JPRS ID: 9101 EAST EUROPE REPORT ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080038-0
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9101
20 May 19~0
Easf Euro e Re ort
p p
'~CONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL AFFl~IRS
(FOUO 3/80)
FBIS F(~REIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9101
20 May 1980
EAST EUROPE REPORT
ECONOMI C AND INDUSTRI AL AFFr~I RS
(FOUO 3/~0)
CONTENTS
CZECHOSIAVAKIA
Improvement of Investment Indicator Process Discussed ~
(Jaroslav Fidrmuc; POLITICKA EKONOMIE, No 2, 1980) 1
Plant Protection Against Air Pollution in Slovak Agriculture
(Stefan Trojan, et al; AGROCHEMIA, Mar 80) 16
.
_ a _ [III - EE - 64 FOUO~
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
IMPROVEMENT OF INVESTMENT INDICATOR PROCESS DISCUSSED
Prague POLITICKA EKONOMIE in Slovak No 2, 1980 pp 179-188
[Article by Jaroslav Fidrmuc: "Main Possibilities for Improving the System
of Indicators of Investment Process Management"] ,
[Text] Sharp criticism of management has recently focused particularly on
the inadequate mutual ties between the plans and the closely related supplier-
customer relations. -
In his concluding remarks on the responsibility for these shortcomings, _
G. Husak pointed oat already at the 12th plenary session of the CPCZ Central
Committee in ?'~cember 1978:
- "A great deal has been said here about supplier-customer relations, about
interlinking of plans and so on. Certainly, the State Planning Commissions
and the planning commissions of both republics are responsible for much of
it. The plan is drawn up, not only by these organs, however, but also by
the ministries, economic production units and enterprises. It is necessary
to improve the entire system of planning: stronger mutual links must be
established within the plans; supplier-customer relations must be put on a
firmer basis; the authority and mandatory nature of the plan must be
enhanced...In 1980 and during L�he Seventh Five-Year Plan, we will have to
make greater progress in economically stimulating the implementation of
these intentions."1
We may add that research also ~ears its share of responsibility for these
shortcomings because it still has not focused its attention on improving
the con~prehensive system of management of efficiency and quality which,
following its experimental verification, would be the axis of the system
of management in the perio3 of the Seventh and obviously of the Eighth
Five-Year Plan as well. ~
The extent to which the inconsistencies and unprogressiveness of the system
of indicators itself account for lack of mutual ties between the plans and
supplier-customer relations, and for the shortcomings in management in `
general, can be judged from the following facts:
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Already when the construction projects are designed the design organizations
and design departments of general directorates are pressed by the system of
indicators acc~rding to which they are appraised, not to reduce, but to
increase the budget costs of projects. The investor organizations and
departments are unable not only to oppose these pressures, but have essen-
tially the same interest as the design sector in the highest possible
~ budget cos~ of projects because they also are assessed by the volume of
capital investment. The same is true of the suppliers during the actual
realization of the capital investment project. Until recently, they were
interested in selecting a Froject with the highest proportion of material
costs, in replacing cheaper materials with more e�.cpensive ones, and they
continue to be interested not in reducing but in increasing the scope of
unfinished projects, in raising wages above the level specified by the budget
by adding the profit margin to them and so on. Other indicators such as the
volume indicator for construction projects to be finished as well as profita-
- bility and quality indicators only more or less unsuccessfully restrict or
- contradict this basic tendeucy, which asserts itself through material
incentives not in efficiency and qua2ity, but in the quantity of outputs
achieved. Contradictions and lack of mutual ties in this system of indi-
cators are also reflected in supplier-customer relations, but also intensify
the shortage of investment materials and labor shortage. The contradictions
in the system of indicators according to which the enterprises are assessed
in fact result in conflicts between party-political and political-educational
work in the enterprises because they ob~ectively give rise to potential
conflicts between the group-enterprise and society's interests.
The social needs of capital inv~stment assert themselves through the investors.
In accordance with the investment needs and [available] investment resaurces,
investment funds are allocated and limits are set for the investors. But
the investment capacities are developed, according to the plan, along a
completely different line--management of suppliers. The considerable amounts
of unused investment funds bear witness to the great differences in manage-
ment of the investment process along these two lines.
It is strange that there is a difference amounting to about Kcs 1.5 billion
within the SSR alone every year--with only a slightly declining tendency--between
the records on basic construction work carried out in connection with the
capital investment projects which are kept by the building contractors and
investors, respectively. A detailed analysis of records on individual con-
struction projects carried out in recent years would be necessary in order
to find out reliably ~ahat these differences actually conceal.
All this offers additional evidence of lack of ties and contradictions between
the system of indicators, specifically in capital investment, and the system
of records based on them.
The two key questions are these: what kind of decisive-comprehensive indicator
for assessing of capital investment should be chosen, and how other indicators
of management of the investment process should be grouped around it.
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Practical attempts to find the best possible answers to these questions in
management of the socialist economy have been taking place since the second
half of the 1960's. First an attempt was made to switch from the gross
production indicator, which set the limit just for the total volume of work
and deliveries, to the indicator of gross actual outputs. It enco~sntered
the greatest problems, however, precisely in capital investment because it
; necessitated a switch from volume billing to billing by projects. The
Byelorussian experiment which was gradually expanded to include other
federal republics, and which was followed very closely in other socialist
countries including the CSSR, revealed possibilities for overcoming these
difficulties. To be sure, the Soviet economists themselves, while generally
_ appreciating the advantages of this more progressive criterion which directed
the enterprises to the final results of their work, for a long time also
pointed out some of its persisting serious defects. In the first place,
it did not eliminate design engineers', investors' and suppliers' interest
in the higher price of construction projects, and essentially provided them
only with the incentive for completing projects as soon as possible. This
made linking of this indicator particularly to the indicators of profita-
bility and quality even more difficult. But the indicator of gross actual
outputs did not even force the contractor to carry out those construction
projects which were most needed from the standpoint of the entire society.
Moreover, the design engineers and contractors, guided by the system of
value indicators, chose the construction projectin accordance with their
interests (and various pressures), frequently in profound conflict with
the society's interests. A big step forward toward the solution of these
problems was not taken until the implementation of the document, approved
by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers in July 1979,
on further improvement of the management of the Soviet national economy
according to which the USSR ministries and ministerial organs and councils
of ministers of federal republics were to switch, completely beginning in
1981, to billing, between investors and contractors, for completely finished
prqjects and capacities already put into operation, for not yet finished
projects, individual parts and buildings prepared for production start and
for providing services on the basis of the budget costs of building pro-
duction. The branches that are ready for it should also apply the standard
of net production excluding material costs as the indicator of the newly-
produced value which reflects the practical contribution of the enterprise
to the production of the national income in accordance with the filling o~
investors' specific orders.
As early as the second half of the 1960's, however, an attempt was also
made--specifically in the CSSR--to switch to the much narrower key value
_ indicator--the indicator of gross income. This indicator--much broader,
on the other hand, than the enterprise profit incentive which was one-sidedly
emphasized in the process of undermining and dismantl~ng central management
during the 1968-1969 crisis--only multiplied the overpayment and speculative
hiring of workers. This indicator zherefore had to be dropped during the
economic consolidation process. In capital investment, for example, it helped
produce such differences 'n enterprise resources that they completely reversed
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the progressive tendencies in the socialist economy. Specifically, contrary
to societywide needs, capital inv~:stment again increased more rapidly in
~ the CSR than in the SSR (by 8.1 percent in the CSR and by 7.9 percent in
the SSR in 1968).
Nor did the transition to the almost exclusive, dominant position of profit
prove successful under the conditions of overestimation of tendencies toward
the decentralized syatem of management as it manifested itself in Hungary's
economy in the late 1960's and early 1970's. At the meetin~ of a work group
of the problems commission for improving the planned system of the manage-
ment of investments in CEMA countries at Bratislava in September 1977, the
head of the Hungarian delegation and coordinator of this group G. Havas
emphasized that these tendencies, which had manifested themselves in Hungary
in the past, among other things had unfavorably influenced the effectiveness
of capital investment specifically. This method, in his opinion, did not
result in effective management of certain more extensive investment complexes.
- The development of the set of indicators for ti:? management of the investment
process in the socialist economy to date has made it clear that sudden,
revolutionary changes can be carried out in the system of management only
with difficulty. Management has built-in inertia nurtured by the ingrained
mode of thought and action of economic workers, and the new more progressive
indicators, no matter how far they are from the beaten track, sooner or
later are adapted to the established habansentirersettofssystemsaindicators,
come this inertia only gradually, usingrocess will take some time. Sudden,
measures and political work, and this p
revolutionary changes al.ways produce chaos in the system of management in
where evEn substantially more progreseive indicators can be misused for
- antisocial purposes.
The course of the gradual but systematic verification of new, more progressive
indicators as well as of an overall, more progressive system of management
was also embarked upon in the CSSR, specifically with the Comprehensive
Experiment in Efficiency and Quality Control which was extended on 1 January
1979 to include selected VHJ [economic production units] in the building
sector. It was the need for a comprehensive, systematic approach to the
management of the national econemy as a whole that also made it necessary
_ after the very first year nf verifying this experiment in industry to apply,
in accordance with the resolution of the 12th plenary session of the CPCZ
Central Committee in December 1978, so~:e �endenceeoffwateseontthehvalueiadded
economy, specifically, emphasizing the dep 8
[indicator] alone, emphasizing and standardizing higher prices based on better
quality, economic penaltles and compliance with the specified assortment so
important precisely ro ca.pital investment.
It is beyond dispute, "r,owever, that if the resolutions of the 15th CPCZ
Congress are to be consistently implemented--which set as an especially
important task for the federal government and national governments, planning
organa and ministries the adoption of a set of ineasures to reduce the scope
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of unfinished projects and meet planned construction deadlines, to prevent
bsdget costs from being exceeded more effectively, and particularly to
allocate the largest possible amount of funds for the rapid completion of _
_ production capactties and putting them into operation--it is imperative to
lay even greater emphasis on the improvement of the s;~stem of the management
of the investment process.
In the future conceptual development of improvement in the system of indica-
tors for the management of the investment process, one can follow these main
courses:
1. Making Mandatory Indicators of the Plan More Specific in Structure,
Effectiveness and Quality
This approach--although, apart from the emphasis on wage dependence on the
~ enterprises' added value, it still uses as the key indicator the indicator
of gross production, volume of investment work and deliveries, with the
well-known and frequently criticized defects--can still be regarded neither
as completely obsolete nor as one that has already exhausted all possibili-
ties for further development.
The directive determination of specified volumes of investment work and
deliveries during the 3ecades of socialist construction demonstrated the
possibility of carrying out, relatively proportionately, extensive capital
investment, incomparable with capital investment under the capitalist system -
of management, of which we are justly proud before the entire world. A
positive role in this approach was also played by the index method of planning,
which systematically promoted this development. At the present time, this
system is significantly improved particularly through the specification of
plan indicators in terms of structure, effectiveness and quality. _
On the basis of the resolutions approved by the 12th plenary session of the
CPCZ Central Committee, industrial enterprises already keep separate records
on deliveries to selected construction projects with budget costs exceeding
Kcs 2 million, deliveries for export to the socialist states and deliveries
for export to the capitalist states. If any of these indicators or indicator
of effectiveness or indicator of technological development is not complied
with, premiums and bonuses are reduced by 20 percent. In accordance with `
the abuve resolutions, punitive damages, fines, cost of rer_tifying defects,
price discounts and similar losses are not only r.o longer included in the ~
_ outputs but are deducted as penalties from the outputs, receipts and profit,
and thus affect wages, premiums and bonuses.
- In comparison with the past, quality is more markedly emphasized. For pro-
ducts subject to testing the following provisions apply: if the product
is included in the first quality grade, the enterprise gets its price
increased by as much as 25 percent of the wholesale price; for the second
quality grsde the standard price applies; if the product is included in the
third quality grade, the price is reduced at least by 15 percent and if this
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- happens repeatedly by as much as 30 percent of the wholesale price~ In
order to promote innovation processes, the price of te~hnical~y progressive
products may be increased by as much as 25 percent fcr a period of 3 years.
- On the other hand, the price of technically obsolete produr_~ts is reduced
at least by 15 percent, with the conditions however that ~heir manufacture
- must continue until they are replaced by a new, technically progressive
_ product.
The present system of indicators for management of the investment process
also offers other possibilities for improvement in this area during the
next p eriod. For example, in tr~e sensitive problem of interlinking individual
indic ators with the entire individual sections of the plan there are great
' possibilities for improving the system of [gescieJ general coordinators and
balanced planning. Modern computer equipment will make possible an increas-
ingly more c~etailed balancing of work and deliveries not only for selected
constructio~i projects with budget costs exceeding Kcs 2 million, but also
for other projects. More consistent checks on the censtruction budg2ts
_ may also substantialiy enhance the authority of the plan in capital invest-
- ment. Likewise, more consistent checks on economic agreements and reasons -
why these economic agreements are not honored and violate the principles
of supplier-customer relations can grEatly help in solving the problein of
this, by far the weakest link in the implementation of the capital invest- ~
mer.t p lan. Finally, many problems will be solved if increasingly bigger
reserves will be earmarked for unanticipated economic needs as ~he economy
develops.
The volume of those fixed assets can be directively determined that must -
be eliminated, and funds put aside spscifically for their replacement.
It is justly demanded that the plan must be more differentiated depending
upon the conditions of individual organizations, and also that the very
system of indicators f.or the management of capital investment must be more
differentiated because it cannot be identical for different sectors and
branches. All this can be improved by furth~r specificar_ion of plan indi-
cators in terms of structure, effectiveness and quality.
_ It is true that ~he system of indicators based on the increasi:ng spQCifi-
catio n of directively assigned tasks is too weak for the fundamental solution
of some long-term tasks of economic and particularly investment development.
� For example, the absence of ties between the investment plan and ~he plam
of scientific and technological deveiopment is often criticized, because
many achievements of basic and applied research are only very rarely, if
ever, included in the investmen t plan that would transform these achievements
into reality. Although evpcy task of the state program of basic research
must contain the implementation outputs, the application of results in social
pract ice or the economic contribution, this does not yet mean that a11
obstacles have been removed from the road to their implementation, -
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'Phis implementation is, specifically in tne investment plan, very complex.
The preparation and implementation of an investment project takes 10--12
years. Effective stimuli, however, are lacking for including all techno-
logical achievements in the investment plan, and also for flexibly changing
che plan on the basis of the latest scientific and technological achievements.
The accomplishment of volume tasks on which the evaluation of enterprises
and organizations is largely based does not require the optimization either
of the plan of investment development or of the plan of technological
development, and the present system of indicators, together with the short-
_ term nature of the operational plan, promotes technological conservatism
instead, �or which experiences of economic practice offer ample proof.
The only way out from the present system of indicators is the directive -
' assignment of additional tasks: assignment of obligations in the application
of all achievements of technologicai progress in social-economic practice;
directive specification of technological progress in individual investment
projects of key importance and in the entire areas of rationalization (for
example in the fuel-energy sector), directive determination of the percentage �
of technically probressive products, and so on. The more rapid and the more
_ general scientitic-technol.ogical progress is, the more difficult it is for
the center to decide on its application in the investment plan. ~ioreover,
even the most rational decisions by the center cannot make up for lack of
interest on the part of lower levels of m~nagement in rationalizing invest- `
ment and technological progress.
The pricnary emphasis on effectiveness and quality resulting among other
- things from the high degree of saturation of the society with quantity
alone--proclaimed at the 14th CPCZ Congress and again and more urgently at
the 15th CPCZ Congress--undoubtedly also requires a new system of indicators
based on other key indicators.
I.t must also be emphasized that no long-existing system of indicators,
including the subsystem of indicators for the management of the investment
process, can be replaced by another one until this new system is thoroughly
tested and proves itself better, superior.
2. [Comprehensive Experiment in Efficiency and Quality Control]
It is necessary to elaborate, define with more precision and further develop -
the Comprehensive Experiment in Efficiency and Quality Control also for the
investment process into a well-rounded and-~-in comparison with the present
J one--qualitatively more perfect system of management, including a self-
_ contain~d and mutually interlinked system of indicators on the national
economic scale.
' In the present experiment, whether conducted in industry or in the building
sector, the volume of gross production, which was the principal indicator
of plnn fulfillment until now, loses ~ts priority position because as an
indicator it fails to encure social effectiveness or to meet other qualitative -
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requirements. In its stead, specifically in the building industry and in
connection witlithe elements of the Byelorussian experiment, pai�ticularly _
the deadlines set for completion of construction projects depending upon
their importance for the national economy, assume key significance. The
eacperimenting VHJ, Kasice Industrial Construction Projects, has introduced
two mandatory indicators of effectiveness: profitability in relation to
production costs and the utilization rate of installed machinery, while
~ the evaluation of enterprises and entire VHJ's is based on the so-called
"reduced outputs," that is outputs from which the effect of materials and
energy consumption in particular is eliminated.
In ~he ~irea of the reproduction of fixed assets proper, the experiment in
selected VHJ's concentrates on the more effective management of investment
projects fo-r which a limit is set (construction projects with budget costs
below Kcs 2 million and machinery not included in the budget of construction
projects) in order to maximize the percentage of progressive modernizations
and investments with rapid returns. Funds for this category must be created
by the VHJ itself according to the specified standard, while a certain part -
of funds will be administered by the central branch organs and used for
projects requiring an increase in the labor force, imgort of machinery and
equipment from the capitalist states or insuring the tasks of socialist
economic integration, technical development and so on.
The complex relations among the participants in the investment process--inves-
tors, design organizations, contractois and subcontractors, but also future
' users of capacities under construction--are why the application of the
Comprehensive Experiment in Effectiveness and Quality Control, its defini-
tion with more precision and further development is especially complex in
this area of the national economy. It is, however, also very important
because the investment process is the carrier of the dynamics of the entire -
national economic plan.
A substantially bigger interest in effectiveness and quality--in capital
investment particularly in shortening of the deadlines set for completion
~ of projects, reducing budget costs and increasing the useful effect of _
investment work and deliveries--from the outset reveals many big reserves -
which were previously hidden in the background. "
In the first place, much more emphasis is laid on the fact, which was also
occasionally formally stressed in the past but from which no adequate
conclusions w~re drawn--namely, that the preparation of construction projects
by the investors and design organizations is of decisive importance. The
present stimuli and saction t~ols in the area of economic law, however,
were primarily applied to supplier building and assembly organizations and
only to a limited extent to other participar_ts in capital investment. It -
has became clear that the new incentive measures must in the first place
support early preparation of projects by the investors and design organiza- ~
tions because this wi_11 stimulate interests on the part of supplier organi-
zations not only in shortening the periods of actual construction, but also
in reducing the budget costs of projects.
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it has becoli~e also clear that there is a conflict between the interest in
improving quality and, in the broader sense, in the maximization of useful
effect of investment pro~ects under construction on the one hand, and
lagging quality control on the other. Specifically, the VHJ Industrial
Construction Pro,jects Kosice applied the former criteria of quality planning
and evaluation as late as 1979, the first year of experiment. It was
- therefore all the more justified that thi~ VHJ sped up preparations for
the introduction of the comprehensive system of quality control as of
1.January 1980 making use of experiences in this area by the VHJ Surface
Construction Projects Bratislava.
True, due to a variety of causes many principles underlying a more effective
system of indicators in the realization of capital investment are difficult
to enforce even in the building sector itself.
In contrast to the experzment in industry, the ~'~iJ Industrial Construction
Projects did not begin to verify the three-year operational plan, but
extended the planning period merely by introducing the so-called two-year
sliding plan and combinin~ it with the one-year operationa~ plan. Experiences
from industry also revealed how difficult it was for the enterprise, despite -
considerable tolerance (for example 4 percent), to draw up a mandatory
three-year operational plan. Mc,reover, the supplier-customer relations
in the building sector, which still is largely individual production, are
particularly labile. Yet even so, the transition to the two-year sliding
plan combined with merely a one-year operational plan represents a big
advance for the building organizations, because it makes possible a more -
consistent preliminary and comprehensive preparation of planned tasks and
thus also a more even and continuous utilization of production capacities,
- whicn is the primary prerequisite both for incre3sing efficiency and reducing
the scope of unfinished projects. The two-year plan also creates better
conditions for comprehensive securing of deliveries of materials, particu- ~
larly those in short supply, and for regula*_ion of complex cooperaticn
relations among the relatively large number of subcontractors, which is
typical of the capital ir.vestment sector. On the other hand, the one-year _
operational plan still in use does not stimulate the enterprises' interest
in technological progress and related measures bec3use the one-year period
for which the funds are allocated and taskn planned is really too short.
The VHJ Industrial Construction Projects tries to cope with the situation _
in the area of technological development by setting up a joint fund for -
financing sectoral and enterprise pro3ects. It wants to systematically =
and centrally coordinate the selection of technological developmene pro~ects
by the general dirzctorate in order to implement the main ideas of the
experiment in regard to shortening construction periods, increasing labor
productivity of its own performance without an increase in material consump-
tion, and increasing profitability in relation to the total production costs.
The principal purpose, however--the stimulation of enterprises' material
interest in technological development--cannot be achieved by the centrali- -
. zation of decision-making in this area. It can only provide incentives for -
promoting greater technological progress in the future, that is during the
- Seventh Five-Year Plan.
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It is also more difficult in the building industry to strengthen the
motivating function of the systPm of indicators of wage control according
to the plan. Although the princi~les governing the basic and incentive
components of wages are in the experiment essentially identical f~r industry
and the building sector--the basic component is determined by the share in
added value and t~e incentive component by the absolute limit depending
upon the attainment of planned profitability and compliance with two addi-
tional conditioning indicators which reflect the material structure of the
economic plan--in contrast to industry, VHJ Industrial Construction Projects
Kosice considers setting up a bonus fund equal not to 20 percent, but only
14 percent of the total volume of wage funds. This means that there will
' continue to be smaller incentives in the building sector than in industry
generally. Although this was also typical of the building industry in the
- nast, this wi71 not benefit the building industry and particularly capital
investment in any way. On the contrary, the fact that the investment
_ process is the carrier of dynamics of the plan speaks in favor of reversed
or at .least equal priority of profitability in the building sector and all
_ of capital investment.
In elaborating, defining with more precision and developing the experiment
in the management of the investment process, it is necessary to guard
against some illusions. In addition to assigning priority to efficiency
and quality, the experiment--in contrast to the previous system of manage-
- ment--no longer stimulates the enterprises to the antisocial hunt for the
largest possible material need. The assessing indicator of added value
or reduced outputs, however, does not stimulate material savings either.
Moreover, it still does not put an end to the equally antisocial interest
of the enterprises in increasing the labor force as the key fac:,~r in their
added value to which--expressed ~.n the volume of wage funds--the percentage
of profit is simply added. The possibility of inflating their own perfor-
mance is thus only restricted, but not completely eliminated.3
Both these facts therefore call for a multitude of additional, more specific,
supplementary and conditional indicators which would regulate enterprise
activity in accordance with society's interests. This further complicates
the problem of attaining consistency of indicators which is particularly
' sensitive precisely in the management of the investment process. At the
_ same time, however, both of these facts indicate tfiat it would be erroneous
to regard as the optimal solution to the system of management the effort
' to elaborate and define with more precision the Comprehensive Experiment
in Efficiency and Quality Control and particularly the value added (reduced
output) indicator as the key indicator for assessing plan fulfillment. In
~ other words, it is only an important, progressive step toward this optimi-
zation (or to put it differently, only a half-way measure) corresponding,
~ however, to the present stage of development of economic theory and economic
practice.
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3. [Assessment of Enterprises According to Actually Economic Results
Achieved]
It is necessary to eliminate not only oartial?y,butcompletely the evaluation
of enterprises according to the principle: "the higher the costs, the
higher the outputs assessed" and to switch to the consistent evaluation of
' enterprises on the basis of economic results actually achieved.
Despite all the progress made in the optimization of the system of management
and foc�using its attention on the increase in efficiency and quality, it
is indtsputable that the implementation of tasks in this principal area of
ecotiomic activity has been slow.
In analyzing the causes of this contemporary development in the Soviet Union,
L. Brezhnev emphasized: "This is hindered not only by objective circum-
stances, but also by inertia--inertia in planning, in management methods
and perhaps primarily in economic theory."4
Indeed, perhaps primarily the inertia in economic theory prevents going
even f.urther and more consistently in the effort to completely eliminate
the assessment of enterprises according to the output achieved--actually
production costs--though in the Experiment in Efficiency and Quality Control
only according to the actual value added.
Not only in the management of the investment process, but also generally
- this means that the fulfillment of enterprise plans must be evaluated not
according to the key value added indicator, but according to the indicator
of economic results actually achieved, because the economic effect--the
objective result of enterprise management--can be deter~nined only after
~ enterprise expenditures not only on material consumption, but also remu-
neration of their labor force are deducted.
How much apprehension there is however, about taking this step forward--appre-
hension that obviously stems from the identification of socialist profit
with capitalist profit! Finally, the lack of atteiition paid to the
elucidation of the essence and forms of profit under socialism, laws that
govern its size (attainment of average profit and maximum profit"as the
goal of the increase in management efficiency) and to its developmental
tendencies in individual phases of socialist construction undoubtedly
betrays the same apprehension about taking a step forward from the well-
trodden path of inertia in economic theory itself as the guide for improving
the system of management in economic practice.
_ It is true that even experimenting with the use of profit as ttts basic
indicator of enterprise material incentive under the conditions af socialism
has so far not resu_lted not only in the optimization of management, but on
the contrary such a basic indic~tor has frequently incited the enterprises
to antisocial behavior.
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Soviet economic theory, which has already examined these questions in
greater detail,5 reached the conclusion that it was not the idea underlying
t}ie profit indicator which was wrong, but its wror?g formulation which was
at fault. The same is true of the wrong formulation of standards of incentive
derived from it. If profit as the basic indicator of enterprise incentive
is to discharge its function properly, certain economic conditions must
be met which Soviet theory is analyzing in detail in man_i publications.
Principal among them are objective, economically justified prices that
perfectly perform the incentive and criterial function, and the assumption
that the enterprise profit is the real (and comprehensive) indicator of
the overall quality of the collective's and workers' activity.
It is not easy to meet these economic conditions, particularly in capital `
investment which for the most part involved calculation of individual
construction projects, butit gradually becomes imperative [to do so]
nevertheless. It is significant in this respect what attention is paid to
checking construction projects' budgets, for example in the Soviet Union
especially in connection with the Byelorussian experiment. In the building
sector an entire hierarchy of organs has been set up beginning with a _
special administrative unit at the ministry all the way down to the technical
work groups in the enterprises. Much attention is also paid to training
personnel specialized in this work. In both these respects, we have to work
hard to catch up with the Soviet Union. The budget costs are firm and
averaged. Although they do not reflect specific conditions of individual
construction projects, they do constitue a barrier against sub~ectivism
in their increase and this is decisive at the present time.
If prof.it is really to be the basic indicator of enterprise material incentive,
it cannot be tied to the compliance with other, quantitative or qualitative,
indicators. If it is, these indicators, such as fulfillment of the sales
plan, labor productivity, quality of products and so on, become the basic
assessing indicators of enterprise work. The increase in profit, however,
cannot then be earmarked for the obligatory appropriations to the investment
or reserve fund, for example. In my opinion it cannot be unambiguously
asserted that "...the amount of earned income is the subject of interest of
the individual enterprise worker" and that "...the material interest of the
enterprise is focused on the increase in the average income per worker" as
emphasized by L. Rusmich.6 With the growth of socialist work collectives,
the interest of individual workers also increases in the augmentation of
the fund for cultural and social needs and its optimal distribution as well
as in the investment and reserve funds as the source and safeguard of
further development. Moreover, there is real societywide interest in lower
prices or increased state subsidies for housing construction, for example.
Nevertheless, precisely because tlie interest in increasing personal incomes
is sti11 decisive, it is true that, if the increase in profit is (obligatorily)
used for other purposes, it loses its function as the basic enterprise
material incentive.
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Generally speaking--if the economic conditions are met, chiefly if profit
and price perfectly discharge their incentive function--the fact that a ,
_ building enterprise selects for its production program a project which
is most advantageous in terms of price and profit, is not a sign of enter-
prise antisocial behavior, but the goal of the optimizationc~f the system.
Obviously, however, such an ideal state can never be achieved. On the
contrary, administrative interventions by the center will always be necessary
in the process of drafting, but also implementing enterprise plans not only
in order to correct the effect of imperfect economic tools, but also in -
~ or.der to press--specifically in the investment plan--the urgent societywide
priorities most vigorously and effectively.
In order not to act counter to enterprise profit interests, these interven-
tions by the center either must have an objectivized economic form or at
- least the directively assigned tasks must be accompanied by the objectivized
material incentives.
Precisely for these reasons K. Vlac'ciynsky proposes as the indicator of
enterprise material incentives the "khozraschet profit"~ from which--by
~he obligatory levies to the state budget and the part of the redistribution
of part of incomes among the enterprises within the VHJ and among VHJ's
within ministries--those external (price and other) influences that
deci~ively affect profit at the present time would be eliminated. (We may
note in this�connection that this objective is to some extent achieved in
the Soviet Union through the reduction of the balance profit by the tax
on frozen funds, fixed and revenue-based payments and interest on loans.)
Yet even this "khozraschet profit" does not on the one hand guarantee
- compliance with urgent social priorities specifically in capital investment,
while on the other hand its function as the indicator of enterprise material
incentive is seriously undermined by the fact that its preponderant part
(87.5 percent in the CSSR during the Fifth Five-Year Plan) is paid in the
form of obligatory levies to the state budget and supervisory organs in -
addition to the obligatory allocations to the enterprise investment and
reserve funds.
In this context particular attention must be paid to the specific formulation
af the enterprise material incentive chosen in the Comprehensive Experiment
' in Efficiency and Quality Control for stimulating effective production for
foreign trade. It was decided to allocate funds for material incentives
for these purposes--shares in foreign trade profits or losses--directly to
the enterprise funds (up to 1 percent of available funds to the bonus fund,
up to 0.1 percent of usable wage funds to the fund for cultural and social
needs, to the development fund and reserve fund to cover import losses and
risks) and to exempt themfrom the obligatory levies of profit.
We have already seen that this economic tool,because of its direct and very
atimulating effect, is especially effective in combination with the substan-
tially higher prices for first-grade products. If it covered the entire
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economic activity of enterprises and removed the limits set for the alloca-
tions to the bonus fund and the fund for cultural and social neecls we would
have a new and r_omprehensive indicator of enterprise material incentive
which would essentially represent the balance of bonuses (and material
penalties) of enterprise collectives for the timely, economical and good
fulfillment of the task (and their negative counterparts) as the real
economic effect of enterprise management.8 Other indicators could then be
grouped around this indicator--indicators of the management of the investment
process such as indicators of construction deadlines, unfinished projects,
useful effect of investments and so on, which would stress specific and
- partial aspects of fulfillment of enterprise tasks.
Naturally, it is necessary not to be afraid of marked material incentives
for shares in profit or losses in accordance with the principle: "if you
work better, you will be considerably better off, but if you work worse,
you will be seriously penalized in a similar way." The past course of the
Comprehensive Experiment indicates that such fears really exist and are
given expression in practice. Certainly, it is not possible to put the
revised system of management into effect immediately without some transi-
- tional period. Bur it is also impossible to delay a substantial increase
in effectiveness of material incentives unreasonably.
I think that such a substantial increase in the effectiveness of economic
incentives in the final analysis is also suggested in the document of the
CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers of further improving
the management of the Soviet national economy, when it emphasized that it
is necessary to enhance the effectiveness of economic tools and stimuli
and to make material motivation directly dependent upon the efficiency and
quality of work, on the fulfillment of planned tasks and results of produc-
tion activity.
The above main courses of improvement of the system of indicators of the
management of the investment process may be combined in practice. The first
two approaches, however, are only preliminary stages for achieving the
third one as the target solution in the present strategic revision of
management because only the third course embodies a consistent transition
from the decisive assessing indicator of gross turnover--enterprise [pro-
duction] costs--to the indicator of real economic effect as the basic
stimulus of enterprise material incentive. Only in the third alternative
can the number of mandatory indicators also be radically reduced (in the
extreme case of a perfectly designed indicator of real economic result,
they can be reduced to one, around which the merely supplementary indicators
can be grouped), because it is not necessary to compensate for the short-
comings of the basic assessing indicator.
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1
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FOOTNOTES
1. PRAVDA 9 December 1978 p 2.
~ 2. Reference to the track is not accidental: the higher the velocity of
the moving system, the broader the gauge of the rails that must be
chosen.
3. The illusion that the indicator of reduced outputs also eliminates the
enterprises' interest in increasing their labor force may be created -
by such information spread by the mass communication media such as the
following: "In evaluating the activities of enterprises as well as of
the entire VHJ participating in the experiment, we shall.take as the _
basis of evaluation the so-called reduced outputs, that is outputs from
which the effect of material and energy consumption has been eliminated.
This new tool will make us concentrate even more on increasing labor _
productivity..." (Quoted from the article "An Important Economic and
Political Task," PRAVDA 27 February 1979 p 5). -
4. L. Brezhnev's election campaign speech at the meeting of voters of the
Bauman election district in Moscow. PRAVDA 3 March 1979 p 3.
5. L. Rusmich made interesting comment on the views of Soviet theoreticians
on these questions in his articles in POLITICKA EKONOMIE Vol 1979 No 1
and particularly in Vol 1979 No 3 pp 262-265. -
6. L. Rusmich, "Economic Interests and Khozaraschet," POLITICKA EKONOMIE,
Vol 1979 No 3 p 262.
7. K. Vlachynsky, "The Position of the Profit Indicator in the Enterprise
Sphere," EKONOMICKY CASOPIS Vol 1978 No 7 p 643.
8. I was already gradually working out its formulation in my articles
"One Alternative for Making the System of Indicators in Capital Invest-
ment More Effective," POLITICKA EKONOMIE, Vol 1978 No 12 and "Consistency
of Plan Indicators, Capital Investment and the Problem of a General
_ Comprehensive Indicator," EKONOMICKY CASOPIS, Vol 1979 No 9.
- COPYRIGHT: Academia, Prague 1380
10501
CSO: 2400
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. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
,
PLANT PROTECTION AGAINST ASR POLLUTION IN SLOVAK AGRICULTURE
~ Bratislava AGROCHEMIA in Slovak D'o 3, Mar 80 pp 81-83
[,Article by Doce~~t Engr Stefan Trojan, Cand.Sci., Engr Anton
Grejtovsky, Engr Ondrej Hronec, ~hai~olle~r1Kosice]i and En-
vironmental Disciplines, Veterinary g .
[Text] Meeting t he tasks for further development of our agri-
culture ~et forth by the 15th Congress of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia calls fcr solving problems by intensifying
all elements of the aqricultural and food industry complex,
i.e., more effective and purposeful application of scientific
findings in everyday practice.
The central element in further development of our agriculture
remains plant production in its close affinity to the needs of
animal production. The level of plant production, expressed in
the amount of yield of agricultural crops and their quality, is
under normal conditions closely dependent on an entire series
of environmental f actors. The latter are with increasing tend-
- ency and significance compounded by factors which are abiotic
' in character, such as phenomena accompanying industrialization
~.nd increasing energy consumption, both o~u~eich have substan-
tially affected the biological part of na
The atmosphere of industrial~regions is pervaded by a number of
gasseous and solid substances of varying chemophysical proper-
ties. Their qualitative relative abundance is determined by
the nature of the production and the fuel base of the given in-
dustrial branch. From th~ viewpoint of detrimental effeets on
vegetation, the dominant factors are sulphur dioxide, hydrogen
fluoride, flue ashes and dust. Other compounds (C1, Pb, tars,
nitroqen solutions, etc.) conGtitute harmful substances of a
more or less local character [1].
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This situation acquires a pa~ticular significance in our COT`_-
ditions. Our fuel and energy bas~ depends for the most part on
the use of domestic, lesser quality fossil fuels wii-h a high
contents of sulphur and other harmful substances such as
As and a great number of trace elements (Be, V, Cr, Pb, Mn, Cd,
Ni, S~ etc.) having potential toxic effects n~t only on plants,
but, naturally, also on all complex food chains.
The Economically Most Significant Relations Between Air Pollution
and Detrimental Effects on Plant Life
The first systematic observations regarding the effects of smoke
products on plants began already in the Iast century. The in-
centive for an intensive study of the problems in this area was
_ provided by the extensive damage to vegetation following WWII.
Its objective was primarily quantification of the negative ef-
fects of air pollution on plants of economic importance. Yet,
no reliable definition could be formulated to date in regards
to t he req~irements on air quality f rom the viewpoint of opti-
mum conditions for the flora of a region.
To identify t he relation between a harmful substance and plant
reaction, it is highly important to select a suita.ble criterion
for measuring the specific effects [ 3]. This is of decisive
significance for determination of critical (limit) concentra-
tions which, as regards the atmosphere, can produce acceptable
conditions for plants and associated forms of life [ 4l.
From the economical. viewpoint, yield and quality of plant pro-
- ducts are of prime importance to assessing the impact of the
effects under study [3]. However,such assessments of yield are
often substantially limited. Changes in t he quality of plants
being studied are in many cases better suited for assessing the
detrimental effects and their relation to the concentration of
and length of exposure to harmful substances. Here we have in
mind mainly more pronounced changes caused by an accummulation
of harmful ~ubstances in plant products, restricting their fur-
ther utilization (accummulation of Pb, Hg, F etc.
In judging the degree to which plants have been affected by
pollutants, Guderian, van Haut and Stratmann differentiate be-
tween two categories, namely "damaging" and "damage." They in-
terpret "damaging'" as any plant reactions (largely reversible)
to polluted air (temporarily lowered assimilation, cell damage,
necroses, premature defoliation, temporarily depressed growth,
late blooming, etc.). On the other hand, under the term
"damage" they include, from the aspect of the utility of the
plant, only those effects that are measurably decreasing
(damaging) the utility value of plants from the funetional,
economic or biocenotic viewpoint (e.g., lower yield, growth,
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quality, associative changes in permanent plant growth, etc.).
Thus, according to the cited aut hors, damaging can, but need
not always be the first degree of aamage. Damaging produces,
e.g., in sugar-beet leaves, an inhibited assimilation, which
results in lower sugar contents and a crop of worthless bulbs.
Defoliation during necroses of decorative plants, leaf vegeta-
bles, or in green cultivation of plants directly lowers their
value, making damaging identical with damage. On the other
hand, leaf necroses in general need not affect the amount of
yield of the main product (damaging t he leaf area of wheat need
~ not have any pronounced effects on grain yield).
Determination of the extent of damaging and of damage represents
thus a special task determined by the requirements on the util-
ity value of t he affected plant (its targeted utility).
At any rate, valid assessment of lower yield due to pollutants,
or impaired quality of the plants cultivated, depends primarily
on authentically obtained mutually comparable values regarding
both affected and not affected plants [b, 7, 8l �
- Standardization of Air Quality and Protection of Agricultural Crops
A total elimination of air pollution and of its negative effects
is, for all practical purposes, impossible. The sources of pol-
lution are often of key importance to the national ec~nomy. For
these reasons, all advanced societies look for solutions that
would minimize any damaging and the resultant damage. The basis
for limiting damage to vegetation or for improving the quality
of air is formed by accepted standards or limits for individual
components of the natural environment.
Directives of t he ~hief Hyqienist of the CSSR, No. 34j1967, re-
quire that concentrations of the individual most important
harmful substanc~s in the atmosphere do not exceed, in isolated
exposure, the values listed in table 1. This standard pre-
scribes the highest admissible short-term concentrations (k
and the highest admissible average daily concentrations (kd~ in
apen air. Thus, e.g., for S02 and dust the m~ntioned standard
allows the following values: km~ = 0.5 mg/m and kd = 0.15
mg/m3.
Short-term concentrations are defined as the median val.ue of
the concentration at a given place in the time period of 30
minutes. ~
Average daily concentration is defined as median value of the
concentration at a given place in the time period of 24 hours.
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The presence of short-term concentrations is allowed to the ex-
tent that they do not exceed the maximum admissible average dai-
ly concentration.
Dust fallout containing up to 20% of f ree Si02 in the amount of
150 tfkm/year is deemed to be a hygienically tolerable value;
at the same time, consideration is given to the size of dust
particles and the pH value of water extract (pH 5 to 8), or, as
t he case may be, the contents of harmful substances.
Table 1. Maximum Admissible Concentratio~s of Key Harmful
Substances in the Atmosphere (O.C, 1,013,25 kPa)
Maximum Maximum
Admissible Admissible
Harmful Substance Short-term Average
conc, k daily co c.
(mg/m~`~ k~ (mg/m~)
Dust 0. 5 0.15
Sulp~ur dioxide 0.5 0.15
Carbon monoxide 6.0 1.0
Nitrogen oxides (such as N02) 0.3 0.1
Chlorine 0.1 0.03
Hydroc~ en sulphide 0.008 0.008
Lead (other than its tetraalkyls) 0.0007
Carbon disulphide 0.03 0.01
Arsenic (inorqanic compounds,
except As H3) 0.003
Fluorine (inorganic gasseous
- compounds) 0.03 0.01
Soot (amorphous C) O.IS O.OS
Formaldehyde 0. 05 0. 015
Phenol 0. 3 0.1
Manganese (such as Mn02) 0.01
Sulphuric acid expresses O.Q1
Nitric acid as 0.01
Hydrochloric acid H~ ions 0.01
Ammonia 0. 3 0.1
Benzene ~ 2.4 0.8
The above listed admissible concentrations of harm~ul substances
f orm the basis for computing compensation for damages caused by
pollutants to agricultural. production (Government decree No.
40/1963 of the Codex and implementing instructions, see Bul.letin
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, part 19 from I970).
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The shortcomings relevant t~ implementation of these valid legal
standards in practice are pointed out by a great number of data
[9, 10, 11]. It is more or less a matter of general knowledge
- by now that the concentrations tolerated by the applicable norms
are too high to prevent damaging and damage to vegetation. Cur-
rent findings regarding t he limits for concentrations (e.g., of
S02) show that t hey are f ar ~elow the prescribed admissible con-
centrations. Tables 2 and 3 list the res~alts obtained in fumi-
gation experiments [12] and in field conditions in the vicinity
of the source [13 Of particular value are the findings of
- Guderian and Stratmann [131, as the second value in table 3 in-
cludes the arithmetical average of S02 c~ncentrations for the
entire cultivation pexiod and, thus, also for periods when t here
is no exposure to S02 (e.g., due to climatic changes), when the
plants "recover" from the pr~evious effects [14] , often without
the presence of visible signs of damage.
Table 2. Maximum Concent rations of S02 for Various Plants
Arrived at Through FumigatiQn Experiments [12]
Maximum ~oncentration
Type of Plants of S02 in mg/m3
Alf al~a, puzple medic, vetch 0.429 - 0.857
Spring wheat, oats, spinach 0.572 - 0.857
Kidney beans, lettuce 0~ 572 - 2~ 287
Strawberries, roses 0.857 - 2.287
Pot atoes, spring beets, radisk~es 1,144 - 2.287
Sugar-beet, cauliflower
Intensive research is currently focussing on the study of the
effects of low concentrations of SO2 , which, as regards effects
on plants, are much more dangerous than high concentrations.
While in the thirties concentrations of S02 around 5.7 mg~m3,
and in the mid sixties still 0.57 mg/m3 were deemed to be the
limit for causing damage �~o plants, it ~ppears that it is pre-
cisely the low values around 0.057 mg/m that can cause sub-
st antial damage to veget ation during protracted exposure [,lJ.
High concentrations produce acute damage to plants that is out-
wardly visible. Low, chronically acting concentrations leave
no visible signs in the early stages of exposure, but have de-
trimental effects on the basic physiological processes of plant
life photosynthesis, breathing, the enzymatic system, etc.
[ 7, 16, 17, etc.] �
We must stay aware of t he f act that in most cases the situsulon
- in terrain conditions is substantially more complicated.
phur dioxide also never acts in isolation, but in conjunction
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with its accompanying components of solid fallout (flue ashes
or dust), the physicochemical properties of which can quite -
substantially affect the degree of damage to plant life.
Table 3. Maxim~.un Concentrations of SO Arrived at in Field
Conditions in the Vicinity o~ the Source [13].
Maximum Concentr~,tion of S02
in ma/m
Types of Plants During During
. Exposuxe Cultivation
(ti)~ (tm)
Fruit trees and barries: '
Gooseberry 0.620 0.743 0.028 - 0.057
Currant 0. 629 - 0, 743 0, 028 - 0. 057
Apple trees 0.629 - 0.743 0.028 - 0.057
Black cherries 0.629 - 1.258 0.028 - 0.237
Cherries 0.743 - 1.258 0.057 - 0.237
Plums 0.743 - 1.258 0.057 - 0.237
Cereals:
Wheat 0.686 - 0.800 0.025 - 0.068
Rye 0.800 - 0.886 0.068 - 0.146
Spring wheat 0.657 - 1.086 0.043 - 0.143
Oats 0.657 - 1.086 0.043 - O.I43
Tubers :
Potatoes ~ 0.600 - 0.657 0.028 - 0.043
Sugar-beet 0.800 - 0.886 0.068 - 0.146
Field fodder:
Clover 0.800 - 0.886 0.068 - 0.146
Alfalfa 0.800 - 0.886 0.068 - O.I46
Green oats 0. 657 - 1. 086 0. 043 - 0,143
Green rye 0.800 - 0.886 0.068 - O.I46
Green spring beets 0.800 - 0.886 0.068 - O.I.46
Vegeta.bles :
Spinach 0.629 - 0.714 0.028 - 0.057
Carrots 0.800 - 1.400 0.068 - 0.297 -
Tomatoes ~0:886~-~1.629 ~O.I46 - 0.354
t~ - 10-minute exposure to S02
tl - arithmetic averages for entire period of cultivation
m Note: The original expresses S02 concentrations in ppm.
Areas in which sulphur dioxide poses potential danger to agri-
cultural crops in the Slovak Socialist Republic are shown in
ill. 1. Three extensive regions with a high degree of dir pol-
lution stand distinctly apart from other Slovak regions; Bra-
tisl.ava, the region of Horna Nitra, Ziar on the Hron River, and
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Kosice. These are joined by the vicinity of Vojany and Banska
Bystrica. The situ~tion is particularly precarious at Horna
Nitra, where the maximum annual concentration of S02 ranges be-
tween 0.20 to 0.25 mg/m3, in the remaining regions mentioned
above the average annual concentration of S02 at maxim}~un con-
centration locations ranges between 0.05 to 0.076 mg/m . At
t he same time, areas in which the ~verage concentration of S02
ranges between 0.025 to 0.050 mg/m C18] ought to be regarded
as highly polluted regions, as it correlates with the 3rd to
- Sth class of air purity according to Marzeyev [ 19J.
~"S L./ r�..~~"'~..1
. a ~.r
' ~ !
� p ZA ~ t y S
.g,.,,,.~ u~ Po 10~9 3 t' ~ r
J 8~.. 3 ~ '~KE� I
r C+n
~
~ c ~o s6 ~O ~ S~S'~~ \ ~ m
~o oNR a
r'
10~ q p
A ~ ~ v~ . -
b
\ S LJ.1J
~ 0 K 70 ~SYm
S02 concentrations o~ less than
or equal to 100 ~ g/m in black.
Illustration 1. Areas of Average Concentrations of S02 in
_ Slovakia ( in ~g/m3 ) ~[18]
In view of the current state of knowledge, as well as in re-
gards to the above mentioned data, we deem it necessary to
point out t hat ~ur contemporary standards will not meet ac-
tual requirements. While at the time of their origin they
were devised innovatively, at t he present they fail to meet
the requirer~ents of biologists, criteria of environmental pro-
tection [20], and not even those for intensification of agri-
cultural mass production.
Technical litexature already presents us with more up-to-date
approaches based on data derived from hundreds of thousands of
measurements. As an example, ~e present the outline of pro-
posed maximum concentrations of S02 (table 4) for plant pro-
tection in the GDR [ 21 l. -
CONCLUSION
The current state and prospective developmental trends of our
fuel and energy base in the immediate future ca11 for devoting
extraordinary attention to the problems of the effects of air
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i
Table 4. Proposed Standards Against SO2 Pollution
for Plant Protection in the ~DR [21J �
Average~concentrations in mg/m3
Per Per 30 minutes ~
Plant Varieties year Growt h not exceed.
Period time ~o
_ 2 . 5~, 5 . O~o ;
1. Most sensitive varieties: ~
Abies, Picea, Juglans, ;
~ Ribes, Trifolium, Medicago 0. 06 0. 05 0. 25 0, 22
2. Sensitive varieties :
Picea, Pinus, Larix, Tilia,
Malus, Hordeum, Avena,
Secale, Triticum 0, 09 0. 08 0. 40 0. 35
3. Less sensitive varieties: ~
Acer, Alnus, Populus,~ ;
Quercus, Prunus, Rosa, ;
~ Solanum, Zea, Vitis, Beta,
Brassica and family
Liliaceae 0.13 0.12 ~0.60 0.53
;
~ i
pollution on economically significant plant life. The increas- ;
ing trend in predicted expectable damages to agriculture ought '
to provide a strong incentive for minimizing losses to pollut- i
ants not only in plant production, but in regards to the vege-
tation cov.ex in general, not exluding thereby also the aspects ~
of preserving soil fertility and other prerequisites to healthy ~
living conditions for mankind. ;
~
EIELIOGRAPHY
1. Wentzel, K-F. "Forstarch" 39, p. 189, 1968. ;
2. Bezacinsky, M. "Ochrana ovzdusi" (Protection of the Atmo- ;
sphere) 9, p. 94, 1977. ' ~
,
3. Materna, J. "Ochrana ovzdusi" 8, p. 5~, 1975. ~ i
~
4. Buck, M, In monograph "Air Pollution. Aroc. First Eur. ~
Congr. on the Influence of Air Pollution on Plants and I-
Animals,".p. 53, Wageningen,,1968.
~ I
5. Guderian, R; van Haut, H.; S~ atmann, H.,"Z. Pflkrankh.
Pflschutz" (Journal for P1an~fDiseases and Plant Protec- '
tion) 67, p. 257, 1960.
23r i '
,
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6. Guderian, R. "Z, Pflkrankh. Pflschutz" 73, p. 241, 1966.
- '7. C,uderian, R. "Staub - Reinhalt. Luft" (Dust - Protection
of the Atmosphere ) 30, p. 17, 1970.
8. `l'oth, J. ; Puskas, J. ; Hanus, J. "Problemy biologie krajiny"
(Problems of Ecologic Biology) 19, p. 73, 1974.
9. Cikovsky, L. "Informacie MPaV SSR" (Bulletin of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Food) no. 2, p. 30, 1976.
10. Janecko, E. In monograph"Vyhodnocovanie sposobenych skod
exhalaciami z priemyselnych zavodov na lesnej a polnohospo-
darskej vyrobe. KV Komitetu pre techniku prostredia pri KR
SVTS v Kosiciach 21-22 maja" (Assessment of Damages to ~or-
ests and Agricultural Production Caused by Ait Pollutants
f rom Industrial Plants. Regional ~ouncil of the Committee
for Environmental Technology at the Regional Board of the
Slovak Technoscientific Society in Kosice on 21-22 May) p.
125, 1974.
11. Materna, J. "Ochrana ovzdusi" 10, p. 28, 1978.
12. Z ahn, R. "Staub" (Dust) 21, p. 56, 1961.
- 13. Guderian, R. ; Stratmann, H. "Forschungsber. d. Landes NRW,
Nr. 1920, Westd. Verlag Koeln u. Opladen" (Research Reports)
1968.
1~'r. Zahn, R, "S~_aub" 23, p. 343, 1963.
- 15. Materna, et al. "Ochrana ovzdusi" 1, p. 84, 1969. _
16. Pahlich, E. ; Jaeger, H-J. ; Steubing, L. "Angew. Bot. "
(Appli~d Botany) 46, p. 183, 1972.
- 17. Kellex, Th. "Photosynthetica" 12, p. 3I.6, I.978. -
- ~ 18. Hesek, F.; Zavodsky, D.; Gabris, P. "Ochrana ovzdusi" 6, p.
105, 1974.
- 19. Cvancara, F. "Zemedelska vyroba v cislech" (Agricultural
Production in Numbers), First Volume, Prague, 1962.
~ 20, Nekovar, J. "Ochrana ovzdusi" I1, p. 1, 1979.
21~ Knabe, W. "Ambio" 5, p, 213, 1976.
COPYRIGHT: AI,FA, ~atislava, 1980 -
8204 E~ -
CSO: 2400
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