JPRS ID: 9158 USSR REPORT PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060044-5
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: REPORTS

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27 MRRCH 1980 t y 1 OF 1
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- JPRS L/9003
27 March 1980
Lati r~ Ar~nerica Re ort ~
p
~
CFOUO 6~/80)
~F~IS FOREIGIV BROADCAST INFJRMATION SERVICE
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r vr vr r 11;1HL U5~ UNLY
JPRS L/9003
27 March 1980
LATIN AMFRICA R~PORi~
_ (FOUO 6/80)
CONTENTS PAGE
EL SALVADOR
'PRELA' Interviews PRS-ERP Leader Villalobo3 -
(Joaquin Villalobos Tnterview; PREI,A, 7~ 9 Mar 80) 1
Salvadoran Revolutionary Interviewed
Second Interview of Villalobos
i)RUGUAY
Briefs -
_ Hungarian Public Health Mission 15
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~ EL SALVADOR
:
'PRELA' INTERVIEWS PRS-ERP LEADER VII,LALOBOS
Salvadoran Revolutionary Interviewed
PA110248 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1810 GMT 7 Mar 80 PA
[Report on the "Main portions" of interview with Joaquin Villalobos, top
political and military leader of the Salvadoran Revolutionary Peoples Army,
conducted by PRELA corres~ondent Mario Menendez Rodriguez, dated 6 March--
"Somewhere in E1 Salvador"]
[TextJ A most uncommon but most efficient and extraordinary school--the
school of errors--where professors and students, the protagonists of pain-
ful and heartrending mistakes,~reflect on the confusion and unrest that
their political conduct has caused among a people immersed in a revolut~on-
ary process. This is a singular school in which the mistakes committed
witl~ regard to the populace are not only admitted. but are corrected in
tlie crucible of the people's struggle until the correct way is chosen again
thereby permitting a secure and firm advance. A school of this type in _
tl~is country at war has an indisputable presence and a well-known name--
� The Revolutionary People's Army, (ERP). The most advanced ERr militants,
in conjunction with important an3 influential sectors of the disp~ssessed
� majority which wanted unity of action among all revolutionary a:~d d~mocratic
organizations, have created the Salvadoran Revolutionary Parcy (Pi.S), which
has the solid political and military strength of the masses.
The synthesis of this spF�clfic experience also has a name: Joaquin Villa-
lobos, the "Rene Cruz" of the underground, the secretary general of the
PRS and at the same time, top leader of the ERP.
For several hours, PRENSA LATIPdA met with the young leader, 28, who aban- �
doned his economic studies to work full time as a revolutionary. The meet- -
ing was held in the home of a typical Salvadoran working class family, a
fitting framework for the sincerity and unaffectedness, the flexibility and
spirit of unity as well as the determination which to3ay character~zes
the members of the PRS-ERP.
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On Militarism and Its Consequences
- Ilowever, before informing the readers of the main portions of the interview
wLth .Joaqiiin Villalobos, it is worthwhile to note that the complex process
of development begun by the ERP in 1971--which evolved through acute con-
flicts--entered a qualitatively superior phase at the first congress of
the PRS in 1977, when the doors were closed to pragmatism, short-sighted- ~
ness, individual ambition for power and control, and militarism with all
its rragic consequences. All of these characteristics had for several
years determined the actions of the ERP and blocked the initial phase of the
PRS. _
' Consider the following: The belief in a short-term victory generated the
concepts and military solution to any type of activity or problem and re-
flected a great underestimation--one could say scorn--for the revolu.tion-
ary moveT~ient of the Salvadoran masses, which was committed to different
methods, forms and means of struggle.
Militarism, for its part, isolated the ERP not only from the people, but
also from the very development of the political process in E1 Salvador. This
was so because the ERP, expecting a prompt resolution to class conflicts
while dedicating its time to preparation of the instruments of war, was pre-
vented from acting and influencing the conjunction of forces that were
operating in the critical phases of the social movement.
Moreover, the hegemonic ambitions demonstrated by the then top chief, Sebas-
tian Urquilla, prevented discussion and internal democracy, encouraged sec-
~arianism and factionalism within the ERP--"Divide and Conquer"--and gave
Eree rein to adventurism, whose most eloquent expression was Carlos Humberto
Poi�~illo (Mario Vladim~.r Rogel) and summary executions as a way to resolve
political disagreements. As a result of this, prestigious members of the
ERP were killed, including the poet Roque Dalton Garcia.
As a logical consec~uence of the above, schisms occurred which tore the ERP
even wider apart. The most important split was that of the ~ectors which
later f.ormed what is tod~y, translated into practice, a prominent and,in-
fluential political-military organization: the national resistan~e. ,
To rediscover the thread of a policy of principles was not, therefore, an
easy task. However, the revolution is a joint problem and the very objec-
Eive reality of the Salvadoran revolutionary process demanded urgent changes.
Therefore, when the instrument of criticism and self-criticism began to be
used by tne most advanced militants--precisely by those who had demonstrated
their heroism in various military operations and who on the basis of the
results of these actions real3zed the need for a link with the movement of
the masses and fo�r unity with the other revolutionary and democratic organ-
izations--the path was opened to collective discussion anclthus began the
destruction of thE mi?.itary structure and the vertical nature of the organ-
ization.
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In the process of recti~ication, a special place is occupied by Rafael
Antonio Arce Zablah, "Amilcar," who fell on 26 September 1975, during the
retreat following the military occupation of Villa del Carmen, in the
castern t,.1 Un~i.on ])epurtment.
Encounter With the Present
- "It has been a very difficult, bitter path. Recovery has demanded a great
sacrifice, but the results are now in sight," adds Octavio Ponc~a, member of -
the political commission of the PRS and of the general staff of the ERP,
as he was ?eading me to some site in the country where Joaquin~Villalobos
could be found.
- "We have matured and improved discipline in the caurse of these years,..to-
day we are certain of the mechanisms which, withcut undermining the dynamism
of the ideological struggle--the engine which mo;;es us to~.,.srd the proper -
positions--insure the unity of the party..." adds the ~.eader who 9 years
ago was among the founders of the ERP.
And what is that unity understood to mean, he was asked. -
Octavio answPred: "By that unity we mean the confidence of all the cadres
and the bases of the party in democratic centralism, which corrects any
possiUle deviation...."
The security measures of the PRS-ERP are similar to those�which are applied
by the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation forces and other Salvadoran
political-military forces...their main pillars are the people themselves,
among whom the revolutionary militants move "like fish in water."
Joaquin Villalobos had chosen the home of a working class family to spend
the night....
"Just as we struggle and work with thern, we also live with them," says the
- "Rene Cruz" of the underground on introducing PRENSA LATINA to his hosts,
who received us amiably, with confidence that the truth will be made public
everywhere.
Things are prepared for the interview and the fighters of hope sit down
to listen to their top leader....
[Question] What are the PRS and the ERP?
[Answer] From the party viewpoint, we could respond in a ~~nceptual manner:
They are the group of political cadres that permit us to prepare for the
task of leading the struggle of the masses for their political and military
~ claims. Inside the organization, they help us to establish the forms and
mett?ods that stimulate the political, tactical and strategic capacity of
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_ the cadres, who are governed by democratic centralism...as far as the army
is concerned, they are perhaps the seed which generated the party and to-
day's peoples army..~however, the most impvrtant thing is that both the
party and the army consider them to be a part of the whole--the advanced
- polltical detachment--in other words, a part of the vanguard of the Salv~z-
dor.ln revolulion...:"
[Question] Why were they created?
[Answer] "It will be necPSSary to look, although briefly, at the history
of the PRS and the ERP, instruments of struggle which are different, but
which have many points of convergence...the ERP emerged around 1971 as
part of a tidal wave...of effervescence and of revolutionary concerns that
~.*ere being maaifested within the political organizations that existed in
the country at the time.... Basically, it emerged because of the need to
create and organize the armed apparatus that would permit the establishment
of new forms of struggle within the Salvadoran revolutionary process....
It was an initial answer, a shortsighted one at the time...it had a dis-
orderly structure, made up of many groups with different views of strategy,
groups which were essentially united by the desire to promote armed strug-
gle in El Salvador.... Later all this was purified and it was channeled
into a process in which the guerrilla cadres reflected, mature and evalu-
ated their experience and acquired a political vision which demanded a link
witti the masses and a structure that would permit adequate political manage-
men~.... In this manner, a greater application of experience made it neces-
sary to enter upon the path of establishing a party.... It is in this risky
process, with many difficulties--internal divisions, schisms--that the party -
was Iormed...there are serious discussions...it is 1975. The process
culminates 2 years later, in 1977, when the first congress is held and the .
main strategic changes are made, one of the most prominent of which is the
eradication of militarism within the organi.zation. The army comes under
its political direction and modifies its structure...it was realized that,
although the upright [verticalismoJ influence was still being felt, the
Salvadoran revolutionary process and its leadership were basically poli-
. tical...the most important thing, therefore, was to establish mechanisms to
adequately channel political and military problems. Hence the party and the
army become historical necessities...."
[Question) What is the PRS-ERP strategy? ~
[Anwser] "Our strategy is that of people's revolutionary warfare. The basic
strategic enemy is imperialism, in alliance with the national oligarchy
and the most reactionary sectors of the army. Within this framework, we
consider ti~e process of formation of the ERP to be a part of the process
of formation of the revolutionary strateAic forces which will make it pos-
sible to de�eatthe enemies of the Salvadoran people. Hawever, although the
strategy of the PRS-ERP is people's revolutionary warfare, it cannot be for-
gotten that we came upon the Salvadoran scene at a time when there was also
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an eruption of a profound crisis in the economic and political structure of -
Central America, which made it possible to see that the revolutionary forces
generated during this period of crisis would necessarily have to assume basic
historical commitments in the framework of a real policy of power in view
of r_t~e weakening of imperialism, the oligar.chy and the puppet governments in
tlie Central Amer:tcan region.... In this sense, in the phase in which the
people's revolutionary warfare is unleashed, the PRS-ERP presented as a
fundamental thesis the application of th~ policy of insurrection, a policy
that was perhaps expressed without all the theoretic and poli~~a?bases
that l~