JPRS ID: 9267 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
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1~OR OFN'!C'IA1. USL: ONLY
JPRS L/9267
- 25 August 1980
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort '
p
Fouo No. 686 -
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_ JPRS L/9267
25 August 1980
SUB-SA{IARAN AFRiCA REPORT
FOUO No. 686
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Monetas~y State of Centra.l African States Examined
(MARCHES T~,OPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jul 80) 1
Report of Merchant Frleets of Africa
~ (Abdelaziz Barouhi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Jul 8C~) 3
Brief s
~ Guinea Bissau-Mauritanian Cooperation 5
ANGOLA
Angolan-Brazilian Relations Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEII~IS, 20 Jun 80) 6
Briefs
- Elf-Aquitaine Oil Agreements Details 8
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Brief s
F`rance Expanding Military Base 9
CHAD
Briefs
Foreign Pilots Sought 10
EQUATORIAI~ GUINEA
Problems, Progress of Reconstruction Noted
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jul 80) 11
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUJ]
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Nl)1: Ul~'1~ IGIAI. Util: l)NI.S' ~
ETHIOPIA
Brief s
Swedish Aid to Ethiopia 15 -
Gi~iANA
Brief s
Energy Conservation Still On 16
Prefabricated Housing Productiori Difficulties 16
GUINEA BISSAU
Briefs
PCP Zeader~s Visit 17
LIBERIA
Measures Regaxding Former President's Family
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Jul 80) 18 -
MALI
Briefs
West German-Malian Cooperation 19
~ench Financing Agreements 19
� MOZAMBIQUE
Increased Brazilian Involvement in Economy
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Jun 80).... 20
SOMALIA
Brief s
IDA Oil Loan 22
ZIMBABWE
Prime Mi.nister Mugabe Interviewed by 'GUARDIAN'
(Robert Mugabe Interview; THE GUARDIAN, 30 Jul 80).. 23
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Fc)R ~FFTCTAL [1S1: l1NI,Y
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~ MONETARY STATE OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES EXAMINED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1802
[Article--passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]
[Text] The /Bank of Central African States (BEAC)/ has recently published
an analysis of the monetary situation as of 31 January 1980 of the states
in which it is licensed: Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Gabon, and
Chad .
For the last 2 years, the /net external position/ of the monetary system
has been improving markedly, going from a net deficit of 31.7 billion
CFA in exchange value at the end of January 1978, and of 24 billion at
the end of January 1979, to a surplus of 11.4 billion CFA at the end of
January 1980. The recovery results both from a significant lightening of
the external indebtedness of the banks in all the states, with the excep-
tion of Gabon, and from a sizeable reduction in Cameroon's trade deficit,
b as well as from a release of foreign loans.
/Official external obligations/ within the zon~ increased, in the same
period, from an exchange value of 21.5 billion CFA at the end of January
1978 and 30 billion at the end of January 1979 to 36.2 billion CFA at the
end of January 1980; in this latter total, recourse to credits from the
/International Monetary Fund/ accounts for 34.6 billion CFA. Cameroon
shows net currency assets with an exchange value of. 20.3 billion CFA, the
Congo and Central Africa are both also in a positive-balance position
(9.3 billion and 6.4 billion respectively), while Gabon and Chad find
themselves indebted: 5.3 billion and 2.7 billion CFA.
Between January 1979 and January 1980 /internal credit/ grew from 489.2
billion to 533.6 billion CFA, expanding at a rate of 9.1 percent.
In overall volume, /national government indebtedness/ declined from 33.8
billion to 10.4 billion CFA, while /cre.'.~ts to the economy/ increased from
455.4 billion to 523.2 billion CFA. The growth in credits to Cameroon
can be attributed to the increase in tonnage of commercial agricultural
products, the grower's price having gone up, and to financing of equipment
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expens~s related to oil exploration. Ir. Central Africa, a net deceleration
~ in credit expa.nsion was recorded, due to the general decline in activity.
A recovery began in Gabon and in the Congo. The increase in credits
results from financing needs of the foodstuffs industry sector.
The exchequer in the Cameroons is in a strong creditor's position on the
internal market: 46.9 billion CFA (against 13.5 billion at the end of
January 1979). In all the other states, the national exchequers have had
recourse to advances from the Institute of Circulation, including 32.5
billion to Gabon (up 102 percent in one year), 13.3 billion in Central
Africa, and 11.5 billion in the Congo.
The to~al of /individual and business deposiL-s/ in the banking system and
postal check centers has grown in one year by 5.2 percent. Cameroon has
in all 116.6 billion CFA in visible accounts, Gabon shows 50.3 billion,
the Congo comes in at 20.3 billion, and Central Africa for 8.6 billion,
for an overall volume of 195.8 billion at the end of January 1980.
A.s for /term accounts/ considered as quasi-monetary, their overall total
is 125 billion CFA (up 35.3 percent over the end of January 1979), of
which 79.8 billion belongs to Cameroon, 38.1 billion to Gabon, 6.1 billion
to the Congo, and only 1 billion to Central Africa.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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INTER-AFP,ICAN AFFAIRS
REPORT ON t'IERCHANT FLEETS OF AFRICA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 50
[Article by Abdelaziz Barouhi--passages between slantlines originally
published in italics]
[Text~ Long at the mercy of the big international com- _
panies, African countries are demanding a new maritime
order. '
Are African countriev going to become more and more the masters of their
own maritime traffic? Theo retically yes. Most of them already have mari-
time companies. But in reality this is not enough. To have a company
is not necessarily the same as owning a fleet. Moreover, because of the
maritime order presently in force at the international level, the African
countries are still far from being in a commanding position.
The Transport Cartzl
Despite a significailt increase, the share of the African countries in the
gross tonnage of the worldwide merchant maritime remains sma11. It went
from 0.4 percent at the heginning af the Seventies to 1.6 percent at the
end of the decade. This increase was basically due to the development
of fleets of countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Nigeria.
Except for Liberia, which o ccupies a separate niche owing to i*s policy
~f flags of convenience (wh ich means that the tonnages carried by the
fo::eign companies which sail under this flag for tax purposes are arti-
'icially counted as belonging to this country), the African countries still,
almost all of them, submit to the rule of what is called "maritime con-
- ferences," cartels of transp orters who are organized to control the traffic ~
of the regular maritime lines. Even as recently as 1975 these "maritime
conferences" established transport rates or read~usted them unilaterally.
Which has resulted in especially high freight costs in the external trade ~
of the African countries. Still more, the "maritime conferences" ad~ust
their rates, naturally, in accordance with their own interests and also
with the in'cerests of those countries--in the northern hemisphere--upon
. which they depend, and with which Africa conducts 90 percent of its trade.
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For example, a heavily forested African country is Uetter off exporting
its wood as rough timber rather than processed, because the freight charges
Favor rough timber over processed wood: How is Africa going to meet this
challenge?
On the international scene, the deveioping countries were able to get,
at UNCTAD in April 1974, the elaboration of a code of conduct for maritime
conferences, a sort of platform for a new international. maritime order. .
This code was once again the focus of debate at UNCTAD V in June 1979
in Manila. It had not yet entered into force at the time, because of
delays in its ratification by most of the maritime powers of the northern _
hemisphere. Since then, the cou~tries of the European community have
announced their intention to rat~fy it. This code, explains Lamine Fadika,
Ivorian shipping minister, means /"that from no~~ on the ships of developing
countries (LDC's) will in principle have an equitable share in the traffic
in various goods which presently represent 20 percent of world cargo
tonnage."/
Better Information '
Parallel with this action at the international level, the African coun- ~
tries are trying to organize at the regional level. As a part of this
effort the ministerial conference on maritime transport of tae eight
states of west and central Africa (Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana,
Upper Volta, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire) set up in 1975 a regional nego-
tiations committee. This committee is the interlocutor of the three
main "maritime conferences" which ply the region. Three years ef nego-
= tiations were necessary to induce the Britannic Maritime Conference UK-
West African Lines, in August 1979, to lower its rate of increase in ~
freight charges. Whereas UKWAL had initially decided on a 23 percent
increase for the 1979-1980 period, the committee succeeded in holding it
~ back to 12.5 percent. This was the first time such a negotiatian took
place on this scale between countries of west and central Africa and a -
~ maritimQ conference.
At the national level, as was explained to us by Mr Georges Rawiri, Gabonese
minister of transport and merchant marine, the aim is to be able /"to get
into the shipping market, to diversify the country's trade, to have better
information on and better control over costs and the setting of Gosts
- for imported and exported products."/
The fusion of efforts on the international, regional, and national level.
is under way. The establishmen~ of a new maritime order is also an essen-
~ tial condition for the development of the Afri~3n countries.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 `
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
GUINEA BISSAU-MAURITANIAN COOPERATION--Guinea Bissau and Mauritania decided _
to create a"great joint cooperation co~iasion." This decision was taken
in Bissau on 10 June at the end of a mee!:ing between Victor Saude Maria,
state commissioner for foreign affairs of Guinea Bissau, and Mohamed Mahmoud `
Ould Hussein, minister delegate to the pr~~sidency of the Republic of Mauri-
tania. [1'ext] [Par3.s MARCHES TROPICAUX E'T MFDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun _
80 p 1562] 6857
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ANGOLA
ANGOLAN-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERI2~iN~:~NS in French 20 Jun 80 pp 1579, 1580
[Text] Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Guerreiro went on an official
- visit to Angola from 9 to 11 June. It was the fifth of the "first line
countries --this expression designating the unofficial organizatiort created
to carry out a common policy toward the Namibian problem--after Za~bia, ~
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique.
Guerreiro is the second minister of foreign affairs of a non-communist country
to visit Angola, the first having been Jean Simonet, head of Belgian diplomacy,
in 1978.
Brazil's foreign policy toward the Namibian problem can only ingratiate it
to Luanda. Through the U.N., Brasilia declared itself in favor of Namibian
indEpendence following free elections and it recognized SWAPO--headed by
Sam Nu~oma--as sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people.
Brazil also severely condemned several times the military operations conduct-
ed by South Africa in Southern Angola. Guerreiro reaffirmed these positions.
Nevertheless, Angola does not seem to be viewing Brazil, a Portuguese-speak-
ing country, as a"brotherly country," due to the latter's other political
choices. Guerreiro's trip should help toward finding a solution to the
problems raised between the two countries by these choices.
Toward Greater Economic Trade With Brazil
Brazil has become one of the leading partners of Angola to which it sold,
- last year, close to 350 million dollars worth of manufactured proc~~=~ts and
food. Brazilian products--from soap to wine--have also invaded Angolan shops.
A Brazilian company is currently overseeing the renovation of three hotels in
Luanda.
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Guerreiro's visit will be implemented
through increased trading. Two cooperation agreements between Brazil and
Angola--one economic, scientific and technical, the other cultural--were
signed on this o~casion. The joint communique published at the end of the -
ministerial visit reaffirmed the ties established between the two countries.
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The two parties hope to develop their cooperation in agriculture (corn),
food, transportation, equipment, energy and the hotel industry. In any case,
private Brazilian companies are already participating in many of these -
industries in Angola.
The Brazilian airline Varig will soon open air travel between Buenos Aires
and Luanda.
Oil cooperation will also be increased even though Petrobas, with other for-
eign companies, is explaiting a bloc north of Angola. Furthermore, the
communique explains that this bilateral cooperation will also apply to
architecture, higher education and the training of middle management.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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6857
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
ELF-AQUITAINE OIL AGREEMENTS DETAILS--The National Angolan Fuel Company
- (SONANGOL) and the National Elf-Aquitaine Company (SNEA) signed in Luanda
on 11 July an agreement regarding exploration and production of Hydro-
carbons in Angola. The contract includes the maritime area called bloc 3,
and is of a"shared production" type. According to the terms of the con-
tract, a group of "entrepreneurs," constituted by oil companies, within
which SNEA holds 50 percent of the rights and obligations as well as being
the main operator, will finance and carry out a minim~ of 8 exploratory
drillings. In the event of an oil find, part of the~roduction will go to .
the group of entrepreneurs as reimbursement for expenses and remuneration.
SONANGOL reserves the right to select the companies which will hold the
other SO percent of the rights and obligations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1935]
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CENTRAL AFRTCAN REPUBLIC
- BRTE~S
FRANCE EXPANDING MILITARY BASE-~France is enlarging its military base at
Bouar, in the nortfi o� the Central African Republ~.c, where most of the soldiers
' who have le�t Chad are stationed. Tfiis expansion (by 3,000-4, S00 men) was
planned with David Dacko, who was then an advisor to the emperor, a few weeks
before Bokassa's fall. IText] jParis JEUNE AFRTQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 36J
8782
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- CI IAD
BRIEFS
FOREIGN PILOTS SOUGHT--Chadians stopped over briefly in London looking for
"foreign pilots" for the helicopters and planes of the former national squadron
that have been grounded for a year in Mondou (the Southern capital). If these
aircraft are brought back into service, they could change the course of the
civil war by giving an advantage to the troops of President Goukouni Oueddei
and his vice-president, Wadal Kamougue, over those of Hissein Habre. [Text]
[Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 36] 8782
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS OF RECONSTRUCTION NOTED
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 pp 3-9
[Article: "Equatorial Guinea flas the Floor"]
_ [Text] End of the Tunnel
"Destroying is easy; rebuilding is difficult." This phrase crops up inces-
santly in the speeches of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the man who put an
end to the absolute reign of Macias Nguema. Equatorial Guinea has indeed
been destroyed. It is no longer the paradise of Africa and denying thi.s
would serve no purpose. Rather, one should as~ whether it can once again
become that paradise and how long it will take.
Following the fall of Macias Nguema, Malabo was a deserted city, a Phnom
Penh th at looked like a scraggly Spanish village. The shops stood empty
and the rare exceptions reminded one of ill-fitfing clothes: A few Chinese
canned goods could not divert.one~'s eyes from the gaping shelves; five shirts
or two pairs of shoes can scarcely fill a show window 3 meters wide. There
was no f ighting in Malabo but the city had nevertheless experienced a de-
bacle. Abandoned vehicles rusted in courtyards and the streets, more numer-
ous than those in use.
Disaster and Af termath
Trees sprouted in the most unexpected places: on the fire engine at the
airport, on sagging rooftops, through a collapsed balcony. Electric lines
turned into tangles of vegetation, unwitting works of art. The center of
the capital was inaccessible, its finest quarters hidden behind an ugly
wall bristling with pillboxes. This no man's land was to protect a presi-
dential palace where the president had no longer appeared for years.
And yet, it had all been pretty, even stylish. Before slipping into obli-
_ vion or sinking into neglect, Malabo had known a good life. Its mayor's
hall was too flamboyant to be bureaucratic, its benches gleamed against
a background of ancient tile, its bars were crowded with youth as golden as
colonial. This artificial paradise was obviously reserved for a small
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privileged frin~e: Spanish merchants and planters, French settlers who
had come Erom Gabon or Cameroon to spend their vacation, But on the whole,
the country occupied a more than honorable rank in Africa. Thanks to its
cacao, considered the best in the world, i t boasted one of the highest
incomes on the continent, leading the group of the poorest countries to
which Equatorial Guinea belongs today. Considering the country's small
size, the road system and infrastructures were more extensive than in any
other nation of a Central Africa scarcely spoiled by French colonialism.
Falling so far to such a low spot, what is ~quatorial Guinea's situation
today? A year after the coup d'etat that got rid of Macias, the diagnosis
is still extremely sad, despite the good will of the new rulers. The
country is barely beginning to move again. Only those who have seen the
extent of the disaster can find a few encouraging signs, Anyone else would
see nothing but desolation. The Bantu Hot el, one of the three "great"
hotels of Malabo, would look like a medioc re camp. In June 1980, electric
l.ights were not yet common, cold beer was a dream and, still lacking refrig-
eration, food remained something to be improvised at the last minute.
Those used to other African.capitals would have reason to complain, but to .
be fair, one must note other details, attend the little celebration marking
the advent of new beds, be present at the arrival of the f irst tiny refrig-
erator or the setting up of a generator, which is already changing many
things. ~
So it is with everything. A traveler arriving for the first time sees only -
what is lacking, only the abandoned shops and the empty garages. He would
have to be told that the house next doar was in the same condition before
a recent cleanup, that the line of hollow shops has at least one operating
when only a few months before, the street harbored only.peddlers whose
complete range of goods would fit on a.single stool. Equatorial Guinea
is coming out of hell; it is.normal for it to resemble purgatory. There
arP those who wonder whether it should be s aid of a glass that it is half
full or half empty. In.Malabo, fruit juice does not taste very natural
and is definitely not fresh. A year ago, there would not have been any
fruit juice at all. . .
Why should one speak so much about adm~.nis tration? Because that is where
the country is right now, because it has t o meet immediate needs, needs
that seemed simple only to those who have not had them for years. Medicine
is a perfect example. Survival came first. From polio to cholera, all
diseases were epidemics. The hospital in the capital had beds without legs
or sheets; the~one in Luba was strewn with garbage. With aid from Spain,
an emergency plan was put into effect: massive vaccinations that are now
completed; the reconstruc~ion and reequipp ing of hospitals the one in ~ �
Luba is nearly finished; and the temporary assignmerit of Spanish doctors
to all large population centers.
But while emergencies were handled in this way, the few~local doctors were
sent to Spain to complete their shaky (6 months) Soviet training. This
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time. it was not a questi~n of ic~nediate needs, but rather, of acquiring
the means needed for the future. In all fields, one has to play on both
boards and even then, progress is not always as clear as in the area of
health.
African Colors
Agriculture must ensure survival but it must also become the driving force _
oF the economy once again, provide foreign exchange resources through export
products such as cacao, coffee and wood. Daily bread is not always taken
for granted, In order to.satisfy the wants of their European customers,
the hotels have to work miracles and assign two or three employees to a .
constant search for housewives who do the baking for their own homes.
As for the rest, breaks in supplies are still frequent, but in general,
the Malabo and Bata markets are making progress. They are taking on African
colors again after a long period exclusively devoted to the greyish brown
of. dried fish and the scarlet hue of cottage-made palm oil.
The startup ts less tangible.in speculative agriculture, on the great Rio
Muni plantations or on the western coast of the island. Government measures
are already being taken: Basically, it is a question of restoring the land
to the former owners (the majority Spanish) on.the condition that they will
get the land back on the road to a.prosperity benefiting the entire country.
They were receiving the fields but had yet to put the machines into them.
Very few have seized the opportunity and it is difficult to make a distinc-
- tion between distrust and the lack of financial means. The government has
therefore gone even further: Insofar as possible, it is supplying the money
for the machinery. ~
"Destroying is easy; rebuilding difficult." The phrase can be applied parti-
cu.larly well here. In addition to the timidity of the former operators,
one has to overcome hard obstacles: To destroy what were once the best -
cacao plantations in the world, it was enough to do nothing. To recover
the resource, many new plants and years of patience will be needed.
This is true because the cacao plantations need care, but also because a
specialized work force also has to be found. It was the Nigerians who
pl.ayed this role and there were so many of them (30,000 to 50,000), that
they made up the majority of the population on the island of Fernando Poo.
Under Macias, bad treatmerit caused them to flee, slowly at first, then
en masse in the course of 1976. The government has resumed contact in order
to seek new agreements on the ~.mportation of labor'.~ It will come, from
Nigeria or elsewhere, but more slowly than it left because the country could
- not withstand an abrupt avalanche of workers who will bring the indispen-
sable arms, but also mouths f.:o feed.
Equatorial Guinea nevertheless has potential wealth. Even if cacao experi-
ences the ups and downs of all raw materials, the Fernando Poo cacao can play
tt~e card of quality rather than quantity. That was its strength and can be
again, but this is a long-range haul.
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Rebui 1.dinK
Are other examples needed? Fishing is also eme rging from a long, dark night.
Macias had put an end to this other national re s ource, destroying the fish- -
ermen's boats to prevent them from serving thos e who wanted to leave his
clomain. The Russians did the rest. Thanks to an agreement too good to be
honest, they cleaned out the ocean depths with their fleet based in Luba.
The traf fic was so heavy that Aeroflot had to set up a line between Malabo
and Moscow to rotate the .r.rews. It will take over a year for the fish to
come back and in the meantime, boats and motor s must be given to those who
make their living from the sea.
Everything has to be rebuilt, but no one has ever been able to do everything
at once. An ele~:tric powerplant is being built in Malabo, the only African
capital which, except for a few generators, is plunged into darkness. It is
impossible to move faster. If, by some miracle , electricity were to be re-
stored today, the equipment that has never been maintained woul~ noC with-
stand the shock and ttie first night would be illuminated by fires. Evety-
tliing is linked together: Without guaranteed p ower, no industry, Without
means of transportation, no sales abroad and imports would remain f ar below
the immense needs (labor and products). On thi s last point,Macias' heri-
tage is no more brilliant than elsewhere: a s ingle boat.and a single air-
plane, Chinese or Russian trucks in rather pit iful condition despite their
natural sturdiness. Every ship that docks in the Malabo port improves the
situation, unloading 30 to 50 trucks, pickups o r cars (the license plates
will come later). The Spanish Air Force has re stored a certain regularity
in relations between the island and the continent.
This Spanish aid is not alone, moreover. The European Economic Community
has also entered the dance, financing the long- awaited construction of the
Malabo electric powerplant. This is definitely one of the most positive
points of the first year of the new regime. Equatorial Guinea is still
uncomfortable, but it is no longer the leper of Africa. Contacts ar�e being
renewed, timid but promisi.ng. Claude Cheysson lzimsell: has just traveled
there, marking the return of the EEC which had preferred to break with a
country where, under Macias Nguema, forced lab or was practiced, among other
things. Aid has been sent, the first less than 2 weeks after Macias' ouster.
Credits have already been granted, others will come, all making it possible
to bind up the innumerable wounds.
This breach in the wall with which the fallen regime surrounded Equatorial
Guinea constitutes the best guarantee of more improvements. It also shows
that Europe is satisfied with the first steps o f the political "reconstruc-
~ion." Here again, nothing is perfect if ineasu red by the usual parameters.
But who will criticize a country for not having an opposition newspaper
when the ~government itself has not yet had the time and the means to estab-
lish a press?
Obviously, life is already better than under the "tiger," Macias Nguema.
In that domain also, Equatorial Guinea has been badly battered and it will
take more than 12 months to make such bruises disappear. "Destroying is
easy; rebuilding is difficult."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980
1i464
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ETHIOPIA
BftIEFS
SWEDISH AID TO ETHIOPIA--Sweden promised to send 1.9 million dollars in
emergency aid to Ethiopia for draught victims. This aid will be sent
- through the World Food Program (WF'P). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1575] 6857
C SO : !~l~00
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GHANA
BRIEFS
ENERGY CONSERVATION STILL ON--Ghanaian Minister of Lands, Natural Resources,
Fuel and Energy George Benneh recently stressed again the importance of the
country's expenditures for energy which were burdened by the successive
increases of the cost of oil. He noted that despite the decrease in �oreign _
purchases, total expenditures are over the billion-dollar mark per year
- and represents 35 percent of Ghana's export earnings. He therefore stressed
the need to continue fuel rationing and even to reduce consumption in every
sector possible. The minister acknowledged, however, that the decrease in
consumption had had the effect of decreasing demand at the Tema refinery by
20 percent. He also announced that fuel would be shipped to the northern
and upper regions by railroad rather than trucks in an effort to save even
more energy. It should be noted that the local production of crude oil--
already insignificant at the beginning--decreased still further and that,
according to the agreement signed with the U.S. exploiting company, Agri-
pPtco International, Ine., this production is shipped to the U.S. for
refining. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1
Aug 80 p 1921]
PREFABRICATED~ HOUSING PRODUCTION DIFFICULTIES--The plant producing pre-
''sbricated .:oncrete panels for construction (Prefabricated Large Panel
�~�_lstruction Factory) is facing a series of new diff iculties requiring
urgent solutions if the factory is to survive. These diff iculties derive
mainly from local shortages of the necessary construction materials,--mainly
concrete--but also frcm delays in the importation of equipment due to scarce
foreign exchange. On 22 Ma.y 1980 an agreement for a total of $240,000 was
signed with the USSR for the purchase of these type of equipment, but
delivery delays were long due to various reasons. It will be recalled that
the plant was first established in 1962 within the framework of a Ghana-
USSR agreemant. Its initial production was gauged at 70,000 square meters
of prefabricated housing per year. Following the 1966 coup d'etat, the ,
plant ceased operations. In 1973, the National Redemption Council renewed
cooperation with the USSR and decided to re-activate the factory, which
re-opened in June 1976. It is now reportedly ready to work at full capacity
if theabove difficulties would be solved. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEEN5 in French 1 Aug 80 p 1921]
- cso: 4~00
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GUINEA BISSAU
BRIEFS
PCP LEADER'S VISIT--Alvaro Cunhal, secreteray general of the Portuguese Com-
munist Party (PCP) toured Guinea Bissau during the second week of May. He
headed a delegation of his party to discuss "relations of friendship and
solidarity between the PCP and PAIGC." The Portuguese delegation studied
problems of common interest for the purpose of strengthening relations. -
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80
p 1562] 6857
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LIBERIA
MF.ASURES REGARDING FORMER PRESIDENT'S FAMTLY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 26
[Article: "Alms For The President's Widow"]
[T'ext] Does Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe have a soft heart? On 7 July he
visited Mrs Victoria Tolbert, widow of the president assassinated two months
; earlier, to give her "expense" money to buy food. Mrs Tolfi ert, who is under
house arrest, affirmed her patriotism and her desire "to work assiduously
with the government of the People's Redemption Council (PRC)."' With thanks,
the former first lady of Liberia asked to see her children and grandchildren.
The master sergeant assured her he would "look kindly" upon this request.
The next day, however, the mutual protestations of good will were over. A
decree published by the PRC announced that all the property of the late ~9illiam
Tolbert had been confiscated by the government except for the clothing, kitchen
utensils, and furnishings of the family home. On 9 July, however, there was
a new calm in the Doe-Tolbert relations: the PRC freed the three daughters of
the former president.
But the head of state's generosity has its limits: he still does not plan to
let Mrs Victoria Tolbert and five other children of hers enjoy the same treat-
ment: "Justice shall take its course." As for her son, Adolphus Benedict,
arrested on 14 June at the residence of the French ambassador (JEUNE AFRIQUE
No 1019), there is no question of releasing him; the most he can count on is
"a fair and equitable trial." Meanwhile, the "cleanup" continues; the govern-
ment has recovered $2.2 million from the former president's entourage, adminis-
tration officials, and True Whig Party.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
8782
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MALI
BRIEFS
WEST GERMAN-MALIAN COOPERATION--On 9 June, Alioune Blandin Beye, Malian
minister of foreigu affairs and international cooperation went on an official -
visit to West Germany. On the economic front, he indicated that "Radio Mali .
would receive three broadcasting stations--two of which would be short waves,
100 and 50 kW, and one middle waves, 100 kW--and two generating sets." He
also called attention to the first phase of the financing contract for the
= renovation of the equipment of the Malian Navigation Company (COMANAV) �
scheduled to receive "one tug-boat, six barges, spare parts, three motors for
- the General Soumare boat and a third boat," from FRG in 1981. The minister
also discussed mining research in Mali and the Niger Office. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1562) 6857
FRENCH FINANCING AGREEI~NTS--Theophile Sangare, Malian director general for
international cooperation and Jean Patriat, head of the French cooperation
mission in Mali signed 3 financing agreements between France and Mali in
Bamako on 24 July, for a total of 270 million Malian france. The first
agreement (200 million Malian franca) is related to French financing of
the third phase of a vegetable cultivation pro3ect and toa food processing
plant in Mali. The second agreement (50 million Malian francs) is a French
subsidy to the program in support of Mali's rural development institute
aimed at ensuring the gathering of virtually all Malian documentation on
rural development, a total of about 7,000 documents. Through the third
~ agreement, France is granting a 20 million Malian franc assistance for the
implementation of a water project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1916]
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MOZAMBIQUE
INCREASED BRAZII,IAN INVOLVIl~IENT IN ECONOMY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1580 _
[Text] The official visit of Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guerreiro to Maputa offers the opportunity to review economic and commercial
relations between Brazil and Mozambique. Once passed the "cold era," follow-
ing Mozambique's accession to independence in 1975, relations between the two
Portuguese-speaking countries expanded substantially despite their ideolo-
gical differences.
Brazilian exports to Mozambique went from 800,000 dollars in 1976 to 423
million dollars during the present year. Maputo imported 21 Brazilian loco-
motives, 40 trucks, nearly 200 tractors, 27,000 tires and 1,800 tons of
paper.
- Since 1978, Brazil awarded a 100 million dollar credit line to Mozambique
and its increase was on Guerreiro's agenda.
Various projects, of a notably agricultural nature, formulated and financed
by Brazil, are underway in the Chokwe region. They include: a 25,000
hectare area of which 20,000 are to be farmed and 5,000 irrigated; the
buil.ding of dikes and even, perhaps, a dam to protect this region against
floods which, until now, have been very numerous; and planning for electri-
fication and a road network. �
Brazilian firms also assumed responsibility for developing the community
villages of that region, with populations ranging between 4,000 and 5,000
inhabitants, as well as some architectural projects. In this case, it
involves integrating Mozambican miners returning from South Africa and
raising the productivity level of the region--objectives which were described
as "conform to the socio-political goals of Mozambique."
The Chokwe region, located some 200 kilometers from Maputo in the Limpopo
Valley, is a relatively fertile, an essentially farming, region. A few
years ago, when the territory was still under its domination, the Portuguese
government decided to develop this region which was then called "Colonato do
Limpopo." These pro~ects were not implemented, due, among other things, to
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the lack of funds of the government of that time, sapped as it was by the
colonial war.
Lately, Mozambique also contacted Brazil for the financing and establishment
of other agricultural and industrial development pro~ects.
They involve in particular the construction of a dam over the Puugoe river,
in the Sofala central province, which will make possible the irrigation of
80,000 hectares of land and the c~eation of a 10,000 hectare banana planta-
tion.
~irazilian experts are in Mozambi~ue for those various pro~ects. In addition,
~ai;.h the support of the Brazilian minister of foreign relations, the Mining
Research Company (CPRM) will begin reseaxch in geophysics, map-making and
geology and will train Mnzambican technicians.
Mozambique is the second commercial partner of Brazil, after .Angola, among
the countries visited by the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs. ,
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
6857
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SOMALIA
1
BRIEFS
IDA OIL LOAN--International Development Aid (IDA), a subsidiary of the World
Bank, recently granted a 6 million dollar loan to Somalia to finance promo-
tion of an oil exploration project. This project is in support of the -
government's efforts to develop a s~ational oil supply and improve plann~.ng
for the energy sector. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS
In French 20 Jun 80 p 1575] 6857
cso: 4400
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ZIMBABWE
PRIME MINISTER MUGABE INTERVIEWED BY 'GUAR.DIAN'
LD301245 London THE GUARDIAN in English 30 Jul 80 p 6
[Interview with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe by Altaf Gauhar in
Salisbury; date n~t indicated]
[Text~ Comrade Robert Mugabe, prime minister of Zimbabwe, sits in an
austere office in Milton House on Jameson Avenue, Salisbury. The room -
is the one which for years was occupied by Ian Smith and later by Bishop
Muzorewa. Nothing has changed in the way of furnishings and fittings,
I was told by the security officer. "Not even the red carpet?" I asked.
He nodded.
Throughout the 45-minute interview Mugabe sat with his arms crossed. I
_ had expected a charismatic revolutionary leader full af fire and rhetoric.
Instead I met a man who was thoughtful and seemed to weigh every word
- before uttering it. `
Altaf Gauhar: Prime Minister, yesterday you were a psychopathi c killer,
a terrorist, an ogre, today, you are a pragmatist, a moderate, and a far-
sighted statesman. How have you ad~usted yourself to the change? -
- Robert Mugabe: The change is not in me. I am not the one who has under-
gone a metamorphosis. The transformation really is taking place in the
minds of those who once upon a time regarded me as an extremist, a -
murderer, a psychopathic killer, as you say. They are the people who
have had to adjust to the change. I have remained my c.onstant self.
What I was, I still am.
During the war we had to fight against the enemy's propaganda machinery.
But all the time we had a definite goal before us: to establish in
Zimbabwe a free society in which people of all shades of opinion, regard-
less of their colour or race or creed, should be able to participate in
- social, economic and political life at an equal level. And this is '
precisely what we have set about to achieve.
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Now that we have our independence, and the war is over, we have called
upon the people, upon our forces to uphold the principle of reconcilia-
tion, because it is on that basis alone that we can establish true peace
in the country. We have never been racist in our approach. We have
never hated the white man. It was the white man`s philosophy of racial
superiority that we hated. That philosophy has now been defeated, and
the philosophy of a nonracial society, of a society based on the recog-
nition of man as man with equal rights and civil liberties, has pre-
_ vailed. That is the philosophy we cherish and know.
A.G.: tiJhat does it mean in concrete terms?
R.M.: It means we have to forgive those who wronged us. Failure to
forgive would perpetuate a state of conflict which we now want to see as
- past history. Hence I have urged our people, blacks and whites, to get
reconciled and to change their attitudes. Of course, reconciliation
does not mean just forgiveness. Reconciliation means that blacks and
whites, members of the same society, with the same loyalty and commitment
to independence, must now accept their obligation to uphold the principles
for which we struggled and fought for so long. Those who lost the fight
for a racially demarcated society must accept the reality of their defeat,
and the reality of the victory of a nonracial society. If they still
oppose the principles of a nonracial society, then there will be no
reconciliation.
A.G.: Prime Minister, your role, and the kind of society you establish
in Zimbabwe will determine the course of events in South Africa. Would
you agree with that?
R.M.: Yes, the future of this region depends on how South Africa gets
reconciled to the reality of the right of self-determination which has
- been achieved by her neighbours. What we are trying to consolidate here
is independence based on the general will of the people who want to
become masters of their destiny in their own areas. But there is always
a kind of interaction in society. When we were engaged in our struggle,
' it was this inCeraction which brought oCher forces to our support. All
progressive revolutionary forces of our region rallied together and
reinforced our str~�~gle.
In my opinion this happened because of the realisation that this region
was entitled to establish a definite political pattern of society, a
society based on democracy, a society inspired by the principle of self-
determination. The South African society is inimi.cal to all these
principles. There a minority has set itself up as an ordained entity,
deriving some kind of divine power to rule the rest of the community on
the basis of racial superiority. Now we are opposed to that kind of
society.
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A.G.: Has the change in Zimbabwe encouraged the revolutionary forces in
South Africa?
R.M.: Our victory here has been an inspiraeion to the people of South
Africa in a very big way. They have seen racism defeated in this region,
i~i Mozambique and Angola, and they have gathered greater courage than
they had, greater inspiration than they had yesterday, to continue theif
own struggle for the liberation of their own country and the establish-
ment of the right of self-determination. Now we do believe that our
success here will promote this trend in South Af rica and that it will -
also consolidate the independence achieved in Mozambique, Zambia,
Botswana and Angola. Naturally it will promote the same course of events
in Namibia.
A.G.: Depending on the success of your model here?
R.M.: Of course, our experiment has to succeed before it becomes a model
for the peaple of South Africa, at least in theory. In other words, we
have to succeed in our bid to establish a nonracial society, in our bid
to kill the principle of racialism, in our bid to establish civil
liberties, a sine qua non of democracy. Once the reconciliation
between the races is complete, once we have the opposing forces in
harmony, then whatever the diffe~ences in the political sphere we will,
at least have that oneness which upholds a democratic society. That is
what will consolidate our independence.
I think it will also act as a consolidating factor for Mozambique,
Zambia, Botswana, Angola and even for the former high commi.ssion
territories in Lesotho and Swaziland. The progressive forces in South
- Africa will have a basis on which to demand that transformation take
place as quickly as possible in their society.
- A.G.: Assuming that your model succeeds here, what chances do you see
of a peaceful transformation in South Africa?
R.M.: I think it depends entirely on how the regime in South Africa
reacts to the present demand, which is already manifesting itself for
change in political philosophy and for social transformation through
democracy. If they react viciously, and do not heed the call for, what
one might call, reconciliation, so that people may get together and
evolve a formula, then the armed struggle will intensify. You see the
more resistant the regime is to change, the greater the impetus there
will be to armed struggle. But if they are more accommodating and accept
the principle of democracy, the principle that there must be majority
rule, they will succeed in getting the political parties to sit at a
round table conference and discuss with them the future of South Africa.
A.G.: Prime Minister, do you see thi.s happening in the near future?
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R.M.: No, I don't see this happening. I think the conflict has already
assumed antagonistic proportions. One really dreads the prospect of
armed hostility gaining momentum in South Africa.
A.G.: In that event, Prime Minister, to what extent would you and the
other African states get sucked into direct struggle in South Africa?
R.M.: Africa is already committed to assisting the liberation struggle
in South Africa. What form it takes will depend on the people of South
Africa themselves. It could be a national struggle without violence, it
could be a violent national struggle. If it takes the latter form Africa
is pledged to total support of that struggle, in fact Africa has a
liberation comtaittee, as you know, of the OAU (Organisation of African
Unity), which finances liberation movements.
The support will now be greater because Africa no longer needs the kind
of ma~or resources required earlier when the Africans had to fight a war
here, a war in South Africa and Namibia, and earli.er a war in Mozambique
and Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Now we can marshal all our resources and
channel them in a more intensive manner toward the intensification of
the struggle in South Africa.
A.G.: Is there any way to prevent the struggle taking such a bloody
course?
R.M.: It all depends on the South Africa regime. It has got to take
cognisance of the wishes of the people of South Africa. The mass
demonstrations, the boycotts which are taking place at the present
moment are a writing on the wall. If they don't take heed now it will
be too late. Then they may not be able to ward off intense armed
struggle.
A.G.: To what extent are you committing your resources to the struggle
in South Africa?
R.M.: We take cognisance of the wishes of the people of South Africa. ~
There are limitations on us, limitations which derive mainly from our
realisation that if we were to provide bases here for the liberation
movements, there will be reprisals from South Africa. And these
reprisals will be of such a nature that the whole process of reconcilia-
tion which we have started here would be set back. It would create
divisions in our own society.
In other words we are not strong enough to be able to give bases as such,
but through the OAU we shall be able to contribute our bit to the strug-
gle in South Africa. If the struggle were to take a direct form, as you
suggested, I see the countries of this region giving political and diplo-
matic support to the national liberation movement in South Africa. -
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They will also provide material support through the OAU but I doubt if
they will offer any bases in this region.
A.G.: Prime Minister, on your political philosophy there are two ques-
tions I must ask. First, whether you will choose the egalitarian
ideals which you enunciated in the past or opt for what one might call
the lasting benefits of a mixed economy and a relatively open society.
Second: Lord Soames said recently: "Mugabe is in charge and what he
wants to do coincides in many ways with what we would like to see him do,
but he has many problems
(A broad smile spread across Mugabe's face. He laughed, but we moved
on to the next question.)
A.G.: There is a lurking suspicion, Prime Minister, in the Western
press that your reconciliation programme may be no more than a conven-
ient strategy. I think it is pertinent to ask whether you have chosen
a rigid Marxist ideological position or a pragmatic position.
R.M.: Let me say tt�at our principles remain as we enunciated them
earlier. As a party we stand by the socialist ideology deriving, to an
extent, from Marxism and Leninism. We don't hide that. At the same
- time we are not governed by those principles alone. We also have our
own tradition, and the principles that we have developed here under the
influence of Christianity, while we were occupied by the West. In other
words, while we adhere to definite socialist principles there is a streak
or morality that runs through them, and this morality is a synthesis of
- our tradition and our Christian practice here. It is our belief that ~
you cannot run a society divorced from moral principles, and it is these
moral principles on which we would like to found our society.
We hold that society must address itself to common ob~ectives, that man
is principally a social being, not an individualist but a collectivist.
Our traditions strengthen that belief. We have always lived as a collec-
tive society. Land belongs to all individuals. True, ea?~h person has
his own cattle and goats but there was always a distinction between what
was communal, and what the individual acquired as his own property. The
rivers and the fruit trees have always been common to us all.
Christianity brought a kind of mixed grill to us in the context of the
social nature of man. It also espoused a kind of individualism. Even
the churchea are divided in the manner in which they organise themselves.
The Catholics are collective. I have been brought up by the Catholics.
They live together, they don't marry, they eat together, the prieats
don't have individual property. The Methodists may be more individual-
istic.
But in respect of our society here we cannot ignore the reality of indi-
vidualism which we have inherited. That means we cannot ignore the
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reality of private enterprise which exists in our society by seizing
private property, and making it state-owned or by handing it over to
collectives. We can't do that without ruining the socio-economic base
on which we want to found our society. We accept its reality, and
- accept that it must continue.
But there are certain communal aspects we must develop in consonance
- with the goals that we cherish as a state. If private enterprise must
continue, then it must be localised as much as possible. There must be
local predominance in the control of the industries.
A.G.: Does that promote a socialist economic system?
R.M.: Not as such. But it promotes national development. Within the
enterprises we would want to see the role of the worker developed. That
is fundamental. The future thrust must be toward a proletarian society.
The worker has got to be organised in industry. We must have workers'
committees which consult regularly with the management on various prob-
lems. Not always about wages and other benefita but to develop a con-
sultative system in which the worker is involved in decision-making.
There must be training facilities for the worker to move up and to
develop a sense of belonging so that he is fully committed to the enter-�
priae. ~
A.G.: To what extent wi�11 the state take direct control of the economy?
R.M.: To the extent that the state takes direct control of partner in -
certain enterprises where this is possible. We have already had cerfain
offers. We are not imposing ourselves. We have only enunciated the `
possibility of the state becoming a partner.
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited, 30 July 1980
CSO: 4420 END ~
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