Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 1, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0.pdf5.86 MB
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 ~1 I ~ ~ ~UG~~T ~ Ft~U~ ~ ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~PRS L/9270 - 26 August 1980 USSR Re ort ~ p MILITARY AFFAIRS _ C~OUO 15i�0~ FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ua..,~"v;i~~.,.,w ,,:,~ti,` ~.~.~::..,x_~xW,,, , , , . , . _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. - Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or tran~literated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names prec~ded by a ques- tion ma~x and enclosed in Farentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. ~ Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. For further information on report content call (703) 351-2938 (economic); 3468 ` (political, sociological, military); 2726 (life sciences); 2725 (physical sciences). COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGUI~ATIONS GOVERNING OWNER~HIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN R~QUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION _ OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' JPRS L/9270 - 26 August 1980 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS (FOUO 15/80) ~ CONTENTS PAGE Book Excerpts: Soviet ViPws on U.S. Military Preparations (V. V. Borisov; OPASNAYA STAVKA: NAUCHNO-TEKfINICHESKAYA REVOI,YUTSIYA I VOYENNYYE PRIGOTOVLENIYA SShA, 1979) 1 Book Excerpts: Optimizing Artillery Fire Support (Ye. V. Izvekov, B. A. Kaplunov; OPTIlKIZATSIYA SREDSTV OBESPECHENIYA STREZ'BY ARTII,I,ERII, 1979) 9 Book Excerpts: History of Soviet Border Guards �(P..A..Ivanchishin, ~t al~:;- CHASO~YYE SOVETSRIKH GRAN~'~S, KRATKIY OCHERK I3TORSI~POCrRANICHNYKH VOYSK SSSR, 1979) .......................................0 19 Book Excerpts: Effectiveness ~f Target Detection (V. A. Gorbunov; EFFEKTIVNOST~ OBNARUZHENIYA TSEI,EY, 1980) 31 Book Excerpts: Indoctrination on Military Traditions (I. N. Petrov; TRADITSII--V STROYU, 1980)................. 47 Book Excerpts: Artillery in Battles and Operations (G. Ye. Peredel~skiy;~ARTIIS~ERIYA V BOYU I OPERATSII, 1980) 50 Soviet Strategy: F`rench Research Group Overview (STRATEGIQUE, Apr-Jun 80) 64 - a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~3:~t;.`Xxb"vv.+Cn.r..3.'.u. wira...i: J:.~+..4�. ; - . . . . . . v.. . , . . . , . . . , o vy4G APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BOOK EXCEIZPTS: SOVIET VI~WS ON U.S. MILITARY PREPARATIONS Moscow OPASNAYA STAVKA: NAUCHNO-TEKfIl~1ICHESKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA I VOYENNYYE PRIGOTOVLENIYA SShA in Russian 1979 signed to press 22 May 79 pp 1-2, 200, 5-8, 196-199 [Annotation, Table of Contents, Introductior and Conclusion of book by V. V. Borisov] [Excerpts] Title Page: ' Title: OPASNAYA STAVKA: NAUCHNO-TEKHNICHESKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA I VOYENNYYE PRIGOTOVLENIYA SShA (A Dangerous Stake: The Scientific-Technological Revolution and U.S. Military Preparations) Publisher: Voyenizdat Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1979 Signed to Press Date: 22 May 1979 Number of Copies Published: 40,000 - Number of Pages: 200 - Brief Description: Employing considerable factual material, the author of this book displays U.S. imperialism in the period of the scientific and technological revo- lution, the influence of this revolution on development of the U.S. mili- tary-industrial complex and armed forces, utilization of the myth of the "Soviet threat" to swell military budgets and escalate the arms race, and intensification of ideological preparations for another war. This book will be of interest to the general military and civilian reader. Table of Contents Introduction 5 1 'FOR OFFICI~. USE ONLY ; . = _ . ~ . , _ ~ _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300024442-4 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ i ~ Chapter 1. U.S. Imperialism in the Era of zhe Scientific and ! , Technological Revolution 9 ~ Hopes and Reality i Under the Mask of "Global Obligations" 19 ~ Chapter 2. Influence of the Scientific and Technological Revolu- I tion on U.S. Military Preparations 30 ~ Radical Revolution in Productive Resources ~ Refornis in Military Affairs 36 ~ ~ Chapter 3. Development of a System of Management of Military ~ Preparations 51 ' Changes in Organizational Structure ~ New Methods: Claims and Facts 67 i ~ Chapter 4. "Permanent" War Economy 76 I - New Ph~nomena and New Conflicts The Military-Industrial Complex 88 , Offensive in the Arms Market 99 ~ Chapter 5. Reorganization of the War Machine 108 Counting on Technological Superiority ~ ~ Aggravation of the Cadre Problem 124 Rearming the Military 138 Modernization of the Navy 144 - Building Up Sea Power 156 _ Chapter 6. Ideological Preparations for War 167 Propaganda Machine of the Military-Industrial Complex "Threat" and Military Budget 175 Chapter 7. A Race Which Cannot Be Won 182 The Burden of Military Might - Against the Pentagon's Plans 188 Conclusion 196 Introduction The contemporary revolution in science and technology is a gigantic global process which is affecting in one way or another the entire population of the earth, but it is occurring particularly intensively in the industriaily most highly-developed countries both socialist and capitalist. First and foremost a radical revolution in the productive resources of society, - this revolution as a process is profot:.zdly social in nature and one of the most important factors in development of ~the contemporary society as a ` whole. 2 FOR OFFICIl,L USE ONLY ~ , , , , . ~ . . . , . . . . . . ..Y~: - . _ _ . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY At the same there are many specific features in the developing sci- entific and technological revolution. It cannot evolve by itself, in a "social vacuum," beyond the framework of concrete production relations. It ~ does not, however, directly affect the form of ownership of the means of production, which comprises the basis of production relations. But it is precisely the characte~ of production relations snd the nature of the so- cietal system which determine the orientation and modes of utilization of scientific and technological advances. There are many similar features in its development both in the socialist countries and in the capitalist world, traits wltlch are connected first and foremost with concrete scientific and technological achievenents. Cybernetics, electronics, and nuclear power engineering, for example, which have become symbols of the contenpo-rary revolution in science and technology, have been developing rapidly in recent decades in both socialist and capitalist countries. Qne should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the very origination and development of these and other new branches of science were dictated by new and greatly increased requirements of society in management and control, automation of production, and energy requirements. Much more important is the question of root differences in the thrust and direction of scientific and technological progress and the principles of its utilization in nations with differing social systems. The question of its thrust and directi;.a has become exceptionally important in our time, since the contemporary scientific and technological revolution is one of the main "bridges" joining the prese:~t with the future. And n~t only the fate of the people presently inhabitfng the earth but also the fate of future generations to a significant degree depends on resclution of this question. In socialist countries scientific and technological progress is utilized for the benefit of all of society, while in the capitalist world scientific advances become a means with the aid of which the dominant exploiter classes endeavor to preserve and consolidate their position both domestical- ly and in the international arena. The contemporary scientific and technological revolution has become one of the main areas of historical competition between capitalism and socialism. Its influence on the development of military affairs is enormous. But this revolution as such did not produee new weapons of unprecedented power. The moribund capitalist system, which is attempting to prolong its existence with the aid of military force, is to blame for the fact that the greatest scientific and technological advances of our time have been embodied in nucie~r missile weapons and other highly-effective weaponry rather than in devices which make people's lives easier and better. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that "aggressive circles in the capitalist world are responding with feverish military preparations to their defeats ' in social battles, to the loss of colonial possessions, to the departure of more and more countries from capitalism, to the successes of world socialism - and growth of the influence of Communist parties in bourgeois countries. 3 FOR OFFICIti:. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 ~ FOIt OFF'ICiAI. USE ONLY riilitary budgets are suaring, new weapons are being developed, military bases are being built, and.shows of military force are being undertaken. ~ Relying on this 'position of strength,' imperialism hopes to preserve the capabiZity to coimnand other countries and peoples, a capability which is slipping out of its hands."* Utilization of scientific and technological advances in providing armed �orces with n2w weapons, the most powerful and imagination-staggering of which was the atomic bomb, was interpretc_d by U.S. ruling classes in their own way. Placing their hopes on U.S. scientific, technological and industrial superiority, in the postwar period U.S. leaders counted on miYi- tary might, based on the latest advances in science and technology. A real "addiction" to military might spread among U.S, ruling circles, an ad- - diction which, just as a drug addiction, engendered many illusions. U.S. leaders figured that by extensively utilizing the latest scientific and technological advances for military purposes, they would acquire "new" military might as a means of establisning worldwide hegemony. ; This policy perfectly corresponded to the interests of the U.S. monopolies, ~ which had done extraordinarily profitable business on military contracts ciuring World War II. This unity of interests of the ruling circles and monopolies producing weapons and military hardware became one of the most important factors dictating the genesis and development of Che military- industrial complex, as well as an arms race on an unprecedented scale, which has continued in the period of international d~tente. i WhilA giving lip service to a call for d~r_ente and undertaking certain ~ steps in that direction, under the pressure of the conditions which have ~ objectively developed in the world, U.S. ruling circles continue at the same time rapidly building up military strength. Direct U.S. military ~ expenditures for the entire World War II, according to official U.S. figui~~s, totaled 224 billion dollars, while the military budget five-year plan for the 19$0-1984 fiscal years specifies expenditure of approximately ' 835 billion dollars. The United States has spent the astronomical sum of ; 1.5 trillion dollars for military purposes in the 30 years since the war. i In the latter hal~ of the 1970's the U.S. military budget swelled beyond ~ the 10a billion dollar mark. In the 1979 fiscal year it approached 130 ~ billion dollars, which means that at the present time the principal capitalist country spends more than 35G million dollars every day for mili- ~ tary purposes. The Pentagori requested 138.2 billion dollars for the 1980 ; fiscal year. In this book an attempt is made to show from the position of Marxist- ' Leninist theory and on the basis of analysis of concrete facts how the ~ United SCates is utilizing the current scientific and technological - revolution for military preparations, what processes are developing in the ; * L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following a Leninist j Path. Speeches and Articles], V~1 6, Moscow, 1978, pp 168-169. ~ ~ FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY I :r_,~ , . . r . ; . _ . J APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY military economy and armed forces under the influence of this revolution, and the consequences to which the buildup of U.S. military might is lead- ing. The military preparations of an imperialist state constitute an extensive system of economic, political, ideological, military proper and certain other auxiliary measures conducted by state monopoly capital for the purpose of building up the military might essential to carry out ag- ' gression or political blackmail in the international arena. It is quite obvious that in a book of limited size it is impossible fully to examine the entire range of questions pertaining to this topic. There- fore the author limits himself to d~scussion of only certain trends, which in his opinion are the most important. One should also note that in many cases it is pracrically impossible to isolate in "pure" form the influence of scientific and technological progress on military preparations, since the development of science and technology is inseparably linked with the economy, politics and other aspects of societal development. Therefore, in analyzing certain phenomena and processes, the author endeavors to show that they have been influenceci not only by scientific and technological progress but by other factors as we11. Studies by Soviet and foreign military experts, economists and historians, mat~rials published in the foreign press, as well as published official documents of the U.S. Department of Defense and several other government agencies served as the principal sources in pr~paring tk~is book. Tn connection with the fact that the majority of the factual data were borrowed from Western sources, including the U.S. press, one should approach fihem cri.tically since, as we knc~~a, facts and figures appearing in foreign publications are frequenLly distorted for the sake of sensational- ism, publicity and other considerations. At the same time one can assume that on the whole the factual data containe4 in this book illustrate to _ a sufficient degree certain general trends. Canclusion The en*.ire postwar history of the Un~.ted States has been dominated by the arms race, unceasing quest for a"superweapon," and the attempt to achieve military superiority over world socialism. Having amassed a vast arsenal of tools of destruction of unprecedented force, American imperialism, to- gether ~ith its aggressive NATO bloc partnecs, is pushing military prepara- tions at a feverish pace, attempting to utilize to a maximum degree the latest sctenfific and technolog~~al advances for military purposes. The hopes of U.S. imperialist circlzs and their :~ilitary-political bloc partners to secure military superiority over the socialist world, however, have proven unattaiiLable. They have proven unattainable primarily because ~ 3.n our era the balance of class forces in the world arena has tipped final- ly and irreversibly in favor of socialism. The increased military and economic inight of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community blocks the path of the aggressive schemes of imperialism. The international 5 - FGR OFFICIA;. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340020042-0 FOCt C1~FICIAL USE ONLY Communis~ and work~r movement, the forces of national liberation, non- aligned nations, and millions upon millions of persons fighting for demo rracy, social pro~ ess and peace in all countries are vigorously oppos- ing the aracs race and }he threat of another war. USSR Nu.nister o~ Defense Mar SU U. F. Ustinov~, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, stated quite emphatically: "U.S. militarist circles have not yet given up their attempts t~ achieve military superiority over - the USSR by developing new mass destruction weapons. History has , demonstrated time arid again the futility of such calculations, and in practice the devel.opmen~ of new .:eapons has not ~trengthened the security of ~he United States. Those who are counting on achieving military _ superiority over the Soviet Union with the aid of such weapons should bear in mind that the economy, science and technology in our country are today at such a high level that we are capable of building in extremely short _ order any weapon on which the enemies of peace would place their cards. 'rhe Soviet Union has stated time and again that we ha-~Q no wish to proceed along such a road. Precisely for this reason the Soviet Union proposed to - the United States a mutual agreement to refrain fY�c?m developing new weapons and weapons systems. "1 The Soviet Union is working vigorously to a~ert another war. The program of further campaign for peace and international cooperation, for freedom and independence of peoplas adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress spells out c~ncrete measures to bring a halt to the arms race and reduce existing - arsenals of weaponry. Tr.e policy of the Soviet State aims at covering all channels of the arms race, that is, on the one hand bringing stockpiling to an end, and then proceeding to reduce existing arms, and on the other - hand to prevent the development of new, as yet undeveloped but potential weapons. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman ~ ~f th~ Presidium of 'JSSR Supreme Soviet, particularly emphasized the imp ortance of nations, and particularly maj.or powers, reaching an agree- ment to ban the development of new mass destruction weapons and delivery systems. J "The level of modern science and technology is such," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "that there is arising the serious danger of development of an = even more fearsome we~pon than nuclear arms. The wisdom and con- _ = science of mankind dictdte the necessity of placing an insuperable barrier in the path of development of such a weapon."2 Waging a consistent struggle for peace and for an end to the arms ra~e, the Soviet Union at the same time sees effectively to its own defense, firmly adhering to Lenin's instructions that "we should acr~mpany our~~3 steps toward peace by stepping up our entire military preparedness.... The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, equipped with the most modern weapons and military hardware, are not only a reliable def~nder of the socialist ~ 6 FOR UFFI(;Iti:. USE UNLY - - ~ . � . _ . , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300024442-4 FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY homeland and the achievements of socialism and communism but also a power- ful factor in the security of peoples, a factor in preventing another war. In view of the growing military preparations of the imperialist nations, the Soviet Union is doing everything necessary to strengthen its defense capability, but Soviet leaders have stressed time and again t~aat the Soviet Union does not and will not seek military superiority over the other side. In recent years the situation in the international arena has become in- creasin;ly more complex. Alarmed by the process of d~tente, which has become the leading trend in today's world, imperialist circles have stepped up their activities~ The militarist forces encouraged by them, particularly the U.S. military-industrial complex, are escalating the arms race, attempting to halt d~tente and to turn the world back to the dark times of "cold war." Endeavoring to utilize to a maxi~ degree for mili- tary purposes the la~est achievements of science and technology and taking new leaps forward in the arms race, they entertain hopes that some "tech- nological breakthrough" will place a new "miracle weapon" in their hands and wi11 sec~re for them military superiority over the socialist counr_ries. - As is persuasivelyshown by the entire course of contemporary world development, these hopes are patently in vain, but seeking military and military-technological superiority is a dangerous game, and a policy which _ aims at developing more and more new weapons is a course which is highly _ dangerous for all mankind. Western reactionary circles essentially encouraged the Chinese hegemonists, who initiated at the beginning of 1979 an aggressive criminal war against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In spite of protests by the world com- munity, they are to develop plans to se11 modern weapons and - military equipment to the Chinese aggressors. Firmly confident in its strength, the Soviet Union, guided by the resolu- tions of the 25th CPSU Congress, continuea.even in today's complicated international situation persistently seeking, together with its friends and allies, a deepening of the process of d~tente and broadening of peace- ful, mutually benefic3al cooperation among nations, and particularly an end to the arms race and a shift to disarmament. The deep-lying laws governing and patterns of the scientific and tecln- nological revolution are in conformity with such policy. Within the mechanism of scientific and technological progress there are no elements which would make its utilization for military purposes inevitable. Develop- ment of science and technology can be cantrolled and managed. There does not exist a"demon technology," ~ust as there does not exist a fatal in- ~vitability of another world war. Plana hatched by imperialist forces to " utilize the latest ~cientiFic and technological advances for the mass destruction of human lives are in conflict with the very essence of sci- ence and technology, which embody the greatest achievements of the human intellect and which have become in our time ~ne of the most powerful factors 7 FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 " FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY of societal development. The root interests of mankind demand that every- thing be .done to ensure that the development of science and technology be utilized solely for peacsful purposes, to ensure economic and social progress in every country in the world. _ The CPSU Central Ca~ittee decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrinat~on Work" states that it is essential resolutely to expose the i.mperi~list advocates of '~old war;' aggravation of inteinational tension and the arms race, which threateas to push the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. It is our duty to place in opposition to the subvPrsive political and ideological activities of the class enemy and his vicious slande.r against sucialism unswerving solidarity, powerful ideological unity within our ranks, deep ~onvictian and political _ vigilance on the part of each and every Soviet citizen, and his readiness and wiliingness to defend the hom~land and the revolutionary achievements of socialism. FOOTNOTES 1. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'l" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1979, page 319. 2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Path], Vol 5, rioscow, 1976, page 320. 3. V. I. Lenir:, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete WorksJ, Vol 40, page 248. COPYRIGHi: Voyenizdat, 1979 3024 CSO; 1801 8 ~ FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY . . . . ~ , . . , , _ . _ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BOOK EXCERPTS: OPTIMIZING ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT Moscow OPTIMIZATSIYA SRIDSTV OBESPECHENIYA STREL'Bi ARTILLERII in Russian - 1979 signed to press 27 Ju1 79 pp 1-2, 111-112, 3-4, 5-10, 108-110. [Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction, excerpts from Chapter 1, , Conclusion, and Bibliography of book by Ye. V. Izvekov and B. A. Kaplunov] [Excerpts] Tit1e Page: Title: OPTIrIIZATSIYA SREDSTV OBESPECHENIYA STREL'BY ARTILLERII (Optimizing Means of Artillery Fire Support) , Publisher: Voyenizdat Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1979 ~ Si~ned t~ Presy Date: 27 July 1979 Number of Copes Published: 8,000 Number of Pages: 112 _ Brief Description: ~ Further increase in effectiveness of employment of artillery is closely ' linked with the development of highly-effective means of artillery fire support. ~ The authors examine the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of means ensuring a specified artillery effectiveness with minimum expendi- tures of manpower and resources, as well as the specific features of op- timization of ineans of topogeodetic, meteorological and ballistic support and organic artillery reconnaissance and observation means. Methods of ~ optimizin.g capabilities and examples of solving specific problems are given. This book is intended for officers, scientific research institute and - design office personnel interested in problems of efficient utilization of - - modern artillery. 9 FOR OFFICIIy;~ USE ONLY s~;e~ T. . . , . - ; ~ : , : _ . : , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOEt UFrICIAL USk: ONLY :tntroduction 3 1. Genera~ Requi�rements cn Means of Artillery Fire Support and Specific Features of Their Optimization 5 1.1. General Requirements on Artillery Fire Support Means 5 - 1.2. Specific Features o~ Optimizat3on of Means of Artil- lery Fire Support 11 1.3. Evaluation of Existing ~iethods of Determining�Re-. quiretaents on Accuracy of Means of Artillery Fire ~upport 23 2. Theoretical Principles of Optimization of Artillery Fire Support 26 2.1. Solving Optimization Problems Without Full Expansion of the Function of Efficiency 2.2. Deriving an Expression for a Criterion of Military- Economic Evaluation of Means of Artillery Fire Sup- port 29 2.3. Deriving a Relation for the Value Function of Means of Artillery Fire Support 33 2.4. The Problem of Determining the Function Ci=f(~'i;Ei) 38 _ 3. Methods of Determining Input Data for Optimization of Means of Artillery Fire Support 43 3.1. Means of Artillery Fire Support Operating Time and Simplified Models of Combat Operations of Artillery Subunits 3.2. Decrease in ~fficiency of Performance of Missions by ArtillFry Due to Incomplete Utilization of Its Combat Capabtlities (K.Cx) 48 3.3. Deriving a Relation For Function K.~II Without Con- ' sidering Function L~ (X~) 55 ~ 3.4. Decr.ease in Probability of Hitting Moving Targets 59 = 3.5. Deriving llependence of Effectiveness o� Artillery Fire on Errors by Means of Artillery Fire Support 64 4. Solving Some Problems of Optimization of Means of Artillery Fire Suppo�rt 77 4.1. Determa.nation of Optimal Demands on i Means of Artillery Fi.xe Support ~ 4.2. Comparison of Several Variants of i Means of�Artil- ; _ lery Fire Support ` 81 s 4.3. Determination of a Reasonable Quantity of Means of ' Ar~illery Fire Support 86 ' 4.4. Military-Economic Evaluation of Means of Artillery _ Fire Support Taking Into Account Their Adaptability to Conditions of Combat Operations 95 ' 4.5. Optimization of Demands on In3tial Geodetic Base { and Equipment for Determining Coordinate Increments 99 i 4.6. Features of Optimization of Means of Artillery Fire Support Taking Account of Their Reliability 103 ` BiUliography 110 3 �i~ � FOR OFFICIti,`. USE ONLY ] ~ # < �i.. , _ : _ . : . , . < . _ . , _ . _ . _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLY Introduction CombaC operations of Ground Forces equipped with high cross-countrq per- formance ir~fantry armored vehicles with potent armament and large num- bers of tanks are impossible raithout close support liy modern artillery. Modern selt-propelled guns and mort~rs and rocket-carrying combat vehicles possess excellent grouping performance, long range of fire, and powerful ammunition. Moderii artillery is capable of the following, under any combat situation - conditions: destroying hostile offensive nuclear weapons and artillery; hitting enemy infantry, tanks and weapons in strong points, at points of concentration, in march columns and on lines of deployment for engagement; of suppressing, damaging and destroqing troop command and control facili- ties, radio electronic and radar facilitiea; of fiitting installations in the immediate rear areas, air defense and army aviation targets; of demol:ish-In~g de.fensve warks, breaching obstacles, laying smoke screens, and illuminating terrain at night. Finally, $rt311ery is an indispensible weapon for gaining fire superiority over the adversary during the conduct of combat operations without employment of nuclear weapons, a~i d especially - under conditions of limited (local) wars. Improvement of. the efficiency of artillery involves not only development of weapons (guns, mortars, rocket-carrying combat vehicles and various types of ammunition for them) but also continuous and constant improvement - and development of ineans of artillery fire support. These means usually include the following: artillery reconnaissance and observation; . topogeodetic support; meteorological support; ballistic support; means of technical preparation; means of preparation of initial firing data. Elabor.ation and adoption of h3ghly-effective means of support constitute one of the conditions for further increasing the combat capabilities of artillery. In this book methods of optimizing means of artillery fire support are presented, means which wi11 help efficiently distr~.bute allocations between artillery and means of artillery fire support. _ l~ FOR OFFICI6L USE ONLY - . : , ~ i r. - . _ , _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' ' Ttiis book cun~ists of four sections. ; Section 1 examines the general requirements on means of arCillery fire sup- { port and the specific features of their optimization for each type of ineans of sup�port. ` Section 2 preseuts the theoretical principles of optimization of ineans of { art:Lllery fire support. ' Section 3 presents methods of determining input data for optimizing means o:E artillery fire support, derives relations for determining the influence oL time and precision of support on effectiveness of combat employment of ; art:illery. Section 4 contains the solution to several problems of optimization of . means of artilleiy fire support. The examples presented are of a purely illustrative nature. This book is intended for officer personnel of military units, staffs, ; scientific research organizations, military educational institutions, as:~well as for engineers in the defense industry.and at appropriate educational institutions. ; The authors wou:ld like to express thanks to professors P. P. Vyazovskiy, 'Y D. M, Komarov, and Yu. V. Chuyev, whose valuable suggestions were very helpful in preparing this book, as we11 as to B. N. Denisov, who was kind enough to contribute the material utilized in writing Section 1. 1. General Requirements on Means of Artillery Fire Support and Specific Features of Their Optimization "l.l. General Requirements on Artillery Fire Support Means Ef~ective employment of artillery in a modern combat engagement is in- ; conceivable without appropriate means of artillery fire support. As we know, the effectiveness of combat employment of modern artillery depends not on the performance charactAristics of the artillery systems themselves, the destructive force of their ammunition, and the effective- ness of the enemy's countermeasures, but also on the time and accuracy characteristics of the means of artillery fire support (Figure 1) [figure not reproduced]. Theretore in optimizing weapons and military equipment one proceeds from the position of achieving the desired effectiveness with minimum outlays (or achieving maximum effectiveness with specified expenditures). In con- formity with this, the following tasks are accomplished in optimizing means of artillery fire support: 1. Determination of optimal requirements on accuracy and time characteristics both of one and of several kinds of ineans of artillery 12, FOR OFFICIb,'.. USE ONLY xu ti ~ : . . _ . . . _ . , . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - fire support applicable to a.n artillery force grouping of one type and different types. 2. Selection of an efficient (.from a military-economic viewpoint) variant of ineans of support from several possible variants. 3. Determinatton of a reasonable required quantity of ineans of support in artillery units and subunits. 4. Determination of optimal requirements on reliability indices of ineans of support. 5. Determination of reasonable timetables and schedules for replacement of one model of a means of support with another. 1.1.1. Requirements on Time Characteristics of Means of Artillery Fire Support Time expended on artillery fire support measures. (artillery fire support time), if it causes delay in opening fire, leads to a decrease in effective- � ness af artillery, due to the following: incomplete utilization of the artillery's potential to inflict damage on the adversary; decrease in probability of hitting moving targets; increase in probability of the adversary hitting friendly artillery in its firing positions (OP). . In determining requirements on artillery fire support time, it is necessary to take into account the following specific features of the influence of this factor on effectiveness of employment of artillery. 1. The influence of ab.tillery:tire support time is connected with the princ3:ples of combat employment of artillery in combat, namely: it depends on the type of engagement (attack, defense, meeting engagement, etc), the availability of reconnoitered targets, ammunition, and other factors. In other words, in the course of combat sometimes fire support measures should - be carried out as rapidly as posaible, while sometiimes sufficient time will be allocated for this. 2. The influence of a~tillery fire support time depends on what type of artillery (regimental, division) is being supported. If the time for bringing into combat readiness the guns of a given type of artillery is suffici~ntly large, and the time required to perfoxm fire support measures is not on a critical path, that is, does not delay initiation of fire, demands on fire support time can be broadened. 13 FOR OFFICIEu. USE ONLY . : , . . . . , . : . : ; - , : ; . . , _ _ - . , . . , . . . � x;.~;,:~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 P'pi; i]FFICIAL USE OIVLY 3. TopogeocleC:i_c suppu;�e ticne depends on the terrain on which the engage- ment occurs anc?, in parti.cular., on the of natural and artificial conr_ours on tlie ter.rain, th~ presence and quality of an initial g~odetic base Lur topo~raptiic. survey, as well as on time of year and day. 4. Artillery fire support time dep~uds ,~n the quantity of ineans of suppor~ in artillery units and subunits. Theref~ire opt3.m.ization of time require- ments shoul.d be perfarmed juintly with optimi2ation of quantity of ineans of sYipport. 5. The approach to de.termination of requirements on fire support time clepends on the principles of combat empluyment of ineans of support proper. , Iri determining requirements on time of determination, for example, firing pos:ition (observation post) coordinates by self-contained means, two time characteristics are ex~wiined: instrumezt time, or equipment operatin6 speed, and f.ull coordinates determination time. The first characteristic should be specified during equipment design and development, while the second should be urilized for military assessment of ineans of support. _ When dete-rmining demands on cf support with the aid of centralized radio technical systems (for example, with the aid of radio technical co- ordinate determination systems such as the U.S. Loran system), two time characteristics are examined: equipment operating speed, and continuity (or allowable discreteness) of operation of the system as a whole. These characteristics are specified when designing equipment. _ 1.1.2. Requirements on Accuracy of Means of Support Aggregate firing errors 3re affected by artillery fire support error~ and ` errors in determining target coordinates. In determining requirements on accuracy of ineans of support, it is neces- sary to consider: characteristics and principles of combat employment of a given type of artillery (natural dispersion, force of ammunition, time and maneuver characteristics); errors of other means of support, if an individual type of support is examined. 1.1.3. Requirements on Reliability of Means of Support In this case the term reliability, in addition to purely technical reliabil- ity, includes reliability of result, which is 4efined as an event consist- ing in the fact that no gross errors were committed (both through the , fault of the operator and due to technical causes) in carrying out artillery fire support measures. 1~ - FOR OFFICIE~. USE ONLY yp, . 3d S~.+.x..~L.}..auv_f.v.,.vd,.r>':caV....i>rJ~.- ....:.:~..~-w. '~c..,. .e..,.R-.,_., . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY A qualitative approach to determinatior of requirements on reliability of means of support can be presented as follows. Reliability possesses two aspects from a military-economic viewpoint. If the fact of failure of individual components or an instrument as a whole is known to us, this leads to an increase in support time in correcting the I malfunction. In this case determination of requirements on reliability can be performed according to the method of determining requirements on support time. Detected failures in turn can be divided into malfunctions which are , corrected both by crew personnel and at special repair facilities. Such a division makes it possible to elaborate requirements on repairability of means of support and to determine requirements in repiacement parts and special repair facilities. Another group of failures, the origin of which is not known, is character- ized by the fact that failures or malfunctions of individual components or - an entire instrwnent lead to an increase in errors. Determination of re- quirements on reliability in this case can be performed according to the method of determining requirements on accuracy. Malfunctions of this group can also be divided into malfunctions caused by gradual change in equipment parameters and malfunctions of the gross error type. Gradual decrease in accuracy of equipment can be elucidated in the process of periodic in- spection and adjustment procedures. Malfunctions of the gross error type can be caused by operator errors or basic defect in equipment design or operating methods. With utilization of centralized means of support, probability of occurrence of gross errors a.ncreases. This is due to the fact that centralized systems are highly complex, and the more users of erroneous information, the greater the ef- fect of these errors. Analysis of gross error statistics in operation of already approved systems and operator work conditions makes it possible to elaborate reasonable requirements on degree of equipment automation and to specify an efficient equipment layout which ensures high reliability of result. 1.I.4. Requirements on Other Characteristics of Means of Artillery Fire Support . Number of operating personnel and their. qualifications constitute an im- portant factor in evaluating means of artillery fire support. In a mili- tary-economic evaluation ~f ineans of fire support, this factor functions as a limitation and should definitely be taken into account, while in cer- tain cases it may prove to be decisive in decision-making. Sometimes it is necessary to decide whether it is necessary to have se~ate means of support for each kind of artillery or one type of ineans of support for an entire artillery group. Military-economic analysis makes it possible to solve the problem of selection of a reasonable and efficient number of types of ineans of support. 15 FOR OFFICIti,'.. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 1~~)l: i)FrIi;TAL USE UNLl' rrec~~.iencly, especially cJt;en piacing ~,~ans of support on a special mobile base, ttie ~.~~iestion of eq�i.pmc:nt weight and si.~e is raised. Or course it is c:;snnr;::~. to requir.e in this case that the vehicle whicn ca:ries the ; ~:c~uipment: p~;;sess cross-c~untry capability which is equ41 to that of arlillery weapons. l.:t . S. Qn Cost of ~ieacls of Support The ~ndeavor to desi.gci and build means of support which are fast aild ac- r_uraCe E~;-ings c~rtai.n t~chnica'1 difficulties a~-~d in the final analysis , 1...~ids ~o ~n ~.ncrease -~.~i equipment ccnuplexity, and consequently cost as we11. Ti,e .iaed to take this circumstance into account is also intensifiud by the fact ti~;it 1a~=_.~ns or artiL"~ery support are mass items. Therefore in dete~.- ~~ining r~~quirements on means of suppurt it is expedient extensiveZy to apply methods of military-economic analysis. E:lc~t~oration of zequiremen~ts on means of support is usually performed in tlZe a o11o~~iing sequence. Ini~~aT1y one e7_aborates the general principles of combat employment of prumising artillery and preliminary operational-tactical requirements on means of support, talcing account of forecast data on future combat opera- tions. 'Ihen scientific research is performed for the purpose of determining tech- nical ways to implement these requirements. This work is completed with a detailed technical-economic analysis of pbssible variants, the results of which can be presented in the form of tables or graphs, the "input" into which will be the characteristics of interest to us (ac- curacy, speed, reliabilifiy, etc), and the "output" the cost~of the given variants. A military-economic analysis is performed taking account of the preliminary work, in order to determine optimal demands on equipment, organic affilia- tion of ineans of support, as well as for reasonable and efficient distribu- tion of allocations between artillery and means of artillery fire support. ~ * * In this Uook we have examined the specific features of optimization of means of artillery fire support. We have demonstrated the possibility and expediency of solving problems of optimization of these means without detailed expansion of the function of efficiency of combat employment of artillery on the background of simplified engagement models. Principal attention has been focused on approaches to determination of the influence of time on the effectiveness of combat employment of artillery, since this question has lieen less thoroughly studied than that of the effect of errors of ineans of artillery fire support. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~x~~ . , _ . , . - . : _ . . . _ . , , . . . . _ . . . _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR pFFICIAL USE ONLY This book does not examine mathematical techniques of determining the ex- tremum (mathema~ical programming methods), since they are extensively 3is- cussed in the Soviet and foreign literature. The basic principles presen~ed in this book may prove useful in elaborating methods of optimization of a number of other items: means of support of missiles of various categories, means of navigation for sea, air, and land vehicles, etc. This book will helg more objectively substantiate the characteristics of means of artillery fire support and modes of their employment in artillery units and subunits. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. GOST 18.001-76. Quantitative Methods of Optimization of Parameters of Standardization Items. General Provisions. 2. Bubnov, I. A.; Kremp, A. I.; et al. "Voyennaya topografiya" [Military Topography], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1969. 3. VBnttsel, Ye. S. "Vvedeniye v issledovaniye operatsiy" [Introduction to Operations Research], Moscow, Sov. radio, 1964. 4. Gordon, Yu. A., and Khorenkov, A. V. "Artilleriyskaya razvedka" [Ar- tillery Reconnaissance and Observation], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1971. 5. Lebedev, V. Ya. "Spravochnik ofitsera nazemnoy artillerii" [Field Artillery Officer's HandbookJ, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1977. 6. Savkin, L. S., and Lebedev, B. D. "Meteorologi}~.a i strel'ba artillerii" [Met~orology and Artillery Fire], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974. 7. "Teoriya strel'by nazeIImoy artillerii" [Theory of Surface-to-Surface Artillery Gunnery], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1967. 8. Fendrikov, N. M., and Yakovlev, V. I. "Metody raschetov boyevoy effektivnosti vooruzheniya" [Methods of Calculating Combat Efficiency of Weapons], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1972. 9. Khan, G., and Shapiro, S. "Statisticheskiye modeli v inzhenernykh zadachakh" [Statistical Models in Engineering Problems], translated from English by Ye. G. Kovalenko, Moscow, Mir, 1969. 10. Chuyev, Yu. V., et al. "Osnovy issledovaniya.operatsiy ~ voye~?oy tekhnike" [Fundamentals of Operations Research in Military Technology], Moscow, Sov.~~radio, 1965. 17 FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY , ~ .r . . . , : , , , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY 11. Chuyev, Yu. V. "Issledovaniye operatsii v voyennom dele" [Operations Research in riilitary Affairs], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1970. 12. Ch~yev, Yu. V., and Spekhova, G. P. "Tel~hnicheskiye zadachi issledovaniya opeiatsiy" [Technical P~-.-:blPms of Operations Research], Moscow, ;iov. radio, 1971. _ 13. Chuyev, Yu. V., and Mikhaylov, Yu. B. "Prognozirovaniye v voyennom dele" [Forecasting in Military Affairs], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975. ' COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1979 3024� CSO: 1801 18 FOR OFFICIti:. USE ONLY , ~,~:4 ~ . . . _ _ _ _1. . ....:.:.t , . - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BOOK EXCERPTS: HISTORY OF SOVIET BORDER GUARDS = Moscow CHASOVYYE SOVETSKIKH GRANITS, KRATKIY OCHERK ISTORII POGRANICHNYKH VOYSK SSSR (Guards of the Soviet Borders, A Short Outline of the History of the USSR Border Troops) in Russian 1979 signed to press 28 Sep 79 pp 284-285, 265-269 [Annotation, Table of .Contents, For.eward and Conclusion from book by Major General P.A. Ivanchishin (head of group of contributing authors); Colonel Yu. G. Kislovskiy, professor and doctor of historical sciences (assistant head); Colonel N..I. Afanas'yev; Major General V.K. Gaponenko; Colonel A.P. Glukhov; Colonel (Ret) V.T. Kukin; Colonel (Ret) S. Ye. Lyubimov; Lieutenant Colonel A.M. Plekhanov, docent and candidate of historical sciences; Colonel K.V. Regush, docent and candidate of historical sciences and Ma~or General G.P. Sechkin, professor and doctor of military sciences, Izdatel'stv.o� Pola.ticheskoy Literatury, 100,000 copies, 286 pages] . [Text] "Guards of the Soviet Borders" is short outline of the history of the border troops of the Soviet state. It describes the role they have played in defending the land of the soviets from the first years 'af its existence ~to the present day. The book familiarizes the reader with ~life on the.present-day border of the USSR, which extends 67,000 km, as well as with the military duties of the border troops.. It provides an extensive description of the participation of V.I. Lenin and the Communist Party in the organization and strengthening of the border troops of the USSR. The Uook is intended for the broad mass of readers. � 19 FOR OFFICIA:, USE ONLY , ; ; . . _ _ , _ . . . : . : ; . . . : , , . . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 'r'OR OFrICiAL USE ONLY Table of Contents Chap ter 1 THE ESTABLTSHMENT OF BORDER GUARD FOR THE SOVIET STATE 1 1. In Defense of the Achievements of the Revolution............ 2. On the Basis of Lenin's Decree.......... ....a....... . 9 . 3. On Guard Over the Borders of the Soviet Republic............ 21 4. On the Front Lines of the.Civil War 26 Chap ter 2 PROTECTING AND DEFENDING THE NATIONAL BORDERS OF THE USSR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE BUILDING OF SO.CIALISM...: 35 1. The Party`s Concern for the Development�of.the~Border.Troops and the Strengthening of Border Defense.......... 2. The Borders Under Lock! 51 3. The Border Troops' Campaign Against Economic Contraband..... 68 4. The Border Troops' Participation in Peaceful Socialist Con- struction 80 = 5. Against the Fascist Threat 88 Chap~er 3 ~ DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR.. 97 1. In Battles Along the Borders 2. Communists Set the Example ..................................113 3. In Combat 122 4. In Action Against Fascist Intelligence 139 5. Defending the National Borders 148 ~ Chapter 4 ' ON GUARD OVER THE PEA.CEFUL LABORS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE 159 1. The Party's Concern for Border Defense 2. The Establishment of Friendship and Cooperation with Border Troops of the Socialist Countries 173 3. Battling ~nemy Scheming oni the Border 183 Chapter 5 . GUAR.DIhG THE BORDERS OF THE STATE.OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE 193 _ 1. The Work of the CPSU in Strengthening Border Defense and Border Troops : 2. Raising the Ideological Consciousness and Increasing the Military Combat Skills.of the Border Troops 201 3. Adding tu Military Tradition 213 4. Border Defense--A Responsibility of the Entire People...... 223 5. New Advances 233 6. In the Tnteres'ts of Increasing Palitical Vigilance and In- suring the Security of the Borders of the Motherland....... 246 7. Increasing Cooperation Between Border Troops of the USSR � and the Fraternal~ Socialist Countries 257 COnCLUSION 265 BRI~F CHRONICLE OF EVENTS 272 20 FOR OFFICIA;, USE ONLY ~ . i , . ~ ~ ~~.-;:~y t~.v:_.. . . . ~~;.e~ . .�r: ~~..v. . . . . . . . . . - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300024442-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Foreword The national border of the USSR is sacred and inviolable. It is the border - of the motherland. And like the thoughtful and attentive owner protects the house he has put up with his own hands, our people, the master of their own country, watch over their f atherland and its borders. The Soviet state has charged the border tronps of the KGB SSSR [Committee on State Security of the USSR] with the honorable aiid responsible task of insuring the armed defense of its national borders. The Soviet border troops have behind them an illustrious military history. They have been standing a vigilant watch over the boundaries of the motherland for more than 60 years. The heroic actions.of our border troops have added brilliant pages to the history of the land of the soviets. Soviet border troops take pride in the fact that the formation of the border troops and the development of the basic principles of border defense under socialism are inseparably liniced with the name of.Vladimir I1'ich Lenin. V.I. Lenin saw the def ense of the borders as an important function of the socialist state. "We insist upon the necessity ~of the state," V.I. Lenin declared, "and the state presumes borders."1 He proceeded to substantiate his conclusion,concerning the need to sterngthen the Soviet borders in every possible way and to carry on a determined struggle against any attempt to weaken their security. V.I. Lenin emphasized that even "a partial, selective opening of the borders carries with it the most serious risks in the sense of permitting the penetration of Russia by all kinds of agents without our having the least chance of controlling it."2 ~ The basic principles of border defense are based on Lenin's teaching concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland. Even before the October revolution V.I. Lenin wrote: "Socialists can and must acknowledge [the necessity of] a military defense of the fatherland /only/ after that fatherland has been restructured on a socialist b asis, that is, a~efense of the proletarian socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie." The thesis on the defense of the socialist fatherland follows naturally from Lenin's theory of ~the socia~list revolution and his conclusion concerning the possibility of its victory in a single country taken individually. V.I. Lenin emphasized that this victory will provoke "a direct attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to destxoy the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. War on our part would under these circumstances be legitimate and ~ustified."4 With the victory in our country of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the defense of the socialist fath erland became a task of immediate practical im- portance. "Now, from 25 October 1917," Vladimir I1'ich declared, "we are the defenders; from this day we are for the defense of the fatherland... We are for the defense of the Russian Soviet Social3st Republic."5 . 21 FOR OFFICIl~;. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300024442-4 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY On the b~zsis of Lenin's direction the party defined the role of border security within the system of armed defense of ~he achievements of the revolution... Experience accumulated in the struggle against the numerous enemies of Soviet rule showed that reliable border security required special troops employing methods of detecting and neutralizing enemy spies and smugglers. Steps were taken from the very beginning of the etfort to set up a border service to combine military security with the activities of the VChK, and the first border troops learned revolutionary vigilance from the renowned Chekists. I.eaning on the creative experience of the masses, the party undertook a search for the most advantageous forms of border-defense-forr_e organization until it concluded that it was necessary to include them within the state se;,urity system. This made possible a fuller demonstration of the function of the border troops maintaining the security of the country along its borders. From the moment of their establishment, the border troops were, and remain, at the same time an integral component of the Armed Forces of the Soviet state. They operate on the basis of the same Leninist principles of military organization which are the laws governing the life of the Soviet Armed Forces. The most imp~rtant among them concerns the leadership to be exercised by the _ Communist Party as the guiding and directing force of socialist society and the core of its political system. The decree adopted ~n December 1918 by the Central Committee.of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) upon the initiative of V.I. Lenin, "The Policy of the Military Department," was oriented toward strengthening the.~arty's influence within the Red Army. This party aim fully applied to the border troops as well. With the aid of its ccmmissars, political organs and unit (chast') and subunit (podrazdeleniye) party organ- izations, the party strengthened its leadership within the border forces and organized political among their personnel. The border troops became a reliable instrument of the party and its peaceful foreign and con- structive and creative domestic policy. The Communist Party carried, and carries, the class principle into practice in the organization of the border forces. The border forces were created as _ an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat and as a weapon in the struggle on behalf of the interests of the workers and peasants now liberated f~om capitalism. The border troops are now an integral part of the structure of a socialist state of the whole people, in which the working class plays the leading role. V,I. Lenin and the Communist Party established on a sound basis and implemented the principle of the indestructible unity of the border troops and the people, the indissoluble ties between the border guards and the masses of working people. The border forces are guided in all their activities by the principle of - proletarian, socialist internationalism. They have always come to the aid of the working people of neighboring states. The formation of the world socialis t system led to the military collaboration of the border guards of the socialist countries. The protection of their borders is a cause common to all members I 22 ; FOR OFFICIti,'_, USE ONLY i ~ , . , . . . : i _ . : _ _ _w... ~ , : . . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR UFFICCAL U5E ONLt of the socialist commonwealth. V.I. Lenin's prophetic words hvae been real- ized; he wrote: "To the old world, the world of national oppression, national - disputes and national isolation, the workers oppose a new world of the cn~.ty of the working people of all nations...."6 Devotion to communist ideals, loyalty to the great motherland, unshakable steadfastness and constant'readiness to do battle with the enemy for the _ triumph oi the cause of conununism, high levels of organization and discip.line and irr~proachable integrity and honesty--all of these traditions of our party have found their reflection in the military activities of the troops on the border. As an integral component of the Soviet Armed Forces, the border troops have added their contribution to the glorious traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy: heroism, valor, boldness, combat experience, deep ideological convic- tions, vigilance, professional skill and boundless devotion to the Soviet motherland. As was the case with all personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, their loyalty - to their military oath, mass-scale heroism in action and great courage in protecting and deFending the national borders became the border guards' greatest traditions. Examples from the Great Patriotic War provide graphic evidence of this. And now today, in our developed socialist society, the protection of our national bor~'ers likewise remains one of the important factors involved in insuring the counCry's security and the armed defense of the boundaries of the socialist fatherland. ~ , The borders with capitalist countries and with China have become lines of - active enemy subversion. Enemy ideological diversionary activity has now become wide-ranging in scop.e. The intelligence gathering activities Qf the imperialist states are b ecoming more cunning and insidious and more sophisti- _ cated in both form and metho~l. The enemy is striving more vigorously and effectively to utilize the ex~~nding channel of international tourism as well as other~connections. Auiong the many fronts on which the ideological struggle against the JSSR is waged, bourgeozs propagandists have now conjured the myth of the "closed society," the essence of which comes down to the demand that the borders of the Soviet Union be opened. The border troops are the subject of attacks in this connectiori as well. "ivo," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev emphasized at the Berlin conference of European Communist Parties, "the socialist countries are not 'closed societies.' We are open to everything truthful anii'honesr; and we are prepared to exploit favorable opportunities in every possible way to increase contacts, which contribute to detente. But our doors will always be closed to publications propagandizing war, the use of force, racism and hat~`ed. All the more tightly will they remain closed to the emissaries of~f~reign secret services and the - anti-Soviet emigre organizations they set up." 23 FOR OFFICIA:. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 - FOR OFFICTAL USL O~1LY Under present day conditions, in which imperialist and Maoist provocations directed toward the disruption of detente are on the rise, the border troops remain a vital component in the overall system providing fo r the country's national security. They function today within the framework of the new con- stiCution, which legislatively conf irms the Leninist princip le of the invio- lability of borders. The Communist Party is therefore striving tirelessly as always to provide reliable assurance of their security. Drawing upon the powerful productive forces of a developed socialism and the achievements of Che Soviet people in the areas of economic, cultural and sc ientific develop- ment:, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Governmen t have during re- cent years taken a number of steps in the direction o� improving border security, strengtt?ening the border forces and increasing the vig:ilance of personnel. Important programmatic documents for the activities of the border troops are _ the Greeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Pres idium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the uSSR to the :nen on the borders in connection with the 60th anniversary of the formation ~ of the bord er troops and the letter from Comrade L:I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to personnel of outstanding-ratecl border posts bEaring the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. L.I. Brezhnev as well as members of the Central Committee Po litburo devote constant attention to the protection of the national borders . Tl~iey visit border posts and vessels and interest themselves in the life, service and conditions of the border txoops. Their paternal concern insp ires them to the gerformance of new patriotic deeds. Fur.ther exp ansion of the party's role in insuring the national security and - protecting the borders and the sterngthening of the party's influence on all aspects of the life and activity of the border guards is a natural and con- sistent development of the present day. Exercising its direction of the organs and troops of the KGB, the Communist Party is develop ing and implement- ing a sound, scientifically based policy directed toward the undeviating executi~n of decisions which have been made concerning the protection and - defense of the b orders of the socialist fatherland and organizing political parLy work, seeing it as the most important condi~ion insuring great vigilance and skill on the part of border guard personnel. The content of this polit- ical training is enriched through creative study of the materials of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the new constitution and the thes es and conclusions contained in the speeches and reports of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general sec- retary of the CPSU Central Committee. Implementati.on of the party's economic plans as outlined by the 25th Con,gress , of the CPSU is making it possible to continue providing our troops with the latest weapons and equipment. The border troops have now become motorized, and the process of raising the level of technical equipment of the subunits directly protecting the national borders has been intensified. Troops tactics and the means and methods of operational performance are being continuously improved, the reliability of our border security ever increasing as a result of these efforts. 21~ FOR OFFICI~;, USE ONLY . : . : . ~ , . _ : . . . - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are not failing to devote attention required to problems associated with the creative elaboration of the theory of national border defense and are taking care to insure that border troop organization measures up the mission to be accomplished. They are outlining the main directions and courses to be followed in the further .:arch for :improved modes and methods of border defense and insuring the widespread introduction of scientific methods into the organization of border-troop com- mand and control. The scope and direction of these current scientific efforts ~ are governed by the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU and subsequent Central Committee decrees. . Human beings, however, play the primary and decisive role in protecting our borders in an environment of sharp resistance, to.the aggressive forces of imperialism. Serving in the border gurads are fighting men who are educated, who are well capable of handling the 1.atest military weapons and equipment and who have been trained and indoctrinated in the military and Chekist tra- ditions. They demonstrate high levels of political vigilance, ideological steadfastness and moral and psychological preparation.. In performing their vital tasks in connection with protecting the boundaries, ~ defending the borders of the socialist state,,the border forces view border defense as an integral element of ineasures taken to insure the country's national security. The amicable and harmonious relationships between the border guards and the organs and personnel of the MVD [Ministry of Internal - Affairs], as well as with subunits and units of the Soviet Armed Forces, are becoming ever stronger. The ties between the border troops and the working people of the border areas are also developin~ and improving with each passing year. This is an entirely natural process. The increased role played by the popular masses in insuring ~ the security of the country, in protecting the national borders is a character- istic feature of socialist society, one which has received legislative con- firmation in the Basic Law. Today as never before the words ring out firmly and resolutely: "The entire Soviet people defend the borders of the mother- land." Each day sees an incerase in the activity of workers, kolkhoz peasants and national intelligentsia in maintaining the necessary border state, main- - taining technical apparatus along the border in its proper condition and in detaining border violators. The border troops value highly the assistance they zeceive from local residents in insuring the inviolability of the national boundaries of the USSR. The border troops' more than 60 years' accumulated operational experience indicates that consistent application of Lenin's idea, "be alert," is one of the crucial conditions for ins.uring a reliabZe defense of the sacred borders , of our motnerland. Our border guards today lead a tense life full of surprises. Along the bor- der, just as in a combat situation, there may arise complex situations re- quiring skill, boldness, initiative and decisiveness. The men in the green service caps are fu11y aware of their responsibility to the motherland for.the 25 - FOR OFFICItu. USE ONLY . z. ~ : ~ ; . , . .a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 I FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONL1' reliable protection of the national borders of the USSR, and they are following strictly the traditions established by the early Chekists of the world's first socialist state and enriched by the heroic heirs to their glorious legacy. The book now offered the readers described the history of the formation and development of the border troops from the time of their organi2ation to the present time and the difficult military service life of the men along the border, each minute, each hour of which is filled with danger, vigilantly protecting the boundaries of the socialist fatherland. "S~cialism," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev poi~.ts out, "can be maintained only if the working people's authority is capable of defending the revolution against any attack by the class enemy."$ In defending the peaceful labors of the Soviet people, in defending socialism, the Soviet border guards are executing strictly their orders from the party and the neople. Conclusion The book "The Guards Over the Soviet Border" is not simply a military history of the border troops. It contains the story of people, of those who contin- uously stand their honored watch along the frontiers of the motherland. , riore than one generation of young fighting men has taken its turn on the bor- ' der since the country's sacred boundaries were first placed under protection. - Uniting them all as sons of a single mother, the socialist motherland, have been, and are, a passionate love for their native land, boundless devotion to the Communist Party, loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and to mi~itary tradition, cbritinuous contact with the people, unflagging vigilance and a deep awareness of their personal responsibility for the protection of the borders. Th~~e nobles qualities displayed by the guards over the Soviet borders are , being passed on from generation to generation. They have now been passed to the Komsomol members and other youth born in the early 1960's. , Many y~ars of experience have shown that undeviating adherence to Lenin's teachings concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland and the need to ~ insure the inviolability of the borders of the socialist state constitutes a guarantee of successful border protection and border-troop organization. Formed under the direction of the Communist Party at the will of V.I. Lenin, the border troops have always been an object of its attention and concern. This produces a sense of pride in our border guards, multiplies their strengths and inspires them to military achievement. Z`he border troops have been worthy bearers of their battle flags throughout the entire history of the Soviet state. They have executed the military ' missions with which they have been charged in honorable fashion at all stages in the building of sociali~m and communism. 26 FOR OFFICIlu. USE ONLY . ~Yn?J~'+r~. ~u a~....~'~ . � . ~ , ...:~~,a ~ . . . . ..,~.a~.' , . - . . . . " _ . . . . . . : ~ , ~ : ~ ~:+f . . . - . - . . . _ . . . ~ . ' . . . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOF OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Communist Party and the Soviet Government are consistently implementing the decision os the 25th Party Congress and the November (1978) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the achievement of continued growth in the motherland's economic strength and a higher material and spiritual level of life for the Soviet people and devoting constant attention to increasing the def ensive capability of the country and to insuring reliable protec~ion of the borders. This has been brought about by the difficult~international situation. Mili- tarist circles in the USA and other capitalist countries are trying to destroy detente; they are intensifying their aggressive activifiies and supercharging the atmosphere along the borders. As recents have shown, the Beijing clique, which with criminal lightheartedness has set its military machine in motion, is creating a serious threat to peace. C~ina's armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam once again lays bare the true aims of Beijing's policy of combining in a bloc with, making advances toward today's most arrantly reactionary forces. In his speech at the pre-election meeting of voters in the Bauman electoral : district, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev pointed out that, citing what they refer to as the "Soviet threat," the imperialists are calling for the allocation of more and more billions for military purposes. "They are trying to crush the peoples' movement for liberation by force and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. The position of the Chinese leadership is - increasingly toward this imperialist policy. "With their Lnprecedentedly brazen and rapacious a,tta~k on a.small neighboring country, socialist Vietnam ,the present Chinese rulers have finally revealed to the entire world the insidious, aggressive nature of the hegemonistic, great-power policy they are pursuing. Everybody now sees that it is pre- cisely this policy that is presently the most serious threat to peace in the - entire world."9 The imperialists' and Maoists' efforts to aggravate the international situation have been accompanied by an intensification of the secret subversive activities ; of enemy special services and an activation of ifleological diversions along the national frontier. To a great exten"t this is what determines the nature and orientation of the border troops' activities.and underlines the political and military importance of the taSk of protecting our country against pene- tration of its borders by enemy agents and other subversive enemy actions. From Chukotiya to Brest, from Kushka to the latitudes of the Arctic, the border guards are vigilantly protecting the borders of the Soviet state. The motherland has placed them on the front line i~n the struggle to thwart the schemes of the enemies~of peace and socialism in the full knowledge that they can be relied upon and that they will not allow anyone to violate our bor- der. Acquitting themselves with honor, the Soviet border troops indeed jus- tify the great trust the motherland has reposed i.n them. 27 FOR OFFICIA,'. USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL US~ 0(~LY The best sons of the Soviet people stand guard on the borders of this develop~d socialist society. Only the worthiest are assigned to the border troops. The border gaurds always keep in mind and take pride in the fact that V.I. Lenin and F.E. Dzerzhinskiy stood at their cradle. "The notable traditions of former generations of border troops," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev wrote to personnel of border guard posts imeni Heroes ~f the Soviet Union, "their heroism and daring, their boundless devotion to the cause of the Communist Party live on in the military life of our younger t~oops--reliable sentinels for the motherland."10,. Successful implementation of plans for communist construction outlined by the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the development of a strong national industrial base and extensive exploitation of advances resulting from progress in science and technology have made possible the achievement of qualitative changes in the equipment of our border troops and add to the resources available to them for insuring reliable protection for the border in the struggle against cunning enemy secret service agents. Border subunits and units have now become highly technically equipped and maneuverable. Their military and other, special-purpose equipment fully mea- sures up to present-day requirements. High-speed ships�and boats, airplanes and helicopters, motor vehicles, armored personnel carriers, instruments for observation, warning and communication equipment, radar and so �orth are all. making possible reliable protection for our borders. But vigilance is the border guards;' main weapon. ~On the border one feels with special intensity why it is the party so pointedly puts the matter of the necessity of increasing ideological vigilance with a view to the aggressive intentions and ideological diversions of imperialism and Maoism. In the developed socialist society the CPSU sees the political vigilance of the Soviet people and its military personnel as a most important public oU- - ligation as well as a patriotic and international duty. "The increasing political, military and economic importance attaching to pro- tection of the motherland's borders poses the task of further improving the modes and methods of border-troop operation, strengthening military discipline and raising the level of combat ski7.1 and vigilance on the part of our per- sonnel," declared Comrade Yu. V. Andropov; "each border guard must remain continually aware of his personal responsibility for strict adherence to officially required border procedures and maintenance of border arrange- ments."11 Soviet border guards have been entrusted with our most'closely concealed affairs--the preservation of the tranquillity and secuiity of the Soviet people in their advance toward communism. The constructive, creative labors of the steel worker and mechanical engineer, the worker in the kolkhoz~field and the geologist; the productive work of the writer and, the scientist; the peaceful sleep of the infant in its cradle--these would all be unthinkable without the vigilant service of our border troops. 2$ FOR OFFICIti; 'USE ONLY ~iu":. aS,. xvi~,:-~.;5essaw.;r.b a .4.r..:9-sxm,m ..xr.,...~i ~r,ek~~:.,.:..'art..s-c...r'.~~ . ~ , . . . . , , . , . rcc.. ~.....c.,.>..., . r . _ ; , i', ..-F APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOIt OFFICIAL USE ONLY Proceeding on the basis of the programmatic theses of the 25th Congress of the CPSU and the decisions of the November (1978) plenum of the CPSU Central Com- mittee, the political organs and party organizations within the border forces are continuously improving the modes and methods employed in political party work in connection with developing vigilance in barder personnel. In addition to propagandizing the successes of the Soviet people in building communism, special attention is devoted to exposure of the aggressive nature of imperial- ism and Maoism and to shedding light upon their subversive actions along our national borders. The great vigilance of our border personnel finds its practical expression in their adherence to communist principles; continuous combat readiness; dis- cipline; bold and decisive actio~ in seizing and~holding border violators; knowledge of~the techniques, methods and�devices resorted to by enemy spies - in crossing a national border and in�their ability to preserve state and military secrets and personal and official documents and to remain forever alert. . Today's border guards are experts in their field, skilled in quickly and accurately "reading" a violator's trail, as well as in utilizing advanced _ technology and the troop's faithful friend--the border guard dog. The factor of vigilance under present-day conditions--this is the weapon with which the border guards of all countries of the socialist commonwealth are armed, the weapon which inspires confidence in its power and helps maintain the inviolability of the borders of our motherland and of the entire socialist commonwealth. When the Soviet border guard goes on his honored duty, he knows . that at that very moment the Polish and Bulgarian border troops are standin~ vigilantly at their borders, preserving with him the peace of the socialist world; that the troops of heroic Vietnam are repulsing the invasio~ of the Chinese aggressors; that Cuba's coastal guard is keeping a vigilant eye on the plots and schemes of the American imperialists; and that the border troops of _ the Mongolian People's Republic, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslo~rakia and Rumania ~ are reliably maintaining the security of the countries of the socialist com- monwealth. Executing the orders of the party and the Soviet people, the border troops now, ~ust as 60 years ago, are mai~taining the inviolability of the boundaries of the Soviet state.through their sel�less military service; they are success- fully cutting off the numerous attempts to violate our borders and suppressing enemy provocations, political and economic contraband a.nd 3deological diver-- sions. � The border of our motherland, along which the Soviet border ~roops stand their unchanging watch, stretches 67,000 km. Each passing day brings us new demon- strations of their steadfastness and courage and .their great va.ligance in protecting the national borders of the USSR. 29 FOR OFFICI~'i,'., USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOOTNOTES 1. V.I. Lenin, "Po1n. sobr. soch" [Complete Works], vol 31, p 435. 2. Ibid., vol 45, p 337. 3. Ibid., vol 30, p 198. 4. Ibid., p 133. 5. Ibid., vol 35, p 395. 6. Ibid., vol 23, p 150. 7. L.I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [On a Leninist Course: Speeches and ArticlesJ, Moscow, 1978, vol 6, p 58. 8. Ibid., vol 6, p�588. 9. L.I. Brezhnev, "In the Name of the Happiness of the Soviet People: A Speech at a Meeting~with Voters of Moscow's Bauman Electoral District on 2 March 1979," Moscow, 1979, pp 16-17, 10. POGRANICHNIK, No 7, p 2. " 11. "Sbornik statey Glavnogo i Politicheskogo upravleniy pogranichnikh voysk KGB USSR], 1978, No 5, p 8. COPYRIGHT: POLITIZDAT, 1979 8963 CSO: 1801 30 FOR OFFICI~,�., USE ONLY t~,ti�~..,.~ i, ; . - , . . . . ~ ~ . . , ~ : . : , , . . : . . . : ; ` . . ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BOOK EXCERPTS: EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGET DETECTION Moscow EFFEKTIVNOST' OBNARUZHENIYA TSELEY in Russian 1980 signed to press 20 Aug 79 pp 1-io, 2~+-25, 52,93, i26, i56-i58 [Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction, etxcerpts from chapters 1-5, and Bibliography of book by V. A. Gorbunov] [Excerpts] Title Page: Title: EFFEKTIVNOST' OBNARUZHENIYA TSELEY (Effectiveness of Target Detection) Publisher: Voyenizdat Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1980 Signed to Press Date: 20 August 1979 Number of Copies Published: 12,000 Number of ~ages: 160 Brief Description: This book presents a classificafion of surveillance systems on the basis of - various criteria and examines methods of evaluating the effectiveness of radar means of surveillance as sources of information for modern automated control systems. The author examines the principles of efficient placement of ineans of search and detection, methods of calculation and evaluation of the effectiveness of simple and multiple-component suxveillance systems. The description is illustrated by examples of evaluation of effectiveness of target detection. This book is based on materials published in the foreign press. It is intended for military specialists working with ob- servatian and surveillance equipment and for readers with an interest 3n problema of target search and detection. Table of Contents Tntroduction 3 . 31 FOR OFFICIti:. USE ONLY 4r . .,...t'a'vW~ ~ ' ~ ~ . ..',1, ~.~ii"vd~n'+sr~J.' ._.r.'. .mf_.i~:.MZV.!....t:.::,. . . .xi..-'.�., :.' .e u.,i.~. .u,.. r.~... ~r,.v.. e. _....i...~ i )v.a,~~....~va,A.~F.._ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020042-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300024442-4 FOR UFFICiAL US~ ONLY Chapter l. General Premises. Target Detection Criteria _5 1.1. Basic Terms and Definitions 1.2. General Description and Classification of Surveillance $ Systems 1.3. Features of.Design.of Integrated and Nonintegrated Sur- veillance 9ystems 10 1.4. Instrumental and Tactical Search Modes, Principal In- dicators of Their Effectiveness 14 1.5. Criteria for Evaluating Target Detection Capability. 19 Some Problems of General Methodology Chapter 2. Effective Range of Surveillance Equipment 24 2.1. Methods of Estimating Anticipated Effective Range 2.2. Concept of Surveillance Instrument Range Distributions 31 2.2.1. Uncertainty of the Act of Target Detection by a Surveillance Instrument. Random Character of Range of Establishment of Instrument.Contact 2.2.2. Distribution of Effective Range 33 2.2.3. Standard Laws of Range Distribution 37 2.2.4. Concept of Distribution of Con�ealment Range and 40 Receding Target Surveillance Itange 2.3. Method of Statistical-Probability Description of An- - ticipated.Effective Range 41 2.3.1. Figuring in Uncertainty of Physical Conditions of Establishing Contact 42 2.3.2. Standard Effective Range Distribution Curves 44 2.3.3. Probability Characteristic of Effective Zone of Surveillance Instrument in a Horizontal Plane 46 2.3.4. Figuring Altitude (Depth) of Target Movement. Detection Zone in Space 4$ Chapter 3. Effectiveness of Establishment of Instrument Contacts 52 3.1. Mathematical Description of Processes of Establishment of Instrument Contacts " " ' S3 3.I.1. Instantaneous Target Detection Probabilities 56 3.1.2. Accumulating Target Detection Probabilities 3.1.3. Methods of Determining Analytical Relations for the 59 Law of Establishment of Instrwnent Contact 3.2. Distribution of Detection Range for a Target Traveling 64 on a Course Parameter~Other Than Zero - 3.2.1. Dist-~ibution of Lateral Detection Range 68 3.2.2. Dif.tribution of True Detection Range 3.3. Methods of Determinating Effective Range (Detection) Characteristics 72 3.3.1. Effective Range of Detection of a Target Moving on 73 a Course Parameter C1ose to Zero 3.3.2. Effective Radius of Action and Effective Surveillance Unit 74 3.3.3. Effective Search (Detection) Bandwidth for a Target 77 Moving on a:Course Parameter,Other Than Zero _ 32 FOR OFFICIti,'.. USE ONLY . p~�;:; Sit~GW4s.^S4