8.7 percent (from 178,000 to 81,600). The
number of people who had rea.ched retirement age but who continued to work
increased from more than 3,200 in 1963 to almost 5,000 in 1967 (pp 125-127).
~
During 1958 - 1970, almost 199~00 graduates of genera'1 education schools
arrived in the national economy. Whereas in 1958, 6,160 yotirrg men and girls
- joined the ranks of the working class, there were 27,633 in 1969. Sixty
percent of those placed in jobs were accepted for work in industrial branches.
The proportion of school grad.uates among the over-all number of those
_ accepted in industrial enterprises increased from 11.3 percent in 1960 to
18. ti percent in 1969 (pp 130-132) . As a resul.t of the abolishment of
producer cooperatives in 1959, $,~06 of theis workers replenished the
republic's deta.chment of workers and e:nployees (p 13Z1~~ .
In 1963~ the proportion of PTU [professional technical school] gra.duates _
among the over-all number of those accepted for work in the republic's
industry was 19 percent, and in 1970-- ~.6 percent. Organized recruitment
under the conditions of the Kirgiz SSR d.id not play a si~;nificant role.
Among the workers who had signed contracts for orderly recruitment, rural
inhabitants formed ~3 percent in 1965, 57 percent in 1966, and 37 percent -
in 1970. D~in~; the yeaxs of the 8th ~'ive-Xeas Plan, from 6~ to 93 percent
of +h~ *~rorKers who had signed a contraL t� yrer.e ar.r~lially sent to those areau
of the co,.zntry where a shorta,ge of manpcwer was being felt (p~imarily to the
Yakutskaya ASSR, Khabarovskiy and Alta.yskiy krays, Kazakhsi:aya SSR, etc.).
50
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The propo r tion of workers, who annually arrived in the indus1,,ria1 enter-
- 1rrt:~c:; of the republic through or~anizad recruitment~ fluctuai~.e~d from 0.04
percent in 1963 to 2.'j pe�rcen~t in 1968 (pp 136-138) . Durir.g 1959-1965,
more than 6,000 Komsomol members arrived at particularly important Kirgiz
SSR construction p~ojects. The most popular form for replenishing the
working class (~imarily slightly qualified workers~ was admittance for
work in individual order. In industxy, this form made up in 1970 92.9 per-
cent of the over-all admittance (98 percent in 1963~ and was somewhat
higher than the a11-union indicator, testifyin~ to the excessive personnel -
fluctua.tion. The transfer of workers from one enterprise to another wa,s
most widely used during the first half of the Sixties (in 1959--5�5 P~-
cent, in ~.961 11.5 percent~ and then began to decrease (pp 1~F2-1~M3).
The proportion of workers within the rep;iblic's entixe population rose
from 40.9 percent in 1959 to 5�1 percent in 1970, and within the gainfully
employed population-- from 39�7 to 53.6 percent. In industry, construction
- and tra.nsport and communications enterprises, the number of workers during
this same period grew by a factor of 1.87; in agriculture and foresty
by a factor. of 1.83; in trade, public catering, procurement and supply
by a factor of 2.5; and in other non-industxial branches-- by a factor of
almost 2. The proportion of Kirgiziya's urban population increased from
31?~ to 37.4 percent (PP 146-147). -
The number of industriai workers in the Kirgiz SSR cluring 1958 - 1970
increased by 111 percent (f`rom 79,900 to 168~600~ as opposed to 57 percent
for the USSR as a whole. The propo~tion of workers~ engaged in the bra,nches
of heavy industry, increased significantly, reaching more than 55 percent. `
In industxy, the over-all number of engineer-technical workers grew about
_ 2.9-fold and their proportion in the active population from 7 to 10
percent (as a whole for the USSR it was equal to 11.7 percent in 1970): the -
proportion of employees and junior service personnel decreased from 10 to
7 percent (with an absolute growth); and the proportion of workers remained
- stable--83 percent (for the USSR 81.1 percent) (pp 150-155)�
- In 1969, the working class of the Kirgiz SSR included representativesof 76
nationalities and peoples (in 1934--25~ P 157). The number of workers~
engineer-technical workers and employees of Kirgiz nationality grew more
than threefold during 1957-1967 (from 55,000 +..0 174,600) with a twofold
increase in tYie over-all number of workers and employees (p 160).
During 1969-1970, the number of women among workers and employees in the
_ republic grew from 1'~6,100 -to 37~;000, and their proportion--from ~l to 47
percent (p 163). The number of Kisgiz among workers~ engineer-technical
workers and employees increased by a factor of 4.5-fold from 195? to 1967.
The stable growth of the proportion of workers of the most able-bodied age -
- -26-49 years (~a 1967, it wa,s equal to 69.9 percent in industry) was
typical of the changes in the a.ge composition of Kirgiziya's working class.
~ 51 -
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T11e ~n oportion of older workers and employees was relatively sta.ble, In
J ~the republic, just as in the USSR on the whole, workers up to 35 Ye~'s old
made up more than 50 percent of a11 workers (pp 167-1.68). The number and -
~roportion of workers, having a long period of work~ increased somewhat.
However,personnel fluidity was still rather high (in industry~ it was
almost 35 percent in 1966-1969) (p 171~.
TYie third chapter is entitled "Changes in the Qualitative Composition of
_ Kirgiziya's Working Class." In 1959, for every 1,000 workers in the repub-
lic there were 389 workers with a higher and secondary education, in 1970-- -
577 (for the IJSSR--586~. The proportion of urban workers, having a higher,
secondar,y special, and general secondary education, rose from 42.7 to 62.3
percent (for the USSR it was 64.2 percent~ (pp 183-184~~. -
- One of the main ways to solve the task of raising the cultural-technical
level of the workers in the republic was the development of a professional- ~
_ ~technical education system. During 1959-1970, the number of urban and
rural professional technical schools, which p~epase personnel for 39 pro-
- fessions, increased to 51 (24~, and the number of students in t,hem from
5,900 to 26,500 (pp. 193-194). From 1960 to 1970~ the proportion of teen-
agers older than 18 among ~ofessional technical school students decreased
from 64~.9 to 25.4~ percent, and the proportion of girls increased from 18.2
to 24.8 percent. The pro?~ortion of students with a complete secondary
education ~rew fro?n 8,4~ percent in 1965 to 20 percent in 1970, and that
for i;hose tirith less than an eighth grade education decreased from 26.5 to
_ 1G~.5 percent (pp 200-201~. During 1959-1965, 31,~0 qualified workers
(including 18,483 for agriculture~ were trained in psofessional technical
schools, and during 1966-1970 59,375 (25,862). During 1959-1961 Kii~iz
formed 33.5 pez~cent of the students in professional technical schools~ and
during 1966-1969 55 percent (pp 212-213),
Iii the Kirgiz SSR � just as in the USSR as a whole, the training of workers -
directly ~n industry plays an important role. Among the workers undergoing -
training in industry using the individua,l training method, 52.4~ percent
(77-,800) were trained during 1959-1965, and 56�z percent (816,000) during ~
1966-1969 (p 221~~, The number of workers and employees, who increased
qualifi~ations, grew more than 2.5-fold, reaching 166,300 (p 227~.
_ The number of workers in the lea.d.ing professions in the Kirgiz SSR grew
� more quick~y than for the USSR as a whole. As a result, the qualification
= level of the republic's workers came close to the all-union level: In -
_ industry, highly qua,lified workers were 18.3 percent (for the USSR, the
same~, qualified 50.7 (52.'~~, slightly and unqualified 31 percent
(29 percent~ (p 24~2) . _
The fourth chapter is entitled "The Growth of the Praduction dlctivity of ~
Kirgiziya's Working Class." In the Kirgiz SSR, more than 90 percent of
the workers and employees as opposed to 80 percent in 1963 paxticipated in
- socialist competition (FP 259 and 382~, and in the movement for a communist -
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attitude t~ward work--more than 500 enterprises and organizations and more -
- than 265,200 workers and employees (2.5-fold more than in 1965~ (p 300~.
The numb;:r of inventors a,nd rationalizers~ amon~ whom 50 percent were
workers, grew 2,6-fold d~ing the 10 years (from 7,994~ to 20,920~. The
economy, obta,ined from the incorporation of rationalizer proposals~ increas-
ed by moxe than four-fold (P 317j,
_ The fifth chapter is entitled "The Growth of the Social and Political -
Activity and the Material Pro~perity of Kirgizstan's Working Class."
, Du~ing 1960 - 1970, the p~oportion of workers in the republic's party
- organization increased ~om 26,5 to 33.~ percent. In 1970, more than one
third of the communists worked in the i.ndustxial branches ( p 326). In
- the Sugreme Soviet of the Kirgiz SSR, the p~oportion of workers rose from
17.6 percent in 1959 to 23.~ percent in 1971~ in local soviets f~om
13.~ to 31.2 percent (the p~oportion of kolkhoz members decreased fro~ri 47.2
- to 36.1 percent, and of employees from 39�~ to 32,7 percent) (p 332). -
The number of those selected for continuously functioning production
conferences grew 2.2-fold during the 10 years. In them,workers formed
63.~ percent in 1970 (in 1959 --69�1 percent) (pp 33$-339)�
The national income of Kirgiziya increased by a factor of 2.2 during 1960-
1970 (:for the USSR on the whole by 99 percent (p 366). The average monthly
wages of the republic~s workers and employees increased from 74~.9 rubles to
112,6 rubl~s. The volume of public consumption funds grew by more than
?.3--i'old and payments from these funds calculated on a per capita basis
from 87 rubles (1959) to 203 rubles. During the years of the 8th Five-
Year Plan~ the real income of the republic's population rose on the average
by 48 percent and calculated on a per capita basis by 28~2 percent
(PP 369-371). The consumption of ineat products grew by 11.8 percent ancZ
of dairy products by 16.2 percent, and the consumption of grain products
decreased by 13.8 perce:~t. According to data from an investigation of
family budgets conducted by the Kirgiz SSR Central Statistical Directorate~
workers' expenditures to acquire clothing, footwear a,nd cloth made up 17.4
percent in 1952 and 20 percent in 1970, for acquiring goods of cultural
and personal services significance 2,9 and 7.3 percent, respectively
(PP 372-373). The volume of everyday services increased from '~.6 million
rubles to 39.8 million. The number of doctors grew by 80 percent. The =
social insurance budget increased from 18.5 million to 49.5 million rubles
(PP 378-379).
COPYftIGHT: ~`iZON AN SSSR
~ 8802
' CSO; 1800 E~
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