JPRS ID: 9225 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02108= CIA-RKZ)OP82-00850R0003000'10008-9

. i f i.f j ~
~ ~F :1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
~
FUR OFF[('1A1. UtiF: ON1.1'
~ JPRS L/9225
29 July 19F30
- Near East/North Africa Report
~ (FOUO 27f80)
~
rB~S FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
= FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9

NOTE :
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news ageticy _
- transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language _
sources are translated; those from English-language ,ources
are transcribed or reprinr_ed, witn the original phrasing and _
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
, last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. T,dhere no processing indicator is given, the i.nfor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
.
Unfamiliar names rendered phoaetically or transliterated are -
r enclosed i.n parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion r.iark and `nclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
- original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate 4:ith the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The cotitents of this Dublication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
For further information on report content
call [phone].
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONP GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL IJSE OiNLY. -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
r'OR OFFICIAL USE CNLY
F7
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRI CA REPOftT
(FOUO a7/so)
CONTENTS
JPR; L/9225
29 July 1980
INTER-ARAB AFFAIP.S
Jordaraian Financial Market in 1970's Described
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 30 May-6 Jun 80) 1
ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
Results of Islamic Conference Summarized
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 23-24 rray so) ....o..o..,,,o.oo � 5
- EGYPT
Briefs
Otomat Anti-Ship Rocket
IRAQ
8
Iraqi Military Superiority Over Iran Ana.lyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 9-15 Ma.y 80) .......o,..,.,.,.o., 9
~ ISRAEL
Opposition Le4der Shimon Peres Interviewed
(Shimon Peres Intervisw; THE TIMES_ 16 Jul 80) ,o,a,oo 12
LEBANON
Phenomenon of Donestic Assassination of Poli.tical Leaders
Analyzed
- (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 16-22 May 80) 15
Conduct of Islamic Groups Noted
_ (AL-WATAN AZ-'ARABI, 9-15 Ma,y $0) . , . . . o . , , . o o � o . . , . 0 21
a - [TII - NE & A - 121 FOUOI
F�OR OFFICIAL L'5E ONLY

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
LIBYr1
I

Syri-an Political Role in Country Reviewed
(AL-WATAN AL-'A.'tABI, 9-15 May 80) ...,.o,.oa...a..,. 27
Qadhdhafi's Pursuit of Opponents Disturbs Relations
With West
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 16-22 May 80) ....,,,.o,a,o.,,, 31
Diplomatic Upheavals Reflect Domestic Disturbances
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 23-29 May 80) 36
Briefs
Fr.ench Mercenaries in Prison 38
- b -
FJR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
r.1Cc OFFiCLt.. USE Odi;:
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
JORDANIAN FINANCIAL MARKET IN 1970'S DESCRIBED
= Faris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May - 6 Jun 80 pp 48-49
[Article: "The Jordanian Finzncial Market In the 1970's: Very Active
With Local, Arab and Foreign Investments und Loans"]
[Text] [Governor ot Jordanian Central Bank] al-Nabulusi:
"Amman is not comreting with Beirut. We look forward to
the two markets complementing each other."
- Pr,litical stability in Jordan has helped to ir.vigorate
the Jordanian financial market, which has came to play
a major role in the economy and in financing public and
private sector developmen.t and construction projects.
. But dces Amman want to take over the ro].e of Beirut?
= Amman--AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI--During the 1970's, and especially in the last
five years, the growth of the financial market in Jordan has attracted the
- attention of Arab and foreign economists, financiers and businessmen, par-
ticularly after many organizations relocated from Beirut to Amman to escape
the LebanESe war,
Jo::dan has recently acquired most of the specialized organizations required
f.or establishing an active financial market. In addition to the Central
Bank, there are 16 commercial banks; 2 investme.nt banks; 6 speci.alized loan
institutions; 28 insurance companies; 2 financial investment companies;
a number of contractual savings and in~vestment institutions; and an ample
number of brokers in the Amman financial marlcet.
~ Private sector deposits in Jordanian banks rose sharply during the last
five years, from 141 million dinars in 1975 to 541 million dinars in 1979.
- The banks offer short-term and medium-term loans and advances to the various
economic sectoxs, particularly business, industry, construction and real
estate. Along with the inceased sources of bank capital, and the increased
number of banks, credit facilities have markedly improved inasmuch as they
~ rose fzom 121 million dinars in 1974 to 465 million dinars in 1979.
= FOR Ob'FICIAL USE ONLY
-1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
- Loans On Easy Terms
That is the situation of the commercial banks. What is the situation of the
other financial institutions?
The specialized lflan ;nstitutions ofLer loans on easy terms to the agricul-
ture, industry, tourism and housing sectors, and to sma.ll businessmen,
_ municipalities and vitlage councils in order to encourage, develop and
improve these sectors.
These institutions depend above all on their capitat, and on c'omestic and
foreigr, borrowing, except the housing bank, which is the sole institution
that accepts deposits, and to a great extent relies on the deposits as a
source for financing.
The assets and liabilities of the specialized loan institutions at the end
of 1979 amounted to more than 190 million dinars. The amount of their loans
exceeded 131 million dinars, of which more than 100 millior: dinars was pro-
vided to the private sector. The housing bank alone had over 86 million
3inars in deposits.
There are 28 insurance companies operating in Jordar_, half of which are
Jordanian and half brancres of foreign companies. These cor.!panies gursue
all the customary acti!ities of insurance companies. They offer automotive,
maritime, fire and general 3ccident insurance. There are 11 iife insurance
companies, of which 4 are Jordanian.
These companies invest the largest part of their liquid assets as deposits
in the banks. This is followed by investment in financial papers such as
- company stocks and bonds, then loans offered to their customers, with security
_ in the form of real estate, insurance policies or government guarantees.
At the end of 1979 premiums collected by the insurance companies amounted
to approximately 13 million dinars, while claims paid ou*_ amounted to
approximately 6 million dinars.
In the area of savings, there is a postal savings fund. It was the first
institution [of its kind], having begun its operations in 1974 for the pur.-
pose of gathering and attracting small savings. It now has 63,000 depositors
with deposits of more than 3 million dinars.
There is the Jordanian Retiremenz Fund which was established to take over
- government obligations in sccordance with the statutes of the civil and
military retirement la.ws. This fund has recently begun to function as a
collecting agency for investment. Its total investments at the end of last
year amounted to appraximateiy 25 million dinars.
With regard to foreign financing, the borrowed European
entered Jordan in recent years to implement large-scale
such as fertilizer manufacturingv phosghate and potash
refining, and so on.
2
FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
dollar market has
industrial projects
production, oil
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
r'OR JFFICIAt. ~SE Or1I.Y
Jordan contracted for 224 miliioaz dollars ;,n loans in 1977, 100 million
_ dollars in 1978, and 17 million, dollars in 1479,
_ The reason for the decrease in the amount borrowed from the European dollar
markec from 1977 to 1979 is the encouragement given by t.he Jordanian authori--
ties to companies and public institutions to issue commercial bonds in the
- local market in order to increase their financial resources. In fact, for
_ the first time, cammercial bonds valued at 5 million dinars were issued zn
1979.
_ According to the gnvernor of the Jordanian Central Bank, Dr Muhamnvsd Sa'id
= al-Nabulusi, Jordan is en,oying an excellent climate for invesrment. In
additiun to the political stability with which it has been blessed, and its
~ mixed economic system, Jordan is disti.nguished by its strategic lucation
between the countries of the Middle East and East Africa. This enahles it
to serve as a commercial and financial intermediary between the markets of
these countries. Moreover, Jordan has an abundance of trained r_adre;; of
administrators and workers, as well as a modern and adiranced communici3tions
- system and an integrated financial apparatus.
Ammsn Has Not Prof.ited From Beirut's Misfortune
- Dr al-Nabulusi went on to say that aZong with the kingdom's increased
- aspirations for dEVelopment, the need for priva4e foreign capi.tal increased.
The Jordanian people have worked very hard, particularly sirice 1973, to
_ adjust the laws, taxes and bureaucracy, and to provide mate.rial iiicentives
to attract foreign capital. Most important aave been investment guarantees,
- the treatment of Arab and foreign capita' on an equa]_ footiiig with Jordan.ian
_ capital, and the offering of many rights, privileges and tax exemptions.
Although the investr.ient encouragement law has been markE:dly successful in
~ attracting money fro*n Jordanians tiaorking abroady as weli as f-rom .A,rab
~ citizens, nevertheless, despite the big exemptions tnat it offers, ir_ has
had only limited sLCCess in attracting investments from Europe and the
United StatES.

- In response to those who say that Jordan's financial market has grown and
- developed at the expense of the Beirut m3rket, whi; h has stagnater.' as; a
result of the Lebanese war, Dr al-Nabulusi said, "Annan's de'velopment irito
~ an Arab financial center did not happen suddenly or by chance. It is the
fruit of continuous efforts by the Jordanian authorities over two decades.
- Amman does not desire, nor is it able, to compete with the private financial
center of Beirut. It has no nesire to exploit r.he unfortunate circumstances
that have over.taken our sister nation of Lebanon. On ttie contrary, we in
Jordan luok forward to the day in Lhe not too distant future when Lebanon
- will regain its stability so that we can strengtnen financial relations
between Amman and Beirut in the interest of Jordan, Lebanon and the entire
_Arab world."
- 3
- FOR OFFICYAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
In Dr al-Nabulusi's view, there is no conflict between Amman and Beirut _
as tinancial centers. If one of them is flourishing, it does not have to
be at the expense of the other. Each finar.cial market has its special
functions which develop and thrive when it cooperates with, and complements
- the other Arab financial markets.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9123
CSO: 4802
w
.
;
f
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFICIAI. iSE ONLY
ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
RESULTS OF ISUiMIC CONFERENCE SUMMARIZED
Paris AL-WATAN P.L-'ARABI in Arabic 23-24 May 80 p 25
[Artic?_e: "The Islamic Conference; Hoetage Crisis Relegated to Rear Rank."
[Text] The issue of the Soviet suppression.of Afghanistan dominated the
_ attention of the Islafiic nations' foreign ministers conference, while the
- Israeli Knesset's decision to confirm Jerusalem as Israel's "eternal" capi-
tal provoked Moslem sentiments. The conference recommended turntng the
issue of the holy city over th.e the international Security Council.
The eleventh regular session of the Is1Gmic nations' foreign ministers con- `
_ vened in Islamabad. Each of the 40 ministcYs and delegates had different _
agendas in mind in terms of the order of ibems -
- Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh, for instance, had no sooner set foot in the Islamabad
airpert when he summoned reporters and dictated the c.onferQnce agenda to
- them, placing the American hostage crisis at the top of the agenda, followed
by the Afghanistan issue, the Palestinian question, Southe:n Lebanon, and `
' then the issue of Iraqi "aggression" against Iran!

- However, most conference delegates did not share Qotbzadeti's views about
placing the hostage crisis at the hEad of the agenda. Earnest and sincere
attempts were made behind the scenes to persuade Qothzadeh to convay the
general desire of th? Islamic nations to his govertment regarding finding `
a rapid solution to the hostage crisis. `
In fact, there is a general Islamic feeling that Iran itself, without any n
outside help, could find for itself a practical solution to the hostage -
crisis, before it loses face.
_ Clearly, most of the Islamic natior.s no longer understand the justification
for continuing ro hold SO hostages since last November without clear Iranian
' demands having been set in exchange for their release.
However, the pr?valling belief ?.s that the inability of the Iranian political
~ leadership to make a decision in this regard and to impose it upon the
S
FOR OFFICTliL USE ON'LY
.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
r'utt urTiUiAL 06c: UIVLY _
' Iranian groups holding the hostages is the thing that is prolonging the
crisis, making it ripe for exploitation, intensifying the international
polarization in the region, ar..d exposing it to dirPCt intervention either _
from the United States or the 5oviet Union.
Behind- the- scenes discussions were aimed at tryxng to persuade Qotbzadeh
~ that the hostage crisis in Iran led to the Soviets seizing the opportunity
to supprPss Afghanistan and to threaten more Islacaic nations with domination
or more "intervention" in their affairs.
Calming Defiant Feelings
~
Thus, th_ Iranian minister's efforts to place the ho;;tage crisis at the
top of the agenda did not bear fruit, and the cause of Afglianistan re-occupied
its basic position in the conference's attention.
The ccnference dealt with this issue, within the meeting ha.l1 or behind the
scenes, with a more optimistic and open atmos;)here than. the pessimistic one
prevailing during January's conference, when religious szatiraent was dominant -
~ and affected by the Soviet crushing of a smail, poor arid weak Islamic state.
- Proposals of a somewhat flexible nature, submitted by the Eastern bloc during
the past few days, to salve the Afghanistan problem, helped to kindle this
cptimism.
This does not mean that these proposals are acceptable. Saudi Arabia, for
example, made it clear that they wer2 unacceptabla. In exchange, it planted
~ in the conferees' minds the idea of offering practicai and constructive
4 proposals which would constitute a path toward solving the problem. However, -
points of view regarding this matter were dissimilar, reflecting the ditfering
- posit-_`.ons of Eastern and Western nations. -
�The conferees noted that, while the United States vehemently rejected the ~
Soviet proposals, Western nations, particularly Britain, appear to be in
agreement with these proposals and consider them realistic. -
It is well-known that Britain feels it would be impossible for the Soviet
Union to accept the downfall of the present Marxist regime in Afghanistan, ~
and wi.thdraw from the country, leaving power tu the rebelliuus Islamic -
groups. Based on this, the British government believes that the wor13 and `
the West must con--ede th..: Afghanistan has at present entered the Soviet -
_ orbit, and has in fact, in one way or another, bren there even before the
Marxists regime came to powPr in 1978.
Howevex, do the Islamic states accept the British viewpoint? That is very
doubtful, despite the fact that the de�iant sentiments stirred up by the
Soviet invasion b.ave calmed down a little. But, circumstances may not per-
~ mit the conference, for its part, to submit a practical, flexible solution
- at the present time, even though there has been considerable encouragemen*_
by Europe for the conference to adopt a solution of this kind.
= 6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OrFICIlU. USE ONLY
It is well worth mentioning ttiat two countries, compYetely ditf?rent in their
policies, have continued to be excluded from the conference. The first is -
- Afghanistan, because of its Marxist regime imposed by force by the Soviet _
army, and the second is Egypt which used to play a prominent role in such ~
conferences. However, Egypt has been excluded, because of its regime's -
- defiance of Islamic sentiments and Arab int`rests by concluding a unilateral _
pact with Israel, which has illegally seized Palestine and is still occupying _
_ the territory of four Arab nations, including Egypt itself. _
- Nevertheless, the case that dominated [he conference's attention was the -
question of Jerusalem, which in fact was the issue of the hour, perhaps
because Israel has chosen to defy the sentiments of nearly 900 million
Moslems by issuing a decision from the Knesset, making Jerusalem its "eternal _
i capital."
- 1he conference adopted a recommendation, submitted by the Jerusalem committee, _
= calling on the Security Council to debate the situation in the city in light .
- of the Knesset's resolution. The conference also adopted a recommendation
to the effect that its memher nations should sever relations with any state
that violates UN resolutions and recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel.
Pakistani proposals also attracted attention. Pakistani President Muhammad
Zia ul-fiaq, at the conference's opening session, called for establishing
a system of Islamic collective security, al.luding to the Islamic nations'
vast military power. He even submitted a proposal to form a joint command
of cemmanders of Isli-am.ic armies, whose mission would be to coordina*_e '
_ defanse of the interests of the Islamic peoples, and to manifest these =
nations' desire to put teeth in their spiritual and ethical power.
.3 In spite of this interest, it is unlikely that the Pakistani proposals _
' will be implemented in the foreseeable future. The Islamic nations, even ~
= on the political level, are still divided and feuding. They are beginning -
to feel their way tocsard the establishment of practical cc,opetation and
coordination among themselves to eliminate conflicting interests, dissimilar ~
aspirations, and incompatible affiliations and loyalties. ~
COPYRIGHT : 19�30 AL-WATAN AL-' ARABI
- 7005
CSO: 4802
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
~
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- EGYPT
~
BRIEFS _
OTOb9AT ANTI-Sf-iIP ROCKET--Egypt is to be eQuipped with Otomat anti-ship mis- ~
siles made with Franco-Italian cooperation by MATRA [expansion unknown] and ~
_ UTO [expansion unknown] Melara. In an article on the Egyptian navy, the
Freiich journal COLS BLEUS, a navy and dockyard weekly, announced on 14 June -
1980 that the Egyptian navy has ordered from the British shipyard, Vespex ~
Thornicroft, sa.x heavy missile-launching patrol boats of the Hamadan class, =
each of which will put four Otomat missiles in operation. The first patrol ~
boat was launched on 6 September 1979. The journal states that the samP ship- ~
yard has begun modernizing six Komar class patrol boats, each to bP armed with two Otomat missiles, and other units of the same class will be similarly armed
= in Egypt. COLS BLEUS also announces that a contract has been signed with the :
, French firm MATRA for delivery of Otomat coastal missile batteriQS. [Tsxt]
[Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 21 Jun 80 p 33] 8946 I
r
~
_ CSO: 4800 ~
6
- ~
. ~
~
~
~
- E
a
~

~
g =
FON 0;`F1 C7.AL USE ONL�Y
-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
~
FOR CFFICIAL USE ONLY
y IRAQ =
~ -
- IRAQI MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER IRAN ANALYZED Paris AL-WATAN AL-' AIlASI in Arabic 9-15 May 80 pp 25-26 ~
[Article: "Iraq Easily Capable of Occupying Iranian Oil Fields."] ~
_ 
- [Text] Strategy experts ridicule Khomeyni's threat to mobi.lize 20 mi.llion
Iranians to march against the Arab Wor1d.. They say that Iran does not
_ constitute a military threat to Iraq, and that it is possible i.x Iraq to
_ easily occupy the Iranian oil wells, relying on its military superiority ~
and on the sympathies oF Arab in'ta'Htants there.
- In spite of serious deterior%tion in relatinns between Iraq and Iran in the
past few days, informed Arab circles still think it unlikely that widespread _
- clashes between the two countries might develop into open warfare.
' These circles believe that it is in the interest of the current Tehran
. regime to escalate tension in its foreign relations, be it with the major
powers of with its Arab neighboYS, particularly Iraq. This is in fact
just what Iran is trying to do, -
14henever the Khomeyni regime has driven the ball out of its court, it has ~
- been relatively able to maintain Iran's cohesion and unity, wiiich has
= apparently begun to disintegrate and collapse a year after the revolution.
Therefore, introducing foreign adventures and confrontations puts off the
_ urgently need2d solutions to pressing internal p roblems, such as solving
- the minorities question and dealing with the economic situation.
_ In fact, the Khomeyni regime, with its numerous pcwer centers and these
centers' foreign connections, has as yet been unable to ensure the desired
political stability and appears to be incapable of finding urgent solutions
to the Iranian problems and difficulcies.
= As for the matter of the American hostages, it has lost its glitter. L,ittle ,
by little, Iranians have begun to turn away from it to their increasingly -
grave daily problems. TEierefore, tlie regime has to find another foreign _
_ problem in )rder to divert the Iranians' attention away �rom their problems, _
_ for which the regi.me has been incapable of f.indIng solutions.
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
I
_ Consequently, the Tehran "ayatollahs" have begnn to concentrate on eszalating :
_ the tension with Iray and L-o talk about "exporting ttie revolutinti" to -
neighboring Arab states. There has been nothing forthcoming f.rom Iraq as '
yet to indicste that it is determined to enter into military confrontati.on
- with Iran, despite the fact that it does not fear the results of any short
= or long-term battle with the Iranians. Iranian military power, in the
r
opinion of Western strategists, does not constitute any threat to Iraq, ~
which enjoys uiarked military superiority. .
~
- These experts also recognize tha.*. Iraq today is the most powerful military -
force in the Middle East, with the exception ot Israe]. with its outstanding `
- American weaponry, and has rapidly replaced Iran as the principal, respected
- military force in the Gulf.
I:raq has doubled the size of its mi'litary forces since 1973. It has a
we';_1-organized, trained army witti solid military leadership. All its -
personnel enjoy high morale, as a result of strong, devoted political -
leadership, represented by the leadership of President Saddam Husayn.
~ This is the rPVerse of the situation in Iran, where organization and morale
- in the Iranian armed forces have deteriorated under the aegis of the presetit
_ regime.
_ The Arab inhabitants of Arabistan look to Iraq
- their struggle for self-determination. This is
suspicions of the Iranians who have hastened to
_ pan-Arab desires in that oil-rich pravince, whi
, with Iraq. The entire joint border between the
Rapid Iraqi Progress in Arabistan
as their basic support in
a matter which raises the
accuse Iraq of nurturing
2h shares a 300 km border
two countries is 1250 km.
- Surely the Iranians will 'lame tbemselves a gr?at deal iyhenever they think
~ about the military progress across the irayi border, as they feverishly =
carry out orders recently issued to them by Khomeyni. They xvill discover
that the Iraqi iorces are capable, in the view c,f Western strategists,
of crushing any advance over their territary. The Iraqis would then be
able to push rapidly across the Shatt al-'Arab into the oil field area in
Iranian Arabistan, through clear naval, air and ground superiority.
- The experts believe it possible for Iraq to easilv control the area whose
Arab inhabitants demand their independence, especially since their senri-
~ ments would be completely in tune with any Iraqi military ini_tiative in
their area.
Iraqi Superiority in Numbers
In Western estimates, Iraq has a qu.arter million troops under arms, divided
among four armored divisions, Cwo mechanized divisions, and one infantry
division. This is compared to 100,000 Iranian troops, who are what is left
of an army comprising about 400,000 troops during the shah's regime. Iraq's
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ar.senal includes 2500 modern tznks, i-ncluding hundreds of Soviet T62 and
T72 tanks which are comparable to the most modern Western tanks. They also
have French MX-3 tanks, in addition to 2500 aimored personnel carriers.
= Iran has 900 British Chieftain tanks and hundreds of American tanks which
- are relatively old and need mai_ntenance and spare parts.
Iraqi firepower includes 1100 artillery pieces, and 50 SCUD-B and FROG-7
missiles (ground to ground).
- Modern weapons have poured into Iraq from variaus Western and Eastern
sources, including SS-12 missiles, French anti-tank missiles and Super
J Matra (air to air) missiles.
, Iraqi superiority in air armaments is evident, since Yt has raised its
number of fighter-bombers from 393 in 1973 to 725 at present. This includes _
120 riiG-21, 80 MiG-23, 100 Sukhoi, scores of transport aircraft, 26 Mirage
Fls, 130 Soviet helicopters and another 100 French helicopter�s. It is
expected that Iraq will take delivery, in the foreseeable future, of approxi-
mately 250 other aircraft, either MiG-23 or MiG-25 types. It is also
- Pxpected to obtain the advanced French Mirage 2000 aircraft.
As for Iran, it has 425 aircraft of inferior level, except for 76 F-14 air-
, craft, all of which sre not believed to be ,erviceable, Secause they need
maintenance and replacement parts. The rest include F-4 and F-5 aircraft.
~ Iraq also enjoys naval superiority, since it has missile boats, rapid-move-
ment torpedoes, and anti-submarine torpedoes. Iraq is expected to receive
several advanced naval units shortly.
Will a military confrontation occur between Iraq and Iran? Western strate-
" gists say that Iraq, for its part, has not yet initiated any action indi-
cating i.ts decision to direct a military strike against its neighbor Iran, _
despite the daily military provocations directed at it hy responsible
and irresponsible mouthpieces in Iran.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WAT.AN AI-'ARABI
7005
CSO: 4802
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ISRAEL
= OPPOSITION LEADER SHIMON PERES INTERVIEWED
[LD161035 London THE TIMES in English 16 Jul 80 pp 1, 8]
[Interview with Israeli Labor Party Leader Shimon Peres by Christopher :
Walker; datelined Jerusalem 15 July]
[Text] Mr Shimon Peres, the leader of Israel's Opposition Labour Party,
today ruled out the possibility of any future government that he would lead -
, agreeing to compromise on the issue of Israeli sovereignty over East
Jerusalem or to dismantle any of the 100 or more Jewish settlements built -
on occupied Arab land.
In an interview with THE TIMES, Mr Peres emphasized that although an attempt
to open negotiations with Jordan would be the main thrust of his foreign
poli.cy, a labour administration would refuse to hand back either the Jordan
Valley or the Etzyon Rlock, a cluster of Jewish settlements between Bethlehem
and Hebron. -
_ "These are areas which we will insist remain under Israeli control because
- they are necessary for the defences of our country," he told me. "They are
_ a strategic need. Also, we do not differ with the present government on
the need to keep United Jerusalem as tixe capital of Israel."
Mr Peres refused to disclose the precise boundaries which Israel would be
prepared to discuss. But scrutiny of the settlement map shows that his ~
_ position would exclude handing back to Jordan land containing about 40
settlements, and the new Jewish suburbs built in East Jerusalem since 1967. -
He also made it clear that his government would contempla.te handing back
_ only parts of the West Bank if the areas concerned remained demilitarized.
"Look at that Mosque," he said, pninting from the window of his Knesset
office. "That was the Jordanian frontier. Nobody would agree to have a
hostile army there."
Like the present right-wing government the labour party remains implacably
_ opposed to the idea of crea*_ing an independent Palestinian state. Its
so-cailed "Jordanian option" is Uased on the premise that any section of ttie West Bank over which Israel relinquished control would become part of
- Jordan after an interim period of joint rule. -
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
1�We 30 nat intend to dismantle any settlements because we do r..ot see anything
wrong in Jewish people living under non-Jewish sovereignty," he went on.
- The labour leader's outline of his stand comes wnen the ruling coalition is
facing severe political difficulties and when all opinion polls agree that
- the opposition would win the next election, which mlist be held at the
_ latest iri November, 1981.
Mr Peres was unable to provide any hard evidence for his repeated claim that
King Husain of Jordan would be prepared to negotiate under labour's terms,
a claim vigorously denied by the King, and strongly doubted by many leading
diplomats in the Middle East.
Earlier this year, King Husain told THE TIMES that on no account would Yie
_ be prepared to negotiate over "an inch of Palestinian soil, or an iota of
Palestinian rights." More recently, he declared that Jurdan's minimum
demands were: "Total Israeli withdrawal from all territories, including
Jerusalem and restoration of ?alestinian rights, including self-determina-
tion."
Pressed for evidence of his conviction, Mr Peres explained, "Today, when we
are watching Jordan, one can easily notice that the voice is that of the
Palestinians, but the acts are those of the Jordanians, and I am equally
impressed by acts as by words."
He added: "The Kiiig carries a legal responsibility for the West Bank which
he canriot escape. I think that somewhere in his heart he would like to
- reconquer by peace what he has lost by war. He would likn eveYything, but
he knows that we will never agree to tliat, because war is not a game we
can forget easily."
Mr Peres also argued that King Husain woLld eventually agree to talk because
he would realize that "an additioiial Palestinian state," would be a permanent
danger t_o Jordaiiian stability.
To explain his point, Mr Peres said, with a grin: "A good friend of mine
who is Jardanian told me that if I was locked in a room with Husain and
Arafat, and Arafat ha.i the only gun with a single cartridge, I need not
worry."
At the next election, the labour party would make its invitation to Jordan
a central plank in its campaign, co~.ibined with a pledge to act quickly to
conclude negotiations with Egypt over the implementation of Palestinian
- autonomy in the Gaza Strip.
"That would demonstrate that Egypt's interests are not limited just to the
Egyptia.n part of the problem, and it would be reasonable for us. We do not
want to incorporate the 450,000 Palestinians who inhabit Gaza into the body
of Israel."
_ 13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Although not willing to evacu3te any settlements, a�uture Zabuur government
would prevent thP building of new Jewish outposts in areas of concentrated
Arab populuLion like Hebron. Mr. Peres pledged today not to implement the -
Begin government's controversial scheme to build a Jewish religious college and museum in the exclusively Arab town.
Mr Peres, who is 57, rejected the biblical vie*as of the extremist Gush �
Emunim group which believes in maximizing Jewish presence in the occupied -
ter.ritories.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1980
CSO: 4820 -
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LEBANON
PHENOMENON OF DOMESTIC ASSASSINATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS ANALYZED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 16-22 May 80 pp 30-32
/Article: "Who W;L11 Be Victim Number 19? Intelligence Agencies Are Track-
ing Lebanon'a Leaders
/Text/ In Issue 122 of last 15 June, AL-WAT.4N AL-'ARABI anticipated that
the leaders and politicians of Lebanon,,+. would be facing a wave of assassin-
ations and physical liquidationa. Since then, in the past 6 months, 18
_ assassination attempts have been made w.ith the object of committing ag-
gressions on these peraons' lives. To3ay AL-WATAN AL-'A.RABI is txying to
= look into the reasons and motives for this terrifying vortex Lebanon is
_ liding through, aupporting itself by the analyses and contenta of an of-
ficial security report presented to higher Lebanese authorities.
It wa8 not odd that the Maronite bishops' retreat
Khuraysh should conclude with the condemnation of
ing place in Lebanon, yrd iC was not strange that
for prayere to overcome the cauaea of division aru
in people's hearts, following the aggravated wave
the country.
headed by Patriarch
the assassinationa tak-
the bistiops should caYl
I for the sowing of love
of violence underway in
The bishops were not alone in feeling anxiety over the increasing politic-
al liquidation attacks in Lebanon. Official Lebanon is afraid of this
wave which is passing over it and officials are talking about reports
which do not portend relief in the near future so much as they portend
that the prelude to any political relief wi11 be the liquidation of polit-
ical peraonslities in order to put a practical limit to aome existing ex-
_ tremiat poaitions, aince the positions have become linked with individuals.
Has the final liquidation stage begun, or did it begin some time ago? Did
it almnst reayh its climax recently?
What is the Lebanese's anticipated picture regarding the things tha fears
of assassination raiae?
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
Who are the targets on the blackliat?
- Hardly a day passes i.n Lebanon that liquidation operations and political
~ a$sasainations do not take place against people fram various parties and
forces on the stage which are coming to promiaenca, thougti they do not ex-
eend ta leaders of the firat or sacond rank.
' However, this situation does not prevent the occurrence of almose weekLy
attempts on political personalities possessing weight on their own or in
~ the current Lebanese situation.
A Report on Official Information
A report which the Lebanese Security Agency presented co President Ilyas
Sarkis stated that 18 assaseination attempts have been made against
= Lebanese political personalit'Les in the past 6 months, but these attempts
were not connected to the atmosphere of security outbursts among party
- forces and militias in various areas of Lebanon.
- On its second page, the report stated "Twelve assassination attempts have
been made in the last 6 montha and investigations have not aucceeded in
- ascertaining whether local elements were behind them. In seven of them,
" methode of explosion throngh tne lang-range detonation of charges in cars
ar at street corners swarming with vehicles and pedestrians were used."
Although this report could not identify any specific foreign parties to
which investigations pointed, one paragraph in it asserted "The radio de-
~ tonation methods used were not local ones; rather, they were advanced
equipment imported from the black market in Europe, in particular West
Germany."
- While this statement does not constitute factual evidence of the existence
of foreign or Iaraeli hands in what is going on, it in any event underlines
the existence of a mentality which is able to use all the modern electronic
means in the world of violence for the sake of its objectives.
Farmer President Sa'ib Saiam says, whenever he hears of an assassination
attempt against a Lebanese political personage, that evil hands are now
trying to resolve the political situation to their benefit by eliminating
groupa whose existence they do not desire. This method is a double-edged
sword which cauld in practice lead 9-he politi-cal parties to gravitate to-
ward extreme positions which will not help those with evil hands to reap
the fruits of what they are doing.
_ Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, who has been exposed to more than one assassyn.-
ation attempt, has stated that foreign elements are working in Lebanon to
- widen the rift of the dispute between political groups in order ta sancti-
fy the partition and prevent the Lebaneee from achieving reconciliation.
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
rc)IZ Oi'FICIAL USE ONI.Y
= Walid Jumblatt, chief of the Soci,alist Frogressive Party, has said in his
: talks with the vational Movement staff that it is ircposaiblf: to acquire
imnunity aga`_nst the assassination attempts going nn in Lebanon and that
all political forces must coopn=ate to put a limit to these dangsrous op��
erations.
Although Walid Jumblatt did not bring the good news af an approaciiing so-
lution, as he atressed in the ceremony comnemorating the grcup of inen
fallen in battle in tne al-Shuf region, and although he stated that the
_ solution would not cume and that thf situation would not quiet down be.cauae
- the conspiracy ia coiitinuing, his circles assert that th.e Druze leader ia
- afraid of new developments whicti might thwart all the attempts being made
to achieve reconciliatton among political forces and implementation of the
- principles of national unity.
_ The Political Objective af Assassination
The fact is that acis of political assassination have not in general been
_ successful in past months. Perhapa this haa prompted a number of informed
observers rn state that these attempts are aimed at tightening ranks and
raising the sword of terror over the heads of political people in one body
or another.
' Some of these peaple believe that the assassinations have on the other
hand led to the mobilization of political figures who havA simed at patha
of political moderation. They have come to feel that the assassinations
~ have not affecte.d politician8 following a moderate path or people enjoying
good relations with various political powers.
However, the validity of this theory has not yet been proved, and it ap-
pears that same Arab embassies' information regarding the probable exist-
ence of schemes to assassinate a number of r,wderate politicians, ir order
to intensify the affiliation of other leaders of oae given orisntat{on or
another, has resulted in a shuffling of cards, putting everyone in the
same boat, as the Lebaneae expresaion goes.
In the light of theae fears, political forces have been actively attempt-
ing to learn about the bodies which lie behicid the assassination attempts.
- In Lebanon, where "Chere is a conspiracy behind every event," views which
volunteer to give information copdemning one party or another always stand
out, though there is no evidence to prove the statement or allegation.
- It appears from the parties whose theories are concerned with today that
the intelligence services active in Lebanon are the ones to which the
fingers of accusation are to be pointed the most, because obscurity uaually
surroun.ds the assassination operations and intel?igence agencies, unifying
doubts and Yeaving rnuch scope for the raiaing of formulations based on
- methods in the arts of killing.
17
_ FOR OFFICIAL liSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
. .
These theories have not spared any intelligence agencies in their charges _
although fingers of accusation in the attempt against Ahmad al-Khatib,
comnander of the "Arab Army of Lebanon" organization, were pointed at the ~
intelligence organization of Lt Col Juni 'Abduh in the Lebanese arniy, and
fingers of accusation in the attempt against former Yresident Camille _
Chemoun were pointed at Israeli intelligence, the inrelligence branch of
the Phalange Party and Syrian intelligence, and, while there were contra-
dictory charges in the attempt against onF-- of al-Jumayyil's childien--to
the point where the attempt seemed to be the act of a son against his -
father or against his brother, and they did not sparc the agencies of form-
~ er president Fran;iyah, the agencies of the Palestinian resistance and -
Syrian intelligence--ox even the partisans of Presiden[ Chamoun.
Talk about assassination attempts must differentiate between the neople
- niaking the plan and the instruments of execution. Perhaps this what
the report presented to President 5arkia referred to. The report states -
= that the circumstancea of certain assassiriatior attempts ccnfirmed the
presence of elements inside closed areas and even within pnlitical ,`.orces
which are known to have shown svmpathy for what went on, thrjugh the exe-
cution of the job, by facilitating the seCting of charges, or even by guar-
anteeing the gerpetrators' easy departure fr.cm the area.
The Unknown Element
_ The report gives an examq1e of this in the attempt io assassinate Staykh
_ YiErre al-Jumayyil, conanander of the Phalange militia, whose daughter and
companions were its victims. The report statas that the perpetrators re-
lied on a person who could observe Bashir al-Jumsyyil's car when it passed
through the detonation zone and that this person could :iot ha,!e deteTmined
, that from a remote location because of the high buildings and walls in the
zone.
This theory led the Phalange Party to surround the area and comb it house
- by house in an attempt to discover the perpetraCor, but this did not show
r-
positive results--proving the ability of participa,`.ing or cooperating per-
sonnel to move easily in the area.
The report points to the Phalange investigation minutes on this incide*.:t.
These contain the fact that the perpetrator may have been given the deton- -
ation signal by telephone as soon as BaRhfr al-Jumayyil's car approached
the mined car, in confirmation of the point that one cannot unraeel this
kind of operation because there is no proof or equipment in the hands of
the perpetrators which could lead to their convic*_ion.
The fact is that the political climate in Lebanon is redolent with talk of
- the fear of political assassinations. The prime minister, Salim al-Huss, _
- says that the paralysis dominating the Lebanese stage could find in the
assassination attempts a way to move one orientation or another in the
direction the planners of theae crimin$1 acts want.
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
,1 Premier al-Huss, who, of all the poliricians in Lebanon, moves around the 1
mogt, is uot afraid of attenipts to aasassinate nim because he is beloved-- in fact, he deteri.inedly believes that tha plotters of assa.asinations want
- to change the po?iti.cal balances among the struggling forces ttirough the
= assassinations, and he is not s pexty to these atruggling forces.
- Perhapa this is t'ie second reason for the prem�ter's failure to use the ~
bulletproof Mexcedes car which the government if West Germar.y gave him. -
The first reason is that the car ia of no use in aperat.tona of detonation
- of explosivf chargee which kill everything around them withirn a radius of -
_ 50 metere. -
The Problem of the Dealings with Israel
In the process of reviewing the current situation in Lebanon, we really
_ find that the government's power to break the scope of the existing polit-
- ical paralyais remains extremely limited and that the problem of those
dealing with Iarael has reached the point where it is not possible to
- achieve practical progress satisfying any power which mortgagea any pro-
greas toward reconciliation and a government of national federation to the
- solution of this intractable problem.
_ This situation has caused the issue of political movement to be of no con-
sequence and to be incapable of changing existing balances. It has
prompted a group of diplomatic observers to atate that those who place
- movement before probleme aspire to developments which might eliminate one
of the parties to the cutrent political balance, now that these problems
_ have become linked with peopla.
This kind of development can come only through political assassinations,
which may elimir.ate some political persanalities and which would entail
the elimination of these peraons' approach--and transcend the problems,
. b:,;aLSe the liquidation operations might be the price for satisfying polit- =
- ical forces which are atill adhering to their rigid positions. Diplomatic
= sources say that these rigid forces may be the target of assassination op- -
eratiions if it is desired to create parties whose leaders can be more ef-
' fectively included.
The more serious these possibilities are, tihe gre&ter the seriousness,
anxiety and fear the Lebanesa officials view them with. Some people be- ~
lieve that the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in 1977 was an attempt to
remove the thorn of a basic party to the Lebanese war, namely the National
Movement.
However, this atternpt did not lead to the intended object because the =
2lational Movement continued to be the major representative of forces in -
Lebanon; therefore, the fear lies in the fact that no new assassination
19
FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
w{11 lead Co a change in the picture, in the balance, or even in the
prubZems--to the contrary, it will lead to more extremism and division.
_ Until the dust of the assassinatinn attempts is dispelled, the politicians -
- ia Lebanon will still be fECed with difficult choices--whether to escape
- f.nd lessen the chances of falling victim to assassinationa, as Gen Raymond _
- Iddah did, to rernain at the mercy of people holding evil designsF or to
- abandon politics and even talk about politics. In any case, the prayer _
which the men of religion have called for remains the only way to replace
- affection with violence and to replace assassinations with intelligent
discourse.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'AR.ABI -
- 11887
CSO: 4802
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFTCIAI. USE ONLY

~
LEBANON
- CONDUCT OF ISLAMIC GROUPS NOTBD -
_ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9-15 May 80 pp 20-22
/Article: "Political Islam in Lebanon"/ -
/Text/ Whi1e the Shiite Moslem faction in Lebanon is gravitating toward -
the &doption of an approach which is politically anrl militarily more inde-
pendent than that of the other main Islamic factions (the Sunnites and
the Bruzee), the Prime Ministers' Club in the Sunnite faction is still in- _
_ separable from the third presidency (the premiership). At the sgme time,
this club ia trying to regain its statua with the Isl.aaic man in the street,
- having lost much of it during the war.
Since 1943 the Lebanese have been talking abou*_ "political Maroniem" as a
slogan and the substance of the nature of the movements Maronite politicians
in Lebanon make towarct the other politicians of other factions, to the
point where this political Maraniam has acquired something similar to law
and custam and hes acquired an entity expYesaive of the Maronite power
centers in the country.
From that date, until recenC years, political Maroniam reniained a center
of gravity around which various poeitions rotated and were measured, in
- terms of their proacimity to or remotenesa from it, because of the status
the Maroni.*_e president occupied and the solidity of his status in compar-
ison with the temporary character which staaiped the tenure of the Sunnite
, prime minister and the Shiite chairman of the Chamber of deputies.
Now, after about 30 years of action to eli.minate factionalism in Lebanon, -
we find that pawers have been distributed among the varioua majar factions,
in spite of the emergence of the National Movement as a political force joining people of the various factione together under the slogan of "The
left after the Lebanese war." -
In recent days, talk has proliferated about "political Islam" in Lebanon,
its role, ite ideas, the principlea it believes in, and the popular force
it represents. While circumstances have made a force of Shiism in the
context of the Amal movement which Mr Musa al-Sadr, the spiritual leader
21 -
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
t
~
~
= of the aect, establ{ahed., "political Is1Am" in its Sunnite context stil.l -
pervedes power centers which coopezate, differ, ally and struggle together
now that they also have entered the strugg'Le on the local and Arab-wide =
axes.
-
- Whgt DnPS "Political Islam" Mean?
What, however, doea the expression "politLcal Islam" maan? Is it a cover _
! for all Meslew political action, or has it managed through the years to ~
achieve a force which has its fixed values, principles and activities based
= on a clear strategy? �
~ It is nost difficult to confine "politicai Islam" to a single area or body -
- in Lebanon. There is the "Islamic grouping," ther_e is the "Islamic Council," =
there is the "Society of the Graduates of Islamic Institutions," there are
the Islamic bodies and societies which meet in political federations or
politfcal leagues, and naturally there is Shaykh Hasan Khalid the Sunnite '
mufti and his advisors. "
The expresaion "political' Islam" could mean all these f orces--in addition
to parties of an Islamic coloring, such as the Scouts P arty for instance.
It cauld mean one of them, if it was in the center of power, according to
circumstances.
- The expression "political Islam" could mean broad ad hoc fronts such as _
- the "Islamic National Front" of 1958 durin.g the civil war of the "'Armun -
Summit" of 1975 when the recent explosion began.
However, since the beginning of the fifties this nomenclature has implied
- an Arabist current seeking political reform ia Lebanon to create a just
~ society, equality of opportunity among citizens and the fragmentation of
factional privilegea and monopoliea.
Political Is lam in Lebanon, in apite of the great iupulses of popular cur-
rents which support it, could only gain a foothold in the fifties through
Nasirism, could only find hope for democratic change in the sixties -
through Shihabism and could only strive for constitutional reforms to guar-
= antee its rights in the seventies through a cammitment to the Palestinian _
- resf$tance and the Arahhood of Lebanon.
Perhapa this is what has made some leaders of "political Is1am" come to
prominence on specific occasions, only to have their star set because their
p'rominence was within a context of varying circumstances, not within a
_ basic Islamic strucCure which could respond flexibly to the demands of the
age.
Now, with the emerging eightfea, "Political Islam" has extended to the
people through the celebrations of the 15th century since the Hegira. A1-
though its extension has been religious and apiritual, politica has not
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL1'
beer. absent from the occasion. Thie hae led to the raising of a basic
question on the political future of Islam and ita ability to live among
other political forces in Lebanon, which have drawn from it and have tried
to give it their characteristics without being able to hide the picture
of what it repreaents. _
- Rotation in the Sunni te Leadership
On January 1977, after about a month had elapaed since he formed his first
government, P rime Minister Salim al-Huss rold the members of the Islamic
Grouping, "From the f irat moment the prime minister comes to power in
Lebanon, he feels that he is being prepared to move out, or to be moved
out. From that moment, his inatability and lack of solidity begin and
this results in weakening hie atatus and his posi*_ions." _
Premier al-huss had sgpealed to the grouping to support his government be-
cause he realized from the outaet that the political history of Islam was
full of competitions for positions of premierahip. How could a doctor in
, ec,onomics enter the club of prime minieters without knowing politics in
advance and knowing it ae a profession? -
From that day, Premier al-Husa placed his finger on the nature of what '
could happen in the future if political Islam formed a bloc against him.
Perhaps the violent statement which the Islamic GrQUping iasued 2 weeks ~
ago will furnish new proof of the fact that the future process of confront-

_ ing Islamir. forces will not be comfortable.
It was the custom that members of the prime miniater's club would rotate
the chair of thP third head. Therefore, the fact that al-Husa has remained
in power for more than three and a half years gives the impresaion that he
is not prepared to move out or be moved out, in spite of all the crises he -
has suffered. This is reason enough for competitors to get moving.
The circumstances of today have brought the Islamic Grouping to the sur-
face; it is the main power representing political Islam, even though some
forcea in the National Movement conaider themselves repreaentatives of
political Islam, drawing their power and personnel from the Islamic man in
the street.
- The fact is that the Islamic Grouping which has reaumed its activity since r
the years of the war loet a great deal of its power after the citizens in
Lebanon had oriented themselvea toward formulas of a non-factional nation- -
al framework, since t:iey were influenced by the factional problems which
the events had brought out, which gave birth to oppoaing reactions among
citizens. These were diatinguiehed by a flight to national political
forces or a flight to a seclusion from political exploitation of the fac-
tional context, as was the case with the Moslem Brothers and others. -
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
However, this loss did not prevent Che Islamic Grouping from *-ying to
get moving once more in fear that it would yield its positiona to new
young forces. Nor did that prevent it from admitting that it was absent
. f rom the arena, which it juatified by the climate of terror which dominated =
the country in the paet few years.
Vicissitudes in the Political Action of Islam
In recent years political Islam has made aerious attempts to rise to posi-
tions of power which could impoae change. Howevsr, these eff orts have not
been characterized by a quality o4f permanence. In March 1975, the Islamic
Council requested the prime minister at that time, Rashid al-Sulh, to re-
- s ign immediately because the Islamic will was no longer represented in the
g overnment, and it called for a modification of the Army Law in order to
restore balance to it.
On 26 October 1975, the Islamic Summit met in 'Arn:un in the home of the
mufti of the republic, Shaykh Hasan Khalid, in the presence of Mr Yaeir
'Araf at, head of the Paleatine Liberation Organizati:,n, snd announced its
support for the premier at the time, Rashid Karami,
The Islamic Summit itself on 5 December 1975 resumed and advised Premier
_ Karami to return to the national decnanda before expanding the government �
and making a national reconciliation. On 8 September 1976 the Islamic
Group ing delegation visited Damascus and met with President Hafiz al-Asad. _
The f ollowing day the late Kamal Jumblatt gave a statement in the name of
tha National Movement in which he attacked the Islamic leaders visiting
Damas cus .
After that visit, the activities of "political Islam" began to pale. At-
tempts were made to hold an expanded Islamic conference in November 1976,
in what was then the center of religious judgments, as proof of the attempt
by the National Movement's young leaders to accelerate the tide of Islata.
However, the former prime miniaters' boycott did not give these forces or
even Mufti Khalid the opportunity to call for the reaurgence of a new
board diffpring from the traditional framework which the Islamic Grouping
wanted.
In 1977 the Islamic Grouping's attempts to gain prominence continued, but
that did not produce great results, in spite of Premier Salim al-Huss'
p ersonal intereat in giving the Islamic Grouping a prominent role in
Lebanese politics.
On 16 May 1977 the Islamic Grouping met Premier al-Huss, in tY:e absence of
_ P remier al-Yafi, Premier Karaiai and Mr Malik Salam. They informed him of
t heir viewpoint regarding the issues of growth and development in the com-
mercial circles in Beirut, the army, and formations and appointments.
24
FO& OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
On 10 May 1977 the Islamic Groupir.g presented al-tiuss with iasuea related
to security; then, At the end of the month of May, it again demanded appli.-
cation of the Caira and (Ma.Licart) Agreements with the Palestinians, which
was to be accompanied by che collection of weapons from all groups in or-
der to make everyone secure. The grouping etreased this to President
Sarkia in its maeting with him that month, with the understanding that the
agreements with the Palestinian resistance would be carried out.
On 29 Auguat 1977, the Islamic Grouping considered that the statement of
the Maronite "Lebanese Front" after the Ihdin respite, was a blow to every
sincere nationalist, and it stressed the need to support the president,
who so far has proved that he is up to events and the masaive task laid on
his shoulders,
Traditional Islam Is Trying To Return
The fact is that with the beginning of the clash between the Syriana and
the "Lebanese Front" in 1977, political Islam in Lebanon has been gravitat-
ing toward a style of attacking the regime in order to make it hesitate to
adopt clear positfons. Premier Sa'ib Salam, member of the Islamic Group-
ing, proceeded to accuse President Sarkis of colluding with the Lebanese
_ Front.
However, this style did not prevent political Islam from trying to play its
role on the Lebanese stage by various means, especi.ally after it had sensed
a clear tendency on the part of some Lebanese and Arab political forces to
- play a role in its name or to hand its forces over to the framework of the
= national and progressive forces. In spite of the ferocity of the national
and progressive forces' attacks against it, it was able to retain its
poli[ical weight within the Lebanese structure, in the hooe that restric-
tions on arms and terror would cauae its forces to return to their natural
state.
In the course of a discusaion with personalities who visited Damascus,
Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam asked "What else does the Islamic Grouping
repreaent besides some former premiers?" He raised the question anew be-
fore President Sarkis in Ba'abda Palace.
This occurred at a time when the Islamic Grouping delegation was visiting
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the context of its efforts to d.evelop and
enlarge its Arab contacts.
Perhaps this question occurred synonymously with the statement which one
member of the grouping made to the effect that the delegation sensed back-
ing for the role which Premier al-Huss ia playing in Riya,3h. It sensed a
- desire for the grouping's activities to grow in accordance with a clear
intellectual structure of the grouping.
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
- Does that mean that the Islamic Grouping has chosen to support the prime
~ minister instead of competing with him, in apite of the violent statement
it made against him--although it is changing the contexts of action it has
relied on in order to show more seriousneas and to qualify it to play the
role it wants?
rremier Rashid Karami, member of the grouping, who has withdrawn to Tripoli,
believes that the current stage is a stage of shuffling of Islamic Group-
_ ing cards and that it does not consider it necessary to concentrate these
forces within final groupings so that political Islam will not be compelled
to rely on forces which the war drew out in their present volumes.
- Shafiq al-Wazzan, member of the grouping and chairman of the Islamic Council,
- underlines this statement, adding that all Lebanese forces have faced polit-
- ical fluctuati.ons i..n past years and that "political Islam" is being called
on to play a fundamental role i,n the process of national reconciliation to-
day, because the war, which has worn out all slogans, has retained the
basic atructure of political Islam in the broad context of Arabhood and
= the national context of needed political reforms.
President Fu'ad Shihab said, "The leaders in Lebanon do not die. Their -
role will `iave to appear some day." Proceeding from that premise, "polit-
ical Islam" may adopt a new role in the eighties relying on the variablea
in the balances and powers which are achieved in the Arab area and in
Lebanon in particular.
Perhaps at that point the question will not be who is representing "polit-
ical Islam" in Lebanon so much as "what does political Islam represent in ~
this coming stage, and what is its role in drawing a picture of Lebanon?"
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887 _
CSO: 4802 -
~
26 -
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LEBANON
SYRIAN POLITICAL ROLE IN COUNTRY REVIEWED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'AR.ABI in Arabic 9-15 May 80 p 22
, /Article: "Khaddam's Talks in Beirut: Moving the Ball Into Sarkis'
Court"/
/Text/ Syrian policy in Lebanon these days seems like a serial whose rid-
dlea everyone is befuddled in interpreting. Did Miniater Khaddam's visit
to Beirut and his diacussiona there result in breaking the mysteries of
the serial?
Lebanese officials are befuddled in interpreting the reasons for and re-
sults of foreign minister 'Abd-al-?ialim Khaddam's -visit to Lebanon and
his discussiona with them.
- Some observers described 'the viaft as just alleviating a rebuke, whiie -
other obaervers felt that it wns intended to return the ball to ehe court
of PreAident Ilyse Arkis, setting forth new rules for the game which would
at least prevent him from returning it to the Syrian court. -
. In the process of reviewing the ieauea raised for discussion, we can de-
duce the following: `
Tihe Middle East crisis: Minister Khaddam said that Syria does not expect
a new initiative in the coming months, although it has been maintaining
its readiness to cope with the results of the autonomy talks between Egypt
- and Israel.
The Syrian minister expressed his fears that tension in the Gulf will turn _
_ into a broad military aonfrontation between the United States and Iran and
_ that ita fallout will extend to the Arabian Gulf. -
Khaddam undertook not to ask Lebanon to join with syria in Syria's stands.
Tre crisis in southern Lebanon and relations with the resistance: It has
- become clear that the aouthern issue is no longer one which Syria:- can
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
help settle by military pressure, since the Arab deterrent forces have
withdrawn from the coastal areas ex[ending to al-Zahrani.
- In the discussions, senior Lebanese officials expressed their fear that
_ the crisis in the souch will be transformed into a bruad clash between
the Amal movement and the Palestinian resistance.
The Lebanese authorities perceive a desire on the popular leaders' part to
restrict the resistance's activity and remove it from the towns and villages,
and a further desire to rekurn the refugees tn their regions.
The government is afraid that these demands will escalate but that it will
not in practice be possible for it to play its part to limit them and that
it will also not be possible for it to bring the army into these regiuns,
as long as it does not receive basic assistance from Syria.
Khaddam replied that the negotiations with the resistance are an issue
which the Lebanese government must take up directly, even though Syria may
help bring the viewpointa closer.
_ Therefore, the top people in the regime in Lebanon felt that moving the
cause into a direct dialogue bypassed the crisis of the south and its
- complications.
- In this regard, Premier al-Huss says that he had been expecting more spe-
cific Syrian help in this regard, especially since direct contact with the
- resistance is going on. The Latest meeting with Yasir 'Arafat took place
2 days before Khaddam arrived, but no principle emerged on whose basis it
would be possible to arrive at a final mutual understanding on the situa- -
~ tion in the south.
The aecurity and military situation: Premier al-Huss presented his notion
of security coordination with Syria from the standpoint of the promulgation
of a plan in which the Arab deterrent forces and the Lebaneae army would
jointly assume charge of security along the coastal road from the far north
to the far south.
However, Minister Khaddam did not want to discuss this subject, on grounds
that there is no pressing security need today, as long as the Arab deter-
rent forces do not make new withdrawals from the existing areas, especial- -
ly the markets in the capital.
President Sarkis' sources say that he was persuaded by the view of Minister
Khaddam on this point, because he knew from the beginning that al-Huss =
. would move from the security question to the issue of the army and the de-
- cree applying the coannand organization, because it is the first problem
standing in the way of implementation of any security plan and implementa-
tion of the principles of reconciliation.
28
_ FOR OP'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
These sources state that President Sarkia did not want Syria to face a
choice between his plan and that of al-Huss, because Syria might gravitate
toward al-Huss' side in rejecting the abaolute powers of the Intelligence
Department. However, Khaddam spared him this aituation when he also
skirted the procnss of making the choice.
The National Federation Government and the principle on dealings with
Israel: On discugsion of the principles of reconciliation, Minister
Khaddam told President Sarkis that Damascus supported the principles he
declared in the letter he sent recently to the Lebanese. He recommended
that President Sarkis conduct consultations dealing with one subject,
namely the issue of dealings with Israel,so that if he reaches an obvious
change, to reject such dealings in a decisive manner, Syria will be able
to help him reduce the obstacTea regarding the formation of a government
of activities and specifically w'ill be able to persuade President Sulayman
~ Franjiah ta change his stand in opposition to the Phalange Party's partic-
ipation in any future government.
In Khaddam's review of this issue, se,~eral points stood out, most import-
ant of which were: the dialogue between Syria and the Maronite Phalange
Par[y is expected to develop. The Phalange Party's statement in Damascus
on rejacting dealings with Isxael was not sufficiently convincing, while
Syria will not put a veto on any political power once it has established
the pxinciple of refusing to deal with Israel.
In any event, in the light of the discussions with Khaddam, Lebanese of-
ficials believe that the issue of refusing to deal with Israel has come to
take precedence over the issue of discussing formation or nonformation of
a national federal government implementing the principles of reconcil-
iation.
President Sarkis' sources say that the di.3cussions did not result in defin-
- ition of a formula for the principle of "refusing to deal with Iarael."
Therefore Syria perhaps wanted to divert the government by discussing
_ formulas which could be rejected at any time and also wanted to postpone
the reaolution of any pending matter in the Lebanese scene.
What is important today is that the "Lebanese Front" still considers that
the dialogue with Syria is a d{alogue which is moving toward coTrnon points.
Therefore its reactions to the results of the visit were in general posi-
_ tive; as for the National Movement, it considers that Syria is trying to
gfve President Franjiyah a big role which will satisfy him, because it
- wants hirn *.o feel that it is he who stalled the reconciliation for a year
because of his refusal to deal with those who deal with Israel, and that
it ia he who will have returned to permit the efforts behind the reconcil-
iation to continue, if he gets what he wants.
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
Perhaps this is what prompted one of the heads of the National Movement to
state that w'.:at is going on now is only a production process for the final
chapter prior to the government of activitiea and that attempts will now
be concentrated on moving the ball into President Sarkis' court.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
CSO: 4802
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
J
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LIBYA
QA17iiDHAFI'S PURSUIT OF OPPONENTS DISTURBS RELATIONS WITH WEST
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 16-22 May 80 pp 34-35
[Article: "The Libyan-Angol-American Crisis: From Steadfastness to Pursuit;
Liquidation of the Opposition Abroad Turns into Confrontation with London
a-nd Washington"]
[Text] Within less than a month, Libyan hit squads killed
six opponents of President al-Qadhdhafi who were in exile
in Europe. The bloody chase, however, has turned into a
sharp diplomatic crisis between the Libyan regime, on the
one hand, and the United States and more than a European
_ country, on the other. It threatens to have oil and
trade implications and ramifications.
London--The British lavishly congratulated themselves for the successful
operation mounted by British commandos who stormed the Iranian embassy to
"rescue" Iranian hostages from armed Arab attackers from the province of
Arabistan (Khuzestan).
The British received more praise--this time from the Iranian president Abol
Hasan Bani-Sadr himself who sent a message of "thanks and congratulations"
_ to prime minister Margaret Thatcher. When he sent the message, he had just
published an article in his newspaper in which he accused her of plotting
with Carter to engineer the embassy incident.
The euphoria of triumph began to dissipate, however, as a number of grisly
facts about the embassy incident graudally began to unfold. AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI alluded to these facts in its previous edition.
The British have discovered that the 5 armed Arabs were not killed in a
battle with the commandoes, but were liquidated by the commandoes after
they were pointed out to them by Iranian hostages. The comnandoes spared
the life of only one gunman and handed him over to Scotland Yard for
- investigation.
According to an eyewitness, Pakistani-born British journalist (Mohamed
Hashir Faruqi), who happened to be in the embassy when the gunmen broke
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
_ into it, the gunmen did not intend to resist and shouted "surrender, sur- -
render," in Persian when the comman does managed to break into the embassy.
This story was supported by British press reports and accounts *:hich gradually _
began ta unmask what went on inside the embassy when the commandoes stormed
it. British papers had noted that the British authorities were using
delay'.ng tactics in responding to the demands of the gunmen during the ,
negotintions with them. Those demands had dwindled in the end to a mere -
request to hold a news conference to explain their province's desire for
autonomy and then leave the country. The fact of the matter, as the British
press noted, is that the British authorities had decided to storm the embassy
regardless of the consequences.
Jounalist Faruqi says that the gunmen could have killed all the hostages
had they wanted to do so. But they only killed the press attache 'Abbas
- (Luasani) when he provokedthem, cha llenged the claims of their province and
assailed their deep hatred for the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeyni.
So, the "high efficiency and good 1 uck" which characterized the British
rescue operation ended in a massac re: the death of 5 gunmen and one other
host--ge besides th.e Iranian press a ttache. This could have been averted had =
British authorities allowed Arab diplomatic mediators to try to end the
incident peacefully. The British f oreign office refused to allow Arab diplo-
mats to undertake mediation efforts when declined to provide them with prior
guarantees that the embassy would not be stormed.
The British hope that the Iranians would not ask them for compensations
for damages befalling the embassy, which are estimated at 800,000 pounds
sterling. They have reminded Iran in anticipation that Tehran has not
_ compensated Britain for damages suffered by the British embassy when demon-
strators broke into it in 1978, toward the end of the shah's regime. At -
that time, those damages were estimated at 220,000 pounds sterling. It is
- certain that Bani-Sadr will not ask Britain for any compensation and will
satisfy himself with the great favo r Britain had done his regime by liqui-
dating the Arab gunmen.
The British Embroil the Americans
The storming of the Iranian embassy, however, is not the "hot" issue in the
British government's list of conce rns. Britain is presently preoccupied
with a diplomatic crisis with Libya. The crisis has forced the foreign
secretary, Lord Carrington, to stay behind and not accompany Prime Minister
Thatcher to Belgrade for the funeral of the late Yugoslav President Tito. -
British diplomatic shrewdness has rQSOrted to the clever gambit of embroiling
the United States in the crisis with Libya, in order to lessen the impact
of Libya's reaction. British security sources leaked information to the
- American authorities about_ plans by Libyan diplomats to mou-at an "intimida-
- tion" campaign against onponents of President al-Qadhdhafi in the United
- States. American officials, their nerves racked by the Afghanistan devel-
opments, the hostages crisis in Iran and the failure of their own rescue
attempt, quickly set off a major diplomatic crisis with Libya.
32
FOR OFF'ICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The State Department declared 4 Libyan diplomats persona non grata and asked
that they be recalled within a cett.ain period of time. The Libyans, however,
would not capitulate. On instructions from their government, they declared
that the 4 would not leave the United States because they are students, not
diplomats.
The crisis escalatede FBI agents surrounded the premises of the Libyan
embassy and threatened to arrest anyone entering or leavin~ the embassy and
to put him on the first plane leaving for Tripoli. In view of this, the
four Libyans were forced to leave the United States.
American authorities have failed to provide any details about the material
_ evidence on which they made charges against the four diplomats. They would
only say that the FBI was keeping them under surveillance and that the
authorities have ascertained that the four had engaged in an "in timidation"
campaign against the opponents of al-Qadhdhafi who have sought refuge in
the United States. Perhaps it is that the Americans, angered by several
recent setbacks, beginning with the failure of the attempt to rescue the
hostages in Iran and ending with the suspension of the autonomy talks between
Egypt and Israel, did not fully assess the consequences of their involvement
at this particular time in a diplomatic crisis with a regime that is no less
nervous and tensE -than them., such as the regime of President al-Qadhdhafi.
Al-Qadhdhafi Threatens
- Indeed, the Libyan president threateningly announced that he is seriously
considering cutting off ail shipments to Britain and America and to pull out ~
Libyan funds deposited in both countries. He followed his threat with
another one, when he raised the issue of renarations to Libya fo r the -
millions of mines left by World War Two armies in the Libya.n des ert, which
have since killed a large number of Libyans.
That desert, as it is well-known, was the site of a formidable tug of war
- bztween the forces of Germany's Marshal Rommel (the desert fox) and the
forces of Britain's Gen Montgomery and their American or Italian allies
(1941-43).
_ The British chuckled se~retly over the Libyan threat. They had nothing much
- to lose since they reportedly ceased to import Libyan oil last year. A
small number of British firms are fulfilling insignificant contracts with _
Libya, but there are 6,000 British citizens working in Libya as advisers
and experts assigned to several projects.
The Americans are the ones who would lose most if al-Qadhdhafi were to
carry out his threat. There are 2,500 Americans working in Libya. Eight
percent of United States oil imports (600,000 barrels per day, o r 35 percent
of Libya's oil output) come from Libya. American oil companies own or run
oil fields, refineries and wells which account for about two thirds of
Libya's oil produc.tion (or 1,700,000 bpd),
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
Although as a precaution, the United States quickly withdrew its two remaining _
diplomats from Libya following the :incident in which President al-Qadhdhafi's -
supporters broke into and set fire to the embassy in December, the United
States stands to suffer serious material losses were al-Qadhdhafi to carry
out his ultimatum or cut off oil. London and Washington, however, do not
believe that al-Qadhdhafi will carry out his threat, especi_ally since he
has forgotten or backed down from similar threats in the past. The latest
was his threat to punish the L'nited States if it failed to deliver to him
the C-130's and Boeings for which he had paid in advance. ~
Libyan-American relations have been swinging back and f.orth over the past
few years. They showed a marked improvement when Carter's younger brother,
who works in commercial advertising, visited Libya. Upon his return, he
promoted American-Libyan friendship but his zeal evaporated gradually.
' The Libyan funds which President al-Qadhdhafi has threatened to withdraw amount
to about $10 billion which are split between the United States and Europe.
Although they constitute only a part of the Arab oil surpluses which are
invested in the two continents, their withdrawal would add to the confusion
_ and disarray of the international financial market which is still stung by
the vestige of the negative impact of the American freezing of Iranian funds.
Perhaps the two European countries which stand to be most affected by the
outbreak of a serious crisis between President al-Qadhdhafi and the West _
would be West Germany and Italy. (A Libyan opposition personality was
killed in Germany on a weekend at the same time that another was killed in
Italy. This brings to 6 the number of persons whum al-Qadhdhafi had liqui- _
dated abroad since April for failing to return home.)
Germany imports 350,000 bpd from Libya, or 16 percent of its oil needs, while
Italy imports some 300,000 bpd, or 15 percent of its oil needs. In addition
to that, there is a large Italian co:nmunity of some 20,000 persons in Libya,
with important commercial and economic interests.
- Actually, the European nations in general do not want to get into a confront-
ation with Libya for clear oil reasons, especially at a time when Iranian
oil has almost trickled to a stop. At the same time, they do not want their
territories and capitals to became arenas of assassination and chasing
grounds in the battle between regimes and their opponents. At any rate,
there is a tendency to be strict with Libya if President al-Qadhdhafi fails
to call off his bloody pursuance of his opponents who have reportedly renewed
their activities on a wide scale lately.
The British say that sending hit squads to silence opponents abroad with
bullets is not a sign of strength, but a sign of weakness within the Libyan
regime and ati indicator signaling the growth of opposition at home. The
Libyans, however, do not see it that way. They say that they are pursuing
"exploiters and the bourgeoisie," and that they have the right to pursue
those elements abroad as they have the right to pursue them at home.
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE GNLY
At any rate, Europe will not suffer alone as a result of the deterioration
of the crisis between the two sides. Libya too, which imports-all its
needs from the West with oil money, wi11 stand to lose in the process of
steadfastness and pursuit.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-IARABI
9254
CSO: 4802
r
a
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9
rvtc urriAIleu., uDn U1YL1
LIBYA =
DIPLOMATIC UPHEAVALS REFLECT DOMESTTC DISTURBANCES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23-29 May 80 p 26
[Article: "In Libya, the Middle Class Reads the Green Book From Left to
- Right"]
[Excerpt] The March on the Embassies
The purges continue at Libyan embassies overseas. "Popular Revolutionary
Committees" have taken over nine embassies, including two in Eastern
Europe, declaring the end of "diplomatic ties" with other peoples and
obsolete "popular relations." The fate of the traditionalist aiabassadors
anCL diplomats, or whether or not they will return to Libya, is as yet un-
known.
The official Libyan news agency, which is distributed here, commented on
the "march of heroes and soldiers of the glorious, First of September
Revolution" on the Libyan embassies overseas, describing it as a"con-
vulsion of the popular revolution which is continuing to shatter the _
foundations of traditional diplomacy, which is the product of capitalist
= society, and to build on its rubble new foundations for popular action
and international relations anong peoples." -
The prevailing belief is that the "march" on the embassies was inspired -
by concepts of the third world theory originated by President al-Qadhdhafi
as a middle course between "unbelieving Communism" and "exploiting capi-
talism," and propounaed in the "Green Book," which he offers as a gospel
of salvation for the people of the wor13. The theory is based on "mass
power" and the dissolution of gover.nmental power, a step which is being _
i.mplemented on a wide scale in Libya but tihich critics of the regime say
has led to "total chaos."
There are conflicting reports of the occurance of "complaints" among the
- prosperous groups in Libya, protesting the recent economic measures which
included the nationalization of private economic and industrial organiza-
_ tions. The latest such measure is the change in the national currency.
However, the replacement of all the currency being carried by the citizens
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY -
I
- is not yet complete. Each citizen is being given 250 Libyan dinars,
_ and a check for the remainder.
It is rumcred that demonstrations and clashes have occurred in Benghazi
_ and Tobruk, and it is said that more than 2,000 persons have been ar-
rested, a third of whom have been "purged" on the charge of corruption,
including officers, government off icials, businessmen and students.
These reports have not been officially confirmed or denied, but it is
not Libya's custom to r-nnounce the results of the trials of "corrupt
persons."
The prevailinb belief here 4s that President al-Qadhdhafi is hasteni'.ng
to nip the domestic opposition movement in the bud by means of the ar-
- rests. He has also vowed to prosecute some of its leaders who are ac-
tive overseas, relying on his popularity among the ranks of students
and young people, on the one hand, and on the firm surveillance which
his intelligence agencies have impased on Libyans living in exile in
- Europe.
_ Some British busin^ssmen recently retsrned from Libya attribute the dis-
turbance to the "revolt of the middle class," the upper segments of which
were affected in the early 1970's by the colossal failure of development -
= and construction projects. Hoi�yever, these segments now violently oppose
the radical revolution which President al-Qadhdhafi iiiitiated in 1968, .
derived from the principles of the Green Book which he wrote in a desert
_ tent.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8559
CSO: 4802
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300014408-9
FOIt OFFICIAL USI: (1N1,Y
_ LIBYA
BRTRF'fi
FRENCH MERCENARIES IN PRISON--There's beginning to be some light shed on the
outcome of t he three French pilots who mysteriously disappeared two yee.rs
- ago over the Mediterranean. According to s.ources in Chad, Michel Winter, _
Roland Raucoules, and Philippe Totu 6?re recruited by the Libyans, without
knowing exactly for what miss.ion. Fihen they learned that it Fras a question
- of escorting to N'Djamena a commando ch.arged with blowing up the French
,;aguars, they refused. Since then tFiey have been imprisoned in the Libyan
desert. [Text] [Paris VALE'[JRS ACTUELLES in French 30 Jun 80 p 131
Cso : 4800
END
r
l
38
FOR OFFICIi,L i1SE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010008-9