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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= GIA-R~P82-00850R000200'100004-4 ~ Lf ~ U L',~ , ~ E ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = JPRS L/9174 2 July 1980 West E u ro e R e o rt p p cFOUO 29iso) F~~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 i NOTE JPRS publications contain information prirnarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sourcas are translated; those from English-language souYces are transcribed or rc:printed, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicator;; such as [Text) or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the - last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was processed. Where no processing indicator is gi~~en, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. WordG or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- _ cies, views or a~.titudes of the U.S. Government. For further information on r.eport content cal.l (7031 351-2811 or 351-2501 (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey). COPYRIGHT LAWS AIvD REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE OIVLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JP R5 L/ 917 4 2 July 1980 WEST EUROf'E REPORT (FOUO 29/80) CONTENTS - THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE Details on 1980 Naval Training Exerciae Provided (Rene Pierre; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HiJI, May 80) 1 COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE Psychological, Political Pro�iles of Socialiet Party Leaders ~I,'EXPRESS, 3 May 80) 6 Characters of Leaders, by Andre Salomon . Socialist Regiater ~ ITALY Pig Farmers Find Proposed EEC Pricing Measures Inadequate (IL SOLE-24 ORE, 7 May 80) 18 Causes of, Remedies for Itampant Inflation (Mario Baldassarri; IL SOL~-24 ORE, 4, 6 May 80) 20 ~ PCI Proposal for Southexn Italy Developm~nt Fund (L'UNITA, 24 May 80) 28 Reform Imposeible; Replacement Necessary, by Marcello Vzllari ~ Details of Communist Program Industry MinisCer's Career, Political Aspirationa (Lorenzo Schegge; IL MONDO, 9 l~iy 80) 32 - a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO) _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 r~uK uFFICIAL USE ONLY DC's Andreotti, PRI's Spadolini on Concordat Revision _ (Giulio Andreotti Interview; IL MONDO, 9 May 80) 35 PSI's Cicchitto an Party's Economic Policy (Fabrizio Cicchitto Interview; IL MONDO, May 80) 43 - - b - � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE DETAILS ON 1950 NAVAI. TRAINING EXERCISE PROVIDED Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 80 pp 14-15 [Article by Rene Pierre] - [Text] iJnits,from tlie Atlantic squadron, under the command of rear-admiral Gagliardi, participated in a series of training maneuvers--called "Gemesux"-- from 12 February to 6 March 1980. For this occasion, the Atlantic squadron sailed into the Mediterranean to join the Mediterranean squadron for a few days, under the conmand of vice- admiral Castelbajac aboard the "Colbert" cruiser. Each element of the Atlantic squadron has had very good naval training and averages 110 days at sea per year. But most of the activities are devoted to ind3spensible public service tasks and support missions for strategic submarine forces. This does not prepare ships for all aspects of sea surface combat. Condi- tioning and preparation of surface ships for peace time and war time missions is the responsibility of squadron commanding admirals, who thus play a funda- mental role with regard to training maneuvers. Training Organization The large deep sea combat units are divided into two squadrons, the Atlantic ' and the Mediterranean. Each squadron commanding admiral is assisted by one staff based at the home port to prepare and condition the ships and one at sea to direct training and, if necessary, operations. The Atlantic squadron includes 15 ships: 13 escort vessels, one refueling tanker, the "Durance," and one transporC freighter, the "Orage." A helicopter carrier the "Jeanne d'Arc," and an escort vessel, the "Forbin," belong to the applied t~aching group for naval officers. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 - r~ux ur~r Lclai. usE orR,Y = Combat training is organized by using any favorableooccasion to gather a significant number of ships and maintain them at sea in forniation for a relatively loug period of time. , The number of participants and the length of training depend on two things. ~ First, on the number of ships availz.ble (ships are periodically grounded for ' planned maintenance) and, second, on the n~.imber of ships which have to remain at the home port to fulfill real missions during the period in ques- ' tion. ~ Generally a training session on the Atlantic lasts between three to si~; weeks and involves only four or f ive ships, to which are added all available ships stationed in Brest and not involved in actual missions, when leaving and entering the Gascogne Gulf. It is under these circumstances that the training session "Gemeaux" took _ place, from 12 F'ebruary to 6 March. The maneuvers met with a series of very favorable factors which should be remembered: Good meteorological ~onditions permitted completion of a very intense training program. The search for favorable~training conditions and concerns for better productivity created a need for msneuvers remote from the Gascogne Gulf. By moving far from the home port, ships develop a self-maintenance capacity, which is an important element for their autonomy. . The constant presence of the tanker "Durance" insured the supply of fuel and food at sea. The two three day stop-overs were only for the crew to - relax and not for any logistical reasons. Exceptionally, buth sqLadrons were able to organize their training sessions sinultaneously, and benef ited from the following: The presence of the aircraf t-carrier "FocYi" and its air force group (also in training) benefited the Atlantic squadron which does not have an aircraft carrier; Refueling practice with the "Durance" a modern tanker not used by Mediter- ranean units; Th2 large number of ships, allowing larger-scale maneuvers; ' The presence of newly operational Lynx WG 13 helicopters fitted only on A.S.M. and P.H. Atlantic escort vessels; The sophisticated tactical confrontations by both staff squadrons. The following vessels participated in the "Gemeaux" training maneuvers: The _ - command vessel of rear admiral Gagliardi, until 17 rebruary; the "Duperre" escort squadrnn; later the "Guguay Trouin," t;he escort squadron "Maille 2 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Breze," the sloop "Aconit," the rapid escort "Le Normand," the refueling tanker "Durance." These vessels formed the permanent body. The escort squadron "Kesaint" and two Avisos A 69s from the Atlantic force joined them in the Gascogne Gulf. - The Mediterranean squadron included: The cruiser "Colbert," command vessel of vice-admiral de Castelbajac, com- mander for the Mediterranean squadron; the aircraft-carrier "Foch" (inclu- ding 10 Alizes, 10 Crusaders, and 15 Etendards), the escort vessel "Duquesne," the rapid escorts the "Vendeen," and the "Alsacien," two logistical ships, the "Isere" and the "Rhin." Aspects of Sea Training Navy mer. distinguish very clearly between group training and individual training. Individual training is designed to teach safe sailing and use equipment (including sonar, radar, txansmitters, armaments, artillery missiles, tor- pedoes and helicopters) and to withstand possible disaster. Of course, propulsion, energv production and administration are the keys to success of the operations. ~ Despite the fact that individual traintng represents only the first part of combat training, it is not easy. It tends to harmonize and synchronize the various functional bodies of the crew, who must interrelate (deck, central operations, weapon systems, energy-propulsion, security, planes) and the 40% to 50% of the crew which is renewed every year. Every year about 60 young men come aboard without any sea experience. They must be taught about life at sea before they can be initiated to their tasks. ~ Individual training is an indispensable formality. Group training develops cooperation with other surface ships, planes, sub- marines, ground bases, P.C. O.P.S. and this with the ob~ective of controlling an air-sea area as large as possible and of countering any danger: surface, submarine, aerial and electronic. The Navy's ability to locate and identify the enemy at any t~me, and to.strike at him from as fa~ as possible, depends on this cooperation. . Surface ships ha~ve two features different from submarines and planes: They rarely operate alone. Their scope of action encompasses the area above and below the sea, because they operate at the sea/air diopter level. 1 3 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY Ships are surrounded by many "echoes" through their radar and sonar screens. It is essential to distinguish quickly and accurately between the good, and bad and the indifferent." Tactical information and the speed of its processing and promulgation are so important that highly performing automatic systems have to be used to ~ analyze information, operate weapons and implement electronic counter- measures. Because some ships do not last long enough to be equipped with modern devices, it was necessary to design and i.mplement appropriate cooperation between old and modern ships. These complicated coogeration schemes (ship-to-ship, ship- . to-helicopter, etc.) require highly knowledgeable and fast personnel with know-how. ~ ~ Any deck watch or central operations officer must know how to use all the _ _ equipment, whether related to his field or not, whether on his home ship or - not. This know-ho~ can be acquired only through grpup training. Synthetic ground installations provide only an initiation. Training is nECessary to develop the navy's commanding staff experience:in - improving the use of tactical equipment. To simulate credible dangers and provide ships with many operating situations, , it is necessary to gather many submarines, and planes and to provid~, tele- guided or pulled targets, training torgedo pick-up. Thus, during trai.ning sessions, s~ich as "Gemeaux" the Navy, the Air Force (supplying attack planes; "Fatma" Aerial tactical sea force), and various ; testing centers (allowing real firing on rapid aerial targets) cooperate. Allied naval forces are also invited to ~oin in for a few hours to play the part of suppliers or enemy forces. During "Gemeaux" three Spanish escort vessels, two Portuguese escort vessels and one suf,marine, and one English antisubmarine vessel joined in th.e ~ maneuvers at one time or another. _ All ships are simultaneously confronted with emergency situations. The dif- ficulty is in scheduling maneuvers at a time convenient for everybody. It is easy to realize how complicated it was to plan for maneuvers as elaborate as "Gemeaux." ' _ The time devoted to tactical training is s~,aller than it was 15 years ago. However, it still represents 20Y of mission time, compared with 20% for support to "Fost," and 10% tc+ public service. 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - The remaining time is distributed between testing, vsrious maneuvers and oversea missions. It was possible to a:aintain this trai~ing at the minimum level through an increase in the number of days at sea, However, it is the only activity - sub~ect to reduction and fuel cuts could ~eopardize the program. Group training is necessary. It permits the creation of complex situations to match th,e existing means at w~rk, and enables testing of staff and crew capability. ~ Navy men are aware of efforts made by the government and the nation to stage - m~neuvers. _ Their pride is to be able to get the most out of auch investments under any circumstances, during peace time or in times of coaflict.. Biography � - Escort vessel captain Rene Pierre graduated in 1954 from the Ecole Navale. He is a graduate of the Staff College in detection, and a graduate of the Ecole Superieure de Guerre Navale. He has been the officer of the escort squadron "Maille Breze" for one year.. Previously he was under chief of staff for operations to the admiral heading the Atlantic squadron. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d~Aujourd'hui" 8924 ~ ~ CSO: 3100 ~ ~ 5 . � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRX SECTION FRANCE PSYCHOLOGICAL, POLITICAL PROFILES OF SOCIALIST PARTY LEADERS Characters of Leaders Paris L'EXPRE5S in French 3 May 80 gp 174-193 [Article by Andre Salomon] - [Text] The PS [Socialist Party] has 3ust held its na- _ tional convention. The main subject under discussion: the seriousness of the international situation and the nomination of the candidates at the presidential elec- - tions. Ideas regarding some personages have become crystallized. No one so far has described them so pre- cisely as ~r Andre Salomon, associate in con3unction with the PS leadership from 1971 to 1978, member of the board of directors, he was in a position to form an opinion on the character of the top leaders. He saw at very close range ~ust how leadership operates, how it makes its decisions, how the various currents of - opinion influenced the party's inner mode of life. Called "PS la mise a nu," [The Socialist Party Brought Out Into the Open], it is a merciless work which he had pub lished by Robert Laffont. It gives us the char- acter sketches of Francois Mitterrand, Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard. He is short in stature. His expression, whether stern or kindly, commands attention. In profile, he is Bonaparte grown old, but nothing is striking his carnassial teeth! Like every human being, he has changed and will continue to change. Mitterrand at 70 is not at all the same as at 80. - The first secretary of the Epinay Party is already ~ong experienced in the political life; he has taken many a blow, he has given proof of outstand- ing qualities, counterbalanced by equally outstanding weaknesses. On the bright side: Unquestionabl~ courage. H~ was an intrepid contestant, I have witnessed it. He is capable of rising above seclusion, he is tena- cious, reticent; endowed with a rare sense of timing, he knows how to make 6 FOR 0~'FICIAL USE ONLY , . ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ORLY = the best possible use of a situation. His natural fierceness can be tinged with gentleness (rarely), his intelligence and memory are on the highest plane. His education, basically literary, his style are more than adequate, and strongly contrast with the mediocrity which one so often encounters in political circles. With the advent of Gaulism, he learned to create the image of haughty, intransigent disdain, of an unyielding fixed point of reference, unoblig- ing with respect to the Right. Physically he has a certain charm. A voice which he uses wonderfully well; by turns fri~ndly, confidential, it can reach a peak of warm enthusiasm. As an orator, h~ is perhaps a little too classical, but effective when he is in close contact with an audience whether it is small or whether he is speaking to a big crowd. Stories abound, he is carried away by his audi- ence's enthusiasm and their laugh~`.er. They were expecting an awe-inspiring panorama of life; but too often he gets lost in irony and the peroration leaves them dissatisfied. His smile, infrequent perhaps, is according to the occasion, scornful, understanding, friendly, ironic, exceptionally joyous. He is often solemn, - almost statelS~. He knows how to get away for some moments of privacy; to relax by taking long walks, by communing with nature, to build up his strength. Indefatigable when circumstances demand it, scouting the high- ways, he has a self-confidence that overcompensates a certain diffidence. - On the dark side: in the foreground, in this distraught and doubting _ Christian, we find a pessimism concerning the human race which he expresses by a complete lack of dedication to another's cause, an abiding distrust with nothing allays, a cruelty which he tries, often unsuccessfully, to hold in check. I remember the uneasiness that prevailed at a certain board of directors' meeting, when, like a tiger attacking its prey, the guite new first secretary lashed into Andre Boulloche, Alain Aavary, or Claude - Fuzier and others, and Andre Piette who had the unfortunate idea to oppose him. He gloated over spite, revenge, retaliation with a little too blatant plea~ure. ~t is quite correct to say that it was Guy Mollet and his friends who planned the FGDS [Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left]*. Mitterrand settled accounts with them; Ceres also with Savary. It was per- haps quite fair. At any rate, it was a distressing spectacle. It fore- shadowed Metz and the after-Metz, when some of the leading spirits will be different, the battle will surrender to the opposing front. Men are composed of only shadow and light. Mitterrand's gray area, which - dates from 1970, was to continue until 1978: a first-rate analysis of political strategy, the choice of union with the PC [Communist Party], to promote PS progress and lend credibility to the left in its entirety. Man's unconcern, perhaps even his inherent inability, in compensation, to define an i3eological theory and to fight for any other than tactical *The FGDS was foun~ed after the 1965 presidential election. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY convergence among the currents of thought wh3ch are going to stir up the - PS throughout the decade. We shall find him at one time showing a prefer- ence for what is connected with tradition and the rev3~~a1 of democratic socialism and at another time stressing the Marxist-version paradigm. Doc- trine is meant to be of service to him, not the contrary. In this respect, he and some of his conventional friends are poles apart regarding the mili- tant practices of the socialist left. The 1971 Mitterrand had never acted militantly in an important party; he was trained in the Fourth Republic political life; the UDSR [expansion un- - knownJ, then the Convention of Republican Institutions, which served in turn as his launching pad; the fir~~ only as a connecting link to estab- _ lish him as a likely choice as minister; to afford h~~ the opportunity to . develop a reasonable architectural perspective in order that, following the 1965 elections, he might establish a harmonious arrangement between the SFIO [French Section of the Fiorkers Internation] and the radicals and - that his own preeminence be established within the Federation of the Left. _ But he also realized the instability of this kind of artificial balaace and the need to set up more stable structures in which his own unusual ability could show what he was capable of accomplishing. This explains the tenacity he demonstrated to enter the "old house" in a dominant posi- tion and with an appropriate setting: the breakup at Issy-les-Molineaux; getting back again to work on the plot that was to end at Epinay. The 1980 Mitterrand: The sun which had kept him out of the shade between 1973 and 1978 is now low on the skyline; the man seems tall but somewhat rigid. The negative leanings have become quite c:Lear; his natural authority has changed into authoritarianism, his public speech has become unvarying and he is inclined to harp on ti~e same sub j ect. On the PS, bubbling and - abounding with life, which he succeeded in bringing together, he imposes strict restraints, he packs the defense, and that is all he does. His assumed amateurism, which made it possible for him to be unp~edictable, was changed into a lamentable rigidity. And, in particular, he made a most ~ unfortunate choice, which is surprising for a man endowed until then with faultless perspicacity. Contrary to Blum, who was able to extricate himself from certain accidents and give himself enough room so as not to be invested with authority until the national or political situation urgently required his intervention, _ Mitterrand who, in 1978, no doubt permanently lost government control, _ fell back indifferently on the party. He turned to some advantage the - authoritative power he had exercised but which was beginning to falter, in order to prepare for the Metz congress under extremely intolerable circumstances, and to try to break the pressure which had brought Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard to appear at his side as a credible, forceful - and distinctive triu~mvirate. On the contrary, he went so far as to carry - his line of argument to extremes, while brushing aside his two faithful 8 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 - FOR OFI~ICIAL USE ONL`I deputies, rurying them so-to-speak to replace them by two young wolves, unknown to the public, but who had sharpened their fangs in his shadow and on the amb ition of those he believed could establish his authority. - It is rhe eternal middle-age love expre~sed in politics: the youthful " spirits restoring to the aging man the illusion of youth. And just as history at ttmes turns into buffoonery, he is going to seek the shades of Guy Mollet in order, once more, to side with the left: Metz. Immediately, the campaign he k~as carrying on for the European elections stressed the distorted analogy with the ominous period of Molletism. The - party trailed along in an opportunisC hodge-podge which bewildered the" militants and left the electors cold. Then,the leadership began to deny reality, to divert the course toward a mythological analysis, to drift into a collective neurosis. But the symp- toms already went back to over a year. In May and June 1978, the followers whispered to anyone who would listen to them, that there was an agreement between Rocard and the Elysee to dishearten Mitterrand, at first, with some hints of the.influence,of~the United States and Chancellor Schmidt on Che positions which Pierre Mauroy maintained. . - Mitterrand himself stated on television that he was being~attacked because he was disturb ing both Carter and Brezhnev, Giscard and Marchais, and the entire leftist press! In the 1977 combination of circumstances leading toward the still uncertain - results of March 1978, a statement such as this could have had some semblance of cradibility. But, after the March defeat, it no longer had the slightest shadow cf truth. That the first secretary should feel harassed at this juncture, that his close friends should spread abroad this same ir~terpretation to explain his refusal to discuss the defeat of the left in 1978, is characteristic of behaviors bordering on paranoia. - The Metz and After-Metz congress prove that the Mitterrand of 1970 had given ~�~ay to a ringleader beset by the darkness of doubt, of anger and re- sentment, and who had become brutishly obsessed even at the risk of a PS = ~ collapse. Mitterrand and the media constituted a permanent factor: the incapability to dominate those dangerous masteYS of transmogrify. On the radio, it is still not too bad, although it ls only average. But, on tele- vision, this orator, who is lyrical in top gear, easily becomes bombastic in style: his laok wanders, his smile is troubled, his sincerity seems doubtful; in slzort, his performance makes one uneasy. How can one explain the weaknesses in the two decisive encounters against Giscard, in 1974, and Barre, in 1978? By a. sagging will? By the behavior of a loser? By insufficient knowledge of the facts? By a poor psycholog- - ical and technical preparation for a confrontation before the cameras? Un- doubtedly, by a combination of most of these parameters. 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Another established fact regarding our hero: be they, rural, early century, his failure to recognize international political problems and the restraints they put on the hexagonal scene. As subtle, nuanced and satis- factory were the analyses of the French domestic situation--although Soieiy _ political and at times politic, Mitterrand, on trying his skill at explain- - ing the world situation, resorts to views which are narrow, oversimplified, and at times dismayingly banal and devoid of fact. To write as he did, that the worker class plays a leading part in the Soviet Union, to lead a PS delegation to the USSR and set up means, even fictitious, for concerted action between the CPSU and our party, is to exaggerate out of all propor- tion the role of an arganization without governmental responsibility and consequently to run the risk of losing its credibility or gratuitously giv- ing the seal of approval to a state structure in s~arch of unwarranted Status. Its immediate advantage is doubtful, even should it seek to influence the Communist electorate. On the contrary, it tends to make impossible a French consensus which is indispensable for leftist victc,ry. More Chan a blunder, - it is an offence. Paradoxically, no doubt, I terminate this not too flattering portrait by stating my firm belief that Mitterrand could have been a great president of the republic if he ha3 been elected in 1974; a little like Louis XIV perhaps, but only a little. His weaknesses would have, no doubt, been changed into strengths, united to qualities of personality, to the lofty - idea which he has of the state, to the hunger which urges him to give him- self full measure, to the ambition he cherished for his country; he would most likely have revealed some unsuspected dimensions. But fortune had, no doubt, definitely decided otherwise in 1978. Today, we are swept along by the tail of a comet whose brilliance is growing fainter from day to day. Pierre Mauroy, one of the triumvirs in Directoire style exile. The man's stature makes his presence imposing. His sense of party, his reapect for the militants safeguards him from any condescending attitude. His deeply engaging manner, his natural cheerfulness, make one accept his extreme ambition, which is perhaps excessive, if we compare it with his actual personal qualities. ~ He has the classic b:earing of the socialist militant secure in his convic- tions and eager to participate in the worker struggle. Assurances inspired by militancy, a small number of big ideas give him some support; he well knows how to while away his time in a chatty fellowship with his northern ~ friends; he is less capable of deeply studying a~ecord or of understanding _ its coded data, and still less of ,nemorizing it. He errs through lack of - - organization; his continual improvisation wears out his associates. A - heavily built but vigorous man, he finds it hard to go beyond regional _ - boundaries to come to grips with problems on a national level. Self- _ centered, he is unaware of being so, neither does he know what it means to have moods (Is this his strength of his weakness?) A mayor in love with _ 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the city of Lille, he is less comforrab]e in Paris, and almost always in a merry mood. To understand him, let us follow him through the streets of ancient Lille, let us see him in front of tfie town--hall belfry, burst- ing with pride at being looked up in tfie "lowlands." There, he is the city mayor representing the working-class power. His loyalty toward the leader, in whom he has full confidence, is almost angelic; this had been true with Mollet until the day when...Tt~at was even truer with regard to Francois Mitterrand, perhaps because he was instrumental in sponsoring him in the new Socialist Party and giving him first place, beside Mr Perichon, a man of distinction. He is slow to change direction; his hesitations, his _ inability to discuss a strategy or any tactics reasonably are often al~rm- ing, but when he does tackle something, it is with unmistakeable resolution. He finds expression for his greatest talent in c~ngress where he thunders forth enthusiastically declaring his strong militant feeling or brow- beating his audience, but, in a brotherly fashion, as Socialists prefer - to be understood or browbeaten. - His fixed idea: unity through synthesis,, His resources: tolerance and : the insatiable longing to contribute to the entire party's collective success. Without him, there would have been no Epinay. After Epinay, a decisive step, the rallying in the party of militants coming from Chris.tian - localities was beyond all question an indispensable factor for extending socialist authority, particularly in Alsace, Brittany and in the Rhone- Alps region. Classified in 1974 as a Rightists Social Democrat, he became the symbol of the PS central line. At the Metz congress, he left it to Mitterrand to use the spurious coinage of the Marxist language to win the party over to the Left. You wonder, is he really aware of that, after the divisions made at the Guy Mollet's SFIO [French Section of the Workers International]! Preeminently an organization man, right up to the 1979 congress he refused to establish any structure connected with his running, knowing well how to put his own interests after the collective interests of the organization, - or believing, a little naively, that this move on this part would be the most advantageous in the end. This explains his low score at Metx, and also his pugnacity since April 1979. His loyalty flouted, the dice loaded, the distorted picture of democratic centralism which the part~'s petty officers are trying to improvise have fomented his revolt. A great deal of water has gone under the bridge since Epinay. After the congress, as he did not dare do it himself, he sent me to face the interna- . tional press reporters in his name. Now, he is careful of his image among the media, he passionately follows his rating at the SOFRE [French Opinion Polling Company] or IHOP [French Public Opinion Institute] exchange, and - assiduously visits the reporters. He understands better than Mitterrand th~ intricacies and restraints which Europe and the world impose on our country and on those who desire to lead it. Fr~ntier man, he, very naturally, has almost instinctive respect for 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the others: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands are well knoFm to hi,m. He has a fine team of workers, composed in part of some cronies whom he tr~ined when he was the leader of tfie Socialist Youth, and some of whom who have become ossified in the machinery; fiis kindness or his w~eakness prevents him from getting rid of them. His national network, based on solidarity and friendship, was built up dur- ing the same period. To this he added a by no means inconsiderable source of influence, but which he was reluctant to mobilize in his own favor--the Leo-Lagrange circles which he himself had initi.ated. Recently he recruited or rather their joined him some militants who came _ to the party through the Socialist Assizes and members of the organization but who refuse to accept the Mitterrand-Rocard presidential bipolarity. In a word, men of the caliber of a Savary, Hubert Dubedout, etc. New blood now began to flow through his running campaign, a fact which some- what disturbed the conventional man formed by SFIO which Pierre Mauroy in great part continued to be. Will he know how to effect the synthesis of this varied input, beginning from there to establish a collective dynamism capable of amalgamating the scattered groups with which he is faced? If his reply is affirmative, the PS future is assured; if not, there is much to be feared. Once again, Mauroy seems to be the key man of the future. Despite Mitterrand's attempts to edge him out of the running, despite his pexsonal defects which I have highlighted, based on a trait which is per- haps overstressed, on the whole, the man deserves support. Regarding Michel Rocard, a sentence full of contrasts sums up both quali- ties and defects: outstanding strength of conviction, strength in adversity, weakness of character, all seasoned with an irri~kating self-centered conceit and a hypomanic zest, that is to say, a continual need for activity which - can reach the point of becoming feverish. Considerable ~udgment, little _ common sense. A youthful bearing which bravely faces the years and out- standing intellectual skill, and out-of-the-ordinary energy for work, a political courage which enabled him to ride the stormy waves of 68 without coming to grief, to �ace at close quarters. He is the only left- ist authority to have accomplished this feat. This, no doubt, led him to take short cuts and to lose ~ great deal of time, but he had the good ~ fortune to understand and to be able to take charge of the new high ambi- tions with more responsibility and more good fellowship than the youthful � generations. Potential candidate in 1969, during an intense, unruly campaign, he de- feated Maurice Couve de Murville to the great amazement of all; stubborn as a mule, eager to prove himself, he, too, has changed in the past 15 years. Wfiat a strange political route, prompted all along the way by ur- gent high aspirations mingled with a pretentious personal ambition. Socialist student leader at the time of the SFIO, responsible fighter, then PSU [Unified Socialist Party] secretary general, PS national secretarq 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100004-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104404-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL'I some month~ after the Pau congress, contrary to Mauroy, he cannot bear to be second, despite a certain sense of team work. His relations with Mendes France were stormy and yet, temperamentally, they shared many points in common, in particular the courage ta speak their mind and not to give in too easily, at the risk of compromising their career. Mendes was a loner; Rocard, on the contrary, loves the militant life in a people's party and cannot imagine his political course outside collective structures. The one, such as Mitterrand, embraced socialism late in life, the other, such as Mauroy, is a died-in-the-wool politician, having dis- covered, at an early age, the socialist response to injustice. Two diver- gent experienc~s ~J_so explain the incompatibility o� temperament and.Zhe distrust that separate Mitterrand and Rocard. This latter economic`expert, this high official who has inhaled engine-room odors at close range and understood the complex character of the problems they pose for power, also knows how to listen to and understand both the union's and the work~rs' ambitions.and reactions. He derives his impact,on - public opinion and his,credibility from the completely original leftist syn- thesis which he is devising from among the ambitions and deep transforma- tions in society and his thorough analysis of economic restraints, and con- - sequently, frbm the margins of liberty within which a socialist project can operate. His enemies are trying to give him the image of a canventional technocrat: on the contrary, I would 'be inclined to say that he is rather the most in- novative of the socialist militants I know. All along the way, he has dem- onstrated inflexibility and the willingness to go just as far as possible. To leave the SFIO, to work unceasingly to keep the PSU alive within the French context where the formation of a political unit on the left out of nothing is to attempt the impossible; to subdue the 68 turbulence after having contributed to the success of the socialist encounters in Grenoble; to learn lessons from the leftist union and take part in the 1974 presi- dential campaign. Finally, to rejoin the Socialist Party, with flag un- furled, despite his weak standing. He needed determination and valor, more _ than courage, for each step of the way brought him criticism of the previ- ous one and the questioning of his honesty. _ The funds Rocard put aside for the running of the 1978 legislative elec- toral campaign he accredited to the permanent need for truth which actuates all his political activity. At the same time, though convinced that he is _ entrusted with an uncommon c