JPRS ID: 9251 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020023-1
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• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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rc~K c~rric~ini. c~tii.~~ -
JPRS L/9251 -
13 August 1980
/ rth Africa Re ort
~~~r East No
p
(FOUO 30/80)
,
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- JPRS L/9251
13 August 1980
NEAR EAST/NGR;fH AFRI~A REPORT ~
(FOUO 30/80)
,
CONT~NTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Strained Relations Between Syria and Fatah Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AI~-'AR.~BI, 7-13 Jun 80) 1
Fatah Reaffirms Hardline Position in Fourth Conference _
(AL-WATAN AZ-~ARABI, 7-13 Jun 80) 6
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Libyan Construction of Airfield in Mauritaxiia Re-Alleged
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Jul 80) 11
A~'GHANISTAN
_ On-the-Spot Observations of French Deputy, Scientist
(VALEURS ACTUELLES, 7 Jul 80) 1L~
Soviet Presence Analyzed
Mountain of Ores
Newsman Describes Everyday Atmosphere in Kabul
(Rainer Wolfgrarmn; DER STERN, 17 Jul 80)......... 19
IRAN
Iran's Arabs Seen No Better Off Under Khomeyni Than
' Under Shah
(AL-WATAN A.L-'ARABI, 9-15 May 80) 24
C1 ergy Reportedly Insuring Claims to Power
(THE TIMES, 26 Jul 80) 29
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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ISRAFL
Ar~br~ I';k~rit~ A~iv i:~~~;, Wut;tr.rr~ Alliz~nr,c~ Mc~mbcr�:c 'l'c, Wc~rlc
Together
(Abba Eban; THE TIMES, 5 Aug 80) 30
1"IAURITANIA
Signer of Agreement With Polisario Joins AMD
( Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi In terview; JEiJNE
AFRIQi1E, 25 Jul 80) . ~ . . . . . . . . . . 3L~
MOROCCO
Cedies Issues Annua"1 Economy Review
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEt~.RANEENS, 16
16, 23 May 80) 38
- b -
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
v
STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND FATAH ANALYZED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Jun 80 pp 20-21
(Article: "Fatah and the Syrian-Pales.*.inian Complex"]
~
[Text] During the past few years, S~rian-Palestinian -
- relations have al.ternated between one e~.treme and the
other due to several factors. Perhaps the most impor-
tant ef these are the intervention in the Lebanese arena,
on the one hand, and the Syrian domestic situatio.^. on the
other. This report, which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI received
from its special correspondent in Damascus, uncovers -
some of the details surrounding the tension and misunder-
jtanding which have characterized these rela*_ions during
the recent pnase.
A few months ago, Syrian-Palestinian relations entered a lukewarm phase.
The two sides wished to avoid airing the details and causes of this devel-
opment, and both sought to surround the matter with secrecy fearing that the
- differences might turn into something of a confrontation which could not be
easily contained or overcome.
- Recently, Yasir 'Arafat, head of the PLO Ececutive Committee, was able to
restore these reiations to a semblance of normality following his meetings
with President Hafiz al-assad. Bu*_ this did not last long. Relations be-
tween the two sides soon began to decline once more.
What are the reasons for this conflict? Will the continuing mediation
efforts succeed in containing it? What is the cost of a return to normal
relations between Fatah and Syria, and then between Syria and the PLO?
Arab diplomatic sources say that the Syrian Government withdrew a number of
the special travel germits which had been furnished to leaders of the Fatah
movement, the largest, strongest, most infiuential and most independent of
the Palestinian organizations. Moreover, it prohibited several of these
leaders from entering Syrian territory across the authorized military lines
and subjected them to the Syrian General Security ~enters located in the
al-Masna' area on the Lebanese-Syrian border.
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These sources add that this measure came on the eve of the Fourth General
Conference of the Fatah movement held in Damascus on 22 May.
Accusations and Arrests
- These measures were accompanied by other indication which revealed the degree
to which the confrontation between the t~ao sides had escalated. These indi-
cations iricluded the following:
1. The attack 1.3unched by the S~~rian newspaper AL-BA'ATH against a number
of Fat3t~ l.eaders in which it accused them of joining the Camp David conspir-
acy ~icicl taorking to eliminate the Palestinian struggle. This attack was the
- culmination of a Syrian campaign against the Fatah movement, and a number of '
Lebanese Nationalist Movement leaders. `
2. The repetition of claims by the Phalangist radio, "Voice of Lebanon," -
that Fatah's number two man Abu Iyad, had visited Cairo and met with Egyp- -
tian President Anwar Sadat, and that he had made contacts with 'Umar
al-Pfuhishi, the Libyan officer who is now living in Egypt because of a coup
he attempted against President Qadhdhafi some years ago. This information
campaign was launched following the Phalangist delegation's visit to -
Damascus.
3. The cancellation of the meeting which had been schedul.ed between Presi-
dent Hafiz Assad and Yasir 'Arafat as part of the tour which Abu 'Ammar made
to several of the Arab states. It was reported at the time that the meeting
had been cancelled because of the likelihood that a mini-summit would be
- held among Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the PLO.
4. T}ie arrest of "Abu Isamah," the financial officer of the Fatah movement
in Syria, on the charge of transferring funds from Jordan to the Moslem
Brotherhaod group in Damascus, Hamah and Allepo. The Syrian authorities
say that "Abu Isamah" admitted to transferring thA funds, but denied that
he supported the Moslem Brotherhood movement in Syria.
The arrest of the Palestinian official followed the arrest of his deputy in
Fatah's financial department in Damascus, "Abu Mundhir." It was reported
that Abu Mundhir confessed to recruiting a number of Moslem brothers and
inciting them to carry out terrorist operations. Interrogations of the
deputy led to the exposure of a network of the Brotherhood's secret organi- -
- zation and the arrest of seven individuals in Damascus who had reportedly
been making preparations for bombings in the Syrian capital.
5. The insistence of Syrian officials on a number of occasions that the
Fatah movement define its position and activities in the Arab-Iaraeli
struggle and reject everything which would tend to perpetuate good relations
with Arab states outside the framework of the "Steadfastness and Resistance
_ Front." [Foreign) Minister Khaddam conveyed this message to the Soviet
ambassador in llamascus, who had tried to mediate between the two sides.
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6. The widening of the conflict between Syria and the Fatah movemenc follow-
ing the Tripoli cor.ference and Damascus' adoption of a formula opposing
Morocco's efforts to deal with th~ greater Sahara problem. The resistance
backed off from the resolution which the Tripoli summit is reported to have
adopted concerning recognition of the POLISARIO.
7. Syrian silence on the efforts to fabricate a clash between the Fatati
movement aad the Shi'ite Ai.T;~l movement in Lebanon, ancl the Syrians' refusal
- to mediate to establish better relations between the two movements. Pales-
tinian sources say that such behavior sroused fears that a clash r.~ight de-
velop between Fatah and othPr forces close to the regime in Syria.
Given these signs which Arab diplomatic sourc.es in Beirut perceive as indica-
tive ~f the nature of relations ~stween Syria and. the Fatah movement, will
- the situation be pushed beyond the point of no return?
Fatah Does Not Ap~rove of Escalation or Containment
Palestinian sources say that the Syrian officials' approach to the actions `
of some Fatah leaders in the contest of the Moslem BrothPrhood's activities
appears to be correct, and that the Fatah movement does not approve of par-
ticipation hy its members in activities and actions of this type. But
' neither does Fataii approve of this position being turned into a confronta- -
tion against the Fatah movement and the Plo or a containment operation in
the middle of the meetings of the Fatah movement general conference in the c
Syrian capital.
The Palestinian sources say that the Fatah movement was determined to hold
its conference in Damascus despite everythir~g that occurred to relations
with Damascus. They indicate that Abu 'Ammar rejected the use of a boycott
because of the possibility that such a move might have led to an escalation
oi the conflict. This in turn could have had an adverse effect on the con-
ditions of the resistance and the methods and means of armament, transport
and movement which Damascus provides to the Palestinian platoons.
Abu 'Ammar tried to deal with the question of relations in his meeting with
Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam during Fatah's general cotifer-
ence. Accordi.ng to informed sources, Khaddam asked 'Arafat to issue a state-
ment on the Fatah movement defining the options among the Arab axes. How-
_ ever, 'Arafat told him that the resistance did not want to be a side among
= the Arab regimes, and that it was President Assad himself who had told him
on previous occasions that it was the openness of the resistance to the
Arab regimes that had made it capable of life.
~ 'Arafat added that the present role of the resistance is to restore under-
_ standing among the Arab regimes, because a unified Arab position would
help provide a boost to the resistance in both the Arab and international
frameworks.
_ 3
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Palestinian circles sense that ~he Fatah movement is willing to sacrifice
some or its mem~ers accused of cooperating with the Moslem Bro~tnerhood on
the con~lition tiiat the Syrian campaigns and the attempts to contain indepen-
dent Palestinian decision-making are halted. These circles say that the
resistance could possibly help Syria achieve a unified resistance pravided
_ that Damascus does not ask Fatah to reform its political and military cadres
and expel some of its leaders. ,
In Damascus, Syrian officials are looking to the formula approved by the _
Patah conference to achie~e national unity among the various segments of the
- resistance in the hope t:'~at relations with the Fatah movement will be restor-
ed to their normal. leve)_. Syrian sources told me that iatah's sanctioning
- of a plan to escalate terrorist action in the interior and its adoption of
a hardline position on diplomatic action to solve the PaleStinian problem
could be th2 avenues to a restoration of understanding between the two sides.
According to these sourc..s, Abu Iyad's announcement shortly before thP Fatah
general conference that the resistance wou~d adherP ~o the resolutions of
the Tripoli conference was an attempt to gather around the arena of the
Arab struggles. Although this did not keep the newspaper AL-BA'Ath from
launching an attack against a number of Fatah officials, the Syrian sources
Felt that everyth;.ng that was said in this connection was aimed at exerting
media pressure on the eve of the general conference.
Repercussions of the Si.tuation of Lebanon
Palestine sc~rces feel that the situation in Lebanon could lead to an increase
in the ievel of tension between Syria and Fatah. These ~ources say that the _
_ nature of the Israeli attack on resistance positions necessitated the adoption
oi decisions pertaining to the protection of the Palestinian camps and re-
location to positions w!~ich could be effectively d~fended against Israeli
attacks. This led Fatah to adopt measures which the Syrian officials may
consider an attempt to regroup *_he Palestinian military forces in the areas
~ and the capital city of Beirut.
The Palestinian sources fear that this situation may lead to Palestinian
- rigidity in the efforts which may be undertaken in cooperation with Damascus
to make new military and security arrangements in Beirut and its suburbs.
However, the Syrian sources sav that understanding between Syrian officials
and the military leaders in Fatah is not a problem because both sides real-
. ize the critical nature of the circumstances surrounding them in Lebanon.
Based on this, the informed sources expect that the conclusion of the Fatah
conference will be the beginning of an effort to restore relations between
- Syria and the resistance to normal so that neither sida will neglect the
- requirements of the confrontation with the Camp David alliance.
- The beginning of this understanding was the release of "Abu Isamah" following
his arrest and interrogation in Damascus. According to the Palestinian
sou~ces, 'Arafat informed the Syrian officials that he would impose a just
sentence on *_he accused.
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In any case, Arab diplomats here feel that this understanding may be tem-
- porary, because a number of unsolved problems are still ~moldering under-
neath the ashes. They feel that the dispu~e may have been avoided at this -
time because of the two sides' desire to maintain balance during the antici-
pated period of deadlock in the Middle East crisis.
One expert on Syrian-Palestinian relationG says that they usually reach the
very brink of the precipice and then observers are surprised by a rapid
return to honeymoon status. Have the circumstances and givens changed to
bring the current developments to the surface, or is the present situation
a link in a chair, which will inevitably end in a hard choice when the dawn
of the Arab-Israeli struggle begins to break?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8591
CSO: 4802
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
FATAH REAFFIRMS HEIRDLINE POSITION IN FOURTH CONFERENCE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Jun 80 pp 22-24
[Article by Palestinian affairs editor: Fatah Report Reflects the Relent-
lessness of the Revolutionaries and tne Failure of the Politicians' Hopes;
Rejection of Dependency, Tutelage and Any Attempt to Prevent the Revolution
From Acting Freely Among Its ~Iasses; The Goal: Liberation of Palestine,
El.imination of Israel, Establishment of a Palestinian State and Use of Armed
Struggle"]
[Text] The report issued by *he fourth conference of the Palestinian organi- -
zation Fatah reflects the climate surrounding the Middle East problem, whch
is characterized by stalemate and a sense of bitterness on the part of the
Palestinians in the face of continued denial of their rights by the United
States and Israel. In addition, the report reflects the climate of failure
surrounding the Camp David approach despite the many concessions made by the
Egyptian regime. Thus, the report confirms the Palestinians' firm stance
rejecting any settlement at the expense of. their cause and their rights. It ~
calls for the total liberation of Palestine and thP elimination of the Zion-
ist entity. This entity is to be replaced by a democratic Palestinian state
encompassing all Palestinian territory and for all people without distinc-
tion. The report also reaffirms the use of the method of armed gopular
revolution as a means to regain the land.
Also reaffirmed was the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs
of any Arab country, coupled with the rejection of tutelage, dependency, -
intervention in the internal affairs of the re~olution, or any attempt to
exclude it f rom operating freely among its masses in their areas of con-
centration.
The Fatah general conference came 9 years after the last conference and was
preceded by p reparations which took more than a year and involved dozens of
meetings. The most recent af these was the meeting of the movement's
Central Committee in Beirut, which continued day and night for more than
10 days.
The third general conference was convened in a climate set by the blow dealt
to the movement and the Palestinian revolution bloc in Jordan in September
1970. The atmosphere at that time was dominated by criticism, self-criticism
and examination of the coursP of the movement from its beginnings to its
emergence from the hollows and wnods6of Jarash.
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Perhaps the most important things produced by that third conference were,
first, the healing of wounds, and, secondly, the rejection of the call that
had arisen--particularly outside Fatah--urging that the tedayeen organiza-
- tions be transrormed into political parties. The conferees were adamant
on the necessity of continuing the armed struggle, and it was during thi.s -
time that 'Arafat uttered his famous cry: "The mountain...the mountain."
This was the beginning of a transformation not only in the history of
Fatah, but in the history of the entire northern front surrounding Jabel
al-Shaykh, particularly in south Lebanon.
At that time, the conference created a central committee which included
Abu 'Ammar, Abu Jihad, Abu Iyad, Khalid al-Hasan, Abu `iusuf al-Najjar,
Kamal 'Adwan, Abu rtazin, Abu Salih and Abu al-Lutf. Following the deaths of
Anu Yusuf and Kamal 'Adwan in 1973, Abu Mahir, Abu al-Hul and Abu-al-Adib
were added to the committee, and Abu al-Lutf was elected secretary of the
committee.
On the occasion of these changes, a revol_utionary council was formed from
individuals who can be considered Fatah's second rank. However, this coun-
cil remained limited in its influence on the Central Committee.
The Difference Over the Years
In this fourth conference, the Fatah organization may have revealed the
big di�ference between the state of the movement 9 years ago and its present
state. The growth which Fatah and the Palestinian revolution in general
have experienced during the last decade is al~ost legendary. This applies
to all levels, in both quaiitative and quantitative terms.
The size of the organization has grown and developed, and the military -
forces and cadres have also grown. Fatah's sphere of influence has widened
as a result of the many centers and organizations that have come into exist-
ence and attracted thousands of Palestinians.
Naturally, this growth has been accompanied and sustained by the moral and
political victories that the revolution has won under Fatah's leadership,
making the Palestiniaii.problem the most disturbing problem in the world and
the most serious threat to peace.
Therefore, i_t was only natural that the conference should postpone its meet-
ing time until the piles of accumulated dossiers had all been studied. T'he
- examination of these documents has meant criticism, self-criticism and long
and persistent study of the course of the struggle over the past 9 years.
And as we have seen, these have not been normal yQars, at least with regard
to the Palestinian people and the changes which have occurred in their
cause. These changes include, to mention a few, the October 1973 war, the
subsequent maneuvers and plots of Kissinger, the war in Lebanon, and
Sadat's break with the Arab strategy and his visit to Jerusalem, followed by
his signing of the peace agreement with the Beg~.n Government. -
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Fatah differs in its origin, make-sp and methods of interaction from other `
we11 known organizations and parties in our big Arab homeland. Despite the
climates and forces that have surrounded Fatah, most of which have been sim- '
ilar in terms of organization, the movement has remained distinct from other
organizations in this respect.
Fatah was not dedicated merely t~ surviving in the Palestinian arena, but
was able to become the leading organization in this arena. It has not~.
undergone a single split since its formation, and the few who have brcken
caith it and rebelled against it--and they can be counted on the fingers of
one hand--have not been able to hold out in the field or impair its unity.
Observers are at a loss to provide a real explanation for this. They say
that a long time must pass before the observer can write a history--from
a knowledgeable position--of the course of this movement, especially in
the context of its internal organizational relations.
In explanation of this, the Fatahists say that the matter is extremely
simple and does not involve any secrets or mysteries. They list the
following reasons:
_ --First, the Fatahists say that what binds them together-- and has bound
- them together from the start--is "Palestine," which they have evaluated
aoove every slogan, opinion or organization. Palestine, i.e., the struggle
for Palestine, was the reason and purpose for their coming together. It is
the norm and standard for them as w~ll as other political forces active
locally, in the Arab world, and in the international scene.
_ They sum this up by saying: "Anyone who supported Palestine in word or in
deed was, according to our conviction, a friend, brother and ally." -
These 3?atahists furnish many examples in their favor and against those who
reproach Fatah for its links with so-called "conservative regimes." They
say that even if their relations with these regimes are no longer good for
the movement, but were in the past, they at least assured the neutralization
of these regimes. 'Phey add: "At any rate, our relations with the conserva-
tive regimes have not prevented us from establishing the best of relations
with the progressi.ve, socialist and communist regimes."
The Fatahists are proud on this count, and say: "Perhaps the relationship ~
of our movement in particular with the socialist states--and especially
the Soviet Union--are stronger than those between these states and some of -
our broth~rs Taho reproach us for our relations with the conservative states."
The truth in this regard is that Fatah has been able to shuffle the Arab -
cards and has made the issue of Palestine the basic 5tandard for what is
nationalistic and progressive and what is said to be conservative.
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- Dialog of the Right and Left jdithin the Movement
- --Second, the Fatahists ~ay: "Because Palestine is the key and the corner-
stone, we do not make membersh;.p in the organization conditional on any cer- -
tain ideology, either right-wing or left-wing. Our formation came about to
convey an objective picture of the true state of our people, whose primary -
- motivation was the cause of their country and their countrymen, no matter
what parties and ideas they embraced."
Thus, the "right and left" within the movement--which do exist-- carry on a
dialog in a language which is not the traditional language of the right and
left outside the movement. No matter how much their colors may vary,
Fatah's flowers remain its own and stay with.in the garden of the organization.
~ --Third, the Fatahists maintain that ~hey are adherents of democracy, and
say: "This is our organization. Show us another organization like it or
better than it in terms of the degree of f r.eedom enjoyed by the Fatahist
in his criticism of and opposition to the leadership. In f act, this f reedom -
- occasionally reaches the point of open comments and head-butting outside
the cadres of the organization. Criticism does not frighten us. On the
contrary, it increases our strength and power. Criti~ism from within gives
_ us the power to withstand opposition f rom the outside and makes us better
_ prepared to respond to such opposition."
- --Fourth, all Fatahists--whatever their differences--insist on frequent
reiteration of what they have termed the "law of love" among them. The
Fatahists have a red line which they cannot cross, which is to strike at
their brother treacherously. Say what you want, biit it must be within the
- framework of the law of love.
_ --Fifth: One point which is not made by the Fatahists alone but is borne
. out by testimany from outside the organization is that from the beginning
' the Fatahists have made their organization one of service to the people.
The doors to Fatah are open to everyone, not just the members of the organi-
zation. When a majority of the Palestinian people were unorganized-- in
spite of their membership in the revolution--these masses found their needs
met in Fatah more than in any other organization. Meanwhile, the other
organizations--perhaps due to inability--could not respond to any needs be- -
yond those of their card-carrying members.
Role of Abu 'Ammar
--Sixth, Abu 'Ammar, a son of Fatah, has been able to make himself a symbol
of the Palestinian people's struggle. This has profited Fatah and the
Fatahists, including those among them who can be regarded as not among
Abu 'Ammar's ardent supporters. It is certain that Abu 'Ammar has also
benefited from this situation. But he really deserves to benefit, because
this role did not descend on him out of the clear blue sky but was the
result of persistent hard work, an incessant struggle and a total devotion
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_ whict~ ha5 cont~nued now for over 20 years. If we are willing to concede that
the Palestiniaci people, like other Arab and Third World peoples, still belong
t.o the "patriarchal" or tribal type which needs a"father," then Abu 'Ammar
has been able to fill this vacuum and become the "father" of his people.
~
F~~r these reasons--and there are perhaps others, but they would take addi-
tion