JPRS ID: 8964 JAPAN REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060005-8
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8964
4 March 1980
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r'ux vr r L~1riL u~~ uivLx
JPRS L/8964
_ 4 March 1980
,
JAPA~I REPORT -
(FOUO 6/80)
CONTENTS PAGE
PQLl'I'ICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL -
Propo.~ed J~.p~.nese-Soviet Treaty Ma.y Threaten Japanese
Sovereignty
(SHIJKAN SHINCHO, 21+ Jan 80) ,..........o..~.....o.... 1
Sonodo to the Middle East: Diplomacy, a Political Tool
(THE DAILY YOMIURI, 3 Feb 80) ......oo.........~..... y
Change of LDP Will Not Change Japan
(MAINIG`HI DAILY NEWS, 5 Feb 80) ~......o~............ 11.
Briefs
Nonpermaneiit UN SecuritJ Council Seat 14
ECONOMIC
Challenge of Japanese Agricultural Industries Discussed
_ (SHUKAN ASAHI, various dates) 15
Agricultural Cooperatives, Meat Industry, by
Takashi 1'achibana
Cause of High-Priced Beef
Close Relations Being Forged Between Egypt, Japan
(Masayuki Tomita; BUSINESS JAPAN, Feb 80) ....o...,., 51
Hign Energy Cost Dampens Frospect of Six Percent Economic
Growth
(Takac Tomitate; ASAHI JANARU, 18 J~,n BO) .....a....o 56
~
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO) -
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL -
,
PROPOSED JAPANESE-SOVIET TREATY MAY THREATEN JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY
Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 24 Jan 80 pp 28-33
_ [Text~ Brezhnev riding atop a tank. Chief Secretary
Marche (phonetic) of the French Communist Party march-
ing alongside t,im. And he ehouts, "On to the Elysee
Palace." It is a political cartnon (in FIGARO), satiri-
zing the French Communist Party which supported the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Could there have been
a Japanese cartoonist who had a dream of another figure -
marching with Marche--Chairman Miyamoto of the Japan
Communiat Part}~ (JCP)? The JCP maintained a long silence
- concerning the Afghan incident, but finally decided to
criticize the Soviet Union. After all, the incident took
- pla~e soon after the JCP shook hands with the Soviet Com-
munist Party. Therefore, the criticism is seen as a pose
directed towards the Diet Upper House. Meanwhile, could
the dream become a reality?
Fears of a Soviet "Invasion of Aid" at JCP's Request
"It was a good thing the oppoaition parties excluded the Japan Communist
Party (JCP) from their coalition regime concept."
"It (the Afghan invasion) has become th~ most concrete proof, hasn't it?"
"The direction of our coalition government concApt is correct. After all,
one can never tell what the JCP might be up to."
"There is ample possibility that, if the JCP is included, Japan could become
a second Afghanistan."
_ T'his casual conversation took place at the discussion meeting of the secre-
tary generals and policy deliberation committee chairmen of the Japan Social-
ist Party and Komeito on a coalition government on 9 and 10 January. Secre-
tary General Yano of the Komeito, one of the participants, remarked as
followa:
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.�vc~ vrri~l~u, u~c VLVL1
"If the JCP should join the coalition and should conclude a friendahip
and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union, Japan might become a second
Afghanistan. No, the JCP should not join us. Aside from the question of
whether the recent Soviet intervention was based on auch a pact and whether '
or not it wae legitimate, the friendahip and cooperation treaty hae pro-
vided the Soviet Union with an excuse for rationalizing the move. There-
fore, I say that we should not create a p~ssibility whereby Japan would be .
taken advantage cf. Excluding the JCP as a partner of our coalition Flan
is not unrelated to the Afghanistan incidento"
_ Leaving aside the "pitfalls" of the coalition regime concept for the raoment.
Tamio Kawakami, international bureau chief of the JSP, which is a so-called _
"relative" of the JCP, said, "I think we should re~~iew more careful.ly the
content of the friendship and cooperation treaty between the USSR and
~ Afghanistan, It is questionable whether such a treaty should be concluded.
Last December when a delegation of Soviet activists visited Japan at the
invitation of the JSP, they told us they loo'~ced forward to an affirmativE ~
response regarding a friendahip and cooperation pact between our two coun-
tries. We rejected the suggestion on the grounds that a Jspan-Soviet amity
pact ahould include a solution to the territorial problema. TY~eir treaty
with Afghaniatan differs som~what from their proposal to Japan concerning
military clauses, but still 3apan should not respond to it. Although the
Soviet Union is seeking to rationalize the recent intervention by virtue -
of the friendship treaty, the incident only serves ta prove the danger of
such ~ pact. I believe we should learn a lesson from it."
The only article in the Soviet-Afghanistan f.riendship treaty which looka _
like a military clause is Article 4, which says, "To consult for the pur-
pose of securing the safety, independence and territorial ir.tegrity of the -
two nations and to adopt appropriate steps based on mutual agreement." In
other words, "appropriate steps" xepresents the invasion by the 50,000
Soviet troops into Afghaniatana In the face of the "appropriate steps,"
the stipulation in Article 1"to promote full cooperation on the basis of
non-violation of territoriea and mutual non-interference in internal
affairs" has been totally ignored.
Now let us compare this with the text in Article 5 of the friendship and
cooperation pact proposed to Japan by the Soviets. "To contact each other
_ i~maediately for the purpose of exchanging views on the possibilities of im-
provement in the situation, in case it is deemed, according to mutual agree-
ment, that a situation has arisen to endanger the maintenance of peace, or
in case of a violation of peace by either side." It is left unclear as to
what steps would be taken after making such a"contract~"
"I see a danger in this exchange of views and in the conta~� being obliga-
tory. It ie dangerous because, whenever a contact is made, there is bound �
to be a pro-Soviet element in the target nation (like Japan). In other j,
words, the Soviets would make contact in order to find someone who would
request intervention. Once this breakthrough is made, the rest can be ex- r
plained in any manner they please. (--Masamori Sase, Japan Defenae College
profeseor)"
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For instance, if the request was by Chairrnan Miyamoto of the JCP which was
mnde up with the Soviet Coc~anuniet Party, the Soviet military could eaeily
_ carry out "military intervention," and a"~Iiyamoto regime" eimilar to the -
Afghan Karmal regime woiild be establiahed as a powerful "military govern~
ment" under the backing of the Soviet forces. _
Landing by Soviet Forces a Poseibility in "Near Future"
Even so, the JCP must either be nonchalant or taken lightly by Brezhnev.
When Miyamoto and his cohorta visited the Soviet Union late last year,
they had apparently not heard a word about Afghanistan. Chairman Miyamoto
held a preas conference 3t the guest house in Moscow on 24 December concern-
ing the joint communique. The following day, Soviet troops invaded Afghan-
istan. Tn retrospect, the content of the press conference was too embar-
rassing to mention, but here is an excerpt of Chairman Miyamoto's remarks:
"I proposed the return of Shikotan and Habomai island. I also proposed -
an interim treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. By a Japan-Soviet
interim treaty, I mean easentially a treaty which is not a finalized peace
treaty, but one which firms up for the present an agreement of friendship.
The Soviet Union has hitherto proposed a pact of neighborly cooperation. ~
- Although we do not intend to recognize the Soviet proposal in ita entirety,
we st~ould discuss both the conclusi~n of such an interim treaty and the re-
turn of Shikotan and Habomai island. This is very important from the stand-
point of solving these problems progressively."
Leaving aside for the moment the fact that the JCP's stance vis-a-vis the
territorial problem is quite different from its contention in the past, the
point here is that the JCP has manifested a desire for a"friendly re-
examination" of the neighborly cooperation pact proposed by the Soviet
Union. This means that, if the Soviet Union intends to use the JCP for -
the Afghanistanization of Japan, Chairman Miyamoto would become a gullible
prey of the Soviet Union. In fact, rather than becoming a prey, Chairman
Miyamoto may be desiring such a turn of e~ents~. Naturally, Chairman Miya-
moto adda that he does not agree with the clause on joint coneultation on
military matters within the proposed neighborly cooperation pact, saying
that it is not aproposa But how long can auch a contention last? There
is na guarantee that Chairman Miyamoto and the 400,000 (publicly announced)
membership of the JCP will defend Japan (its independence) from the Soviet
Union.
Columniat Kotaro Tawara explains in his "Novel of the Near Future" as
follows:
"Let us suppose that a democratic coalition government materializes in
Japan, and a Japan-Soviet neighborly cooperation treaty is concluded.
Someone like Takeo Miki might take over as the prime minister of the regime.
_ Let us say it is a Kerenaky type of government (Note: Regime prior to the
Bolshevik takeover of Russia) and it topplea in 3 to 6 montha amidat
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exposures of pers~nal wrongdoing. It is not clear whether the successor -
regime r.iight be headed by Asukata or (at one leap) by Miyamoto. But in any -
case it would be quashed by an Imperial court coup d'etr~t. And, while
Miyamoto holds the reins of government, a single rifle ahot will trigger -
an invasion by Soviet troops. Such a scenario is easily imaginable. In
- other worda, Miyamoto is the Amin uf Japan, don't you see?"
Here is the opinion of Hayao Shimizu (professor, Tokyo University of Foreign _
Studies) on the "N~ar Future":
"Let us auppose the JCP embraces a faction of the JSP (Socialist Asaociation
faction?) and forms a coalition regime. The JSP-JCP coalition government
might be anti-Soviet at the outset. But judging from the present attitude
of the JCP, the U.S.-Japan security pact will be abrogated and relationa
with the United States will deteriorate. The U.S. will apply military and
economic pressures towards Japan as an ~dversary nation. As a result--
~ although the coalition has stressed non-armed neutrality--once it takes
_ over the reins of government, it will realize that this is unrealistic
and begin to feel the need for national security. At that point, the
Soviet Union will extend i*_s hand. An army cannot be built overnight and
the decision will be made tc~ accept Soviet aid, reaulting in an ambiguous
treaty between Japan and the Soviet Ur_ion. Meanwhile, the JSP-JCP wi11
embark on various economic Leforms. From the anti-trust standpoint, exor-
bitant taxes will be imposed and no firing or rationalization moves will
be recognized. This will bring a flight of capital out of the country _
= and, with U.S. relations cut off, economic confusion will reign internally.
No matter how Miyamoto, who aims for an independent policy, may suppreas
the opposition, pro-Soviet elements like the Shiga group will be sure to
appear. There will be those who believe that 'the situation is critical and
Japan cannot make it alone.' Someone in the pro-Soviet groups will request
interv~ntion by the USSR based on the neighborly cooperation treaty. The _
Soviet invasion begins, Japan becomes a second Afghanistan and Miyamoto
a second Amin."
Shimizu concludes:
"Since Miyamoto is a self-confident man, he may not have auch worries, but,
objectively speaking, I believe it is possible." The danger is that we
cannot dismiss it as a mere "premonition."
A Barking Dog Does not Stop the Tanks
The JCP maintained a long silence before it criticized the Soviet Union on
the Afghan proble:n. A former party cadre remarked that "it was easy to
understand the JCP's dilemma, since it was soon after it shook hands with
rhe Soviet Communist Party.
"The decision by the JCP to take a atand was late in coming. It mentioned
something about conducting its own investigation, but it appeara that it
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was watching the reaction of other communist parties. Miyamoto does not
wish to become isoYated. He was hedging. He must have wanted to be on
the side of the majority. Moreover, the Up~er House elections will be held
this year, and he probably felt his votes would drop if he aupported the
Soviet Union. He could have sent hia cohorte to the varioue regiona to
s~und out the posaibilities" (--Hayao Shimizu).
"Of course, Miyamoto had just visited the Soviet Union and eaten and drunk
with them. He must have felt on his return home that the Soviets had played
a dirty trick on him. At the same time, he muat have felt proud about
having achieved a reconciliation with them after 15 years. I do believe
he was in a dilemma. So, I think that, while stressing independence, he
was observing the reaction of the otl~er cammunist parties~ At that point,
the Iralian Co~nunist Party expressed criticism towards the Soviet Union,
whereupon Miyamoto must have decided that he too would take a critical
~ stanceo The French Co~nunist Party offered the Soviets flattering aupport.
On the other hand, Miyamoto is more of a Berlinguer (chief secretary of
the Italian Communist Party) than a M,arche (chief secretary of the French -
Communist Party).
On 28 December, a note ~ras received by the JCP from the Soviet Union. It
requested support towards the Soviet interver.tion in Afghanistan. The
JCP did not reply but kept silent. (Note: According to the JCP, a question-
naire was aent to the Soviet Union, but was not answered.) But, actually,
_ the JCP must have wanted to offer support. It probably meant to indicate
_ that support by maintaining silence. If it had clearly indicated its sup-
port, it would have been subjected immediately to attack by the Japanese
mass media, It was probably aware of th is. On the other hand, if Berlinguer
had supported the Soviets, what would the JCP have done? It would really
have been something to see if Miyamoto had singlehandedly criticized the -
Soviet Union" (--Kotaro Tawara).
Until imnediately prior to the 3ecision to take a critical stand towards
the Soviet Union, the reporting in the AKAHATA was albeit minimal in apace
somewhat supp~rtive of the Soviet Union. One party member said:
"In the international column of the AKAHATA on 31 December of last year,
Hiroshi Takakusagi (also read Kokusagi) wrote a bylined analysis on the -
Afghan change of government. It was clearly supportive of the Soviet inva-
sion into Afghanistan. I was concerned whether it was safe to write such
an article, I even discussed with my colleagues the possibility of Takaku-
sagi being fired."
'I~ao days before the communique was announced criticizing the Soviet Union,
the AKAHATA (8 Jan) carried ar article which was undeniably pro-Soviet. -
_ T'he article was written in reply to criticism from an elderly participant
in the TBS-TV program "Ji,ji Hodan"(Free Discussion on Timely Topics). For
example, it contains the following passage:
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"The report was based on the fact that the incumbent Karma~ government re-
quested asaistance from the Soviet Union 'to repel the threat from foreign
powers to overthrow Afghanistan,' and the fact that the troops were deployed
by the Soviet Union on the basis of the military cooperation clause (Art{.cle
4) of the neighborly cooperation treaty."
The report also declared that criticizing the JCP simultaneously with an
attack on the Soviet Union is to "kowtow to the United Stateso"
Deapite such a declaration what did the AKANATA report soon after that?
Let us look at a report carried on 11 Jaizuary:
"There ia no basis which can be found to interpret the deployment of Soviet
troopa, the execution of Amin the former regime head and the establishment
of the new Karmal regime, including the timing and steps taken (according
to the standing committee communique), as a legitimate implementation of
the neighborly cooperation treat�y."
_ The "facts" carried in the AKAHATA took a 180-degree about-face in 3 day8.
Also, the JCP dispatched two AKAHATA reportera to Afghanietan via Moecow
on 9 January on an "emergency mission." Was it for the purpose of what the
AKAHATA called "an analysis of the situation in order to render judgment
based on the facts?" Actually, the JCP issued a communique crit~cal of the
Soviet ltnion without waiting for a single report "based on the facts" b~~
the two correspondents. Perhaps the correspondents are aomewhere in the
Afghan mountains, rueing the fact that "a barking dog cannot stop the tanka."
Meanwhile, rumors are belatedly flying about concerning the "truth" of the
Miyamoto visit to Moscow. A former party member and scholar, now living
in the Kansai area, said he "could not perceive his purpose as anything
but to beg funda from the Soviet Union."
He continued,
"The ,1CP is heavily saddled with mounting debts incurred during the elec-
tiona~ Last November, the fund-gathering goal by the yearend totalled 30
billion yen. Most of it was to offset the election deficits. One regional
campaign office in Kyushu incurred a 56 million yen deficit and I have heard
of many regional committees which wenr. into deficita of 5 or 6 million yen.
This is apparently due to the impact of the decrease in JCP-affiliated re-
formist community groups. The deficits can hardly be offaet despite the
increase in JCT Dietmen. Moreover, the AKAHATA is deep in debt. The JCP
which must increase its Diet members is desperate for funds. It is probably
confident that, with sufficient funds, it could win 60 to 70 aeats. Appar-
ently, that was the reason for its decision to visit the Soviet Union."
The foregoing could somewhat. clear up the mystery surroending the indeciaion
of the JCP in criticizing the Soviet Union.
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Deception of "Neighborliness" and "Equality"
"I hadn't imagined they would go so far regarding Afgha.nistan, but my reac-
tion on hearing the news was that they finally revealed their true colors."
_ This was the impression of Michi.o Takeyama (writer). The JCP ia the bearer
of an annoying disease called "Yoyogi syndr~:~~a," which causes it to react
like a porcupine whenever it is criticized by outsiders. But when it con-
cerns the "principles of behavior" of the Soviet Union, its "boss," its
reaction can only be called "the Moscow block syndrome."
Mr Takeyama goes on,
"I doubt whether the Soviet linion will confront Jr~pan in a full-fledged
~uarrel. But there are many other clever ways. It could let the Third
World make inroads and gradually isolate the free societieso It could
also enable the Soviet Navy to freely navigate the aouthern seas and create
conditions where ships carrying raw materials to Japan are sunk from "un-
known causes," Japan would have no choice but to endure it, as it did when
robbed of the Shikotan and Habomai island. Deapite this, it would not result
in war, but Japan could be annoyed in various ways and would have to bear
it. Finally, Japan's industry could be taken over intact and Finlandized,
and thue be at the mercy of the Soviet Union. I believe this is the Soviet
master plan."
Finlandization rneans, in a word, that when the Soviet Union conducts foreign
relations with a free nation, it induces the politica, apeech and foreign
policy of the target nation to become non-antagoniatic toward the Soviet
Union which recognizes ita "independence." Military intervention is not
necessarily the only monopoly of the Soviet Union.
If so, why does the Soviet Union continue its expanaioniat policy toward
- the world'? Hiroshi Kimura (scholar of Rusaian literature) gives the follow-
ing commentary:
"As Solzhenitsyn writes in his 6-volume 'Gu1ag Archipelago,' in the ~oviet -
Union the exact opposita of the principle of justice has been perpetrated
for the past 60 years.
"To put what Solzhenitsyn says in the 50,000 words of the 'Gulag Archipelago'
in a nutshell--it is the fearsomeness of the priority placed on Soviet ide-
ology. The Soviet system is nothing more than a system under which anything
_ goea for the sake of its ideology. It would be acceptable if the ideology
were just and good for all people, but actually the ideology is nebulous and
repreaents the egoiam of a ltandful of inen in power. This is the tragedy of
the 20th century. There ia nothing on the front page of PRAVDA concerning
the Afghan invasion. Therefore, the Soviet people must know very little
about it. There is only slight reference to it in the international column
and it merely criticizes the UnitPd Statea for interfering. -
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"One gets the impression that a world exists within the Soviet Uni~n which
ia 180 degrees at variance from the world in general."
According to Mr Takeyama, there are :~o people as clever at propaganda as
the communists. When one reads the AKAHATA, one certainly receives such -
an impression. They always claim to be on the side of justice and utopia.
The trump card they use is the concept of "quality." But recent history _
proves that their ao-called "equality" is actually the lowest form of "in-
equality." Witness the Hungarian incident, the Czechoslovakian incident,
the Pol Pot regime and the Afghan invasion. There is still another "trap-
word." Might it nat be the simulated concept of "neighborliness?"
COPYRIGHT: Shinchosha, 1980
5884
CSO: 4105
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I~~~I,i'~ Ii'(1i, A;~ ~ .~iiCiOLOGICAL
- 5ONOll(1 '1'O 'Ci{E ^tIDDLF. EAST: llIPLOMACY, A POLITICAL TOOL _
_ 'I'oky