JPRS ID: 9232 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/9232
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5 August 1980
a-
s -
W est Europe Report -
= (FOUO 34/80)
c .
Fg~$ FORE`GN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9232
5 August 1980
WEST EUROPE REPO RT
' (FOUO 34/80)
q
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FRANCE
Neutron Bomb Seen Key To Defense of France
(Jean Cau; PARIS MATCB, 27 Jun 80) 1
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PCF's Marchais: His Personality, Strategy Reviewed '
- (Auguste Lecoeur; PARIS MATCH, 27 Jun 80) 10
Gaudard's Reasons for Quitting 'L'HUMANITE' Staff Discussed
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 28 Jun 80).... 28
Aspects of PCF Internal Crisis Examined
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 21 Jun 80).... 29
ITALY
_ Production of Nava'1 Equipment Described
(DEFENSA, May 80) 31
SPAIN
Army upgrades Tanks, Firat BMR-600 Delivered ,
(DEFENSA, May 80) 37
- Unemployment Dilemma Continues To Worsen
(CAMBIO 16, 8 Jun 80).................................. 39
Basque, Catalonian Economic Ministers on Regional Plans _
(CAMBIO 16, 22 Jun 80) 43
_ a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FRA.NCE
NEUTRON BOMB SEEN KEY TO DEFENSE OF FRANCE -
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Jun 80 pp 36-40-41, 78
[Article by Jean Cau: "Nice N-Bomb!--And if It Ware Our Only Hope of Escap-
ing Holocaust"]
[Text] Carter has refused to build it--so as not to compro-
mise the SALT agreements. The Kussians give assurances that
they are not preparing it. Only France, audaciously, an-
nounces that it knows how to make it, that it has perhaps
made it and that it can produce it on the assembly line.
Decision imminent. We are speaking, of course, of the neu- ~
tron bomb, which divides the political world but on which
all the military seem to be in agreement. It is the solu-
tion to the problem that invasion by conventional forces
would pose tc us. It is a Frenchman, Robert Ignace Dautray,
scientific dire:tor for military applications in the Atomic
Energy Commission, who is coordinating the research. "An
exceptionally gifted mind," says Alain Peyrefitte, who gave -
him the job when he waR ~ninister of energy. Tn the follow-
in pages, Jean Cau opans up the neutron-bomb file. He has
met with its "father." Both the one and the other find merits
in it. Another fascinating application oP neutron radiation:
the new Maginot line of impassable radiation conceived of by
Colonel Geneste and designed by Robert Bonneville.
For as long as there have been individuals, the eneny in war ha.s had a face.
But the question finally arose: how to wipe out an enemy called a"mass,"
with millions of inen capable of being thrown into the battles? Nuclear
- firepower was then invented. Providence has taken care of everything. For
mass societies, mass massacres. While it is true that since the end of
World War II, these wild beasts that are the great nations hnve let peoples
whose combatants they have encouraged, remote-controlled or armed tear one
another to pieces around them, they have not fought directly against one an-
_ other. Each has been content to ?et its claws and fangs grow while keeping
an eye on the growth of those of its nei.ghbors. Unfortunately ar fortunate-
ly (as one chooses), this progression is not being halted. When we had al-
ready accustomed ourselves to our good old terrifying A-bombs and H-bombs,
, an unknown star appeared on the screens of terror: the neutron bomb.
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What is it? Rather--and first of all--who is its father? In 1943, a young
American science student, Samuel Cohen, was called up and sent off to the
Massac:husgtts Institute of Technology (MIT) near Boston, to do engineering
studies before being assigned to some technical service in the U.S. Army.
He himself tells how one day, when he was very busy taking a nap and flunk-
ing an electronics course, he was brusquely awakened by a sergeant who
brought him before an official. This official had been ordered to round up
a tew students at MIT to complete the device for a mysterious "Manhattan
Project" (in fact, the construction of the first atomic bomb), and since he
was pressed for time, he did not want to upset the classrooms and had asked
the sergeant to bring him some students lounging in the cafeteria or snoring
in the dormitories. And that is how Samuel Cohen soon found himself in Los
Alamos, New Mexico. "And that," he says, "is how I became a'nuclear scien-
tist' by flunking a course!" Today he is about 60, ir: good shape. He loves
Paris, where he is at the moment for the issuance of the book "Echec a la
Guerre" [Checkmating War] (Editions Copernic), which he has written in col-
laboration with his fri-~nd the French Col Marc Geneste. Now that we have
established the identity of the fatrer, let us see who the child called N-
bomb is. Very simple: it is a miniaturized thermonuclear weapon (a mini-H-
bomb) fitted with a detonator (A-bomb or laaer). Its novelty consists in
this: wherPas the explosion of a normal atomic bomb of the Hiroshima type
liberates only 20 percent'of its energy in neutron form (X-rays) but 80 per-
cent in mechanical effects (blasi.) a:1d ther.mal effects (heat), the propor-
_ tion is reversed in the neutron bomb. Let us say that it radiates 80 per-
_ cent and blasts and heats only 20 percent. (This formidable emission of
neutrons is due to tne use of tritium as the basic product. It is very ex-
pensive: 30 million centimes per gram, and 10 gr.ama are needed for one small
N-bomb. It replaces the lithium of conventional atomic bombs, and on con-
tact with deuteriucr, produces the neutron flux.
There. Now you know everything.) The advantage of this bomb is therefore
- that it reduces the blast and heat effects very considerably beyond 300 m
from the point of explosion. In counterpaXt, it reieases a neutron flux so
dense that it passes through the armor of tanks (for example) without de-
stroying them, but irradiates the crews, paralyzes thern and kills them. At
the point of burst, where more tran 1 trillion neutrons per cm2 are re-
leased, it "dries them up" in a few minutes. At 500 m, one receives 30,000;
at 1,000 :n, 3,000. Now 600 are enough to doom any living b2ing to death.
, "Does one suffer very much from irradiation, Mr Cohen?" "Less than from
mortar-shell explosions. Roughly speaking, one feels all the symptoms of a
very violent intestinal flu, with vomiting and diarrhea. But flu can be
cured, while the radia;:ion cannot." Bitterly, passionatel:7, Samuel Cohen
_ defends "his" bomb. Such is the charm of scientists even when they conceive
the most teYrible engines of death: they love their children and celebrate
their qualities. "Are you, shall we say, embarrassed, Mr Cohen, at being
- the father of this bomb%" He is surprised and almost takes offense: "Me?
No. Why shoiild I be? Let's speak can.didly, if you don't mind. After 20
years of strategic errors, Europe is militarily at the mercy of the Soviets,
who are permitted all the political audacities by this situation. Now my
_ bomb is 'clean,' since it has very little radioactive fallout despite its
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incredi.ble effectiveness. It is the death ray, the death bath; it is the
most etFective device for crushing a ground offensive in which only the at-
tackers would die. I have therefore struck a blow for peace, 5ince I have
invented a credible nuclear weapon, at least as regards strategic defense,
for ii upsets the Russians' offensive designs terribly. It can be used to
kill but without destroying." "The fact remains that it is an abominable
- wespon."--"Listen, in order to have peace" (here it is Geneste who takes
, over from Samuel Cohen and replies to us) "there are two solutions: either
improve human nature, which the church and a few idealists have been trying
unsuccessfully to do for 10,000 years; or terrify the adversary, and if one
is forced to do ::o, destroy him. Meanwhile, it is indispensable for us to
make an effective umbrel]a without holes in it. This is the N-bomb."---
"Which, Mr Cohen, as you `,umorously said to us, makes it possible to kill
- the sniper isolated in the belltower, even if he is a bishop, without razing
the whole village."--"Yes, and it is in this way that it is useful for close
~ combat, since it wipes out all life at the ground surface, even if you are
protected by armor." Seriossly, what would one do if the 50,000 Soviet
- tanks all started moving?
Fry their crews with the N-bomb. One can imagine that the Russians, who ev-
ery month make a number or new tanks equivalent to all those that the French
Army has (most of which, besides, are more than 16 years old!), would be
fairly upset at the thought that their armada might be good for nothing but
scrap. Whence their loud cries, the most extravagant of which is: "The N-
bomb is a capitalist weapon! It kil?.s persons and spares property!" Col-
onel Geneste's reply: "And the bayonet?" And he adds: "To good people, 3e-
terrence means preventing war, but this is only a theor . With deterrence,
one must also have the desire to use it, and pressing t.~e button to exchange
the absolute 'vitrification' of France for the destruction of a few Soviet
cities is all well and good, but it is to forg2t that the other side is 100
times bigger. We can wound it, but it wipes us out and there is no battle."
Whereas with the neurron bomb, its partisans assure, everything is differ-
, ent. It is a battle weapon and comes under a different concept than the
' weapon of pure terror (the A-bomb or H-bomb packed with frightful megaton-
nage). It obliges the Soviets to reconsider their entire strategy. Indeed,
in the present state of affairs, they are, as Colonel Geneste says, 100
times bigger than we, and in the event of thermonuclear confrontation could
_ wipe us off the nap at a stroke. Except that they know that we are capable
oi wounding them seriously before we die if--obviously--we press the button.
But would we press it or not? They can avoid the risk of this bet--a mor-
tal one for us but very hard on them--by simply attacking with ground
forces, since in this area, with their tidal wave of tanks, they also enjoy
overwhelming superiority. In the face of that, we are defenseless unless we
oppose the onsiaught with a barrage of neutron bombs. Zn brief, these
bombs ablige the Soviets, in thei;r miiitary thinking, Lo renounce the use of
their forinidable power of attack by gcound forces, which they have never ne-
glec:ted--quite to the contrary!--to go on strengtnening ceaselessly. "Neu-
tron bomb? Very bothersome indeed! The Western tricksters now seem to have
a battle weapon, whereas we were able to crush them without using thermonuc-
lear weapons, to which--one never knows--they might have replied," the Rus-
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sians ttiink. It: is a battle weapon because the N-bomb can be fired either
by artillery, with 200-mm guns, or by rockets, airplanes or cruise missiles.
Its weight? Light. Barely 200 kg. Tirelessly straining to explain its
"advantages," Samuel Cohen and Colonel Geneste declare further rhat we are
presently sitting on thousands of nuclear mines "ready to explode all at
once, or nearly so, at the slightest signal, whicn might be automatic tomor-
- row if certain American projects that make one's hair stand on end (for
those who have any) are carried out. In fact, it is planned, in order to
save the thermonuclear bombs from 'counterstrikes,' by their opposite num-
bers, to do nothing less than send them off to their targets (that is, to
- the ontire enemy territory) upon the 'missile alert' (Launch on alert sys-
tem). Handing the fate of the world over to electronics! Which means, all
in ell, that the exploitation of the atom for explosive purposes in order to
en-jure 'deterrence by terror' can quite simpiy wipe our civilization off the
map because of a false alert, a short circuit, a bad calculation or an es-
_ calation out of control. Such escalation could, in our day, result from the
- confrontations that are multiplying in the world up to the present, with
peaks and troughs, but the aggravation of which could indeed ignite the ar-
quebuses and the bombards -in the heat of the action.... Therefore it was
normal to ask whether the atom might provide, for deterrence, more intelli-
gent solutions than its use in the brutal and unsubtle form in which we have
known it so far and which was only a gigantic extrapolation of the explosive
virtues of TNT--to such a point that the power of nuclear weapons is stili
expressed in terms of khousands of tons of conventional-explosive equiva-
lent!... Thus was the neutron bomb born." Thanks to which,"deterrence
would be ensured in a totally credible manner without the need to blow up
the planet with the powder-magazine that asks only to explode under our
feet. Under cover of the neutrons of tactical artillery, one could even en-
- vision clearing t:e civiZized world of these mines by gradually reducing the
'hostage-execution platoons' constituted by all the H-bombs that make us run
a frightful risk, constantly aggravated by the strategic armaments race,
wtiich has now become insane and incoercible."
- Where does this famous N-bomb stand today? On the American side, everything
is summarized in a few dates. 1957: the first tests are carried out in the
United States, while Eisenhower is president. The team assigned to develop
the bomb is led by Samuel Cohen and scientists of the Livermore laboratory
in California. 1958: a bomb explodes 160 km from a Pacific island. 1963:
one was fired in the Nevada desert. 1975: at the end of the Vietnam war,
several neutron bombs were used "experimentally" in the midd;.e of an inten-
sive conventional B-52 bombardment to delay the push of the tanks toward
Saigon. 1977: the Amer?.cans perfect the antimissile neutron bomb (for in ad-
dition to the mortal ionization that it causes in living tissue, the N-bomb
also causes considerable damage to the electronic devices of nuclear war-
heads). But following a colossal propaganda campaign unleashed by the USSR,
Carter blocks any decision.
1978: Carter, who war.*_s to put some cards in Cyrus Vance's hand for starting
a discussion about the SALT agreements, puts off manufacture of the antitank
neutron bomb.
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On this map of Europe, the black dots represent what would
be the line of Colonel Geneste's defensive barrage, alort6
the border of the FRG. The defense would be complemented
by the presence of atomic submarines in the North Sea and
in Che Mediterranean.
On the Soviet side, it is beyond doubt that they have mastered the tech-
' niques of the N-bomb and have made it . At what rate--since this bomb, a
defensive weapon, is not their preferred weapon, since they have no attack
by ground military forces to fear? A mystery. But there is ao need for
anxiety on Moscow's part: they are at the same point.
_ In 1978 they tested an N-bomb, while at the same time stirring up the entire
world against the United States, which was ready to make it on the assembly
line. Jimmy Carter replied sharply: "The Soviets know, and President Brezh-
nev kno*.is, that the neutron weapon is designed to be used against a massive
and perhaps overwhelming attack by tanks on Westerri:Europe. The Sc,-iets,
for their part, have no use for a neutron weapon, and Mr Brezhnev's offer to
abstain from manufacturing them makes no sense in the European theater. He
knows this!" Nonetheless, in the same year, Carter gave in to Brezhnev.
Arthur Peche, principal rapporteur for the military-programming law, de-
clared to us: "This was the triumph of disinformation. In Europe, thanks to
the Communist parties and the hazy intellectuals, the Russians conducted an
_ incredible campaign against the 'immorality' of the N-bomb. This campaign
had a certain effect on American puritanism. 'How can we Americans do some-
thing immoral?' Then we let ourselves be abused once more, which shows the
~ extraorclinary naivete of the Western world. Without giving battle, the War-
saw Pact has achieved formidable conventional superiority. Here is ttie re-
sult of a policy of renunciation!" Finally, where do we on the French side
stand? Do we have "the" bomb? We probably do! (There is even talk of some
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10 bombs already developed while the green light--if it is given--from the
Elysee which would lead to assembly-line production of the devices is
awaited. )
And among us, who would its father be? Here we go back in time and find
ourselves in Paris on 1 February 1928, when Robert Ignace Kouchelewitz was
born, to a Jewish f.amily of Russian origin. When war broke out, little Ro-
bert--whose father died as a deportee--was sent to the Causses, where he
herede sheep while trying, with books, to give himself an slementary educa-
" tion. When the war ended (Alain Peyrefitte recounts all this in his book
"Le Mal Francais [The French Sickness]), he timidly wanted to "risk the bac-
calaureate." He was admitted easily. On his return to Paris, he entered
the National School of Arts and Crafts at the head of his class. His teach-
ers, unanimous about this extraordinarily gifted student, advised him to ap-
ply to the Polytechnique. It was agreed that he not count on it! And he
graduated at the head of his class in 1949! The following year, he decided
not to call himself Kouchelewitz any longer, but Robert Dautray, and began
his career as a mining engineer in Clermont-Ferrand. He was soon detached
to the CEA (Atomic Energy Commission) ar Saclay, where, according to Peyre-
fitte, "he did his exploits." The author of "Le Mal Francais," then minis-
- ter of energy, then soughti a new man to whom to entrust scientific manage-
ment at the military-applications department of the CEA at Limeuil. "Dau-
tray," writes Alain Peyrefitte, "had exactly the profile of the man that we
needed. An exceptionally gifted mind that rapidly assimilates a11 the dis-
ciplines necessary for synthesis and master them; he was able to understand
the language of the component analyses and reconcile them." Thus he became
the father of ttie Frencti H-bomb and, Peyrefitte concludes, "in August 1968,
de Gaulle had one oL his final joys when our first two H devices exploded."
Since then, Robert Dautray has not ceased his specific research, under the
direction of Jacques Chevalier--himself father of the French nuclear-sub-
marine engine and director of military applications in the CEA--an3 can be
considered the production supervisor for our N-bomb. He does not proclaim
this. This palefaced mazi, who wears thick glasses with silver rims, shies
away from publicity and glory. Upon his reception into the Academy of Sci-
ences, he asked for the press not to be invited at all. He lives in a blind
alley in Paris, in a small house with barred windows on which ivy winds. I-ie
contemplates, without entering the arena, the agitation occurring in France
_ about his bomb and the superartillery that the neutron weaporL would consti-
tute--agitation that is increasingly sharp as the shadow of the Soviet co-
, lossus lengthens over Western Europe. The UDF [French Democratic Union], on
the pretext, its report says, "that tomorrow Europe may be the major theater
of a possible confrontation," is for it. Arthur Peche, UDF deputy and prin-
cipal rapporteur of the military-programming law, declared to PARIS MATCH:
"I want my country to have the best possible defense, and the most effective
tool at the lowest cost. Then, when I heard talk about the neutron weapon,
I tried to learn whether we had the technology for it. The answer is yes.
We r_an produce it. I wanted to know if it could be integrated into the bud-
getary effort that we are devoting to our present forces. The answer was
yes. My third concern was to know whether this weapon could be integrated
into our strategic concept of deterrence. The answer is yes." For Mr
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Peche, then, there is no technical problem for France. Isn't it more than a
budgetary problem? "We have the possibility of arziving at the development
stage in the space of about 2 years.... Rockets, submarines--we have them
while hoping not to have to use them, but one cannot rule out the possibil-
ity of the adversary's saying oue day: 'I want to attempt a strike with con-
ventional mens.' We then have to be able to reply to him. We do not have
the right to do without the neutron weapon, whether we like it or not,
whether we have succumbed to disinformation or not. It is a queation of re-
sponsibility.... It has been acknowledged, and Mr Bourges has confirmed it,
that the Defense Council could take a certain number of decisions before
summer. There was a meeting last week. There will be another. These are
limited council meetings at a very high level. For my part, I am waiting to
see what the president of the republic will say in his televised speech on
26 June, if the question is asked of him." General Mery, chief of staff of
the armed forces, is also personally in favor of France's building the bomb.
The RPR, faithfsl to the Gaullist "all or nothing" concept, is at present
rather against this graduated and flexible response system.
The Communist Party is categorically against it, and the Socialist Party is
obviously hostile.
If this campaign by those for it and against it is so lively, it is because
it originates in the fact that for the last 30 years, Europe's security has
depended entirely on American good wi1l--on its will, period. There was ab-
solute belief in the American nuclear umbrella. Now there is less belief in
it. Far less--especially since the USSF has reached and gone beyond nuclear
parity and has established a 4-to-1 ratio between its conventional forces
and those that could be pitted against it.
It is against this background of anguish and terror that man will have to
reach a decision before long. Yes or no to our neutron armament? Yes or no
to "assembly-line" manufacture of N-bombs by France? For the time being,
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the president of the republic, remains silent.
His responsibility, in the position he occupies and has wanted to occupy, is
immense. Like the position, for that matter, of all those in our modern
states and in these new times of the atom who have the supreme responsibil-
ity. In these new times, yes, for as Samuel Cohen and Marc Geneste write in
a report of the Total Strategy Studies Circle (CEST), we have seen nothing
yet: military application of nuclear energy is "still in its infancy. It is
only 40 years old.... After a few decades of existence, the "military" atom -
--with due proportion kept in mind--has reached the level of its gunpowder
ancestor of the first ages, the stage of the arquebuses and bombards. And
in this report ("Earth without Massacre"), our two specialists explain that
after the neutron bomb it would be time to go still farther along a road on
which "terror would be less asinine and less malevolent." The solution ex-
ists. "We declare that it is possible to terrorize an enemy tribe and neu-
tralize its ability to do harm without necessarily exterminating it while at
the same time exterminating oneself.... It is sufficient to use controlled
radioactivi.ty as an instrument of terror, to abolish the collective death
penalty with which we are all threatened today." _
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On the basis of this preamble, it is necessary quote at length the Americun
fnttier of ttle N-bomb and the French military man, who know what tliey arc
talki.nF; and wri.ting abaut: "This weapon exists potentially today: it is the
gamma bomb, which we shall by that name because it derives ita virtues from
the [illegible] specific aspect of nuclear energy, nonexplosive, the possi-
bility of spreading gamma rays as fearful as are the neutrons for individu-
als, but only at a distance, and whose effects, contrary to those of all the
weapons that have preceded it, are totally controllable (1) in space, (2) in
time, (3) in their intensity. Let us suppose that a rocket warhead, instead
of exploding abruptly like the A, H and N devices, over an enemy city, or
any other target, limits itself to showering down on the target a rain of
micropellets previously activated in a nuclear reactor specifically designed
for the purpose. A carpet of gamma rays falls down on the zone in question.
Its dimensions are controllable. It ia a function of the surface area cov-
ered by this rain, which is deadly after a time. Its effectiveness time is
controllable in function of the duration of activity of the components chos-
en. Its intensity is control?able in function of the density of the micro-
- pellets, and of their nature. For the first time, it is a totally control-
lable weapon. And if the object of war is more 'control' than 'destruc-
, tion,' such a device merits attention. Its effects on the enemy are spec-
tacular. Because they are not immediately mortal, they force him, under
pain of death, to get out of the target zone as quickly as possible, or go
underground and not come out until the end of the 'treatment'; he could be
there for a long time, and meanwhile would not be capable of doing any harm.
One can imagine the reactions of a civilian population--of the East or of
~ the West--suddenly covered by such a carpet of radiation.
"And to cap it all off, let us suppose that a small fraction of our nicro-
peLlets is made luminescent by radiation, which is very easy. A sinister
greenish glow would then blanket the target zone, marking the zone of slow
deatti and at nighttime giving visible form to the bath of gamma rays to
which civilians and military are exposed if they da not scram. Everyone
would know that death was there. A hallucinating spectacJ.e. With the help
_ of nuclear mythology, all the inhabitants would take to their heels without
. waiting for the verdict of the Geiger counters giving the administrative or-
der to evacuate.
It would be a militarily effective form of bombardment that would disarm of
their personnel all the installations taking part in the war effort, and a
morally charitable one, since it would give the inhabitants a few extra min-
utes to save their skins, while fixing the boundaries of the dear.h zone,
which one could get out of by running. And contrary to the H-bombs, it
would give the aggressor the time and opportunity to reflect on the conse-
quences of his acts and renounce them. Without breaking a window or killing
anyone, except for traffic accidents or heart attacks attributable to panic.
T'error without massacre...."
No, this is not science fiction. It is our reality. We are immersed in it.
tdo matter what our ignorance and our desire "not to think about that," we
are living this reality. Monstrous, apocalygtic in rhe porper sense of the
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word --war is there, insane but possible. The states are preparing for it,
skaggering budgets are swallowed up in it, strategists are thinking it out,
the engines of war carry it on their sides. In this time, we are living oiir
dai.ly lives and what we believe lightheadedly to be "the great problems of
the huur." We are living our lesiure, our work, our strikes, our unemploy-
ment, our political quarrels and our political sideshows. And too often, so
lightheadedly, we tell ourselves that all oiir "difficulties" "have scraped
the bottom of the barrel," whereas we are threatened with having something
else scraped.
~ After an unimaRinaGle self-genocide, a"scraping-away of humanity and the
world." Elorrified, some scientists who have developed the radical apoca-
lypse are now trying to make it possible to lower the rungs of the ladder.
Ay means of H-bombs or gamma bombs (and by means of what else tomorrow?),
they want to negotiate the ravages of terror, at its zenith today. At one
! extreme, we should thank them for this. Our fate is in their hands. We
have opened--I say "we" because these scientists are our own--the horrible
Pandora's box. Only scientists are able, not to close it--that is impos-
sible--but to control the now-wild winds that are escaping from it. In this
--for peace, a mortal goddess, wil.l never be eternal--lies our sole, our
only hope.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse SA
11?67
CSO: 3100
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CQIINTRY SEG'FlON FRANCE
r
, PCF'S MARCHAISt F3IS PERSONALITY, SZ'RATDGY REIfIEWED
Paris PARIS 1+fATCH in French 27 Jun 80 Pp 3-11
["Excerta" frnm "The Strateg,Sr of the Lie - from the Kremlin to Georges
- Maxahais" by Augaste Lecoeurs "Marcha3s or the Strategy of the Lie"]
~
[Text] A television atar but also aecretary g,eneral of
the Frenah Commounist Party (PCF), through hie political
_ broadcaste on the different networks, Georg+es Marchais has
attracted a vast publia wbich ig tickled with his vexbal
- performanoes, outbursts arid alynesa, which comes on in an
unsophisticated manner. Dnxing the past fex yeare, his
, public has often found it difficu3t to follaw the meaader-
. ings of this discourse an the suocessive options of his
- party. Auguate Leooeur, f,ormsr member of the resistaaoe
and Xiaruice Tliorez' former searetary of state and hFir
until hia exclueion from tine party ia 1954, had published
"Iha Strategy of the Lie - from the Hremlin to Georges
Marchais" in the Dditions Ramsay. In an exclusive report,
P1RIS MATCH here presents his analysis of the successive
and apparently contradictory stands taken by the PCF$a
futuxe candidate for the presidenay.
As with manq television viewera, we can be satisfied with holding our aides
with laughter at each of I~'~.archais' appearances on the little screen. Too
maay Frenchmen see in him a television atar rrho has perfected his act and -
reached the peaic of his career as a comedian. But let ua be on our guard.
There is nothing funny about this character. We cari sense it through the
uneasiness we feel between two spasms of laughter.
All else being equal, in 1917, after 'che fall of the Czaxiat regime, Leni.n
too was in his oWn way lauEhable in his pretentiona. At Russia's first ~
Soviet congxess in June 1917, a Berensly mini.ster said "that there is no
political party in Ruesia ready to assume f~a.l.l power." In the audience,
a little man got up aad shouteds "Yes, such a party does exist!" That
man was Lenin and the party he was alluding to was the Bolshevik Party,
" weak, divided, just emerging from a atate of illogality. There was a moment
of general hilaxity in the hall. Saeers aad gibee br.oke out %or a long time,
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A few month.s later, those who laughed had disappeared. Thinge might have
been differeat if, ia June 1917 instead of being received vith laughter,
Lenia had been taken seri?usly...
In the pagee that follow, let no cne expeci; to find God kaoMS rhat eort of
aeaaational revelaticn or apicy detail oas the life of Georges Marohais,
Snch readera rrill be rapidly disappoonted beoauee that fe not the object
of this aaslyeis. Ma,raheiet dailq liYe from 1943 to 1946, whiah he himeelf
noreaver ta~lcree pleasnre ia surronading with aa artiBtic and suepeat kind
of vagueaeoa, 1s not in itself so importaai; that we ought to dvell on it
at leagth and in depth. The queation of finding ont xhether, vhere, ti+hen,
how and why Marchaia went trirough the various atages of his doctriaa3re
training in the IISSR is also, after all, of very minor interest. Onae
again, whila these trivial questions make people equirm irith joy in nerrs-
paper ofYiaea And when dining out, they are not very import+ant to the or-
d3nary citizen, whoso searah for informatioa is of a quitE, diYferent kind.
('.nmmuni 8't $'tI'St9g'yi 3I1 IIIpOrt
Let us remember that the poliay of aRy aommuniat pa.rty, in power or in the
opposition, ia the ona that is dictated by itg leader, period, �Espeaially
whgn, ance it has gong thrnugh the delicate trausitional phase of aonsti-
tuent leadership, suah a party has finally managed to stabilize the orgat
nizatian and definitively establish t3ie authority of the nex secretary
g+eneral at its head.
Thie abaolute politiaal ascendaucy of one leader over the entire organisar
tion he embodies the apirit of fe, at one and the same time, the distin-
guiahtng characteristic and tha monopoly of a aommni.st party. Aad from
Augsburg to Kabu]., e.gain and again we fiud tYiia aoneistoncy of beYiaQior
we aee in Maucchais ana. - beyoad his mere person throughout the party
he personigies, unfor'~a:sately, this eaw logic of political policy. Juet
as i~,.~e color and height of its glag pormit us to idontify the nationality
and pos:it::Un of aur;.ip, caxa-f,il examination of MarcJnais' persmality con-
st3.tui-ezi -the pr'vilegcid means of aacess to an overall underatanding of the
PCF's iazterr+al :~clumi.su:; an3 a correat i.nterpreta,tion of the atrateg,y
ef:ai-aci;or:l.ti tic it.
:i of a,1.1, wc: underataLd nofi3,.ing i.f We refuse to see that, unlike other
r~;:~~:�;:_~:s, the PCF is not an or~aniz.ztion of French creation, It was not
crew-;,od; ~t did aot xound itself, it's ideology, organi%ationa, stretegy
aL,u ::.~nal.ly i W s veLy rea.scu for existfng are importP. An enen moro dis-
conce�::ting pointz Unli.?se bia aounterparts in the other parties, the eeo-
ret..a=-y gene--ral, oalleei on to lead -thra party, is in no xey respansible to
the xan:ti :iile for hi.e acts arid deeda. Ho doea not have to acaommodate
the op:..iuons Ul' otiiers in his view3 nor bend to the fluctuatione of internal
o~i~:~.:�,r~ w-:Zi.ah, an the ccntraryy, 3.n whe democratic partiea influencea the
h..1lsvioz Of trie pa.rty machirae,
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What hae made thi.e poesible3 Qnite eimply, the acnditions nnder which the
PCP was areated. It ie, paradoxiaally in faat, the lvvit of the rejeotion
of all the kn=uiet tsaditione snd democrstio etruoturee of the Frenah
soalallst and worker aovement. Mhen he brought it to the bnptiemal font,
Isnin enbjected thfe party to a oertain nnmber of ideologiaal an8 orgaaiza,-
tianal iffiperativea. I,ater, a11 3talin had to do was to finieh the job by
making aa absolute feudal lord of the party in Moscotir. From then on, per-
maaently iooked in ite Bolehavilc ison oollar, 'r,he PCFvas to go ite wey
guided by its 3oviet bea,aon, yesterd,Wr as it is toQey.
When a comainiat parby leader euddenly deoidea to impose a aew orientation
on hia party, it 3,s not only the netirapapernaea or the public at large that
- he takee unawares, bat also the party members. It rrould be tedioua to
give the aoaplete liBt of theae hairpia turris oapable of disconcerting the
- moat docile of inembers as vell as those mcst used to euch practiaes. From
the Germen-3oviet Pact to the break xith the Leffi IInion, the PCF has fol-
lorred a couree with maay ine aad outs. ylhether xe oall them "headings,"
- "turnine-points," "linee" or "aurvee" malcee little difference. They are
alxeys rather brutal strategic breaka.
Commentators aad hietoriaas are in the habilu of making big iasueg of eaah
of theae phaees, reactions or atatee of mind of this or that aontrnversial
- intelleetual or of some vague figure moving towai*d a epectaaular break.
They atick pins in their aharts to mark these isolated inataaces, neglect-
ing to point out the immense poyehologiaal baeklash produced ruithin the
maes of the party membera by this ahange of politioal line, ,
Even thougka their departure ia raore diacreet, afte= having euddenly heard
the nerr PCF line on the radio or televiaian, thousauds of followers from
all aveial 1evels wi.ll nevertheleas deeide to leave the party without de-
manding what is dne them. Thia bleeding of the ranks of the PCF ia not kept
~ track of offiofally; it only ahowa up in the nonpayment of dues,..
7horez Copied Leni.n's Method
7be party is changing but its leader ha.s not budged, keeping his hand ever
more firmly on the tiller. 7hus, deapite the many fluctuations in its
political line, the PCF has in the end seen only two authentic lsaders
sacceed to porrer sizice ite "Bolshevization" in 1924-1926. Aetua].ly, we
ahould note in parentheses the haadtlil of emptq figurehkiads aharged xith _
aseuring interim leaderahip aad hsadling current affairs. Just as Khruahchev
in the IISSR as history ha.s it rraa in the end limited to effeeti.ng the =
traasition between Stalin and Breahnev withaut reallymatzaBinS to impoae
his w'.~11 in a lasting way, since his original initiativeg finally became
cause :for concern among the vigilant guardians of the Marxist-Leniriist ideo-
logy, Waldeck-Rochet was satisfied with plaqring minor roles for several
years during the brief lapse of time separating fihe death of Z'horez from
Marchais' official arrival oa the scene,..
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In aonnection with this, the moet widely-epread not3on - amoiag the publia
at large as vell ae among euppoeedly informed oommentatora consists of
3ntarpreting aoamauniet behavior by esplaining that Stalin rep:reaented the
modern veraioal of the ay:aical and bloodthiraty despot or that he diaplqyed
all the eymptoste of a perYect imbalw1oe due to pasanoia or ahronia megalo-
mauia aad, aonsequently, in "Sta11n3am" we aazet see juet a "tcaaeient,
ohaaae occurrence" wi+,a no fu1me, an of course perveree, but aberrant and
ephemeral detour from the otherKiae juet and proper aourse of Marxist-
Leninism.
We are aorry to have to dieilluaion these obdurate utopiaas, tru.t at the
riak of tempering their aomewhat irrepressible optimism tiey ought to
Qonvince themsglves that Sta3.in�e behav:ior was inspired by neither madneas
nor the eg+otism born of peraanal iaterest, but rather by an unshakable faith
in an ideology of which he was the gusraator aad zealoue servant. Whi.le
Stalfn's policy eeems f'rightful to ue, it ie not omly becauee of the me,s-
eacree aad deetractiaal it provoked aad eaaat3oned, but alao arut espeaially
because it has lmoxingly perpetuated the Leainiet doatrine aad ita key
principles of orgaaizatim rrb.ich qnite na.turally lead to such orines arid
destruatian, xhereas without Stalin we might have haped that this ill-fated
ideology, xith its principles of action, Moald not have suzvive+3 Lenin.
In Franoe, from the start of the 1930's, Maurice Rhorez in hie turn ehowed
thatt he had learaed hie leseons Well. He too in faat $erved as the party's
weapooa. Moscow had impoeed on him an inflexibility attaaed to PaF poliay.
Zb aahi.eve this, Thorez firsi had to consolidate hia i:rusteeship� 'lhen he
got the idea of launching an all-out opennees oampaign xith the vrsttchvrord:
"Open yaur mauthsl No dumaies in the partyt"
One must rea113r be very naive to etill persist in interpreting that today
as a eincexe attempt at liberalization. Actually and with due allorraace
made, Thorez limLted himself to aopying the ffiethod that had been ao sucaees-
ful for Leanin in 1921 sad for stalin in 1924. The "dummies" to be broken
Were thoae men who mig2it have alowed Thorez dovn in his rise to pow$r.
As for the invita.tion to an opea meeting of the minds aad dealaraticina of
partisaaism, this was in fact not made in approval of irreverence; rathsr,
oaa the contra.ry, it was a quest for votee in pra3ae of himaelf arid axi
appeal to all of hia supportere, virtual or confirmed.
.
These Oradours, Dubbed "Cleariup Opera.tions"
From then on, t3ie secretary general of the PCF systematically resorted to
this device every ti.me he thought he saw a hint of opposition to hia rule
forming or it seemed to him that this or that party bigwig waa challeng3ng
hio policy line irith the risk that such disagreement would deg+enerate iato
tdie formation of a really organized faction, 'ib remind us of thie, let us
reoall these various affa3xs: 1horez versus earbe-Celor in 1931, versus
Doriot in 1934, versus Tillam-Marty in 1952, versn.s Servin-^..a,sanova in 1961;
Maraha.is vereus Claude xoy in 1956 or, mere recently, versue Garaudjr in
1970 aaa F`tszbJ.n in 1979...
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'IIiere was ino reason for Thorez to be disappointed in his trainee (Marohais).
'lhe latter quickly had a ohaaae to shorr hov capable he was of being a
staunc,h Stral.inist supporter. Need we remind ourselves, for ezamp3e, of
his eloquent attitwde when writer Claude &oy vaa e=cluded from the party.
73ie latter had made the mist.ake of coondeaming - aoreover, in canju ction
with a number of other party membere the bloody Soviet intervention in
Hungary. He was immediately aummoned to his cell to appear before a sort
of tribunal. It was procisely MLrchaie who, representing the party lea,der-
ship, playod the role of prneeautor ia th.is sort of "MoscoW trial" in
Frartce. &bt let us turn the floor aver to Claude Hoyt
"ilhen I spoke of millions of inaoaent people beiug deported or executed in
the IISSR, of tena of thousaads in Hangaag, he raised his voicg to peak
volume. Yiolent aagers 'Yea,' shouted Marchais, 'they arrested people
aad they threw people into prisonl Well, let are tell you: They d3dn't
arrest enough of them! Thsy didn't throx enaugh of them into prisonl
If they had been tougtier aud more vigilaat, xe rronld not be where rte are
~niie~~�t M
nrai~
~n
In accordsnce with this eame ]cind of intelleatual logio, Marchais today
aaneidera the g+enocide perpetrated by the Red ArV in Afghaaistan as a
negligible matter. These mase-produced Oradours, xhich are called "clean-
up operationa" in the Saviet Dnion - the euphemiam is a pithy one are
not repreheneible because they follow "the direatian of hietory"... "You
caa't make sa ome_let without breaking eggs," Isnin said,.. Jlnd they are
promis3.ng ue a ta.r,sty omelet for the day after tomorror+. Go ahead aud
question the cook's methods afterxard8l T'hi$ morality in terme of a
_variable geometsy ia that of - we must af'ter all bear this in mind - a
flitu.re candidate for the presidency of the nation. Frenohmen, get read,y
to have yaur hearts skip a beat! In 1968 a party-internal offenaive was
outl3ned, capable of jeoparciizing the c.areer of Ceorg+es Marahais, whose
promising riae had until then been effeated r+ithout any major difficulty.
Roger Garaudy, for ezample, `rho at that time was atill a member of the
Political Buresu, did not aonaeal hia hostility toward Marohais in statements
he made autside the party. But, wl.thin the party itaelf, opposition to
Ma.rchais Was expreaeed essentially thraugh the voice of Benoit Frachon,
as Frischmwn, who was also at the time a member of the Political Burean,
was later persuaded to reveal.
In 1968 Marchais Hoped for Police RepressiaK^
We must admit thsit 1968 was a really black year for the PCF'... even that
it was the rrorst it had seen since 1947. Tha eituation inside the PCF
was anything but satisfactory. At the head of the party machine, Wa7.deck-
_ Rochet aarried no weight at a time when the party needed sameone capable
of fizmly gripping the tiller. Moreover, the prooess of replacing bim had
already been set in motion,
' To aahieve this, the Soviets, a,e always, expreesed their preferenae through
' their spokesmaa, Jacques Duclos, uaed to this kind of responsibiiity. The
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Kremlin's candidate to succeed Wa1deak-xoahet was Geoi"gea Marchais. Nor,
not a11 of the members of the Politital Bumau xere very keen an support-
' ing such a candidate. Feeling t.hat he bad enough iaternal enpport, Roger
Garaudy them decided to publioly oppose nim (that ie, of courae, outeide
the paxtylo regular org+aniQations). We maet admit that, oao� agaiu, the
eituation itself in 1968 offered (iaraudy eolid grounds for jumtit'ying aad
illuet.rating hie burg1eaaing dieeideanae. The PCF had indeed etepped up
its shillyshallying and blundering. It ha+d been oaught aapping by the
great movement of university rebellion.
In L'HQMANITE of 3 May 196e9 Marahaie published - or rather, let uB sahy,
sigmed - an article, xhiah has sinae become famous, entitled "Fake Re-
volutionariea to He Expoaed,� In it, he bluntlg said thet the Sorbonne
student Fronde was merely an action pxvduced by "a handful of small left-
ist groups" which had to be liquidated. 'ihe anthor of the artiale could
have satiafied himself with sugg+eating to "the mass of nonleftiet etudente"
to g+o aad try to reason With the feW blaok sheep. Hut no, Me~rchais appeal-
ed directly to the goRrernment to take eteps calculated ta reatore the
faculties to normal operation.
Carried aasky by the virulence of his criticism of the leaders of the stu-
dent revolt, our editorialist ma,intained modeat sile�nce on the sxcesees of
poliQe repzvssion when he did not g+o so far as to openly encanrage it.
Too often, we forget to say t.hat the then miniater of interior Yound in
him a not so negligible aad virtu.ally uneapeoted touroe of eupport.
Grabbing the ball in mid-a3r, Garaudy and his friende ezpreased their die-
approval it goes rithout sa,ying of what lcoked like the adoption of
an official positian, 3udging it to be suah that it would damage the party.
It was true beyand any eha,dow of a doubt that thie attitude did Yrart tYie
party, becauee the parliamentary elee�iivue, which ia June 3mediately fol-
lrnred the events that had taken place, were also turned 3$to a net decline
in votES for the PCF.
_ Two maaths later, t,he shack producsd by the Soviet intervention in Czecho-
~ slovakia naturally omly ftiurther emphaiszed thia dealine in public opiizion
in favor of the PCF. There, once again,, Garaudy believed - wrangly to
have found in the current situatian an ideal pretest for bettering his
position.
A Code Message T7iat Opened the Door to Power
But if the philosopher .aad ths group of
. him imagined that the trrofold situation
_ would weigi i.n favor of their arguments
mistaken. Far from destx.royiug Marcha,ist
= rise to power and, at the same time, the
, Rochet.
35
sympathizers that centexed about
- national and international -
and their wi.shes, they xere eadly
paaitions, it precipitated hie
diecreet elimination of Waldeclr-
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Yes, of crurse, all the circumetances ve have 3net discuaeed apparently
dealt the party a severe blox but, as alwaya, where the coamuniat world ia
concerned, it is not the tip of the iceberg one rahould watah, but the aub-
merg+ed masa. 1Qow this move or Zess gancealed, mass brought to bear the full
weight of the ideology and +,he party mach~r,e, And oa the contrary, the
latter vere coneiderably strengthened in the proaesa.
Contrary to xbat Garaudy believed, Marchaia had in no waY macle a mistake
in publiahing the article the machine ha+d him sign in May 1968...
A real leader in poaer, he was nottun&W=e of the faat that he ha,d ta get
- over one last hurdle, $ major orYe at that: the favorable opinion af the
Kremlin, that "nihil obatat" indispensable to the qnalification and final
confirmation of euqy potential eecretary geaeaal. It it ebnuld be rrithheld,
thia formidable final appraval is,LiY+ely to bar. the xay to, a f'uiuLre sUP-
plient.
_ To obtai.n this, he rras clever enougli to send the Kremlin the code message
that opened a11 the imPortant doors to power to him. IndPed, let us not
forget that in 1968 tre were in the mtddle of a phas e during which 1'io$caw
was obsessed tirith the danger the in its eyes growing inflaence of Maoism
almost everywhere in the rrorld represented (this was 'ihe era of the aul-
tural revolution in Ch:na) and ita leftist factions, which rrere proliferat
ting, particularly in Earope.
Now, since Lenin, leftism has been one of the Saviet IInion's moat d,anger-
ous enemies. It has "to be cut out xith a ecalpe'L" (the Fathsr of the
Fevolution said). In sigaaing hia famouq article, rrh{ oh struck out at t;ne
proteating atudents with ma3or ezaommnioatial - arad whir.h, f'urthezaore,
for the firat time attracted the attention of everyone in the politica1
arorld - Marohais deliberately and opportunely p3.aced htmself urud:ex
the ideoiogical juriadiction of MQeaow at that precisa mament in the evo-
lution of internatienal communism. Hia obseasion was the sam as the
Kremlin's and he shoved the masters of Soviet Rnasia t,hat someane in Parie
was reasiy to place himself at their dispoaition... Mac4i8' 13,8htning-
- like promotion to the PCF party machine Mas for the fir.st time afficially
canfirmed at the 19th PCF Congrese in 1970, xnen he vas appointed titul.ar
a,ssistaat secretary general. Now the usage aad custom befitting this k3nd
of commnnist ceremony demand tbat the lengtby speeches introducing and
welcoming the recipient of the title rival oaie anot,her in trne dit2~yrambic
style. All the party's rehtorical florrers were gathered to compoae a
bouquet in order to flatteringly eapatiate on the numernus virtues and
merits of the exceptional individual who had been called on to henceforth
guide the destiny of the party down the path df an exultant future. Mean-
while, raised to white heat, the audience clapped in cadence, sometimes
even going so far as to toss confetti i.nto the air.
On that day, the 3ob of introducing Marchais fell to Gaston Pliasonier,
formerly appointed by Waldeck-Hochet and his ex-colleague on the editorial
etaff of the newspa.per Ld TEHRE before hie aaeeseiun to the administrative
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secretariat. Now, as panegyrias go, that aane was rather brief. I leave
3.t to the reader to figure out rrhy. The apeaker di3 not have muah to eay.
"Uur oomrade is 49 years old, is a metal xorker and joined the party in
1q47."
R'hese fex bits of infon3ation rere then wrapped in a eham packAge. Not
~
the slightest allusioa to the Fbpular Bront or the war ar the liberat3oa.
It g+oea xithout uWing that, if Masaha3s hM baen deported and ha+d esoaped
in the proceas, the lgriaal flight of eloquence on his service to the party
would not have been la,c,king. Bnt as euc,h flights go, this aue ras more
like an angel passirg overhead...
Strange Silenae of the Med.ia au a Donbtfhl Past
For ages now, the party, Diorez, Dualos, B'raahon aad the rrhole maohine
including, aad especiall.y, those particularly responaibls for liaison w3.th
_ N1osaow had lrnowm all about Georg+es Marcha3s' traublesome family baalo-
ground. Fuxthermore, it taris out that, eince at least 19631, the polioe
aad the General Informatioan Buresu - oonaequently the po1itical `rorld as
_ well have been aware of the ahady past thie Coamai$t leader has been
carr3ri.ng around with himself. NoMr no one has ever let the oat out of ths
- bag. Zhie ie why Marchaie was not taken seriouely wheva he believed he had
the right to say in court, under oath aad bstveen two eobs, that "he and
his ~arty (had been) the victims of a conepiracy f~eom the momemt he nhad
been entrusted with hie respansibilitiess" Zhis bit of perjury ti+ae merely
- another link in a laug chain of earlier lfes. In fact, if ve talce into
account Marohaisl natiowal respoueibilities, we reali$e that they begsn
when he joined the Centra;t Coamittee in 1956 and then the Politiaal Bpreau
in 1959. In 1961 he succeeded Marcel Servin ia the poet ot' na,tional aec-
retary to the orgaaiza,tion, aa event rhtch the press of the time reported
on rather tiideiy, In Februa.ry 1970 he vas appo3nted - as we bsve eeen
aeaistaat secretary g+emeral, which meana that einoe then he has been of-
ficially confir,eed as the veritable bosa of the party, since Waldeok-8oahet
has been permailently kept out of paz-ty affa3rs due to his iacurable illness,
There Was No Better Scarecrow Than Marcha,is
Once agai.n, tha.t election constituted an event that waa of "mimber-one
importance" for the entire presa. Now the media would devote no spaae to
the slightest commentary on the peauliar "hnles" the nex PCF leader's per-
sonal hietory was myateriously shot thraugh irith.
Sa, since,tnere was no leak between 1956 aad February 1970, We mttat aesume
that a sort of gentlemen's agreement had been negotiateft. A little later,
we could see that arven then f;he president, the predeeessor of the current
president, did not want the affair to be divulg+ed,.. '!'4ze first disturbing
indication was the police record detnrmined by the miniater of interiox's
General Information Bu~.�eau. Before Lll N6TI0N 5ACIALISTE published documenta
throxing li.ght on Georges Marchais ' real life, this record oonaiated of
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nothing but false information, favorable to Marcha3s. Thus, at the begin-
nixtig of 1977 - I did say 1977 - this record atill ahowed that Marchais
"ba,d been conscripted by the Fbrced Labor Service (STO)." Better yet, two
paragraphs farther on, this record indiaated "that it wa.s impossible to
lrnow whether Mr Marc,ha.is had actually gone to Germany to work. There is
no record of hia departure nor of his return to France."
Now we understand hov publiaatiaai of theae documents or; Georgea Marchais'
= voluntary departvre for Germar,y, with a11 the pertineait detaile, covld
have upeet the plans of this whole wonderflul world,..
Nov, on the eve of the 1981 presidential electians, the demonatration of
this caa be easily made. No aeed to be an eapert on politics to aomprehend
that no majority leader could dream of a better scarecrow thari Marahais
at the head of the PCF. '.the great riak for the right now in power is that
it finds itself forced to oppose a g+ood, aredible candidate who comes from
the Socialist Party (PS). Fbr the ffia3ority, to mobilize an3 really gro for
the PS is not g^ood tactics for a preaidential election in wLxiah it has to
take into coaisidera.tiun the support it derives from vote shifts aad the
na,tional cli.mate once i;he election is over. So, according to some, here
comes providence or, according to othera, the Kremlin, eending them Georges
Marchais. Flrst of a11, in 1978 he helped them to wi.n xlierl, by breaki.ng
up the Left Union, he gave them an unexpected majority. Since then, the
PS has again become the chief enemy. Socialist leaders likely to be ca;.:-
didates in 1981 have been taken by storm aad subjected to the w3.thering
fire oi Communist attacks.
Under the circeimstancea, w2~y be surpriaed at the favor Marchais en3oys with
IIysee newsmen on the radio and television? The more Marchais is seen in
a favora,ble light, the better his chauces of wi.nning votea. From which
electoral constituency will he talce votes? The RPR [8a11y for the Republic]?
The UDF [French Democratic tTnion]? Fhough joking around. He can recover
votes from the PS (since his campaign has been eased and encouraged by
the majority), 3ust a few points wan by Marcha,is from the Socialist can.-
didate would be a guarantee of nictory for the majority candidate.
In 1973 Marr.hais ha,d already benefited from this support. When a11 poli-
ical parties were in the process of choosing candidates, the voting dis-
trict where A'faxchais would be running was exami.ned as were the other dis-
tricts assigned to the different party leaders. In the first district of
Va1-d.e-Marne, Marchais' constituency, the Gaullists at first planned on
choosing Pierre Gharpy to run, but G"lostermann became the candida,te. He
jumped =nto the ring, setting the tone for the campaign �4ith a statement
calculated to kick up a row:
"During the wax," he said, "I shot down the German planes Marchais built.
Today, I'm going to shoot him down."
In fact, the whole thing took no more than the tine it takes to send a
press communique. When it was announced that issue migYi-t be taken with
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Marcha.is' German past, rhe Elyaee got that candid.ate to withdraw from the
race and opposed Marahais with a candidate with principles aad a low profile,
NWe Laveille, r+ho di d not want to be supported by so dynamic a paxtaer as
Clostarma.*ui...
7fie entire French F:o1itical world, aud along wifih it the majority of t,he
country's ordinary citizens, is now convinced that Ceorges Marahais deli-
berately smashed the Left IInion, xhich he d.id not want to win in Yarch
1978. A certa,in number of hypotlzeses are still being proposed, here and
tY+ere, on the rea.sons that drove Marchais to make that decision. Yet,
there is no nqystery as to why he did so. Perhaps a bit late, Marchais
drew inferencee from his failure which, in the eyes of the oldest party
members and the Saviets, was inevitable inasmuch as for the fixst time in
the history of Socialist-Commniat relatione the PS appeared to be the
major beneficiary of the PCF's unity strategy. Of cwrse, Georg+es Marchais
could not say that he ha.d aot been warned. Wanting to relieve concern, he
announced to the Central Comi.ttees
"tJe consider the joint program to be a step forward, ena,bling us to create
the most favora.ble conditions for setting the masses in motion with regard
to our ideas, our solutions and our objectives,"
The 1973 Parliamentary elections were a disappointment. At the 22d Congreas,
Marchais was persisteat aud wanted to clear the air by i.mproving the party
image in the country through m+ore forceful criticism of the methods arid meaas
esercised i.n the IISSR and the aocialist countries arid, by again beeoming
the first party of the Left IInion through a funclAmental criticism of the
PS, to make the PCF appear to be the only hope of democratic revival for a
socialism which would be flying the French colors.
Deliberate, Planned and Sustained Ambiguity
This national-communist or liberal-communist line convinced no one in the
country. 2he PS continued to strengthen itself arid the Savieta felt offend-
ed. Tha.t was where the attempt failed. Marchais had neg+otiated with M
Mitterand and a fossilized PS, just barely risen from the ashes bequeath_,~d
by Guy Mollet and then he suddenly found hi.mself up aga.inst a atrengthened
PS, very much alive, oile tbat was the leading party in the I,eft IInion.
_ ror Georges riarchais and the Communi.sts, a victory of the Left IInion should
hs.ve consolidated a PCF victory and the defeat of the PS. Thi.s result was
not, o3tained, which neant a defeat.
Ambiguity, misca.iculation - these, more or leas, are the terms ari immediate
analy.sis of the COmmunist poliCy briDgs to mind. It only becomes clear
when projected in-to the future. We can then see that the ambiguity wa,s
deliberate, planned and sustained in order to achieve caxefully concealed
objectives. The Commanists would not hesitate to get rid of anything that
mifht, soone-r or laiar, jeopardize them. For examplet in 1939, theY chose
the Soviet-German Pact to the detriment oi unity in the struggls against
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"'()p "rtc:r,v. ttsi: Orti,r
~ fascism; in 1947, they cliose the Cominform to the detri.ment of unity for
national reaonstruction; in 1977., they chose defeat of the 3oint program
to the detriment of the T,eft IIaion; in 19809 they have chosea Soviet aggres-
sian in Kabul to the letriment of EastrWest detente and peoples' right to
guide their own deatinies.
For t,he PCF as well as for all couminist paxties in power, initiatives
t.hat signal a ohaag+e 9n policy are inspired by Kremlin strategy. While
real, Marchs.is' passing falling-out wiich Hreztmev was merely an episode,
braught on by Marchai.e' opportunist blunder, which never threatened active
solidarity arith the PCF in, terms of Soviet foreign policy. To ftilly under-
stand Marchaisl opportunist blunder (bluruier in Brezhnev's eyes), we have
to go back a bit in time. We must besr in mi.nd #he difficulties encoun-
tered in Moscow starting with t,he death of Stalin in 1953: from Malenkov's
sxift passagg, the elimination of Beria and what, including Molotov, xas
called the antiparty faction, then the 20th Congress in February 1956,
from Khrushchev' e reigu until 1964 aad the arrivel of BrezYmev.
7he problems Sovi.et leaders had to grapple xith during eaah of these phases
along rrith the intrigue s they hatched in search of unity of thought and
action in a stable aituation had their repercuseions in the other communist
parties without, evidently, sparing the PCF. I will not go into the ups
arid doWns the party experienced in France in order ta keep the party in
line with the policy that rras incorrectly oalled de-Stalinization (we can
talk of de-Stalinization when an ideolog3cal revision undertakes the de-
Ruasificatian of party atzuatures and ideology).
In reaction to the dognatism of Stalinist leadership, Khrushchev rranted to
give communism a more open, more human imag+e. He set the example in taking
liberal initiatives on the domestic scen.e. As for foreign affairs, he gave
the signal for a renewal of the policy of rapprochement with the socialists
and in reality restored the specific channels to a"peaceful trarlsition to
a parlia.mentaiy system," He favora.bly received the objections registered
by Toglia.tti, wlw criticized not only Stali.n., but also the system that had
made his accession to power possibZe and the way he exercised it.
Khrushchev's reintroduction of "frontism," that is, the tactic of "extend-
ing one's hand to the other forces of ;:he left," did not displease Thorez
and even less so Waldeck-Rochet, who set the party on the road to a broad
opening until the incident involving Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia
(itself in a way the result of the timid attempt`to launch akind of "social-
ism with a human face") put a sudden stop to his own aspirations.
Brezhnev Criticized Khrushchev's Progressivism
In his domestic policy, Marcha.is fol2owed the same old course...
He ha.d realized and he sa.id a.s much that tne path +4hat had been fol-
lowed until then was leading to an impasse. He opened the way to new pros-
pects by saying at his meetingss "If we go on as we have, we will be
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aelebra.ting the PCF's hundred-year armi.vereary as an oppoeition paxty."
- Iie therefore proposed to march boldly down the pafih of union. Better yet,
he rranted the PCF to no long+er be in the opposition; that is, he was com-
- mittsd to aozicesaiona that mak,e poasible agreement on a grovernment program,
the program Waldeak-8ochet had dreamed of.
It was from that moment on that Brezbnev probably first became conaerned ~
over the situation. Withaut bring3ng in the "secret report," he criticized
"Khruahc,hev'a progres$infsm" an.d wbat he called his "subjeative errore";
he condermled his predecesaor's "fickle and erperimental opportunism."
In France, while not condemning it, Ma,rahais should at least have "eva]u-
atecl" his predecessor' a"opportunismp in the same way. But he rras very
careful not to do so arid, quite the contrary, set ant on the pa,th that led
to the joint government progsam. 7he euccess he banked on for his party
was late in $howing up. Pesaimism gs3ned ground. The azaalysis he made
before the Central Committee the day after the Maroh 1973 parliamentary
elections, which hardly represented a auccess for the PCF, absolutely dis-
pleased the Savieta.
In fact, one of the reasons appealed to to expla3n the party's lack of suc-
ceas was that it was not diatinct enough from the F..astern Earopeaa commu-
nist regimes or that of the IISSR. 2he Central Committee almost iuvolun-
tarily - and that is the best way it could have happened demonstrated
that the Coamnulists were getting into aloser rapport if I may use the
term with France by keeping their distance from Moscow.
The Soviet reproach can be summed up as followss "You aapitulate to the
bourgeoisie's anti-Soviet campaigns and aeek comfort in the eha,de of social
democracy." Brezhnev reacted to Marchais like the boss of a compaay xith
his best worker who decides to set himaelf up in busineas for himself to
compete with hi.m.
The moment of gxeatest t nsion hard not yet arrived. Shifte in temper be-
came more frequent aad appeared very clearly after Brezhnev, Zagladine aad
Marcha,is met at the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 7 December 1974. The PCF
secretary general tried to demonstrate to his Soviet interlocutors that
his policy af openness wa.s a correct a,claptation of the international move-
ment's general stra.tegy to cond.itions in France,
PCF Denied Ecistence of G.il,ag in Russia
What followed showed tha.t Maxcha,is had not convinced his partners in the
discussion. The examples of Yugoslavia, Ghina, Albania and others proved
too well to the Soviets that, while national communism certainly did not
destroy the party practicin$ it, it did deal a sevsre blow to internationa.l
communism, without whose unity and discipline t,he IISSR would on a worldWi.de
scale lose iis m.ost effective means os action. W}-~at the Soviets laid open
to question was not the "frontist" tactic, Which in the past had always
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favored the PCF to the detriment of ii;s partnera, the Socialiats in parti- -
cular, but the political conditinne and commitmenta conceded by the PCF in -
the 1972 joint program. They deacribed these compromises as opportuniat, rAproached the PCF 3or Yaving underestimated the strength of the Social -
Democratic Party and of having thus perhaps tied their hands in terms of
international affaixs. ~
Despite the warning of the "aviets and of many party members, Marchais in-
sieted on foZlowing the same path. He gave his followers the impression
of for the future being satisfied with a commu,n.tet party that would serve
as an auziliary force for its joint program alliea. He would adniinister -
anal alterna.tively at tkiat - the affairs of the company born of the appli-
cation of the 3oint gnvernment program.
As far a.s the IISSR wa-. aoncexned, the PCF's new behavior seemed to confirm
this strategic b,ypothesis. Indeed, for a half a century the PCF had vehe-
msntly denied the existenca of conceatration camps in the IISSR. Then, fol-
lowiag French Television Channel 1's 11 December 1975 telecast of a report
an a concentration camp iu the Soviet Union, the PCF's Pol.itical Bureau
the next day announced: "The film t.hat was shown g3ves us au inntolorable
pieture of the conditiona of detention in this camP. Furthermore, the com-
mentator said that some of the prigoners are political prieoners. This
claim is of a11 the more interest to us inasmuch as there are in fa.ct
trials in trie Soviet IInion conducted agai.nst citizens because of the poli-
tical positions they have adopted.. Under the circumstaaces, the PCF's
Political,Bureau announces tbat, if the actual situation corresponds to
the scenes that have been shown and if the Soviet authorities do not pub-
licly deny that this is so, it wiahes to express its profound surprise arid
most formal censure of the situation."
A month later, L' HOMANITE devoted a lengtby a�rticle entitled "I,eonid
Plyushch's Arrival in Paris" to the affair. On that occasion, the Communiat
dai.ly cited an editori.al by Rene Andrieux in which he wrote: "We are not
;*a;fferent to the case of mathematician I,eonid Plyushch and we have long
aought to obtain information on the matter.
"If it is true and unfortunately to date no proof to the contrary has
been offered that he has been canfined in a mental hospital because he
hard adopted a position opposed to certain aspects of Soviet policy or the
regime itself, we can only very clearly confirm our total disapproval and
demand that he be released as quickly as possible..."
When Plyushch was released and arrived in Paris, in the name of the PCF
Pierre Juquin shook hia hand at a public meeting. When Plyushch granted
his first press conference, LtHIIMANITE 8ave an objective account of it, one
that was very unfavorable to the Soviet regi.me.
Tha.t same year, the problem of auothe-r famous Soviet dissident, Vladimir
Bukovsky, provoked ariother PCF attaek on the Soviets. When, in December
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1976, an exrhange of two political prisoners was made, the release of
- BukovslQr for that of Chileari Communis 'l, Party secretary general Luis Corvalan,
the only foreign commiuiist leader who found a rea.son to stigma,tize the
traasaction was Georges Marchais. He sa,ids
Marchais Lost His National Aspirations in Corsica
- "Tao man, twu political prisoners, have just become the object of a deplo-
_ rable exclumg+e,,. We feel tha.t the barga,in.ing that has taken place between
a socialist countrsr and a fa.scist country over the fate of two men who were
_ tried for having exerciaed their inalienable human righta is inadmiseible.11
Qgite eviden+ly, Marchaie wauted, with little expenditure of effort, to
ahoW tha.t he retained his free will as far as Brezhnev is cvncerned. At
the time, mention of the latter rras systematically omitted from the cQlumus
of L' HiTMAM'IE or he was referred to in driblets. For esample, his 70th
birthday, 19 December 1976, was the ocaasion for speaial festivities in
the IISSR. Qut of a total of eight pages, PRAVDI devoted six to his birthday.
Iie was showered with telegrawns from overy corner of the globe and - what
couJ.d be more natural - from all communist party secretary generals -
- with one exception: Georg+es Ma.rchais! From Frarice there were meaeages
from first statesman of the nation, President Gisca,rd d'Esta,ing, trom the
first man of the opposition, Francois Mitteraad, and from Gaston
J?lissonier in the name of the PCF! Thi.s gratuitous pettiness of Maz^ahais
~ sydmirably illustrates a11 the i.nconsistency of the man...
It wan duri.ng this euphorious period that March,a,is was hospitalized for a
comple�tely uniraportaat illness. This gave Mitterand an opportunity tn make
the folloiting sta,tement:
"The friendahip I have for Georgea Maacchais and the consideration I have
for his efforts - the Left Uni.on owes him a lot - lead me to feel deep
c;oncErn over the news." People were wrong in ridiculing this expression
_ of esteem, ,li.tterand's err,)r was not in expressing 2zis esteem, whtch,
given the domestic situation, Marchais well deserved, but in dimming the
prospects of t'r.e communist movement and ignoring the ideelogical nature af
its leaders. Xarcr.a,is himself provided hi.m with the confirmation of his
error cn his precipitaus retuxn in the summer of 1977 from his vaeation in
Corsica wnere ne had "done a lot of thulking." 2b those who doubted the
independence of his thini{ing, Marchais replied: "I am not returni.ng from
= I:osco_q, I ha.ve not paid a visit to the Soviet Enbassy."
He who tries to prove too much... Everyone lazows that in our beautiful
anci democzatic country Soviet "tourists" have the right to travel every-
where, naturally including Corsica. As for Paris, we ha,ve met with the
Soviets there througi Thorez, Duclos and at times Frachon without having
to gn to Moscow ox tizeir embassy in France, The Soviets have enough dis-
creet apartnents in Paris aad the suburbs, comfortable country housea where
we uaed to dine very discreetly "in a fraternal malmer."
~
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Initiatives Assumed Without Consulting the Party
Still, �chis was merely anecdotic arid we have shown this to be the case, -
There wa.s no need for Marcha.is ta go to Moscow aud there was no reason for
expecting any other aonclu_-io: than the one he brought back from Corsica
in his suitcase. Soviet pressures, or their arguments, if you prefer,
were right about Georges Marcha.is' national aspirations. Eversrthing turned
out the way the Kremlin wanted it to.
A little later, perhaps, Marchais realized that the Soviet ariticisms rrere -
justified, He also realized that the Sovie'cs, who had helped him - that _
is the least one can say of this in his rise to the top of the PCF,
could also con, ribute to promoting someone else. He delivered his self-
criticism publicly, on television. Disregatd.ing the debates of the public
meetings with the Socialists, he sa,id:
"The I,eft IInion policy failed becauae We had illusions about the PS, be-
cause the ma,sses did not assume enough responsibility for joint program
objectives. We must Uuild a new rank�and-file union based on concrete
objectives correaponding to the needs of the workers,"
Given the fact that in the language of Lenin and Stalin "needs of the
workers" translates into "needa of the communiat movement," Marcha.i.s wa,s
repeating word for word the cxiticisms the Soviets hard laveled at liim since
1973.
Today, with the coup i.n K~,bul, the ma.es media ha.ve discovered that the PCF -
is following in the footsteps of the Soviets. This is an opportunity to
observe that the press with the exception of those newspapers managed
or fi.nanced by the PCF is in agreement in recognizing that in the field -
of foreign policy, the defenae of Soviet interesta is still the PCF's
dominant concern and that it is only when French interests coincide with
Russian interests that the Communists ase g+ood patriots.
These same newapaper4, with the same unanimity, are also discovering tY~.:a,t
the secretary general of the PCF is the only one to assume political i.ni-
tiatives in the name of the party, which he does not consult since the
party is an instrument for the application of the policy decided on at the
top, not an organization for the elaboration of that policy. Ilhe rank-and-
file member i-s kept up to date on these great decisions by the radio or
- television or i;y the "bourgeois press."
We had to ha,ve a pu'olic statement, like the one Henri Fiszbin made (to cite -
one of the most recant), for it to dawn on the press. Now the dissent re-
- vealed by Fiszbin is to be found in most of the cells.
We have to go a long way back to find a comparable situation.
The unrest among the rank and file is a reflectiorz of criticisms from the
surrounding environment, that is, from the mass of ord.inary people who _
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vote for the left. With the exception of the period of mutual beax hugs
right after the liberation, a PCF leadership has never afforded the right
a.s mucri satisfaction as the .;ne Marchais heads.� Marchais' i.ependent
a.spi.rations with regard to the Kremliu have today, as we lrnow, completely
disappeared.. On the occasion of four 3mportant political events, he has
differed rrith the rest of the Euxopean communist movement. The first of
these was Marchais' lone campaigri at the end of 1979 against the installa-
tion of Pershing missiles in Europe, when the "Elirocommunists" did not
follow his lead at all, moreover, no more than did the French Socialists,
gi.nce the Soviet origin of that opera.tion was too obvious. The second
event was the YCF Political Bureau'e statement after the Red AruW' e inver
eion of Afghariiatan on 27 Deaember 1979. In that co=nuzique, the PCF's
Political 8ureau described the Soviet aggresaion "as aid against a rebel-
lj.on 3upported from a,,road."
Keeping the Audience Amused to Make Them Forget Afginanistan
The communist parties which, along with Georges Marchais, sanctioned this
lie were the same ones that sarictioned the invasion of Czechoslovakia on
21 August 1968. Among them are the satellite country parties and the com-
munist parties of Portugal, the FRG, Luxembourg, Cyprus, etc., that is,
those for whom the monthly paycheck from Brezhnev is indiepensable to as-
sure their meana of existence.
The other parties, which did not sanction the Babul coup, were the sawe
ones tha.t adopted a position a,gainst the Prague coup, including the com-
rmunist parties of Italy, Spain, Eagland, etc. Therefore, in considering
in the words of its secretaxy general that the inva.sion of Afghanistan
was a"normal procedure," the PCF was the only party to shift from one
camp to the other.
The third event that permitted Marchais to abandon his European communiat
movement "friends" was his trip to Moscow, made 3 days after the Political
Bureau conmunique we just mentioned. After having beforehand in vain at-
tempted to entice Berlinguer in Rome, Marchaia once more singled himself
out from the others, but this time through his absolute alinement with
Moscow.
'i'h.is trip was for him a.n opportunity to gauge the rarik he held in the
SoviPc haxem, He was the object of exceptional honors and favora of the
ki.id tne Kremlin reserves ouly for a titular chief of state. On his departr
ure from Paxis and on his return, he was greeted by Soviet Ambassador
Chervonenko. Or, his arrival in Moscow and on his departure. he was re-
ceived at the airport and reaccompanied to it by the team of Suslov atid
Pononaxev, a ceremonial eng-aged in only for guests who have proven their
greatest docility with regard to Kremlin ukases,
Uuring his stay, the Soviet press was mobilized and devoted as much space
and time to him as to a foreign chief of state of one of the satellite
countries. Heaped with honors, Marchais was granted three consecutive
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conversations with Brezhnev, an eztremely rare privilege.
The fourth event that marked Marchais' final about-face in the direction
~ of I+Ioscow was the conferenae of Etuopean communist parties held in Paris
on 28-29 April. Firet of a11, as cnorganizer of the conference and chair-
, maa, Marchais blithely retracted what he lzad said at the previous Eaat
Berlin conference in June 1976, xhen he wae opposed to the holding of a
oonferanae of the eame kind in the f'utare. So, the Paris conference (which
he coneented to oomoke at the request of the Soviets) waa merely a eort
of repPtition of the one held in Eaet Berlin '_n June 1976, including its
title. In 1976s Conference for Peaae, Seaurity, Cooperation and Social
Progress in Europe. In 1980: Conference for Peace aad Diearrtiament in
Europe. The asme cliche, but this time to keep the audience amused irhile
the Russiana were with diffiaulty d.igesting Afghaniatan.
However, there ia a major difference betrreen these two conferences: In
Berlin, it was a success in terms of number of participants; in Paris, it
ended in a serious defeat.
PCF Could Not Evolve by One Iota,
At the previoua conference, in Berlin, the only Fastern bloc couatry missing
was Albania and the only Western representative was the Icelandic Communiat
Party. At the Paris conference, there were more aefeci;ions than attending
parties. Ten European ccmuulist paxties were absent and txo others, the
Swiss and Belgian parties, limited themselves to sexiding just "observers."
The absentee reoord was broken at thie international aonference in Paxis.
Z4ie main reason for these rejectionp esaentially hars tc do with Soviet
aggression aga.i.nst Afghanietan.
2'he mi.strust on the part of the "brnther oarties" is, of course, primaxily
due to the record of Marchais' activities ai.nce he haa beea secretary gene-
ra1 of the PCF. Marchais, xho has again become one of the Soviets' most
effective vassals, is the only communist Zeader to ha,ve switched sides in
such acrobatic fashion in the domains of domestic, E~zropean end inter-
national policy.
A conscious instrument of Soviet foreign policy, as he clearlv expressed
it to Frenchmen over televisjon antennas, Marchais did not hesitate to
sacriiice the Left Union in Pi-ance and Eurocommuni.am in Europe.
What is obvious today was less so when the 3oint gc,:~=nment program was
signed. But men like Mitterand, Deferre and Mauroy, to mention only the
most experienced Socialist politicians, were not apprentices in this field.
The hopes the Communists ha.ve always enterta,ined for the future, the methods
of and means available to the leaders of the organization h.:ve held no
secrets for them. They lmew that tha PCF could not evolve by one iota as
long as it remained faithful to its ideology and its Leninist-Stali.nist
principles.
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From that point on, out of 1 yalty to the institutions of a liberal society
and with the prospect of the establiahnent of a de-mocratic and humane kind
of socialiem, Mitterand and hia frienda owed it to themselves not to reject
the union and eleatoral agreemeats, but to reflise to sign a government
agres:uwnt without having beforehaud aonckcted an ideolcgical debate whiah
would expose tt:e gulf th.at separatea totalitasian communism frnm democratic
socialism.
In breaking up the Left Union, in sanctioning Russian imperialist expansion-
ism in Kabul and elsewhere, the PCF itself toclay imposes the need for an
idaological debate. So, onco again, the PS, which ahould have been pre-
sent on a field of action that could only be favorable to it- , has placed
itself on the defensive. It is afraid it would suffer an electoxal defeat
in 1981 and has taken reflige behind its 1972 aigature! It is paralyzc3d
by its fear of commun.i.sm, which it does not lrnox "how to deal with" and
its fear of "what they will say in L'fliTMANIR'E," for which Leon Blum in his
ti.me had alreaciy reproached it. This kind of ob3ective subiaiesion, this
fear of being braaded anticommunist xas impoaed on it by the PCF through
a still effective tactic.
A Yery Well Perfected Terrorist Method
Thus, the PCF opposes aRy criticism, whatever it may be, with abarrage
whose everlasting effectiveness it fa aWare of. It yells: "Narrow-minded"
or "crass" aaticommunism, This method of intellectual terrorism works
wanderfully well becauae it relies on the bad consciences of the adversaries
tilis argument, as holZow as it is, succeeds in making feel guilty, at once
and begrond all expectations by disqualifying their speeches in advaace.
Ttius, consenting to remain on the defensive, the partner in the discuasion
hastens to deny the inflammatory accusation and sweara to God that he is
not opposed - fax from it - to communism or the PCF or the Soviet IInion,
as though it were a matter of as many tabus. This devotion (to repeat a
term used by Jean-Francois Revel) of free men is the poisoned apple repre-
sented by the practice of ideological capitulation to communist totalita-
rianism. But it also stems from the terror-fascination effect produced
by a commin.ist party so certain of its future victory, as it ie of the
inevitable triutuph of Soviet comnunism over the whole world, that it cannot
starid A"or even a hint of criticism, ffiuch less a challenge. The specter of
Munich, whi.ch hangs ovex the actions of the Western leaders, like the in-
tellectual and moral account-renderin.g of the chief socialist leaders, can
only comfort the PCF in its attitude.
CGPYRIGHT: 1980 par (;ogedipresse S.A.
11,466
cso: 3100
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
GAUDARD'S P.EASONS FOR QUITTING 'L'HUMANITE' STAFE DISCUSSED
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 28 Jun 80 pp 28-29
[Article by Thierry Pfister: "Resignation From 'L'HUMANITE
[Text] "Could you work anywhere else but L'HUMANITE?" Harris and Sedouy
asked Jean-Pierre Gaudard 6 years ago. "No," replied the head of the eco-
nomics department of the communist daily. He explained: "I follow an
ideology bPfore I follow a trade." At the L'HUMANITE staff conference
on Wednesday, Roland Leroy was nevertheless forced to announce the resigna-
- tion of Jean-Pierre Gaudard.
Several weeks of discussions with the PCF leadership could not make this
young rising star of the communist press go back on his decision. He be-
lieves that he can no longer carry on in his profession. The position of
the PCF on Afghanistan also seems to have played a decisive role in his
feelings. It is true that Guadard, who joined the party in 1966, is the
~ prototype of the new communists shaped through the march toward unity and
who want a complete de-Stalinization of their group. "The most serious
- error is not to live dem.cratically," Gaudard explained to Harris and Sedouy.
"From that error stem all the others."
In fact, it is the absence of internal democracy ;:hat most troubles the new
cadres of the PCF. This is true at L'HUMANITE and striking at REVOLUTION.
The weekly's sditorial staff ineeting following the resignation of Francois
Hincker from his duties as assistant editor and that of Serge Goffard was
revealing. The lack of openness and confrontation is so deeply felt that
Guy Hermier, editor of REVOLUTION, and Jean Burles, editor in chief, noted
that none of their associates came to their defense during the debaLe.
Their silence was eloquent.
The next session of the Central Committee will take up the situation thus
created in the communist press, but also the case of Henri Fiszbin, whom
Georges Marchais criticized for speaking out in LE MONDE.
Nothing would seem to indicate that this body of the PCF has any sudden
desir_e to "live democratically." _
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
28
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COUNIRY SECTION
ASPECl'S OF YCF INTERNAL CRISIS EXAMINID
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 21 Jun 80 p 32
[Article by Thierry Pfister]
FRANCE Z'
[Text] Jean Elleinstein screams political censorship. He accuses the
"Editions Sociales," an outfit controlled by the French Communist Party (PCF)
to hzve withdrawn from him the coordinaticn of the eight volumes of the
"History of Contemporary France." To this Lucien Seve, member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party and director of the Editions Sociales replies
matter of factly by underlining the serious delays of Jean Elleinstein in
the delivery of promised texts. The position of the protesting communist
historian would be stronger if his difficulties were limited to the publish-
ing firm of the PCF. This is not tne case. Jean Elleinstein is in more
or less serious conflict with the publishers Le Seuil, Grasset and Albin
Michel. As to the publishers Stock they went so far as to have a part of
the proceeds from the sale of the historian's library seized. In order to
reco,�T ,�rh^rored contracts.
If there is political censorship in the PCF it should be looked for somewhere
else. It is more serious and goes deeper. The crisis which is shaking
REVOLUTION illustrates this. Francois Hincker, assistant chief editor of
the weekly, in fact, just felt obliged to resign because Guy Hermier, member
of the Political Bureau and director of REVOLUTION refused to approve one
of his articles. It concerned, it is true, an answer to Lucien Marest,
Hermier's collaborator at the section of intellectuals and culture of the
Central Committee,
In two articles of REVOLUTION, Marest has just defined the new line of the
party in cultural matters. It consists in the favoring of animation over
creation. One does not go on admitting that the cultural centers of Communist
municipalities produce works which do not attract the public, a comp].aint
already voiced by Guy Poussy, group secretary of the 'Jal-de-Marne district
and mouthpiece of Georges Marchais. In its stride the direction of the
PCF by the way intends to take charge again of the country groups. No more
invitations of whichever singer to the local celebrations of the party.
Renaud for instance is specifically outlawed. No more preference for the
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productions of "bourgeois" publishers rather than for those of the party
workshops.
Francois Hincker had wanted to say that this policy would again make the L
optiuns if the PCF questionable. He has been condemned to silence. This
is most serious for REVOLUTION. Already in the strictly political field, the
weekly had to toe the line or, as in the case of Afghanistan, shut up. If
' the direction of the party imposes on it the same rule in cultural matters
the specific value of REVOLUTION disappears. As it is, the figures are not
that great. The objective of 50,000 subscriptions is far from achieved.
There are only 15,000 and the distribution amounts to around 40,000 copies.
It is true that the young weekly--it published its 15th number--cannot count
on the Communist press to become better known. L'HUMANITE ignores it and
Roland Leroy forbids the journalists of the daily to give a leg up to _
REVOLUTION.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
8696
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COUNTRY SECTION
PRODUCTION OF NAVAL EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish May 80 pp 26-29
[Article by Artabro: "Italian Naval Exhibition"]
[Text] Italian technology in the military naval field
appears, at present, to be one of the most complete and
_ competitive technologies. Within it, the United Naval
Shipyards (CNR) group coordinates and assembles a large
part of the facilities and export capability.
Multipurpose Escorts
ITALY
Trre "Lup-_" and "Maestrale" class frigates have meant the definitive con-
solidat:ion of Italian industry as an exporter of complete principal
fighting ships, that is to say, with purely Italian technology in almost
all their systems and subsystems.
'I'he "Lupo" class ships are 2,525-ton ships, fully loaded, and are 113
meters iong. Multipurpose is the basic aim within these moderate dimen-
, sions. Their basic qvnnery is one 127/54 Oto Melara "Compatto" [com-
pact] gun the gun with the most rapid fire that there is with that
caliber and two Breda twin 40/70 antimissile mounts. Antiaircraft
protection is increased by means of placing onboard an Alba:tros/Aspide
. point defense missile system, also with good antimissile capability, while
the antiship capability goes much beyond �the gunnery trar}ge by the re-
ceipt onboard of Otomat missiles, up to eight, with an impact distance
limi.ted by the radar horizon much more than by its own propulsive action
radius. Antisubmarine activity is based on a medium-sized helicopter and
short-range homing torpedoes, launchable both from the frigate and from
the helicopter.
The electronic equipment on the "Lupo" class ships, and particularly the
sensors, are also mostly of Italian technology, with the exception of
the sonar. Although they are variable, depending on the request, they
are naturally incorporated in the ship's weapons system. Z'he matter of
support measures and electronic countermeasures, especially sophisti-
cated, is to be emphasized particularly. Propulsion, of the CODAG
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[expansion unknown] type, makes maximum speeds on the order of 35 knots
possible, very infrequent in modern escort ships, with 31.7 knots sus-
tained speed (40,000 horsepower), but with only 7,800 horsepower, maximum
sustained diesel power, it is possible to maintain 20 knots. This makes
very great radiuses of action (5,500 miles at 16 knots) possible.
In short, the "Lupo" design has sought to combine multipurpose. good per-
fornance and economy. This kind of frigate can operate both by itself and
on escort duty. It can also be incorporated in air-sea tactical groups,
regardless of how fast they are. Four units were built for the Italian
Navy, at the same time as the Peruvian Navy ordered four more (of the "Car-
vajal" series) and the Venezuelan Navy ordered six ("Mariscal Sucre" se-
ries), in both cases with local variants. The first one of all, "Lupo,"
was finished in 1977.
T:ie "Maestrale" design, produced in principle on order by the Italian Navy
to proceed to build six units, is merely an enlarged and improved "Lupo."
The displacement now increases to 3,040 tons full load, with a length some-
what less than 123 meters. By using somewhat more powerful diesels than
the "Lupo" class, but with the same FIAT/General Electric LM 2500 gas tur-
bines, the maximum speed barely exceeds 33 knots, still higher than what
is normal in recent constructions, but the action radius is 6,000 miles
at 15 knots. Its military capability seems to be increased, in compari-
son with the preceding design, primarily in the antisuimarine area:
There are two medium-sized ship-borne helicopters, or one heavy helicopter,
all with air-to-surface combat facilities.
Wire-guided 533-millimeter long torpedoes are added (Italian A-184).
The hull sonar seems to be supplemented by another variable depth sonar (sys-
tem identical to the systems of the Spanish "Descubierta" class corvettes,
second series).
The radical increase in hangar capacity is owing to the shifting of the
Aspide/Albatros missile launcher to the bow.
Although up to now only the Italian Navy is continuing to order escorts
of this class, it seems beyond all doubt that new orders, comi.ng especially
from navies usinq American World War II destroyers, will follow them, par-
ticularly when the first units become tangible.
Smaller Units
The CNR offers a very wide range of alternatives, both in dimensions and
in assignments and functions, in the field of small combatant ships.
The largest patrol craft produced so far by the Italian company are in
compliance with an order from the Libyan Navy, where they are building
the "Wadi" series, four units, followed then by another order from Ecuador
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for six more. With dimensions similar to the FPB-58 design of the Gex,~3n
Lurssen Company (the Spanish "Lazaga" class and the Israeli "Reshef" clas:~),
their displacement is definitely greater (630 to 685 tons full load, de-
pending on the version). It allows various configurations of weapons,
sensors and propulsion. This always affects the multipurpose feature of
the basic design. In fact, these small ships tend to be classified as
corvettes rather than as patrol craft. Zhe installation of a 76/62 Oto
Melara gun, the familiar "Compatto," and a twin 35 or 40-millimeter mount
for close-in antimissile defense is common to all the variants provided.
There also always are Otomat ship-to-ship missiles. The various versions
are determined by the alternative presence of antisubmarine torpedoes,
short-range antiaircraft missiles and even a helicopter, in spite of the
small displacement of the design.
A project connected with the foregoing one, although with more originality,
is the "Saettia," not yet ordered definitely, and whose armament and sen-
sors are basically similar to the �'Wadi" class, without antisubmarine wea-
pons or antiaircraft missiles. Z'he originality of the design lies in the
almost elimination of superstructure, thanks to a high draft and consider-
able freeboard, which find expression in seaworthy features very superior
to what is usual in ships of their size (360 tons full load) and much in-
te-rior space. They also offer a small radar silhouette and few dead spots
for gunnery fire. The theoretical speed probably reaches 40 knots with
20,000 horsepower.
Still in the line of missile-launching patrol craft, CNR pioneered construc-
tion of military hydrofoils in Western Europe, owing to its "Sparviero"
prototype, completed in 1974. Its most remarkable detail is its compact-
ness. On a hull with a maximum displacement of only 60 tons its houses a
76/62 Oto Melara gun and two Otomat missiles, with pertinent electronics.
'I'he "Sparviero" is capable of attaining 50 knots with a 4,500-horsepower
gas turbine. Si mor.e units are going to be produced for the Italian Navy
(the factory name for the series is "Swordfish").
A number of other light combatant craft projects are offered by Breda, in
Venice: 400-, 250- and 150-ton missile-launching boats, with various
armament and equipment possibilities, including a helicopter with a tele-
_ scopic hangar on the largest. At the same time, other specialized ship-
yards offer smaller craft, like the 41-ton and 8-ton fiberglass craft from
CRESTITALIA, used by the Finance Guard owing to t.heir high speed (34
knots), or the 21-ton patrol craft, also made of plastic, from INTERMARINE.
This Sarzana firm is precisely the one that has a contract with the Italian
Nav}r to construct a series of Italian minesweepers, an Italian answer to
the European *ripartite design. Ten units are going to be produced for
now, forming the "Lerici" series. It is an unquestionably interesting
development and very comparable with the best of other navies.
With regard to logistic support ships, CNR produced two fleet supply ships
for the Italian Navy, the "Vesubio" and the "Stromboli," displacing
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8,700 tons full load. Based on their experience, it offers enlarged de-
siqns of them, displacing 13,500 and 21,000 tons. This last-mentioned
ship is a real surface fighting ship, because it adds, to its logistic
- capability, two heavy helicopters, Aspide antiaircraft missiles and four
40/70 millimeter guns with electronic equipment similar to what is found
on an escort ship. Breda, in turn, has designed a very complete 3,000-
ton submarine rescue ship, capable of operating at great depths, especially
if it uses the Breda 13-ton minisubmarine, capable of reaching a depth of
600 meters (with a safety coefficient of 1.25).
Onboard Weapons
Naval weapons have a possibly greater relative importance, within Italian
exports, than the complete ships themselves, to the point of having made
. local industry one of the leaders of the world market.
Naval gunnery is very particularly the gatherer of the greatest exporting
achievements and especially for the compact products of the Oto Melara Com-
pany. The 127/54, that we mentioned already when we discussed the "Lupo"
and "Maestrale" frigat9s, has a very light mount (34 tons), with a very
high rate of fire and both antiaircraft and surface capability. It has
66 rounds i.n continuous sv.pply. It has received foreign orders-(from Ca-
nada, in addition to importers of frigates built in Italy), but it seems
that its commercial activity is just starting.
Nevertheless, the lighter 76/62 is the gun used most extensively all over
the world among the new automatics. It has been adopted by over 20 navies,
including the United States Navy, which calls it NDc-75. Altogether, it
weighs 7.3 tons. It can fire 85 rounds a minute and mnintain continuous
bursts for a whole minute without serious damage to the barrel. This means
that it is capable of putting more explosive weight in the air than a dual
semiautomatic 126-milli.meter mount, in the same time. Its low weight makes
it possible to install it also on very light ships.
The variants that Breda has produced on the Bofors 40/70 guns are also
noteworthy: the automatic loader for a single mount, providing 144
rounds in automatic ammunition supply and, especially, thp closed twin
mount, with a joint rate of fire of 600 rounds a minute and continuous
ammunition supply of 444 or 736 rounds. This mount is shipborne parti-
cularly for antimissile purposes, above all since a proximi.ty fuze was
placed in service.
Breda also produces the 105-millimeter window and electronic decoy rocket
launcher system, which also admits flare or ground bombardment rockets.
Twenty-tube rocket launchers are made for medium-sized ships and 6-tube
launchers for patrol boats and corvettes.
Another important item is torpedoes. Whitehead Motofides has produced sub-
stitutes for the American antisubmarine homi.ng torpedoes, calling them
A-244 and A-244S. Their same launching tubes can be used, although there
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is ari autochthonous launching system, the ILAS-3 of ELSAG. A new long,
533-millimeter wire-guided torpedo, the A-184, is used on board the new
"Maestrale" class frigates.
Concerning missiles, we have already commented on the performance of the
ones used on the new frigates. The Aspide, incorporated in the Albatros
control system, is a remarkable improvement of the NATO Sea Sparrow, with
more maneuverability, greater range and wider margins of operation, in
addition to increasing its antimissile capabilities. The Otomat, in its im-
proved Teseo version, has a high degree of maneuverability for diversion in
proximity to the target and it is highly immune to countermeasures. It
is also the ship-to-ship missile with the greatest range on the whole
Western market.
Electronics
This is another item that has been equipping Italian-constructed ships for
years now, with our own technology.
The ELSAG Company not only produces radars, but also close-in defense sys-
tems (the Dardo), fire control systems and electronic decoy systems.
ELETTRONICA SpA specializes in an electronic warfare system with a quality
and advanced design that is without competition in the world. Thus, its
countermeasures systems are used in many navies. ELMER produces communi-
cations and data-transmission systems. SELENIA is the prime corltrac-
tor for long-range search radars and it also produces command and control
systems for integrated weapons systems.
Engines
In conclusion, we can mention the existence of a wide variety of Italian
propulsion systems. GMT produces its series 230, 20-cylinder diesels,
_ used on frigates for economical propulsion at cruising and patrol speeds.
Stabilimenti Meccanici, in Trieste, manufactures the VM TI-1312 series for
small craft, with 380/480 horsepower, and CRM makes its series of 12-
cylinder V CRM 12 D/SS diesels, in the 1085/1374 horsepower range, in
Milan.
To meet the requirements for power and high acceleration in escort ships
and fast ships, FIAT manufactures, under license, the General Electric
LM2500 gas turbine, derived from the TG-39/CF-6 jet, which equips the
commercial DC-10 for example, with a maximum power of 25,000 horsepower.
FIAT also provides electronic automation systems for maehinery.
Genoa
In summary, all this and much more is to appear in the Naval Exhibition,
which will be amply covered by a team from DEFENSA.
35
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Participating Companies
(1) ASTILl,EROS
(6) ARMAMENTO Y ELECTRONICA
- Buques mayores ( 2)
Breda Meccanica Bresciana
Brescia
('antieri Navali Riuniti
Genova (11 )
F1AR
Milin
Cantierie Navale Breda
Venecia (12)
C.I.S. DEG
Roma
[talcantieri
Trieste
Contraves ltaliana
Roma
- Buques menores ( 3)
Consonio SMIN
Roma
- CanUeri Baglietto
Varazze
Elettronica
Roma
Caniieri Navali Liguri
Riva Trigoso
Elettronica S. Giorgio
Genova
Canueri di Pisa
Pisa
Elmer
Pomeaia (Roma)
Caqtieri Picchiotti
Viareggio
Face Standard
,
Milin
Crestitalia
Ameglia
Fratelli Borletti
Milin
Intermarine
Sarzana
Gajon
(;enova
Italcraft
Roma (13)
[RET
Trieste
Navaltecnica
Messina
Italtel
Milin
(4) SISTEMAS DE PR
OPULSION,
Litton Italiana
Pomezia
5)MAQUINARIA ELECTRICA Y AUXILIAR
Marconi Italiana
t;enova
- Sistemas de propulsion
Microtecnica
Turin
Aifo
Milin
Misar
Ghedi
Alfa Romeo
Abbiategrasso
Oerlikon [taliana
Ofticine Galileo
Milin
I~lorencia (14)
C.R.M.
Fiat Aviazione
Milin
Turin
Oto Melara
La Spezia
- Franco Tosi
Legnano
Selenia
Roma
Grandi Motori Trieste
Trieste
Sistel
S
A
M
Rona
Florencia
Isotta Fraschini
Saronno
.
.
.
Snia Visrosa
Roma
V.M. Cento
- Maquinaria Electrica y Auzilrar
Usea
'
Pugliola Lerici
Ansaldo
Genova
ides
Whitehead Moto F
(7)
Leghorn
L
Arona
Voghera
AVIACION NAVA
A.T.I.S.A.
Genova
Aviones de Patrulla Maritima y Exploracion
Cutler Hammer Italiana
Milin
Aeritalia
Napoles (15)
Delchi
Villasanta
Aeronautica Macchi
Varese
Elettcital
Genova
Ind. Aer. Rinatda Piaggio
Genova
Fratelli Garbarino
Acyui
Meteor
Roma
Ghisalba
Turin
SIAI Marchetti
Sesto Calcnde
I.F.E.N.
Roma
(9) Kelicopteros navales
Socogen/Intar
Genova
Costr. Aer. G. Agusta
Cascinx Costa
Magneti Marelli
Milin
Breda Nardi
Milin
Sace
Turin
(10) EQUIPOS ESPECIALES
'Cermokimik
Milin
(;aleazzi
La Spezia
Termomeccanica Italiana
La Spezia
lndustrie Pirelli
Milin
Nuova Callegari & Chigi
Ravena
Ofticine Panerai
Florenria
Oleodinamica Magnaghi
Milin
Riva Calzoni
Bolunia (16)
Signani
La Spezia
Technisub
c;enova
Key: 1. shipyards; 2. large ships; 3, small ships; 4, propul-
sion systems; 5, electrical and auxiliary machinery; 6. arma-
ment an3 electronics; 7. naval aviation; 8. sea patrol and
search aircraft; 9, naval helicopters; 10. special equipment;
11. Genoa; 12. Venice; 13. Rome; 14. Florence; 15. Naples;
16. Bologna
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A. Madrid 1980
10,042
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY SECTION
ARMY UPGRADES TANKS, FIRST BMR-600 DELIVERED
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish No 25, May 80 pp 88, 90
SPAIN
[Text] The Spanish Army has been displaying considerable activity in the
area of armored vehicles in the past few months with the incorporation,
procurement and modernization of this type of equipment for its various
units.
First came the signing of the contract with the Santa Barbara Military
Industries National Enterprise last June for the construction of a new
series of 100 AMX-30E cars, whose patent became the property of the
Spanish Government precisely in 1980, a fact which will facilitate its
production, improvement and modification.
The incorporation of the new M-48E (M-48A5) tanks, whose f'Lrst 10 units
were delivered to the Montesa 3d and the Alcantara lOth Armored Cavalry
Regiments in Ceuta and Melilla, has been taking place since last August.
~ These vehicles form part of the first lot of 108 Spanish Army M-48 tanks
j undergoing thorough reconditioning and modernization at the Chrysler
_ Espana company's facilities in Villaverde (see DEFENSE No 3).
The operation practically affects the whole tank, with the cupola, hull,
engine cooling grilles and fenders undergoing transformations. They get
a ne;a AVDS-1790-2A diesel engine and transmission, have the final stages
replaced, and the suspension and running gear repaired and improved. New
fuel tanks also are installed. The driving and aiming optical system is
improved and a new ballistic calculator is provided.
But all in all, what makes the modernization really worthwhile and upgrades
" the tanks is the installation of the 105/51mm L-7A2 gun, a weapon of
acknowledged effectiveness, accuracy and quality employed by a large number
of Western tanks (Leopard, M-60, Strv-103, Centurion, Pz-68, etc.).
This modernization brings the M-48E tanks, except for weight and mass, to
the level of the tanks currently in service--especially the M-60, with
which it has numerous details in common--and constitutes a significant
increase in Spanish armored potential.
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rvn vrriuicu, uoz vivLi
Thac potential , according to offictal sources , wi 11. he nugmented by I shiP-
inenL o1 M-48A2 Lanks zicyuired from tlic HRC that also will be modernized
_ in Spain by the identical process applied to the others.
On the other hand, the first BMIt-600 cars have come out of the ENASA
factories in Valladolid and have been delivered to the Calatrava 2d Training -
Regiment of the Caval;:y Academy and the Espana llth RLAC [Light Armored
Cavalry Regimen t?], as well as a shipment to the Clvil Guard UAR's
[Rural Antiterrorist Unit]. There are studies and plans to equip armored
and mechanized units with the various versions of the B~R-600 cars over -
the intermediate term, to replace tracked equipment as vehicles become
available for this purpose. These vehicles consist of the BMR-600 PP
basic version armed with an N;G-3S 7.62mm machine gun on a Mowag mounting
- (made in Spain) and ha-,ing a capacity of 13 men.
Regarding the BMR-600 and the M-41 cars, tests were recently conducted
with HOT Mephis to turrets to ascertain their capabilities as antitank
rocket laur.chers, and there is also a Chrysler Espana program for the
modernization and modification of 180 M-41 cars by means of the installa-
tion of 500 HP diesel engines and 90mm guns.
- COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A., Madrid 1980
s.1
8414
C:SO: 3110

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COUNTRY SECTION
UNi24PLOYMIVT DILI',NIINA CONTINUES TO WORSEN
iMa.drid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 8 Jun 80 pp 68-70
[Text] Nearly 750,000 unemployed will share more than
200 billion pesetas this year. But others who have
reached the term of their benefits without finding new
employment or who are seeking a job for the first time
do not collect anything. In the meantime unemployment
disbursements are emptying the public coffers and each
day there are 1,000 additional jobless while no more
than 10 hillion pesetas are left for the employment
program.
SPAIN
Each day more than 1,000 SFaniards become unemployed. In the first 3 months
of 1980 recorded unemployment--those jobless who register as such at the ~
offices of the National Enployment Institute [INEM]--rose by 91,700, that -
is, by about 1,000 individuals daily. Unemployment, far from having reach- -
ed. apeak, cont7.nues to increase. According to Carlos Ferrer, president of
the CEOE [2panish Confederation of Business Organizations], the number of
unemployed has risen by some 40,000 a month since October 1979.
This social defect is costing Spain about 200 billion pesetas, a figure
that could increase to 250 billion pesetas by the end of 1980, according
to inform.ation supplied to CAMBIO 16 by Social Security. This amount does,
not help more than half of those who are jobless, with 43 percent of the
unemployed not collecting unemployment benefits according to a recent study
of the UGT [General Union of Workers].
Tn the last analysis, the scant resources available are earmarked to assist
economically a portion of the uneruployed while barely a few million pesetas
are left to promote e,mployment, to create jobs rather than pay benefits
running for 18 months to the unemp'Loyed. "What we should aim for is to R
allocate more funds for the promrtion of employment than for unemployment
insurance," Miguel Cuenca, director general for em,,ployment, told CANIBIO 16.
He went further: It would be desirable that the worker should be able to
cYioose between unemployment insurance and collecting, in a lump sum, assist-
ance to enable him to set up his own business, Cuenca added. But the matter ~
is not so easy. For tne present the Ministry of Economy noted that the
39
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run vrriulcsi, i�r, V1VL1
Interministerial Committee on Public Investment has completed an :.nvestment
program for the 1980-83 period which suggests approximately an outlay of
2 trillion pesetas and which impacts first and foremost on professional
training, agriculture(IRXDA [Agrarian Reform and Development Institute] and
_ TCONA [National Institute for the Preservation of Nature]), housing, public 4
works, and energy.
Computations of Unemployment
In all the circles that we consulted there was first a concern to determine
whether it would be possible to increase the millions available to pay the
unemployed and thus tD succeed in having all of them collect assistance.
The government, on the basis of its economic program, has undertaken to
assist up to 40 percent of the unemployed. The balance is to be financed
with contributions from the busir_ess sector (2.35 percent of real wages)
and the contributions paid by the workers (0.35 percent).
To increase the participation of the state would involve raising the fiscal
burden on the taxpayer (which is presently almost impossible according to
tax experts consulted by this periodical) or to inerease the state's deficit
which is already worrisome as it is. Any rise in the contributions of bus-
iness or wage-earners is not well received besides the fact that it could
have counterproductive effects. However, perhaps something could be done
in this connection since "the contribution of businessmen and workers to
unemployment benefits is the lowest in Europe," Miguel Cuenca told CANIBIO
16.
Inflows for unemployment have failed to cover outlays in the last few
years. There is, pending approval of the Cortes, a special credit of 20
- billion pesetas to liquidate the deficit on account of the unemploymeni, -
insurance expenditures of Social Security in 1979. And if no one remedies
this history will repeat itself in fiscal 1980. According to information
' supplied by Social Security to CAMBIO 16, aggregate outlays anticipated
for 1980 on account of unemployment will reach 242 billion pesetas. Now
then, the collection of contributions will bring in 96 billion pesetas and
- it is expected that the government will make 85 billion pesetas available.
This then leaves a deficit of 61 billion which will have to com.e irom some-
where so that the unemployed ma.y collect every month.
And it is clear that the deficit is getting larger every yea.r because the
contributions are not growing in the same proportion as needs and because
of the number of unemployed (who, in turn, collect benefits based on
increasingly higher wages). Consequently, the government's conti-ibution
has grown 20-fold in the past 3 years and the deficit of Social Security
itself is growing.
It Is iime for Redistribution
If inputs cannot be increased significantly it wi11 be necessary to deter-
mirie whether it is possible to reduce unemployment expenditures. Or better,
40
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given the low rate of coverage, whether it is possible to spend more
effectively and cover more necessities with the same revenues. "The [draft
of the) Basic Enployment Law which will be sent to the general meeting of
the congress in tr,a first half of Jurie 1980 does not try to save money but
ralt'her to better allocate the available funds," Miguel Cuenca told this
- periodical.
The government bill--which Socialists and communists have asked the govern-
ment to withdraw--tries to reduce benefits as a f`:nction of contributions
(with a scale of 3 months' payments to the worker uho has contributed for
6 months' up to 18 months' benefits when a worker has contributed for 3-1/2
years) so that those millions that would be saved may be paid to workers
who have problems collecting unemployment benefits today and do not find
work.
Miguel Cuenca explained to CAMBIU 16 that special assistance of 75 percent
of the minimiun wage will be guaranteed--which ha,s n;,t??ing to da with the
dues contributed to Social Security--for youths (aged from 16 t0 25 years
of age) seeking their first job in the form of scholarships -'or occupational
training and for adults over 50 years of age whose unemployment benefits
have termi.nated. F'_so, to women (who have family responsibilities), the
_ disabled, and returning emigrants. There remains the issue of unemployment
insurance for the agricultural sector, picked up once more in the Economic
Program of Government and which, according to the director general of
employment, "is a problem that deserves thorough technical study."
Another improvement being tried in terms of oktlays is to place a ceiling
ori collections in order to avoid having some workers collect 80,000 pesetas
for each month of unemployment while there are others who collect nothing.
- The employment bill sets a ceiling of 220 percent of the interoccupational
minimum wage (which would indicate maximum unemployment benefits of 55,000
pesetas, if the request of trade u.nions for a new minimum wage of 25.000
pesetas is approved).
Funds for Businesses in Trouble
Businesses in trouble account for a sizable portion of the fUnds for unem-
ployment. In the meantime it is INEM and not the firm which assumes respon-
sibility for wages in the crisis situations accountir.g for partial unemploy-
:1ent. 'I'he control of enployment at SEAT [Spanish Passenger Car Company,
Inc.], for example, will cost some 2 billion pesetas to Social Security.
"That the firm should emerge from the crisis with our assistance is some-
thing that is er:tirely lawful," Miguel Cuenca, director general of employ-
iiient, rioted. "Now then," he added, "when an unemployment control provision
is authorized it is because the firm has presented a viable reorganization
plan. We also investigate thoroughly the causes of the trouble. We do not
give mone,y Lo a lost cause but only when the firm has a solution [to its
predicament]."
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run vrri%1iew uor, virLi
Doing away with fraud seems to be a f~andamental point in the sound dis-
tritiution of millions in unemployment compensation. One out of every
three firms fraudulently hires unemployed workers collect,ing unemployment
benefits while only five out of every 100 workers who receive compensation
- are involved in the fraud of holding down another job, according to the
' results of the latest survey by IiVEM. In the January-March 1980 period,
fines wero imposed on businesses amounting to 130 million pesetas (the
highest fine ran to 3 million pesetas). "Our idea is to publicize the
sanctions as one more means to fight fraud," Miguel Cuenca told CANBIO 16.
By way of a precedent the Labor Delegation of Granada has alread,y published
such names recently in the local newspaper IDFA.L.
Administration of Unemployment Funds
Another important problem to solve, according to the experts, is the man-
agement of unemployment flunds. As of January 1980 INEM has been responsible
for unemployment assistance and employment policy. However, it is still
Social Security which collects the contributions from the business sector
(that is, from the firm and the worker) and which makes payments, even
though it does so only on the orders of INEM's treasury. "As for the bene-
fits and as regards the dues collected, we continue to operate as we did
3 years a.go," Lorenzo Gil Pelaez, head of the financial economic c:abinet
of Social Security, told CANIBIO 16.
Up to a few days ago there was a complication in this "transfer of powers"
from Social Security to INEM. The latter did not know for how long each
unemployed worker seeking compensation had contributed, and it had to use
the Social Security's computers. According to Miguel Cuenca, since Ma.y 1980
INEM has had this information in some provinces and the process will soon be
completed with its own data-processing system.
For 1980 the government also anticipates earmarking 10 billion pesetas to
an employment program as well as expanding assistance to agrarian community
employment with a program of 11,848 million pesetas. The employment promo-
tion program includes assistance and subsidies to firms, the development of
professional training (for which purpose 1,821 million additional pesetas
are available), tax assistance and allowances for Social Security, and
special aid to underdeveloped zones (E1 Ferrol, Cadiz, Valles, and Antequera).
_ COPYRIGHT: 1979 INFORMACION Y REPISTAS, S.A.
2662
C so : 3110
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COUNTF.Y SECTION
BASQUE, CATALONIAN ECONOMIC MINISTERS ON REGIONAL PLANS
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Jun 80 pp 5E+-59
[Text] Catalonia and the Basque country represent
one-third of the Spanish economy and provide employ-
ment for almost one oiit of every four Spaniards.
But they are also two regions where the recession
has gone deeper. With their governments inaugurated
recently, two economic teams are getting ready to
improve their economies.
SPAIN
A month after the appointment of the Basque and Catalonian autonomous govern-
ments, the va:-ious regional government cabinet officials or economic
"ministers" are getting ready to btock out a minimal administrative struc-
ture to begin to put measures and programs into motion. The peripheral
administration continues without getting on top of the problems but has failed
to complete the processes of the transfer of inen and resources serving as
support for the autonomous management of the crisis.
"Nowadays," a Basque economic expert told this periodical, "the autonomous
regional government cabinet officials for economic matters are sort of
'paper ministers' as long as they do not have sufficient means or margins
for maneuver." Catalonian sources consulted by this periodical all assert
that "economic self-government" has many limitations even though everything
seems to indicate that advances in this field will be more visible here than
in the Basque country.
On the other hand, a-,cording to declarations by Basque and Catalonian
_ regional government cabinet officials for economic matters consulted by
CANBIO 16, there is general agreement to the effect that it is not possible
to create "kingdoms of economic cliques" and that the economic unity of the
Spanish state, which they respect, implies a series of restrictions, even
though a significant sector of Spanish business may view the autonomous
process as a possible inhibiting element to economic unity.
In contrast, those theoretically responsible for the Catalonian and Basque
economy concur in asserting, too, that it i.-, not possible to emerge from
the crisis without everyone's cooperation and especially that Madrid should
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l Vl\ VA l 1V1[W V1.lL Vl\L1
not take any far-reaching measures for the Basque or Catalonian economy
without consulting the sections involved and without receiving their
cooperation. For the time being the contacts among Pedro Luis Uriarte,
Basque regional government cabinet official for economic matters [minister
of the economy], Ramon Trias Fargas of the Generalitat [Catalonian re-
gional government], and the deputy prime minister for economic affairs
and the mini3ter of economy have been qualified as "cordial."
y According to Uriarte, "we are draftint jointly with the ministers a pro-
visional formula so that we may secure the minimum resources indispensable
to putting the government into motion, to meeting all urgent investments,
and to paying wages."
In the intermediate term what the autonomous regions' ministers wish is
that transfers be accelerated, that the Financing Law of the Autonumous
Communities be initiated, and--especially the Basques--that economic
agreements should be signed. Carlos Garaicoechea, president of the Basque
government, in the face of the [central] government's slowness in
initiating discussions concerning agreements, has unilaterally appointed
his representatives on the Committee of Transfers and on the Committee
of Agreements so that they may begin to identify the options o'L the
autonomous regions.
A few days ago the president of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol, held a 9-hour
meeting with the heads of Catalonia's economic departments, other senior
officials in those regional government cabinets, and various advisers and
experts with the purpose of drafting the economic action program which
Pujol has committed himself to present to the Catalonian parliament in
September 1980.
In the meantime, the principal regional government cabinet officials for
economic matters gave CAMBIO 16 a preview of the fundamental lines of this
program.
The economic plan of the Basque government is less advanced and the various
regional government cabinet officials are completing their collection of
data and making up their departments, appointing the various teams.
Ramon Trias Fargas (Economy and Finance): "We Seek a Mixed Economy"
"We hope that the economic-social model of the most advanced democracies of
WestPrn Europe will prosper in Catalonia," Ramon Trias Fargas, adviser for
economy and finance at the Generalitat, who holds a master's degree in
economics from the University of Chicago, is president of Convergencia
Democratica [Democratic Convergence]--Jordi Pujol's party--and a deputy to
the congress for the [Catalonian] Convergence and Unity coalition, commented,
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; (1) CATALUNA
,
~j
~  Ca ntiA pw ua~ .7 E]y " w+MO a 4{MppKebn Io1M
~ 4)
~
- i ~
l[NIDA Gf110NA svllun ~f
I O Q ~~IrY
t6 ~ 6 7 Can+o~ooe~
t~nd
! T~.o~wco. ~s~
sAac[waA wmu.
' O D s.~,cb. ~es
5
I ) P08lACION 5.122.567
Pablacibn aW
I un~~coN~ a1a 2.046000
I O Q /7\ .00~ 116.TOro FMn~ 1
i ~6~ Evaucior~ oeL aaao
(%a ooaaeen MnM I
i
I 12%
. 9 EaPOFTnCiON ]61tle W *.oatac e+ufoot Q9
Nt AW e~MawAM Or aW ~OOOwnptiaa I.U
�/ONLGON A lA PRpOUCt10N TWAL 20%
" 2 % W..,m, pubW.m c.t..ft �x i.9M n 7e 79 eo ~
~
Key:
1. Catalonia
2. Ranking in terms of per capita income
3. Ranking in terms of total production
4, Production:
- Agriculture 8 percent
Industry 54 percent
Construction 6 perceat
Textiles 8 percent
Metallic products 15 percent
Chemicals 8 percent
Services 38 percent
5. Population 5,122,567
Economically active population 2,046,000
6. Growth of unemployment
(as a percentage of the
economically active population)
7. Number of unemployed 200,000 (unemployed youth, 46.7 percent)
8. Estimated
. 9. Exports: 28 percent of total Spanish exports
10. Number of businesses in trouble: 3,000
- 11. Share of total production: 20 percent
12. Percentage of public investment in Catalonia: 11 percent
45
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(1) PAIS VAYCO
10~.�:~:C-op. (3) 
(4)
vIzcArA PAQokmxpN
~OO GUI.UZGOA O.^.z..
r+~WrC�ne~ 5.1
~S Q wa~.~�~ ~.e
AIAVA
,Og
EM/ONTACION 16\OWW G.DaVC.woNh01ft
0 s"owron.. a o.qo. tn wron.r
- 4.7pt ~M O. L4M a 1979
1 VE1tS~ON
- us,* �ntitan�+.vm
Key:
46
, FOR OFFICIAL USE OIvZY
r,oe,m.nrYOO. x]
G+rAO S.~
Apr.b.wanou. se
i BLACION 1.878636
PoWcidnactiva 800ln70
P-I mantmo (7)
~�4xPwo..wW.33.m..&..)
evauaor, ML qao (6)
(%ftOaWKiOnaclM) ~SA
440 11.2
~~-600d (8)
78 79 80 -.+.o.
1. Basque country
2. Ranking in terms of per capita income
3. Ranking in terms of total production
4. Production:
Chemicals 4 percent
Paper and cardboard 5.1 percent
Machinery 4.8 percent
Metallic products 21.3 percent
Rubber 5.4 percent
Electrical equipment 5.8 percent
5. Population 1,878,636
Economically active population 800,000
6. Growth of unemployment
(as a percentage of the
economically active population)
7. Recorded unemployment 71,338 (unemployed youth, 56 percent:
unemployed women, 33 percent)
8. Estimated
9. Exports: 16 percent of total Spanish exports
10. Number of firms suspending payments: 125
11. Investments:
Down 4.39 percent annually between 1974 and 1978
Down 32.61 percent between 1978 and 1979
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Trias Fargas advocates a mixed economy. "Mixed," he explained, "because
we believe that private enterprise and the market economy constitute the
least inefficient combination. Mixed, because we think that there is no
de-bureaucratized 3nd imaginative public sector capable of eliminating in
- che field of socia.l. justice the imbalances that could result from the free
enterprise system. All this must be situated within the context of the
energy crisis and the third industrial revolution," Trias Fargas continued.
"We may perhaps anticipate a stage of accelerated changes in which private
initiative, advised by a well-informed government, seems to us the best
way to weather a temporary situation," he summed up.
The major lines of the Generalitat's economic po:iicy will be presented to
- the parliament of Catalonia in September 1980. "It is clear," Trias
anticipated, "that we cannot intervene more in economic policy by con-
templating further control of aggregate demand. In contrast, we believe
that we shall be able in the intermediate and long range to take structural
measures that would improve the situation on the supply side." He added:
"We shall turn to given sectors and even to specific firms where we can
indicate microeconomic policy."
= The regional government cabinet official for economic matters considers that
the principal problem is unemployment "which in our opinion will onlp be
solved by the resumption of pri-iate investment with the support of some
selective public investment even though the latter will not depend on us."
In the fiscal realm Trias Fargas does not plan to request any kind of
privileges. "Neither do we want the tax burden to fall on Catalonians
beyond their real ability to pay. At any rate, for the time being there
is no thought that the Generalitat will levy its owil taxes given that
we do not wish to increase the fiscal burden." The Catalonian regional
government cabinet official would like to have the freedom to tax enjoyed
_ by the federated states of the United States and considers that "both the
text of the [Autonomy] Statute and the Financing Law of the Autonomous
Communities seem restrictive to me."
Trias Fargas does not believe in conf.rontations among different regions and
natioilal groups of the Spanish state and thinks that "once the rights of
tiie Catalonian natian are secured through the present Statute or its
reforni in the constitur_ional field, the Catalonians want to assume their
responsibilities on a basis of equality with all the peoples of Spain."
Final.ly, and referring to the resources that are available, Trias Fargas
considers ehat "in order to subsist the Generalitat needs a minimal
infrastzuc:;ire that is justified on the basis of the Statute, through
ttie transf_er of the costs of central services, and on the basis of the
state budget for the newly created institutions."
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Pedro Luis Uriarte (Economy and Treasury): "It Is Necessary To Establish
a Basque Public Sector"
"The economic program pursued by the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] is a
government program th at we could call progressive but which still needs
to be implemented," P edro Luis Uriarte Santamaria, economist at the
Deusto Jesuit Univers ity and subsequently a professor, a PNV partisan
for a few years now, told CAMBIO 16. And while he is working with his
team, in the program he proposes that "the basic goal that we have is to
fight unemployment as much as possible because it is the fundamental
economic, social, and I would even say political problem which the Baeque
country is fac.ing at this time."
_ The regional government cabinet official for economic matters [minister
of the economy] believes that it is necessary to fight unemployment by
two means: One is by increasing private investment, which will call for
a series of ineasures to create a better environment and retrieve the
confidence of the business sector. The other is by increasing public
investment, improving the existing shortage of social facilities (that is,
basically improving the construction industry), and establishing a Basque
public sector.
Pedro Luis Uriarte comes from the Bank of Bilbao where he was regional
director for the Basque country. Uriarte explained why he beli?ves that
Garaicoechea has picked him to steer the Basque economy. "I believe
that he selected me because of the familiarity that I have with Basque
industry where I worked before joining the bank and then also because I
am a specialist in p lanning and control." ~
As the one responsib le for the fiscal issue Uriarte was categorical: "The
Basque government will not seek privileges for the Basque country. The
fact is that cognizance given to a tradition which, in the case of
Guipuzcoa and Vizoay a, was eliminated by the force of arms does not mean
any privilege." He added: "We recognize that we have a fundamental duty
of solidarity with nations and regions making up the state, a duty spelled
out in Article 41 of the Autonomy Statute. We are not trying to create
tax havens or to reduce our tax burden with reference to the rest of the
s[ate."
Pedro Luis Uriarte b elieves that the PNV, through the economic agreer.ient,
"will have all taxes under its control except those pertaining to fiscal
monopolies and customs revenues, which logically pertain to the [central]
government. The agreement, he added, merely makes possible the Basque
country's own management of its expenditures which, being closer to the
people, can be more effective than the central administration."
In connection with the rest of the state, the regional government cabinet
official for economic matters wished to put unfounded fears to rest.
"The traditional economic relations of the Basque country with the rest
of the state will not be altered. Agreements are a traditional system
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that we have always had and which will make it possible for us to have
better administration and to have a cho3.ce about where we wish to place
the resources available to us."
Will there be sufficient resources? "We shall, rather, have resources.
We have to spend public funds in a prudent, very sparing, and very
controlled way. We shall try to give the Basque public administration
a more accessible and more flexible image as if it were that of a private
enterprise striving to earn money."
Mario Fernandez Pe1as (Labor): "Unemployment Will Get Worse"
"The first problem which the Basque government has to face is unemployment,"
Mario Fernandez Pelas, regional government cabinet official for labor
[minister of labor] and a man trained at the Deusto Jesuit University where
he was also a faculty member, told CAMBIO 16. "The unemployment levels
in the Basque country," Fernandez Pelas added, "are growing at a rate
greater than the unemployment levels iri the state overall. There will
probably be problems in the suspension of payments [debt moratarium] and
in the regulation of important employment control provisions. The
- year 1980 will be worse than 1979."
While seeking solutions to v.nemployment Fernandez Pelas believes that it
is necessary to be realistic and not to create false illusions. "As long
as the Basque government does not have appropriate powers transferred to
it, while no negotiations take place, and no economic agreement becomes
operative, what the Basque government will be able to do is to study the
rroblem and pressure the central administration but it will not find its
own solutions."
As regional government cabinet official for labor Fernandez Pelas told this
periodical that his first step will be "to find a solution for the re-
structuring of firms in trouble." .
Regarding the topic of labor conflict, the regional government cabinet
official for labor wished to check that image of the Basque country as a
powderkeg. "It is not an established fact that in the Basque country
labor conf lict is notably greater than that which exists in the rest of
the state." He attributed this to the spirit of negotiation observed
by the labor unions and employers' associations of Guipuzcoa Province.
Carlos Blasco de Imaz (Commerce and Tourism): Silent Because "He Is Too Busy"
After 2 weeks of literally being pursued by CAI-MIO 16 Blasco de Imaz,
Basque regional government cabinet official for commerce and tourism
[minister of commerce and tourism], activist of the PNV for some months
now, a lawyer, a business adviser and promoter of Operation "Basque
Export," did not wish to answer the questions posed by CAMBIO 16, alleging
that he was "too busy." CAMBIO 16's delegation in the Basque country has
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drawn up a written protest and sent it to Carlos Garaicoechea, presi:dent
of the Bas4ue government, "because of his [Blasco de Imaz'] inappropriate
attitude and his known bad relations with the press."
.Javier Garcia Egocheaga (Industry): "Collective Effort, the Only Solurion"
"The industrial crisis in the Basque country is a far-reaching crisis
which has some important structural defects and which, furthermore, is
strongly influenced by the international recession and the specific
crisis of the Spanish economy, Javier Garcia Egocheaga, a native of
San Sebastian who left the General Directorate of Iron and Steel,
Metallurgical and Naval Industries in Madrid to take charge of the Basque
regional government cabinet office for industry [minister of industry],
explained to CANIBIO 16. '
"This crisis, undoubtedly extraordinarily acute, has only one solution
which in the last analysis passes through global consciousness-raising
and collective effort," Garcia Egocheaga opined.
- The initial steps of the regional government cabinet office for industry
are, for the time being, an effort to organize a fluid, flexible and
effective administration. "Already in the realm of action," Garcia
Egocheaga added, "the fundamental element will be promotion--in the
business and financial f ields and in the technological fields as well
as in the evolution of small- and medium-sized businesses.
Garcia Egocheaga, trained at the Deusto Jesuit University and subsea ' uently
a faculty member at that institution, was general manager of TtTBACEX
from 1970 to 1978, when he joined the cabinet. He recognized that a certain _
_ exodus of businessmen from the Basque country has occurred even though
"this exodus has to be qualified." _
LJhile seeking solutions Javier Garcia Egocheaga believes that what needs
to be done is "tc carry out a process of industrial improvement and,
furthermore, to seriously prop up what is available and to develop what
we could call our strong points."
The regional government cabinet official for industry puts his faith in
the capital goods sector where there is great potential in the Basque
economy. "What will not appear to us is Our Lady of Lourdes," he said.
Vicens Oller (Industry and Energy) : "The Firm, Basis of Our Industrial Poli cy"
"There is no doubt that the industrial crisis goes beyond any territorial
- limit in which one may try to situate it. On our part we believe that
as long as industrial policy operates within a framework which unquestionab ly
conditions it, it is possible to find approaches to guide the crisis on the
basis of an intimate mutual understanding between the public administration
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an,' the private sector as regards the pattern of the policies to be
followed and their initiation," Vicens Oller, the [Catalor.ian] Generalitat's
regional government cabinet official for industry and energy [minister
of industry and energy] , explained to CAMBIO 16.
"It is not a matter of whether or
Madrid but rather of contributing
added. Vicens 011er was director
Study Center] up to his appointme
Information and Studies Service].
Circle of Barcelona and secretary
Development.
not to take measures independently of
all that is within our reach," he
of CEAM [Metallurgical Consultation
nt as director of SIEC [Catalonian
He was also president of the Economic
general of the empluyers' Project
Regarding the importance of business investment in Catalonia, O1?er
believes that "the businessman is seeking from a professional viewpoint
' rational arguments to improve his business and engage in new investments.
There has been a change of expectations in some people and, undoubtedly,
the obligation of the Catalonian public administration is to improve to
the maximum their specification and implementation."
~
_ In terms of energy Uicens Oller believes that it is not a matter of entering
ar not entering the nuclear controversy. "What is involved," he explained,
"is to engage in analysis and action based on the aggregate possibilities
that we have within our reach in the short, medium and long range both
in the area of pro3uction and in that of energy conservation." And he
� added that the polemics must be directed to criteria which consider both
economic and social well-being.
Joan Rigol (LaUor):"It Is Necessary To Seek a Catalonian Framework-Agreement"
Industrial unemployment in Catalonia, specifically in the Barcelona region,
is even higher than the national average in Spain, according to what
Joan Rigol, the Generalitat's retional governme:lt cabinet official for
- labor [minister of labor], told CAMBIO 16. "In Madrid," he added, "the
unemploymeat problem is seen from a strictly administrative viewpoint,
the central government's major concern being that of managing the funds
slated to assist the unemployed. Here, at the Generalitat, the problem
must be viewed in a diff erent manner with the introduction of a concept
of zones which demands concrete solution in each of them. Everything
that it has must be mobilized for creating potential work."
- The Generalitat does not enjoy transfers of public funds for unemployment
compensation. "It is necessary that we implement our unemployment policy,"
Rigol explained, "which is that of managing all the funds flowing through
this region, that of propping up all the firms that are salvageable, at
times through emergency measures taken with credits obtained in Mgdrid
and at times seeking our own solutions."
- Joan Rigol, 37 years cld, an individual belnuging to the UDC [Democratic
Union of Catalonia], is very familiar with the business world since he was
, secretary general of PIMEC [Small- and Medium-Sized Businesses of Catalonia].
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The regional government cabinet official for labor showed himself in favor
of a framework-agreement "that would facilitate the prospects of firms,
that would increase productivity as a function of the market shares that
must be met. The General itat can promote in Catalonia a framework-agree-
ment open to all economic and social forces without discrimination."
For the time being Joal Rigol does not have many means. "This regional
government cabinet," he exp?ained, "has seen transferred to it the immense
majority of problems but not the imnense majority of solutions. While
- waiting for our jurisdiction to broaden, the first thing that we plan to
do is to put into motion once again the Catalonian Labor Council which
a was a.lready in operation ae the time of the provisional Generalitat and
which is a consultative organ that welcomes all the social forces."
Francesco Sanuy (Commerce and Tourism): "Catalonian Exports Are More
Competitive"
"There is only one foreign trade for the entire Spanish state, as mentioned
in the Constitution, and therefore trade policy must be blocked out by the -
central government in Mad rid," Francesco Sanuy, the Generalitat's regional
government cabinet official for commerce and tourism [minister of coTrnerce
and tourism], told CAMBIO 16. He added: "It may be that specific sectors -
_ of activity, because of their high concentration in Catalonia, are felt
more proximately by the Generalitat and therefore, before agiven problem,
it may get around to sugg esting some type of action to the central government."
Once the responsibilitie s in general areas are identified, Sanuy believes
that "the Generalitat would be able to develop promotional activity in
some f ields and sectors." Specif ically, the program of his party--
[Catalonian] Convergence and Unity--includes the establ.ishment of a
Catalonian Institute for the Promotion of Foreign Trade.
The regional government c abinet official for commerce and tourism believes
that "Catalonia has an export industry above the average in Spain and that
its level comes very close to the average level of Western competition." `
"Tn addition to Europe," Francesco Sanuy added, "there are other countries
of Latin America, the Maghreb, and the Middle East wh ich are open to
specific sectors of the Catalonian industry: Engineering and consulting,
tiirnkey plants, and capital equipment."
Cata:?_onia hosts one out of every five tourists visiting Spain (21.83 percent
to be exact). For Sanuy the recession in the tourist sector is a world
problem and "one needs imagination to obviate the downswing by developing _
facilities that are dif f erent and sophisticated."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 INFORMATION Y REVISTAS, S.A.
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