JPRS ID: 9137 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090023-5
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• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: REPORTS

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F'nlt OFFIC'IAI. U~F: ON1.1'
JPRS L/9137
11 June 1980
Near East/ '
North Africa Re ort
p
(~OlJO 21/80)
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JPRS L/9137
11 June 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPART
(FOUO 2~/so)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIFS
Details of Arab People's Conference Outlined
(George al-Rasi; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Apr 80) 1
AFGHANISTAN
Operations Againat Guerrillas Diecuased
(Muhamed Rafi Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
14-20 Mar 80) 9
Correspondent Relates Details of Assaesination of Taraki
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARpgI, 14-2.0 Mar 80) 13
zuaq
Deteriorating Relatione With Iran Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Apr 80) t~
SAUDi ~;RABIA
Royal Family, Religious Establishm~nt Ponder Future Changes
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Mar-3 Apr 80) 24
Planned Governmental, Administrative Changes Detail~d
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Mar-3 Apr 80) 3/.
Offi.cial Diacusses Social Problems Confronting Youth
(Faysal ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz Interview; AL-4IATAN
AL-'ARABI, 28 Mar-3 Apr 80) 38
Incentives Offered for Joint Petrochemical Enterprises
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 14-20 Mar 80) 47
- a - [III - NE & A- L21 FOUO]
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Development Plan Gives Priority to Agriculture,
Services, Petrochemicals
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 4-10 Apr 80) 49
SULTANATE OF OMAN
Sultan Interviewed on Foreign Policy
(Qabus ibn Sa'id Interview; THE TIMES, 9 May 80) . 52 _
SYRIA
Economic Problems Threaten Political Stability
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Apr 80) 56
TUNISIA -
i:ew Political Trend Seen in Mzali Appointment
(MARCHES TROPIC~4~X ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 May 80) 60
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INTER-ARAB AF'FAIRS
DETAILS OF ARAB PEOPLE'S CONFEREN~E OUTLINED
Paris AL-WATAN AIr'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Apr 80 pp 18-21
[Article by George sl-Rasi: "Saddam Husayn Honors al-Bitar and al-Hurani;
- Baghdad Has Turned into a Home for the Arab Nation and Has Given a New
Dimension to the Effectiveness of People's Conferences"]
[Textj It is not usual for 1,000 Arabs from 20 Arab countries to meet
together in one large room outside the framework of off icial meetings and
su~it conferences.
The fact that 1,000 Arabs should meet around a discussion table to talk
freely and in a democratic way about basic questions that deal with the
future of the nation is quite rare.
Nevertheless, such a meeting was made possible in Baghdad during the f inal
week of the last month. For 4 days a Mauritanian spoke with a Yemeni, a
Moroccan with a Kuwaiti and a Somali with an Egyptian. They all said what
_ they wanted to say and raised any subjects they wanted ro raise to the point
- that those who presided over the People's Pan-Arab Confere.nce were compelled
to interfere and use their mandate continuously, bearing tfiereby all the ~
consequences of gathering the Arab nat3on in one auditorium.
But these consequences are acceptable and reassuring. The mere fact that a
meeting of such a large number of representatives of parties and political,
professional and popular organizations throughout the greate~r homeland took
place is in itself a positive factor that leaves deep impressions on people. '
In this sense at least we must recognize that Baghdad has become open to all
the citizens of the Arab nation. Arabs go into [Iraq] without a visa, and
they"may work there in any sector 3ust like any other Iraqis.
Tlaese are some of the f eelings that one has whe~i one sees this spontaneous
meeting between hundzeds of people from the Arab Maghreb and hundreds of
, Arabs fram the eastem part of the homeland who had never before met each
other, become acquainted with each other or talked with each other.
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_ One asks oneself: how many of our brothers who live in the eastern part of
the homeland and who are present here know exactly what Muhanunad al-Basri,
'Abd-al-Rat~�nan al-Yusufi or Yusuf al-Ruwisi represent? How many of them had
in the past come into contact with Atmmed.Ben Salah or ~ith Bachir Boumaaza
(the only Algerian attending the.conf erence) and tried to understand at close
range the experience of each one of tfiem in his ~wn country?
One asks oneself: how many of our brothers who live in the Arab Ma~hreb ~
know the real role that Akram al-Hurani or Salah a1-Din al-Bitar played in
Syria's contemporary history? How tnany of them tried to approach the
rich experiences of strife that the coi~ntries .of the eastern part ,of the
P.rab homeland experienced early this century?
It may be said in this sense that the cld and the new colonialism had
achieved considerable success in making the capitals of the West "centers"
Eor the Arab parties. They thus created a big gap between the parts which
make up this nation. The recent fall of Cairo was tantamount to the icing
on the cake in this conspiratorial course that is deep-rooted in history.
For all these reasons the People's Pan-Arab Conference became the first
step on the ruad to rectify the rift and repair the f1aw. What did each
delegation contribute to the achievem~nt of this goal? What manifest and
hidden signs can be deduced from the historic Baghdad meer_ing?
'ifi e Iraqi Delegation: the Smallest and the Ler~st Talkative
Contrary to what usually happens in such conferences, and especially if they
are people's conferences, the delegation of the country which convened the
conference--and we are not saying the host country because the Iraqis do not
consider the rest of the Arabs their guests, as was indicated by President
Saddam Husayn in his address to the conferees. The Iraqi delegation was the ~
smallest delegation and the one that spoke the least. In most cases the
delegation ~onsisted of four or five members. 'They were Messrs Tariq 'Aziz,
iVa' im Haddad , d Qas im Haimnud i, Shaf iq al-Kamal i and Nas if ' Awwad .
- This delegation's participation in the conference was conf ined to making a
few quick comments, while the "guests" moncpolized almost all the time that
- was set aside for discussion. We must, nevertheless, co~nend the two unlrnown
soldiers who made a major effort [to en.^�ure] the success of the conf erence. '
They are Na'im Haddad and Sa'd Qasim Hammudi. The first welcomed the 1,000
guests at the airport and shook each one's hand and then spent two and a half
hours delivering th~ document that had been prepared by the Socialist Arab
Ba'th Party. He had attached it to P:esident Saddam Husayn's Pan-Arab
Proclamation. This led the chairman of the opening sesaion, a1-Shaykh 'Abd- '
a1-Hamid al-Sa'ih to congratulate Na'im Haddad for his youth and his vigor. ~
Sa'd Qasim Hammudi, however, stayed with the conference every step of the way
from the f irst preparations that were made for it until the last statement j
that was issued. He had stayed up for a whole night with his colleagues in j
the Drafting Cotmnittee so as to finish the conference's final statement on !
schedule and to take into consideration a17. the remarks that were made by
the t~:ausand confereer.
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There are hundreds of thousands of Egyptians in Iraq today. They went to the
land of the Tigris and the Euphrates voluntarily to take part in building
modern Iraq. They entered Iraq without visas, and they live there in peace
and security. They are not under the observation of the police, and there
arP no indications of raciem. They send their savings to their families in
Egypt, and they do so freel}� and with peace of mind.
Today, Egyptians in Iraq live in entire villages which are located all
along the road between Baghdad and Mosul. So~e of them are even scattered
in the governorates of the north. Many of them :.an be foimd in the services
sector--in hotels, construction and caf es--and in the agricultural sector.
If we know that in addition to all those Egyptians there are about 50,000
citizens ot the Arab Maghreb, most of whom are from Ttinisia, we can then
imagine the new demographic map of the land of the Tigris and the Euphrates,
and we can see it as a miniature model of the future demographic map of the
- united Arab nation.
With much work and few words Baghdad is offering a live model of the future.
This is one of the results with which all those who attended the People's
Pan-Arab Conf erence left.
Egyptian Discussions
If Egyptian Elrabs can be found in such large numbers in Iraq, their national
question, along with the question of Palestine, was one of the principal
questions around which the debate was focused. Such a conference would not
have }~een convened in the first place ha.d it not been for the new circumstances
[that emerged] on the Arab scene following the signing of the Camp David
A~ccords.
The Egyptian problem--if it can be called that--is divided today into two
parts. The first one deals with the persistent struggle which the opposition
inside the country is waging to unify its ranks and to contain on all level.s
all the effects of the normalization [of relationsJ. The other part pertai~is
to the attempts to divide the opposition abroad, which, were it to be re-united,
would undoubtedly be capable of playing a prominent leadership and media role.
It cannot, however, be a substitute for the internal struggle.
The delegation of the Egyptian National Movement that came frum Cairo and was
headed by Mr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Ghazali defended its cause with enthusiasm and
elected a reporter for the conf erence. But the strong opposition front that
had been formed a f ew weeks earlier under the name, the Egyptian National
Coalition, and included diff erent forces including the legal opposition which _
is led by Ibrahim ~;hukri, was represented by Dr 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah and
Sabri al-Mubdi.
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As far as the opposition abroad is ccncerned, it appeared evident today that
it ha;i two centers. The first was proclaimed in Damascus by Lt Gen Sa'd al-
Din ;al-Shadhli while the Baghdad Conference was in session, and the second
group rallied around Mr 'Abd-al-Ma~id Farid.
Tn connection with the 3aghdad meeting, meetinga between the Egyptian
opposition inside the country and the opposition abroad, on the one hand, and
_ between the parties to the latter opposition, on the other, continued without
i;~terruption [for the duration of the canference] . Naturally, the point of
view of the domestic opposition--and it is to a certain extent accurate--was
that the real opposition was that which cou13 be found on the principal,
domestic scene. It was waging its struggle against all the manifestations
of Zionism on the land and soil of Egypt and enduring at the same time the
government's pressure and oppression.
In connection with the ongoing efforts to control and organize the Egyptian
opposition inside Egypt and abroad, the Baghdad Conference provided ample
opportunity for discussion among the members of the Egyptian delegation.
Safinaz Kazim, for example, who lives in Baghdad, ~.s an instructor at the
al-Mustansariyah University. She came to the conference dressed in black,
perhaps because she was mourning Arab conditions. Ii, one of her heated inter-
~ections she did not even spare Jamal `Abd-al-Nasir when she said, "The seeds
of thorns yield nothing but thorns!" She mad e that statement in the course
of tier discussion of al-Sadat's treason.
But soon fervor and zeal gained the better of some members of the delegation
coming from Cairo. Mr Mujahid Muhammad Mujahid from the Nasirist Popular
- Organization in Egypt stood up to respond to Saf inaz Kazim, reminding her of
the esreem with which the late president was held. He said that no one was
permitted to deal with Nasir's prestige in a provocative and impassioned manner.
Engineer 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hammudah, member of the Egyptian delegation defended
democracy and said, "Gentlemen, the democratic factor and the fact that it has
been ignored in the Arab homeland for the last 25 or 30 years is what made
[our] national independence frail. I am saying t?iat we were among 'Abd-al-
- Nasir's opponents, but we are now among those who grieve for him the most
and.who approve of his accomplistanents even though they may not be frail.
"Democracy is non-existent because it was not established on a dez~ocratic
fotmdation. Where are the socialist gains which were achieved by 'Abd-al-
Nasir and were copied by some Arab coimtries?"
In order for us to do a better job of recreating the atmosphere of reproof
and "soul searching" in which the members of the Egyptian delegation indulged
themselves, let us listen to some of what was stated by the patriotic writer
'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah:
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"If the primary perpetrator of the crime is in Cairo, he has many partners
[to the crime] outside Egypt. Many of the forces who are shedding many
passionate tears for Egypt, just as heirs weep for their benefactor while they
calculate their share of the estate, did prepare for thia hor~ible crime."
It seems that Sa'd Zaghlul Fu'ad miaunderatood the intentions of his
colleague 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah. He ~umped up passionately afterwards and
asked the chairman of the session to give him the f~oor so he could say that
al-Sadat alone was respcro sible [for the crime).
This matter notw{.thstanding, the vitality which charact~rized the Egyptian
~ delegation is a sign of health. It undoubtedly suggests that the process of
, clarif ication and elsamination which is presently taking place will undoubtedly
strengthen the unified action struggle on the Egyptian scene inside and outside
Egypt.
The Syrian Delegation and the Historic Meeting
Like the Iraqi delegation the Sy.rian delegation had Iittle to say, But this
spontaneous meeting itself which took place between old companies did say a
great deal.
Alaram al-Hurani and Salah..al-Din al-Bitar sat in one row. T'hey were surrounded
by Hamud al-Shuf i, Amin al-Haiiz and Ahmad Mahfal. Akr~m al-Hurani did not
say a single word, but he contirru ed to attend all the sessions. He applauded
with enthusiasm, and he embraced all his old friends. He was exhausted by
the smoke,in the auditor ium, by the heat and by the length of some of the
sessions, but, as usual, he attended all the sessions.
Hamud al-Shufi spoke, repeating some of what he had said in the statement he
had made in New York when he resigned as Syria's permanent ambassador to the
'United Nations, Ahmad Mahfal, the representative of the Syrian Communist Party
also spoke along the same l~nes.
Salah al-Din al-Bitar's statement was a defense of democracy and of the human
rights of Arabs. After he explained his understanding of present internationul
relations, he alerted the conferees who were present to the necessity of giving
ma~ or importance to the matter of regaining Egypt. He t~ld [his audienceJ that
in less than a year Egypt will have been returned to the Arab comin~;nity.
He concluded his address by saying, "How can we avercome the partitioning of
the Arab homeland with the unity of the Arab people? We cannot overcome this
, unless peaceful borders are established between the Arab countries. This
means that the borders must be open to people; they must be open to opinions;
and they must be open to the press so that the opinions of the people of
one nation may interact with those of the other. A recanciliation between
regimes cannot be achieved on a national basis un less the borders between the
Arab countries are opened. Opening the borders is tied to the condition
that one Arab country will not conspire against another.
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rux urr 1l;tEw U~~; UNi,Y ~
"It is my opinion ti~at this cannot be achieved unless democratic freedom is
made available in every Arab country. There is one thing called freedom
and one thing ~:alled democracy. We have not had either during the la:;t 20
years, and we have been incapable [of taking action]. This thing that has ~
been absent must be restored to us. Today, the question of unity, the question
of liberating Palestine, the question of socialism and the question of non- i
al'''Lance are called democracy in activist terms. It is for this reason that '
I go back and repeat that everything that I said today will remain mere ink on
paper if we do not achieve democracy. Let me repeat tYiat for emphasis, ~
everything that I said tod.ay will remain ink on paper if we do not achieve ~
democracy."
There is no doubt about the implications of the wave of applause with which ;
Mr Salah al-Din al-Bitar's speech was received. j
= Saddam Iiusayn Honors al-Hurani and al-Bitar
The implication of President Saddam Husayn's honorable initiative was also _
clearer. When he addressed the conf erence he praised the "great teachers" who
had furthered "our national and human awareness" and who had been attending
the conference. He mentioned specif ically Akram al-Hurani and Salah al-Din ,
al-Bitar. At the dinner banquet which the Iraqi president hosted for ~he
conferees, the guests noticed with delight and pleasure that the president
had invited Mr al-Hurani to sit at his right and Mr al-Bitar to sit at his
left. It were as thougr he were extending an invitation to all f ighrers to
~oin forces, to reunite their rsnks, to unite the nation and to dress the ~
wounds so that a new course can be begun,
The Lebanese delegation was chaired by I?r Usamah Fakhuri who read a statement 1'
that had been prepared in advance by the Natiunal l~ovement. The atatement ~
defined the movement's position on the ma~or questions whicY~ are pending on '
the Arab scene.
Perhape the best statement that wasdelivered in the name of Lebanon waR that ~
which was delivered by Mrs Ikram Shararah, the representative of the Lebanese
Feminist Community. She was one uf rew women who represented Arab women in ~
the People's Par~-Arab Conference. ~Irs Shararah call~d upon the Palestinian
Resistance in Lebanon to take i:~to consideration the sacrif ices that were made
by the Lebanese in the last~few years and to re-evaluate some of their positions ~
on the Lebanese scene. The Lebanese had done their utmost for the Palestinian
qu es t ion .
Speaking about Lebanon brings us to speaking about Palestine which was . ~
~ represented by a sphinx-like figure from the Fatah leadership--Hayil 'Abd- ~
al-Hamid. The sphinx-like figure himself read the letter of thanks which
the conference sent to President Saddam Husayn and to the Iraqi leadership
for convening the conference. This occurred d.u~:ing the popular celebration ~
that took place in the municipal aud itorium at the conclusion of the !
conference. ~
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During the same celebzation I~ 'Abd-al-Ma~id ~arid read the resolutions
that were issu:ed by the conference. These w-are in the form of a final
statement that all pazticipating parties we=e to abide by.
In addition to the sphinx-like figure the Palestinians were also represented
by al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, the good son of Jerusalem. Ris charming
manner and good management of. the opening seasion arousdd [everybody's]
admira t ion .
Moroccan Attendance Was Strong -
.
Almost all the parties were represented in the delegations that came from the
Arab Maghreb: al-Istiqlal [Independence] Party; the Socialist Union of
, People's Forces [USFpJ (Bouabid's groug); 'Abdallah Ibrahian's group, the
Tunisian General Union of Labor [UGTT~; and the Revolutionary Choice Graup
[led by] Muhammad al-Basri. Naturally, this strong attendance from the
Maghreb (about 100 participants) had a positive effect on the atmosphere
at the conference, even though there were some sharp exchanges with the
Mauritanian delegation. Perhapa Algeria's absence prevented the usual sharp
d iscussi~n on the Sa hara question.
It is noteworthy here that the largest nimmber of Maghreb students who are -
studying in any E'sab country can be found in Baghdad. There are about 200
univera ity students from the Maghreb in Baghd.ad, and there isn't a single
~ne in Cairo, for example. 3tudents from the Arab Maghreb who are in the
Iraqi capital rally around a student banner whicn has its political, athletic
and cultural activities. While the conference was in session, the students
organized a lecture by Maghreb leader Mr Muhananad aI-Basri who attended the
- meeting. For 3 hours they talked with him about conditions in Maghreb and
about Arab questions.
~ Tunisia ~~as represented basically by the People's Unity M~vement [MUP] which
is headed by Mr Ahmad Ben Salah. Ben Salah deiivered a speech to the
conference that agreed with what Salah al-Din al-Bitar had said.
Mas'ud al-Shabi also came from Tiuiisia. A;uong other :iational figures who
came was Yusuf al-Ruwisi who received special honors because of his pioneering
~ role in spreading the idea of Arab nationalism in the countries of the Arab
Maghreb. A1-Ibuwisi is one of those who visit the eastern part of the Arab
hameland at least once every year. He considers this annual pilgrimage to
the capitals of the eastern countries of the Arab world, and especially to
Baghdad, to be something whose interruption he cannot accept.
HoF� can we not mention tiie delegati~ns of Somalia, D3 ibouti, Yemen and Sudan -
which came to aff irm their positions ~_f sol.{.darity w~th the Arab question.
We must also mention that the conference re3ected a South Yemen i proposal to
replace the word, "foreign," which is mentioned in the Pan-Arab Declaration,
with the word, "imperialist," because the principal purpose behind convening
_ th,e conference was to ch~cic foreign intervention on Arab land in particular
regardless of the identity of this for eigner and whe~her we consider him a
�riendly foreigner or a hostile one.
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And finally how can we not mention the delegations of Arab expatriates who
came fram Australia, Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil? How can we not mention
in particular ttie delegate from Brazil who aroused the zeal of those present
when he told them that Brazil was larger than the Arab homeland, t;?at it was
more densely populated and that it included innumerable ethnic groups,
religioua sects and linguistic differences?1 It was, neverthelese~ one -
country and all the people came together when the matter pertained to the
country's higher interest. Why can't the Arabs have the same level of unity
_ and aw~rc.~ness of their interests? The brother, of course, is coming from
Braz il and has not yet "adjusted" to Arab disputes.
At any rate the People's Pan-Ara~ Conference has openeci broad prospects for
greater solidarity between nationalist forces throughout the Arab homeland.
It has done more to pave the way for a deeper, a more realistic and a more ;
democratic treatment of matters than any other popular conference did.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
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ArGHANISTAN
1
~ OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLAS DISCUSSED
~ Paris Al,-WATAN AL-ARABI in Asabic 14-20 Mar 80 pp 38-39
[Interciew with Defense Minister Muhamed Rafi by correspondent Badr E1-Haj]
[Text] "Dar al Aman" Palace which was built by king Amanullah 58 years
ago, became the Headquartzrs of the Afghan Defense Ministry. The hugh three
atory palace, surrounded by gardens and watch towers, is located at the
Southern part of the Afghan capital. ~
Before I entered the palace, I saw traces of tank shelling of the third
floor. I also noticed the effects of heavy shelling on one of the militnry _
buildings near the palace. The workers were busy with the removal of
- traces of the shelling and with repair work.
After I was searched thoroughly by the guards, a civilian official escorted
me to the third floor, where I met with Defense Minister Muhammad Rafi'.
He is a young man in his early thirties, one of the military partisans
(Parcham wing) who played a major role in the coup d'etat of April 1978,
which ousted Muham~nad Daud, and brought the People's Democratic Party
~Khalq) to power.
The m.inisrzr apologized for being late because of an important military
meeting. He welcomed me, and expressed his readiness to answer all questions
I might have. The minister spoke in Persian, and a trauslator fro~: the Party
translated his answers into English.
[Question] I have been told that you came out of prison recently, and that
President Hafizullah Amin had sentenced you to 13 years.
[Answe r] I held the position of Chief of Staff of the Tank Corps in Kabul _
before the April revolution. At the same time, I held the position of
Deputy Coimnander of the Tank Corps. After the success of the April 1978
revolution, I was appointed minister of public health. I.ater on, as a
result of differences of opinion resulting from the actions of Hafizullah
Amin and hia gang, I was sent to ~ail along with a number of our comrades.
I was set free on 29 December last year, after the revolution entered a
new phase. ~
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Afghanistan Is Jnder Our Control ,
[QuestionJ Western newspapers' reports state that several parts of
Afghanistan are not under the control of the Kabul government, and that the
rebels are increasing their military attacks. What ia the true situation
in the regions which are not under government control? ~
[AnswerJ The truth of the matter is that this is a media campaign launched ;
against us by American imperialism, Peking and some Arab countries. +
_ Our armed forces.succeeded in ending the_Royal.rule. And today, our
revolution enters a new phafie. This also is due to our victorious armed
forces which play an important role in protecting the independence of
Afghanistan, and striking at the agents of American imperialism in our '
country.
Natural.ly, their plotting takes the form of misleading information, claiming
tl~r~t tliere are parts of Afghanistan under the control of the rebels. But ;
I would like to declare that all Afghan territories are under the control j
of the government. It is absolutely untrue that some Afghan regions are
controlled by the rebels.
The Cruth of the matter is that there are only gangs of murderers, terrorists
and highway robbers outside the borders, especially near the Eastern and
North Eastern borders. They are armed and trained by imperialist forces,
- and then sent across the borders with the purpose of destruction, theft,
and murder. Therefore, the Afghan armed forces are at work in this area
to teach these gangs a lesson they will never forget.
[QuestionJ There are thoae who say that complete military units ~oined
the opposition after Amin was overthrown, and there are those who say that '
_ ~1min enjoyed a strong support within the Afghan army. ~
[Answer] Being the Defense Minister, I can say that the Hafizullah Amin �
_ gang in the army was very small. This gang used to practice methods of ~
terrorism inside the army by arresting and torturing democratic and
patriotic fighters, and liquidating them physically.
It is absolutely untrue that Amin enjoyed the support of the armed forces. ~
His power was very limited, and the claim that unita of the armed forces
joined the rebels is propaganda casted by imperialist sources. '
There is also poisonous propaganda about a disarming of our armed forces.
I already answered these unfounded claims, when I said that the situation in ~
the armed forces is normal and regular. If our armed forces were disarmed, i
how could they fight the reactionary gangs which are trained and armed � ~
outside Afghanistan?
i
I can assure you that since I became defense minister l did not receive any I
reports indicating that a unit of our armed forces ie fighting against us
or for Hafizullah Amin.
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Operations Against Rebels Across Border
[Question] Fram the military point of view, how can the armed resiatance `
which prepares for a long war be faced? Is there an intention to attack
training bases in Pakistan to prevent infiltration through mountainous -
areas into Afghanistan?
[Answer] With regard to the first part of the question, it is clear that
the arming and training of the guerrillas increased after the Afghan
revolution entered its new phase. Terrorists are being trained on the other
~ side of the borders. We have information which indicate that 50 training
- camps exist thrQUgh coordination.with Pakis*_an.and.direct supervision ~t
the Chinese and Americans. With reference to the aecond part of the question
concerning destroying these bases, all I can tell you is that we have under-
taken auccessful steps and operations against these targets. I am sorry,
I cannot offer more details or explanations due to security considerations,
but I can say that successful operations took place and gave good resulta.
[Question] You said that the Americans and Chinese offer assistance to the
rebels. Do you have any evidence?
[Answer] Yes, we confiscated various types of weapons and ammunitions
made in China and the United States. These weapons are in hand, and you may
see them at the Information Center of the Ministry of Guidance. You can
also take pictures of these weapons and ammunitions.
Soviet Mission is to Confront External Intervention
[Question] News reports mentioned that there are Soviet military concentra-
tions on the Iranian borders, and that the Soviet military existence in
Afghanistan is a step on the road to the Gulf oil fields. What is your
opinion as a military man?
[Answer] In reply to this quPStion, eapecially with regard to the frater~~l
Soviet assistance, I repeat what comrade Babrak Karmal, the secretary
general, said before. The assistance from our friends came as a result of
an official request of the Afghan government to confront attacks launched
against us from outside. This limited military assistance is in accordance
with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. �
But the imperialist forces are trying to characterize that assistance
according to their desires and interests. Facing the external aggression
is the only purpose of the Soviet military force in Afghaniatan.
I mentioned to you before that our armed forces are strong enough to deter
internal plots. But the limited Soviet force will handle external attacks
on our country. I repeat, the misleading campaigns which say that the
purpose of the limited Soviet force in Afghanistan is to draw close to the
oil sources and warm waters is an ~nvention of western sources. -
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(Question] Are the armed forces sufficient to face the internal rev~lution?
[AnswerJ We had previausly established party militia in all the provinces.
Iiut the erroneous practices and directions of Hafizullah Amin and his gang
i~inclerc~d pasitive results. Today we are studying this subject with great
c.~re, nnd we will try to benefit from the experience of the revolutiona ln
_ ott~er countries. We will establishe people's militia to stand side by side
with our armed forces ready to defend the independence and sovereignty
of our country.
As he saw me off at.the end of the interview, the young minister wished
the Arabs victory over zionism and imperialism. He reiterated that the
Afgtian revolution stands in the same bunker with the Palestinian revolution
against the zionist and imperialists.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
9607 ~
CSO: 4902
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AFGHAN I S7'AN
CORRESPONDENT RELATES DETAIL$_OF ASSA$SINATION OF TARAKI
Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Mar 80 pp 40-42 _
(Article by Kabul Correspondent: "The Distressful End of the Former Afghan
Preaident; Amin's Officers Strangled Taraki With a Pillow; 'We Bought a
Shroud for Taraki, Dug a Grave for Him, and Cried After We Buried Iiim1�'] -
[Text] In the absence of freedom and democracy, the power
atruggle becomes a barbaric one governed by the law of the
~ungle which does not recognize ethics, conacience, or
mercy. It also does not pay attention to friendship or
comradership. AL-WATAN AL-ARABI's correspondent in Kabul
presents the fine details of the assassination of Nur
Mohammad Taraki, the former Afghaa president, quoting the
minutes of the official investigation of those who ordered
Taraki's liquidation.
Since Moha~oad Daud overthrew hie couein King Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1972,
Afghanistan is still drowning in a sea of liquidations. Mohammad Daud's
residence in the Royal palace, which became the People's Palace, did not
exceed 5 years when the tanka destroyed the palace ending the reign of
Mohammad Daud.
'fhe shadow of terror continued to hover over Afghanistan. Since the coup
d'etat of April 1978, the Islamic and the Maoist forces opposing the regime
started an armed struggle against the government in Kabul. Afghan citizens
paid a death tax for this struggle which is still going on.
The struggle was not limited to the government and the opposition. It also
started within the ruling party (Zitalq) 2 months after the party rose Co
power, through a campaign of physical liquidation of all elements of the
Parcham (the Flag) Wing of the party.
In addition to the fighting against opposition forces, the discord flared
up again within Khalq. It t~:~ok the form of conflict between Secretary
General of Afghan People's Deniocratic Party and Prime Minister Nur Mohammad
Taraki, and his deputy Hafizullah Amin who held several political and
military positions in addition to his membership of the central committee
and the politburesu of the party.
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When the shooting started in the People's Palace between Mohammad Taraki
supportera and supporters of Hafizullah Amin on a certain day last September,
Amin announced over the radio and television that evening that Taraki was
alive and well, but that due to his illness, Taraki had resigned from all
his pvsitions. Therefore, Amin assumed these positions.
A few days~later, p.min announced that Mohamm~:.:d Nur Taraki died from hysteria.
Did Taraki actually die from hysteria? The story of the military people
accuaed of liquidating him differs completely from that~
Lieutenant Muhammad Abdal-Qayyum Iqbal, who was one of the People's
Palace guards, says that former Afghan President Hafizullah Amin entrusted
l~im and two other comrades with liquidating the detained Afghan President
Mohammad Nur Taraki.
Iqbal says that when he was getting ready to go home on the 8th of October,
the telephone rang. When he picked up the telephone, the caller was
Lieutenant Habazad, commander of the guard of the Peoples Palace, who asked
Iqbal to go immediately to his office for an important matter.
Iqbal continues: "When I entered the office, I apologized for wearing
civilian clothes, but he said that this was not a problem. At this point,
Lieutenant Wadud came in on a similar request from Lieutenant Habazad.
Lieutenant Ruzi, the officer in charge of the political police also entered
the office. As to Wadud, he was officer in charge of communications.
"After a short while, the commander said in a staid voice: 'You should
expect things like this. They are natural in the march of the revolution.'
We thought that he meant that a decision had been made to convert us into a
commando unit, and that we wauld be sent to one af the provinces. But he
interrupted our thinking, and said: 'A decision has been issued by the
Secretary Ceneral of the Afghan People's Democratic Party and by the
Politbureau to liquidate comrade Nur Mohammad Taraki.' He ordered us to
carry out the decision as we are party comrades who obey party orders
issued by our higher commandes.
"I requested to see the text of the decision, but he said that 'Trust is the
basis of our dealings,' and scolded me for my behavior. He added: 'Taraki ~
became an ordinary person after he was relieved of all his positions. The
decision to liquidate him was issued by the party, and we have to carry
it out.
Iqbal continues his exciting story, saying; "We asked him if the news will
be announced over the radio. He replied: 'Everything is arranged. Have
no fears. We will announce the matter over the radio our own way.' He
ordered ~is to keep party secrets as disciplined party members. Before he
ended his conversation, he demanded that Lieutenant Ruzi go aee the chief
of ataff to receive certain instructiona.
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"We all left tlie office of the commander, and as soon as I reached my
office, he called me again and asked me to see him. When I went to his
oEfice, he handed me 500 Afgt?an rupees, and asked me to go buy a shroud
and return immediately. Thereupon, I bought a shroud, which was a piece
of white cloth, and returned. The chief of police put it in his desk
drawer. Lieutenant Ruzi then came in, and said that the instructions of
the chief of staff are to bury Taraki next to his brother who died a
- year ago. He added that Lieutenant Habazad knows where the grave is. ~
,
"At this point Habazad asked Lieutenant Ruzi to tell the chief of staff
that he did not accompany those who buried Taraki's brother, and that the
chief of staff himself was among those who went to the grave. Ruzi evaded
the mission, and excused himself. He said that he had to go to attend a
ceremony for the distribution of Party ID cards to the troopa, and that he
had to be there, because he was the political officer."
Iqbal adds: "Habazad here asked me to inform the chief of staff that he
_ does not know exactly the location of the grave. When I informed the chief
of ataff of that, he told me that the grave was near a big tree next to
old graves. I was ordered to tell Lieutenant Habazad to go and search for
the grave of Taraki's brother in Kol-i Abashkan [phonetic] Cemetery. When
I returned to the commander's office, Habazad was there waiting for me. My
commander told me that he was going with Habazad to attend the ID cards
ceremony, I had no choice but to go and look for the grave myself.
"When I arrived at the cemetery, I asked two old people who were sitting by
the grave. One of them showed me ~he grave. When I told the commander the
story, he asked me if anyone knew about the matter. I told him no, except
those two old people: He said: 'There are many members of the intelligence
service who work in that area. If they should learn about the matter, you
will stand martial trial.' I returned to my office.
"Unce a~nin, klabazad called me into his office at 8:30 pm. There, I found
l.ieutenant Ruzi. The guard commander told us: 'Since Lieutenant Wadud is
on duty now, you have to carry Qut his orders.' We left the office, and
Lieutenant Ruzi drove us in a jeep. We left the barracks toward Jisr Mahmoud
Khan. I asked Lieutenant Ruzi about our destination. He said that the
commander asked him to go to Tallat al-Shuhada [Martyrs' Hill] to pick up
some troops, who would dig the grave. The jeep stopped in the area, and
Ruzi entered one of the buildings, while I waited for him in the jeep. Half
an hour later, an officer l did not know came out. The officer, accompanied
by two soldiers, got into the jeep. Ruzi talked to the officer privately.
Later on, I learned that the officer was a member of a special unit of the
guards, and that he and Ruzi had waited for a telephone call inside the
building.
"Ruzi,the officer, and I proceeded to Tallat al-Shuhada, and entered the
guard barracks. The officer selected four of his men who brouglit picks and
shovels with them. He said that since he could not get a stretcher at this
hour, we had to obtain one quickly from one of the depots. But Lieutenant Ruzi
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FO USE ONLX
said that he would personally solve the problem, and that he w~uld use
steel plates which we had brought to the military worlcshop to write slogans -
on.
"Ruzi went to tne workshop, took two plates and put them in the ~eep with
- the help of two soldiers. He asked me to accompany him to the grave to
mark it, so that the soldiers could start digging. Then, we returned to
the palace where we found th~ guards commander alone in his office reading
some reports. He asked us how things were going. Ruzi said the grave was
being dug, and that everything was fine, The commander then said:
'Lieuter~ent�Wadud left already, and you ahould catch up with him.'
"Ruzi and I left the office. Up to this point, I did not know where President
Taraki was being detained. I asked Ruzi wha told me that Taraki was at
Kuthi Pasha Jail. When we reached the ,jail entrance, we saw Lieutenant Wadud
wuitLng for us at the stairs of the Western entrance. Ruzi immediately asked
Wadud: 'Where is he?' Wadud nodded his head toward the inside and said:
'He is in the room."'
Strangling of Taraki
Officer Iqbal continues his exciting story, saying: "The three of us, Ruzi, ~
Wadud and I, entered the building. Ruzi was carrying keys in his pocket. '
He used one of them to open a door. We climbed the stairs, and entered the j-
hall upstairs. Ruzi knocked on a door but no one answered. Thereupon, we
entered a side door and went to the room where Taraki was detained. ~
"When we entered the room we found Taraki sitting with his clothes on. Ruzi
told him that he should accompany us to another place. Taraki agreed, and
asked us to help him carry his cases. Ruzi answered. 'Do not worry about ~
the cases. You should come with us first. We will take care of the cases ~
later. ;
I
Iqbal says: ''It seems that Preaident Taraki realized that the end was close. '
He picked up a small wallet, opened it, and picked up soma money. Taraki '
said: 'These are 45,000 Afghan rupees, and here are some other personal ~
things. Please give them to my wife, if she is still alive.' Ruzi told
him: 'Leave the case here, and we will take care of the matter later on.' ~
i
"Taraki walked, and Ruzi followed him. Wadud carried the white shroud. All i
of us went down to the ground floor. Lieutenant Ruzi asked Taraki to enter I
one of the rooms. Up to this point, only Ruzi knew how the execution was to
take place. In the lower room, Taraki gave his wrist watch to Lieutenant
Ruai saying: 'This is Hafizullah Amin's gift, return it to him.' Ruzi I
took the watch and put it aside on the table. Then Taraki took his party j
II~ card, and gave it to Ruzi, telling him: 'This is for Hafizullah Amin ~
too.' Ruzi put it next to the watch." j
Iqbal says: "Ruzi was the one who gave us orders. He ordered me to tie . ~
up Taraki's hands, and I did. Then he ordered Taraki to stretch on the i
table. Taraki did. Ruzi went to lock the outside door. ~
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"At this time Taraki asked Wadud for a glass of water. Wadud asked me to
go out, and get a glass. When I started filling the glass, Ruzi saw me
and yelled at me, saying: 'I believe that you are late, return to your
place.' I returned to the room. Wadud asked me why i did not brinR the
- wr~ter. t said that Ruzi had prevented me. When Waduc? tried, Ruzi prevented
I~im also. I do remember that I asked LieutenanC Ruzi the following day,
'Why did you not permit us to give Taraki water? It was his last demand.'
He smiled, and said: 'I did not want to disturb him after drinking the water.'
"Ruzi suddenly fell on Taraki, closed his mouth firmly with his palm, ordered
~ Wadud to hold Taraki's legs, and ordered me to hold his knees tightly. Then
he covered Taraki's face with a pillow, and pressed_hard. The body of the
_ _ - - _ -
old president quivered for a few minutes. Then the motion died gradually.
When the body calmed down, we toolc off our hands while co~d sweat dripped
off our foreheads. Ruzi li.fted the pillow, and we l~oked at the face of
the man who was alive a few minutes ago. His eyes were closed as if he
were asleep. His face was pale, with a tint of blue. President Nur
Mohammad Taraki (62 yeara) was finished.
"We wrapped the body in the shroud, put it in the jeep outside, and left the
~ail. We were followed by another car belonging to the tourism office and ~
occupied by a number of guards. When we reached Kol-i Abashkan Cemetery,
we transferred the body to the grave, put the steel plates on top of it,
ahoveled in the dirt, and put a stone on the grave. When we finished the
mission, Ruzi informed the guard commander by radio that the mission was
over. The commander ordered us back. When we arrived, he was furious with
Ruzi, and asked him: 'Why did you contact me over the radio? You should
not have done so at all.'
"After a short period of silence Habazad called somebody I did not know.
Later on, I learned that Habazad had called Ali Salih, the Police Chief.
Habazad aeked him to send a few of his men to guard the grave, lest somebody
ahould steal the body, although the area is under tight surveillance by tlie
intelligence service (Kamm).
"When the guard commander finished his telephone conversation, we all burst
into tears. He angrily said: 'You should not be emotional. You carried
out the decision of the party, the Politbureau, and the Revolutionary ~
Council.' He asked us to have dinner with him, but we execused ourselves
and everyone went to his office."
Habazad's Confessions
This was the story of Lieutenant Iqbal, extracted from the official investiga-
tion. But what is the story of Lieutenant Habazad, the Guard Commander who
issued the orders to strangle Taraki on orders from his boss Amin? Habazad
says: "After my return from Havana, where I accompanied President Taraki,
he called me in, and informed me that he sensed that chaos had developed
within the ranks oP the p~rty during his abasence. Since I was Commander
of the People's Palace Guards, he asked me to tighten security for his~
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peraonal protection. I thanked the president and left. I immediately
informed the the officers of the need to give inatructions to the guards to
be more alert, especi~lly with regard to the security of the president. I
also ordered the officera to cancel soldiers leaves until further notice.
"Later on, I learned that Preai~:ient Taraki called the Chief o� Staff
Mohammad Yacoub, the Air ForcP Commander, and the Air Defense Commander
for the same reason. On the same day I informed the officers un~er my
command of the new orders, Hafizu.l.lah Amin, the defense minister called me
into his office. He told me that he had learned that President Taraki had
called me into his office. Amin aeked me: 'What did the president want
from you? And what did you two talk about?' I told him that the preeident
wanted.me to tighten security measures related to hie personal protection.
Amin als~ asked me whether Taraki asked me about him. My reply was
negative. Amin then asked hia assistant to call in Yacoub, the Chief of
Staff. Amin ordered me to leave.
"When I returned to my office, I realized that there was conflict between
the two men. I was at a loas, what could I do? It was impossible to
mediate between the two men who are at the highest level in the land.
Therefore, I informed one of the President's assistants of the matter, but
- he told me that these are secondary matters, and I should not pay attention
to them. ,
. "When Hafizullah Amin assumed power he transferred Taraki and his family
members to their house, and nobody was hurt. But when the Politbureau
decided to aseassinate Taraki, Amin ordered Ruzi the political officer of
the guard, to tranafer Taraki to another place. The following day,
Hafizullah Amin and the Chief of Staff called me in, and told me that all
matters related to Taraki from now on are the responsibility of Lieutenant
Ruzi. The following day, aome officera who support Hafi2ullah Amin, auch �
as Shah Jihan, Muhamad Nur and Fattah, were appointed to guard Taraki and
- hia family.
"Anynne who wanted to see Taraki had to obtain permission from Hafizullah
Amin, Assadullah Amin or the Chief of Staff. However, Assadullah.Amin and
the Chief of Staff were not in a position to give auch permisaion without
the approval of Hafizullah Amin.
"After 2 days, all Taraki's belonginga were taken from the Palace to another ~
place in a truck. Taraki was transferred to Kuthi Pasha ~sil and remained
there until he was executed. ,
i
"With regard to Taraki's execution, the Chief of Staff told us that the '
Sovieta suggested that they were not ready to receive Taraki in case Amin ~
ouated him from the party on the basis of clear charges." I
~
Thia wae Habazad's story. But what will history say? I
I
What will history say about the comrades who liquidated cach other, uaing ~
methode that human, ethical or party principles cannot approva of?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
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IRAQ
DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAN ANALYZED
Parie AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic Z1-17 Apr 80 pp 32-33
[Art icle: "As Relations Between Baghdad and Tehran Deteriorate, Iran Will
Be the Loeer in Any Military Confrontation with Iraq"]
[Text] The aituation between Iraq and Iran is tense and extremely serious.
If Tehran is enduring the consequences of escalating the tension in the last
few weelcs, it wi11 face worse cansequences.if it chooses the road of military
confrontation with Iraq.
Relationa between Iraq and Iran have deteriorated to their lowest point since
the outbreak of the Iran ian Revolutian mere than a year ago.
In the past few days both sides have recal3ed their diplomats. It has been
said that both si,des had ruahed some of their armed forces to the borders in
the aftermath of two cr3minal incidents that took place in Baghdad last week.
A public celebrati~n was interrupted by a bomb that was thrown [in the crowd].
It killed one Iraqi yoimg man and two young women. Some people were w~ounded,
- and among them was a sen ior Iraqi official, Mr Tariq 'Aziz, deputy prime
minister and member of the Iraqi Revolutionary Leadership Coimcil.
During the popular funeral procession that was held for the young man and
the young woman, the mourners were subjected to another criminal act when
a similar bomb was thrown in their midst. Studenbs and youmg people sunounded ~
an Iraaian school and a number of homes where Iranians live in the area of
al-Waziriyah after they became suspicious that the bomb had been thrown from
one of the corners of the school.
The two incidents left a deep impression on citizens. From the first instant
people accused the agents of the Iranign reg~me which.has not ceased to
show its positions that are hostile to Iraq and its existing regime.
One of the citizens who was most affected by what had taken place was the
Iraqi president himself, Saddam Husayn. Ae visited the wounded in.the hosp ital -
to reassure himself about their condition, and; in a wave of pasaion, he
_ pledged and swore to God that the blood of the dead and the w~unded w~ould not
be wasted. He said, "I swear to God and I sw~ear by every grain in Iraqi soil
that the pure blood which was shed in al Mustansariyah will not have been shed
in vain!"
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It seems that the preaident was referring in particular to Mr Tariq 'Aziz
since he is one.of the prominent leaders of the lraqi revoltuion and regime.
Furthermore, he als~ en~oys the confidence and ~he,affection.of Preaident
Saddam Husayn, of the party leaders and,of the party's popular bases.
Tehran Eecalatea Its Provocatione
The two criminal incidents were preceded by [actions from] Tehran to escalate
the tension in official and unoff icial relations with the Arab countries,
and e~pecially with its neighboring countries on the Gulf and chiefly Iraq. ,
Thia escalation manifested itself in provocativP st~tements tY-~at were issued
by senior off icials in the Iranian regime. These statements revealed a
spirit of hostility tawards Arab regimes and Arab citizens for no other reason
than that the Arabs had not yet.copied the accomplislmients of the Iranian
Revolution and had had a lukewarm reaction to the sacking of the U.S. embassy
in Tehran and the detention of its diplomats by a mob. This detention is
unacceptable by diplamatic atandards or by [standards ofJ hinnane treatment.
The operation itaelf did provide an opportunity for the western propaganda,
media and the forcea of 2ionism to defame Islam, Islamic ideals and Islamic
principles.
The fact is that relations between Baghdad and Tehran have not been good since
the establishment of Khomeyni's reg~me in Iran. The head of that reg:(me and
its ayatollahs have adopted a hostile position towards Iraq. They ma}~ have
been moved to do so because the Iraqi regime has been intent on aff irming
its own Arab identity and aff iliation. These twa matters arouse in the
Persian Iranians feelings that go back, as Saddam Husayn said, to past -
historical epochs which began when the Persian ~pire fell to the Moslem ~
Arabs who began their strong victory with the famous battle of al-Qadisiyah.
Tehran's Failure to Agitate Shi'ite Iraqis
It seems that the Iranian regime imagined that it was capable of turning
sectora of Shi'ite Iraqis againat the regime in Baghdad. But the conditions ;
of 2 million Shi`ite Arabs who live in Ahvaz under Khomeyni's regime were -
not better than the conditions they had in the shadow of Khomeyni's family
[sic?]. i
The Shi'ite Iraqis saw that their Arab brothers in Ahvaz were being sub~ected
to maltreat~nent, and they were being denied their request to maintain their
Arab personality and their Arab heritage. Thia maltreatment reached the point
of having the militia of the regime (the revolutionary guard) kill young Arab
- men openly in the streets or execute them after superfic3al trials. Their ~
religious leader, Ayatollah Khaqani, was exiled to Qom where he was detained !
in a residence near that of Khomeyni.
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The regime.of the ayatollahs ~~as in fact talcen by surprise when the popular
mavement did xcur, not in South Iraq, but rather in the Arab area of Ahvaz.
ThiP ie the Arab~arey that is rich in oil f ields; it is the area wbich the
oppreseors of Iran sub3ugated by force;
Perhaps the other reseon why the revolutionary agpeals thrit were made from
Tehran were received with little eathueiaem bq the Arabs is the fact that
the Iraaian Revolu,tion was not able to greaent itself, either through its _
men, its coaduct or its "accomplishmeats," as a model of a genu ine revolution,
or rather, an Islamic Revolution zhat can be followed.
What heighteaed this �eeling is the fact that the ayatollahs deprived the
Palestinian Revolution of an historic opportunity when they ignored the
mediation [efforts] of Palestinian leaders for the release of the hostages.
The success of such a mediation effort--had it been carried out--would have
constituted a strong moral and diplamatic support for the Palestinians at a ~
time when theq had the most nee3 for this support amfdst the hustle and bustle
of diplamatic iaitiarives an the international acene. This may have had a
strong effect on WaRnington and ia a,,~erican circles which are still resisti.-~g
recognition of the YLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people and recognition of the legit~mate rights of the Palestinian people.
As the activities of the Arabs in Ahvaz increased, the Tehran regime became
suspicious that Iraq was supporting these activities and was sympathiz~.ng
with the Arabs there.
More than oae attempt was made to restore relations between the two countries
to their normal state. But the centers of power in Tehran, in the abaence of
a responsible government and given the wealmese of the f igurehead elected
pzesident Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, were returning to their former course of
malcing contradictorq, provocative statements against the Arabs and against
Iraq.
It wae self-evident that after Bani-3adr made 8tatewents affirming Iran's
refusal to withdraw its troops from the three islands it has been occupyinb
near the Straits of Aormuz that Iraq sent a measage to Dr Waldheim, the
aeczetary general of the Uaited Nations reminding him that Iran was occupying
the aforementioned islands; that these islands were Arab islands; and that
Iran must withdraw fram them.
- The Military Superiority of the Iraqis
Observers here think that Iran would be selecting a road that is fraught with
danger if it resorts to a style of terr~rism or if it brandlahes its armed
force to solve its probl~s with its neighbor, Iraq. _
In thie regard observers in Iraq refer to the major difference between the
two countries in military preparedness and in politicsl stability in epite
of the fact ~:hat Iran's population is tYnree times that o� Iraq.
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It is estimated that there are about 222,OQ0 soldiers in the Iraqi forces. _
They are provided with advanced modern weapons in their armored divieion, in
their air force and ~heir air defense. They have gained considerable
knowledge and expertise through their participation in a principal way on
the Syrian front in the fighting against Israel during the October War.
The Iranian forces, however, which were eatimated to be at 415,000 soldiers
during the administration of the Shah, have been seriously impaired during -
the administration of Khomeyni. Most [military] leaders Yxave been execu ted,
and [a2-my] officers have fled. Sixty percent of the soldiers have relieved
themselves of their duty to serve or to abide by the discipline. Iran also
_ lacke maint~nance serzices for the weapons it owns, and it also lacks spare
parts.
From Arab Ahvaz: the Separatist Oil
Newe from Tehran indicates that the oil refining process in the t~ro refineries
at Abadan and Karamanshah has come to a standstill early this week as a
result of the fact that the pumps have been blown out.
There is increasi.ng worry in the Iranian capital over the poseibility that
the oil sector will be affected by all the political disturbances that the
c ountry is exper ienc ing .
The National Oil Company overseea all Qf Iran's production of this mater3.a1,
and daily reveciues fur this company amount to 80 million dollars.
Although the National Iranian Oil Company is the only campany that was not
aff ected by the local disturbances, it is at the present time sub,~ect to
numeroue problems. One of the first indications of such problems is the 30
percent decline in oil production.
The Iranian Oil Company is headed by Mr Ali Akbar Moinfar (50 years), the
enthueiaetic Iranian min ister of oil. But those who are informed about affairs
in the Iranian capital believe that Moinfar'8 future itself is in ~eopardy
and that it is unstable especially following the strong rumors that he may be
replaced by Ali Rida Nubari (32 yeare), the president of Iran's Central Bank
and one of the peraons who are close to Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, the president
of the republic.
Moinfar's problems began when he visited the workers at the Abadan Refinery
and listened to their complaints. The workers were angry when they received
him.
It is expected that the current month will be a diff icult period with regard
to the nature of work relations. Negotiation~ are underway to sign the contract
~or wages for the next 3 years. This will be especially difficult after the
labor union organization~ that operated during the Shah's adminiatration were
deatroyed and replaced by three new labor organizations.
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It seems that the Iranian company is facing problems from tr~e separatist
Arab workers in the province of Ahvaz (Arabistan) which is . considered one
of the largest areas of oil production in Iran. Although the company is
prepared to repair all the ord inary damages that occur in the oil pipeline
and can do so even without the help of.f oreign experta, theae problemg
mu at also be taken into consideration. Those Araba make up a high percentage
of the oil workers there.
A aimple review of the daily Iranian newspapers will show that a bomb explodes
ev ery week. One time, For example, euch an explosion led to the destruction
of six pipes and to a fire that firefighters had to make a tzemendous effort
to bring under control.
COPYRIGHT; 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4802
.
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SAUDI ARABIA
ROYAL FAMILY, RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT PONDER FUTURE CHANGES
Paris AL-T~tATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Mar-3 Apr pp 19-22
[Article: "What Is Royal Family's Role in Dialogue Being Witnessed by Saudi -
Society; No Backing Down on Development and no Slowdown in Development Plana;
300 Billion Dollara for Five-Year Plan But 2 Million Arab and Foreign
Workers Are Social Problem"]
[Text] The Saudi society is witnessing a vital and calm dialogue in which
various social, professional and religious organizations and groups are
taking part. The goal is to find the ideal way for development and change
at the social, economic and political levels. But what is the role of the
royal family, the religious establishment, the technocratic groups and the
youth generations in this dialogue?
The political editor has written: ,
Saudi Arabia is not an ordinary state in the Arab chain. Since the mid-
1960's, Saudi Arabia has had special Arab, Islamic and international im-
portance.
Under the leadership of King Faysal and after the departure of King Sa'u~
from the throne, Saudi Arabia emerged as a leader of the conservative
direction which was fighting the broad radical current led by the departed -
Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.
Saudi Arabia underlined its Arab role and influence with the evacuation
of the Egyptian forces from Yemen and with the sudden departure of
'Abd-al-Nasir in the early 1970's. The silent Saudi diplomacy still _
maintains its activity throughout the Arab homeland, despite King Faysal's
sudden departure in 1975.
Rather, the Saudi diplomacy has become more flexible and more capable of
movement. It can now embark on dialogue without the complexes of radical
countriea such as Algeria and Lihya. What has helped Saudi Arabia in this
regard ~s its breaking away at the right time from the policy of al-Sadat
which has completely isolaCed him fram the Arab body.
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The Isl$mic role stetns primaxily ,fxam the ~act that the land in which
Islam rose is an inCegral part o~ the kingdom~a territories and the
fact that the sacred monuments of Is1am are atill present with all their _
beauty, glory and majesty on this land which is the pilgr~cnage site of
hundreda of thousands o,~ Musliias every year. -
This role is bolstered by the fact that the Islamic system relies essen-
tially on a puritanic Islamic movement that emerged in the 18Ch century
and wanted to restore to Islam its original purity and essence. Thus,
the kingdom considers itself an Islamic state primarily and it is through
this consideration that it extends its strong bridges with the Islamic -
countries.
As for the international role with the ever-riaing importance, it is due,
as is well known, to the vast oil wealth with which God has blessed this
part of the Arab homeland. Oil is not only a aource of energy supplying
~ the industrial world with the means of life. The increase in oil reve-
nues has given Saudi Arabia an influential financial and economic role. -
Saudi investments are made in the U. S. and European financial channels.
The tranafer of a part of these investments from one channel to another
or from one currency to another is enough to aend shivers in the financial
circles and tremors in the political circles.
Moreover, the immense Saudi spending on the economic development plans at-
tracts big competition and rivalry among the industrial firms of the world
to win the implementation contracts. This spending in itself has come to
~ constitute a source of national income in more than one western and Asian
country.
The world's in~:erest in this Arab country has been intensified by the
country's strategic location which overlooks several seas in which the
oil shipping lanea run. In these seas, at their entrances and outside
Chem, a race is currently in progress between the two super powers to
amass their fleets and to gain naval and air basea and facilities.
Effect of Extiernal and Domestic Events
The political and military developments experienced by the area surround-
ing the Arabian Peninsula and extending from the Horn of Africa to Central
Asia, including South Yemen and Iran, have cast their shadows and reflec-
tions on the Arab area, including Saudi Arabia.
Ignoring these events and the domestic incidents that have accompanied
them, foremost of whiGh was the storming of the mosque of Mecca at the
end of last year, is a kind of obstinacy that neither the observer nor
those with the power of making the political decision can afford when
tney evaluate the entire situation or determine the course or the policy
that may be followed in the future.
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But there are in fact a number of domestic Saudi circumstances that impose
themselves in a manner that forms in itself reasons for social aad politi-
cal transformation that surpasa by far the external reasons or such a
transient incident as the Mecca incident.
Development, eapecially the induatrial progrmns, has carried Saudi ArabiA
in one leap fram a eimple bedouin societp {nto a modern society. But this
enormous leap, realized by the allocation of the larger part of the oil
revenues for spending on development, has been accompanied by and has gen-
erated numerous social problems and concerns.
The fact i's that these problems are a nonaal thing faced by any developing
society that adopts the means of economic development. The Saudi regime
iCtself speaks, despite its customary infoxmation conaervatism, with a kind
of frankness and even through its top officials.
The regime seems determined to meet the needs of econamic development in a
manner that allows this development to be accompanied by parallel social
and political development.
But what are the social problems emanating from the rapid economic develop-
ment? How is the.dialogue aad the discussion seeking to fi'nd solutions for
these pzoblems proceeding? Aad what are these problems? _
Dialogue on Development Plans
Saudi Arabia has witnessed in recent months an argument at the top polit- `
ical and administrative levels on whether it should proceed in the ambi-
tious development plans or whether it should slow down until the problems
created by the rapid development are absorbed.
However, this argument has not prevented preparation of the third five-year
plan which will be announced ia the coming month of May. The unofficial
figures declared make this the biggest special development plan in the en-
tire world with allocations ranging from 275 billion to 310 billion dollars.
Most of the spending will be channelled toward relatively new spheres.
Conaidering that industrialization and the construction of airports and
ports consumed most of the expenditures in the second (1975-80) five-year
plan, agriculture and the rural areas will be developed, city conditions
wi11 be improved, national manpower will be trained, and public sprvices
(roads, electricity and water) and social services will be expanded, in
addition to apending on hydrocarbon pro~ects and developing the mining
industxies.
The mexe announcement about the date for presenting this development plan
indicates that the dialogue has been settled in favor of continuing the
rapi~? econamic development and accepting all its social results, including
the nagative aspects generated by this development.
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i
This announcement also constitutes a rejection of all the argu~ents to !
slow down imp:Lementation of the growth and development projects, consid- ~
ering that Islam is qualified, in the view of the ma3ority, to meet the
_ requirementa of change and modernization without losing its genuine ~
character, its tolerant principles and its deep roots in the souls of ~
the Saudis. ~
~
The officials have found that there can be no backing down on continued
growth and development even if there were a desire for auch backing down ~
because implecnentation of the development programs has reached an ad-
vanced atage, because the programs are interconnected and integrated,
because a long time has been spent studying them and because tens of '
billions of dollars have been spent on them.
Development has become a principle, a faith and a daily concern of the i
Saudi technocrats who received their higher studies and their technical
training in the industrial world and who are eager to see econo~mic and
eocial development in their country rivalling and keeping up pace with
aimilar development in the advanced societies.
One of the motives for speeding up the development and for (turning on '
the boilers) is the issue of ineeting the requirements of the post-oil
era. The Saudis want to diversify the sources of their revenues and to
build a huge industrlal base fit to replaca with its production and reve- ~
nues the oil revenues in the future so that they may preserve the high ~
standard of living that they have realized. 1
I"
- However, the issue of oil with its two main branches, namely production ~
and prices, has also been the sub~ect of an extensive exchange of opin- ~
ion recently at the level of the political and administrative leader- ;
- ehips. It ie no secret that there have been varying opinions on whether
Saudi Arabia ahould persist in its current average daily production (.9.5
million barrels) or whether it should go back to the previous average ~
exiating before the Iranian revolution (8 million barrels). ~
. ;
It is also no secret that there are those who have urged reducing produc- ;
tion even further (6 million barrels) and called for a large increase in
prices as long as the United States has not fulfilled its promises to find ~
_ a way for a~ust and honorable solution for the Middle East issue.
. ~
However, it can be said tha.t oil production will continue at its present
level in the foreseeable future and until the delicate studies on the is- 4
sues of production and prices are completed in light of the requirements !
of financing the ambitioua development plan. '
' Two Million Arabs and Foreignere . I
I
Now, what are the prominent social problems faced by Saudi Arabia and re-
sulting from 3~nplementation of the development and growth pro~ects? ~
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Perhaps the most prominent of these issues is the issue of Arab and
_ foreign labor. There are nearly 2 million Arab and foreign workers in
a country whose population does not exceed 10 million. There are one .
million Araba, half of them fram Yemen and the rest are Egyptians,
Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, Jordanians and Algerians. The foreigners
have been attracted by the oil investmente and have come from Pakistan,
India, the Philippines, Afghanistan and South Korea.
Thia immense influx has created tension in the social relations as a re-
sult of the different customs and traditions. It has also demanded urgent
requirem~nts, such as providing housing, food and the means of transporta-
tion.
Measures were taken recently to c~rtail intensification of the negative
aspects of the foreign Iabor problem. There is a tendency at present to
train Saudi cadres to replace a part of the foreign cadres. In any case,
any social, and perhaps political, measures must take into consideration
the problem of the Arab and foreign workers. .
There ia also the problem of the nomadic tribes. The government has been
able to resettle the larger part of the members of these tribes whose num-
bera are eatimated, unofficially, at more than one-half a million people.
However, the sudden change from a nomadic society to an urban society has
_ created psychological and social problems. Despite this, these citizens
are displaying a.great ability to overcome the problem and to adapt to
their new and settled situation.
Education, along with industrialization, constitutes the other prominent
feature of growth and development ia the modern Saudi society. One-half
the Saudi population is of youth age. There are 1.5 million male and
female studenta in the elementary and secondary schools, 50,000 students
distributed over six modern ianiversities and 15,000 students studying at
U. S. and European universities. There are also thousands of gradua~es
who now occupy important positiona in the government administrations and
agencies after having returned from abroad with high diplomas and uni- -
versity degrees.
The Saudi technocrats�are very enthusiastic for the development and growth
pro~ects adopted by their government. They participate in these projects
with their experience and knowledge and they believe that these projects
must be accompanied by social development so that a socio-economic balance
may be established and may matce it possible to avoid the political side
effects of development.
Like any economy that is open to the world economy and that imports from
it.and exports to it at a large scale, some of the negative aspects of _
the capitalist economy have been reflected in the Saudi economy, led by -
.the aspect of inflation (high prices).
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Currency liquidity is available to the Saudis but the currency's purchas-
ing power is deteriorating as a result of inflation. This is where the
need has risen for a more fair distribution of the wealth. The Saudi of-
ficials say in this regard tha.t they follow King Faysal's steps in defin- -
ing the goal of the development plans. The ultimate social goal of the
development plan is to realize this distribution without undermining the
principle of the free economy and of free investment.
Royal Family Maintains Balance
But where does the Saudi royal family stand in the middle of this economic -
and social thrust created by the industrialization and development and in
the middle of Che mutual calls and dialogues?
The royal family is not a small family. It includes, as Crown Prince Fahd
saye, 4,000 members. It is, therefore, closer to a tribe.
This family--like any royal family with such numbers and with such a posi-
tion as the one that the Saudi family occupies in the political system and -
with the influential administrative, economic and social positions it
holds--has mutual [mutabadalah] opinions and viewpoints.
Perhaps the observer is astonished by the Saudi royal family`s ability to '
reconcile these opinions and viewpoints within the framework of dialogue
insid~ the family--a dialogue conducted in the "family democracy" way, if _
we may use the phrase, which permits the multiplicity of opinions that '
ultimately end up in a unified position expressed by the head of the
regime who is also the head of the family, i.e. the king himself. ,
~
I
The fact ia that the Saudi family performs at present the role of a balanc- ;
ing factor between the Saudi circles participating in the country's economic
and social dialogue. This family is the side that reaches the political ;
decieion through chis dialogue and then puts it in ita legal and executive '
form.
Under the new circumstances and changes, this family has been able to
bolster its solidarity, its cohesion and its support ~or King Khalid.
In the past few months, King Khalid toured the various parts of the vast
kingdom to establish direct dialogue with the various sectors of the
citizens, administrators, governors and province amirs. -
As for Prince Fahd, the crown prince and the first deputy prime minister, -
he is, in addition to his main task of participating directly in making '
the political decision, in charge of managing the daily affairs of govern-
ment.
~
There is no doubt that the royal family's role as an effective factor in
maintaining the balance between the supporters of rapid economic and
social change and the supporters of a slow change taking the religioua
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traditions into consideration is an extremely ~mportant role, especially
since the effective decision depends on this role when the viewpoin~ts
clash.
Perhape the moet significant task undertaken by the king and the group of
princee assiating him is, in addition to making the political decieion,
to encourage the incentives of change and development within the sound
Islamic framework and in accordance with the tolerant principles of the
Shari'a.
This is an extremely difficult and delicate task. But King Khalid and
Prince Fahd have proven throughout the past 5 years since the departure
_ of King Faysal that they are capable of adopting the decision and of taking
the right~initiatives with the necessary speed and flexibility.
In the wake of the incident at the venerable mosque of Mecca, there was
greater atreas and stronger determination to respond to the religious es-
tablishment's demands for confronting anq aspects that this establishment
does not view as compatible with its interpretation of the religious prin-
ciplea.
1'he religious establiahment holds a venerable position in the eyes of
both the regime and of the citizens. It has broad powers. For example,
regaining the venerable mosque of Mecca [frrnn the hands of its captors]
had to wait for an interpretation [fatwa] fram the Council of Ulema.
At the same time and while stressing the importance of safeguarding and
entrenching the principles of the orthodox faith, there has been a clear
tendency to develop the system of government so that a stronger and more
- organized connection may be established between the political decision
makers heading the system and the forces distributed among society's
various sectors, beginning with the religious establishment and ending
with the generations of youth and including the tribal chiefs, the tech-
nocrats and the administrators.
Moying Force Behind Development
A quick review of Prince Fahd's views on raform, development ~nd change
embodiea a model of the thinking of the middle-aged generation of the
ruling Saudi family and, consequently, reflects what is in the mind and
heart of the Saudi decision maker at the top levels.
The crown prince displays enthusiasm for proceeding with the growth and
development plans with all their momentum and thrust. Ae is also enthusi-
astic for "gradual" political development, as he has said in his recent
statementa.
He even has ideas concerning Islam's social and political responsibilities
in the modern age but admits that he is reluctant to present them. Perhaps
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he is waiting for a major conference of Muslim ulema to present these
ideas. He concludes from the opinions of the men of religion what he ~
deema suitable to adopt at the level of goverrnnent, administration and
legislation in a country like Saudi Arabia which is strongly attached
to the religious principles and to the venerable Sunna.
Prince Fahd reflects the extent of the Saudi regime's willingness to listen
to the various opinions and points out that fanatic strictness in applying
the faith produces the opposite of the desired result. He even goes to an
extreme degree of frankness when he says that there are those who demand
that we apply the rules of the faith more strictly whereas others accuse
us of failure.
However, it seems that King Khalid, Prince Fahd and the group of princes
in the decision-making circle have made up their mind to introduce polit-
ical changes compatible with the economic change and responding in one
way or another to the social development requirements--all this without
ewerving from the principles laid down by Islam that are still applied .
in this Islamic Arab country.
A quick review of the statements and decisions made so far on developing
the system of government indicates that the first goal is to "codify" the
institutions or, to put it in other words, to issue firm legislations,
rules and regulations through which the executive, legislative and admin-
istrative authorities emerge more clearly defined.
Th2 eteps declared so far may not mean a long stride in the western sense ,
of democracy. But they are, in the Saudi calculations, a ma~or first step
toward giving the Saudi state a more modern and developed from responding
more strongly to the needs of the modern society that has arisen in the -
kingdom.
The royal announcemenC issued last week defines three main tasks for the
committee formed under the chairmanship of Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, I
the minister of interior:
Drawing up a basic law of government [constitution].
Drawing up a law for the consultative council.
Drawing up a districts law. ;
To make the picture clearer to the non-Saudi Arab reader, it can be said .
that the "basic law of goverrunent" means a constitution and, that the con-
sultative council means a parliament. However, the use of these two worda '
has been avoided because the constitution in an Islamic state is, in fact, ,
the Koran. ~
I
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Regardlesa of the difference in verhal names, Saudi Arabia will shortly
have a constitution that emanates from the principles of Islam as stated
in the venerable Knran. The fact is that formulation of the basic law
has made long strides. The committee formed has to studp this draft and
put it in its final form.
No significant information has been available yet on the contents of the
law~-coastitution. All that can be said about it at this early stage is
that it will be a faithful "legal translation" of the reality of the
regime and of the Islamic principles on which it is founded.
As for the consultative council, or the parliament, it is expected that
it will include between 50 and 70 members representing the influential
Saudi factions and sectors, including the royal family, the religious
establishment, the technocrats, the intel.lectuals and the young genera-
tions.
However, the percentage allocated for every faction in the new "parliament"
is not definite and is sub~ect to the opinion and decision of Ring Khalid
and of his top advisers and sides among the princes and the officials--a
decision which will be made oa the basis of the study to be presented by
the formed committee.
It is most likely that the members of the consultative council will be
chosen by selection and not election. Perhaps the wisdom of relying on
appointment by selection is due to the eagerness to have the council
representing all the forces jfa'aliyat] in the Saudi society, especially
since the municipal elections experiment has not been encouraging because,
according to the words of Prince Fahd, it brought those who have the money
to the membership of the municipal councils.
Perhaps it is axiotnatic that the consultative council members will be ap-
pointed rather than elected, especially since Saudi Arabia has not yet
known partisanship and political and unionist forces in their clear and
definite aense.
But how far will the powers and responsibilities of the consultative coun-
cil go?
Here also no accurate information is available. It is certain that the
council will undertake a defin~ite task of participating in legislation.
Perhaps it is unlikely that its powers will include giving a vote of con-
fidence to the cabinet or dismissing it.
In any case, Saudi Arabia seems to be today an the threshold of important
conatitutional and legislative steps which will see the light in the few
caming months. It is natural that gradual steps do not please some people
who are in a hurry and who aspire for quicker steps in building the insti-
tutione of gover~ent. However, the 3mportance of these steps lies in the
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1''UK UFt''1l:lAL U~E UNLY
fact that they have put Saudi Arabia on the right path that leads to
giving this Islamic Arab country a more modern structure that responds
to the needs and requirements of the modern society without losing its
genuine character and tts absolute abidance by the principlea of the
faitfi and by tts tolerant Shari'a.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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SAUDI ARABIA
PLANNED GOVERNMENTAL, ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES DETAILED
Paris AL-WAT'AN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Mar-3 Apr 80 pp 18-19
[Article: "For First Time in Saudi Arabia's History: Basic Law (Constitu-
tion), Consultative Council (Parliament) and System for Administrative
Diatricts; 'They Shall Consult on Their Affairs;' Islaan Remains as System
of Govermnent and of Society and as Source of Legislation"]
[Text] Riqadh--What does drawing up a constitution for government in Saudi
Arabia mean? What is the role and what are the powers of the new consulta-
tive council? Moreover, what are the causes and motives that have urged
Saudi Arabia to develop its political and administrative syetem? How far
_ will the new development go in both form and content? What is the religi~us
establishment's position toward the dialogue being witnessed by the Saudi
society these days and in which various groups of technocrats, intellectuals
and students are taking part? What is the role played by the royal family
in this dialogue and then in taking the proper political decision?
The editorial staff of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has found in the royal decree
ordering the formation of the Basic Law [Constitution] Committee and the
_ Consultative Council Committee an occasion to review the conditions and
the changes that have required this important step. The magazine's goal
is to present as general, complete and honest a picture as possible to the
Arab public opinion so that it may know what is happening in this Muslim _
Arab country that occupies an important position at the various Arab,
Islamic, international and strategic levels.
On the lOth of last January, the international wire services carr~ed im-
portant press statements by Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-`Aziz, the Crown
Prince of Saudi Arabia, in which he said that a basic law of government
was being dra~m up for the lcingdom and that it contains nearly 200
articles, all derived from the Islamic law. The prince added that the
new law will be accompanied by another law on the creation of a consul-
tative counc3.1 to share the responsibilities of goverrnnent with the .
Council of Ministers.
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On the 18th of this month of March, King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz issued
a royal decree forming a special committee under the chairmanship of
Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the minister of interior, with the task
of completing formulation of the final form c` the basic law for govern-
ment and the consultative council law, as well as a third law to which
Prince Fahd had n~ot referred in hia press statements, namely the [admin-
iatrative] districts law for the kingdom which is geographically the
biggest Arab country after Sudan.
It seems that the issuance of the royal decree fo~ing thia committee has
come to confirm the promise made by Prince Fahd in the aforementioned
statementa.
The nature of the committee structure and the selection of its members
from among people with scientific, religious and administrative special-
izationa seem to conf irm another promise made by Prince Fahd in his
statements, namely that a change in government will take place and that
this change will not be just in persons but also in the systems and men-
tality of government.
Islamic System Dealing With Spirit of Age
But this does not mean under any circumstances the likelihood that the
systems of government in the forthcoming phase--after completion of the
basic law and of the consultative council law--will deviate from the
spirit of Islam or from the text of the Islamic legislation. The new
systems and the new mentality must inevitably emanate from a religious
spiritual premise based on the Koranic law and the venerable Sunna. But
at the same time, the new systems and the new mentality must take maximum
advantage of the spirit of the age with a flexible futuristic viaualiza-
tion to deal with the given facts of the modern sciences and changes that
are carried into the life of the contemporary Saudi man so as to preaerve
this man's genuine social Arab and Islamic traditions and to also meet his
human aspirations for development and progress in order that he may keep
up pace with the march of the others around him.
This means by necessity that the formulation of the basic law for govern-
ment will impose the will for change in persons and in the systems and
mentality of g~vernment to wh3.ch Prince Fahd has referred.
i
By neceasity also, the change that applies to the system of government will ~
also apply to the new consultative council in accordance with its law, :
_ founded mainly on the Islamic law. This council must inevitably respand ;
to the aepirations for development by taking advantage from what is best ;
in the international parliamentary systems within a framework governed ~
by the principles of the Islamic law and by the traditions and conventions ' ~
of the cultural heritage of the people of the Kingdrnn of Saudi Arabia.
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The new consultative council will be new i.n the sense of the quality of
the people who will represent in it the religious, economic, political,
administrative and planniag capabilities, especially since the kingdom
has now large assets of these religious, scientific and academic capa-
bilitiea. There are 1,500 Saudis who have doctorates tn var~ous spe-
_ c~alizations, in additi4n to many times this nianber of people who have
their M.A.'s and various parallel educational degrees.
_ It is well-known that the consultative system of government is a purely
Ielamic system which started with the beginning of the foundation of the
first Islamic state in the era of Prophet Muhaimmad, may God's prayers
aad peace be upon him. This system reflects a Roranic principle--"they
shall consult on their affairs." The prophet used to consult with his
companions on the affairs of the newborn state, on the people~s affairs
and on the affairs of the new society.
They Shall Consult on Their Affairs
As an Islamic state founded in the land of the divine message, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabic has had to abide by this principle in the form and essence
of the system of government.
Wtten the late King 'Abd-al-'Aziz gained control 49 years ago and when the
provinces of the kingdam were united, the king made sure to surround him-
self with a group of praminent ulema, wise men and thinkers to consult
- the~ on government, state and the people's affairs. He used to resort
to the consultative council which consisted of such men whenever he had
- any problema so that the council may help him and so that he may clear
his conscience of the responsibility of individualistic decisions.
Thus, the founder of the kingdoan Iaid down the fundamental principle which
the required consultative council muet observe. The founder wanted this
council to be a real and effective council, to be comprised of inen capable
of working for the public interest and to be independent in its work, wit'~-
out anybody having any authority over it.
It seems that when Prince Fahd announced the drawing up of a basic law for
~ ~ government and a consultative council law, he wanted to underline abidance
by the rule which his father had laid down in this regard. Then came the
> royal decree to confirm all this.
It is also difficult to isolate the royal decree for drawin~ up a law for
the provinces of the vast kingdom from the royal decree for drawing up the
two other laws for government and for consultation. The day after the is-
suance of this decree, another decree was issued appointing four new amirs
for the provinces of the venerable Mecra, al-Quasim, Tabuk and Ha~il. -
It is to be noted that the kingdom is divided into provinces, each governed
by an amir with the powers of an administrative governor. But the amir is
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under the jurisdiction o~ the Ministry of Interior which has a special
department for provincial af~airs. ~
i
It aeema that the pro~ection of a new law for the provinces indicates a
- new developme:it in the powers of the province amirs. They are expected i
to en~oy greater powera, perhaps political and financial, to keep up ~
pace with the expected development in the systems and mentality of ~
government--powers that give the province amirs greater freedam of move-
ment in their provinces within the frame.work of the general policy of
the regime and of the state.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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SAUL~I ARABIA
OFFICIAL DISCUSSES SOCIAL PROBLEMS CONFRONTING YOUTH
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Mar-3 Apr 80 pp 72-73
[Interview With Prince Faysal ibn 'Abd-a.l-'Aziz, General Director of Youth
Welfare; "General Director of Youth 6Jelfare in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: ~
Thia ls How We Prepare New Generation to Face Future Challenges"]
[TextJ Prince Faysal ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the general director of Youth
Welfare in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, sheds light in this comprehensive
interview on the Saudi youth issues and on the means to tackle them,
asserting that the immunity ~f Islam is the best weapon to confront the
conflict of ideologies and currents in this important phase of our history.
[QuestionJ In your capacity as the official in charge of building the future
of the kingdom's youth, what are the plans that have been adopted [words
indistinct] in this phase in which the conflict of ideologies is intensifying
the world over?
[Anawerj To start with, I would like to point out a fact that we have felt
and experienced .for a long Cime and whose viability was proven recently.
Stressing thie fact is, in my view, tantamount to reflecting its continue~
soundness which has been proven by the experiences. Insofar as the Saudi
youth are concerned, they en~oy the greatest immunity in history, nameiy
the immunity of Islam.
There isn't the least doubt that the truth of the conflicting ideologies in
the world, both those that are nearby and those that are remote, has been
exposed. Whoever views matters realistically finds that these 3.deologies
have realized nothing tangible for the world as a whole. Mnreover, the old,
new, recently innovated and consumed ideologies are still crawling and
faltering in their cradle.
On this premise, we find that our youth, immunized by Islam, are moving
forward resolutely and that they have stood fast in the face of these -
currents. As for the futurQ, our faith in God, may he be praised, is
strong and firm and cannot change under any circumstances.
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Today's youth are a natural extension of the past generation of parents
and the future yoisth will, God willing, be an extension of today's youth.
Concerning the point brought up at the outset regarding our youth being
immune with Islam, the truth of this point was proven in what happened
recently. I mean by thia abominable crime that took place in the venerable
Mecca, the holiest of Muslim placea, when a group of outlaws stormed and
_ occupied the mosque with the force of arms. People from all walks of
life rallied around the leaderehip naturally and instinctively. This
rally has proven to the entire world that this state forms, God be tha:~ked,
a firm, cohesive and comprehensive national unity.
As for the role of youth, I have presented to his majesty the king and to
his highness the crown prince thousands of cables that I had received from
various youth groups asking me to permit them to take part in the operation
to purge the mosque from the outlaws or be martyred serving God. These
thousands of cables, in addition to the tens of delegations which came to
visit me here, show th.at all our youth believe completely in their faith, thanks be
to God, and believe that this country has no life without Chis faith.
My view of the future of our youth is a view of complete reassurance, as lotig
as we march on the straight path which is the path of the Koran and of the
- prophet's Sunna.
[Question] The talk on what happened in the venerable mosque of Mecca leads
us to bring up the question of what happened afteYwards. Has the Youth
Welfare chairmanship called for symposiums and meetings to discuss what
happened?
~ [Answer] In fact, before the Youth Welfare could takp any initiative, the
youth circles and the athletic clubs held public rallies to collect donations -
for the families of the martyrs of the venerable mosque of Mecca. At the ~
same time, the Y~uth Welfare has carried out its duties and has directed
its agencies to discuss this issue.
In fact, this issue has been discussed generally. It is expected that we
_ will draw up shortly a comprehensive plan to discuss the issue in detail
and in a focused and concentrated manner with the various youth organiza-
tions. Our esteemed ulema, thinkers and men of letters will take part in
these discussions.
!
Naturally, the barbaric and insane incident that has taken place in the holy ~
mosque of Mecca is the third incident of its kind in the history of Islam.
This is why this issue deserves to be studied and discussed and those who
_ are best equippc:d to discuss it are the youth.
As I have already told you, we will hold a detailed discussion and conduct a
comprehensive analysis in the youth circles. We will ask these circles to
make their comments on what has happened. In fact, the youth have already
taken the initiative, both in the press and in the various information media,
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and their poems and their prose compositions have reflected their position
toward the despicable crime.
Naturally, these discussions will begin after announcement of the outcome
of the inveatigations so that we may have full information and so that the
youth may re~lize what has happened exactly. Insanity, abnormal thinking
and deviation lead people to this degree of rabid violence that is based
on no religion, principle, faith or conscience whatsoever.
I would like to stress again that this spontaneous enthusiasm by thousands
upon thousands of youth has not been just a transient sweeping emotion but
has come as a result of the deep faith with which our youth have grown up.
Numerous Plana
[Question] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is in constant need of cadres in
the various sectora. In your capacity as the official in charge of the
youth and their future, is there in your program a plan to prepare the
cadres to take charge of the future tasks in the various sectors?
[Answer] The fact is that there is not ~ust one plan but seve~al plans
that are under implementation. The first of these plans ca13s for pro-
viding youth with guidance from a certain age, namely the age of l years
app~oximately, and to create for them the natural climate to receive their
education under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. As for the
second plan, the Ministry of Education is in charge of implementing it
through ita curricula. At the same time, we provide the youth with
guidance when they are not in school through the various youth clubs and
- associations present in all parts of the kingdom. `The Youth Welfare Agency
also focuses on the cadres that must work in its apparatus through specializa-
tions. Insofar as the other cadres are concerned, the Saudi universities
play a ma~or and effective role in developing the talent~ and capabilities
of our youth.
Preparing State Cadres
To put it briefly, all the plans seek one goal, namely to develop the state's
- civil servant cadres with educated Saudi youth who know perfectly well that
their country needs every atom of their thinking and every minute of their
time. God be thanked, we have realized important steps on this path through
coordination among the various authorities.
There is another important point that I want to underline, namely the presence
of a Higher Youth Council headed by His Royal Highness Prince Fahd, the c~own
prince. All the authorities that I have mentioned, namely the Ministry of
Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs
and the Ministry of Information are represented in this council. Work is
currently proceeding in accordance with an organized and coordinated five-
year plan. This helps us in the procesa of providing the required cadres.
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We Conceal Notning
. [QuestionJ In your meetings ~~ith the youth committees in the kingdom, does
the diecuseion touch on the political line adopted by the kingdom and is
- there a dialogue with the youth insofar as their thoughte and interpreta-
tions are conce rned?
[Answer] First, my meetings with the youths are ceaseless and continue ~
during the work hours, at home and in the various clubs and associations.
The kingdom's political course has been well-known since the days of the
departed King 'Abd-al-'Aziz. We continued to follow this course during
the reign of King Sa'ud and King Faysal, may God have mercy upon their
souls.
Today we are still following the same policy whose foundations were laid
down by King ',Abd-al-'Aziz and which is supported by King Khalid, may God
preserve him. As for our discussions with the youth, it is always a dis-
cussion of brothers among whom formality is discarded. At the same time, ~
I personally try with all my power to keep the discussion frank, clear
and direct, meaning that we are ready to answer all questions and that we '
have nothing to conceal. We are proud of this.
These meetings have been very beneficial because they have helped to make
the youth problems much better understood. Meetings and on-the-~pot visits
are a lot better than sending delegations or receiving memoranda. There
are absolutely no taboos on which questfons cannot be asked insofar as we
are concerned and such a thing has never happened in the history of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On the contrary, what is wanted is that queries ~
and questions be raised so that both of us [we and the youths] may be
fully aware of our country's policy. I would like to point out that the
meetings that take place are not confined to the political issues alone
but surpass them to the social, cultural, literary and artistic issues.
I am proud to say that the discussions with the youths have increased
constantly in the recent period and that they have taken the quality of ,
continuity. ~
The fact is that these meetings take place between the youth and the top
state officials without any difficulty. Insofar as his ma~esty the king ;
and his highness the crown prince are concerned, their homes and their
offices are always open to all citizens, including the youth. Moreover,
his majesty the king honors the Youth Welfare with his royal patronage
every year by attending its final ceremonies~where he and his highness
the crown prince meet with the e~ccelling teams and with the outstanding
university students. Their highnesses Prince Sultan, Prince 'Abdallah, ;
Prince Nayif and Prince Salman also attend these ceremonies. ~
We in the Youth Welfare consider Prince Salman our big brother. I am not
talking here about Prince Salman in his capacity as my uncle but in his
official capacity. He holds numerous and constant meetings with the youth. ~
Prince Salman has honored iae by having me a~ his friend. Through our
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meetings with the officials, we discern the great interest in the youth.
Moreover, his ma~esty the king always urges me to devote attention to all
the youth affairs. Decisions and recommendations were taken recently in
the Council of Ministers stressing the importance and need for serious
work among the youth.
There is constant coordination on the youth problems between the Youth
Welfare and His Highness Prince Salman.
t~ithin this framework, I would like to point out that Prince Salman exerts
utmost efforts to solve any problem facing any youth. This, God be thanked,
is a tradition of which we in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are proud. A.ny
youth can meet the top officials, beginning with his ma~esty and ending
with the most ~unior state official, without any obstacles whatsoever.
Naturally, the excelling and outstanding youth get special appreciation and
moral and material rewards.
[Question] In view of the vast geographic area of the kingdom and of the
- inability of all the youth to come to Riyadh, the administrative and political
center, do you make periodic tours and inspection visits to the youth centers -
in the provinces?
[Answer] This is done periodically and regularly. We now have nearly 27
projects in the various provinces of the kingdom. Beginning next month,
I will pay field visits to inaugurate these pro~ects and, at the same time, �
to meet with the youth and get acquainted with their problems.
Saudi Woman and Marriage Question
[Question] At the outset of our interview, we talked about youth problems
and the family structure. What are your instructions and opinions on this
issue?
[AnswerJ First, I want to focus on an important point, namely that the
Saudi woman is more entitled than others to a Saudi youth. On this basis,
there has been an official decree barring Saudis from marrying foreigners
[women] except on a special permit from the Ministry of Interior and for
logical and acceptable reasons. You must know that marriage in our country
takes place at an early age, even before the young man finishes his universit~~
education. Naturally, problems emerge as a result of young age, adolescence
and so on.
lfiis is why the Youth Welfare, in cooperation with the Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Inforn~ation, has played an effective
guidance role through offering advice, holding symposiums and pubiishing
special books dealing with the issue of marriage.
I repeat again that [barring] the Saudi youth from marrying non-Saudi women
does not at all mean any kind of fanaticism or bias. It only means one fact
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that we have felt, namely that 90 percent of the marriages to foreign
women have been failure whereas the contrary happens in the marriages
to Saudi women.
The problem faced by the Saudi youth insofar as marriage is concerned is
the problem of inflation and of dowry. This is why instructions were
recently issued by His Highness Prince Fahd, the crown prince, for the
formation of a committee from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
and the Ministry of Interior, in addition to the Call, Interpretation '
and Guidance Council and the Youth Welfare, to discuss this issue and *_o
- lay down the foundations to limit the value of the dowry to make it
reasonable and compatible with the conditions.
Here is where the major role entrusted to the Youth Welfare emerges. There
are many youth who give wedding parties in special houses ~that are rented
for a single night for a large sum of money. To deal with this issue, we
will begin as of next month to rent special houses in all parts of the
kingdom for the youth wedding parties. Instead of paying 10,000 or 15,000
riyals for a single night, the youth will pay a symbolic sum of 100 riyals,
provided that he has not been married before. This pro~ect is in~portant
because it will solve the problems of thousands of youths.
The other problem is connected with the marriage of our youth at a young
age. Th~;s problem may be considered serious by some people but in our
situation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we want the population to grow
because of the kingdom's vast area. We encourage this natural phenomenon
in our country and we hope that it will continue. At the same time, there
is no reason to prevent a Saudi youth from marrying a Saudi woman, regardless
~ of whether the young man studies at home or abroad. Our universities graduate
hundreds of women every year. If a young man wants to get married to an
educated girl, there are tens of them.
t would also like to note another point connected with housing. I believe
that you have noticed the enormous pr~ects being implemented by the Mi.nistry
of Housing to provide proper modern housing to the citizens. The issue of
- housing preoccupies the mind of many youths with limited income.
This is why the Real Estate Bank offers facilities that amount to hundreds
of thousands of riyals within this framework. On the instructions of his
- ma~eaty the king and his highness the crown prince, the municipalities have
also distributed lands to people with limited income. This will solve one
of our ma~or problems.
Family life in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is character9.zed by the complete
and absolute bond existing within the same family.
Therefore, there is absolutely no place, God be thanked, for intellectual '
sectarian or political conflict. When such a conflict occurs, it can destroy
the entire family, as we see in various countries of the world. We are proud
that we are marching along a straight path and we hope to overcome all the
small obstacles facing our path.
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[Question] How did the Saudis who went to study abroad face the various
intellectual currents and how atongly is their study abroad reflected in
their intellectual and religious tendencies?
[Answer] This question is, in fact, very important. Here I will point
%ut that the main goal of the youth going abroad is to study and get the
required degrees and, at the same time, to see what is happening in the
world. We l~ave vast numbers of students who are studying in all parts
of the world--the United States, England, Germany, Spain, Italy, Pakistan
and a number of Arab countries.
All those who graduate from universities abroad return home. Only a very
small number has deviated from this rule. There are exceptions in every
society and no society can, under any circumstances, be ~udged by its
exceptions. There are people without will or people with a weak will
~ who have not been able to face the western life. But ultimately, the
western life changes them for only a short time after which they return
to their country where they are embraced again without any questions at
all. Some of these people have returned home and they are now taking
part in numerous responsibilities in the state.
I feel very reassured in this regard and my reassurance is due to one thing,
namely the firm base on which our youth rely, i.e., the Islamic faith.
State and Rind Father
[Question] But in case these youths return home and take up responsible
poaitions in their country, is a dialogue opened with them and are their
ideas and interpretations discussed?
[Answer] Undoubtedly, this happens continuously. I liken the state to a
kind father. When a father finds that a son who had rebelled against him
and gone astray with his thinking has Chen come back to him repentantly,
the father e~braces this son im~nediately. I imagine that a sensible fath~~~
would not bring up past affairs with his son. The past is the property of
the past and we work for the future.
[Question] Now, can we know the political thinking of Prince Faysal and,
consequently can he offer us a complete visualization of the policy of the
new generation in the kingdom and of ttre political line of this:generation?
[Answer] There are two questions here. The first is connected with me
persunally and the second is connected with the youth. I have already
answered the question pertaining to the youth at the outset of the interview.
However, I would like to repeat the answer, myself being ohe of the youth.
Since becoming aware of the world, I have been dazzled, fascinated and full
of admiration for my grandfather, His Ma~esty King 'Abd-a1='Aziz. Believe -
me when I tell you that the image of King 'Abd-al-'Aziz, that ambitious
youth who marched alone with the slogan of "there is no god but God and
Muhanmiad is the prophet of God" and who proceeded along a single political
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line from which he never swerved throughout his life, is never absent from
my memory for a single day. This line is clear and well-known. If I have
a supreme ideal in this life, then it is King 'Abd-al-'Aziz.
I am honored to say that my political line is the line that King 'Abd-al-'Aziz
mapped out. Naturally, the kingdom's policy is well-known and clear and is
not affected by whimzical tensions and fluctuations but by reason, wisdom
and planning. On this premise, we find that our policy is proceeding, God
be thanked, in a firm and well-studied manner. This is clear to all.
As an individual in this society, I believe that my government`s policy is
a sound policy that has achieved security, welfare and prosperity at home
and, at the same time, rapprochement,love and strength abroad. I mean by
strength the strength of the rapprochement in the Arab ranks. This is an
extension of the policy of His Ma~esty King 'Abd-al-'Aziz. I believe that
history abounds with his accomplishments to strengthen the bond among the
Arab brothers. .
Naturally, I read a lot and I like political and history books and biographies.
I find it en~oyable to read about the policy of the others so that we may
underatand this policy and discuss it ob~ectively and then compare it with
our country's policy.
Hope and Pain
[QuestionJ What is your view of the political situation prevalent in the
Arab area?
[AnswerJ I want to talk of hope and pain, the hope that Arab solidarity
will be regained strongly and in an organized manner that will prevent the ~
emergence of any gaps in the future.
As for the pain, it usually comes from the rifts that we find existing among ~
some Arab countries. This is, of course, something that pains every Arab.
We hope sincerely that the rifts will be eliminated and that Arab solidarity
will be restored, especially in view of these conditions under which we
live and under which the ma~or powers are in agreement on certain things
for the Arab world. At the same time, I find--in the wake of the' Camp
David accords and the comprehensive change in the Mtddle East policy--nothing
but the need to abide by the resolutions and recommendations adopted by the
Arabs at the Baghdad summit or in the latest summit held in Tunis. I
personally hope that abidance by these resolutions will be complete and
comprehensive so that the hope may be realized and the pain eliminated. !
[C?uestion] Are there any special instructions for the Arab youth in this ~
phase?
[AnswerJ First, I would like to thank AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI for giving me
this opportunity to address the Arab youth generally and to say things that
need not be repeated, namely that the youth are the foundation and the future.
If they truly realize this, then it is up to them to decide how the future
will be. ~5 . I
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Reason, a sense of balance and organization prevail among the overwhelming
ma~ority of the Arab youth. I believe that the future will be prosperous
because all resources are made available to the youth to lead their
countries toward prosperity, abundance and impregnability.
At the same time, I say that the Saudi youth are an indivisible part of the
Arab youth, respond to all calls and never fail to take part in any Arab
occasion.
On this premise, we experience the concerns of the Arab youth every day. I
would like to tell this youth that the fundamental focus must be primarily
on the interest of the homeland which comes before any other ideology.
Otherwise the Arab youth will become a toy in the hands of the ma~or powers
that have secret hands which they manipulate in this area.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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SAUDI ARABIA
INCENTIVES OFFERED FOR JOINT PETROCHEMICAL ENTERPRISES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Mar 80 p 46
[Article: "Saudi Arabia: Incentives for Oil Companies to Enter into
Petrochemical Projects"J
[Text] Riyadh--The agreement concluded between Petromin and Mobil Company
to build a~oint refinery for the exportation of oil derivatives from the
Saudi port of Yanbu' (on the Red Sea) embodies the new tendency based on
, .offering incentives to the ma~or oil companies to enter into ~oint pro~ects
with Saudi Arabia in the field of oil and petrochemicals.
The agreement stipulates that the shares be owned equally, instead of 51
percent for Petramin and 49 for the foreign side.
The proposed capacity of the refinery amounts to 250,000 barrels of oil
daily. The oil will be carried from the Eastern Province to the Red Sea
coast by a new pipeline extending 750 miles across the Saudi deserts to
terminate in Yanbu'.
Zt is well-known that the Mobil Company has a contract with Petromin to
assiat in managing the work to lay down th~ pipeline and then in the work
to operate it.
One of the incentives that have aroused interest is the incentive that
gives Mobil the right to take 50 percent of the proposed refinery's pro-
duction in kind, keeping in mind that the production will include naphta
jal-naft], benzine, ~et aircr~ft fuel, diesel oil, heating oil and heavy
fuel oil.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has also learned that the estimated costs of the
project exceed one billion dollar, a sum which will be paid equally by
the two sides. However, the burden to Mobil will be reduced, consider-
ing that it will collect wages for its technical and administrative
services for the pro~ect.
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_ It is understood that this proj ect i.s an inlet to another pro,ject in which
Mobil will be an equal partner. This is a project for the construction of
an eaormoue petrochemicale complex in Yanbu' as part of the new Saudi five-
year plan.
Implementation of .the two pro~ects will strengthen the position of the new
port of Yanbu', where work is still in progress, as a ma~or port for the
exportation of Saudi oil, heavy [oil] products and petrochemicals through -
the Red Sea.
COP1'RIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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SAUDI ARABIA
DEVELOPMENT PLAN GIVES PRIORITY TO AGRICULTURE, SERVICES, PETROCHEMICALS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Apr 80 p 48
- [Article: "Saudi Development Plan No 3: Attention to Agriculture and
Services, in Addition to Petrochemicals"J
~ (Text] Riyadh--Even thoi.~gh the third five-year plan will not be announced
officially before next May--see previous issue of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI--what
has been Ieaked about it will turn the Saudi theater into an arena of fierce
_ inter~iational campetition, especially between the U. S. and European com- +
panies, to win [the contracts] for the implementation of the plan pro~ects
whose estimated a].locations amount to 290 billion dollars which may rise
by 100 more billion dollars, depending on the circumstances, to meet the ~
rise in prices and costs and to meet the expenses of some subsidiary
pro~ects.
The third five-year plan has special importance because of its enormous ,
size and because it seeks to create an alternative base to the oil re- '
sources so that oil may not continue to be the main source of revenues.
Consequently, the plan contains huge allocations to develop agriculture ;
and the rural areas and to set up two gigantic heavy induatry complexes, i
in addition to two petrochemical complexes, two steel and iron plants '
and three immense complexes for light conawner industries. ~
This is all accompanied by a design within the plan to modernize the edu-
cational apparatus, with stress on vocational education and training
through the use of incentives so as to provid.e Saudi technical cadres
for the various pro~ ects. Therefore, enhancem.ent of the growth reaources ~
will be accompanied by the development and enhancement of the natural re- I
sources.
~
The plan policy seeks to create incentives to tempt the specialized inter- i
national finas to enter into equal partnership with Saudi sides to imple-
ment the agricultural development pro3ects. These incenttves include pro- ~
viding loans for a symbolic interest and providing 50 percent of the value ~
of machinery imported for the agricultural pro~ects, in addition to numerous
tax exemptions. _
~
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One of the consulting establishments reviewing one of the plan's agricul-
tural development pro~ects has said that this pro~ect, which costs 7 mil-
lion dollars, is capable o~ q~elding S mtllion dollars in annual profits
after the first year of its implementation.
Petrochemical Pro~ects
_ However, the immense petrochemical pro~ects, especially in al-Jubayl and
Yanbu', are the pro~ects attracting the main intemational attention be-
cause the availability of natural gas as a cheap fuel for these pro~ects
is likely to make the projecta profitable.
On the basis of this premise, Saudi investments in the field of petro-
chemicals may amount to 6 billion dollars, in additioa to 16 billion _
- dollars for the pipeline network to gather the gas fram the oil fields
and carry it to the sites of its consimmption, liquidation, exportation
and use in the petrochemical industries.
~ To attract foreign investments in these Saudi projects, the incentive
selected has been that of giving the foreign firm a conanitment which
secures for it 1,000 barrels of oil for every million dollars it invests
in its Saudi partnerships.
In thia regard, Saudi Arabic insists that the participating firms offer
marketing services for the Saudi share of the products of the petrochem=
ical pro~ects.
The Saudi Basic Industries Authority is in charge of the ma~or industrial
pro~ects. This authority hae decided to participate with 80 percent of
the capital of the ateel plant in al-Jubayl--a plant with an annual
capacity of 850,000 tons--in partnership with the German (Korf Stahl)
Firm and to participate by the eame percer~tage in the Jiddah steel plant
which will have an annual capacity of 120,000 tona.
It is understood from the reports leaYced about the plan that medium and
light industry projects will spread on the peripheries of the major
pro3ects in al-Jubayl and of the industrial camplexes in Tabuk, Medina
and Khamis Mushayt so that industrial development may not be restricted
to Jiddah, Riyadh and al-Daumnam. -
It is understood that the allocations for these industrial complexes
amount to 2 billion dollars. This is in addition to the enormous govern-
ment sid for the Saudi campanies establishing industrial pro~ecta. For
example, the ceramic Industries Company in Riyadh has been given 30,000
square metera of state-owned lands for an annual rent of ~ust 2,000 dollars.
Meanwhile, the development, modernization and expangion of the education
- apparatus will be accompanied by agricultural and industrial development
activities. The program to eacpand and modernize the Riyadh University
, alone will cost nearly 2 billion dollars.
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rux ur~~'tl;tAL U~~ UNLY
The educational development policy seeks to establish participation ties
with international educational institutes, includtng the U. S. Duke and
_ Colorado univexsities, to expand the sphere of vocati:onal education and
training in particular.
Besides all this, the Joint Saudi-U. S. Economic Cooperation ComanitCee hnd
entrusted 35 U. S. experts with the task of eetting up 10 vocational train-
ing centers in various parts of the kingdom extending from al-Qasim in the
northEastern part of the country to Abha in the southwestern mountainous
~ area.
Thus, the pro~ects of the 1980-85 five-year plan wi11 turn Saudi Arabia
into a main theater of fierce competition between the international ftrms.
In this regard, the U. S. ftrms camplain that the U. S. tax policies that
include the profits of Americans abroad weaken the ability of these firms ,
to compete with the French, German, British, Japanese and South Korean
firma that can offer rinancial and technical facilities which the U. S.
firms can off er only at the expense of their profits.
This is why the U. S. telephone and radio conanunication fircns have given
up any hope of competing with the Canadian Bell Firm or the Swedish
(Ericson) Firm ~~ahich are given important incentives by their governments
that offer them soft-term loans and credit and borrowing facilities.
COPYRTGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'A.RABI
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SULTANATE OF OMAN
1
SULTAN INTERVIEWED ON FOREIGN POLICY
LD091135 London THE TIMES in English 9 May 80 P(Roman)
[Interview with Qabua ibn Sa'id~ Sultan of Oman, by Michael Frenchman in -
Salalah; date not givenJ
[Text] During the past 10 yeara Sultan Qabus, or "Super Q" as the 5,000
British expatrisre$ call him, hae dragged his country into the 20th century
without encountering many of the diff iculties suffered by some of his
neighboLrs. Until a decade ago there were many tribesmen living in the -
Jibal or mountains who hsd never set eyes on a white man and who lived a
atone age existence. Sultan Qabus has achieved a remarkable degree of
ewif t progress for his country.
- But he is no dreamer and Oa?an is no dreamland. When the British helped
to remove his aging father, Sultan Said Ibn Taimur, on July 23, 1970, in
' a bloodless coup the country was immediately plunged further into a violent
war with rebel tribesmen in the south backed by the full weight of a
Soviet-dominated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The old
- aultan, who had kept his Sandhurst-educated son a near prisoner in the
south, had refused to come to terms with the 20th century, which enabled
South Yemen to make much political capital.
- The war took a heavy toll of both men and money as Oman was not one of the
new get-rich-quick oil states. However, with the end of the war in 1975,
its diminishing oil resources are being augm~nted by new discoveries which
will place the economy on a firmer base and enable the new five-year devel-
opmer.t plan which calls for a budget of about $3,OOOM to go ahead with
confidence.
Today, however, it is international politics and not so much the path
towards domestic progress, now assured, that occupies the sultan's mind.
Speaking in his comfortable refurbished seaside palace in Salalah, capital
~ of the southern province of Dohfar, he discussed a wide range of topics,
quietly and frankly. He speaks fluent English with ease and h~s a spiritual
calmness that adds weight to many of his arguments.
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He feels strongly that the Western nations have failed tu realize the
dangers of the Soviet grand design for the expansion of communtsm in the
Middle Eaet and Africa, and in particular the vulnerability of the S~trait
of Hormuz at the entrance of the Gulf.
"We have recognized the seriouaness of the Soviet threat for the past r
5 years; we warned the West what would happen in Africa. Now Afghanis-
tan has made us all aware of the aituation." He believes that the Soviet
Union has a new expansionist policy and if necessary would interf ere in
any country outside the Warsaw Pact. He added: "The free world should
really wake up to the fact and not allow the Russians to go on doing what
. they have been doing."
The aultan, in cummon with his ministers and advisera, is preoccupied
with the possibility of a full-scale attack through SouCh Yemen. "We
have fought and fought for our independence, and won; but if there were
to be a massive attack supported by combined Rusaian, Cuban or East
German aeaietance, the result might be different." The chief threat, he
thought, was "still from the south, with the Russians taking advantage and
supporting a spurious and orchestrated subversive element within our
country."
The one encouraging factor in the south was reports of serious discontent
among the South Yemenis. Many of them were disillusioned about the
Marxist message as a result of the dire economic problems facing the
country. This was why many refugees were said to be coming across the
border into Oman.
The sultan is a deeply religious man and an authority on Islam. Discuss-
ing the relative merits of Marxism and Islam, he said he would like to -
believe that the ideologies had nothing in common. But there was one meet-
ing point, he said after a pause for thought; "Islam is based on collective
thinking--the people muat be together as in all great religione. Other-
wise, there is no similarity whataoever with couununism."
He went on: "Communism wi11 never succeed in any country which has a
strong tradition or belief in a religion. It might perhaps be attrac-
tive to a few individuals in an ~islamic country, but never on a large
scale. No Arab, or truly Islamic people, will ever be sympathetic to
_ Leninist or Marxist theories."
He dwelt on the sub~ect for several more minutes, then stopped for a -
moment to gaze out of the open window across the Gulf of Oman to the
north. Referring once again to the question of individuals who might be
susceptible to the attractiona of communism, particularly those in coun-
tries with large populations spread throughout the land, he said it might
be possible f or a few individuals to try to sow the communist seed and
gain some influence over sections of the people.
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But, ~n the long term, he believes that communiam would never get a real
grip on an Islamic country and certainly not in Iran. Thia was his only
reference to that atate, with whi~h Oman had en~oyed very friendly
relationahips under the shah's regime.
Returning to the military threat, he said he was concerned at the bad
relations between Iran and Iraq and the reported amassing of Soviet troops
on Iran's northern border. Logically, he considered that this could lead
to renewed activity in South Yemen. If the situation were to worsen in
the north and south, Oman would be caught between the Soviet pincers.
"There would hhen be a direct military threat to the Strait of Hormuz,
but our real concern there now is the threat of terrorist activity, and
in particular mines dropped into the strait in the Gulf," the sultan said.
_ He has been much criticized privately and Co a limited extent publicly,
mainly overseas, for his style and method of government, which he feels
outsiders do not understand. "We are ruled by the Koran and that allows
us to say exactly what we think when spea~ing of government. We base
our system on the Islamic tradition. We will not import the form of
democracy that you are familiar with. The people will be represented in
government when they have learned to understand what that really means.
After all, you in Britain took hundreds of years to evolve your system."
His next remarks, which were not intended as a comment on the Westminster
style of government, but on many of the imitations by developing countries,
were particularly outspoken as he added: "Here, we do not do anything for
show in our rule. It must be genuine, it must be right, it must not be
~ hollow. Every country must eventually form its own kind of dEmo.cracy."
The sultan, as well as being head of state, is prime minister and chair-
man of the Executive Authority, the Council of Ministers. He refuted
allegations that he was ignorant of his people's f eelings and wishes. He
makes regular tours of his country for several weeks at a time visiting
all the towns and remote villages in the mountains and deserts. The~e
are grea t caravans of 100 or more vehicles. At each stop the tents are
set up, the rugs spread out on the ground, and the king meets his people.
- "I have these tours," he explained. "I sit with my people. I listen to
them, to their grievances, their complaints, their comments. Every one
seems genuinely happy at this kind of system. They all speak their minds.
This is our custom, it is my ~ob."
It is traditional in Arab countries for the ruler to hold this kind of
open court in his palace where everyone can come and meet him. Known as
a ma~lis it is now becoming more and more of a ceremonial occasion in
some Arab countries but not so in Oman. It would appear to be time-
c~nsuming because the sultan could be dealing with apparently trifling
matters which in practice ought to be dealt with by the local village
head man or mayor, the wahli. In the old days well rights and boundary
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disputea were main topics. But today, with development of the country,
better water supplies and expanding irrigation, matters such as these
are retreating in*_o the background.
The aultan realizea that change will come in due course. With more and
more Omania ~ust returning from education abroad, they will eventually feel
they would like a greater role and more participation in the society they
are developing.
The sultan commented: "Our ultimate hope is that when the time comes
they will have their say; they already have to a certain extent, but
perhaps not in the way you would see it." As well as the Council of Min-
istere he has now establiehed a council of nongovernment employees to look
at the economy and expansion of development. Other councils are also
being formed. The council meets every week and the sultan receives
detailed reports.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1980
CSO: 4820
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SYRIA
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THRg,ATEN pOLITICAL STABILITY
Paris AI~-WATAN AL-'ARAgI in Arabic 11-17 Apr 80 pp 46-47
[Article: "Arab Subsidy to Make Up for Most of the Def icit; Economic
Disturbancea in Sqria Paved the Way to Political Disturbances"]
[Text] Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad can add to the long liet of his
opponents, whom he holds responsible for the disturbances in Syria, [the
name of] a secret opponeat. ge may not ha~e takea the power of this opponent
into accoimt when he came to power in 1970. _
Very si,mply this opponent is the ecanomic factor which has always played a
basic role in strengthening the political and social stability [of a country]
or shaking the fotmdations upon which regimes in the whole world are built.
There is no difference here between the capitalist world, the comm~unist
world, the advanced world or the backward world; they are all equally affected.
A visitor may note all the aspects of civilized life in Damascus--a city that
ie so overcrowded that people walk shoulder to shoulder on the sidewalks; cars
crowd the streets; and over the city hangs a cloud of engine and factory
exhauet. The city has the most modern cars that are manufactured by U.S.
a~nd German factories, and it has the most recent electronic equipment and
tools that are produced by Japanese factories as well as the latest in men'S
_ 8nd women's clothing made by P~ench and Italian designers. In addition, huge
tourist hotels are being erected, and commercial office buildings are springing
up in the heart of the city.
But all of these phenotnena cannot hide from the economic and social investigat~r
the chaos from which the economy is suffering. This chaos was reflected in the
last few months and weeks in negative results that were perceived by the average
lay people of Syria. These negative results were utilized by opponents of
the regime to create difficulties and unreat.
Perhaps the one thought with which Syrian p~anners and economic experts are
preoccupied these days is detexmin ing whether they should proceed ahead with
the developmeat plans or stop to review the past and focus on co~crecting the
mistakes that were made in pro3ects that have been implementerl or in those '
that are being impleme~nted.
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~ Those experts are inclined to favor the second choice ao ab to curb spendi~~g
[whose growth] has been reflected in an annual inflation rate that is
eatimated to be at least between 15 and 30 percent.
The Bourgeoisie of the State
Syrian experts attribute the reasona for the economic crisis to the atate's
control of the economy. The state is an employer, an owner of the means of
production, an economic guide, a merchant, a partner and collector of taxes
and ~ees.
This enlargement of the state's economic role, along with its political
cantrol, may have been a beneficial factor had the state had the ability to
make good plans and to manage [its affairs] eff iciently. In spite of its
huge political and ecanomic role the state is suffering from several sharp
and eerious handicaps.
There is firat the bureaucracy whicb ie getting worse as a rasult of the large
numbers of non-productive civil aervants and employees. There are also
incampatibilities among the mandates of agencies, and there are excesses
which lawa have not been able to curb.
Along with bureaucracy corruption inched its way into the system. It weighed
heavily cm the pro~ects and the programs that have been implemented. This
was manifested in the destructive role that was played by middlemen, brokers
and functionaries who receive huge commissions. There are p~ople in Syria
now whoae names may be considered in the category of billionaires or, if
one ia extremely modest, mfllionaires.
_ The imbalance in economic planning is due basically to the lack of a general
- economic policy and to the abaence of accurate statistics. Recently, con-
- cerned departments had to review their statistics for the seventies so that
they would have f igures that would approach accuracy and can build upon them
their plans in the future.
Oil is almoat the only industry that is managed eff iciently in the country
inspite of the fact that funds invested in the conversion induatries amount
to between 5 and 6 billion Syrian pounds annually.
~ Official statistics indicate that the rate of growth in the industrial sector -
amounta to 5 percent per year. The food industriea and the~textile industries
meanwhile showed a noticeable decline because of the aforementioned chaos. ~
Cultivation of Cotton Falls Off
Same parts of the agricultural sector experienced progress and others lagged
behind. The cultivation of cotton, which along with oil, constitutes Syria's
own basic source of hard currency becauae.they are two carmnoditiea for export,
fell off noticeably in recent years. Production fell and the area of land i
cultivated decreased even though cotton prices have doubled in world mark.ets.+
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Oae is taken by surprise regarding this declinel but Syrian experts are saying
- that part of the land that was cultivated with cotton was converted to the
cultivation of wheat and beeta to meet basic food needs aad especially after
construction of the sugar production ua3tawere completed.
- Farmere' conditions have improved elightly, but misery, unemployment and the
backward atatus of women are still characterietics of the Syrian countryside.
Agrarian reform did aot affect large sectors of destitute peasants since vast
agricultural land is leased to functionaries who in turn lease the land to the
peasants.
As a result of this extensive imbalance in the grincipal sectors of production,
the value of national production has been affected a~d there was a def icit
in the balance of payments and in the general budget. The deficit in last
year's budget amounted to approximately 8.1 billion Syrian pounds (or 2
billion dollars).
The small aurplus that Syria had in its balance of payments in 1976 and 1977
tumed to a 200 million dollar deficit in 1978~.
The monetary inflatian that has been caused by the state's indebtedness to
the Central Bank has weakened the purchasing power of the Syrian pound. This
wealmeas affected wages, which rose before the recent increase, 100 percent
between 1970 and 1977. Prices, meanwhile, rose 300 vercent [in the same period]. _
Arab and ForeiRn Aid
To cover this deficit the state hae depended in a special way on Arab supvort.
It ie estimated that the aid which Syria receives annually in accordanc~ with
the reaolutions of the BaRhdad Swmiit of late 1978 is 1.85 billion dollars.
It ia believed that this is a substitute for the allocatians of the 1974
Rabat Summit which are estimated to be 1.3 billion dollars per. year.
This atd has affected defense allocations which have been increased. Last
year defense allocatione amouuted to 8.2 billion pounds; they were increastd -
this year by about 159 million dallars.
It is expected that Arab and foreign sid this year, including direct aid -
from the Baghdad Summit, will amount to 2.48 billion dollars (9,920 billion
Syrian pounds).
During the seventies the Arabs took the position that the Soviet Union had in
the sixties with regard to the amount of foreign aid Syria was receiving. It
is believed that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are offering -
Syria aid worth about 100 million dollars annually. Meanwhile, since 1975
the Americans have been offering sid 3n an amount that is almost comparable,
but last year they stopped this aid. Aid and loans from the World Bank since
1972 amounted to 450 m illion dollars.
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The state has been encouraging the privai:~ seci:.or :ind fore:.~i invest~ents,
but the vrivate sector is still refrainin~ from contributinq to long-range
development pro~ects. It has devoted itself entirely to the commercial sector,
to the houeing sector and to.real estate.
According to 1977 statistics and in spite of the growing role of the public
aector, the private aector--deapite successive expropriations--still controls
97 percent of the light indiistries, 95 percent of agriculture, 95 percent
of the conetruction induatry, most of domestic trade and 8 1 pPrcent of the
traneportation sector.
Guaranteea and incentives meanwhile have failed to attract Arab capital
except for the interest in purchasing real estate and land. Several Arab
corporationa did withdraw from the Syrian market after encountering admin-
istrative and bureaucratic obstacies.
The Syrian economy does nevertheless encompass all the capabilities of a
successful economy if use of balanced economic planning is guaranted and
all the obstacles from which the economy is now suffering are eliminated.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4802
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TUNISIA
NEW POLITICAL TREND SEEN IN MZALI APPOINTMENT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 pp 1074-1075
[Textj With the naming of the Mohamed Mzali Cabinet on 23 and 26 April
1980, a phase in the political history of Tunisia comes to a close. That
phase began on 20 December 1977, with the resignation of ministers and
secretaries of state opposed to a hardening of the government position on
trade unions. Since that time, all those who resigned returned to their
high official posts, the first to resume public activity being Habib Chatti,
who became secretary general of the Islamic Conference, and the last being
Mongi-Kooli, now minister delegate to the Office of Prime Minister and
director of the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD).
One of these "re-entries" into Tunisian public life no longer hesitates to
state, privately, that at the time of his resignation, he had sent a letter
to President Bourguiha containing warnings that the subsequent course of
events conf irmed: He predicted social disturbances and serious incidents
provoked by autsiders and he believes that the trade union riots of 26 Jan-
uary 1978 in Tunis and the abortive attack on Gafsa on 27 January 1980
validated his predictions. The new team believes that any repetition of
such unfortunate events must be prevented.
- One can do nothing but praise the devotion, energy and~courage demonstrated
for so long by Hedi Nouira before he was felled by a malady that could have
proved fatal and that stemmed from overwork. One must also recognize that
- he was able to improve the standard of living of all the Tunisian people,
restore the balance of payments, improve production, attenuate social con-
trasts within an emerging "average society," and create a good image for
his country. History will record his name as that of one of Che builders
of independent Tunisia.
However, Hedi Nouira governed in such a personal manner, monopolized the
dialog with the chief of state so completely, and so clearly reduced the
ministers to the rank of office heads only in charge of carrying out orders
that his sudden disappearance for reasons of serious health problems made
the president realize the scope of the political vacuum that had gradually
been created. Instead of confining himself to arbitrating quarrels of the
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different factions, as he had at the last congress of the Neo-Destourian
Party, he suddenly had to meet political realities head on and fully exer-
cise the role actua?ly shared by the head of the Executive Branch so ahort
_ a time before.
The naming of Mohamed Mzali as "coordinator" on 1 March and prime minister
on 23 April, while Hedi Nouira returned to Tunisia for a long convalescence,
demonstrated President Bourguiba's determination to restore a normal situa-
tion at the pinnacle of power. The readmission to the Destourian Socialist
Party of some of the opposition "liberals" constituted a sign of a cautious
march toward pluralism. The return to power,of those who resigned in Decem-
ber 1977 points to a political shift. It is not a radical shift, nor will -
it be a very rapid one, but it is clear that the style of Tunisian political.
life is going to change, an~d not under the prompting of Congress, whose
latest session scarcely rose above the level of clan struggles, hut at the
urging of a president who finds the secret of a new youth in initiative
and struggle. -
Indispensable Harshness -
With a very aeute sense of balance and a determination to deprive the clan �
struggle of all sustenance, President Bourguiba is compensating for Hedi
Nouira's physical retirement by a considerable reduction in the duties of
Mohamed Sayah. The latter is losing the roles of both party director and
minister delegate to the Office of Prime Minister, but he is not removed
from the Cabinet. He receives the portfolio of Equipment.
Circumstances have enabled the president to take two-fold aetion about
which he had undoubtedly�thought, while deeming it to be impossible with-
_ out risk of serious reactions in the leadership class: removing back to
back, so to speak, the two major figures who had polarized political life.
Most assuredly, the action was not taken without sadness. In Mohamed Sayah,
President Bourguiba cherishes the historian, the popularizer of the na-
- tional epic, the educator of the new Destourian classes, the keeper of
the original Destourian flame. In Hedi Nouira, he found the eternal loyal
confident, the safekeeper of a certain social order and a well-thought-out
economic progress, the unshakable artisan of healthy balances, the precise
and comforting calculator of intermediate solutions that could reassure
the people and their leader.
Partially fmposed, partially chosen, the sacrifice is a heavy one for the
old historical fighter, who would willingly have continued to reduce his
active role. But there are in Habib Bourguiba inexhaustible resources of
energy that age has not eroded in the slightest. He still shows that he
is capable of being very hard with regard to himself, and this undoubtedly
helps to explain why, going against many, he is also very harsh toward
others.
i
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Preaident Bourguiba knew that if he failed to exerc3se his right to grant
clemency in favor of any of the "condemned of Gafsa," he would shock a
large share of world opinion and disappoint his country's best foreign
friends. But none oE those completely familiar with the career of the
Tuniaian chief of stute expected, under the current circumstance~, any
such measures oC clemency. Although two of thoae aentenced to death wer.e
not clearly convinced that they themselves killed anyone, the president
was convinced, for his own part, that justice had been indulgent. Going
beyond the courts would have seemed weakness, endangering the nation's very
security, as had previously been the case in similar circumstances. The
execution seemed to him to be an indispensable measure for the public good.
Naturally, one is permitted to think that clemency would have made him a
larger historical figure and perhaps that idea crossed his mind also.
Perhaps he did so with regret, but as he has always done, he took a hard
position. ~
= Future Laden With Problems
- The decisions that President Bourguiba has made in recent weeks do not only
settle the most urgent current problems; they also involve the future.
It is not that the ministerial team put in office entails any substantial
change in high-ranking .political personnel; rather, it ratifi~s a return
to seasoned politicians out of favor for a time. The only major innovation
- consists in the new and more complex articulation of the economic minis-
tries, with the establishment of a Ministry of Planning and Finance en-
trusted to Mansour Moalla, who was the first Tunisian student at the French
ENA [National School of Admir~istrationJ and who long before had left admin-
istration for banking.
However, the new prime minister, Mohamed Mzali, who is considerably younger
than his predecessor, being only 55, is designated, by virtue of his
appointment, to be the provisional successor of the chief of state in
case of the death of the laCter. W:Lthout doubting his qualities, it is
sometimes noted in Tunis that they consist of proportion and moderation
rather than visible energy and decisive inspiration. He is essentially a
teacher and it should be emphasized that he has contributed a great deal to
appeasement in the university, but it is also pointed out that he has
scarcely 10 years of participation in the Political Bureau.
At the same time, the ministerial team includes at least two outstanding
political figures who are very gifted for government: Driss Guiga, minister
of interior, and Mahamed Sayah, former director of the party who became,
as we noted, minister of equipment.
However, while all those who resigned in December 1977 did return in good
graces, two are abroad: the former minister of foreign affairs, Habib
Chatti, who would normally still hold the quite eminent post of secretary
general of the Islamic Conference for many years to come, and the former
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cva~ vrrivtr~ Vo~ Ui~LI
minister of interior, '~ahar Belkhocij~t, k-~,~ ;ucceeaed Driss Guig~3 as an:bassa-
dor to Bonn, a post decidedly not on a par with his political abilities
or, undoubtedly, with his ambitions.
Some persons already believe that Tahar Belkhodja's return to the ministry,
prefacing a reappearance of Ahmed Mestiri and other "liberals" on the
government scene, would constitute the logical followup to the measures
[akPn in recent weeks. One would ther~ be at only the beginning of a
- decisive evolution for the future of Tunisia. But no one can state that
this would be the design of the "Supreme Combatant," who has again taken
the reins with lucidity and energy and who does not intend to be ca.rried
+iwny by events. He has certainly thought a great deal about the important
problems that will assuredly not be long in ariaing, while already pre-
paring the first outlines of a solution.
COF'YRiGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
_ 11, 464
CSO: 4400 END
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