JPRS ID: 9079 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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JPRS L/9079
7 May 1~980
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- cFOUO , siso~
- FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAS7 INFORMIATION SERVICE -
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. JPRS L/9079
' _ 7 May 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 16/80) -
~ CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Libyan Efforts To Dislodge Bourguiba T.o Continue
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Feb 80)......... 1
Qadhdhafi's Popularity in Tunisia Said Plummeting
(Abdelazia Barouhi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Feb 80)......... 4
International Ramifications of Proposed PDRY-YAR Unity
Discussed _
(AIr-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 29 Feb-6 Mar 80) 6
EGYPT
Egyptian Opposition Abroad Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 14-20 Mar 80) 12
MAURITANIA
Additional Details on CNPF Delegation's Visit
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80)....... 24
Briefs
FAO Fish Resources Agreement 2(
CNPF Delegation's Visit 26
Tea Shortages Combated 26
Koundi Agro-Industrial Complex Studied 26
Measures Against Unauthorized Construction 27
Japanese Guelbs P~oject Loan 27
Iraqi Aid 2~
SYRIA
Reacticns to Recent Events Analyzed
(AL-WATAiV AL-'ARABI, 4-10 Apr 80) 28
- a- [ISI - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued)
Domestic Unrest, Gover~ent's Reaction Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Mar 80)............o.... 34
WESTERN SAHARA
_ Paris Magazine Views Potential Sahara Fighting
(JEiJNE AFRIQUE, 9 Apr 80) 40
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
LIBYAN EFFORTS TO DISLODGE BOURGUIBA TO CONTINUE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb 80 pp 36-37
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "It Isn't Over"]
[Text] Although the "Amr Ibn el-Ass brigade" ~as ready to attack Gafsa
during the night of 26-27 January (J.A. No. 997), an entirely different
type of co~nando force was sent across the Gulf of Gabes by Qadhdhafi.
Escorted by units of the Libyan navy, an oil drilling rig was inatalled
about 100 kilometers north of Zuwarah and approximately 12Q kilometers
east of Jerba. In the area of the Tunisian-Libyan continental shelf which
has been a sub~ect of contention between the two countries for many years.
The rig and its naval escort, which may even have violated Tunieian terri-
torial waters, was sti11 in place at the end of February.
"Irreversible Opposition" .
. This is certainly not the first time that Colonel Qadhdhafi used such
methods to revive his claima to the continental shelf. But the date se-
lected for the operation gives another dimension to the affair, which is
one more link in the very peculiar war that Qadhdhafi intends to delivar
to Tunisia. Didn't he say, on 18 February, in the extreme left-wing Paris -
daily, LIBERATIaN, that the events of Gafaa mark~d the "beginntng of the
end" for the, Tunisian regime, adding: "From now on, our opposition is
irreversible."
The rig, which is floating in the open sea in the Gulf of Gabes, belongs
to the I~orwegian company, Morland Off Shore AS, whose headquarters is in
Oslo. Semi-submersible, it can accommodate between 50 and 80 people, and
its rental amounts to approximately $45,000 per day (9 million FCFA). It
was leased by the Middle East North Africa Petroleum Company, in which
Libya owns the ma~ority of the capital (51 percent as opposed to 49 per-
cent by the AGIP [National Italian Oil Co], a subaidiary of the Italian
National Hydrocarbon Company, ENI).
Qadhdhafi's objectives in this operatfon are purely political. Because
the disputed zone has very large oil reseaves. Som~ sources estimate that
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they are capable of quintupling Tunisian production, which is presently
nearly 5 million tons per year, making it the leading export station
(40 percent of the total value of sales to foreign countriea).
TherPfore, the stakes are ~izable, and the greed with which Tunisians and
Libyans have been claiming this area since 1970 is easily understood.
However, on 26 August 1976, they accepted the principle of arbitration
frflm the International Court o~ Justice (CIJ) in The Hague. But in Febxu-
= ary 1977, Libya sent the first rig into the contested waters. It was re-
" moved at the beginning of May, as a result of Tunisian proteats, then re-
placed by another.
Tense Atmosphere .
_ On 28 May, they were on the brink of a naval confrontation. Fortunately,
the worst was avoided since both parties ultimately preferred the negotiat-
ing table. On 10 June, a compromise agreement was signed on the appeal of
the CIJ. Tunisia gave her consent to The Hague on 1 December 1978 and
- Libya on 14 February 1979. A new rig (the third) in August 1979. It was
to operate for severaJ. weeks. No reaction from Tunis. For the fourth, in .
January 1980, Prime Minister Hedi Nouira took action before the National
Assembly of 13 February. He informed the deputies that the government had
_ lodged a protest against this Libyan "provocation."
Was Qadhdhafi trying to block the regulations agreed upon before the CIJ?
It was provided ehat both parties were obliged to refrain from any action
or activity which could aggravate the dispute. Actions which, in another
respect, had no legal vaiidity. Qadhdhafi hadn't respected that agreement.
Was he also going to fail to,keep the others?
Both countries had to file a report before 31 May, and a second document
must be presented by Tunisia before 30 November 1980 and by Libys before
31 January 1981. Only then will they be able to begin the public arguments
before the tribunal which is presided over by Brit:ish Sir Humphrey Waldock,
president of the CIJ.
For the fiime being, the presence of the Norwegian rig is nourishing the
tense atmosphere which seems to be growing worse. In fact, in the South,
large military farces have taken up positions here and there along the
frontier. Skirmishes have taken place, and in the government offices at
- Medenine, a Libyan foray over F km was reported. Unidentified planes have
flown over Tunisian territory. Fears of new aggression (by land or by
sea) are being reinforced.
Internally, attention is turned toward the returning emigres who continue
to pour in and to center around the university. Since reopening (11 Febru-
ary), the campus in Tunis has been the scene of sporadic strikes and vio-
lent confrontations, especially between the integrationists and the "demo-
cratic patriots"--combining several small groups from the extreme left who
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echo the sentiments of Radio-Tripoli. "Gafsa is only the beginning," pro-
claim the posters denouncing "the Fr.ench presence" and the imperialist
interference in the intei~nal affairs of the country. The declared goal
of the activists is to paralyze the university to "sustain the people's
re~~olution in Gafsa."
Being afraid to pay the costs of putting things in order, the integra- -
tionist students, who had officially condemned "the aggression at Gafsa,"
violently opposed their comrades, and on 13 February, some were wounded.
Of the 100 or so students who were involved, two were brought before the
courts. But on 18 Feb�ruary, an official statement was posted in the
faculties [departments] of the university. If the studen.ts did not return
to classes by 19 February, they w�ere threatened with being deprived of
their acholarships, and of access to university canteens and residence
halls, and with being excluded from examinatiuns for the session, which
will be held in June.
Libyan Manipulation
- The next day, Tuesday the 19th, there was a meeting of the students and
intervention by the forces for order within the university. Several dozen
students were involved in altercations. Result: an Wednesday the 20th,
the strike spread throughout the university. Since Radio-Tripoli announced,
even before the end of the university va~ation, that the students would not
return to class, some people thought they saw a Libyan manipulation of stu-
dent youths in this coincidence. According to a highly placed source, how-
ever, the university fever will drop whe~ the Gafsa affair is settled in
. Tunisia. That is. when the 110 accused parties have been brought before
the National Security Court.
~
Naming of the magistrates who will compose the court should not be delayed.
Tt will be presided over by Bechir Jedidi, advisor to the Supreme Court of _
Appeal, who will fi11 this role for the first time. Abdelmajid Bouslama,
former director of the Surete, advisor to the Supreme Court of Appeals,
and prosecu.*.or in the trial of Ben Salah, will also be the prosecutor in
this matter. The accused will be defended by 70 attorneqs of various
[politicalJ inclinations, since the ma~ority of the families did not name
a dEfense lawyer.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9174
CSO: 4400
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- INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
QADHDHAFI'S POPULARITY IN TUNISIA SAID PLU1rII~lETING
_ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb 80 p 37
[Article by Abdelazia Barcuhi: "A Little Boy"]
[Text] In the early 70's, Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi was popular in Bourguiba's
Tunisia. He was young and handsome. In spite of his verbal audacities, '
he defended values to which a goodly number of Tunisians were devoted.
- Businessmen and politicians courted the Libyan 12ader. During his two
most notable visits, to Tunis in 1972 and to Quairouan in March 1975, i~e
received a welcome which was, to say the very least, warm (even after the
aborted union "strike" at Jerba, 12 January 1974).
= But since then, the popularity of the man who was called "brother" has
followed a descending curve. To begin with, his behavior wounded t~e
dignity of the Tunisians. There were repeated expulsions and strong-arm
tactics were used against workers living in Libya, to which were added
insulting Gomments about the habits of Tunisians and the practice of black-
= mail, which consisted of offering subsidies in petrodollars in exchange
for political concessions.
Then, Tunisian public opinion was outraged by the fact that Qadhdhafi wae
contending with Tunisia for the petroleum deposits in the Gulf of Gabes,
even though his own country has an overabundance of oil. Not to mention
the commando force sent to Tunis from Libya in 1976 to "remove or assassi-
nate" Prims Minister Hedi Nouira.
In spite of everything, Qadhdhafi still en~oyed a fair amount of poptl:.rity
in Tunisia. The first results of a pull taken by JEUNE AFRIQUE before the
"Gafsa coup" show that he was still popular with nearly 10 percent o.f our
Tunisian readers. By unleas~iing the "Amr Ibn el-Ass brigade" against Gafsa,
and by again expelling their compatriots, qadhdhafi has finally angered
the Tunisians, nok almost unanimously, in spite of their internal squa~blas,
to the point of re~ecting his "hegemonism."
, "We do not have to learn.lessons of Arabism, Islamism or democracy from
Qadhdhafi," says an average Tunisian citizer~, who until then had regarded .
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the Libyan star performer fac-orably. "Our workers are not cattle,`' ad~ied
a union member. For many Tunisians, the name Qadhdhafi has become synony-
mous with devil. Blinded by his global dreams, the Libyan "guide" has
forgotten that a revolution cannot be exported, especially to Tunisia,
where national feeling is strong, and where there ie no resemblance to the
Chadian mosaic.
A little boy, in a fit of temper, kicking a world globe and repeating:
"The whole world is againat me...but I don't care. No one underatands
met" Today, this would be a caricature of Qadhdhafi as Tunisians aee him
after the Gafsa operation.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9174
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS ~
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INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF PROPOSED PDRY-YAR UNITY DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 29 Feb-6 Mar 80 pp 34-35
[Article filed by our reporter in San'a': "Washington and Moscow Stick
Their Fingers into the Shifting Sands of Yemen: San'a"s Wooing Aden ~
Stirs American Jealousy"]
[TextJ The banners of unity which Aden and San'a' have
suddenly raised have alarmed the Americans who for the ~
first time had plunged into the shifting sands of Yemen.
Meanwhile, certain Arab quarters have not expressed
great apprehension. This is due to the fact that they
know it would be easier to rebuild the Ma'rib Dam than
to forge a union betw~en the twin nations of. Yemen.
What's happening in the two Yemens?
I)oes no one know? Are the two sister nations heading for unity as the
discussions, meetings and declarations seem to suggest?
Can unity be realized between the Marxist state which is bound by a treaty
of friendship and cooperation to the Soviet Union, and which holds a
seat in the Eastern Bloc economic organization COMECON, and the state
with a conservative regime, f.ree economy, and powerful Bedouin tribes who
- impose their hegemony on the system, the state, and the society?
Is it possible f or the two armies which fought one another a year ago to
_ be united? Will the North accept the leadership of the South and its
- president, 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, a scion of the National Front, which
through his thought and commitment became the military base of Yemeni
Marxism? Or will the South accept the leadership of the North and its
president, 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, a product of the traditional military
establishment?
If a union between the two sister nations were possible, could it be
possible between the discordant and mutually antagonistic ideologies and
� among the numerous conflicting loyalties?
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The observer here is at a loss amidst the dust stirred up around the -
question of unity between the two countries, and with regard to San'a " s
relationship with Moscow, Riyadh, and Washington. In the middle of all
this he finds only that the succession of events might be analyzed by
extreme simplification; he leaves to the visible or distant future to
detennine what will happen next. It is difficult to predict, hencefortli,
what will take place amid the shifting sands of Yemen into which the feet
of many Arabs and foreigners have sunk during recpnt dacades.
The discussions and communications which took place recently between
San'a'and the National Democratic Front [NDF] have led to an agreement of
cooperati.on. This includes a number of basic articles summarized by
Mr Sultan Ahmad 'Umar, leader of the Front, as follows: �
The formation of a coalition government; the implementation of free elec- -
tions; the issuance of a new constitution; the enactment of political and
trade unionist freedoms; the affirmation of the need for developing the -
country and building a national economy on the basis of its emancipation
from dependency. `
In the foreign aren,a, the agreemEnt embraces a policy of non-alignment, "
commercial dealings with goverrnnents or causes on the basis of equality -
and mutual respect, and the non-interference in internal affairs.
The two sides have not made a statement about whether there was a specific
time f or the execution of the agreement to begin. Nevertheless, the air
in San'a' is filled with talk of an expected ministerial change in keeping
, with what was agreed on with the Front.
~ Will the Agreement Stand?
Still, the agree~nent as such forms a large question mark as to the possi- ~
' bility of its being applied. The NDF joins radical parties (the Democrati.c ~
Revolutionary Party, the Labor Party, the Organization of Revolutionary
= Patriots, the Popula~ Vanguard Party, the Union of Democratic Peoples),
- in addition to educated and Bedouin elements, as well. All of these stand
far to the left of the regime. In f act they battled alongside the South
Yemeni forces when they crossed the border -in March of last year and
hoisted their revolutionary banners in the "liberated" frontier zones.
Stranger and perhaps more unusual than this was the fact that the announce-
ment of the agreement between San'a' and the NDF was preceded, accompanied
and followed by seemingly feverish activity in the talks between San'a'
and Aden towards the ach~evement of unity between the two countries,
- including the unifi~ation of the armed forces.
The bilateral talks come in imple�.~entation of the Kuwait Agreement between
the two Yemeni presidents on the achievement of unity. This was a revival
of previous ag.reements on this matt~r, none of which were implemented in �
view of the political and ideological differences and the continual changes
of regimes in the two countries.
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Most observers here do not expect the Kuwait Agreement to be more fortunate -
t~an the previous agreements, especially as it is not possible to overcome
the ideological disparity between the two regimes, even though some factions
in San'a' want unity.
~
Then why the affirmation from both sides on the question of unity? Here
the observer must return, to a certain extent, to the events and develop- -
ments which followed the battle last March.
American-Soviet Rivalry _
The United States hastened to present the regime of President 'Ali 'Abdallah ~
Salih with a deal for arms and equipment in the amount of $390 million,
and Saudi Arabia promised to finance it. The goal was to bolster the North '
_ Yemeni forces so they would be enabled to confront any sudden attack or
large scale penetration from the South.
The deal included 12 F-SE fighter-bombers, these heing equivalent in
capability to th~~ Soviet MiG-21 jets. Also included were 90 M-60 tanks,
and a like number of M-113 armored personnel carriers. Arriving with the
first installment of these arms was a number of American military experts
and advisers, possibly amounting to 70 in all, to train the Yemeni forces
in their use.
Suddenly the Americans se~sed the sands shifting beneath them. There _
began arriving in the country Soviet planes anci ships unloading freight
o� arms and equipment. Along with these came Soviet experts and advisers
whose number American sources have estimated to be 100.
When the Soviet arms and equipment poured forth in such a remarkable ~
fashion the Americans queried the Yemeni officials concerned. They replied:
_ "Why the alarm? We signed a similar military agreement with the Soviet
Union, and we are free to choose and diversify our sources of armament."
Indeed, arms are always the passport of the great powers to the lesser
nations. Just when Washington thought it had gained a foothold for itself
i.n San'a', it was surprised to learn the Soviets had a foothold there as -
~ well. Thus American hopes were dashed in the continuation ~f the game
with the Soviets on the edge of the strategic Bab al-Mandab, which separates
the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean. ~
It a~pears that the North Yemenis w~re disturbed by the propagandistic
- manner of the announcement of the arms deal and the explanation of it as
if it were tantamount to an acceptance of American hegemony. The regime _
of 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih wishes to continue with the policy of his predeces-
sors Ibrahim Hamdi and Ahmad Ghashmi--the first was assa~~sinated by bullet,
the second by explosion--in pursuing a policy of inclependence and the
development of North Yemen with the assistance of all the Arab states,
taking into the same consideration the special relationship which ties her
- to Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and tn her sister state, South Yemen,
on the other.
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Mr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghani, the current prime minister, says in regard
to this that San'