JPRS ID: 9065 KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080002-9
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• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9065 ~
1 May 1980 =
- Kor~an Affai rs e rt -
R o
~
CFOUO 3/80) ~
~~1S FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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- JPRS L/9065
= 1May1.980
KQREAN AFFAIRS REPORT =
(FOUO 3/80)
_ CONTENTS
SOUTH KOREA -
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Speculation Made About 5outh Korea's New Leaders
- (Takao Ona; GUNJI KENKYU, Jan 80) 1 -
- Power Struggle Within the Korean Military Observed -
_ (Yasuhiro Maeda; SEIiAI, Jan 80) 7
NORTH KOREA
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Kidnapping Incident of Leban.ese Women by North Koreans -
Reported
(Kwi Mun-pom; GUNJI KENKYU, Feb 80) 20 -
~
- a - [III - ASIA - I.09 FOUO]
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- S. KOR~A/gaLITICS ArID GOVERNrII~1T . -
~ SPECL'LATION MADE ABOUT SOUTH KORGA~S :3Ei1 LEADERS ~
_ Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Jan 80 pp 28-37
e [Article by Takao Ona: "Wh~ Will Be Korea's New president"~
- [~xcerpt] TtYe next regular president will need to fill the follawing
requirements:
= 1. *San of integrlty. Up to this point the upper class of Korea has been
very corrupt. Thei-e was much corruption during President Syngman Rhee's
- adrflinistration, an~ conditions didn`t change during President Pak`s. A1mQet
all of the people who became political leaders as a result of their roles
~ in the independence movement have amassed great ~ortunes by dishonest means.
' Previous KCIA directors provide an excellent example. Kim Ch'ae-kyu was ~
the eighth KCIA Director during President Pak's 18--year tenure. The average
~ length of service per person has been 2 years and 3 months. These eight
men all accumulated great wealth. The first director, Kim Chong-pil, was
ousted by Yi Hu-rak, but not before he became knawn as one of the wealthiest
- men in Korea. As for Yi ~iu-rak, it is said his wealth has reached astro-
nomical figures fram his day~ as the head of the President's Secretariat.
Whether this is true or not is unknawn, but it is also said that he was
_ the moneybags for President Pak`s election campaign. The third director,
: Kim Chae-chun, also accumulated a massive fortune even though he was only
- in for 6 months. The sixth KCIA director, Kin Hy~ng-=uk, testified be~c~re
_ the United States Congress during the Pak Tong--hui incident about in~luance -
purchasing attempts amang Anaerican politicians, ituplicating several mem-
= bers of the Rorean cabinet. Howevex, the idea that he had fled to the
_ United States because he had been charged by Pxesident Pak ~or illegal
bribes is nc~t beyond reason. Kiiu Chong-pil, Kim Chae-ch' un, and Kiip Hyong-
; uk, as well as ~irector eF i~',etropolitan Police Yun Pil-yong (who was
imprisoned for bribery), were all me.mhezs o� the ~amous eighth graduating _
class o~ tY.e~Korean znilitary academy which led the revolution to succe.ss
and helped Pak Chong-hui come to pawer. Something is wrong with a politi-
- cal system which gllows people to accumulate such fortunes, and the Korean -
people are aware of this. These types of people will probably not be -
- elected, and if they are Korea's tragedies can be expected to b e repeated.
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2. The second qualificatian is the ability to control the military. Korea
i~ a military ~ation. R~gardless of the people'S like or dislike af their
= adversary relationship with North Korea, national sPCUrity is the over-
riding priority. Accordingly, the military unfts bearing thia burden ~
, have great pawer, and the military particularly has a powerful voice in r
political affairs~ Also, the next president will tiave to possess an ade-
quatQ military background in order to be able to cope in the event of an
emergency action against North Korea, as well as aufficient knowledge of
military affairs to handle military golicies on a day-to-day basis. It
- ia absolutely esaential that the next president be sameone the military -
trusts as well as someone~who can c~ontrol the milita.ry. ,
, For reference sake, the backgrounds of Korean military leaders hav~e been ~
divided into the following three general groups.
~ G~oup one. When the armed forces were formed ar the time of Korea's inde-
pendence, a military school was established. Group one is comprised of -
graduates of this school. At first it was mainly staffed by veterans who
- had been trained in the Japanese and Manchurian armies, but academicians
also joined to form the nucleus of the school. President Pak was a graduate
- of the second class. Those who put him in power, led by Kim G'hong-pil, _
= are members of the eighth graduating class. The school continued for ten _
- classes. At the ti~e of the Korean War, graduates of the tenth class were
active as platoon leaders, etc., and those wha remained in the military
- are today moatly in the general officer class. -
= The second group includes those who are formal graduates of the Korean
Military Academy, established in 1950. It was founded by President Pak .
and by General Yi Han-yim, who is also a graduate of the Japan Military
Academy, and who personally served as the first head of the new acade~y.. -
This academy incorporated the strong points of both the Japan Military _
- Academy and the United States academies, and it developed fine officers
through tough training and rugged individualism. The f irst class was
caught up in the ~orean [Jar after only a year, and many of them were killed. _
The second and subsequent classes receyved a full 4 years of formal school-
ing despite the continuing war. Today the most illustrious of these
graduates is Major General Chon Tu-hwan, Commandzng General o~ the Defense _
Security Command (Director o~ the Joint Investigation Headquarters under
ilartial Law Command), who just arrested KCIA. Dir~ctor Kim Ch'ae-kyu. _
Including majors and brigadier generals, ther~ are today apQroximately ~
~ 50 general o�ficers �rom the academy serving in important military line
- and staff positions such as division commanders. There are two yiews
regarding the cohesiveness of gzaduates o~ the academy. The ~irst view
is that the ties among these gxaduates is extremely strong, and the
second is that they are not because up till this point associations have -
been frowned upon by thz KCIA. However, it is believed there is su~f i- -
cient cohesion for them to uni~y in the event of an emergency. Both
- inside the military as well as in a domestic sense this group is like the
eye of a hurricane. Within the military their statements carry immense ~
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weigtit, and there is no doubt that they can also influence the public as
well. Presently, there are academies for each of the thr~e branches of -
the armed services, but the navy and air force academi2s are snall, and
theJ* are not a part of this power clique.
- The third group includes those who participated in the Korean War at the =
_ same time that the regular military academy was being established. This "
= involved only three or four classes, but they produced many heroes. Haw- -
ever, they do not exert any concentbated power and in addition it is
diffic~lt to identify exactly who belongs to this group. For instance,
included are those who are naw in the reserves after having received ROTC
training in college and served as officers in the military. Perhaps
= including them is not totally proper, but they are v~ry numerous. -
~ Hawever, although at the present time the military has declared emergency
martial law� it has also stated that it will not participat~ in the elec-
tion process, and that their policy is to support acting President Kyu
- Ha-choi.
- 3. So~eone acceptable to the United States. This is another condition
~ which cannot be overZooked. If Rorea were abandoned by the United States
it would be thrown into turmoil. For instance, public opinion started
boiling at President Carter's announcement of withdrawl of American troops
_ stationed in Korea. Although the troop withdrawl was postponed for the -
time ~eing because of U.S. military estimates of a large military buildup
~ by North Korea, in light of President Carter's hwnan rights diplomacy the
iJnited States will seiae this opportunity to put pressur~ on Korea to
: seiect more democratic leaders. Many signs have already appeared of this _
pressure on Rorea in efforts to force it to comply with the spirit of
- the Korean Security Pact, and South K~orea is naw trying to do so. Some- -
~ne who can work with the United States is a very important consideration.
= 4. Someone not born in North Rarea. This may be thought to be somewhat
_ inconsequential, but the South Korean "allergy" to North Rorea is some- _
thing that cannot be ignored. President Pak shunned North Ror~ans, chiefly ~
~ elevating people from his native province of Ryonsang. The number of
people from his home area in high po7_itica3. and especially~financial circles
is st~rtling. Resentment o~ this "Ryonsang 3rtafia" is very strong.
When President Pak initiated the reyolution, he set much stoxe on the
contributions o~ people �xow North RoTea. But a~ter the xeyolution they -
- were not permitted to entex the countzy, and many of the nvw outToz-~avor ~
North Koreans quickly inmuigrated to the United States ox' z'etxeated 3nto -
religion. As a result, today mast Chxistian organizatians in South Korea
are opposition hotbeds and radical anti-establishment organizatians.
~ Peopl.e born in North Korea are numexous, and the people who were not able
to immigrate or enter religion have become a source of domestic unrest.
_ Haw to deal with the "Kyonsang Maf.ia" and the displaced North Koreans will
. be a difficult problem for some time to come.
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S. Someone with charisma. This ~s only the opini4n o~ this writer, but
- charis~a is an absalute essential.
So~r~eone with the appeal of President Pak is not likely to come forth, but
- it will not be possible for soneone lacking some degree of chariama to -
become president and effectively lead the country.
There are obviously other political and experience conditions, but by
! and Iarge someone fillir,g the atsove qualific.ations w~11 be chosen as the
- formal successor.
fiherefore, this is nothing more than speculation, but since the names of
Kim Cl~ong�-pil, Yi Hu-rak, Chong I1-kwon, and Pak Chong-kyu have appeared _
- in the news media, a look at them on an individual b asis is in order.
; Acting President Choi Kyu~ha will probably be the last president to be in
. office longer than a normaZ term, Choi attended high school in Tokyo, . -
graduate school at "Daido" in Manchuria, and has been a professor at
- Seoul Lr.iversity. He was at ~ne timQ the hQad of tihe Korean Consulate
General to Japan. Having no military, bac~Cground or great charisma, he
~ himself has said he will not run for election.
- Kim Chong-pil
- Once the pri~e minister, Kim received the backing ~f President Pak and _
has made a comeback, to become president o� the party in power, the Republi-
~ can Party. Although he initially said that he would not run in the Decem- -
" ber presidential elections in order to avoid causing further confusion,
- he is now very mucn inclined to do so. At the present time he is coimnonly
- believed to be the favorite. A very forceful person, he has many enemies,
and in order to achieve his objecti~~es it will be necessary for him to
- supprese these political fops. That will be a prot~lem, and the fact that =
in the paet he has lacked somewhat in the first area of integrity will also
hurt him. The public and the military will probably overlook past mistakes,
but they will have misgivings.
Yi Hu-rak
Once considered a man of great ability, he overdid things during the Kim
Dae-jung incident and �ell in~o dis#ayox. k'oz a time he apparently
retreated into seclusion at a temple studying, but he has since made a
comeback as a non-elected ~ue.~her o~ the Koxean Congress. He is ambitious,
but his chances are not considered to be good, and his ~ain e~~ect has _
been to elevate the chances o~ Kinl Chong-pil. He has close connections
with the U.S. CIA, hut does that mesn that the United States will support -
him? Also, will the Koxean people elect soznepne with his corrupt zecord? _
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= Chong I1-kwon
Chong I1-icwon possesaes a splendid record as Chief of the Joint Chiefa
of Staff at the time of the counterattack during the Korean War, as -
Ambassador to the United States and France, and as P~resident of the Korean =
Congresa. He is ~ighly intelligent, and he handlea himself flawlessly. ~
A member of the Japan Academy class of 1955 and a veteran of the Manchurian
arsay, he was senior even to President Pak. If chosen as.his auccesaor =
he will be a progreaeive leader. He is also highly acceptable to the
United States and enjnya the Cruat of the peopLe. However, it 1s unfortu-
nate that he is of North Korean origin, and he lacka charisma. Iie may also -
lack the ambition to become president.
Pak Chong-kyu
The former Chief of the Presidential Security Service, he resigned after
having accepted responsibility for the Yuk Yong-su shooting incident, and
so it will not be necessary to consider him further. _
In conclusion, it is believed that there is no really suitable successor _
among these men. If this writer were to make a bold guess as to whom =
might follow it would be that some candidate might appear with the backing
" of the military. The military might pick an active or retired military -
leader and act to sway public opinion to put him in office. Certainly -
rhere is someone in the military who is both upright and charismatic.
- Ha~wever, it will still be a little too early for a graduate of the regular -
military academy. Ma~or General Chon Tu-hwan of the Defense Security ~
Co~ar??and has been mentioned in some newspaper.s, but it is still too early =
_ for him. Rather, isn't he in a poaition to put soiueone else in power? r
The feeling one gets is that General Han Sin, former Chief of the Joint ~
- Chiefs of Staff, is a prime candidate. He meefis all the requirements. _
The only question is whether he is inclined to seek office. Finally, _
this writer apologizes to all candidates, and he realizes that all the _
above can be disregarded as mere speculation by an outsider.
Ten million refugees to come to Japan. =
~ The present and future problems of Squth Korea �ollowing President Pak's
death have been related in great detail, but the fact of the znatter is
= South Korea wants stabitity above all else. It would not be oyercon~i-
- dent to say that within grasp is ~eace with the wozld as well as prosperity _
like Japan`s. If the Carter admini~stxation were to give genexous support
tawards stabilization, it would help solve many o~ their proble,ms, On the
_ other hand, in the case of Japan, Prime Minister Ohira announced that he
would attend the state funeral ~ox President Pak, but then he canceled -
his visit for political reasons. The head o~ the Banking, Cama~terce, and
Industries Association, a previous Ambassador to Japanj criticized this
- as an example of a wait-and-see attitude in Japaneae econamic and political
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- circles, but as a member of a pro-Japanese faction his words are probably
" representative of the f eelings of the Rorean people. Japan should listen
" more carefully to what is being said. _
- If the South were to f a"sl into the hands of North Koreas it is er.~irely ,
posaible that 10 million South Korean refugees would attempt to f lee to -
= Japan. The Vietnamese and Cambodian refugee problem would be nothing -
- compared to this. When I submitted this idea to several political leaders,
I was given the cold shoulder with "Japan would not be able to accommodate
- the refugees." t
= ~de Japanese must be more neighborly and pay more attention to people less
= fortunate than we throughout the world. Then we must act in accordance
with reality. _
- COPYRIGHT: Japan Military Review 1980 _
9180 _
CSO: 4105 -
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_ S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVFRNMENT ~
POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE KOREAN MILITARY OBSERVED _
= Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Jan 80 pp 150-158 -
[Journalist Yasuhiro Maeda states the relationship between Pak's death and
the old and new military leaders of South Korea]
[Text] Pak Chong-hui had held supreme power in South Korea for the 18 and ~
' one half years since he, as a major general, had himself led young officers -
in a military coup d'etat. On the evening of 26 O~tober 1979 he was killed
= by a pistol shot from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) Director
- Kim Chae-hyu, an associate from Pak's locale and from his class at the Korean
Military Academy (KMA). This closed the curtain on a dictatorship of length
- unprecedented in that country.
The 'leading players' in this shocking murder mystery were, in addition to
= President Pak and Director Kim, Presidential Secretary General Kim Kye-won
- and Presidential Security Force [PSF] Director ~h'a Chi-ch'ol. These four
men who ~aere at the center of power suddenly fell into a relationship of
inurderer and victim. Investigating the facts of this trage3y is the Joint _
Investigation Headquarters (Defense SecLrity Command Chief Chon Tu-hwan) of
the Martial Law Command, of which Army Chief of Stiaff Chong Sung-hwa is
_ Martial La~~ Commander. A'post-Pak system' is about to be created wholly
by the mili~ary.
� Naturally the future course of the milirary is the focus of interest inside _
and outside South Korea.
~ The long rule of President Pak, who had a military background, was supported
by the KCIA, the Army Security Command (CIC--in 1977 the three services were
combined to form the Defense Security Command), the Presidential Security
Force and Secretariat, and by the cabin~et and national enterprises; theae _
= organizations include large numbers of persons with military backgrounds or
connections. On the oth~r hand, a new phenomenon has come up quickly in the
past few years--the shift to a new technocrat class, civil officials traine3
in Europe or the U.S., and a new generation within the military itself, The
- 'human element' which will move South Korea hereaftPr has become more com-
plex. The leadership of the new era will be outlined here, with a focus on
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the established power group, which has experienced terrific power struggles
and repeated changes of alignment, and on the movements of the young profes-
sional military men backed by 600,000 troops.
Despite the stimulus of the great misfortune of the shooting of the president, -
the political and militar}* situation has, on the surface, remained miraculously
- calm. On the basis of martial law and in the name of preparation for the =
_ eventuality of war, immediately following the incident all South Korean
military forces were put in an alert status and directed toward maintaining
- domestic order. This is seen as a factor which kept the people calm.
Some even suspected that some sort of 'prior' arrangements had been made to
handle the incident in an orderly way. Rumors of a military coup d'etat or _
of some military involvement circulated inside and outside the country.
~ GIl 6 November the Joint Investigation Headquarters put together a final re-
_ port on the shooting and, attempting to settle the case, stressed that "KCIA '
Director Kim Chae-kyu acted alone in trying to seize power, and the military -
was not involved in the matter.'
However, the relationship which Director Kim Chae-kyu, the criminal, and the
KCIA organization as a whole have with the military is close, personal and
- unseverable. Director Kim was the father of the Army Security Command, and
mar:y cf his followers remain within the present Defense Security Command led
by Chon Tu-hwan. It is impossible, f or that reason, to fathom the shock this _
~ incident gave the military as a whole. It can be said, in view of the intri-
cately involved interrelationships of these influential figures, that it will
take the military a long time to recover from the turmoil.
It is not hard to imagine that the military of South Korea, which in the -
30 years the state has existed has come to pride itself on having one of
the world's strongest armies, has lost its confidence at least temporarily in
the unusual situation wherein a subordinate has used his weapon to send the
_ heaci of state to the grave. There have been, therefore, more than a few pre-
dictions that the military would run wild, but a month after the incident the
possibility of a coup d'etat by the military has disappeared. -
Immediately after the incident, Defense Minister No Chae-hyon joined with
Chiet of Staff Chong Sung-hwa and other leaders of the three services to
announce a policy of support for the interim government centering on Acting . _
President Ch'oe Kyu-ha. The people of Sauth Korea, and al.so such friendly
countries as Japan and the U.S., were again impressed with the pervasive
p-resence of that country's military. At the same time, there were growing .
fears tnat the military might mave toward establishment of a'Pak-less Pak
~ system', that is, a military government. However, on 3 November U.S. S~cretary
oE State Vance, who attended the state funeral for President Pak, demanded a
democratic system in South Korea and it became clear that the military fully
supported civilian government, thus for the time being reassurinr those within '
~nd without voicing desire for civilian rule. ;
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It came about that the military autl?orities withdrew (on 7 Nove~be~) from -
- the Emergency Measures Council that was formed from the military and the
cabinet right after the incident, and procedures were worked out for the
election of a President in December under Acting President Ch'oe, and for ~
= revision of the constitution. It is still possible, however, for the mil- ~
itary to exercise behind the scene influence until the new regime is estab-
lished, and it is quite possible that influential persons With military back- _
grounds or high military officials will participate directly in the new
rPgime. ~ _
Looking at the leaders kho will be responsible, it appears, for the regular -
_ government following the Ch'oe interim government, there are established
- persons of influence who k~ave produced 'records' of upholding the Pak regime
through repeated ups and aowns, and there are opposition forces and oppositiun
party leaders, primarily non-military. If finan~ial power, inf luence within
the government party and t~?e support of the military are considered to be _
factors in the ability to run the government, it is clear that influential
persons of military background, who extended their influence as fierce stXUg- R
gles for loyalty developed under Pres~dent Pak, will line up as close as -
; possible to the new government. ~
Personal Ties
It is said that there are ia South Korea some 14~ persons trained in the
Japanese Army Officers School during the nearly 60 years up to I945 ~hen the -
cosntry became independent on the defeat of Jaga~x (from the South Korean
monthly magazine WOLGAN CHUNGANG, August 1977). According to this magazine,
- 114 of these served in t~ie Japanese Army, and 27 passed through the prepara~tory
course of the Manchurian Army Office~s School before entering the standard
course of the Japanese Miiitary Academy. These included PresidenL Pak and ~
also Chong I1-1cwTOn (former speaker of the National Assem~ly, former prime -
- minister), Yu Chae-hung (former minister of defense), Chong Hyok-nae (former
minister of defense), Chang Sa-ryang {.former chief of Naval Operations),
and Yi Se-ho (former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former minister
of defense). In addition there are m3ny with backgrounds in the old Japanese
Army as student soldiers or conscripts, and Ambassador to Japan Kim Chong-yom
(presidential secretary general for 10 years from November 1969) Qxperie~~ced
the bombing of Hiroshima as an en].isted man. Former Lieutenant General Ch'oe
Tok-sin (a graduate of China's Whampoa Military Academy, age 65), who served
as Foreign Minister for two and a half years beginning in October 1961, ~usz
after the coup d'etat by Major General Pak, once characterized General Pak's
regime as 'the most pro-Japanese government Korea hae ever produced.~ Ch'oe -
lost out in a power struggle with the Japanese Military Academy faction and
: fled to the U.S., where he has engaged in anti-Pak propaganda since the end
of 1977.
= The South Korean Army began as the National Defense Constabulary f~llowing _
litreration from Japan in i945. Qn 5 Ocbober 1948, with the establishment
of tt~e Syngman Rheee regiII~e, it became indeper.dent of the U.S. military govern-
ment and was constituted as a regular army. It was necessary to quickly
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- re~ruit a military cadre, and the 'Military English School' (January to June
_ 1.94~) was created. This was a ~ratter of recruiting former military men with
a variety of experiences in the former Japanese army, the Chinese arm;~ and
~ tt1P_ anti-Japanese Korean army, and having the U.S. Army retrain ther~ in
American methods. One who shone among these was Yi Hu-rak, a legislator of the
_ ruling Democratic-Re~ublican Party (former KCIA dixector, former ambassador to
Japat~). Another was Presidential Secretary General Kim Kye-won (a~e 56}, the -
accomplice in the shooting of FresidenL PaK. Secretary General Kim was also
one ,:f the group that entered the school form Yonhui College Business Adminis-
tr~~tion Department, (predecessor of the present Yonsei University). The
r!ilitary English School lasted a mere half year, but over a hundred graduated;
using English freely, they served as an active link with the U.S. forces in
- South Korea.
Then in June 1948 the National Defense Constabulary Academy was established,
and ~oith the crea.tion of the state in 194$ it was officially named the Korean
Military Academy. At that time it was intensive education lasting from one and
, a half to six months. The First Class included Special Presidential Advisor
So Chong-ch'ol (former Defense Minister, age 54) and National Unification
Board member Kim Chom-kon (former Major General, age 56).
In}~erestingly enough, both President Pak and KCIA Director Kim Chae-kyu (age -
53) c�~ere members of the Second Class. Director Kim had been a middle school -
- t~,acher in Taegu, but Pak, who was nine years his senior but from the same
ho~ne town, urgend Kim to `come along to the military academy.' Kim entered
the academy at the age of 20 and it is said his marks were always at the top
of the class. Until 1950 when the Korean war broke out, training usually
_ lasted six mo.iths, and the creation of senior officers was rushed. A pro-
r~inent member of the third class was Minister of Defense No Chae-hyon (age
53). Having served as army chief of staff in 1972 and chairman af the ~oint
chiefs of staff in 1975, he was the first member of his class to become a
cabinet minister (1977).
In the emergency cabinet meetii:g called by the Defense Ministry after the crime, .
~o irnmediately arrested Director Kim Chae-kyu, who puffed out his chest and -
said, 'the United States is behind me,' and thus No had the distinction of
preventing seizure of the government--a coup d'etat embroiling the military.
In the Fourth Class was Kim Chong-hwan, who succeeded vo as Chairman of the
.Toint Chiefs of Staff and has served in that position since 1977. The role
of r.he chairman is to coordinate activities among the three services. Heading ~
tt;e li.st of the fifth class was Army Chief of Staff Chong Sung-hwa. Actual
control over the .rmy is concentrated in Chong; he also serves as Martial
Law Commander and can be called the strongest person in the military at pre-
sen~. Like President Pak and Director Kim Chae-kyu he came from Kyongsang -
Prevince, and there are still many puzzling questions about his actions at the -
time of the crime, such as the matter of his having been summoned by Director
';.i.m and being near the scene of the shooting. '
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- The "elite Eighth Clasa" among the revolutionary forces which took action along ~
with Ma~or General Pak began training in December 1948. To form a regular
army a call was made for 1800 men and over 30,000 young men responded; aiz
_ assembly of talent was selected from the best of Korea's youth.at that time.
They were commiasioned as the first officers after Ko~ean independence, and
they went into the Korean War two yeara later as first lieutenanta. Moat -
of them died in that war. There were many youth in the Eighth Class who had
come south from a dislike for the communist system. They formed an officer
class with a strong sense of anti-communism, and it should be noted that this
determ~ned the subsequent thought structure of the South Korean military. The =
_ few survivora are represented by ruling Democratic-Republican Party President =
Kim Chong-p'il (former Prime Minister). Next is Yi Pyong-hui, a legislator .
of that party (former First Minister Without Portfolio, age 53), who is known
- as a pipeline between Japan and South Korea. And there are other personalities
who have subsequently spent lives full of turmoil, like the legislator of the
same party Kil Chon-sik (age 55); former Army Security Command chief Kang
- Ch'ang-song (formzr major general, age 52), presently director of the Maritime
_ and Port Authority; Kim Hyong-uk (former KCIA director, in his 40's);
- 0 Ch'i-song (former minister of home affairs); Kim Tong-hwan (former Republican
Party floor leader); and Kil Chae-ho (former Republican Party secretary `
_ general). -
= Even now the military is largely in the hands of the Sev~nth and Eighth Classes,
= which provided the present commanders of the corps guarding the border, the
First, Second and Third Army Commanders, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the =
vice minister and Assistant Deputy Minister of Defense. The war broke out _
just after the Ninth Class began school, and the Eleventh Class, which entered
- echool in June 1950, was the first composed of high school graduates selected
for four years ~f education; they graduated the spring following.the end of
- the war in 1953. It is this Eleventh Class that is usually called the First -
Class of the Korean Military Academy. Defense Security Command Chief Chon
Tu-hwan is a member of this new First Class. All of them have become generals
since 1973, and they are the group wnich w111 grasp the real power upon the _
retirement of the senior group of military officers, which is expected to be ~
accelerated on the occasion of this change of government. _
The present size of the Military Academy has about 250 cadets per year, and
100 each more for the Naval and Air Force Academy. All together about 400
per year become officers to direct the 600,000-man military. President Pak -
: considered the personal ties of the acad.emy to be important, and in 1977 he
had his oldest son, Chi-man (age 21) enrolled in the Military Academy, where
i he is now in his second year.
The Korean War was the occasion for great expansion of the South Korean mili- ,
tary, and including marines it reachec~ a scale of 650r000 men by 1970. At
this time there are no longer a Marine Corps (abolished as of the end oi
1973), but the military is still huge, with an army of 550,000 (1,100,000
reserves), an air force of 30,000 (55,000 reserves) and a navy of 25,000
(25,000 reserves).
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Retirements, Purges and Falls
_ Korean society was to a large degree closed, on the basis of an awareness -
of blood-relations, pedigree and school and provincial ties, and had come to
be characterize~ by a lack of ability to organize human resources. Under the
_ influence of the U.S. military, however, the South Korean military grew into
the only segment of society having strong organiza[ion and vertical and hor-
_ izonta]. solidarity.
~ There are many who take the view that the military, having attained such great
_ strength, is evident in all political matters and dominates the political sit-
- uation of South Korea. So far, thou~h, the military has maintained quite
strict political neutrality, and it also avoided involvement in politics during
the 12 years of dictatorship of Syngman Rhee. At the time of the outbreak ~
of the student revolution in April 1960 the military did not attempt to take -
action, in contrast to security and police authorities that set about re-
pressing the masses. And at the time of the military coup d'etat by Major `
General Pak Chong-hui's group, the other military units d~d not take political -
action.
What President Pak, who had come to power on the basis of his military s~rength,
feared most as he held powQr subsequently was none other than military inter- ~
vention in political matters. Therefore in addition to purging and driving
out politicians in general, he caused generals with the political strength to
become future political enemies and key officers who could develop leadership
in the military as 4 whole to retire one after another, and diverted them into _
- enterprises with no direct relations with the administration. Thus he
redoubled his efforts to nip in the bud any 'second coup d'etat.' ,
Directly after the 16 May coup d'etat President Pak Chong-hui showed his fangs -
by transferring more than 260 general officers to reserve status, isolating
them from the center of military affairs. For the past 18 years he has done
all he could to remove prominant military figures, and has not permitted the
= existence of a number two man. In the period prior to President Pak's inau-
- guration at the end of 1963 nine cases of attempted rebellion designated as
'plots against the state' were exposed. All of these were struggles to seize _
power in opposition to the Pak-Kim Chong-p'il line; the first began with the
arrest of Supreme Council for National Reconstruction Chairman Chang To-yong,
- the coup d'etat figurehead who had been appointed chairman of the Military
- Revolutionary Committee from his position as Army Chief of Staff. Revolutionary
- Committee members Brigadier General Song Ch'an-ho and Colonel Pak Ch'i-ok were
deposed at the same time as Chairman Chang, but in all these cases they were
from narth of the 38th parallel. In the Syngman Rhee era, President Rhee had
himself come from the north, and northerners made up 80 or 90 percent of the
South Korean military leadership at that time. For this reason, President
Pak began with moves to put the military in the hands of southerners. With -
strong pressure from the U.S., Chairman Chang managed to take asylum in the
U.S. Later, in 1977, Yujonghoe member Kan Mun-pong (former Lieutenant
General) was ,jailed for corruption. Kang, who was said to be close to
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former Na[ional Assembly Speaker Chong I1-kwon (from Hamgyong Province), was
accused of plotting the overthrow of the Pak regime, and there were rumors
of the~.'final treason' of influential northerners against President Pak.
One remarkably long-lived northerner was the super-elite Chong I1-kwon~ who _
held a series of key posts in the military and even served as Prime Minieter
and Speaker of the National Aasembly. He had the reputation and military
record to withstand President Pak, and he as well-received by the American -
military; he wxs early considered a likely successor, buC as a northerner,
the path to number one was closed to him.
President Pak, exhibiting his adroit trickery and unusual skill in personnel
administration even against the revolutionary core group, the coup comrades of
the IQ~L4 Eighth.Class, attempted to divide them into small factions and diffuse
their energy.
In 1977 the influential South Korean evening newspaper TONGA ILBO surveyed
- the paths of some 87 men frum among the revolutionary mainstream force.
Some like Kim Chong-p'il and legislator Pak Chong-kyu (former PSF chief)
- were still powerful and found in prominent places such as the National As-
sembly, the PSF, the KCIA, state-run enterprises and the cabinet. But over -
half had suffered such tragic fates as being deposed, imprisoned or exiled.
More than twenty--such as former Lieutenant General :?ak Im-hang--lacked means
_ of daily support. Even the eight who have served as Director of the KCIA, ~
founded by President Pak, have had dramatic fates. Three are left: Kim _
Chong-p'il, the first; legislator Yi Hu-rak, the sixth; and Special Presi-
dential Advisor Sin Sik-~u, the seventh. Kim Hyong-uk, who boasted the longest
tenure as KCIA Director at six years and three months, displayed great shrewd- -
- ness as President Pak's right-hand man. He shifted huge amounts of money to ~
the U.S., and became a topic of conversati.on through exposure of the involve-
ment of the Pak government and the KCIA in payoffs to U.S. congressmen and
the kidnapping of Kim Tae-chung; he is one of the `influential persons' who
escaped abroad. One wonders why Secretary General Kim Kye-won (the fifth),
who en~oyed the confidence of President Pak, decided to cast his lot with
Director Kim Chae-kyu. There are many who make the interpretation that -
President Pak was ready to demote him, and that it was a matter of t~ec _
cornered mouse biting the cat.' The truth of the matter, however, has not -
yet been made known.
Kim Chong-p'il, who married President Pak's niece, has also repeatedly come
into conflict with the President, and has been compelled to travel abroad.
After leaving the post of Prime Minister at the end of 1975 he lived in
Geclusion for nearly four years.
And Yi Hu-zak, from the time of the Kim Tae-chung kidnapping in the summer
of 1973 to his election to the National Assembly in the general election at -
- the end of last year, was allowed no political life at al.l.
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- The Old Gang of Five And the New Gang of Three
_ From the 1960s until ].973 five men from the revolutionary mainstream force--
_ these Kim and Yi, PSF Chief Pak Chong-kyu, Capital Security Command Chief -
- Yun P'i~-yong and Army Security Command Chief Kang Ch,'ang-song--formed the =
nucleus of the Pak regime. However, Commander Yun was s�ddenly removed
from his Post on charges of embezzlement and accepting bribes, and Commander -
Kang also disappeared for several years because of corruption. Security ~
Force Chief Pak was held responsible for an incident of sniping at President -
Pak in the summer of 1974 (in which Yuk Yong-su, the President's wife was �
killed) and removed from his post. In this way the era of 'five close a~-
sociates' came to an end. _
After that the aura of direct Presidential rule grew even stronger. Bureaucrats
with purely administrative backgrounds emerged--men like Prime Minister Ch'oe
Kyu-ha, Foreign Minister Pak Tong-ching and Culture Minister Kim Song-chin--
and growing numbers of special Presidential advisors and secretaries had
backgrounds as scholars or journalists.
During the first half of the Pak regime, from 1961 to 1971 or 1972, there `
were many former military men appointed to all fields of endeavor. They
were elements which supported the Pak regime from the outside. During the
Syngman Rhee era the cabinet members of military background amounted to
seven or eight percent, but under the Pak regime one out of four ministers
.was military,, 23 percent of the members of the Seventh National Assembly
(1967) were of military origin, the presidents of many business and financial
institutions were general officers, and the majority of the heads of state-
run enterprises were usually military elders. This was a policy that killed
two birds with one stone: on the one hand it could be used to separate mili- '
- tary elders from the military organization while avoiding their discontent
by giving them a certain amount of financial power; on the other hand it _
- brcught about an expansion of the forces of the ruling party. In many cases ~
persons of influence who were not given these diverse posts were regarded _
as 'elements' who could not live under the Pak regime and left the country _
as emigrants or exiles; many of them subsequently turned tc ~he anti-Pak -
- movement.
After the system of 'five close associates' crumbied, those who constituted
the new close associates of President Pak, apart from the bureaucrats with
purely administrative backgrounds, were Kim Chae-kyu, Kim Kye-kyu [as pub-
lished] and Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, ali of military origin, who took the leading parts
in the current assassination. Previous [PSF chiefs] Pak Chong-kyu a~d Kim
Chong-yom were both civil officials with no record of serv ice in the Korean
military. PSF Chief Ch'a Chi-ch'ol had been a paratrooper who graduated f~om
U.S. Infantry School, and although militarily second class to the YCMA graduates
Kim Kye-won and Kim Chae-kyu, without question President Pak was set on having
military men for his new cJose associates. The 'new gang of three' which _
took power in place of the 'old gang of five' counterbalanced each other in -
- the struggle of loyalties, and faced catastrophe as they surrounded the pivotal
= President Pak. It cannot be denied that the fall of the 'old gang of five'
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was also the result of dissention and power struggles among Kim, Yi, Pak, Yun ~
- and Kang. Although he was able to avoid being shot with a pistol at that time, _
it is hard not to imagine that President Pak repeatedly faced explosive crises
around 1973.
- President Pak, who cut down without mercy the powerful and thoae who had
brought about the military coup d'etat, had while causing strugglea for loyalty
among the new gang af three intended to ride out the second phase of th~ re- _
~ storation movement which started at the end of 1978, but in the end, every- -
thin~ "exploded."
This crime unintendedly brought to the surface the South K4rean military's
~ complex personal ties, which are intertwined with rank and seniority.
It appears that Director Kim Chae-kyu originally tried to win over Army Chief
- of Staff (General) Chong. He was confident that it was he himself who had made
General Chong the Chief of Staff. The background of his claim of 'U.S. backing' _
may have been the idea that if the incumbent Director of the KCIA took organ-
ized and decisive action, the U.S. would have to give tacit recognition, even
if only after the f act. In Korea it is often the case that when an influential
person changes posts he takes along the direct subordinates in whom he has con-
- fidence, at the same time creating a communal organization which is firmly
united in terms of status and advancement. The other side of this is that de-
- motion and downfall also extends to the whole group. The s~ubordinates that
Director Kim Chae-kyu had nurtured during long years of activity in the mil-
itary and in the Army Security Command went along with him to the KCIA, and
Kim's excessive confidence that he had a firm circle of first-rate, loyal
soldiers was linked with his idea of shooting the president and seizing power.
. The treatment of Director Kim Chae-kyu since the incident--changing from simple
removal from the directorship, to arrest, and to referral to court martial--
have shown a glimpse of the anguish of the leaders of the military. In other
words, those leaders were forced to turn away from the tight relationship
which had existed previously and perform ma3or surgery to remove a part of the
military.
As mentioned previously, Minister No Chae-hyon, JCS Chairman Kim Chong-hwan, "
Chief of Staff Chong and Director Kim share seninr - junior relationships
that go back to the military academy.
The talented people in the military and from the military who will be maving
up hereafter are Deputy Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyo and Deputy
_ Commander of the U.S. - Korea Joint Command Yu Pyong-hyon, (both of the KMT
Seventh Classj, and Army Deputy Chief of Staff Yi Hui-song who became acting -
KCIA Director and reorganized the KCIA immediately after the incident, Assistant
Deputy Minister of National Defense Yi Pom-chun, and Assistant Deputy Minist~r
_ of National Defense Yu Hak-song (all of the Eighth Class).
Of note in the new First Class (Eleventh Class) is Commander Chon Tu-hwan,
Chief of the Joint Investigation Headquarters of the Martial Law Command. �
Commander Chon gained distinction in that class. President Pak had his eye
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on him, and made him chief of the Security Command as a major general. This
_ was an unusuai choice in that the post had perviously been held by lieutenant
generals. Director Kim Chae-kyu was the superior who had created the Security �
"Command,,but in the report of the facts of the crime, Commander Chor~ reflected
_ the will of the mainstream of the military by maintaining strict neutrality.
He determined that Director Kim's crime was 'the result of a personal grie-
. vance,' and drew a sharp line between Director Kim and the military, even
though Kim was a military elder. Compared with the first ten classes of the
military academy--the older generation--whose desire for political power was "
strong, the Eleventh and subsequer~.t classes have many members with experience
- in U.S. schoo].s, who have been indoctrinated with a perfect West Point style
of training, and fiave been raised as a generation which understands the ad- ~ `
- ministrative methods of civilian control. They are now lieutenant colonels,
- colonels and Major Generals, and the differences of approach to national -
- political and defense matters between them and the close associates of the
politicians and the pre~ident, the people who transferred to the president's -
private organs ].ike the KCIA, are growing more prominant each year.
_ Another inescapable phenomenon is the fact that there had begun to be a solid
= core of� officers who turned a critical eye on the matter of President Pak
having surrounded himself with people of military origin who caught his fancy.
Within the same military there was a substantial change in the quality of the
personnel, with the dividing line coming two or three years after the Korean
War. Thus, in the last 10 years there have come to be many officers who if
- anything, tend to share, the same new national and political awareness with
- the rapidly rising technocrats, government officials returned from the U.S., _
~ournalists and scholars.
Moreover, a gap has arisen between them and those like President Pak who
have backgrounds in the old Japanese army, to the extent that military ex- _
perts in Seoul have commented that 'the distinction is so great one would ~
not think they were from the same country.' -
It is this new generation of military men that was able to act cooly and take
a defense posture that was perfect from the perspective of national security,
even in the face of a shock like the assassination of the head of state.
Therefor.e, even if one of the influential persons mentioned in rumors does
advance, on the basis of direct national elections and democratic procedures
in the National Assembly, there is no question but that he would be strongly
influenced by the views of the military. _
There is also the factor, however, that one cannot say a person with military
background or a strong voice in the military will automatically receive the
' support of the military. Anticoum?unism is common to both the ruling and the
opposition parties of South Korea. And all classes of the people agree on
government premised on a close military relationship with the U.S. Opposition
to the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea can also be called a national con-
CPI1SllS. In the 1971 presidential election only a million votes separated ~ _
former presidential candidate Kim Tae-chung from President Pak; it was
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literally personal combat between the two, and it is safe to say that in this
= direct national election many mi].itary personnel cast their votes for Kim
_ Tae-chung.
Wavea of Democratization and Change
Acting Preaident Ch'oe Kyu-ha is strongly expected to have only an interim
government. The following administration will depend largely on whether there
is order~y implementation of such things as enactment of the constitution,
normalization of the National Assembly and the holding of fair elections. It
is certain that non-military politicians will surface sooner or later--such
figures as Kim Yong-sam, President the New Democratic Party, an opposition
party constituting an anti-Pak force, former President Yi Ch'ol-sung of that
party who has taken a middle course, and Kim Tae-chung who still maintains -
considerable influence. The old guard who are aiming for a'Pak-less Pak
system' naturally support those with military backgrounds like Kim Chong-p'il,
Chong I1-kwon and Yi Hu-rak, and other elders of the ruling party. These -
are a11 personalities who demonstrated strength (or shrewdness in some cases) -
under the Pak regime, and while each of them has his own strengths and weak-
nesses, they are all at the minimum distance from the next government in
terms of popular recognition. Almost no one thinks that military leaders
- who are not well known to the people would be able in the next while to lead
the political world in South Korea, even though they had real influence within
the military. It is quite conceivable, on the other hand, that the military,
as a collective pressure group, will give its support to the completely
civilian Acting President Ch'oe Kyu-ha because of his popular recognition and
- because he presents little risk.
So far there have been no indications that the military would reject a purely
civilian--de-Pakified--government ~s lon~ as it involves no radical change in
the realm of national sec�rity.
It is safe to say that over 18 years President Pak succeeded in the 'political
emascualtion' of the military, and the side effect of a relative drop in the
- status of the military cannot be ignored either. At one time the military -
was the major source of the talent the nation needed, but as the various
segments of the society matured, that role of the military gradually came to
an end. To the extent ~hat South Korea had to become a modern nation in the
areas of diplomacy, economics and domestic politics, control came to be no -
longer exerted by the military alone. If the scholarly world, the press and
_ labor bring forth multifaceted talent as democratization progresses, the
_ strength of the military can be expected to grow that much weaker. Under the
Pak regime the policy of priority to national security and the policy of do-
- mestic control functioned as two,sides of the sane coin, and for that reason
the power of the military was maintained in an artificially strengthened
farm, Because of this, there is a growing feeling that unless the political
situation is disrupted to the point of endangering national security, the
military will n4t again leap into the scene as it was 18 years ago.
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It is certain that a transition has been made from an era in which loyalty to
President ~'ak and loyalty to the nation were regarded as the same thing to an ~
era of military men who keep the two strictly divided. _
On 16 Octuber President Pak declared martial law in Pusan and garrison law
Ln Maean, using tt~e military to suppress the populace. This was a matter c~f
making wi~e use of the military as a whole, though it had previously concen-
trated on 'defense against communism.' Faced with the repressive policy of -
President Yak, who would not recoil from firing at the people, the military
was on the brink of losing the confidence the people had placed in it. Ul-
timately there was the unexpected resolution in which the KCIA director 'acted
_ alone,' but it is certain that a great sense of uneasiness had arisen at
levels below the strictly hard-line President Pak and top military leaders. _
There are many who point out that there was the danger of eruption of a'clash'
far more dramatic than Pak's shooting. By placing the military in a painful _
position, President Pak was on the verge of losing the loyalty of the military.
One example of this is that on 18 October there were repeated demonstrations _
made up of students, workers and townsmen in the Pusan area despite *_nartial
law, and these could not be put down by military threats in the form of bayo-
nets and tanks. No recourse remained but the exercise of force in the form
of rifle fire; troops were sent to restore order and the stage was set for
the military to receive a shock. Although he was himself of military back-
ground, President Pak had become unable to understand the qualitative changes
acld generational differences within the military, and under the pressure of
_ time, the 'abandonment of the president' by the military came closer to
realization.
'The moves of the South Korean military reported in THE NEW YORR TIMES of 2
- November show one aspect of the constitution of the military hereafter. It
_ was reported that on 29 and 30 October, two days after Pak's shooting, the
generals leading the military quickly held a secret meeting in the Defense -
Ministry and decided informally to do away with the Yusin Constitution which
had been the legal basis for the Pak dictatorship. All were agreed that the
constitution could no longer continue after President Pak's death. It is -
noteworthy that they made this decision before the government ministers.
According to the paper, more than 50 military leaders attended that meeting.
DeEense Security Command Chief Chon Tu-hwan and other young officers who
ti~ere deeply loyal to President Pak opposed the hasty abandonment of the con-
sti.tution, and the date for its abandonment was not dec~ded. There was the -
view among the military, according to that newspaper, that the status of the -
f;overnment should be frozen for three months. This was p.robably because the
sudden 'loss' of such a st~rong leader as President Pak was exp~cted to cause
such political instability and agitation among the people that national secu-
rity could be endangered, but judging from the situation one month after that
tirne, there is little indication of the military strengthening its political
- interference with democratization by such means as blocking repeal of the
constitution. Rather, the backbone of the military--the young officers--
~~av~ heen approving the successes of the Pak regime but without concealing
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their opposition to the influential persons and military elders who improperly
stregnthened their political influence and bolstered the dictatorship.
_ Because of this, those who feel the military will continue to have great
inf.luence in the political situation of South Korea consider it impossible
to satisfy the people of that country short of the emergence of new politi- -
ciana. There are other observers who take the following view: the military,
the ma~ority of which belongs to the new generation, and the people are un- ~
: likely to support leaders who assiated in the repressive policies of the Pak
regime or who gained their positions, even temporarily, as pawns of that
regime; in such a situation the political consciousness of the people will
- make a complete turnaround in a short period by means of repeal of the Yusin
Constitution and lifting of Presidential Emergency Order No. 9o These ob-
servers have begun to see the immense wave of reform that wuuld eventually
engulf the military itself.
COPYRIGHT: Iwanami Shoten 1979
9601
CSO: 4105
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P'UK UKrll;l[iL U~~ U1vLT -
N. KOREA/MILITARY AFk'AIRS
= KIDNAPPING INCIDENT OF LEBANESE WOMEN BY NORTH KOREANS REPORTED _
Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Feb 80 pp 146-149
[Article by Commentator Kwi Mun-pom: "Sensel.ess K~dnapping and Brain-
washing by North Korea; Plot To Train Foreigners as Spies Exposed by
- Escape of Five Leb anese Women"]
[Text~ The Lebanese newspapers L'ORIENT-LE JOUR (French) of 30 October
- and the IKE (English) of 30 October reported that, of five Lebanese women
transported to North Korea, two have escaped and three still remain there.
Also, according to the "Tong-il Ilbo," the Christian religious program in
Lebanon, "Voice of Hope," is reported to have broadcasti on 17 November
_ that four Lebaneae university students, including one female, were spirit- -
ed away to Narth Korea and were forced to undergo training in asgionage.
Additionally, the SEGYE ILBO of 2 December carried a report by its apecial
correspondent in Seou~ regarding efforts by North KorBa to transport Leba-
nese women to North Korea for training in espionage against the United
States and South Korea. All of the foregoing reports only give brief
sketches of the af~air because of limited space. It is therefore diffi- -
cult to obtain an overall picture of the details, and some observers seem
to doubt whether No~th Korea would actually go to such an extreme.
Origin of Incident and Turn of Events in North Korea
Lebanon is situated at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea between
Israel and Syria. It extends to the north and south with the Damascus _
- region in the mid-section. The incident began with its capital city,
Beirut, as the center stage. Early in July 1978, two Asians appeared
at the YMCA secretarial school in Beirut. They were introduced by a
iocal figure named Shayuki A,jami [phonetic] as Akito Tanaka--an offi-
' cial of Japan's Hitachi, Ltd--and an employee named Kaneqama. They said -
Hitachi was interested in hiring a large number of secretaries knowledge-
able in local affairs and they asked for cooperation in rounding up can-
didates. The conditions were that the candidates must be 1) physical7.y
attractive; 2) fluent in both Arabic and French; 3) unmarried; and 4)
they would be given a starting salary of 1,300 dollars; and 5) they must
go to Japan for language study and professional training, with travel,
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_ food and lodging costs to be paid entirely by the ~ompany. The five
candidates who applied were Samia Kabbara, Naima Rassir, Siham Shraidhi,
Haif Skaff and one unnamed per.son. _
The five candidates, accompanied by Shayuki A~ami and guided by Kaneyama,
departed from Beirut in August ~nd arrived in Pyongyang via Athens, Bel- _
grade, Moscow and Irkutsk (Soviet military base). At Pyongyang airport,
they did not exit from the regular pasaenger gate, but were led by a man
_ named Kim Won-hyon through a s~ecial gate, pu~ on a car and taken to a
Western-style, three-storied building. They were later to learn that this
wae their living quarters and training center. Kaneyama collected their ~
_ pasaports and disappeared. Meaaiwhile, their escort, Shayuki A~ami, re- -
turned to Beirut after a stay of 4 days. _
Kim Won-hyon, who had brought them to the center from the airport, ex-
plained that they must receive preliminary training before going to Japan.
At the beginning (about 2 months), they were only shown movies of North
Korea and the Soviet Union two or ttnree times a week. These movies al-
ways included, in addition to documentaries on development in North Korea
- and the USSR, lessons on espionage activities.
By the time the five felt more or less settled, ideological training be- -
gan on the philosophies of Kim I1-song. It was not something accepted by � -
~ the five women, but the lectures were forced on them unilaterally. The
brainwashing included, in addition to such topics as "Anti-Americanism r
and the South Korean People's Struggle for Liberation," the "Chuche" _
_ philosophy (of Kim I1-song). Also, in addition to academic studies, they
were trained in sharpshooting, uae of explosivee, karate, self-defense,
lock-breaking, survival during illegal activitiea and other terrorist
- training.
= However, the five women had not agreed on such activities and frequently
argued with Kim Won-hyon during the lectures, demanding that they be re-
turned home. Meanwhile, in April 1979, Shayuki A~ami reappeared and took
Samia and Naima to Belgrade, capital of Yugoslavia. The purpose was to ~
compel them to telephone their families in Lebanon, informing them that
"they were well and had obtained ~oba in Japan." The two considered es- =
cape at this point, but were unaB~le to do so under the strict surveillance
of the North Korean agents. They realized the Idorth Roreans were deter-
mined to train them as spies and ceased to protiest that "they be sent to -
Japan as soon as possible" or to "be returned to Lebanon." They decided
` to submit ostensibly to the North Korean demands. In order to find an -
opportunity for escape, they decided to be on good terms with the North
Koreans.
= On 8 August 1979, the opportunity came. The North Koreans provided e
two women with passports under the aliasea Yi Ok-yo and Chon Myong-' 1, -
and permitted them to travel to Belgrade and stap at the Metro Hotel in
order to again telephone their families regarding their safety.
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The North Korean cadre (mentioned later) was caught completely off guard
and allowed the two to visit a beauty salon in the hotel. Immediately
on ~xiting from the hotel, the twr~ took a taxi and sought asylum at the -
local Kuwaiti Embassy, where they revealed everything and requested assis-
tance. The Kuwaiti Embassy officials escorted them to the Lebanese Em-
bassy and asked for their protection. The two had succeeded in their
escape plan. And on 13 August they were provided with special passports
requested by the Lebanese Embassy in Yugoslavia from the Home Ministry -
Public Safety Agency and they returned home via Paris. �
When the ~ncident thus became known to the Lebanese Government, tY?e Leba-
nese Foreign Ministry submitted a formal inquiry to the North Korean
- Government and launched an investigation concerning the five North Korean _
operatives who had spirited the five women out of Lebanon. As a result,
it became clear that Shayuki A~ami was "chairman of the Lebanon branch =
of the Kim I1-song philosophy committee"; that Akito Tanaka was a figure
who had entered Lebanon temporarily from North Korea to give operational
instructions; and that ICaneyama was actually Na Chun-ui, deputy delegate =
of the North Korean trade delegation in Lebanon.
,
Foreign Minister Butrus of Lebanon summoned the North Korean trade repre- _
sentative in Lebanon and demanded an explanation concerning the transport
and detention of the Lebanese women in North Korea. He also demanded an
immediate report on the whereabouts of the three other women still in
ilorth Korea. This resulted in reports published in various local news- ~
papers on 30 October. Subsequently, as the result of strong demands by
- the Lebanese side, North Korea reluctantly permitted the remaining three
- women to return home safely on 16 Noveraber. The inciden~ thus appeared _
to be settled, but it was only the incident concerning the Lebanese women
which was settled.
Samia and Naima, who had previously escaped, reported that there were
other young men and women from Lebanon, the Mideast, Europe and other
countries throughout the world, including South Korean citizens, who were ~
involved. Also, Hai�a Skaff, who returned later, stated that five French
women and others from the Netherlands and West Germany were being trained. -
Life in North Korea -
The locale where the five Lebanese women lived and received training is -
said to be a village of some SOQ households about 40 kilometers from
Pyongyang (direction not clarified). The five women were placed in a _
- splendid three-storied, West~rn-stqle building where the food was said
to ba Western-style and of high quality. Not onl,y this building, but
also all the other educational buildings in the village were called
"xecept~.on cEnters." Military personnel were placed as sentries at the
entrances and soldiers made inspection rounds periodically. Therefore,
' the building was completely isolated from the other "reception centers"
in the village and the women could not exchange a word with the other
trainees they met outside during drills. _
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At the rec~ptior. center where the five women li~ed, there was an "omni"
who served and ~cleaned for them while managing and guarding them. There
wae also a cook (also called an "oma~i"). These persons reportedly ar- -
rived at work at 6 in the morning and returned at 11 at night to a small -
house directly in front of the recep�ion center. Addiscionally, there wae
a male instructor who Zectured on the "Chuche'' philoeophy and taught them _
Arabic. Hie name was Kim [Jon-hyon. The~e was also another male who was
called a"cadre," who observed the ?rogress of instructioa and gave orders
- to the instructor. He gave an examination once a month, checked the re- ~
sulta and offered encouragement (the same cadre who was in Beirut).
- The Lebanese women received a monthly stipend of 200 won (about 50,000 =
Japanese yen) and were permitted to purchase daily commodities and con- -
fectioneries at an exclusive store. Sometimes they bought gifts for the
"o~is" and instructors. The living standard of the cadres appeared to -
- be quite good, but the instructors and "om~is" did not have enough to
eat, so the five women reportedly shared thEir food with them.
The building had a lecture room (there were 2 days of instruction a week)
and a television vie~wing room (called a theater) on the first floor. T'he
second floor had a dining room, kitchen and rooms ~or the "omnis." The
third floor had bedrooms for the five Lebanese women and a lecture room.
What was unbearable was that, at the beginxiing, as soon as the meal was
_ over the five women felt faint and their pulse beats dropped perceptibly--
a condition which continued for some time. It seems certain that, in
order to weaken their will to protest, some kind of drug was being inaerted
into their food. Furthermore, there was one unforgiveable occasion when
Samia f~ll while taking a bath and broke a tooth. Although the broken
tooth caused bleeding, nothing was done for her for 2 weeks. After her .
condition worsened conaiderably, an operation was finally performed with-
out any anesthesia. The explanation given was that, because Samia was
destined to become a spy (she had feigned compliance), she nad to be
trained in endurance, so that she could absolutely refuse to reveal any
- secrets in case she was caught by American or South Rorean investigators.
Denial of Human Rights and Self R~ghteousness of North Korea
The fraudulent and deceitful makeup of North Korea became worse and its
aelf righteousness grew to the point where it was no longer saCisfied -
with transporting South Korean residents of Japan to Pyongyang for train-
ing as spies. It also dec~ived and shanghaied young people throughout
the world in an attempt to groom them as espionage agents. If the two -
Lebanese women had not succeeded in escaping, they would have continued
to be "educated" ~n Plorth Korea until they had really become brafnwashed.
Among the numerous ~?oung people in the "reception centers," anyone who
- was determined to avoid being brainwashed might have disappeared into
oblivion and become untraceable. Such disregard of human rights, aelf
righteoussness and barbarity on the part of North Rorea will probably -
_ increase ~s long as Kim I1-song remains in power.
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What would reault if these young pe~ple undergoing brainwashing were to
really be sent out as spies? There would probably be cases where diplo-
mats and overseas repreaentatives of commercial firms of free nations
might fall prey and co~it traitorous acts to protect their individual
safety. A1so, it cannot be abaolutely certain that diplomats and repre-
sentativea of commercial firms from South Korea stationed overseas would
not dieappear suddenly and announce several days later that they had
"sought refuge in Pyongyang." There ia the example of the South Korean
artist and his family residing in Paris, who were kidnapped to North
Korea via Yugoslavia. -
- COPYRIGHT: Japan Military Review 1980 ~
5884
CSO: 4105 END
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