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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200'100046-8 E I . # _ ~ ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY - JPRS L19215 - - 24 July 1980 Sub-Saha rc~n Af rica Re ort - p FOUO (Vo. 682 ~B f$ FOREIC~N BR~ADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE , FOR OFFICIAL USE Q~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 NOTE - JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets - are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt) in the first line of each item, or following the - last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was - processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. _ Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are - enclosed in parentheses. Wards or names preceded by a ques- - tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the - original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. - The contents of this publication in no way regresent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. For further information on report content call (703) 351-3165. . ~ COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIAI~S REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ JPRS L/9215 - 24 July 1980 - , - SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT FOUO no. 682 CONTENTS INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS � F'rench Renault Trucks for Lusophone Countriea _ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Ma}� 80) 1 Briefa Congolese-Angola~ Petroleum Corparation 2 - Senegal, Gambia Facing Famine 2 Malian Reaction to Libyan Airport 2 _ ANGOLA Briefs Agreement With Spain Detailed 3 New Oil Contract 3 CAPE VERDE Briefs Soviets Denied Air Base 4 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Government Crisis Coming To Light, Dacko Ungble To Act - (Chrietian Badagui; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun-6 Ju1 80) . 5 Briefs Documents on French Preaident 9 CHAD Reporter Gives Eyewitnesa Account of Fratricide in Ndjamena (Roger Holeindre; PARIS MP,TCH, 23 Maq 80) 10 ' France Presaured To Take Up Its Obligatione _ (AFRIQUE A~SIE, 16 May-8 Jun 80) 15 - a - [III - NE & A- 1.20 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NAF Reportedly Cuts O~f Libyan Access Route " (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jun 80) 16 GUINEA Wave of Repreasion Seen Following Attempt A.gainst Toure (Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE A~'RIQUE, 28 May 80) 17 Senghor, Houphouet-Boigny, Giacard Seen Losers (S,ennen Andriamirado; JFUNE AFRIQUE, 28 May 80) 18 Policy of Opening to West Reportedly Unchanged - (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 May 80) 22 IVORY COAST Move Towards U.S, Form of Democracy Seen (Jonathan Kc,lela; AFR?QUE-ASIE, 9-22 Jun 80) 24 Sugar Production Venture Becomes a'Nightmare' - (Sophie Bessis; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jun ~0) 28 : KENYA Panorama of Economic Evolution in 1978-1979 (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEvITERRANEENS, 13 Jun 80) 36 _ LIBERIA - Planning Miniater Viewa Political, Economic Situati~:. (Togba Na'r.-Tipoteh Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, ' 18 Jun 80) 42 - - New Regime's Financial Probieu~a, Orientation Noted (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 16 May-8 Jun 80) 45 Briefs Relatione With U.S. 47 MALI Briefs . IDA Industrial Loan 48 Food Processing Loan 48 MAIIRITIUS Negotiations for Oil Refinery Examined (Herve-Masson; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May 80) 49 - b - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MOZAI~BIQUE - Samora Machel Gives Interview to Paris Magazine (Samora Machel Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, ~-zo Ju1 so) sz Chiasano Viewa Relationa With Portugal, 6ther Statea (Joaquim Chiasano Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, . ~ 7-20 Jul 80) 59 = Briefs Portuguese Port Improvement Cooperation 64 Norwegian Wood-Processing Financing 64 - Transportation Sector Appointmenta 64 NIGER - Briefs CCCE Loans 65 Dam Project 65 REUNION Co~nunist Deputy Verges Interviewed by Elie Ramaro (Paul Verges Interview; AFRIQU~-ASIE, 26 May 80) 66 SENEGAL Economic Statiatics for 1979 Reported (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 May 80) 70 - Briefs Natural Gas Exploitation 72 Greek Cooperation Agreement 72 Wage Increases ~ 72 - SIER.RA LEONE Problems Posed by OAU Summit (MARCI~ S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 May 80) 7? Briefs Minister Visite GDR 74 - ~ - c - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' SOUTH AFRICA Botha ~efenda S. African Political System in Interview (P. W. Botha Interview; THE TIMES, 1 Jul 80) 75 TOGO Agricultural, Monetary Statistics Published (MARCHES TROPTCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 May 80) 80 ZIMBABWE Church ~nvolvement in Independence Examined - (Roland Pichon; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May 80) 82 - d - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS FRENCH RENAULT TRUCKS FOR LUSOPHONE COUNTRIES Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRA,'NEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1253 [Report: "One Thousand Trucks for Lusophone Africa"] . [Excerpts] In 1980 Renault Vehicules Industriels wil; deliver over 1,000 trucks worth 160 million French francs to Portuguese-speaking African - countries: Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. - Angola: In 1979 Renault Vehicules Industriels received two orders from Abamat, the national transportation material purchasing agency, for a total of 230 heavy duty vehicles. This applied, above all, to construc- tion materials, specifically for the building of a new city, the future capitai of Lunda Norte Province. Mozambique: This year the Renault Vehicules Industriels ~rill deliver close to 700 vehicles to Intermecano, the national purchasing agency. - The order includes a great variety of items such as SG2 minibus, heavy- duty garbage trucks and trucks of various tonnages. Guinea-Bissau: Renault Vehicules Industriels will deli.ver 80 vehicles (minibus, various transport and public works vehicles), or a substantial share of the overall purchase. Future prospects are good, a representa- tion contract having been signed with the Armazens do Povo purchasing agency. This overall result shows the will of the French manufacturer to be = represented in the new expanding markets. It is the result of patient work and of several years of effort in the face of very stiff inter- _ _ national competition. It r~~quired the use of substantial funds to secure from the start the necessary follow-up services: technical assistance, availabi_lity of spare parts, and personnel training. Renault Vehicules Industriels will continue its efforts and participate, this year again, in the Maputo International Fair in Mozambique, in September 1980. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 - 5157 CSO: 4400 ~ 1 FOR OFFICI~4;. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS BRIEFS CONGOLESE-ANGOLAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION--A petroleum agreement was signed at ~ the beginning of JunP between the People's Republic of Angola and the People's Repub?ic of the Congo. The communique was released after the talks held in Luanda by the Angolan minister of Petrolewn, Jorge Augusto de Morais, and the Congo~ese minister of Mines and Energy, Rodolphe Adada. It states that the two parties ~~xa~.ined petroleum c~uestions and ways of establishing a comple- mentary economic policy between the two countries based on the guidelines given by Presidents Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Denis Sassou-Nguesso. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun-6 Jul 80 p 34J 8782 - SENEGAL, GAMBIA FACING FAMINE--Senegal and Gambia are presently victims of a drou~ht that has severely afflicted the countries' harvests. Gambia's present ' shortfall is estimated at about 12,000 metric tons; more than half of the pea-. nut crop has been destroyed by dry weather. Half of this deficit will be _ covered by international food aid. Also, 3,000 tons of sorghum will be dis- - tributed to 56,000 people for about 4 1/2 months. In Senegal, 45,000 tons of - grain will be distributed to the million people living in the hardes~-hit areas. Also, 5,000 tons of sorghum and 2,800 tons of corn-based food will be distri- ' buted for 3 months to the 370,000 people directly threatened with famine. Under these conditions, what should be said about the 700,000 unconsumed sand- ~ wiches that were thrown into the garbage by the organizers of the mass said by Pope Jean-Paul II at Le Bourget, in Paris? [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in - Fren~h 23 Jun-6 Jul 80 p 35J 8782 . . . = MaLIAN REACTION TO LIBYAN AIRPORT--MaZi has been disturbed by the con- - struction of a secret Libyan airport on the border between Libya and Mauritania. Tn the middle of June, Bamako dispatched Minister of Foreign Affairs Alioune Blondin Beye to Tripoli and Nouakchott in an attempt to clarify the matter. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUF. in French No 1017 2 Jul 80 p 35] CSO: 4400 , 2 ~ FOR OFFICItiL, USE ONLY ; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ANGOLA BRIEFS AGREEMENT WITH SPAIN DETAILID--Following the visit of Spanish Minister of Transportation and Communications Jose Lii3.z Alvarez to Luanda, an agree- ment in the fishing sector was signed between Angola and Spain. Accord- - ing to its terms, Spain will provide training for technical cadre and participate in the construction of a canning factory. Through the Spanish Oceanographic Institute, Spain will provide technical assistance to Angola, notably in the lobster breeding field, as well as in the estab- lishment of canning and freezing industries. Moreover, according to the terms of this 3-year agre~nent, 84 Spanish fishing vessels will be allow~d to catch 18,000 tons of seafood per year in Angolan waters, 12 tuna boats will be permitted a catch of up to 24,000 tons of tuaa per year while the - boats fishing for grouper will be al.lowed to catch 12,000 tons. During his visit to Angola, the Spanish minister also studied the possibilities - of increasing the economic and trade relations between the two countries. Alvarez specified that "Spain is ready to establish general relations in various sectors of the economy," giving the two countries the opportun- ity to contribute something to each other. It should also be ncted that the Spanish minister gave Angolan chie� of state Jose Eduardo dos Santos a personal message from King Juan Carlos. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1580] NEW OIL CONTRACT--Th~ Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Angola recently appr~ved a c~ntract for the share of output between - Sonangol and Total-Angolan Petroleum Company (Total-Cap). Total-Cap, a branch of Compagnie francaise des petroles, will thus gain a 100 percent interest .in block 6(about 4,8~J0 square kilometers) located offshore of Luanda. The faci?.ity will be operated by Total. The CFP [French Petro- leum Company] points out that Total-Cap also holds a 17.5 percent share ' of block No 2 where petroleum production was undertaken at the beginning of the year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1226] 515% CSO: 4400 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 _ FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY C~pE VERDE _ BRIEFS SOVIETS DENIED AIR AASE--Cape Verde refused categdzicslly at the end of April the new Soviet proposals to install on the island of Sal, a small air base. President Aristid2s Pereira may have even forbidden the construction ~ of a building intended to house the crews of the commercial airline Aeroflot which calls at this island. [TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1012 ~ - 28 May 80 p 39] 9018 - CSO: 4400 = 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CENTRAL AFRZCAN REPUBi.IC - GOVERNMENT CRISIS CObiING TO LIGHT, DACKO UNABLE TO ACT Paris ~+FRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun-6 Jul 80 pp 32-33 = {Article by Christian Badagui: "Artificial Sovereignty"J jTextJ Tfie head man has been changed, but tfie methods are the same, except that this time they have France's ~ direct and visible support, ' The political situation in the Central African Republic seems to be headitng toward a confrontation between the opposition and the party in power. The ~ survival of the regime founded by tfie events of 20 September 1979 now depends on two condi~ions: tfie quest for French support and the people's adherence to the policy of David Dacko. Unless the new head of state makes a big change in policy, which is unlikely, the latter condition is far from being fulfilled. _ The~tension prevailing in the country is so great that one wonders if th e growing malaise won't force tfie French government to revise its strategy. - So much has been said and written about the Frencfi presence in Central Africa that anything we might add would be commonplace, The French presence has m3de obvious how dependent African countries are on the former colonial power. 'I'his presence fias alsa definitely tarnished France's image, but it has like- wise weakened all of Africa. For example, it is now cleax that OCAM is France's front in the CAR. This can be seen upor. arriving at the center o~ town in - Bangui, where the building supposed to house OCAM headquarters is located between the television station and the university campus. The building has been turned into the French army headquarters! When will these occiipation forces leave: Dacko has warned, "In ten years, if necessary." But thE~ real answer actually depends on the Central African people. The civil servants a,;d students applauded Bokassa's eviction last 20 September and thus seemed to appro~e of French intervention, but now they are clarifying ~ their position. "What we were showing," they say, "was our joy at seeing the ~ _ tyrant leave. Emotion prevented us from distinctly separating the two events." _ Many facts show tlie animosity and even hatred that the inhabitants of Bangui _ have for the French soldiers. The Central African president was asked about this last 3 April and answered with his usual clumsiness, saying that the mis- understanding was natural, because, he thought, it was due to "18 yeax-alds," which is the age of most high-school5senioxs, But it is no remedy to downplay FOR OFFICIIu, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the illness. i~acko knows very well that on1Y the Fxench pxesence ~,s hqlding , him up. One o~ �hose who hel~ed the A~x~.can cornmi.ssa.on the children's massacre said what some CAR of~icials axe thinking; "~f they ~the French soldiers~ leave, civil war will be inescapable, because the situation is explosive." ~ _ The young peaple feel frustrated. They write in their.tracts thei.r . victory has been stolen. And tfie general run of Central A�ricans are becoming increasingly aware that Paris's intervening was intended to protect French _ interests rather than bring down Bokassa, They feel more and more that the tyranny has not disappeared, The man has cfianged, the methods~stay th,e same, _ The reign of the dictatorsfiip has not come to an end, But this time it remains because of France's direct and visible support, The higl-~-level CAR civil servants who, with. the Frencfi, drew up the plan for _ recovery, unanimously agree that France is ~ut to recolonize the country, - = One of them points to a specific passage in the voluminous document, on page 21: "To apply this reform, a controller~s office for committed funds shall � be created and be responsible to either the prime minister or the Finance minister, Within tfiis office, a service res~onsible for following up and supervising the management of government companies and organizations shall - - ~2 established. Technical assistance shall be called upon to employ the controller." Thus, ~.11 public expenses will be overseen by France. It looks - like a throwback to the time of the outline law, And that is not all. On page 22: "The services and accounting of the government sinking fund shall be reorganized; the management of this organization shall be placed temporarily under a technical assistant," who, obviously, shall be French, Now it is - understandable why the journal MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS could sum - up thF situation in a sentence: "Assistance is being strengthened in the key _ sectors of the economy and mainly in the central supervisory services," _ ~v'hat remains, then, of the cuuntry~s sovereignty and independence? What is - left of the dignity that is part cf its motto? An Increasing Number'of Tracts Prance's broad intervention is undoubtedly contributing to heightening tension in Central Afr.ic3. The malaise is all the greater because the leaders do not - seem to be aware of it. Privileged people are regretful and discouraged as they seek to cons~lidate their advantages; so are those who seek to join them. Everybody is criticizing the present team's bad policy, political tracts are ~~reasingly numerous in Bangui. One of them denounces the Central African _ Democratic U:~ion (UDC), the party founded by the new leaders, as being the personal property of Dacko (president), Maidou (vice president), Ayandho (prime minister), and Koyamba (minister of Finance, and Postal and Telecommu- nications Services). Another emphasizes the fact that credit is granted along ~ tribal lines. Another denounces the French takeover. Faced wi~h the prolifera- - tion of tracts, President Dacko called a meeting with students, whom he accuse~l - of being responsible for this agitation. They, however, responded courageously, saying that while thep did not always approve of what this clandestine "press" had to say, they nonetheless felt that it was just another form of free spee~h. This is a way of saying that it is normal for public opinion to express itself 6 - FOR OFFICII,~. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - in this way because there is no dialogue or democratic freedom, _ - But the Dacko regime is open to many other criticisms. The four strong men - of the regime have been criticized for the high ~alaries they have voted - themselves, and they have made the unfortunate mistake of saying they are being paic; by Gabon and France. Finally, it might have been said that Central Africa had never experienced any tribal problems, or very few--ann - a.ny there were were aue to intellectuals--but now this scourge is tending - to spread, so much that the "river people" are beginning to panic. A tract - sigried by the Central African ?,iberation Movements for Democracy denounces = this evil and cites a few examples of tribalism on the part of the p eople _ in power, particularly that most of the governmen~ members are "river people" _ ~ (of the Yakoma, Sango, Banziri and Ngbaka ethnic groups). "Para-governmental - administration and services.are no except~on to this rule," the tract states. - O~her facts are worth being noted because they see;n so scandalous. The head of state appointed his nephew--against the advice of his minister of Agricul- ture--to be the general manager of the Central African Tobacco Factory (FCAT). ~ - He appointed his son general secretary of the Coffee Fund, although he was in - no way qualified for the j ob . The ~tribal politic.s of the people in power also gives rise to comic episodes, sa much so thafi a humanities professor is thinking of writing a tragi-comic play on the theme. Thus, the prime minister made a speech in Yakoma to con- - gratulate the minister of Energy for having chosen one of his oti+n people-- Bangazoni--for the job of director of the National Electxic Company. The _ minister of Energy was visibly irrita~ed and retorted that he was not a Yakoma. An argument �ollowed, which Darko settled by throwing out Bangazoni's appoint- - _ ment. It is also known that the genexal manager of the Central African Cotton _ Union (UCCA) gives room and board to foreign Yakoma officials on consultant visits to Bangui, and that t;~e UCCA also pay~s for their travel expenses. ~ On the other hand, the tract adds, "Revocations and sanctions are meted out to the other tribes .and the members of other parties." ~ ~ ~fhile the four strong men of the regime shaxe the same unslakable thirst for - personal power, their association is very fragile, and internal differences . are appearing more and more frequently. Maidou, the vice president, and Ayandho, the prime minister, are at swords' points. The vice pxesident's advisor harshly criticized the draft constitution drawn up by the Dacko- Ayandho clan, writing, "Caustic ~aits are even saying that the UDC (Central African Democratic Union) stands for the 'Union of Dacko and Cronies', - because if it were really the Central African Democratic Union, the abbre- viation would be UDCA." Maidou has already caused a confrontation between Ayaridho and Dacko by - threatening to resign. Vice Prime hlinister Bangui and Pime Minister Ayandho do not get along any bettex. There is dissension even bstween Malendoma, the state minister, and Bangu i. This means that the crisis within the - government is now out in the open. Dacko is paralyzed, as he was in 1965. - And if history repeats itself, one may wonder whether France is not ready - to sacrifice him all over again, as it did then. 7 . FOR OFFICI.SL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 - i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Tn any case, tl~e Central A~ricans, i.ncludi.n~ th.e moderates, seem to have decided to regain their independence. A vast interplay of action is under way, and this time Dr Abel Goumba's Ou~anoui Patriotic Front (FPO) will have - to be dealt with. Despite the incompetence of some of its members, it is - still the most structured organization and continues to benefit from the support of progressive African countries, ' It is generally felt here that the French government would be making a serious mistake--which coulu have repercussions on the French presidential campaign-- in persisting in its support of the government installed by the coup of 20 September 1979. COPYRIGHT: 1980. Afrique-Asie 8782 CSO: 4400 - 8 _ FOR OFFICIti;, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - BRIEFS DOCUMENTS OD. FRENCH PRESIDENT--Boksssa has revealed in writing to several _ chiefs of state his "little secrets" with Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Some of the recipients immediately informed the French president, warn- ing him that the former Central African monarch may be preparing an explosive file which would be published shortly befare the French 1981 presidential elections. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Jun 80 p 40] 5157 CSO: 4400 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAI~ USE ONLY CHAD REPORTER GIVFS EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF FRAIRICIDE IN NDJAMENA - Paris PARIS MATCH in French 23 May 80 pp 54, 56-57 _ jArticle by Roger Holeindre: "I Saw Chad Suffering"] [Text] Destroyed by tF~o group leaders gone gun crazy. Combat in Ndja~ena: These saldiers o~ Oueddei Goukouni try to outflank a position of I~issein Habre's forces. � They have just launched the assault from the bank of the ri.ver. The evening had been calm, but the sudde~i night filled again with the sounds of war. Heavy weapons replaced the mach3_ne guns and at a steady rate artillery ur mortar shells fell into the bruised city. The front had been "Ctabilized" for 3 weeks aftex 2 insane days when, ~or 16 or 17 hours a~ day, the rival armies had slaughtered each other to try and conquer the capital o� a country that no longer exists. It was dur~n~ the night from Thursday to Friday, 21 March 80, that the fighting, the cause of the current events, began between Chadian factions and movements ~ained together within the military police, the first integrated component of Che new arnry which France had agreed to set up, sending o~.cP again advisers from the national . police, uniforms, arms, vehicles and, of course, money. Since that date, the city has been cut in half, and each camp accuses the other of being the cause of this fratricide which has already lpft hundreds dead and thousands - wounded. At the French base, the guards are at their station near the main - gate, three light tanks are on alert, while in a trench two paratroopers - are on guard next to an antitank gun. Hexe, there is water and electricfty, _ here there is life. Whatever is still worlcing in this country is here in this couple of square kilometers. All calls for peace, all calls for calm have been frLitless, it seemr that the men of this country have gone crazy and decided to kill down to tiiQ last comt~atant. With a noise like thunder, a Transall goes over at treetop level, talcing off along the axis of the Chari _ river, all lights off while, vexy close, tracers crease the sky. It is on - our base that all the men and women o� whatever nationality who a~e fleeing this country have converged... Russian and ~merican diplomats and their _ families have been placed under the protection of our paratroopers and our iangers, who have given them bed anci boaxd while wai~ing to get them out on 10 FOR OFFIGT.AI, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 military planes or across the Chari on the two ferries still working, operated by the men of the Army Engineers brought in by air from Montauban. It is also through here that the 900 European civilians left, 75U of them, who _ got out of th~ city, sometimes under dramatic conditions under the bullets and shells, frequently after having spent days trapped in their houses in the - middle of the bursts of gunfire and the explosions. However, some hung on... but today they're going, because on orders from Paris, our army is pulling out, and for the first time there will remain in Ndjamena no civilian or military adviser, no European priest, missionary or doctor. After 15 May, the military ferry will be off-limits to civilians, Chadian or European, and by the 20th all the French troops of Colonel Lardry [words illegible] are to have crossed the Chari. There is no longer any international telephone communication... the modern, billion-plus CFA franc exchange completed just a year ago has been sabotaged; everything made of ~ copper has disappeared. The electric powerplant on the river bank, presently in the zone held by Goukouni's men, only runs thanks to a truckload of fuel oil supplied each - day by the French army. The city has been almost completely pillaged. Each political faction--eleven have been counted, split into two rival camps lined up respectively behind Goukouni, FAP (People's Armed Forces)~ and Hissein Habre, FAN (Armed Forces of the North)--has roused up every last ' man jack of its faithful. These last "reinforcements" are not the "cream-of- ~ the-crop." If Hissein Habre, Commander Galopin's assassin, had some , "warriors" who had been stealing shot in front of two old Europeans trapped ; in his zone and who left later, in Goukouni's zone the spectacle is extremely ~ disheartening. ! All the looters from the Kanem are there, breaking everything, sacking _ evexything. This is not stealing, this is vandalism pure and simple. With a submachine gun or assault rifle in their hand, these 14 or 15 year old ~ "warriors" destroy everything they get their hands on, having no idea of ~ what a city can be. Others have been seen hopelessly trying to find Radio France International with the knobs of an air con.ditioner... or carrying ~ oft to areas with no electricity some "white cases which make ice," refrigerators stolen from French houses. , Our ambassador, Mr Marcel Beaux, there since October 1979, has seen fit, abandoning his em~assy and residence because of the heavy mortar shelling which the neighborhood has suffered, to entrust to President Goukouni i- - personally the care and safekeeping of t}:e French buildings. The Residence ' of rrance, one of the most beautiful in i~frica, has been totally sacked, ~ the furniture broken, feces on the rugs of the salons, "warriors" sleeping fully clothed in the ambassador's bed. Our representative has carried the ; ~oke so far as to request authorization from an aide of the president to go with some vehicles to recover whatever they could, among other things _ the wine cellar (s~~mntuously stocked with great vintages) and the Sevres chinaware which was used for the presidential visits. . u - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Gertrude, the tane ostrich that strutted around in an enclosure in the ~ middle of the ark has for her p , , part, chosen freedom, like one of the greats. She left in the middle of the fighting and, neutral like her owner, - calmly munches the grass between the two camps. Sometimes, for a few hours, the firing starts again, but more than real ' street fighting,.the "warriors" now seem content to fire overhead... from - position to position. All the weapons are good for that, and nobody seems - to be trying to conserve a~?unition, most of it Russian. Fortunately for ~ the combatants of both sides, the French are treating the wounded without ~ distinctian as to which camp they come Erom. Gouk,~.uni's FAP men are generally evacuated to the little 40-bed hospital on the French base... and that, too, is going to be transferred over to Cameroon. 1400 wounded have gone through _ there. Under the command of the chief physician, Teisserenc, and the commandi~g physician, Dumurgier, a courageous team works day and night treating abdomens, skulls and chests, patching up arteries or doing facial surgery under very difficult conditions on men arriving sometimes horribly wounded by heavy weapons fire. - On the other side of the Chari, in Kousseri, the II~fIRE (R.apid Response Military Medical Unit) has set up its housing and operating tents. The complete staff of a field hospital is assembled there. 80 military personnel - including ten women, from every army hospital in France, from the Orleans ~ Health Service School and from the Army Pharmacists Corps. There also, the number of wounded treated is approaching 1500. The latest in medical technology is used. The environment is very difficult because, in this very small village of Cameroon, more than 100,000 residents of Ndjamena have taken refuge, fleeing the war by crossing the river. A Tragic Western: The Fighters No Longer Even 41ant To Give Blood To Their - Wounded Brothers Moreover, this influx has created tensions between the two populations and sometimes brings on violent disturbances which are worrying the Cameroon authorities. Here, the wounded come from the forces of Hissein Habre, the FAN, or from the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) of Col Kamougue, allied with Goukouni. The cohabitation of the wounded is therefore not always easy. Sometimes, during the night criminal hands rip off dressings and infusions. The war goes on even among the dying. A~ the "Relais de Logone" [Logone Waystation] near the field hospital, a little restaurant and bar on the edge of the river, ~ the paths cross and recross of the men in civilian clothing from every Chadian faction, from all the intemational camps, from all the agencies of nations concerned by the war in Chad. In a tropical spy movie atmosphere, - the honorable correspondents watch each other and each pretends to see nothing... like in the movies... in the damp heat which a couple of fans tirelessly stir around. 12 FOR OFy`ICIAI, USE ONI,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 _ ~~R OFFICIAI~ USE ONLY ' In reality, twc chiefs from the North, two muslims are fighting to gain pow?r for their exclusive benefit. And Hissein Habre and Goukouni th2mselves represent togerher less than 200,000 people out of the 3 1/2 million inhabitants of Chad, of whom more than 2 million are blacks from the South and more than 1 million are Arabs, considered by the men of the B-E-T (Bourkou- Ennedi-Tibesti) (0.2 inhabitants per km2) as inferior. , The two northern leaders can use a language in public and for the international _ press different from that of their fighters. That doesn't prevent Goukouni - from claiming to be more "noble" than Hissein, since he's a Toubou from the mountains and the Toubous claim to be superior the Arabs of Chad, an inferior race, andto the blacks of the South who are only food for working and being their slaves. In the rank~ of the men of the Great No-rth, it is said that one Toubou is worth 40 Libyans or 60 Arabs or 100 blacks... The famous inter-African neutral force whose arrival in Nd~amena was announced is a farce. Arriving with 600 men, the Marxist blacks of the People~s Republic of the Congo, with superior arms from the Russians, never left their base and survived only thanks to the French Army which fed them. The - Toubous called them the "jellies." They were in such a hurry to leave, because the Benins and the Guineans who were to join them never came, that the French Army hrid to require that they load up all their equipment before giving them ~ permission to take off. Ever}~thing that France does is an obligation. In ~ the hospitals, the French staff, dead tired, 3re entitled to no thanks, to no recognitor.; everything that happens is the fault of France. The northern fighters even refuse to give blood for their wounded. The same refrains are - forever being heard in discussions with men of all the factions: "You are lying, you're not neutral. because you are not helping us!" "Give us guns and ammunition, nobody will say anything to the others..." The high-sounding words, the great empty phrases which don't scare anyone... lost in their verbal delirium, "students" say everything and its opposite. ' Every team leader is a"chief of staff." For all of them, Ndjamena has become the Far West where you play cowboys and indians. Having said to a - young "intellectual" in front of the beautiful, burnt out cathedral, "But you are ruining your capital..." I got the reply, "That doesn~t matter, ~eople aren't hot for that anymore. Anyway, they'll build another one." They? They who? Who will get the country back on its feet? Who can ~ rebuild a viable state out of this disaster? Who, since worse yet everyone rejects the federal answer with distinct regions... since everyone wants everything... all the power and all the country. Themselves also arriving on the outskirts of Ndjamena, the southern troops of Col Kamougue seem to refuse to enter the city in order not to get caught up in the pillage. Maybe also waiting for the outcome of events, because if one of the northern chiefs were to be killed, there's no guarantee that all the basic fighters would not regroup against the blacks who had always been their slaves until the " French came. Those blacks who, alone, have the cadres able to get the country back on its feet and to ensure cooperation with Frances because, in ~ 13 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 _ FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY order to cooperate, it takes two, and if Hissein Habre does have, for his part, a few good men at his side, around Goukouni it's a total void. Sacked, - ruined and burned out, Ndjamena tomorrow will be the stakes for all the - opposing forces which occupy part of it or surround it. Each is waiting for the last French soldier to leave in order to atart the attack and occupy - the base and especially the sir strip which will enable whoever has it to receive cargo planes of all nationalities. While now, day and night, our soldiers pack the equipment crates and load planes and trucks, in a corner of the military airbase there sit waiting, in working condition, four DC-3's, two DC-4's, two Cessna 337's, four AD-4 Skyraiders, in a word: the "whole" air force of Chad, which President = Goukouni intends to keep there, even without having a single pilot, and knowing that the forces of Hissein will not waste time before opening fire on the site. Even better, the French military advisers under contract to the "Chadian authorities" representing a state which is dying and no longer exists except on paper, are going to leave behind them in a hangar three new Pumas worth 8 million francs apiece, two new Alouettes worth 2.6 million _ each, and millions of francs in spare parts. All this equipment belonging, they say, to Chad"which supposedly paid for it. One wonders with what money, because the treasury has been empty for years. While I was heading toward the Transall which was to take me back home, two - old French Chadians, some here for nearly 20 years, also came toward the plane. One Ndjamena lady from Marseille even left carrying her 7 cats. Now and then a spent bullet would whistle overhead. Some soldiers, young kids of 18 or 20, helped everybody, carrying the suitcases or trunks, being kind and looking out for you. For months, these soldiers caught in the crossfire have been doing their job in an exemplary manner, obeying orders of absolute - neutrality. For the first time, they are awaiting their departure impatiently, because, they say, "It's not a job for paratroopers to sit around watching - the death of a friendly country." ~ COPYRIGH^1: 1980 Societe d'editions scientifiques 9550 CSO: 4400 _ 1L~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = CHAD FRANCE PRESSURED TO TAKE UP ITS OBLIGATIONS - Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French 16 May-8 Jun 80 p 16 [ReporC: "Chad: 'Pressures' on France"] ' [Text] While armed forces continue to confront each other in Ndjamena, the Chadian crisis may experience new surgings in the stride of the - decisions taken hy the OAU in Lagos, and the "exchanges of views," talks, and statements which occurred "in margin" of the Franco-African summit. Officially, obviously, the Chadian problem was not on the agenda in the Nice meeting, and it was exclusively the delegation of the Chadian National Transition Linion (GUNT), headed by Vice President Kamougue, and ' sent by President Oueddei Goukouni, that was admitted to partic.ipate in the proceedings of the summit where, not without difficulty, it managed to submit a simple "communication" "not followed by debates" on the Chadian situation. However, the "illegitimate" delegation, speaking on � behalf of Hissein Habre, was also in Nice where, naturally, it did not - remain idle. As was to be expected, also "in the margin" of the proceed- ings, voices were publicly heard among France's allies "wishing" that Paris would reconsider its decision to evacuate its miiitary forces from Ndjamena and "help," as President Senghor stated, "to find a solution." The supporters of this solution, who are waving the Libyan scarecrow, would not be worried by one more contradiction. Actually, it is the Lagos agreements of 21 August last, which also called for the French withdrawal, that th?y invoke, demanding, at the same time, that the , latest developmentsbe ignored. Let us note, finally, that the president of the original National Libera- tion Front, Abba Siddick, who also went to Nice, stated that "France has obligations and that it should impose a cease-fire." On the other hand, ' he claimed that the removal of Hissein Habre from the Transitional ' National Union Government was "legally worthless." ~ _ COPYRIGHT: 1980 AFRIQUE ASIE = 5157 CSO: 4400 - 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ CFiA~D NAF REPORTEDLY CUTS OFF LIBYAN ACCESS ROUTE Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 80 p 28 [Article: "Hiss~~in Habre Resurfaces"] ~ [Text) After more than 2 months of fierce street fighting in Ndjamena between President Goukouni's troops and those of former Prime Minister Hissein Habre, is the balance of forces tilting in favor of the latter? Several new developments seem to attest to the swing, First of all, since the beginning of June the confrontation up to that time limited to the capital, has expanded into several cities of the center of the country: Abeche, Ati and Bokoro in particular. The Popular Armed Forces (PAF) of Goukouni and their allies of the Common Action Front (CAF) launched that offensive in an attempt to cut off the "Sadat trail" which runs through the Sudan, channeling supplies to Hissein Habre's Northern Armed Forces (NAF). However, it seems that they have foiled and that NAF responded on the spot with a violent counter offensive to cut off the "Qadhdhafi trail," which feeds Goukouni's troops from Libya. _ As a result, on 2 June Habre would have seized the very important district of Faya-Largeau which controls access to Tibesti and to Libya. Furthermore, according to some sources, several PAF units, dissatisfied with Goukouni's protracted alliance witfi Colonel Kamougue's "southerners," would have crossed over to NAF. Finally, even in Ndjamena, on 6 June Habre's troops would _ have captured the buildings of the presidency of the republic located at the heart of Goukouni's zone. President Goukouni and fiis assistants have evidently denied any setbacks; but, it rather appears tllat they have been on the defen- sive since a fortnight in the face of a Hissein Habre, whose supply in arms is more regular and more assured. Of course, no one has lost or won the battle yet and sudden changes are still possible. Habre, readily marked for defeat because everyone is against him, is now sailing before the wind. And that may will make Qadhdhafi uneasy. . COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 9213 16 CSO: 4400 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ GUINEA - WAVE OF REPRESSION SEEN FOLLOWING ATTE~T AGAINST TOURF Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE i~n French 28 May 80 p 5 ~Article by Sennen AndriamiradoJ [Text] The Guinea Opposition has changed its strategy. Preference is given, rather than virulent denunciations of the terror established as government system by the president, Sekou Toure, the attempts at the landing of . mercenaries and opponents on the coasts of Guinea (22 November 1970) to direct and totally irreversible action: political assassination. Ahmed Sekou Toure, the acknowledged target has certainly made enemies in 20 years of reign and terror. It would be a truism to affirm this. The Great Sily, as they call him, has emptied his prisons by having his real or alleged enemies killed. The proof is that no Guinean family could congratulate itself today in having, among its members no victims of the repressive system of Sekou Toure. So much so that the bitterness of the widows and that of the orphans feed regularly the thirst for vengeance of the exiles outside the country and the victims inside it. Both the former and the latter have vowed to avenge their dead. A reaction, which if not permissible is at least understandabl.e. Bu~ is the crime worth an assassination? For Sekou Toure did indeed escape from an as~assination attempt on 14 May (see pp 36-38). Such an act could not be j ustified, neither in the case of Guinea, nor as an absolute rule. It is a fact, of course, that a struggle to death is often the rule of the game in politics. But in the country of Sekou Toure, this rule is often manifested in tragedy: the failed attempt against the ruler of Conacry has ~ (or will have) as consequence a new e~calation of the terror against citizens ~ who certainly have no need of it. The proverb puts it well: '~Wounded, but not slaughtered, the beast only becomes mc~re ferocious." Those who wanted to eliminate Sekou Toure by this method could not have failed to be aware of this. The Guinea government has invented enough false conspiracies not to take advantage of a real plot which would "justify" a resurgence of the repression. By their attempt and failure, Sekou�s mortal enemies have taken ~ their responsibilities. Those outside leave exposed to terror those remaining within the dictator's reach, they knew this and yet they persisted. No doubt because.they were unaware of the Oriental wisdom: "If you wish to lcill your enemy, sit down by the riverside. One day, you will see his corpse pass by." But perhaps wisdom itself has long ago been expelled from Guinea. COPYRTGHT: Jeune Afrique GRITPJIA 1980 9018 CSO: 4400 i7 - ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GUINEA SENGHOR, HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, GISCARD SEEN LOSERS Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 May 80 pp 36-38 [Article by Sennen Andriamirado] [Excerpts] Seko u Toure escaped death. Or perhaps it was death that would , not have Sekou Toure. This sordid nuance which the Guineans of the opposition like to apply to comment on the assassination attempt which on 14 May 1980 alm4st eliminated once and for all the "Guide of the Guinea revolution" is not important. From Europe and Africa, congratulations and messages of ~ support poured into Conakry. ; It is a sign of the times that today's sympathizers and f riends are not those ~ - of yesterday. Only 3 years ago Sekou Toure himself would have i~ediately accused the Ivory Coast, France and Senegal of arming his assassins. This , time, the Frenchman Valery Giscard d'Estaing hastened to express his sympathy. ; Felix Houphoue~-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Leopold Sedar Senghor of the Senegal and Gnassingbe Eyadema were not satisfied with a telegram condemning ~ the "blind violence." ~ Calls for Calm 'rhey also sent to Conakry messages requesting Sekou Toure not to resort (or to return) in his turn to the bloody repressions which had become a habit. ~ For since the policy of openness he had inaugurated in March 1,978, Sekou had ~ calmed down. He had even freed m~ost of those remaining to be freed among _ his real of alleged enemies: the survivors of the concentration camps. ltao years after this opening, the failed assassination attempt of 14 May 1980 risks causing the sinister Guinea ~ails to be filled with crowds of "traitors, henchmen and helpers" of so-called imperialism "camouflaged in the party ~ ranks." The disgrace and arrest of General Lansana Diane and the former j minister Toumani Sangare indicate that a repressive purge has begun. For the first time in 20 years, opponents are distributing tracts in Guinea, - throwing grenades and proving organized enough to disapp ear immediately. It - is also the first time that an armed assassination attemp t has been made against the person of Sekou Toure. And the first anyone has heard of that 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ "Patriotic Front of Guinea." Guinea opponents who have taken refuge in France will assure us that it is a"name improvised for the occasion." - An Unusal Fact _ But certain observers do not exclude the possibility of the master of Conakry having totally fabricated this assassination attempt to justify a new wave : - of repressions. This hypothesis does not hold good when analyzed. Quite ~ simply because although Sekou Toure may sacrifice a few companions in an "assassination"of his own devising, he would neverliave incurred the risk of bei^g hit by even a shrapnel of a grenade. This time, and for the first time seriously, Sekou was altwost killed. I1at that he has not had warnings during his 20 years of terror. Repression came down and became the daily fate of the Guinea citizens, hardly protected by the international indignation. But the opposition to Sekou Toure has never given up. It even contributed to the "repentance" of the dictator. ~ August 1977 marked the open insurrection of the women shopkeepers, who came into the streets of C~nakry and even under the windows of the comrade-president to demand more justice and liberalism. The revolution spread even to certain cities of the interior. In March 19?8, 7 months later, the Great Sily was reconciled with Houphouet-L~oigny and Leopold Sedar Senghor. By doing this, he opened his borders, on one hand, and on the other har.d he invited in vain or almost in vain, the diaspora Guinea nationals to return to their motherland. "War Effort" The detente has been ephemeral. No doubt because it permitted certain hopes for democratization. For Sekou could not accept such prospects. And much before the attempr of 14 May 1980, he had resumed his drastic actions against all revolutionary impulses. For example, last March, rendered desperate by the economic crisis, the inhabitants of the Kankan region stopped paying their taxes. The latter - were claimed from them in kind, in the pure tradition of what the French - colonizer called "the war effort": in cabbage trees, rubber, rice (125 kilo- grams of paddy per person). This was unsuccessful. The governor of the _ ~ region and the garrison head are paying today in prison for their nobility. - InsLrrections Once again in March 1980, and until April, the students of Kindia (150 km east of Conakry) had gone on strike and had insulted the national minister of - Education who had come for the purpose of calming them: 30 students were arrested and interned since then in the Conakzy Boiro camp, another thousand deported from Kindia to a place near the Liberian border, 1,000 km away from their original high school. 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY _ Thus internal de~=.ente gave rise to insurrections, poorly tolerated by the regime of Ivlr Sek~:>u Toure. It is in this context that the assassination attempt of 14 May iailed or almost succeeded. And this event, the failure, changes completely the political equilibrium both in West Africa and in Guinea. The attempt marks first of all a turning point in the strategy of the _ Guinea opposition, which is no longer content to make speeches outside, but has chosen to establish terrorism inside. Better still (or worsej these - ~ opponents are now condemned to a forward course: they ?tnow that having _ escaped death, Sekou Toure will take vengeance (he started by having some of his closest collaborators arrested) on those remaining in the country. They believe that to fight against the aura of invincibility surrounding the dictator, they have to repeat their attempt. The Guinea opposition group outside the country has, for the rest, published from Brussels, a communique _ _ to the effect that "This act of great political range, must be repeated as soon as possible." A Castle Collapses Arter all, a race against death is on between Sekou Toure and his enemies. The former will not decide to entrench himself, but will strike by filling up the prisons again. The latter, who are not unaware of this will seek to repea~ (and this time to succeed) their attempt at assassination as soon as possible, by aJ_1 means. TrTho is going to pay for the breakages? The opponents inside r_he country and their familiPS, because being within the reach of repression, _ they are ~;ulnerable. At this time, S~kou Toure knows himself, that his enemies :nave decided, no longer to overthrow him, but to kill him. The people of Guinea are no longer the only ones threatened. At the diplomatic level, everything is also swinging in West Africa. By making up in March 1978 with his brother enemies Sengor and Houphouet, Sekou Toure had refurbished his escutcheon. By opening his borders, he had seemed to liberalize his regime. But this failed attempt is already causing him to recover his congenital reflexes. Sekou is not a man to let bygones be bygones. Wounded, he reacts = by And the house of cards built by Senghor and Houphouet is collapsing: as guarantors of Sekou Toure's repentance, they will be the more embarrased by their Guinean Brother's "relapse." Another unexpected victim of the attempt: Valery Giscard d'Estaing~s France who had also counted on the detente in Guinea to assure its West African policy. According to certain indiscreet remarks, Giscard saw in Sekou Toure - the only charismatic personality of the region able to take over from the aging Senghor and Houphouet. At 58, Sekou has remained an extraordinary tribune, still endowed with his halo of glory as an African patriot and _ founder (one of the last survi~,~ors) of theOAU [Organization of African Unity]. _ He killed thousands of his compd;-.riots? True. But since then, he had repented. His prestige had suffered thereby in Africa, but to Giscard, he - remained the "African personality" of the eighties, on whom French African policy was to be supported. The assassination attempt of 14 May has destroyed this dream. By his usual blind repression, the charismatic Sekou Toure is going to further sully 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ C _ himself. The France of human rights could hardly congratulate itself on being his un~onditional ally. I~iore and More ~~f~ explains rio doubt why in certain French political circles, efforts were ma~ie to attribute the assassination attempt to the pro-Soviet Guineans. Allegedly to prevent Seko u Tour.e from pursuing his course towards the bosom - of the Western nations. But it would be both dangerous and too restrictive to accept this analysis. If only because, having made too many enemies, Sekou Toure knows that he can expect anything from any quarter. A person - who had been very close to him commented to us "Sekou will never leave power - alive. He has killed too many people not to be killed some day. By anybody. And that is the tragedy of that lonely man called Ahmed Sekou Toure: in order not to be killed, he feels abliged to continue killing more and more. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 9018 CSO: 4400 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1.::.LNEA POLICY OF OPENING TO WEST REPORTEDLY UNCHANGED - - Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 pp 12b3-1264 - [Report; "The Attempt on the Life of the Chief of State Does Not Seem to Have Had Repercussions on Political Life"] ' [Excerpt] One of the 30 people wounded in the course of the 14 May - attempt on the life of President Sekou Toure (see MTM, 23 May, p 1706), ~ a 39-year-old woman, died on 24 May, thus raising the number of victims to two. - The main consequence of the attempt would be to regain control of the , administration and the Guinea Democratic Party apparatus. - In turn, the National Revolutionary Council, the highest authority of " the sole Guinean party between two congresses, issued an appeal on 20 May ' calling fQr the "purge" of the party and state apparatus. The council added that in this operation the party should not "limit itself to the results of the evil but attack the reasons at the roots." The council also called for vigilance "without, nevertheless, exposing one's flank to the enemy" who, it said, is trying to compromise the gains of an "opening to the outside and of int?rnal justice" of Guinea, and whose "satanical maneuvers" aim at "dragging (Guinea) into the psychosis of a permanent plot." - We note, therefore, that President Sekou Toure and the highest party and state officials do not se~m willing to reassess the policy of an opening ro the West which should help Guinea to implement its economic plans, or its reconciliation with its neighbors, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. ' Conversely, a substantial liberalization within the country, noted for the past several months by observers, could bear the cost of the attempted coup d'etat. Sekou Toure seems to consider that this ' "internal demobilization" may have been too quick and been used by "doubtful" and "corrupt" elements. However, more than being a prelude to a purge, the warnings and appeals of the National Revolutionary 22 ~ _ FOR OFFICIE'iL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Council seem to express the will to "remobilize" the members of the - Guinean Democratic Party and the entire Guinean population. A certain reshuffling of party cadres as well as at the various levels of the administration, the armed forces, and the police may be expected, as has been demanded by the Revolutionary Council. - COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 5157 CSO: 4400 ~ 23 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IVORY COAST MOVE TOWARDS U. S. FORM OF DIIrf~C'RACY SEEN Parts AFRTQUE-ASIE in k'rench 9-22 Jun 80 pp 22-23 [Article by Jonatlian Rolela] [Text] The Ivory Coast Democrat~c Party (~DCT) SixtI~ Congress initially scheduled for the last quarter of tfie current ysar, tfien brougfit several months foward, has 3ust been changed again. Tt is to be held towarcls the month of September, they say, in the Ivory Coast capital, at the end of a - pre-congress which will be held in ~uly. Tn the succeasion atmosphere open _ to the present head of state, Houphouet-Boigny--now 75 years old--to anyone - - who knows Abidjan, these calendar shiftings can only give xise to new rumors, especially since tfiey are happening only a few weeks after the frustrated attempt at a military coup d'etat early in May. For the Ivory Coast inhabitants, 1980 constitutes a date line for several reasons. On the political plane, the holding of the congress should open the way to a series of elections: municipal, legislative, tben presidential. _ In the economic field, the current year marks the launcfiing of the new Five- Year Plan, and consequently the defining of clear and undoubtedly new choices-- at least for some amon~ the~--even tf:V...~�. .~u :,Y~nion of economic experts, the Ivory Coast is beginning a period of slight gro~th, that its running into _ foreign debt is causing authorities and creditors some concern, despite the almost unprecedented phenomenon in this country which has had one of the highest rates of growth in Africa in the past 20 years, the country finds itself obliged to give up some pro~ects which have already been widely initiated. "What is most significant is not so much the Congress per se as the dealings that precede it," said a young Ivory Coast university student who describes himself as "neither for nor against the government." "As loag as the latter come to nothin.g," he said, "as long as those who control the political, economic and administrative power have not settled on a name, tbat of the 'Oldster's*' successor, holding the congress raises some very touchy questions." - One of his colleagues who shares his opinion, agrees by nodding his head, and _ adds: "The pLesident has been dominating political life for more than 30 years. He has no political personality other than that affirmed by tho~e around him. ~ This, no doubt, is what has enabled him to avoid any wrangling at sfiaze meetings, but we dread the thought of a political vacuum...." ~ Fami.liar name for Houphouet-Boign � ~ , 2~ - 'FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ Four "Barons" As a matter of fact, both backers and opponents of the present regime have agreed to recognize the personification of power strengthened, moreover, since July 1977, the date of the four "barons departure from the government: _ Mohamed Diaware (now president of the Dakar Club), Konan Bedie (consultant - to Che president of tfie World Bank), Abdoulaye Sawadogo and U~her Assouan, minist~rs respectfvely of the economic and finance plan and agriculture and foreign affairs. But rather than speaking of a political vaccum, it would be more wortfiwhile to discuss the number of candidates in view of one another. A half dozen people, in fact, are laying claim to Houphouet-~oigny's succession, without, however, any one of them openly coming forth or, a fortiori, being able constitutionally to assume the official "title of "dauphin." A long time holder of this qualification--Pfiilippe Yace, party secretary general--particu- larly after the 1975 constitutional amendment--immediately before the fifth PDCI congress, which proclaimed t-~ie president of the national assembly the sv~:cessor designate to the fiead of state, in the event of the office being vacant--is no longer sure that he is to carry on. As a matter of fact, beh~nd the need "to democratize political life," a slogan which is being increasingly repeated by the head of state, at Abidjan they are asking wfiat this saying means. This "democratization" could have as its objective to enable the masses to have a greater part in choosing the president - of the republic, in otfierwords, that this no longer need lie the prerogative of the party machinery alone. In which event, it has been pointed out in ! some political circles, "since the nomination machinery is no longer under - Party control, Mr Yace could find himself faced with other candidates." But ' the "democratization" desired by h3,gh places could also mean the departure of some high-ranking Party members. However, the key to the problem resides, far more than on reckonings as unreliables as these, in the head of state's desire to proceed, within the coming months or even the coming weeks, ~ to a new amendement to the constitution. Since the possibility of creating a prime minister post has been dismissed, it looks as if we are on our way towards an "American type" presidency. This would entail the czeation of a vice president of the republic post and its holder, Houphouet-Boigny's fellow candidate during the coming presidential elections, would be responsible for - assuring "continuity" in the event that the "Sage of Yamoussoukro" should - decide to withdraw. What would the Elysee position be in the respect? A former diplomat, and now back in business, states: The Ivory Coast constitutes ~ an essential anchorage point for French politics in Africa. Those who still doubted this could be convinced of it on the occasion of Giscard's visit among ~ ~ us 2 years ago. How do you expect the French to lose sight of the thousands of francs worth of investments, a geopolitical position of the first order in West Africa, at the very time that Senegal was tormented by uprisings, that Mali was experiencing serious problems and that Ghana and Liberia were not particularly stabe? Unemployment in France will soon affect 1.5 million ' people. Now, on the Ivory Coast, there are between 40,000 and 45,000 French people. That is the number of people who will not be swelling the list of those seeking employment over there. ~specially wY~en we are on the eve of a pr~sidential election, and the unemployment also vote." 25 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ In fact, French authorities, these last few months, have, in several ways, _ shown that they attach.a great deal of importance to the after-Houphouet period, even to the point of causing the latter some annoyance. The reason for this interest most certainly lies in the arguments in current use: the importance of French investments, military facilities (the Port Bouet base), a strong French colony, but also, they say, without sny ~erious proof of this because of the fact that many parallel networks and centers of intrigue more of less connected with French political parties (of the majority) on the Ivory Coast control some rather juicy bits of business. Those who spread such rumors also maintain that the departure of the French ambassador, Raphael-I.eygues, last year, after 15 years of active and loyal service on the Ivory Coast, was the result of secret quarrels among tfie centers of intrigue. Mr Raphael-Leygues, a Gaullist, yielded his post to a diplomat closer to the present Frencfi president and to those who support him. Which, in short, they say, explains the annoyance of the Ivory Coast president to whom Mr Raphael-Leygues was a friend, and also his decision to make the Apostolic Nuncio the dean of the diplomatic corps, although ttiat post, until then, _ was reserved to the French ambassador. In tfie economic and social field, the Ivory Coast is experiencing a lull, like its capital, Abid~an, where skyscrapers and alaandoned shipyards now hug the shore. "Over there," an Abidjan economist expalined to us, "is a French building enterprise which has gone bankrupt. The program for the buidling of housing accommodations has been abandoned, and the case will soon be brought to court." Here we are not far from the African Riviera, a residential area for lower-salaried staff, on tfie outskirts of tfie capital. At the other far end of Abidjan, the scene is the same. Blocks of flats have also been abandoned there, even though, at times, the second story has already been completed. The reason? Building promotion companies, which sprung up like mushrooms in the rain, and which now no longer find enough buyers for their housing, which is considered too expensive. In the best of cases, buyers have succeeded in being reimbursed. In others, they came up against closed offices. The promoters had left without leaving any address. Housing, Health, School - The housing question--Abidjan has more than 1 million inhabitants--is _ undoubtedly one of the thorniest the authorities have ever known. Despite the success encountered with the state-financed low-income housing managed by two public organizations, the supply is far below the demand. Another touchy problem is the lack of a sanitary substructure. Although it is one of the best developed in Africa, it does not meet the demographic and urbanization pattern of growth. "Although we have 500 beds," a high official in charge of the management of one of the largest hospitals in the capital told us, "we sometimes have as many as 600 patients." Doctors, nurses, and even more so, the sick, also complain about the small budget allocated to the central pharmacy, whicb manages the hospital credits for tfie purcfiase of inedication. ConstantZy cut down by inflation (medications - 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY are a11 import~~d) , this budget is no longer adequate for providing the hospital urith.lahat at times is even the most indispensable. Many doctors advise their patients to get them themselves, before being hospitalized. I,astly, there is the lack of schools which now makes a great many Abidjani preter to resort to private scfiools--at least, those who have the means to do so. For, in private educat ion, just as in private dispensaries, the charges are very higfi. Didn't the owner of one of these schoc:.s only - recently ask parents to pay the children's school fees, beginni:~g in April _ for the next school year. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie ~ 8870 CSO: 440Q 27 FOR OFFICIAI~ USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IVORY COAST ' SUGAR PRODUCTION VENTURE BECOMES A'NIGHTMARE' Paris JEi1NE AFRIQUE in French 4 Jun 80 pp 57-62 - [Article by Sophie Bessis: "Sugar: The Ivory Coast Victim of Its Friends"] [Text] The price of cacao dropped below 1,100 British pounds per ton (about 495,000 CFA [African Financial CommuniCy] francs) in the London market. Prices had not dropped this 1ow in 4 years. This is a new hard blow for the Ivory Coast, first world producer of this commodity, who has been watching the clouds bank up on its economy since the beginning of the year. With a production of 325,000 tons of cacao in 1980 it could - have equalized its balance of payments which otheYwise risks a deficit. But the industrialized countries have decided othezwise: last 30 March in London negotiations for a new in~ernational agreement on cacao ended in a complete failure. Producers' and consumers' respective positions were nevertheless not irreconcilable: the former wanted to fix the bottom price at 120 cents per pound (220 CFA francs), the latter did not want to exceed 110 cents. The consumers were totatly intransigent, especially - Great Britain and FRG. Were they not trying to tell the group of cacao producers formed shortly before at Yamoussoukro, that the West would not stand for any real and concerted effort to renegotiate the terms of the exchange? In the mean- - time, economically weak countries like Ghana sell their cacao aC London _ prices and the Ivory Coast cannot stand alone for long. Already sorely affected by the disappointments of the sugar plan, the = Ivory Coast expected more understanding from its Western allies whose political credo and development model it has borrowed. These allies do not seem to be grateful. Now that the first sugar-loaded ship has just left the port of Abidjan, the Europe of the Nine ~ealously closes its market to African sugar production while its businesses are, for the moment, - the main beneficiaries of agro-industrial development in the Ivory Coast and elsewhere. Despite the encouragement lavished on it by Western indus- trialists at the time it was implementing its sugar plan, the Ivory Coast's - repeated export requests have yet to be granted. 28 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY First result o; the stagnation: the chief of state, following the World Bank's insiste~~zt advice, abandoned certain pro~ects which were costly and really more prestigious than useful, such as expansion of the Port Bouet airdrome and the improvement of infrastructures in Yamoussoukro. . Ivorian authorities are apinfully read~uating their accounts. From the proud buildinga of the Abid~an plateau, some are starting to question the _ validity of the Ivorian choice, yet without intending to reconsider it. On their side, the industrialized countries have not yet understood, or do not want to understand, that by trying to keep all and abandon none of their exhorbitant privileges, they are risking to contribute more than any foreign "enterprise" to that destabi.lization of Af.rica which they fear so much. Will European Commissioner Claude Cheysson's flash visit to _ Abidjan last 25 May and his statement that from now on the cacao "affair is too serious to be left to the Cechnicians" help restore the precarious _ balance? It is still too soon to be optimistic. After 3 very gloomy years for exporters, sugar world prices have started climbing spectacularly at the beginning of the year. The Ivory Coast has been at death's door. There is some recovery at the ministries of Agri- culture and Finances and at the SODESUCRE [Company for the Development of Sugar Cane Plantations and the Industrialization and Marketing of Sugar]. If the current tendency continues, Ivorian sugar could be exported under less catastrophic conditions than expected...provided that buyers can be found. "/The Ivory Coast might be able to win its sugar wager. We will get back our out?ays, you wi11 see/," [in italics] say those in charge, yet, /quietly/ [in italics]. But there is no real cry of victory as yet in Abidjan after the countless disappointments of the last 5 years. The reason is that since 1974, "king sugar" has been one of the main actors in ivorian economic politics...and in politics simple: it has undone _ ministers and high officials; it has apparently made some fortunes... In any case, it is being talked about not only at Abid~an but also in the European capitals and especially at the seat of the EEC in Brussels, where there is concern about the new African producers' whim to export _ to an already overstocked European market. But nowhere, with the possible excep;,ion of Sudan, has this alternative attained such proportions as in the Ivory Coast. It was 1974. The Ivorian leaders, intoxicated by the echo of their "miracle" abroad, watch world sugar prices climb to unattained heights. P~~esident Felix Houphouet-Boigny ts searching for a way to develop the - Ivorian North, quite backward by comparison to the South, an area of im- portant export crops. The decision is made: a sugar plan providing for _ the creation of 11 agro-industrial complexes will produce 600,000 tons of ~ sugar, 500,000 of which will be exported. The experts agree that world production wi11 soon fall short of the demand. In addition to the one in Ferkessegoudou I, which is already producing, 10 new complexes wi11 be installed in the savannahs. President Houphouet- Boigny starts distributing them among the underpr3.vileged regions with 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - an ease that produces some concern among several of his collaborators who, already, would prefer exceed 5 complexes. The chief of state, who decides by himself, accuses them of thinking small and keeps the 10 comple~z~. Price foreseen at that time: almost 300 billion CFA francs that the Ivory Coast, deemed good payer on international markets, expects to obtain without difficultq. Those in charge are not mistaken: once - the Ivorian ambitions are kaown, equipment merchants who had also encour- aged them, o�fer to build the complexes and provide financing. Am~ericans, _ Canadians and Europeans scramble to sell their a stiff price to the Ivorians, who are new to the sub~ect and unaware of the subtleties of an industry highly concentrated at the world level. In addition, foreign builders and Ivorian intermediaries, each in their own way, see in these enormous investments the possibility of making ~uicy profits. Moreover, it seems there were some rather unsavory practices since the construction of the Ferke I complex in 1971-1972. There was - at that time a French-Ivorian company, the Sosuci (Sugar Company of the Ivory Coast), which had conducted the first planting studies. But very soon the Sosuci was dissolved, the SODESUCRE created in 1971, aitd the French evicted in favor.of the famous Ang1o-South African company Lonhro, which called upon the American company Lang Engineering as builders. Implementatian conditions are not better, but Lonhro brings the financing in its luggage and its representative in Abidjan is very well thought of by many high Ivorian officials, probably a decisive fact. The contract is signed by mutual agreement; overall investment of 26 billion CFA francs, already huge, is to be financed by the American Eximbank at existing - banking market rates. The precedent is set: of the other ~5 complexes, only one called for bids, . and then only on the French market. On the Ivorian side, program finanr_ing ~ is studied by the three ministries in~volved: A.griculture, Finances and Planning, who formed the Interministerial Committee on Sugar, the Sodesucre being only an agent. As far back as 1975, implementation starts on the Ferke II complex, en- trusted to the Anglo-Canadian company Redpath, while negotiations for the one at Borotou speed up. Ivorian authorities want in fact to reinterest France in the sugar plan and to use public credit, much less expensive than private credit. On the side, the govennment thin~cs. this is a good opportunity to make its industrialists reenter the race,,and the - central bank is "begged" to finance most of it, despite the resernations _ expressed by many officials about the merits of such an undertaking. But the order comes from the top: President Giscard d'Estaing and his then minister of cooperation, Pierre Abelin, had promised financing to Presi- dent Houphouet-Boigny himself, � ~ At the beginning, Paris imposed the Technisucre company, fruit of the - IRAT and the SATFC*, which undertakes the feasibility studies at such a * Institute for Research on Trapical Agriculture and Technica~. Assistance and Cooperation Company, both supervised by the NL.nistry of Cooperation. 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY prohibitive co~t that the Ivorian authorities, tt?ough not tight-fisted, become frantic and dismiss it. A call for bids is launched on the French market where the main competitors are the SONIDIAA [expansion unknown] and a new consortium formed for the occasion: ADRA, where the state- ' owned Renault company holds a majority. The prices proposed seem too high to the Ivorians. During a final meeting headed by President Houphouet- Boigny the ADRA, some say supported by the French government, grants a more significant discount that its competitors and wins a contract for F800 million of tl:e time, that is, 40 billion CFA francs. With the help ~ of inflation, that is already the average cost of the complexes and in 1977, the SQDESUCRE's investment program takes on alarming proportions: 250 billion CFA francs for 6 complexes instead of 10. During this same time, sugar prices sink to 7 cents the pound. There is no more talk of shortage but of surplus: potential markets close, especi- ally the European market. The Ivory Coast was hoping to be able to join the "sugar protocol" an appendix of the Lome Convention permitting a certain number of ACP's [African, Caribbean and Pacific countries] to sell - their sugar at prices 2.5 times over world prices. But Brussels makes _ it plain that Europe, having a surplus, cannot authorize new African sugar exports under privileged conditions. Now, if the Ivory Coast is obliged to follow world prices, the stabilization fund would have to disburse several billion CFA francs each year to equalize the cost price, reaching $900 the ton, and an absurdly 1ow selling price: the subvention would consume 200 million CFA francs between 1980 and 1990. And it is the Tvorian consumer who pays a large part by buying the kg of sugar at 300 CFA francs, that is, the highest price in a11 French-speaking Africa. - In Abidjan, anxiety replaces euphoria. Except for Borotou, all the com- plexes are financed by private credit entailing a huge indebtment which can no longer be amortized by hypothetical exports. International fin- : ancing organizations such as the World Bank and the FED (European Develop- ment Fund), hostile to the sugar plan from the beginning, warn the Ivory Coast of the "folly" in which it is involved: 600,000 Cons of sugar in ' 1985, of which only 100,000 wi11 be absorbed by domestic consumption and - an indebtment that seriously compromises its international solvency and credibility. Rumors about widespread commissions and under-the-table deals become more insistent. President Houphouet becomes alarmed and asks for advice from "objective" observers. An Egyptian specialist recommended by Cameroon, - Professor Sabri, pulls the sugar plan accounts to pieces a~d concludes - that total financing exceeds the real investment by 35 billion, that is, the average cost of a complex. There is talk of overcharges which would go to fill well-placed pockets. July 1977, dramatic coup in Abidjan: ministers Henri Konan Bedie, Abdoulaye Sawadogo and Mohamed Diawara, who have led Ivorian economic policy for 10 years, are evicted from the government. Official excuse: the errors and malversations that have surrounded the sugar plan. Obviously, those , 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' ~ i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY concerned deny it. When those who were involved in sugar problems at the time, are asked about this in Paris or Abid~an, they respond with an uneasy silence or some evasive answers. If no one has stated that precise sums were diverted, no one has seriously refuted the rumors either. The fact remains that the Ivorian president, furious by accounts of all those who approached him, and anxious to limit expenses, starts first by de- ducting from the operators the sums presumably overcharged, without regis- tering any protests from them: proof that all was not right. Second surgical operation: the sugar plan is reduced to six complexes and the other 5 projects are simply abandoned, to the satisfaction of all Ivorian and foreigners who found excessive the Ivorian ambitions. All provisions are revised: prices are raised, production and profits are lowered. The six complexes kept are Ferke I, Ferke II, Borotou, Serebou, built by the SOIrIDIAA, Ratiola, built by Belgian and Austrian companies and Zuenoula, built jointly by HVA and HBR [expansions unknown], a Dutch and Belgian companies respectively. Finally, the overall cost of the sugar plan, reduced to six units, greatly exceeds the original 300 billion CFA francs, the cost of the complexes varying between 35 and 50 billion CFA francs for a theoretical produc- tion capacity of 45,000 to 60,000 tons per year. By way of comparison, the CAMSUCO [expansion unknown] complex in Cameroon cost slightlg more than 15 billion for a yearly capacity of 50,000 tons; the sugar refinery - of Banfora in Upper Volta, started in 1967 and productng 35,000 tons of sugar per year, cost 11 billion CFA francs. To that the Ivorians respond that it is impossible to compare the incomparable and that their refineries _ have state-of-the-art technologies, a.nd are therefore more expensive. But there is no doubt that they were implemented at stiff prices and, with Che _ help of inflation, costs have exceeded the initial forecasts. Result: the SODESUCRE's main foreign debt reached 175 billion CFA francs, without taking into account the interests which will reach 60 billion CFA francs over the reimbursement period. In 1978 the state company was not abla to repay and was removed from all financial aspects of the plan. The sugar debt was taken over by the - Ivorian state while exporting was entrusted to the stabilization bank. But more had to be done. For a year, a series of austerity measures were taken to reduce the charges which provad crushing while production was quite behind the initial forecasts. In the first place, the period of laxism toward the operators who pro�ited so much is well over with: one of the first decisions of Mr Kwame Kra, the SODESUCRE's new director genexal, was to modify the management con- tracts of those businessmen whose earnings were no~ tied to the output of the sugar refineries. They were replaced by technical assistance con- tracts where the fees are proportional to the actual sugar production. Moreover, all means of pushing back the due dates are good; the Ivorian - officials look twice now before taking delivery of a complex: thus, Ferke II, not reaching the performance level provided for in the opera- tion plan, will not be accepted. The SODESUCRE, cheated, has learned mistrust and prudence. - - 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ The role of most operators wss in fact one of the gr.eatest scandals of this affair: the Ivorians were crudely "bowled out" more than once. In the procedure f irs~ of all: tc?e financiers almost always imposed the origin of the equipment without a word from the buyer. In addition, the contracts kept the competition out by mutual agreement and prevented ttte Ivorians - from "dickering over" the price of their complexes. Finally, the opera- ~ tors, who were mostly European and old hands in sugar ma.tters, knew full - well that the Ivory Coast would have enormous marketing difficulties and _ that implementation costs would make its sugar unsaleable on the world market. But they did not say a word, very happy to make unexpected invest- ments in an economic crisis. As for the countries, they left their indus- trialists alone to the point thaC in 1978 the European Commission, alarmed, _ stressed /".the incoherence/" [in italics] between the policy of the Com- munity and that of its member countries. The latter, eager to check the growth of the CEE sugar surplus, protect their markets. It is normal. This is where the euphemistic incoherence comes in: through export credits and collateraZ loans, they continue to encourage their builders to imple- ment refineries in Africa. There is good reason to tell Paris, I,ondon or Bonn thafi the decisions come from different ministries. In fact, it seems that despite their attenuating statements about development aid, the industrialized countries are playing what Claude Cheysson, European Commissioner for Development, does not hesitate to call "/a systematic double game/" [in italics]. _ t~ccording to hirn, political assurances about export possibilities were - given to countries like the Ivory Coast while the CEE received contrary orders. The latter is thus split between the interests of the industrial- - is~s and those of the European beet growers who look very unfavorably on the gro~ath of the African production: those are the countries who no longer need to import European sugar and even want to export sugar to Europe. The community's indignation can only satisfy them. Nevertheless the hypocrisy continues: very competent persons have assured us in Abidjan ihat high-level contacts were being made with European countries to open _ up the sugar protocol to the Ivory Coast. Results are expect~d...In any - case, Zambia has ~ust cancelled an exception to its request for privileges. Where does the Ivory Coast stand in the meantime? The six sugar complexes have begun production in 1980. Starting this year, the country will pro- duce 100,000 tons of sugar, 40,000 of which must be exported. In 1984- 1985 exports will reach 188,000 tons against a domestic consumption of 192,000 tons. If the rise in prices is short lived and new markets are _ not found as fast as possible, Che situation could become even worse. , That is why, following the advice and thanks to the brokerage of the ' Sugar and Commodities Company whose resources are spread throughout the " world, the Ivorian president has just signed his country to the interna- ; - tional agreement on sugar. That wi11 let him place 70,000 tons exempted = from certain taxes on the American market. With Africa being provided for, the rest depends on Europe. The "project of the century" has become a nightmare. And yet, in 1974, ~ the sugar plan was not all that wild. At the time many specialieta were counting on a shortage of world production starting in 1~80. The Ivorian 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 . FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY chief of state thought he could draw a double benefit from that situation: to place himself in a goQd positio~ on the world market, while adopting a voluntary developmex~t policy for the savannah region. The decisian to build ten complexes was political. When the time came to be more realistic, it was realized that no more than six complexes should ever have been programmed for such a short period of time. The haste with which the plan was carried out to be able to "exist" internationally in 1980 was fatal. The Ivory Coast overestimated its ability to control such an extensive program in a field unknown to it and which by general opinion is "a rotten world." In a coiuitry where the encourag?ment to become wealthy is the keystone of official ideology, it was inevitable for such a fabulous in- vestment program t4 encourage some weaknesses.... Thus, this plan has been burdening the finances of the Ivorian State for - a long time. Nevertheless, the authorities try to stress the positive aspects: it has created some 3,000 permanent jobs per complex and helped - settle 100,000 persons in the co.untry's poorest areas which, in this way, have profited from a series of infrastr:~ctures. In 1980, 12 billion salaries wi11 be distributed to sugar workers, contributing to a better distribution of the national wealth. But, even some of its promoters believe that the sugar "graft" has not yet taken hold: The developmenC of the receiving areas is still artif:Lcial sincQ the complexes have not been integrated into the regional economy. In addition, while there has been success in creating jobs, 60 percent of the personnel are expatriated and the seasonal untra~ned labor force are mostly Upper Voltans as usual. It is too much for a country who wants to control its future. What exactly does this future hold for the next 15 years? Maybe it is here that justification for the sugar plan should be looked for: exports are - in fact expected to decrease starting in 1983, due to an increased domestic demand. In 1992-1993, the Ivory Coast will, in principle, stop being an exporter and will find itself with a production capacity of 300,000 tons completely paid for and insuring its self-sufficiency. The installa- tions are e~ected to be profitable by the valorization of molasses, alcohol production, etc. It is not aIl negative, therefore. The catastrophe would have taken place - had the initial plan been followed, but it stopped at the edge of the abyss. While the Ivory Coast's economic strength enabled it to limit its expenses, it is more fragile for the experience. The time has come to draw the balance sheets. Will the sugar lesson be a gaod one? The Door Is Locked The sugar wor'~d market is a very big word: in fact it involves onlq 10 percent of the sugar marketed in the world. In addition, its prices rarely reflect production and consumption realities: its fluctuations are generally speculative in origin and its oligopolistic nature sub~ects _ it to the dictatorship of several large companies which fully dominate it. .3lt FOR OFFICIAI, USE ~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY The-refore, most of the international sugar t-rade is dominated by a series of agreem~nts between producers and consumers at prices that are gener- ally above world market prices. This is the case of the CEE sugar pro- - _ tocol, which is part of the "dowry" brought by Great Britain when it joined the Common Market. The United Kingdom is in fact the only CEE country with a sugar shortage and has always brought its provisions from : its Af rican and Caribbean co3onies. According to this "sugar protocol" which dates from 1972, the Commonwealth countries could continue to se11 their product in the framework of a protected market. Only the countries which were already exporters could join. When warld prices climbed in 1975, the EEC, suffering a temporary shortage, authorized annual imporCs of 1.3 million tons of sugar from the ACP's and most of it was bought by the English trust of Tate and Ly1e. There was euFhoria at that time. Many African countries expected to be able to join the sugar protocol with - the perspective of a European and world shortage and toak on significant - exporting capabilities. But the situation has changed radically in 5 = years: Europe has a surplus again, while the ACP's production keeps in- creasing; it will reach 4.8 million tons in 1981 against 3.5 in 1978, or an exportable surplus of 900,000 tons which will exceed 1.5 million tons between 1982 and 1985. Tharef ore, it is understandable that cour~tries like the Ivory Coast, Kenya _ and Sudan, will become large exporters starting next year, are insistently knock,?ng at the sugar protocol's door. However, the door _ seems to be well locked, while a few years ago Europe had given the apprer~- tice produce-rs unquestionable hopes. I~s interests have changed. An ~ eventual decision to grant the new states access to the community market _ could only be political. In the meantime, the CEE is denouncing the ambi~u~us '~ehavior of countries like France and Great Britain and would like to es~ablish a methodical in~formation system with the ACP's. But the member countries do not seem to be ready to treat their former colonies as equaise... ' COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 � ~ - 9341 CSO~ 440~ - k 35 - - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY KENYA ' PANORAMA OF ECONOMIC EVOLUTION IN 1978-1979 Paris MARCHE5 TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in rrench 13 Jun 80 pp 1492-1493 [Article: "Central Bank Issuea 1978-1979 Report on Evolution of Economy of Kenya"] [Text] The reporC of Kenya Central Bank for fiscal year ending 30 June 1979 ~ contains essential elements of the economic situatioa of that country for 1978. We believe Chat, despite the time lag, this information is not without interest, considering that it is usually very difficult to obtai.n recent statistics for African countries. The year 1978 in Kenya was influenced on the agricultural plane by not very _ favorable weaCher and on the plane of trade by rising prices on imports coinciding with a decrease in exports value. These circumstances notwith- standing, the economy continued to grow at a r.ate weaker than that in 1977, with some reduction in consumer prices. However, the deterioration of the balance of payments, begun during the second semester of 1977, resulted in a deficit and in remedial measures to limit imports of goods aad exit of capital at Che end of 19?8. A tempor~ry audit of Kenya's economic situation for 1978 showed that its gross National Product (GNP) at market cost increased at current price by only 12 percent, as compared with 36 percent in 1977, and at constant price - (1972 level by 5.7 percent, instead of 8.6 percent. - ' Poor agricultural production wag compensated among other things by an ameriioration in industry, transports, warehouses and cammunications, res~ sstate and banking. Consumpt ion would have pasaed from 27,805 mil.lion Kenyan shillings* in 1977 to 34,955 million in 1978, corresponding to a real groFrth of 10 percent , , ~At the end of December 1978, 1 DT5 was equal to 9.66 Kenyan shillings or 5.446 French francs. One'Kenpan shilling was therefore worth about 0.564 French f ranc . ~ 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY instead of 9 percent. Gross investments cont3nued to expand, from 8,825 ~ million sb.illings to 11,945 milli,on, involving in particular equipment for _ agriculture, construction and development of stocks. 5aving, on its part, sensib ly decreased: 7,335 million shillings in 1978 instead of 10,190 million. These preli.minary data which needed confirmation, indicated that the situation in Kenya was finally better tl~an that expected with concexn at � midyear. Agricultural ProducCion The share of agricultural production, including �orestry and fishing, in the _ GNP was down from 39.,8 percent in 1977 to 34.5 percent in 1978. The voltmme of diverse productions had changed in terms af percentage from 1977 to 1978. In lieu of data in abaolute value, the report gave the following variations: coffee, -13.1 percent; wheat, -2.3 percen.*_; corn, -44.3 - percent (deliveries to the Marke~ing Board); cattle, -50 percent (deliveries _ to Kenya Meat Co~.ission); cotton, +67.3 percent; milk, +4 percent. Coffee _ p ro~uction had shrunk* because of abundant ra3ns at efflorescence; wheat harvesting was also affected by rains. By conCrast, deliveries o� sugar cane to factories reached record levels, whereas commercialization of sisal and pyrethrum declined; cultivation of pyrethrum had been progressively ' _ abandoned for oCher more rentiable crops. The overall picture of Kenya's - agricultural production was marred by dwindling coffee and tea prices on world markets; on the whole, gross revenue from agricultural production was down from 8,300 million shi111ngs in 1977 to 6,540 million in 1978, thus ~ decreasing by 21 percent, while in 1977 it increased by 66 percent as compared with 1976. P rices paid to producers remained unchanged for wheat, corn, sugar cane and milk; by contrast, there was a markup of 9 and 10 percent for paddy according to grades, and also fnr meat (+10 percent), cotton (+8 percent) and pyrethrum - C+15 percent). Finally, the average income of coffee and tea producers, despite much centraction, was still superior to that of 1976. Average Income o� Coffee and Tea Producers _ (~n shillings per 100 kgs) _ Coffee Tea = 1976 , 2,524 1,057 1977 3,975 2,149 1978 2,741 1,528 - '~Production figures agreed upon by Tnternational Org~nization of Coffee: - 1976-77: 102,000 t; 1977-78: 81,360 t; 1978-79: 64,380 t. 37 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - ` APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Despite a government policy giving agrt,culture preferential treatment in credit matter, the deteriorating situat3,on confronting Kenyan mail producers - led to a transfer of income fraat.rural environmeat to urhan environment, thus promoting urban concentration, contrary to the~1977 pictnre. Industrial ProducCion Industrial production continued to forge ahead_in 1978 tn proportion to _ constant demand; its real expan~ion rate approximatied 14.4 percent, slightly - inferior to that of 1977 (15 percent). All sectors were in the black, except butchery, dairy, furnishing and rubber industry; the decline was particularly sharp in the firat two sectors. The most i.mportant boost involved transport materials (+192 percent), plastics (+43.1 percent), and electric materials (+38 percent); clothing, leathers and shoes also moved ahead strongly. _ The building trade continued to cash in on the 1977 economic affluence in rural zone as well as in the cities, whereas public worka were stimulated ` by goverffient road-building and hydraulic progr~ms. T~urism made a comeback in 1978 following the 1977 slump prompted by the dislocation of the Eastern African Community and the closing of the Tanzaniazz border. Returns from tourism 24.4 percent (1,200 million shillings instead of 966). The number of visitors augmented by 4 percent, as compared with a 22.3 percent decrease the preceding year. Leugths of atay.diminished, But hotel o:.cupancy rate went up by 3.8 percent due to expanding national tourism. - Prices and Salaries The consumer price index continued to rise but at a ra~te smaller than that in 1977 (12.5 percent instead of 16 percent); the most important hike centered an 1ow incomes (+13.7 percent). The food price upward spiral - slackened whereas rents, clothing and shoes underwent a seasible increase. Consumer Price Index at Nairobi (base 100: January/June 1975) - Dec 1976 Dec 1977 Dec 1978 Middle incomes 114.9 130.~ 14i.0 Low incomes 118.3 142.8 162.3 (of which foods) (111.5) (130.7) (147.8) Employment remained stagnant wiCh a 1 percent increase as compared with . 5.3 percent in 1977, falling short of the 1974-1978 development plan targets: an annual 4.5 percent. TIie number of wage earners increased from 902,900 in 1977 to 911,500 in 1978. In real term~, salaries increased an average 12. percent, as compared with 12.5 percent on Cfie average consumer price index. 38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ; Foreign Trade A detailed analysis of the balance.of paymenta anabled an observer to have ~ a basic idea of Kenyan exterior trade: There r~tas a sudden aggravation of the trade defic~t in the wake of dec'reasing co�fee exports and increasing imports. Kenyan Foreign Trade ~ (in million shillings) ; Import Export* Balance 1976 ` 8,140 6,373 -2,954 _ 1977 10,625 9,460 -1,165 1978 (temporary) 13,222 7,400 -5,822 - Trade deals which picked up in 1977 (120 as compared with 91 in 1976) degraded again in 1978: 103, representing a 14.2 percent decrease. ~ There was an increase in imports from most countries of origin except Iran, while Japan and Africa simply stabilized their positions. Origins of Kenyan Imports (in million shillings) 1976 1977 1978 Africa 335.2 159.9 184.9 Great ~ritain 1,540d9 1,904.3 2,918.6 . r.R.G. 819.5 1,157.~ 1,755.1 ~ , Japan 900.7 1,312.0 1,358.2 ! - Iran 1,367.0 910.1 896.3 Other countries 3,176.0 5,182.4 6,109.4 Total 8.139.9 10,625.7 13,222.5 ~ Kenya curtailed its raw materials imporCs (cotton and rubber) and limiCed its = hydrocarbons purchases (2,378 mi111on shillings in 1978 as compared with 2,367. in 1977). But, importa for "mechanical" and "transport materials" - sectors shot up to fulfill naCional development needa and to replace the structure of the former Eastern African Co~uttity. The volume.of exports--45.6 percent Co the European.Economic Community and ~ _ 23 percent to ~lfrica--diminished by 7.2 percent in 1978. *Reexports not included. 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Destinations o~ Ken~*an Exports* (in million sh311~.ngs~ 1976 1g77 1978 Africa 1,944..0 2,204.0 1,879.5 . Great Britain 71a.1 1,271.5 1,143.9 ` F.R.G. 842.2 1,719.0 1,136.2 Netherlands 338-.-9 1,026.9 487.0 United States 366.2 551.9 3~0:4 Other coun~ries 2,898.8 3,119.6 2,897.2 Total 6,901.2 9,892.9 7,914.2 In 1978, Uganda still was Kenya's leading African imporCer (769 million shillings), with Rwanda trailing far behind but showing signs of catch~ng - up and with an insignificant trade with Tanzania. Coffee and tea were with hydrocarbons the main exports; although the relative importance of Che first Cwo products had diminished a decrease - in prices, their share of the market was only down from 59 percent in 1977 to 51.3 percent in 1978. Kenyan Exports of Coffee and Tea (T: tons; V: million shillings) Green Coffee Tea - T V T V 1976 77,546 1,866.0 59,267 635.3 1977 94,235 4,087.5 70,152 1,435.6 1978 85,432 2,495.2 ' 84,966 1,269.7 ' Sydrocarbons exports also diminished by 9.5 percent: 1,389 million shillinga instead of 1,534 in 1978, because the Ugandan market had shriveled up and J Che Tanzanian market had disappeared. Balance of Payments The situation of the balance of payments'was directly in.fluenced by a decrease in exports since the secon~ seme~ter of 1977; tiiat year finally saw an important surplus; by contrast, tfiere t,t~as in 1978 a deficit, for.t~nately limited hy an introduction of long-term capitals and by a favorable ~osi~ioa ~f the "innisi5les." Tfie ev~lution of the balance of payments can be su~ed up as follo~rs: *Reexports included. 1~0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ Balance of Payments of Kenya (in: million shillings) ~ - 1976 ?977 1978 (temporary) Balance of goods - 698 + 482 -5,050 and services, i.e., ~ - Balance of trade (-1,934) (-1,284) (-7,135) Balance of invisibles +1,236 '(+1,766) (+2,086) 1 Balance of capitals +1,420 (+1,808) (+3,420) (of which: long-term movements) +1,274 (+1,744) (+3,148) i Errors and Omissions - 12 - 37 - 80 General balance ~ + 710 +2,253 -1,550 - Growing deficit had led the Kenyan Government to predict at the end of the year a restriction on imports: This was realized by an instruction issued by the Central Bank on 2 January 1979 imposing especiall.y a preliminsry ~ deposit of 100 percent on nonindisponsable products. ; I The Central Bank's statistical bull.etin of June 1979 indicated that effec- ! tively the balance of payments, following a rEduced deficit in the lst - quarter of 1979, developed a surplus during the 2nd quarter, fewer imporCs ~ _ and large returns from tourism making up for a decrease in exports cauaed ~ I by the loss of value of coffee. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 ; I 1 i 9213 ~ CSO: 4400 i ' i li I I I 1t1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LIBERIA PI.ANNING MINISTER VIEWS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATION _ LD241433 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in.French 18 Jun 80 pp 34-35 [Interview with Togba Nah-Tipoteh, Liberian Minister for Planning and Economic ~ffairs by Raphael Mergui, Monrovia: "The Soldiers Should Be Given Credit For This," date of interview not specified] - [Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE: What is the program of the Movement for Justice in Africa [MOJA]? Togba Nah-Tipoteh: Our program is the unity and liberation of all Africans. MOJA's national branches work according to every country's specific circum- stances but they all have three points in co~non--struggle against Apartheid, anti-Zionism and support for the Saharan people. JEUNE AFRIQUE: Does this mean that your movement is a kind of African amnesty international? Togba Nah-Tipoteh: No. We are, above all, political activists. _ JEUNE AFRIQUE: In how many African countries has MOJA taken root? - Togba Nah-Topoteh: In 30 countries. JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you taking advantage of the present situation in - Liberia to increase the number of MOJA's supporters and strengthen your organization? Togba Nah-Topoteh: Since the constitution has been suspended, we neither act nor think as MOJA. After the revolution, the mavement's leadership decided that activists should offer their services to the People's Redemp- tion Council [CPR] as individuals. We devote our efforts to agricultural - development projects and to the task of increasing the nimmber of jobs _ available. 1~2 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 rv~ vrrtt,tt~u, UJ~. ULVLY JEUNE AFRIQUE: Does this mean that you will dissolve MOJA? Togba Nah-Topoteh: No, but we participate in a national unity government. We are ruled by soldiers; we cannot do what we like. JEUNE AFRIQUE: This means that you are not free.... Togba Nah-Tipoteh: I am free. JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is it not paradoxical that a leftist movement cooperates with the military? Togba Nah-Tipoteh: I do not know whether we are leftists. Let us say that we are progressists. It is not in the least paradoxical that we cooperate with the military because they have rid us of the former regime and have provided us with an opportunity for raising the level of the ; consciousness of the masses. On the contrary, it would be paradoxical and counterrevolutionary if a movement claiming to be leftwing kept aloof from the revolution. JEUNE AFREQUE: Did you willingly agree ta become a minister? i Togba Nah-Tipoteh: I am happy to serve in a government which has rid us _ of repression and promised to bring democracy to the Liberian people. JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you allowed to play an important role' in the govern- ment? ~ j Togba Nah-Tipoteh: The ministers are responsible to the CPR for the smooth running of their departments. The CPR makes all political deci- sions. It often asks for our advice. The council is very open to suggestions. JEUNE AFRTQUE: Did you approve of the execution of 13 dignatariea of the former reg~me? Togba Nah-Tipoteh: The relevant decision was not adopted by the It was made by the miiitary. I was asked what I thought of this after it was all over. I said that it was necessary to execute them. JEUNE AFRIQUE: What was the immediate reason for overthrowing the Tolbert - regime? ; Togba Nah-Tipoteh: Repressive measures taken against soldiers who ~ expressed political opinions. I had warned the Tolbert government on BBC radio that it should avoid taking repressive measures against the _ military. 1~3 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 i - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYj i ! ; JEUNE AFRIQUE: Did you maintain any relations with the military before the revolution? Togba Nah-Tipoteh: MOJA was co-administrator of the Marcus Garvey Memorial High School which Samuel Doe attended and which propagated Pan-African ideas. JEUNE AFRIQUE: Did you then have an opportunity to meet Master Sergeant Samuel Doe? _ Togba Nah-Tipoteh: Yes, but only occasionally. The military prepared for and carried out the revolution by themselves. They should be g iven - credit for it. JEUNE AFRIQUE: How did the military express their political opinions prior to 12 April? - Togba Nah-Tipoteh; Last year, during the April demonstrations, the soldiers refused to fire at the crowd. Many of them were arrested and tortured. At one time, repression ~ecame less intense but it increased - again in March-April 1980 because many soldiers were expressing the ir support for the progressive movement by attending MOJA and People's Progressive Party meetings. One of my cousins, a captain, was arrested. - JEUNE AFRIQUE: I have the impression that the revolution is not changing things very much.... Togba Nah-Tipoteh: The revolution is only 1. month old. People guilty of corruption are in prison and will not come back. This is a great change. The rest will take much longer. We have undertaken to create jobs and improve the people's living standard. JEUNE AFRIQUE: Where will you find the money? - Togba Nah-Tipoteh: By making the Liberians participate in decisionmaking, we will insure that they work harder. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPSIA 1980 C~O: ~'+~GO ~ - FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LIBERIA NE[d REGIME'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, ORIENTATION NOTED Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French 16 May-8 Jun 80 p 16 ~Report: "Liberia: The Totally Empty Cash Registers"] [Text] The Liberian military who overthrew President William Tolbert in the night of 11 April last and who gave the leadership of the state to - a People's Redemption Council, presided o�~er by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, has decided to put an end to the executions of the leaders of the old system, 13 of whom have been executed in accordance with a slap- dash instruction. The sentences, cheered by the Monrovia crowds, had created a certain confusion abroad and triggered a number of calls for clemency on the part of chiefs of state, the Pope, and a number of humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty International. - Announcing the end of the executions, President K. Doe justifiably expressed his regrets that for over a century human rights in Liberia had drawn no attention as long as those who had been deprived of them were poor. "This attitude," he said in essence, "leads the true defenders of human rights to ask themselves whether all those who call today for respect for human rights in Liberia are not simply seeking to rescue their rich friends in trouble." Meanwhile, the trial of the old system goes on. A supreme people's court of seven justices was appointed by the People's Redemption Cour~cil. It will consider the cases of some 100 personalities accused of high treason, including former ministers, high officials of the True Whig Party (Tolbert's party), former deputies and senators, high officials of the old administration, and high-ranking officers, including the former chief of staff and two generals. On the other hand, Togba-Nah Tipoteh, leader of the MOJA--Movement for Justice in Africa--one of the two political groups represented, together with the military, in the government, and minister of the pian and the _ economy, revealed that on the eve of the coup d'etat, all that the Tolbert government had was $1.5 million (about 300 million CFA francs) in cash in his treasury while owing $700 million (about 140 billion CFA francs) to foreign creditors. Rice reserves were sufficient for no more than one week while petroleum reserves were sufficient for two weeks, 1~5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY whereas they were supposed to suffice, respectively, for three months and two months. The new government has already succeeded in raising these levels to two weeks and two months. Finally, the minister stated that every year the overthrown government - had been appropriating $127,000 for the former presidents of tt?e republic, even though the country did not have a single one. The political orientation of the new team continues to raise questions. The strictness of the initial sentences strangely clashes with the fate of several former high officials and ministers, some of whom either kept their positians or are about to assume them. Furthermore, the unappea 1- able condemnation of the Tolbert regime, on the economic level, has no t been followed, to this day, by nationalization measures. M/Sgt K. Doe, whose official biography states that "he is not a socialist and not particularly capitalist, but supports the reestablishment of equaZ opp o r- tunity without discrimination," has merely announced a forthcoming reduc- tion in the price of rice (basic staple) and of the cost of transporta- tion. In order to prevent the flight of capital, he has also proclaimed that authorized withdrawal from bank accounts may not exceed $1,000 pe r individual and $20,000 per company. ~ Finalll~, on 14 May the authorities announced the detention of Ma~or Douglas, minister of commerce, and of a number of officers who had planned a counter coup d'etat which was thwarted. COPYRIGHT: 1980 AFRIQUE ASIE 5157 CSO: 4400 ' . i 46 ' , FOR OFFICIti;.. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LIBERIA BRIEFS ; RELATIONS WITH U.S.--The American military mission continues to occupy an entire story at the Liberian ministry. Following the 12 April coup d'etat as a result of which the now deceased President Tolbert was over- - thrown, it was believed that relations between the two countries would worsen. However, the new leaders in Monrovia claim that the privileged ' relations with Washington will be retained. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Jun 80 p 40] 5157 CSO: 4400 i _ ~ , !~7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240100046-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MALI BRIEFS - IDA INDUSTRIAL LOAN--The International Development Association (IDA), a branch of the World Bank, has granted Mali a loan of $8 million f ar a development project involving both industry and traditional activities, - to be handled by the Mali Centra] Bank. The loan will a.lso be used to promote the modernization and expansion of the Bamako Dairy Union which manufactures pasteurized dairy goods. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR~4NEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1263] 5157 - FOOD PROCESSING LOAN--French loans to agroindustry. The Central Economic , Coo~eration Bank has granted Mali two loans totaling 15 million French francs (1.5 billion Mali francs), which will cover slightly over one- - third of the cost of building a flour mill and an assembly line for the production of cattle feed in Koulikoro. The production of the flour mill wi11 make it possible to import coarse grain instead of flour and process local output, whose development is favored by the FAC and AID. - [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRpiNEENS In French 30 May 80 - p 1263] 5157 CSO: 4400 ~.8 _ FOR OFFICI~. USE ONLY ~ I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 . ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ; - MAURITIUS , NEGOTIATIONS FOR OIL REFINERY EXAMINED Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May 80 p."s6 [Article by HErve-Masson, "About Oil and Diamonds"] , [Text] The government of Mauritius is currently negotiating with a private - French firm for tfie construction of a large oil refinery, The pretext: the black gold would then cost less for tfie Mauritians (whose consumption ~ is not very great, however) . The arguments: the island possesses Cwo well- - sheltered ports (Port Louis and Mahebourg) , it is not very f~r from :the oil-producing countries of the Gulf, and labor is cheap there. The cost of the operation is estimated at a billion rupees (1 rupee: 0.55 French francs), 'F which is a great deal for a little country in the throes of an ec~nomic ' crisis without precedent. But tiiey assert that tfie project will be financed by the French firm. ~ Actually th~_s French firm serves as a screen for the Pretoria authorities who, since the Iranian revolution, are e~eriencing increasing difficulties in getting the oil they need, even by roundabout routes. Mauritius is a fissure in the bloc of progressive countries and Arab countries which are striving to isolate tfie apartheid regime. It maintains close links with Pretoria. Mauritian ministers are sent there on delegations, and do not hesitate to denounce the position of Mauritius� own representative at the UN, Mr Ra.mphul. The latter never fails to denounce the South African regime before the United Nations witfiout his government, which adjusts his fire every time, dismissing him from his job. This is one of the comic-- - opera peculiarities of Dr Ramgoolam. With him posing no obstacles , Pretoria is going to lend 145 million to I Port-Zouis; it will again buy Mauritian tea, reputedly of bad quality, at p~eferential prices; aircraft of tlie South African Airways land regularly - and very officially in Mauritius. Ma.uritius, 90 percent of whose population � have a brown, or a very brown skin, has no better friend than the racist ' Sout_+t African Republic ! In this context they easily grasp the ~unavowed) obaect of the refinery operation. Under the cover of t~ie Mauritian Governmeni: and a French firm, - Pretoria will invest whatever is necessary to have on the soil of Mauritius 1~9 ~ ~ ~ FOR USE ONLY _ I ' I - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - and large refinexy pxocess~ng o~l imported directly ,fzom the Gulf. ':usritius, still servile, would then ree-.-~ort the ref~ned petroleum to South A~~rican ports. Simple, but it makes one think.... If these projects, which for the moment are only well-founded rumors, are realized, the OAU should take the necessary measures against the present Mauritian regime. The latter, moreover, proceeds from one scandle to the next. So Mauritius has had its "Muldergate affair," and is now having its "affair of the diamonds." - The first was quickly hushed up. Buying Silence - - A deputy of the majority party, Mr Chettiar, wha is also treasurer of tfie _ Labor Party of Prime Minister Ramgoolam, made some shocking revelations to ~ the press before the return of parliament, asserting tha t public funds had been used by the party in po~rer to fi.nance partisan activities. He had said he was able to prove his allegations. The prime minister i~ediately denied it, while buying Chettiar's silence. The latter has therefore ~ust made a = uew statement to the Assembly in which he completely denies his "revelations" and at the same states t~iat he had spoken under the influence of emotion and anger! Convicted of corruption by a~udicial body, two ministers had been forced to resign. Namely Messrs Badry and Daby. Fearing that they might strengthen _ the ranks of the opposition, tfie prime minister reimbursed them, quite - officially. The first was decorated, and the second was appointed "chief whip" ~f the Labor Party. The opposition decided never to have any dealings _ with Mr Daby. As for the "affair of the 3iamonds," it is an unprecedented scandal. Through ~ the intermediary of a British mercenary, Mr Rewcastle, Minister Ramgoolam had an enormous lot of jewels which had been seized by the customs sold from hand to hand, quite illegally. At fialf the price assessed by experts. One would like to know into whose pockets the (probable? commissions went. - Ministers? Tfie mercenary? After the inventory, the director of the audit service, in charge of controlling state expenses, revealed that 7 diamonds, 7 emeralds, one pearl and a pearl necklace had disappeared without trace. _ No police investigation was ordered by the prime minister, who is also minister of the interior. Wfiy? What did they have to hide? In what ~ewel - - box had the ~tolen stones gone? A mystery....But the answer is on everyone's _ lips. Replying to a motion of censure of the opposition, the prime minister made embarrassing explanations, contenting himself praising publicly the mercenary Rewcastle and...denouncing the incompetence of the director of the audit. Tfiis director, Mr Pillay, one suspects, is supported by the opposition parties and by the powerful civiJ. service trade union, which emhraces a11 officials. As for resigning, as public opinion unanimousl;~ - demands, Ramgoolam doesn't want *_o hear about it: "Mo pas enan pou a11er" (I don't have to leave), he said serenely. 50 - FOR OFFICI~;. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOIt OFFICIAL US~. ONLY _ But the cup is filled to overflowing. Will it be necessary to resort to ' other methods than those which pertain to pretended democratic legality in = order to drive out of office these people who are milking their country? The temptation is strong. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie , b108 C50: 4400 - . . ; - 51 FOR OFFICIAL USE OI~II,Y i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MOZAI~ IQUE SAMORA MACHEL GIVES INTERVIEW TO PARIS MAGAZINE LD151433 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7-20 Jul 80 Supplement pp 6-11 [Interview with Mozambique President Samora Machel in Maputo by Simon Malley, on occasion~of fifth anniversary of Independence Day 25 June 1975: "Samora Machel: 'The Wind of RevoLution Is Blowiag Over Africg..."'] [Excerpts] [Introductory passage omitted] "Well before our victory," Samora Machel said, "FRELIMO knew that.without the liberation of our African brothers in Zimbabwe and South Africa our independence would be threatened and our stability precarious. Sub3ected as we constantly were to the dangers of military aggression from racist regimes, which moreover organize, finance and train Mozambique traitors and the mercenaries in their pay with a view to destabilizing our country, we were perfectly aware of the reality of these dangers. This is why the support we gave to our comrades in arms in Zimbabwe was not only an act of faith, of belief in their sacred cause, but also a political obligation forming an integral part of FRELIMO's funda- mental principles. By sending our own soldiers onto the battlefield, we were translating internationalism into concrete actiQns, as other revolu- tionary regimes have done in Africa and elaewhere.... ~ "You ask if independence in Zimbabwe will change the correlation of forces in southern Africa. Things do not change automatically. Historq does not make itself. It is made by men. The question we must ask is in whose favor this correlation of forces has changed and will change. In other words if this change meets our wishea and our interests. Can it be doubted? Anyway, _ who has been the agent, the driving force ber.ind *_:~e change? The enemy or - us? Can the answer be in any doubt? . "All this means that Zimbabwe's indspendence has definitely caused a change in the correlation of forces i�n our area, a change which promotes our inter- esta. But haw are we going to defend of�r victory? For imperialism`s weapons - are not merely political or military. ~;eq are also and primarilq economic. And economic weapons are more dangerous because they are more subtle, ffiore cunning.. Imperialism knows Afric~ very well. It has dominated, exploited = and oppressed it for centuries. It also Fossesses technology, scienc~ and _ money and thus has formidable reaources for applying pressure against us. Let me give you one example concerning Zimbabwe. Now independent, it does - 52 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY not have a single geologist although it poasessea gold mines, coal mines, chromium and iron. It has no agronomista although it produces corn, tobacco, tea and so on. It~:has'no vets although it has so much cattle. There are no engineers, no doctors. Nothing. Absolutely nothing.~ "Oh yes:, colonialiem trained lawyers, historians, philosophers, socio~.o- gists--a bit like here, but where are the hydraulic engineers, the chemists, ~ the technicians concerned with irrigation, constructi~n, dams...? Can you not see that, alas, we are atill.vunerable to imperialism? How do we re- sist it then? It is tru2 we have the~will to create revolution, the pro- found desire to upset and change~ everything. But imperialism remains - around us and holds and reins of the science of which it has deprived us. "How do we combat this vulnerability except by the unity of the active forces of the African nations, by their cohes~.on, their ever increasing cooperation. The racists thought they would remain for ever in a country like Zimbabwe. So they built plants., aet up factories, extracted gold and chromium and exploited the iron. How can the nationalist forces take up their rightful place when ~he racists have the acience and technology? In other worde I return to my firat queation: How~do we defend~our victory? I say 'our' victory, for the victory�of the Zimbabwe people ia a victory - f~r all of us, for all the African peoples. [Question) But, comrade president, do you think that imperialism wi11 allow - you to defend this victory? Some people say, for example, that the United States has allegedly put Mozambique bn its black liat? ~ [Answer] I said to the Americans: ~'It is you who should be on the black list of the Mozambique people. During our war of liberation the United Statea denied our right to independence, to liberty. They were uncondi- tional allies of Portugues~ colonialism. They never helped us. Following ~ our victory, let me tell you that we too have our black list:" I think that this is the first time in hiatory that a country which maintains diplo- . - matic relations with another has put this latter on a black list, as the ~ Americans are doing. But did they ever put raciat Rhodesia on their black list? Have they ever done this for South Africa? Perhapa because the truth ie that Washington favors apartheid. ~ Let us go further in our diacugsion and our analysis. The last FRELIMO congress defined~key sectora for our development. We said that agriculture is the bas3.s of our economy. That industry is its dynamic element and that heavy induatry is a decisive factor. If the Amaricans ~iave put us on their ~ list it is becauae they kriow all this. They know too that we want to put ~ an enc', to hunger, nakedness, ei~ckness, poverty and miaery. To put an end in order to produce food, to ensure�decent housing for all our citizens, ~ to eliminate illiteracy. Well, the United States thinke it can dominate - the world because of ita agricultural wealth. As a result, if Mozambique, - _ whose climate is fsvorable to agriculture--we hardly ever experience ~ - drought--becomes an agricultural power, domination by U.S. imperialism in this sphere would be broken. ~ ~ 7~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Do you know that every second considerable quantities of water from our rivers escape into the sea while we suffer from hunger? If we had 200 dams, Mozambique would be Africa's cereal granary. We would provide food for the oil-producing countries. Yes, just 200 dams, when our country could have 1,000: We have, in fact, 15 great rivers and their water flaws unfortunately toward the aea. We are capable of producing al~ that Africa, Europe, even Latin America produces. Cotton, wheat, corn, rice, tea, coffee, milk and even flowers: We have conditions to~rival those of Canada, we could.develop a rich livestock, very rich; ~attla;, sheep, goats, pigs and so on. We have considerable wealth in our soil and in our substrata, for we possess raw materials which could make us one of the continent's big producers; for example, one o.f the big producers of alvminum with the power fram Cabora - Bassa.... African countries with such potential are rare. This is why we are on the U.S. black 1ist. We want to upset the cozrela- tion of forces and put an end to our dependence which is so we11 organized from outside. As for the United States, it is fighting for thi~ dependence to be preserved. For us to continue to depend on-their wheat, thei.r corn, . - their flour.... ~ - So, I tell them that their strategy is to fight to preserve and perpetuate underdevelopment. They live, yes theq live by other people's underdevelop- - ment.... Thus this strategy is based on two essential etements: The destabilization and the economic dependence of countries in the process of - development. That amounta to organizing underdevelopment: That's what they call civilization; Organizing i~.literacy, preserving ignorance, depriving us of the means ot build hospitals, schools, trading in education, hospitals and death: Organizing grostitu~ion, drugs trafficking, supporting bandits, the Mafia. It is against all this, comrade, that we are fighting. - [Question] But what counterstrategy are you advocating? Our Camrade Aquino _ de Braganca often alludes to what he calls "Sam+orian strategy;" What does this involve? 5amora Machel laughs wholeheartedly before continuing: - [Answer) Our policy rests on the principle that we wish to develop our cooperation with all peoples. We do not want aid from.anyone. We are.not asking for aid from anyone. We are in favor of economic, scientific, tech- nological and cultural cooperation with everyone. , And it is within the bour_~s of this cooperation that we define objectives and priorities. We know our country's needs and we are fighting to aecure these for our people.. But we are ready to cooperate with everyone, we want to know and dete~ine what is in everybody's interests. � [QuestionJ It appears that this is what qou allegedly said to Claude Cheyason, the EEC representative, and that he was s~upposedly rather aur- - prised at certain remarks.... ~ ' 54 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY " APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Answer] Yes, I told him straight that we do not want aid from anyone at all. Cooperation maybe. But what benefita doea the EEC get from this coop eration? In my opinion it is not a public charity organization so it mus t fi.nd definite benefits in it. What bene~its? When people say to us: - We ar e going to grant you $5 million. I reply: In exchange for what? I . do no t think they grant ua euch a eum for nothing: Who on earth would do ' that ? Usually it is only God who does that.... God is good at�that, but - the EEC? It does not have a vocation'for distributing largesse as if it were handingoutfree beer.... If the EEC wants to cooperate, it must give prio r ity to the creation of industries capable of developing our infrastruc- ture, of liberating us from dependence in the face of the industrialized ' powers. This is how I envisage constructive cooperation with the EEC. And this is what I told Cheysson. [Answer ends] When I broached the question of relations between the People's Republic of ' - Mozambique and South Africa, I was obviously broaching a topic which arouses cont r oversies among progressive African opinion and even createa a certain pres s campaign among the Western media which sims to weaken FRELIMO's pres- tige and standing. ~ . [Machel] The atruggle we are all waging is not directed againat a country-- ~ South Africa--but against apartheid. Our struggle is not against the whites. _ who are not foreigners in their country, but against the racial and racist discrimination which is practiced against the overwhelming ma~ority of the South African people. Why then do the Arab countries fight againat Israel? It i s not because the Israelis are not the inhabitants of this territory ~ but b ecause they r~fuse to recognize that the PaleBtinians, whom they have ' either expelled or subjected to their yoke, have righte--of which they have ; been deprived. � . ' That is why Iarael will first have to give back the occupied Arab terri- ~ tor i es and accept the UN resolutions and the right of the Palestinians to an independent, sovereign and free atate. Once this has been secured I. ' - do not think that there would be any major proble~n which could not be over- ~ come or settled. Israel is the destabilizing factor in the Middle East be- caus e it refuses the Palestinians the rights which belong�to them. : This is to say that the day when apartheid falls in South Africa, the day when ~he whites, the blacks and the Asians participate fully in tlie polit- ical, socioeconomic and cultural decision-making in tke 3outH:A~Erica ataCe, then a11 countries of the world will have normal relations with it. On that day~ Mozambique,itaelf wi11 ask for SouCh Africa's memberahip in the OAU. IC is an essentially racial problem. Abolish apartheid, and South Africa, - which is a founder-member of the United Nations and therefore an independent country according to the charter, will be recognized by all. _ As far as economic relations between Mozambique and South Africa go, there is a golden rule: You can chooae your friende~iaut unfortunately you can never chooae your neighbore in the same way as you do not chooae your brother. 55 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY He might be a bandit, an assassin, a crook, a dropout, a drug addict, a = criminal. But he is your brother and you cannot alter the fact. The South African regime is.racist but it ia our neighbor. Neither it.nor we can do - anything about it. We cannot get out of it by saying that we are a.Marxist state. No doubt South Africa would like not to have a Marxist neighbor, ~ just as all of us in Mozambique and no doubt elsewhere would like not to have racist South Africa on our borders. � But is is necessary to understand the problems bequeathed to us by Portu- guese colonialism. Over 500,000 Mozambicans live and work in South Africa. Married, they live in that country, but they come to visit their country of origin, then return home. We have here and in South Africa co~wn ethnic groups which speak the same�language. They have the same customs, the same traditions, the same habits and the same culture. It ia apar~heid which prevents theae peoples from developiag their solidarity, their unity. Nobody can be unaware ot this. ~ On the economic 1eve1, we depend on South Africa to a certain extent. T'here is a sort of interdepencence. The port of Maputo makes its living from South Africa. A certain area of South Africa in,turn makes its living fram the purt of�Maputo. It is a bit like the FRG and the GDR. All the socialist countries have relations with the FRG, including the GDR, although there are profound differences between them, mainly about Berlin. Moreover these relations are not restricted to economic cooperation. They eatend to the cultuxal, scientific and technological spheres. Al1 sorts of cooperation except for ideological cooperation. And'just take the example of links between the� socialist countries and countries which have all manner of relations with _ tretoria. France, Britain, the United States, the FRG--all of tlzem supply and equip South Africa, which allows it to threaten its neighbors and wreak - aggression against them. And why then do the socialist countries not 8ever their relations with these Western powera? tinder the law, is not he who a~ns the criminal not equally guilty? A.nd the United~Nations? Has it de- creed any sanctions against South Africa? . - [Question) The General Assembly, yea. But the Security Council, whose decisions are binding, has not imposed these sanctions.... [Anawer] Exactly. Resolutions, then Weetera vetos: This is the play- acting we have witnessed in the Security Council on South Africa, when the council had the opportunity to impose by force a blockade of the South African coast, and even to provide for recourse to military intervention - - to force it to conform to its decisions. But all decision in this area has been '.-locked by the Western powers. Thus it is they who are 3ust as responsible,for the preservation of the regime of apar~heid in�South Africa. And evPn though the Security Council bans the delivery of 4trategic arms to - Pretoria, none of the Western pawers has seriously respected thie: These 56 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY arms continue to be supplied, either directly or through the interniediary ; - vi other countries or companies. [Answer endsJ An Economic Capital for Southern Africa? On the subject of the international tenaion which has developed in recent months, I put two crucial the Mozambique head of state. Doea he think that there is a danger of a world crisis, of a military confron- ' tation between Washington and Moscow? And what does he think of.the Afghan ; affair and of the campaign of military hysteria unleashed almost everywhere by the Western media, including those of a certain left which alleges iteelf ; to be "progressive?" , . ~ [Answer] We all know that imperialism is in the proceas of preparing condi- tions which would to provoke a war. It-is not the Soviet Union which desires or.wanta this. Look how imperialism is mobilizing a11 the necessary resources,.maneuvering and plotting to achieve ita ends. Cuba, through the voice of Comrade Fidel Castro, declared in 1977 that it is ready ~ - to reestablish relations with the United States. But the hostile and nega- tive reaction of the Americans revealed their real intentions and designa against the Cuban revolution. And so.a hysterical campaign was unleaehed _ against Cuba. And the thousands of those dropouta, criminals and bandits that cuba allowed to go to the United States, Peru, Venezuela and elsewhere wer:. exploited by Washington to try to strike a blow at the prestige of � the Cuban revolutionariea. But we ~11 know that the enemies of the Cubsn ; revoiutionaries are the imperialists. And do you know what I call these , dropouts who lefC th.eir motherland? The arnry of imperialism: ~ So let us talk about Afghanistan. Our stance is clear: It is to adopt a ~ policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. That means that if the Afghan Government decided to ca11 on another country, a - foreign military force to help it~to defend its eovereignty and its inde- pencence, we could only support it. It is not a queation for us of support- ' ing the Soviet Union because Chere ie no Soviet invaston of Afghaniatan on ~ which we musC take,a stance. If the Soviets went there, it is becauee they - were requested to do so. The Cubane went into Angola then into Ethiopia~ . because these two countries asked them to support,them and we approved of their action. ' Having said that, we aupport the Afghan Governsnent's atance and thie is why I do not underatand the polemic mounted againeC the Sovieta. If there is . ~ to be a polemic, it should be mounted againet Afghaniatan, as it is a sovereign decision of a sovereign and independent government. To aCt$ck ; the USSR is to distract attention from the easence of the problem in ord~r _ to exacerbate world tension. But do not let us enter into thie polemic, _ Let us be satisfied with asking ourselvee if Afghaniatan was right or wrong to ask for Soviet aid. Ask youraelf what France, for example, would have done if Kabul had turned to it inatead of turning to the Soviet Union? Do you seriously think that Paris would have given a reply to.defend Afghanistan against rebels supported by the Americans and their allies? 57 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE QNLY [Question] Paris intervened at the request of certain African governments under colonialism..,. ~ [Answer] Precisely. The French never asked for the Security Council`s authorization before sending troop~ into Zaire, Morocco, Central Africa, Chad and so on. Why did they not ask the council to intervene--or why did they show no opposition--when Bob Denard's mercenaries disembarked on the Comoro Islands, murdered,Head of State Ali Soilih and set up a state with a soldier of fortune as its head? [Answer ends] , ~ COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie CSO: 4400 - 58 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MOZAMBIQUE CHISSANO VIEWS RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL, OTHER STATES - LD151501 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7-20 Jul 80 Supplement pp 14-17 [Interview with Mozambique Foreign Minister Joaquim Chiasano in Maputo by - - Simon Ma11ey: "An Interview With Joaquim Chassano"--date of interview not specified] � [Excerpts] Simon Malley: Is there not a degree of deadlock in your rela- tions with Portuga 1 at present? What is your view as the man who carried out the initial negotiations with that country? ~ . Joaquim Chissano: The instability and frequent changes of government in Portugal are probab ly major reasons for the deterioration in our relations ~ azd for the deadlock into which they are slipping. With each change of government, negotiations have stopped. Then they started again only to end with the fall of another fleeting government. , What however is the main problem? In my view it is simply that the Portu- guese leader�s have not yet fu11y accepted the fact that we are independent, and that Portugal is no longer our mother country. When they have assimi- lated this fact we will probably have better relations and wt11 cooperate - as we do with many countries--Sweden, France, Brazil and ao forth. _ It is not the language queation which determines the degree of cooperation. A co~non language may, of course, be an advantage but the essential point ' is the nature of r elations and the principles on which they are based. Portugal must not b etray the principle8 b ehind the 25 April revolution, when there was a sincere desire to defeat fasciam and liberate the country from . ; the colonial :,ur.den. ; ~ However, with time, people will atart to think differently in Portugal and - we will then be ab le to reach a better understanding. ~ Simon Malley: Wha t is the fundamental dispute? Ie it economic queationa? ~ Joaquim Chissano: That is where the difference lies. We do not talk of a dispute. We do not think there is one. We have said so aince the 1974 - negotiations. : 59 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Simon Malley: Are they demanding compensation? - Joaquim Chissano: At firat there was talk of a deb t. Then they 8poke of - a dispute. We have never refused to recognize the existence of a debt. However we have said that it must be proved and that the figurea should be clear. Finally.we wanted to see after all the calculations had been made, who was in debt to whom. At that stage they changed and started talking about a dispute. ' Si.mon Malley: So, at preaent there is no cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique.... Joaquim Chissano: In practical terms there are only co~ercial relations. Variaus agreements have been signed but they have not been implemented. So far, no Portuguese min~.ater has visited our country nor have any of our ministers visited Portugal, I would like to say a few worda here about our relations with the FRG which have not been developed either. We are at present carrying out negotiations reiating, in particular, to the defin~tion of West.Berlin`s status. Howevsr - we think this problem will be overcome and we will establish means of co- _ operating at.economic level. . . Simon Malley: However, your realtions with Brasil, for example, have been _ developed. � - Joaquim Chissano: Yes. Especially from the co~nercial viewpoint. We are expecting a visit from the Brazilian foreign~minister. This wil.l launch official contacts which may ~nable us to extend the sphere of cooperation. Simon Malley:. What relatians does Mozsmbique have with the Middle East, - - the Arab world in general, Africa and the other c~ntinents? Joaquim Chissano: The most important area for us i~, of courae, Africa. We have devoted a great deal of effoYt to consolidating African unity within - the OAU and giving it a more comgetitive character with regard to imperialism and colonialism. We have $l~o engaged in economic battles within ~he organi- zation and have established bilateral contacts with several member countries, especially those in our region, We believe that regional cooperation is not solely motivated by geographical position but that its scale dependa essentially on economic affinities and on existing or potential complementaritq. In our view that is the most appropriate basis for A~'rica's economic lib~ration. We are seeking specific practical areas which could give rise ta cooperatiom with~the whole conti- nent. For instance with Algeria, Guinea, the Congo, and West Africa as a whole which I have 3ust visited in order to find our more about the econamic - initiatives taken by the countries in that region. As regards Latin America, we }?ave contacts with numerous countries,_ This is true of Guyan,a, Jamiaca 60 FOR OFFICIAL USE OPiLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 ; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and Cuba, wit:~ whom we.naturally have excellent cooperation in the social and economic apheres. , As regards the Middle East I muat point out that we have always supported the struggle being waged by the peoples in this region to recover their sovereignty over the territories occupied by others and for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. We have also always condemned the imperialist maneuvers to prevent the success~of these struggles by every possible means.... It is unacceptable that Egypt shauld act the Pales- _ tinian people's name. It is the Palestinian people and their legitimate rerpesentatives who must be consulted with a view to~finding a just solution to the crisis. We also have economic contacts in thia region however. We cooperate with Kuwait, Iraq and Syria. We are fully prepared to cooperate with any country in the world. Indeed we have even come to cooperate with traditional enemies such as South Africa. Our relations with South Africa are motivated by very apecial reasons connected with our economic infra- structures. However I would like to stress that we do not cooperate with _ fascist regimes such as those in Chile, Ierael, South Korea or Taiwan. We are prepared to cooperate with Western Europe. - Our best friends are in Eastern Europe. We have good relations with the Soviet Union and China and Cooperate with them. ciowever our stances on the various international issues and our domestic ' policies should not be confusefl with our friendahip for the socialist countries which dates from the time of our struggl~ against Portuguese ~ colonialism. Our positions are based solely on our own analyaes and we establish them in full independence. Simon Malley: You used the expression "cooperation with South Africa." In so doing--although your aim is clearly to reduce your dependency on - Pretoria--some people might say that you are strengthening thE apartheid regime? Is such cooperation not contrary to the resolutions adopted by the OAU, nonaligned countries and other international bodies advocating South Africa's isolation? ' - Joaquim Chissano: It is we who drafted theae resolutions, who uphold them and force those who can to ap~,ly them. We will never acG~pt apartheid and have told the South Africana that. However it has to be admitted that some countries have no choice. The ties which?.their former colonizera had es- tablished with South Africa involve their very infrastructures. Theae tiea are such that it is now impossible to reject cooperation without disastrous consequences for our economies. _ We want to develop in order to change this situation. In this respect the - victory won by the people in the last British colony is a ma~or step forward for the whole region and especially for us aince we are alBO dependent on - Rhodesia from the economic viewpoint. Today we have relations on an equal footing with an independent neighbor to our west: The Republic of Zimbabwe. 61 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240100046-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY We are trying to balance our cooperation. We are urging everybody to help us to overcome our dependence on South Africa. We would even Iike our _ economic strength to bring preasure to bear on Pretoria; that could help _ bring about a change in the apartheid regime, - _ Our position is, therefore, verq different fram virtuElly all other coun- - tries. That is why we supported an OAU resolution advocating an economic boycott on South Africa but giving a diapensation to those countries which are unable to do so. This applies to us and to Botswan~, Lesotho, Swasiland and Cape Verde. The Portuguese and the South Africans built the Cabora Basss dam in our country and the electricity it produces goes to South Africa. What could we do with all that energy at our present stage of de- velopment? What about our railroads and ports? They were designed solely to serve South Africa. Simon Malley: At present the situation seems very tense. Do you not fear an attack from South Africa? Joaquim Chissano: I do not think they stand to gain from attacking us openly. However, if they did we would take the necessary steps, as we did sgainst P.hodesia. We would immediately sever economic links and that would make them suffer. Moreover, such a situation would enable the nationalists to step up the internal and exr_ernal struggle against South Africa.... No. What we fear is what is already happening. The mercenaries which South Africa is harboring, the so-called "resistance fronts," are infiltrating into Mozambique to try and destabilise us, attempt subversion and spread _ terrorism. For instance we discovered a booby-trapped truck containing tons of explosives outside Maputo's Hotel Polana. If it had exploded it . would have killed hundreds of people including foreigners and tourists.... That truck came from South Africa, and all the equipment it contained came from there. Simon Malley: What is happening with the subversive group which calls itself Resistencia? Joaquim Chissano: Resistencia, Free Africa, Free Mozambique and so forth are_all part of the same group which is now installed in Spain and Lisbon, Their men receive supplies from South Africa. We regularly inform the United Nations and its secretary general of all their activities and involve- _ ment. Simon Malley: Is the border with Zimbabwe now calm? Joaquim Chissano: No. There are still gangs on both sides of the border which threaten Zimbabwe's security and ours. Simon Malley: The press has reported a statement by President Samora M,achel on the international legal characteristics of the South African state: He says it is an independent and sovereign atate and an African state. Could you expand on this idea and on the "internal" nature of apartheid? 62 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Joaquim Chasszno: From the legal viewpoint it has to be admitted that ~ - South Africa is an independent and sovereign state. It is even a UN founder-member. However what can be stressed is that this independence was won without the majority of the people having a share in the power. The total exclusion of this majority is ?aid down by a system of laws which constitute apartheid. It is against this that we are fighting: We want the abo? ition of apartheid, in other words the people's participation in the life of the country. If the Soufih African people achieve this, if democratic rules are finally established, th?n South Africa will be fully accepted by the international couununity. _ COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie CSO: 4400 ~ 63 - FOR OFFICZAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . MOZAMBIQUE BRIEFS _ P~JRT'J~I3~SE PORT IMPROVEMENT COOPERATION--Four contracts for a total of _ $1 m~_llion aimed at improving the ports of Maputo and Beira ware signed betweez: L4ozambique and the Portuguese firm SETENAVE. This will allow Mozambique to end its dependence on South Africa and Madagascar for mari- time repairs. It is well-known that Mozambican ports, already used by South Africa, Swaziland and Malawi for part of their exports, will enter a phase of important development through the handling of Zimbabwe's for- eign trade; this country also wishes to free itself from its dependence _ on South African ports. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER- - RANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1644] NORWEGIAN WOOD-PROCESSING FINANCING--Norway will finance the construction of a plant in the southern part of Mozambique for the production of wooden telegraph poles. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1644] TRANSPORTATION SECTOR APPOINTMENTS--~.i~Lnister of Ports and Transportation Alcantara Santos announced on 28 May ti:at Mozambique would create two state societies for river and maritime transports and for road transports. A number of new appointments were made in the directorate of transporta- tion. Namushakar Bate was named national director of ports and railroads; Adamo Valy was ~ppointed national director of river and maritime trans- ports and Zacarias Paulo de Pima and Fernando Ferreira Mendes were made - deputy national directors of ports and railroads. Antonio Sifa and Lazaro Sebastiao are deputy national directors of road transports, Francisco Ilidio Dinis is director of Mozambican Railroads for the south, Ramiro _ Lopes da Silva director of Mozambican Railroads for the center and Carlos Alberto Veloso director of Mozambican Railroads for the northern part of the country. Jorge de Souza Coelho was ap~ointed director of the port o� Maputo, Rui Carvalho Fonseca director of the port of Beira and Isaias Muate director of the port of Nacala. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX - _ ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1644] CSO: 4400 6!~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NIGER BRIEFS CCCE LOANS--On 15 May the Niger Council of Ministers considered and - adopted two draft ordinances authorizing the chief of state to borrow a _ first loan of 8.8 million French francs (440 million CFA) from the Central Bank for Economic Cooperation. _ A second loan of 140 million French francs, or 7 billion CFA francs, will be borrowed also from the CCCE. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1267] 5157 - DAM PROJECT--During his stay in France where he took part in the Franco- ~ African Summit Meeting in Nice, Presid:.nt Seyni Kountche met in Paris with the executives of a compai~y in charge of studies on the Kandadji Dam with whom he discussed the status of the project. All that remains to be done are technical studies of details. The work is scheduled to - begin in 1983 following the adoption of a strategy for contacting investors. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French _ 30 May 80 p 1267] 5157 , ~ C S 0 : 4400 , I ~ 65 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY R~UNION COMMUNIST DEPUTY VERGES INTERVIEWED BY ELIE RAMARp _ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Ma.y 80 pp 34-35 [Interview with Paul Verges, secretary general of the Reunion Communist Party by Elie Ramaro] [Text] The Reunion Autonomists, deprived of prospects by the defeat and _ _ disunity of the left ~n France, demand the decolonization of their island before the international organizations. Heard last January by the "ad 'hoc" committee created at the initiative of . the Co~ittee on Decolonization of tfie OAU in order to discuss the status of Reunion island, by the same token that a small pro-independence organization-- - the People's Movement for the Tndependence of Reunion-- the various parties or trade unions forming the anticolonialist front for the self-determination of Reunion (FRAPER) desire to be recognized as a"liberation movement." No less do they insist on the specific nature of tfie case of Reunion--an island the settlement of which was entirely colonial--as Paul Verges explains. He is a deputy in the European Parliament at Strasbourg, secretary general of the Reunion Co~unist Party, and main leader of this movement. [Question] "European" deputy 3n Strasbourg when you are the representative ~ ~ of a tropical colony in the Indian Ocean--what's the use of that?" . [Answer] Mainly to attract the attention of Europe to our extraordinary situation. The deputies of the "~Iine" discover to their astonishment that - there still exist colonial dependencies of~Europe and that they raise frightening problems. This irritates the British conservatives, the ring- ' leaders of whom taunted me one day: "We are speaking of our counCries as a community. Verges speaks about Iiis own." - [QuestionJ And the fo~er Gaullist minister, Michel Debre, who has his headquarters at Strasbourg? _ [Answer] No dialogue possible. I have the best relatians in the world with - everybody. With him, nothing: I must be an incarnation of the devil! But Debre rarely speaks of Reunion as such as Strasbourg. Anc~ when be does, it is to explain that the island is a citadel or a sentinel of the "free world." The Italian deputies told me that they didn't believe their headphones... 66 FOR OFFICIA,'.. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ - [Question] Is i.ntegrat~.on urith the European Lconomic Coumrunity good for ~ Reunion and the othez c~verseas departments and territories? - [Answer] It is an aggravating cause of our own crisis. One can easily see why in the question of the guaranteed sugar "quctas." The community sets - good conditions for the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries associated with the EEC in the framework of the Lome convention: it is to help their ~ development. But we of the Overseas Department of the Antilles or Reunion also belong to the T~ird World, but we are integrated into the European system and we come second. It is an enormous contradication. [Question] Hurricane Hyacinth left some deep scare.... [Answer] There were 7,500 people made homeless, most of whom are in shantytowns. But there have also been victims of a permanent hurricane: that of colonialism. When one refuses, like the government at Paris whicfi governs us at a distance of 10,000 kilometers, to consider Reunion as a tropical island, with its specific problems of climate, precipitation, and _ _ erosion; when they urge us to clear the land of stones systematically in the framework of recovery plans wYiich were inadequately thoughtout, and to - produce more at any cost; when they don't build enough and build poorly, forcing people to build wretched habitations in zones subject to flooding.... _ well, one naturally suffers damage! - ~ _ [Question] But financial aid promised by Paris is going to descend on the island, strengthe:~ing still further tYLis regime of permanent assistance... [Answer] The money is announced and distributed through bribes; but we have ' ~ the greatest difficulty in following the credits through to the end; and the democratic mun:icipalities are not associated with tfie control of distri- ~ bution of the funds, despite repeated demands. The Reunion geranium--the second largest export following sugar--has been wiped out: they did too � much stone clearing and the water "washed" the land of these plantations in the middle mountains. The planters, who will receive notfiing from their crops f.or 9 months, are going to come down onto the plain, seeking work ' , in construction--a sector which has had a certain revival after the hurricane. But will they ever go back up again? ' [Question] But that succeeds in deceiving people again.... [Answer] Less and less. Lock at the municipal election of Sainte Suzanne, ; last March, after two cancellations of the results due Co irregularities committed by the right. It was a Communist, Lucet Langenier, who won it, at the head of a list of the left; part of tfie population, especially the ~ "Cafres" (descendants of African slaves), saw in it the victory of the _ Negro Kunta-Kinte, hero of tfie te� evision drama. "Roots." The friends of Michel Debre, who had succeeded in controlling the key elements ~ of the political and administrative apparatus of the island in the 60's by ~ - resorting to open election fraud, are slowing down. The Giscardian party has _ 67 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY taken up positions there and uses for its oum benef-i,t the blackmail of aid, a more "suitable" method of fraud. They plan on securing the long-term _ passivity of the population by proving incessantly that they are indispenable to the "survival" of the island. But those who bave a profession--fiandicrafts " and fazmers, workers and intellectuals--know what they fiave lost through being "aided." And they are waking up... - [Question] What is the regly of the Left in the Face of this strangling of Reunion? [Answer] Before 1978 it was simple; the French Left had i.ncluded a chapter ~ on the self-determination of the Overseas Departments and Territories in its program; it was up to us then to have it applied. But it failed against ~ Giscard d'Estaing. Our 5th Congress, which will take place early in July, must derive the lessons from this and assess better the international aspects of our struggle. There have been important changes:in our region in the last fek years: Madagascar, Mozambique, the Seychelles, and Rhodesia have passed over ~o the anti-imperialist side, whatever their internal difficulties. The French Government should take this into account: it is trying to "open" Reunion just a little bit to its region, breaking a little with the policy ~ of the "bastion" dear to Michel Debre. There was also the aggravation of the militarization of the island, and the strategic role which they are making it play in the region, in the service . of the imperialist West. And even the economic crisis in ~urape, whicfi prevents France from using as much as it would like the emigration organized to solve the difficulties of Reunion, [Question] They say that the Reunion working class is already in France, - and that the country is being emptied of its living forces... [Answer] It makes one diz zy. It's terrifying. If one applied to France the present data on Reunion, that county would have 6 million unemployed, and 45 million airplane seats offered every year to the population (out of . ~ total number of 55 million Frenc~), That's what they call "territorial - continuity." They want people to forget that we are distant and different from them. They empty our countries, they destr.oy them, they crush them flat. The Antillians, who are sub~ected to r_nis Frenc:: colonial pressure even more tfian we, because they have pract;.cally no local production any more, call it "genocide by substituion." [Question] And despite everything you su~.:ceed in deeping your militants? _ [Answer] The leftist electorate was ina slight niajority during the last presidential elections in 1 974, wfiich modified the w~aole climate of the Reunion political life. At each election a third of the votes, on the average, are for our candidates--and tbat in consideration of the official figures, without taking into account the electoral fraud which persists. . At our annual holiday, we order 70,000 entry tickets (out of a population - of 500,000 inhabitants of Reunion). And every day we publish a I6-page newspaper TEMOIGNAGES, which is the only daily on Reunion in opposition to the colonial palicy. 68 FOR OFFICI~'i:. USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 _ ~ FOR OFFTCIAL USE UNLY [Question] In 1978, when it raised the question of the decolonizat7.on of Reui~ion, the 0~`U started looking for a lifieration movement... [AnsF~er] We are this liberation movement, and the Anticolonialist F`ront for the Self-Iktarmination of Reunion (FRAPAR), which comprises seven local organizations* went last January to Dar es Salaam, becoming the ad hoc decoloniaation committee of the OAU, in order tfiere to reveal the realities of the Reunion question: an island the entire population of which derived from an old colonization going back to 1642, the ethnic diversity of which is extreme: one-third of the population is of European origin, and is not otherwise surprised to hear that the~r ancestors were French; another third is the issue of communities of laborers imported from Madagascar and Mozambique, who experiened two and a half�centuries of slavery, and retained - a vivid memory of it; and the last is descended from Tamil families from the south of India "hired" by the sugar plantations of factories to replace the "kaffir" labor after slavery was abolished. This explains the slow formation of the Reunion personality, in a country where--exceptional in the Third World--the class struggle preceded the grasp of national awareness. The OAU delegates, when they disembark on Reunion, will see that it is a country quite different from whatone ordinarily sees in Africa. *Communist Party (PCK), General Workers Confederation (CGTR), Women`s Union ~ (UFR), General Confederation of Farmers and Cattle-raisers (CGPRR~, Autonomous Youth Front (FJAR), Reunion Christian~Witness (TCR), General Union of Reunion Workers in France (UGTRF) COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie . 6108 ' - CSO: 4400 69 FOR OFFICI.~i,'.. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ SENEGAL - ECONOMIC STATISTICS FOR 1979 REPORTED Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1262 [Report: "Recent Circumstantial Elements"] , [Text] The latest circumstances affecting the Senegalese economy were the topic of one of the latest economic and monetary statistical - bulletins of the Central Bank of Western African States (BCEAO). The main agricultural outout of the 1978-1979 season was as follows: peanuts, 781,700 tons 340,000 tons compared with the previous season); cotton, 33,800 tons 3,300 tons); paddy, 127,000 tons 43,300 tons); millet and sorghum, 795,000 tons 244,000 tons), and corn, 46,800 tons 1,400 tons). At the beginning of the campaign, purchase prices paid the producers rose from 41.5 to 45.5 francs CFA per kilo for peanuts and from 49 to 55 francs CFA per kilo for first grade cotton. Consequently, the crop was worth 32.4 billion CFA for peanuts and 1.7 billion CFA for cotton. The food output was worth 31.8 billion for millet and sorghum and 5.3 billion for paddy. On 25 February 1980 total peanut purchases from the 1979-1980 crop totaled 261,000 tons, or a drop compared with the previous crop. In 1979 peanut deliveries to oil extraction plants totaled 664,500 tons. In 1979 tuna fishing supplied the Local canneries with 9,100 tons of fish. ~ , In 1979 calcium phosphate production reached 1.6 million tons in terms of exported amounts (plus 100,000 tons compared with 1978); alumina _ phosphate extraction totaled 185,000 tons, similar to the 1978 tonnage. A total of 380,000 tons of cement 9 percent) and 79,C00 tons of clinker 63 percent) were produced. At the end of the third quarter of 1979 the industrial production - indicator, excluding oil extraction plants, reached 180.8 compared with - 178.6 the previous year (with 1969 = 100). 70 FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY , i . ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ In the first 11 months of 1979 Dakar International Airport recorded a - traffic of 13,824 commer cial aircraft with 772,700 passengers (departures, ; arrivals, and in transit). Freight tonnage totaled 15,800 tons. By the end of December 1 979 the turnover indicator of the main commercial ' enterprises was 219.6 as against 176.5 the previous year (based on 19i0 = 100). - Also at the end of December 1979 the overall index of family consumption prices per African family was 247 as against 226.7 at the end of December 1979 (1970 = 100). On 1 January 1980 the minimal guaranteed interpr~.fessional hourly wage was raised from 107.05 to 133.81 francs CFA. _ In the first three quart ers of 1979 customs dues and fees totaled 42.4 billion CFA, about 92 pe rcent of which levied on imports. The budget for 1 July 19 79-30 June 1980 fiscal year totaled 134,2 billion CFA in revenue and expen ditures 2.3 billion compared with the previous _ budget). Equipment loan s totaled 24 billion 11 billion). In 1979 peanut oil exports from the ,t978-1979 harvest totaled 120,800 tons of unrefined oils an d 15,100 ton~ of refined oils with prices lower by 25-35 percent compare d with 1978. Oi.l-cake exports totaled 240,100 tons. The foreign debt figures are for the end of 1978. Total bills equaled , 104.7 billion CFA 12.3 billion that year) and a~ unestablished as yet margin on loans totaling 86.8 billion CFA 10.4 billion compared with end of 1977). The servicing., of the loan (interest and principle) totaled 19.8 billion CFA in 1978 (as against 12 billion in 1977). - On 30 Ncvember 1979 the c ash in circulation totaled 44.2 billion CFA as compared with 38.9 billio n the previous year. At the end of September , 1979 the amount of long a nd short-term bank deposits was 123.9 billion - CFA 22.8 billion compa red with September 1978). Loans to the economy _ at the same date totaled 234 billion CFA as against 171.4 billion on ' 30 September 1978. , Also at the end of September 1979 the Senegalese treasury owed monetary institutions 16.9 billion CFA, four billion of which to the Central Bank, , compared with a total ind ebtedness of 15.1 billion the previous year (of I which 8.3 billion advance d by the Emissions Institute). ~ . ~ Again on 30 September 197 9 net external assets exceeded liabilities by ` 57.4 billion CFA or an in crease of 20 billion compared with September 1978. COPYRIGHT: RENE MOREUX E T CIE., PARIS, 1980 5157 71 - CSO: 4400 FOR OFFICIAL USE OivZ,Y ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFI~CIAL USE ONLY SENEGAL BRIEFS NATURAL GAS EXPLOITATION--For the first time, Senegal has begun to duce electric power based on natural gas deposits discovered some 40 kilo- meters from Dakar. A gas turbine with a generating capacity of 52,560,000 ~ kilowa~t hours, connected to the deposits through a gas pipeline, was inaugurated on 23 May by Cheikh Amidou Kane, minister of industrial devslopment and crafts. Senegal's need for electric power being assessed at 6?,1,740,000 kilowatt hours, the new turbine will be used as a backup unit ~or the diesel and steam units currently in operation. According to the specialists the deposit will be exhausted by 1995. As a non- petroleum producing country, in 1980 Senegal ~aill spend close to SO billion CFA francs on petroleum. The energy consumed by the country is essentially of thermal origin. Therefore, the government has decided to implement a vast program for the use of solar energy with a view to reducing its dependence on energy fuels. The program will inc~ude the building of two solar electric power plants the bigger of which will have a peak generating power of 25 kilowatts and a daily capacity of 221 kilowatt hours. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1262] 5157 GREEK COOPERATION AGREEMENT--On 3 May Senegal and Greece signed an agree- ment for economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. According to the agreement, negotiated�last November in the course of a visit to Greece by the Senegalese chief of state, Greece will provide Senegal with assistance in a study of the feasibility and development of tourism. In turn, Senegal will grant commercial facilities to Greece in ways to be c specified subsequently. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1262] 5157 _ WAGE INCREASES--In our 9 May issue (p 1089) we mentioned that the second _ portion of the salary increases in Senegal would become effective next July. Let us specify that the public sector alone is affected by this - measure. For budgetary reasons, the salary increases for this sector were to be given at two different times: in January and Jt~ly 1980. In : the private sector one salary increase had been granted in January 1980. According to the obligations which had been assumed, specifically that of reviewing rates over the next three years each December in order to set the new salaries as of 1 January of each year, no increase in salaries in the private sector will be granted in Senegal before 1 January 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1262] 5157 CSO: 4400 = 72 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SIERRA LEONE PROBLEMS POSED AY OAU SUMriIT Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1270 [Report: "Problems Posed by the Future OAU Summit in Freetown"] ~ [Excerpt] Intensive activities are currently underway in Freetown in connection with the preparations for the 17th Summit Meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) next July and the conference on the ministerial level which will open on 16 June. Preparations involving the repaving of streets, and improvements in the - lighting and sewer systems had to be speeded up in order to complete them before the advent of the rainy season. _ Even though Sierra Leone feels pride in being the host of the next OAU summit, and considers the event a success for the diplomacy of President _ Si??~a Stevens, who has headed the country since 1968, it is, nevertheless, somewhat concerned. This was pointed out by THE FINANCIAL TIMES in its 28 May issue. Indeed, this summit would involve expenditures dispropor- tionate to Sierra Leone's resources. The expenditures, assessed at 123 - million leones (51 million pounds sterling) are to be incurred at a time of financial crisis, when a discontent caused by price increases (a 31 percent increase on the price of fuels has even recently triggered violent hostile demonstrations) are showing up, as well as during a period in which corruption and black marketing are on the rise. Finally, let us add to all this rumors according to which the chief of state might be giving up the presidency of his country after being the president of the OAU for one year. The recent events in Liberia, where ' William Tolbert, the current president of the OAU, was overthrown and assassinated, are not contributing to maintaining in Sierra Leone an atmosphere of perfect calm, the more so since some of the conditions currently experienced bv the country resemble those of Liberia prior to the coup d'etat of the night a` 12 April 1980. COPY-tCIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 Si57 CSO: 4400 73 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ SIERRA LEONE BRIEFS MINISTER VISITS GDR--Abdulai Osman Conteh, Sierra Leone minister of foreign affairs, paid a 48-hour official visit to the GDR last May. In Berlin Conteh had discussions with Willi Stoph, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, and Oskar Fischer, head of the GDR Diplomatic Service. Before his departure Conteh signed a commercial and a cultural agreement between the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER.RANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1270] 5157 CSO: 4400 f 7L~ _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SOUTH AFRICA _ SOTHA DEFENDS S. AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN INTERVIEW LDOlI401 London THE TIMES (EUROPE SUPPLII~IENT) in English 1 Jul 80 pp I, IV [Interview with South African Prime Minister P. W. Botha by Walter Spiegel: date or location not indicated] [Text] Q~JESTION: Did the electiion~.results in Zimbabwe surprise you? - - ANSWER: I expected it. It ~,ras a surprise tn some international co~unities, but not to us. ~ QUESTION: The South African media were ssrprised. ANSWER: I was not surprised. I expected it. The people there were sick and tired of war and theylniew the onZy way to stop the war was to vote the way they did. The previous prime minister, Bishop Muzorewa, allowed the British to convince him that he must relinquish his prime-ministership, and that cre- ; ated the image of a weak personalitq. QUESTION: Zimbabwe is not willing to cooperate politically with you but it depends on you economically? ANSWER: It is rather interesting to look at some relevant figures. South African imports from Zimbabwe amounted to 177M rand (98M pounds) in 1979. Our exports to Zimbabwe amounted to 276M rand (153M pounds). Economically it is in their interest to cooperate with us and we do not prescribe to neigh- � bours what form of government they have. But we are not going to allow them to prescribe to us which govermnent we should have. - So long as theq keep peace with us, we will not interfere in their internal affairs. We trade with those who are prepared to trade with us, and that is " the attitude the whole world shfluld adopt. QUESTION: Very often you hear the arg~uaent in South Afrfca: "Never mind if - they criticize our internal system. They are dependent on us." That is true to a certain extent for Europe but not for the IInited States. 75 FOR OFFICIAL JSE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 , ~ _ ANSWER: I am not so sure o:f that. Strategic minerals such as chromium or manganese are of equal i~portance to Western Europe and to Ameriea and, should South Africa fall into the wrong hands and be dominated by Marxist forces, I have no doubt tfiat will create a very serious situation for the whole of the free world. I think a lot of hypocrisy is applied against us for international opportun- � iat reasons to satisfy the demands of certain $tates. Take Miami. The most serious eruptions took place in Miami, people died in the fights that broke ~ our. One of the black leaders in America was shot recently. Yet America - has the audacity, through one of its departments, to criticize South Africa ' for internal problems we are experiencing in some parts of our country. ~ Well, the whole free world is today struggling with internal unrest in cer- tain spheres and Germany has its terrorists who are making it impossible, ~ - at certain stages, to kee~t., order. Grea: Britain has its unrests. France has been e~cperiencing difficulties in ~ this connection and yet you never hear of that in the same way as South Africa's prablems are being internationalized. QUESTION: South Africa is also hypocritical. If it admitted that there are ~ two clsi~ses of people, and that drastic changes would alter the way of Iife of the�white populatior~, then South African critics would have fewer arg~- ; ments because the crit.ics have nothing to lose. ' - ANSWER: No, I do not think you can call it hypocritical, we are trying to . escape from a colonial past. This goverimaent has been in power for 30 years ~ now. We inhexited a colonial past and we are still fighting the heritage.of a colonial pa~t.. My own people achieved its independence less than half a century ago and ~ ' - we were the first people to start obliterating the flame of colonialism in South Africa, so you cannot ca11 us hypocritical. , I believe in evolutionary development of political rights, evolutionary de- ' velopment of economic potential and evolut3onary development of the country - _ as a whole, bur l do not believe in revolutionary forces. QUESTION: The basis of your internal policy has different names. It use3 ~ ~ _ to be called apartheid, It is now called separate development and you call it good neighbourliness. The basis of this is that the black people live _ separate in homelands or in entities, such as Transkei. So far 13 per cent ~ _ of the land has been allotted to nearly 80 per cent of the population, that is the blacks. The blacks regarded this as insufficient. Are there plans ~ - to enlarge these areas fox the blacka? = ANSWER: Yes, we have a scheme of adding land for consolidation purposes to : - t'he original black areas. A special investigation is taking place at pres-~ ~ ent. In this connection I am awaiting a report later in the year. ' 76 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLi' We have spent hundreds of millions of rand already on the consolidation of these areas and hundreds of millions will still have to be spent. But I must point out that those areas where the black peoples live are the more fertile areas with the highest rainfall. - The soil is of the best in the whole of Southern Africa and vast areas oceu- pied by whites at present , such as the Karoo, is dry land. The rainfall is very low. 4?e have deserts and semideserts as part of the white area. So you - cannot compare the two. QUES~ION: Does your answer imply that many blacks are not capable of using what they have got? ANSWER: They have a backlog. They must be taught, and I think this is one - of the biggest problems the goverrnnents of these areas have. They have to = teach the people to make the correct use of the soil. I believe that on t~~e _ present land �or blacks food can be produced under bet~~er conditions and *nore scientific conditions eventually to feed 24 million people. That is on ~ the available 1and, but we are far from that yet. ~UESTION: When you travel through these areas for blacks you do not see much change, but in the Transkei they have their own airline already. _ ANS.~TER: The problem we have is the same problem we have throughout Africa. Africa can feed itself; yet it does not feed itself. It will take genera- ~ tions to convince and to train people to make use o� what is available. So this cannot take place in a year or two, ~ QUESTION: I~ it passible without the help of white advisers? ANS6dER: Well, I do not think it will ever be passible without white advisers. - QUE~TION: The main ~~illars of your policy of separation, or as you ca11 it, = good neighborliness, are homela~ds and states . Will all blacks ev~i=tually belong to these entities, whether thay live there or not? ANSWIIi: We will always have hlack people in urban areas next to white cities. Our economy is fonned in such a way that you need the black people as they ~ need you. So we make ~.rovision for them to live in townships which we are - developing on a large scale, s~zch as Soweto. In Soweto we are busy witlz electrification, we have introduced housing schemes and training schemes on a large scale. We believe in the urban de- velopment of the blacks, b ut n3tura1ly, whether they live in urban areas or in their natural homes, they remain people who belong to the same cultural and historic groups and we must make provision for them to have their links with those countries. 77 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 _ _ ~ ; - i QUESTION: Will they have passports from those areas? A.NSWER: Yes. There are some who were actually born in the urban areas of South Africa who are serving now as ministers in those areas. QUESTION: If you follow this path, is not the final result that yo~x have a Republic of South Africa which is inhabited by law only by whites, coloureds, and Indians? There might be some millions of blacks here that are by law foreigners. ' ANSWER: We have not solved that probl~~m yet. We are investigating how to ~ arrive at final solutions on citizenship. Some of the objections to becoming .citizens of a new black state are based on the problem of travelling documents for those people, and that is one of the questions we have referred to a ; constitutional commi.ttee at present. ' I think the solution can be found when we eventually come to the forming of a constallation of states in the shape of a confederation, in which provisions can be made for these problems . QUESTIOid: One grievance is that qualified non-whites such as doctors, teach- ers or lawyers are paid less than their white colleagues? ANSWER: We have already started a sct~eme in which we narrow the gap, and the principle of paying people the same salaries for the same qualifications and - work has been adop ted and we are applying it gradually so that eventually dif�erences will be eliminated. In some cases it has already been applied. - QUESTION: Why cann~t one do it in one step? _ _ ANSWER: It is a financial matter and a question of introducing a scheme without disrupting your budget. - QUESTION: Suppose the system of separate development would ne given up now and the system of one-man-one-vote introduced--what would happen to this country? ANSWER: Let me first of all say that all parties represented in parliament, government and opposition parties, are against the principle of one-man-one- vote from the interim report of the commission of inquiry on the constitution: "You commission is of the opinion that the Westminster system of government' - in unadapted form would not provide a solution to the constitutional problems ~ of the republic. Under the present constitutional representation the so- , called one-man-one-vote system will probably lead to minorities being dom- inated by majorities and to serious conflict among population groups in the = republic." ' We have a problem of minorities. If you take the Zulus--they are a minority - as~against the rest of the population. 78 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY :Y ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY QUESTION: But do not all blacks feel, now at least, as one group? ANSWER: No, no, no. Let me give you an example. Take T~'anskei and Lesotho. Transkei is an independent coimtry. They border on Lesotho, which is also an _ independent state. Y~et the two peoples do not merge. They do not form one state, they do not form a federation, thE,~ remain separate. QUESTION: Why? ~ ANSWER: Because they are separate peoples, they do not want to merge. They are prepared to cooperate economically, just as Europe is prepared to cooper- ate, but for the same reasons you cannot unite the Netherlands and Germany _ into one state. For that same reason you cannot unite Lesotho and Transkei. _ ~ QUESTION: I think they do not want to merge because the handful of leaders - there would lose their domination position. - QUE5TION: No, it is not only a question of a handful of leaders. It is a ques- tion of cultural and historic differences. The Zulus will not unite with the Xhosas. They are different people. Although they are black, they have their own traditions, their own history and their own language and one must take - cognizance of these differences. QUESTION: You are also minister of defence. You intended to erect a glacis in the north of the republic. With the changes in Zimbabwe that part has been broken out. In Namiliia the future is uncertain. Do you have to change your - defence in the north? - ANSWER: No. I do not agree with that statement. What we were trying to do ~ was to secure a stable Southern Africa. It is in the interest of our neigh- bours, too, that they should not turn communist. The Marxists took over in Angola and Mozambique. and economically it meant a deterioration for thosE countries. Where Mozambi_que exported food not only a few years ago, today they experience a food shortage. The same happened in Angola. A tragic situation exists in Angola today. Vast numbers have no hope for the future. The whole of Southern Africa should be protected against this type of economic deterioriation. _ We believe in a free enterprise system and we believe.that this system can ~ build up in a stable Southern Africa. To protect ourselves, we have built up a strong defence force. We have no claims against our neighbours but we believe that by maintaining a strong defence force we can contribute to stability in Southern Africa. COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1980 CSO: 4420 - ~ 79 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - TOGO AGRICULTURAL, MONETARY STATISTICS PUBLISHED Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1210 [Repo.rt: "Recent Market Elements"] [Excerpts] The Central Bank of Western African States (BCEAO) dedicated to Togo one of its recent economic and monetary statistical bulletins. The main agricultural products of the 1978-1979 harvest totaled 12,fi02 _ tons of cocoa (4,084 tons below the previous harvest), 6,229 ton_ of coffee (plus 1,522 tons), 12,674 tons of cotton (plus 8,157 tons), 5,758 tons of palmetto (plus 4,981 tons) and 1,217 tons of karite (minus 4,792 tons). In 1979 phosphate exports totaled 3 million tons as against 2.8 million in 1978. Based on an average price of 7,693 francs CFA per ton, exports ' totaled 23 billion CFA. Since 1962, the year it undertook the exploita- = tion of phosphate deposits, Togo has exported 29.3 million tons, totaling 177.6 billion CFA. _ In 1979 the traffic handled by the port of Lome totaled one million tons _ of goods unloaded (of which 400,OG0 tons of petroleum products and 200,000 tons of clinker) and 300,000 tons of goods loaded (excluding phosphates). In the first 11 months of 1979 the Lome International Airport registered ~ a turnover of 4,270 commercial airplanes and a total of 194,60Q passengers (arrived, departed, and in transit), and 4,200 tons of freight. - The 1980 fiscal year budget was set at 67.2 billion CFA in revenues and expenditures (as against 64.8 billion for 1979); expenditures include 15 billion CFA loan payments. � On 30 November 1979 the amount of cash in circulation totaled 22.6 billion CFA as against 21.6 billion the previous year. At the end of September - 1979 long and short-term bank deposits totaled 53.7 billion CFA (plus 10 80 - F'OR OFFICIA,'.. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICLAL iTSF. ONI,1' ' billion compared with September 1978). Loans to the economy totaled - 56.8 billion CFA (plus 6.6 billion compared with end of September 1978). - On 30 September 1979 the Togolese treasury owed monetary institutions 8.4 billion CFA (from 11.6 billion through the instrumentality of the - Central Bank), as against debits of 6.9 billion CFA the previous year (from 10.7 billion advanced by the Emissions Institute). Between the end of September 1978 and the end of September 1979 the net - external assets rose from 6 billion CFA to 8.3 billion CFA. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 _ 5157 ~ CSO: 4400 i si FOR OFFICI6;. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ZIMBABWE - CHURCH INVOLVII~IENT IN INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED � Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May 80 pp 30-31 [Article by Roland Pichon, S. J.J [Text] In an open letter to the Rhodesian Government, dated 11 August 1976, His Excellency Donal Lamont, bishop of Salisbury and chairman of.tfie Peace and Justice Committee, among other things, said: "Conscience obliges me to declare that your administration, by its clearly racist and oppressive policy, by its obstinate rejection of any and all change, is largely responsible for the injustices which have brought about the present disorder and should, in this same capacity, be held responsible for all the suffering or shedding of blood which may result from it. ~ "Your policy, very far from defending Christianity and Western Civilization, as you claim it does, makes a mockery of Cfiristts law and succeeds only in attracting Africans to Communism. God wills that His world and His people be governed with justice....The way you govern Rhodesia openly disregards and deliberately scoffs at this Will." We cannot fail to applaud Bishop Lamont's moral honesty which prompted him to acts of "civil disobedience" towards Smith~s racist government; but we must not too quickly come to the conclusion that the Church in Rhodesia supported the Zimbabwe people in their struggle for liberation. In the first place, it should be noted that, when he was about to be deported, his colleagues in the episcopacy (two Africans and three Europeans) did not make common cause with him and raised no public protest. There was even one religious dignitary - present there (Father Hill, superior of the Sby Carmelite comanunity) wfio stated that "the government had been very lenient towards Bishop Lamont" (which is, after all, not incorrect, for an African convicted of the same "crimes" was hanged!). _ Wh,y did the struggle waged by the Zimbabwe people bring about a division such as this within the Church in Rhodesia with so totally positions _ such as those of Bishop I,amont and Father Hill? Why did this struggle bring = about such a cfiange in Bishop Lamont himself? It is generally known that the latter also signed thP bishops' jQint statement, as did all Europeans, the 82 FOR OFFICIA: USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOK UFFICIAL US~: ONLY day after Smith's revolt unilaterally proclaiming independence (11 November 1965), and in which among other things he asked Africans "to be ready to suffer even temporary curtailing uf their rights in order to preserve public order, as experience clearly shows that violence or revolution, even in the defense of citizens' rights, generally gives rise to more harm to the common weal than a simple abuse of power." Just as it was the colonists--the pioneers who arrived with Rhodes--who built the Rhodesian state, so it was tfie missionaries riding in their pioneer wagons~ who built thE Church. _ From that time forward, there was nothing unusual about the close cooperation existing between Church and State during the colonial period until the 1960s. Still in 1959, Bishop Lamont's main concern was for his Rhodesian "cowboys." At a time when the most fully alert Africans compared these relations to those of a horseman with his horse, he wrote: "There is an outstanding degree of harmony in the relations between Africans and Europeans." The Zimbabwe Africans did no~t await the years 1960 to 1970 to become awaxe of their situation as colonists. The British Government had hardly named ~rheir territory "Southern Rhodesia," when, at one bound, tfie two ethn~c groups, the Matabeles and the Mashonas, who made up the people of Zimbabwe, in 1896 rose up in rebellion to tfie cry "Murenga" (insurrection). Of course, at that time, the missionaries did their best to lessen the sufferings which the ruth- _ less repress~on of the colonists brought in its wake, but they were convinced that the Africans were wrong in opposing colonization, as for example, Father Ricfiartz, S. J., superior of the Chishawasha mission, who wrote at ; this time: "On the one side are the missionaries continually reminding them of God's punisiiments, and on the other, ~heir god's prophets, with their ' _ cries 'Muranga.' By a~wonderful act of Prdvidence~,~-our victory~has been ' com~lete in the eyes of the people." At that time, the enemy was not atheistic communism coming from MoscoTa or from Peking but "paganism" and the "Devil's , - prophets!" There can hardly be any doubt but that this collusion of the missionaries with the pioneers, the close collaboration of the Church and State mada the African's ' - "awakening" difficult. "Completely crushed in this armed struggle, forcibly ' subjected to rigorous control, the entire African population fell into a state ~ in which the instinct for sel�-preservation became predominant....We have lived too long as a conquered people, and it is not easy to retrieve the sense of our national respect,*" - i Must we recall what Rhodes said: "The missionaries are more effective and ~ less costly than the policei" * L. Vambe: "An I11 Fated People." He inemann, London, 1972. 83 - FOR OFFICIEw USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY However, we must recognize the great work the missionaries rendered by their educational work. The leaders of the liberation movements, all products of their schools, are grateful to them for this. Tt:ey are less so, no doubt, for their Christian d~ctrine, especially the Catholic doctrine, which insi.sts on "obedience to establisfied authority" while passing over in silence the demands of ~ustice. It is no doubt not by mere chan~e that the present leaders of liberation movements (with the exception of Mugabe) are products of Protestant _ schools--where they could become directly familiar with the Bible, which they could read in the light of their traditional belief in God, inherited from their ancestors, and where they found a confix~nation of the injustices - of the racist government set up by the colonists. "Armed with spears, they rose in revolt [in 1896-1898]. They were defeated. They tried their own civilization~s game, to come to an understanding with them. ~~hey were defeated. They tried to express themselves politically. They were defeated. They threw Molotov cocktails and had a run in with the police. They were defeated. Now they are going to resort to guns and let us see if they will succeed...."This, su~ed up in a few words by a simple - farmer, is almost a century's history of these Zimbabwe people, struggling for liberation without having to be prodded by Peking, Mosc~w or Cuba. Noting this "awakening" of the Zimbabwe people, some Western observers such as Pomonti from the periodical LE MONDE, would like to attribute it to the Churches. "In almost a century of European presence," he wrote, "the Christian Churches have played a de,:isive role in awakening African awareness.*" _ Without denying, as some have said, the valuable service which the missionaries - have rendered, it would undoubtedly be fairer to say that, in their own awaken- ing, the Zimbabwe people have also roused the consciousness of the Church. Would the people have been roused to revolt had they remained loyal to the bishops who forbade them to engage in violence? And Bishop Lamont, would he have had the courage to oppose an act of civil obedience to the racist state - if the guerillas had not indeed begun it? Without the Zimbabwe people's insurrection, it is indeed very probable that the Church would have had no scruple whatsoever in continuing its cooperation with the racist government. In 1970, the Church once more entered i.~to an agreement with the Rhodesian Government by finally accepting the terms and conditions of the constitution _ passed in 1969 (which the bishops, however, declared to be anti-Christian), - - and they did this not to defend the rights cf Africans, but to remain the proprietors of their lands. Nevertheless, especially since 1972, European missionar.ies "woke up." The struggle waged `oy the Zimbabwe people opened their eyes and they recognize (or rather again perceive) the demands of the evange- - lical mission. They have refused to become supporters of the colonists' " *LE MONDE 27-28 Feb 1977 84 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY bourgeois ideoLogy, but they have t~ken part wherever and whenever they could in the struggle for liberation. Bishop Lamont is a typical example of this - "awakening." He has not hesitated to "obey God rather than men." Mugabe, Mantist and Catholic The archbishop of Salisbury, as he blessed the crowd in thc Harare staditun, _ standing in the official tribune between Prime Minister Robert Mugabe a:~d - the president of the republic, the Reverend Canaan Banana, is an unusual sight in a ceremony which is to commemorate the birth of an African State after a fierce armed struggle. It is, however, the true image of a country in which the Church, since the end of the last century, has played a leading role in the very heart of the African population. - There are few Zimbab~rc leaders today who have not been deeply influenced by Christianity. There they all learned the tools of their trade, Che English .language, on the mission school benches, and very few will deny this influence. The prime minister has never been reluctant to re~.ind us that he was a devout Catholic, even if, at present, Christ's teaching has to be adapted to the � principlas of scientific socialism. In addition to the head of state, other persons in authority have also sat at these school desks. Joshua Nkomo was for a long time a lay preacher at the same time that he was a union head and a political organizer. The political blindness of the Methodist bishop (American obedience) Abel Muzorewa, and the Rev Ndabaninge Sithole's incohe- rence, made it impossible for them to continue to assume any leading role in that to which their long flirt with power seemed to predestine them. This goes to show whether the concerns expressed in the Vatican paper the OSSER- - VATORE ROMANO by the bishop of Wankie, His Excellency Ignazio Prieto, who feared the replacement of Smith's racist government by "an atheistic oriented ' government," were founded. Although the guerrillas now in power are atheists, they are not anticlerical. There have been only a few white Christian authorities who, like this - Father Arthur Lewis, president of a P,hodesian Christian Group, have preferred to go into exile rather "than live in a country ruled by Marxists." , Without mentioning partnership, for decades the Church has been deeply involved ~ - in the iife of the people. The impressive num'oer of prelates, such as the Bishop of UmCali, His Excellency Don~.ld Lamont, who have paid with their � liberty, or with their life, for being opposed to the Smith government, bears witness to this. Yet, the colonists, and along with them, Bishop Muzorewa, ~ have done F;verything they can to try to describe the liberation m~vement as ~ characterized by the murder of priests, the destruction nf churches and the ~ kidnapping of children. In fact, dozens of missionaries were murdered during the liberation war. But _ according to survivors' testimony, it was speciaZ army unita, dressed in - _ guerrilla uniforms, who committed all these crimes. The slaughter of defense- less peoples, as in Mozambique during the war against Portugal, and of which the missionaries were the sole witnesses, for~ed the Christians to speak up and, in doing so, brought down the vengeance of the army on then,,. 95 FOR GrFICIAL U~E aNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200104446-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY If imperialist propaganda deceived some espec~ally conservative Christians, it did not, fiowever, succeed in preventing the Ecumenical Council of Churches from continuing its assistance to the Patriotic Front, even after Bishop Muzorewa had replaced Ian Smith. Tfie keen insigfit of those in charge of the Ecumenical Council of Churches has now been completely justified. On the other hand, it shows the diffidence, if not tfie foolishness, of the Vatican, which hesitated to take a stand even when thPre was a question of supporting the Rhodesian episcopate's very courageous Justice and Peace Committee. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie 8870 CSO: 4400 IND . 86 ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200100046-8