JPRS ID: 9278 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020050-1
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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1~OI2 OFFI('IA1. I~tiN: ONI,Y
JPRS L/9278
28 August 1980 _
/ �
Near East North Afreca Re ort
p _
CFC~UO 32/80)
FBI$ Fl7REIGN BROA~CAST INFORMAT~ON SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPR5 L/9278
2 8 Auqus t 19 8 0
HEAR EAST/~IORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 32/~30)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AF'~'AIRS
~ Needy Arab Nations Urged To Provide Security for
AOPEC Money
(AI~-WATAN AI,-sARABI, 21-27 Jun 80) l
Exorbitant Corrm~issions, Bribes Ca11ed Main Causes of
~ Corruption
(AI~-WATAN AZ-'~iR~ABI, 3 May-6 Jun 80) 6
Illegal Financial Activita~es
Two Prominent Middlemen
Historic Arab Ilivisiveness 1}iscussed
(AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Jun 80) 16 .
ALGERIA
Arrr~y Wins: General Staff Restored ~
(JEtTNE AFRIQUE,30 Jul SO) 19
MAURITANIA
Evidence of ~Intolerance, Repression, Vengeance~ Deplored
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jul 80) 21
Abolition of Slavery Hailed ~
(JEITNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jul 80) ~5
SAUDI ARABIA,
Saudis Preoccupi.ed With Balancing Modernism With 7.`radition
(AI~-WATAN AL-~ARABI, 7.4-20 Jun 80) 26
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO~
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TUNISIA
Meaning of Increased Strikes Analyzed
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRtQUE, 25 Jun 80) 3~
Improvement in Agricultural Output Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ~T MEDITFRRAN'r~E[JS, 1 Aug SO) 31~
0
~d
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
NEEDY ARAB NATIONS URGE~J TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR AOPEC MONEY
Paris AL-WATAN t~.L-'ARABI iii Arabic 21-27 Jun 80 pp 45-47
[Article: "Arab Funds Give Banks of the Worlc~ Indigestion; Where Will
Surplus of 100 Billion Petrodollars Go This Y~.ar? Foreign Banks Are
Threatening to Refuse OPEC Deposits if They Are Not Invested f~r Long
- Terms"]
[Text] Arab oil money accumulating in foreign banks face the threat that
these banks might not be able to absorb it or invest it. It is also
feared that this money might be frozen in the event of a political crisis
between the Arabs and the West. Why ig it that the non-oil producing
Arab countries uo not offer the necessary guaranteees ~or the investment
of this money in development, industrial and agricultural projects?
This question is directed to the countries that own rhese deposits and to
their sister countries which are in dire need for such deposits.
Estimates show that the OPEC countries will have a surplus this year of
100 to 120 billion dollars, and that this surplus could reach, within a
period of 5 years, 500 billion dollars.
What would the oil producing countries ~io with this legendary wealth?
Traditional financial policies of the OPEC countries haye developed very
little irom 1940 until 1980. These countries have gained some.experience
in circulating their surplus in the international banking system. How-
ever, these countries are still conservative and cautious on one hand. On
the other, they lack iong range financial and banking planning and coordin-
ation which would guarantee stable and qualified investment.
- The international banking system was successful in absorbing the financial
surplus of the OPEC countries last year, and was able to circulate it, or
in other words, was able to successfully transform it into short and long
term loans for the developing countries.
Statistics of the International Settlements Bank show that the commercial
banks received during the past year finar_cia~ surpluaes estimated at 30
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billion dollars, and that these banks were able to offer 24 billion of
these surplu~es in the form of loans to the developing countries.
The banks which took part in this complicated and successful financial
operation were the major banks of the top ten industrial countries, over-
' seas branches of American banks and banks in such countries as Switzerland,
Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg.
To appreciate the measure of success of the international banking system
in circulating the oil money, one must bear in mind that this operation
was conducted under unfavorable circumstances for the banks. Th~se circum-
stances were represented by tight money policy and a rise in the interest
rate in the U.S., strict lend~ng requirements imposed by international
banks (e.g. the Internatior3l Monetary I+und and the World Bank), and the
negative eff~acts of the freezing of Iranian assets in American banks and
- in their branches overseas.
Hardships of the Developing Countries
This success in absorbing and circuZating the financial surpluses of the
OPEC does not mean that this will continue to be possible in the future.
Experts of the European Common MarkPt say that the international monetary
system will face a crisis in trying to circulate this money in 1982.
It seems that the international monetary system will be capable of absorb-
ing and circulating the financial surpluses this year and the following
one. However, with the rise in inflation, the developin3 countries which
- have weak economies will face a severe crisis in repaying their debts in
1981, and in getting new loans to finance development and imports.
In fact a number of private commercial banks have begun to be hesitant in
offering loans to the developing countr3.es, in view of the increase in
their. existing debts and the failure of somP of them to either repay these
debts or to request that they be refinanced.
Statistics of the European Common Market show that the debts of the develop-
ing countries have increased from 75 billion dollars to 250 billion dollars
_ during the past 7 years, and that these debts are exQected to reach 400
billion dollars in 1982.
The oil countries offer tremendous assistance to the developing countries
which exceedsthat offered by the advanded industrial countries. However,
with regard to their financial surpluses on deposit in foreign bank3, the
~ OPEC countries, like any businessman, want to loan them for short terms,
not exceeding six periods and for secured interest, while the developing
- countries try to secure loans for relatively low interest rates and for
long terms.
There are two dangerous aspects of this crisis. The developing countries
want, at the present time, to secure loans to repay their previous ones.
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This means that these new loans are not being used any more to finance de-
velopment and reconstruction pro3ects. Instead, they are increasing the
financial burdens of countries which are becoming poorer and poorer as a
result of this. But, what is the solution for this slowly approaching
crisis?
What Ys the Role of International Banks?
Co~ercial banks are currently calling upon the international banks and
institutions to help them in absorbing and circulating oil money surpluses.
The call is ma~nly made to two international banks: the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
_ The commercial banks are capable of securing OPEC financial surpluses and
offering them to the developing countries at terms ~asier than thoae under
which the two banks are offerir..o *.heir loans presently.
However, the two world banks are hesitant about absorbing any additional
surpluses, mainly because they are presently offering large loans (sic).
Another suggestion is that the OPEC countries should themselves offer loans
- in the form of bilateral contracts to the developing countriea or to the
developed countries which are suffering from financial or commercial
deficits.
In fact, bilateral contracts and transactions have been made between Saudi
Arabia and Germany, whereby Germany received a large Saudi loan to cover
tr~e deficit in its national budget.
An indication of the beginning of the inability of the international bank-
ing system to absorb and circulate oii money surpluses is the sudden
disappearance of billio~s of dollars from commercial banks. Banking experts
in international money markets say that some of these biilions have migrated
to the U.S. not as bank deposits, but in payment for real estate and bonds.
It is said also that some Middle Eastern oil countries have made large se-
cret transactions for the purch~se of gold from the Soviet Union in exchange
for dollars, which are being sought by the Soviets to finance their pur-
chases from the West.
An intense battle is presently under way between the owners and directors
of commercial banks and the OPEC countries, mainly tre Arab oil producing
, countries, for the purpose of convincing these countries to leave their
large deposits in these banks for long periods ranging between four and
five years, instead of for short-term periods which do nct exceed six months.
Commercial banks claim that they will fail, under curre~,t conditions, to
absorb, circulate and invest the oil money in the developing countries. The
battle has reached the level of threats and blackmail. Some banks are even
calling for solidarity in refusing� oil revenues.
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Some Western experts say *hat, in the end, freezing bank deposits will lead
the oil producing countries to lower their oil production. This would be
natural, sinc2 it is better to retain the oil wealth in the ground than to
maintain paper money in banks where its value depreciates by the effect of
inf lation.
LoWering oil produ~tion would mean higher demand and lower supply. This
situation would eventually lead to large sporadic leaps in oil pricea whi~h
would cause inflationary pressures in the industrial countrtes and lead to
waves of economic stagnation. In the end, a11 concerned parties would suf- `
fer from the failure to reach a formula to absorb and circulate the oil
revenue .
011 Revenues Are Heading Toward the Arab Market _
However, there is an increasing tendency on the part of the Arab OPEC coun-
tries to invest their finar.cial surpluses in the Arab and Islamic world in
an attempt to liberate the money markets and industry from Western domina-
tion.
In fact, large banks and compani~s have been established during the current
and past year. It also has been decided to establish an insurance company
with a 3.5 billion dollar capital to compete with Lloyds of London which has
a capital of 4.5 billion dollars. The reason behind such a move was the
fact that Lloyds increased its insurance rates on shipping to the Gulf area
under the pretext that it is a dangerous area.
The Arab League of Nations is currently preparing a campaign for econo~ic
cooperation and coordination among its 21 members. This campaign aims at
working equitably with the Arab.economic blocks for the purpose of invest-
ing Arab money in the rapid development of Arab projects. ~
In fact, the Arabs are no longer rushing their money tu the United States. _
Instead, they are searching for a more stable and aecure market. There
are now between 30 and 40 billion Arab petrodollars {n =he U.S. market. _
- However, this sum has not decreased, but has also not increased since tl:e
U.S. government froze the 8 billion do llars of Iranian assets.
An Arab financial inst:itution, which is the Arab Mouetary Fund, has been
established in order to coordinate the Arab economic policies. ~
A draft c~f the Arab economic charter will be submitted through the Secretar-
iate General of the Arab League to the Arab Economic Summit Conference which
is to be held at the end of the current year.
The largest and most successful Arab economic pro~ects are those of the
CAPEC such as: a ship maintenance and repair company in Bahrain and a mar-
itime shipping company. However, prof its are low in comparison to the size
of the investment.
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- There is real interest among the Arab Gulf oil countries in increasing their
_ investments in the Arab Islamic countries. Saudi Arabia is encouraging
private capital to be invested in Arab markets, rather than in Western mar-
kets, and Kuwait is investing more than one-fourth of its financial reserves
in Arab markets.
_ Several Arab countries have begun establishing ~oint companies in partner-
ship with both Arab and radical (socialist) countries.
There are also several Arab banking and financial institutions with partners
_ such as Kuwait, Libya and the UAE.
Howevsr, there are political, administrative and financial obstacles which
prevent the flow of Arab ~il money toward investment opportunitiea in Arab
rion-oil producing countries.
This could be caused by either political inetability or faulty administra-
tive systems which hamper money transfecs and economic pro~ects.
In addition, Arab capital needs investment security with regard to ultimate
repatriation of the investment and its profits. It is very possible that
the absence of such security prevents the investment of Arab capital in
Arab markets, and forces tt to seek security and easy profits in areas dis-
tant from the Arab world.
The cold safes anc~ vaults of foreign banks are filled with Arab aeposits a~d
accounts. These banks look for favorable opportunities, proper guarantees
and carefully studied pro3ects before they agree to finance them.
The non-oil producing Arab cuuntries are in dire need for these billions to
invest in their development pro3ects, to secure work for tens of thousands
of people, and eventually to secure social and political stability.
The opportunity is here, but it is the duty of the regimes of these coun-
tries to be more serious and concerned about attracting oil money than to
3ust wait for crumbs which fall from the tables of foreign banks and monetary
funds.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARA.BI
8988
CSO: 4802
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS -
EXOABITANT COMMISSIONS, BRIBES CALLED MAIN CAUSES OF CURRUPTION
Illegal Financial Activities -
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 3 May-6 .Tun 80 pp 27-30 ~
[Text] The exorbitant commissions that brokers, middlemen, local and for-
eign agents are receiving have become a phenomenon that is threatening the
political, economic and social stabil3.ty in the Middle East. AL-WATAN AL- n
'ARABI is shedding some light on this phenomenon, on its secrets, its secret ~
avenues and its negative effects. It is expressing the hope that ways and
pro~edures will be pre~,ared to eliminate this phenomenon in the area of
operaticns, transactions and ma~or industrial and commercial contracts.
This phenome~:,~~,.ts undermining the relationship between the ruler and the
citizen, on the one hand, and it is distrubing thp economic cycle, on the
other. _
On the street it is called a tip; in educated circles it is called a bribe;
and in commercial and economic circles as well as in administrative depart-
ments it is called a commission.
This [sum] varies from a few �rancs or pounds in the pocket of a worker in
a coffee shop, a restaurant, a hotel or a government civil servant to hun-
dreds of millions of dollars flowing into the pocket of an official, an
executive, a middleman, a client, a network or a joint, mutual corporation.
Whether it is Yarge or small, a bribe or a commission has destructive effects
on society, on politics, on the economy, on morals and on the state machinery.
Bribery is a common disease that has equally afflicted the young and the old,
the poor and the rich, small countries and rich countries. But it has as-
sumed the form of an epidemic and a disease that is spreading in the coun-
tries uf the Middle East as fortunes accumulate and as spending expands. It
is like cholera, which has become a native disease in the area after moving
to it fram parts of Africa and Central Asia.
The [average] citizen, especially in the Third World has come to believe that
his question or his problem cannot be solved through government channels with-
out a middleman or an agent and unless he pays the price. A bribe or a com-
mission has become like a passport, easy and fast; a bribe or a commission ~
has become the rule, and [complianc 6 with] the law is the exception.
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The matter is not confined to the citizen. When local and foreign companies
compete for contracts, they know that they have to pay a price or a commis-
sion to win the contract or the deal. And here a middleman is always ready
to play his overt or confidential role in promoting a contract between two
concerned parties--between a company and the administrative or governmental
agency in question.
With the exception of a few Third World countries, and also perhaps a few in
the capitalist and the socialist world, government and regimes have been ob-
viously unable to deal with this destructive form of curruption in spite of
the fact that the penalty [for such actions] in some of these countries may
be execution or life imprisonment.
General Laxity in Confronting Corruption '
There actually is general laxity in confronting this phenomenon of corrup*ion
for numerous reasons. Among those reasons is the fact that clients, middle-
men and brokers are most often a privileged group with broad influence and
close ties with those in power. [Another reason] is that corruption is no
longer confined to a privileged group, but it has overwhelmed a specific
class or segment, and this broad segment has joined [its forces] and held _
them together to conceal its corruption.
In a non-oil country in the Middle East there were almost mass resignations
_ among senior civil servants. Those people formed semi-superficial companies;
they obtained authorizations from foreign corporations; and they ~ntered the _
_ field of competition to obtain contracts to implement development and con-
struction projects listed in the development plans.
Those people benefited from the influenc~e they had in the past in the admin-
3strative agencies; from their friendships with their colleagues who stayed
in government; or from the�Lr contacts and the tempting offers they made to
senior executives to reap large fortunes in the shortest possible time.
The result was that enormous investments were wasted on pro~ects that were
not fully investigated economically and technically. ~
Today, it is not strange that opposition programs in the Middle East in par-
ticular and in the Third World in general are teeming with urgent demands
to abolish the role of middlemen and brokers in the economic and administra-
tive sectors. They are calling for the implementation of specific rules
and regulations in the drawing up of contracts and deals, and they are call-
ing for the adoption of a system of absolute secrecy in weighing ~:he offers
that are made to select the most suitable and the most economical.
The billions oi dollars which middlemen, brokers and functionaries have re-
ceived huve left their marks on the various aspects of life in the Middle
East. Suffice it here to make quick reference to some of the negative ef-
fects of commissions:
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They disrupt governmental and administrative activity, and they place a
secret authority in place of the official or the legitimate authority.
They spread an atmosp"r?ere of distrust in transactions with government
agencies, and [they bring about] the deterioration of morals and noble prin-
_ ciples which are required in a govsrnment official. -
They arouse citizens' suspicions about the integrity of senior officials
who control matters in the political leadership.
They shake up political stability in the country in question over the
long range, and they open the door for the appearance of movements that _
adopt political violence as a means for their actions and for their general ~
conduct. This is especially the case if administrative corruption accom-
panies suppression and political and social oppression.
Large commissions have inflationary effects since corporations which paid
these commissions to a limited number of people want to get them back quick-
ly from the public's pockets.
What Do the Statements of the Opposition Say?
There would be no objection to citing passages from a secret report distri-
buted recently by an opposition party in an Arab country. The report des-
cribes the negative results of commissions, bribes and administrative cor-
ruption:
"...A large portion of these (government) expenditures f inds its way into
the pockets of new or old local wealthy men in the form of purchases and _
supplies. In fact a portion of the business of foreign corporations was
guaranteed for local groups." ~
The report adds, "After the 1973 War the demand for entrepreneurs grew, and
some invitations to submit bids tha* were announced went begging for three
consecutive times. This provi3ed the opportunity for a not inconsiderable
number of people, who were close to men in government, to enrich themselves.
These contractual businesses used to produce for these men enormous sums of
money through the partnerships [they formed~ with the entrepreneurs."
After referring to the effects o� these economic "violations" on prices, the
report refers to the fact that the country in question rushed to obtain ma-
jor aid and loans from Arab, eastern and western countries. "It was thus
marginally possible to carry out private deals with foreign corporations
and their agents. These deals guaranteed for officials commissions that
could not be sneered a~. Those off icials acquired fortunes and capital in-
side the country and abroad."
Middlemen do not look alike nor do they have the same affiliation. There may
- be senior officers among them or executives who are not working in a govern-
ment agency; they are, however, close to a[government] official because of
friendship, a family relationship or a tribal or sectarian affiliation.
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The middleman may be a woman who can use her power and her influence to con-
clude profitable deals, or he may be a foreign agent. There are now scores
of prominent figures in the world of finance and politics traveling in the
_ capitals of the Middle East to conclude deals and to arrange commission rates.
Among those "desirable" figures who visited Cairo in the last few days were
- the Jewish ma~or financier, Baron Ae Rothschild; David Rockefeller, chairman
of the board of the Chase Manhattan Bank; Spiro Agnew, Nixon's former vice ,
president; ar~d Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency
and currently director of an American public relations firm. Those visitors `
are not strangers to these capitals.
The deposed Shah of Iran had relied totally on U.S. middlemen and brokers '
in particular--especially those like Rockefeller--to slip billions of dol-
lars of Iran's funds into the coffers of U.S. banks and corporations in re-
turn for projects that yielded a small or an imaginary return to his country,
or in r~turn for projects to purchase and amass weapons which the Iranian
army could neither absorb nor use. These weapons were purchased at prices
higher than their real prices, an3 the difference went to the Shah and to
the brokers.
Trading in Oil -
Trading in oil is a mark.et in itsel.f. Fantastic profits are realized in
this market by foreign oi~ companies, but after they pay a commission to the
functionaries.
The oil companies used to submit to the Iranian Ministry of Oil requests to
purchase quantities of oil outside the framework of the long-term contracts.
They would indicate their willingness to pay the official price determined
by the government. They would agree with the men of the [Shah's] court,
- who were brokers, clients and functionaries, to pay a secret "allowance"
above the official price. An imperial order would then be issued to the Min-
istry of Oil to sell the required quantity of oil to the company.
This allowance used to vary in some cases between 5 and 8 dollars for every
_ barr~al of oil. It would be possible to make an estimate of the commission if
we indicated that the smallest quantity of oil that would be purchased by any
company would be 100,000 barrels. This means that the middleman or the agent
would receive somewhere between half a million dollars and 800,000 dollars
for facilitating the conclusion of a deal. There is no doubt that scores of
deals are concluded on this basis per month.
The oil company in question would also realize fantastic profits from selling
the quantity of oil it obtained on the spot market in Rotterdam, for example.
Prices on the spot market are always higher than prices for long-term contracts.
This method is still being used now. International oil companies, and espec-
ially American companies, are still realizing fantastic profits from selling
OPEC oil which they obtain even at its current high prices.
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The 3rave nature of the commissions received by weapons merchants and mid-
dlemen may be estimated if we know that the world will spend close to 500
btllion dollars on weapons this year. This means that it will cost 20,000
dollars to equip one soldier.
Secret trading activity in the arms field has become one of the most danger-
aus commercial operations. It is more dangerous than trading in the area
of manufacturing and smuggling narcotics. Some clients and prominent weap-
- ons merchants have lost their lives in mysterious circumstances in the next
[s3c] few years as a result of the competition between the weapons racket- -
eers.
Other brokers and midd~emen have also been able to supply weapons through
complicated operations from communist countries to rightist countries or
regimes, or they were able to supply weapons from western countries to left-
ist countries or organizations. It is therefore not strang2, for e~cample,
for a Soviet or a Czech~slovakian Kalashnikov to show up in Che hands of .
some righti~t organizations in Lebanon or in the hands of Afghan inaurgents.
In most rases mu?~ti-national corporations play a negative role in the econ-
= omic cycles of ~ountries in the Middle East through the strong influence
that is practiced by their clients, their middlemen and the delegations of
their directors.
A European Common Market report says that multi-national corporations are
trying to gain control of the international economy through immoral means
such as corruption, extortion, threats and tax evasion.
Estimates indicate that there are /+,500 multi-national corporations and that
2,500 work in Europe and in the Middle East. Altogether they control be-
tween 650 and 750 billion dollars worth of international trade. At present,
efforts are being made in Eur~pe and in the United Nations to subject these
corporations to laws that determine their conduct and their moral course in
business and profit by monitoring their relations, their records and their
finances as well as the control they have over their branches.
Saudi Arabia has recently announced its third development plan which in- :
cludes about 300 billion ~ollars in expenditures for construction and devel-
opment pro~ects. Sources of foreign corporations are currently admittipg
that obtaining contracts to take part in implementing Saudi pro~ects has be-
come more difficult than at any time in the past because concerned Saudi
authorities are strictly observing the determination of specifications~and
conditions and also because they are making certain that the terms of the
contracts include the best conditions that are suitable to the interests of
the state.
There seems to be unanimity, however, among conservative and radical Arab
regimes that the role of a middleman in trade has been broadened and en-
larged in the seventies and has become predatory and negative.
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But major government efforts must be made in addition to the efforts that
have so far been made to reduce this role and to shrink it down to an appro- -
priate size without letting it have negative effects not only on the economy,
but also on all the various fields, and chiefly the political field.
Will the regimes actually be able to do this?
The matter is to a large degree tied to what can be done in the foreseeabl~
_ future. This is because popular sentiment against the role of brokers and
middlemen has increased noticeably under the delicate circumstances which
the area is experiencing. This is happening at a time when hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars are being budgeted for expenditures on growth, development
and services.
Two Promtnent Middlemen _
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 3 May-6 Jun 80 pp 30-31 .
. [Text] Ma~or middlemen and brokers who are men of business, finance and pol-
itics in the Middle East do not share their critics' opinion that brokerage
and mediation are improper activities in the international or regional econ-
omic cycle.
They generally view their roles in positive terms, and they consider them to
be legitimate or ratiher indispensable in the context of international trade
and economic cooperation between the countries of the world.
There are prominent Arab names in the field of business in the world. Those
people have achieved a major portion of their profits through brokerage op-
erations for which they received Iarge commissions.
The lights have been focused on names such as those of 'Adnan al-Khashuqji
Akram al-`Ajjah, Ghayth Fara'un and Rif'at al-Asad. This is perhaps because
those people have won fame in social or political circles in addition to
their economic and commercial fame.
But this does not prevent us from saying that those people are treated un-
fairly if people sometimes criticize them severely and bitterly and pursue
them with this criticism in their commercial operations or in their social
- activities. There are also Arab names that are almost unknown; the fortunes
ancl the profits of those may exceed the fortunes and profits of those with
famous names. The limelight does not fall on them, however, because they
stay away from the lights and prefer to work in the narrowest scope of fame
and publicity.
A1-Khashuqji Unhappy in Love, Happy in Trade
The most famous Arab business man at present is perhaps Mr 'Adnan al-Khash-
uq~i (45 years). He is a Saudi citizen of Turkish ancestry. His father
was a physician for the late King 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the founder of the Kingdom,
of Saudi Arabia.
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'Adnan made his way in the world of trade and finance with a small capital,
His daring and his close ties [with people] enabled him to achieve a hugh
fortune gradually and to establish a complicated network of corporations,
organizations and businesses all over the globe.
"Adnan was destined to pursue his business in,the Middle East and in the
world away from the limelight. But his friendship with a number of senior
politicians in the world and his entry into the society of the jet-set in
- the United States and in Europe has made him a target for the goodwill and
the ill will of the major yellow newspapers in the world.
The interests of these newspapers soon turned from al-Rhashuqji's social
activities to his commercial activities. His reputation was slightly affec-
ted 3 years ago when the U.S. government accused the Lockheed and the North-
rop Corporation of paying commissions to 'Adnan for facilitating operations,
deals and contracts on their behalf in some countries of the Middle East.
The Northrop Cor.poration alleged, for example, that he had asked for a
450,000 dollars commission to pay two senior officers in the air force in
one of the Third World countries. '
The Lockheed Corporation alleges that he received a 105 million dollars com-
mission from it to promote its unfartunate airplanes, the L-1011, during the
period from 1970 to 1975.
Although Mr al-Khashuqji neither confirmed or denied the charges, he explain-
ed that receiving a commission to promote specific products was a legitimate,
permissible and known action in the world of trade and finance.
But the worst thing that happened to the major Arab billionaire was his dis-
pute with his British wife Thurayya; his separation from her; and then his
divorce.
It seems that Thurayya (34 years) found someone to encourage her to sue al-
Khashuqji and to try to defame him. She rushed to the Los Angeles court in .
California, which is known for settling domestic cases promptly, and filed
a suit against him asking for compensation of 2.5 billion dollars. She said '
that this sum was half the sum that 'Adnan had gained while he was married
to her.
'Adnan became furious when Thurayya began to publish memoirs about her pri-
vate life and her relations with some known political and non-political fig-
ures. She sa.id that she had established some of these relations while she
was still married to her former husband. She soon presented documents to
- the Los Angeles court claiming that Mr al-Khashuq~i's employees had sent
girls and gifts to some senior employees of U.S. corporations that are im- :
plementing contracts in the Middle East.
She also claimed that some of al-Khashuqji's employees had e~tablished roman-
tic relations with the secretaries of senior officers in U.S. corporations
to obtain from them trade secrets that pertain to the activities and the
business of these companies in areas that are of interest to Mr al-Khashuqji.
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She said that an account had been opened in a Swiss bank in the name of one
of the secretaries by way of bribing her.
The corporations in question denied the allegations that were made by Mrs
Thurayya. 'Adnan himself asked that the court not allow journalists to have
access to these documents that his wife was submitting tsecause they were
hurting him ethically and financially, especially since he was "a respect- .
able business man" with commercial interests in various countries of the
world.
Akram al-'Ajjah: From Sports to Trade
Mr Akram 'Aj3ah (65 years) appears much younger than he is with his thick
hair and his copper tone complexion, which has been tanned by the heat of
massage baths, when he shows up at the nightclubs and the French restaurants
which he frequents.
His most recent successful undertaking last year was his marriage to the 21-
year old daughter of Maj Gen Mustafa Talas, the Syrian minister of defense.
Akram 'Ajjah is a Syrian from a commercial family that is well-known in Dam-
ascus. He grew up in Damascus and won a scholarship to study in France.
One of his most successful projects there was his marriage to a French gym-
nast in which his strong love for sports was exemplified.
Fortune smiled upon the big businessman: he did not achieve his dream of
becoming a sports teacher like his first wife was, but fortune led him to
make the acquaintance of a number of Arab executives, and he was able with
his skill and his good conduct to embark upon successful commercial and in-
dustrial businesses with their help. -
But these businesses were thwarted for a period of time when France entered
into a bloody dispute with Egypt, Tunisia and%Algeria id the fifties. He
was then accused of siding with his first Arab homeland'against his second ~
French homeland, and he was sentenced to prison in absentia for 3 years.
Then he returned to France in the sixties to affirm his affection and t,is
loyalty to France. Since 1963 he has been able to contribute to the estab-
lishment of a number of successful industrial and commercial projects in
Switzerland and in France through trilateral relations with Arab and French
businessmen.
Akram 'Ajjah owns palaces and luxurious homes in both European countries.
One of his most famous deals was that in which he acquired the famous passen-
ger ship, France, in 1974 when he >innounced that he would turn it into a
floating hotel. But he sold it last year for 18 million dollars, and he
also sold with it art ob~ects worth 54 million French francs.
'Aj~ah is not less famous in European press and social circles than his coun-
terpart Mr al-Khashuq~i. But it is thought that he does not match him as
far as wealth is concerned.
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r~ux urr~l~lEU. ua~ ~NLz
' HIl llllill:dl.ll7l1 of ~tii~ is thc fact th?t the net profits of the principal
U.S. oil companies which deal with the Middle East area are estimated to be
~ 221 billion dollars from their sales and operations inside the United States
and abroad in the present aecade. Carter has been trying to take away 272
billion dollars of these profits in the eighties.
Commissions Paid by Airline Companies
The scandals of the three principal U.S. airplane manufacturing companies
are still on the minds of Americans. The Lockheed, MacDonald Douglas and
the Boeing corporations paid hundreds of millions of dollars to clients,
brokers and executives in the capitalist and in tfie developing world to
sell the airplanes they manufacture.
Profitable deals were concluded for the first two companies, but the coun-
tries that purchased DC-10's, which are ma.nufactured by MacDonald Douglas,
and L-1011 Tristars, which are manufactured by Lockheed, suffered enormous
losses as a result of the fact that a flaw was discovered in the devices
of these airplanes. This flaw caused some of the airplanes to crash, and
they were then grounded in most of the countries that own them out of con-
cern for the safety of passengers.
The Boeing Corporation was accused of paying 3.6 million dollars in commis-
sions to sell a Leb anese airline company three ~umbo 747 airplanes.
U.S. courts were obliged to forego the trial of ITT Telecommunications Cor-
poration after it was discovered that the company's record was full of
bribes and commissions that were paid in foreign countries. This is be-
cause such a trial would reveal secrets that would affect U.S. political
interests.
It is known that this corporation has a special relationship with the Cen- ~
tral Intelligence Agency. It was the front through which the CIA took
action to strike Allende's regime in Chile in the early seventies. ,
The U.S. press held a tight hold a few months ago on a resounding scandal
in which the wife of the Jewish senator, Jacob Javits was implicated. This
happened when the new regime in Iran presented documents to prove that Mrs
Javits had received payments from the deposed Shah to facilitate arms deals.
Mrs Javits claimed that she had received these payments to "to improve" the
reputation of the Shah's regime in U.S. public opinion shortly before the
- Shah fell. The testimony of the senator's wife was taken seriously, and it
was possible to keep a tight hold on the question due to the fact that the
U.S. press under the effect of Zionist influence covered it up.
The World of Secret Weapons ~
Commissions paid in the arms trade are not any less than those paid in the
oil trade. But secrecy here is tighter for obvious reasons.
There are scores of names of prominent political, military and economic fig-
ures that appear on the secret list of clients and middlemen, especially in
the Middle East which is considered the.most important international market
.f
for the most modern and the most complex weapons. ~
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At any rate the value of their fortunes remains a secret even though some
French newspapers did claim last year that the businesses of Mr al-'A3jah
had been somewhat affected. The newspapers provided evidence for this by
stating that al-'Ajjah had been forced to sell [the ship] France and his
objects of art.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4802
~
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
HISTORIC ARAB DIVISIVENESS DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-~'ARABI in Arabic 21-27 Jun 80 pp 20-22
[Article: "Ha:, Iran's Revolution 5n1it the Arabs"]
[TextJ This headli~~e may be un~ust to Iran's revolution, since the Arabs
were not united to begin with for Khomeyni to come and tear them apart.
~ They were not one unit~d state that was split into as many states as there
are "ayatollahs" by the Tehran revolution.
The Arabs, in their ancient and modern history, have always been torn,
split, divided and even fighting each other. Their disputes allow some
to charge that they have never been and never will be one nation. Some
even deny their Arabism, saying that it is neither an Arab race, people,
or nation, but only a language, a culture or a league...like our Arab
League which is in itself a dedication to separation and div~sion.
The Arabs, even after their countries became independent and after they
established their league in the 1940's, have always been sub~ect to
polarization. They had polarization of royal families, of different
political politics ('Abd al-Nasir's Egypt versus Nuri al'Sa'id's Iraq
over the issu~ of alliances), and of national and ethnic affiliationa
('Abd al-Nasir's Egypt versus 'Abd al-Karim Qasim's Iraq).
Recently, even before Khomeyni's revoiution, axes or strong relations
between r_wo or more countries were still being formed (al-Sadat's Egypt
and al-Asad's Syria, followed by al-Sadat's Egypt and Faysal's Saudi
Arabia). "
Later, al-Sadat independently formed an axis in which he included Israel,
the historic enemy which is foreign to the Arab nation. He formed this
axis against all other Arab nations, including those he was allied with .
or closely related to, from Qadhdhafi's Libya to al-Asad's Syria to Faysal's '
Saudi Arabia.
Iraq, under al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn, was able to rally almost all the
~ Arabs into a least common denominator axis in Baghdad at the end of
1978, to face the Carter-Begin-Sadat axis. This may have been the first
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time in modern Arab history that [almost] all Arabs organized around
one [common] purpose. The purpose, briefly, was to confront the
Egyptian-Israeli axis which wants to penetrate the Arab front against
Zionist occupation and usurpation.
_ Some Arabs thought, or imagined,due to the intensity of their longing for
unity, or at least for firm solidarity, that the 3aghdad axis would re-
sult in a cohesive Arab position, or least in minimal Arab solidarity on
most issues, not just against al-Sadat and Camp David. They thought that
the Arabs could unify their position toward Europe, the Soviet Union,
international polarization in their region, etc. But they were wrong.
Saddam Husayn's Iraq concurred with 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il's Yemen and
Hafiz al-Asad's Syria on a minimal common stand against the Camp David
trio, but found itself in disagreement with Isma'il's Yemen over the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and with al-Asad's Syria over its
position on Iran's revolution. Whi~.e Baghdad condemned Soviet interven-
tion in Afghanistan, Aden welcomed it, and Damascus approved of it or
overlooked it.
In other words, what united Baghdad, Damascus, Aden and Tripoli together
in facing Camp David did not necessarily unite them to confront Soviet
intervention in Iran (sic) or international polarization of the Gulf.
Role of Affiliations, Interests and Connections
The reason for the above is obvious. If the ultimate Arab interest had
united all these na~ions against Camp David in an act of self-defense
against surrendering to the enemy, this interest was not relevant in
other situations.
In the case of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the criterion for
Saddam Husayn's Iraq was national affiliation. Thus, he condemned this
intervention. Aden's criterion was ideological affiliation or rather
ideological subordination. The Marxist regime in Aden did not find
anything wrong with Marxist Russia's crushing of nonalined, Islamic, or
more specifically, conservative Afghanistan.
This leads us to the factual conclusion about our Arab policy, namely
that the standards set by various governments to measure and define their
political positions are vastly different. These contradictory and
different standards tear�the Arabs apart, and result in diverse politi-
cal decisions and positions.
Had there been adherence to the sole criterion of national or Arab
independence, there would have been a united position, as happened with
regard to Camp David, and as did not happen with regard to the situation
in the Gulf, the intervention in Afghanistan, and the revolution in Iran.
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~
Had there been one standard to adhere to, there would not have been
Arab policies on Lebanon, and this small country would have been saved
from steadily drowning in a sea of blood for 5 years. There would not
have been as many armies and militias in Lebanon as there are armies and
militias in the Arab countries. At least, there would have been one
united Arab position to confront foreign intervention, be it by Israel,
the U.S., or anyone else.
Had there been one standard to adhere to, there would have been or~e unified
Arab position on Iran's revolution.
What we want to say is that Arab fragmentation and political differences
are caused by the diversity of Arab standards more than by o~her non-Arab
factors.
We are not trying to acquit the Iranian revolution from its role in divid-
ing Arab ranks. But this division would not have been an instrument in
Iranian hands had there not been more than one Arab will and more than one
standard by which to determine Arab policy toward div~:rse situations.
What, for example, makes relations between Tehran and Baghdad so.extremely
tense, while they are so clear, pure and almost innocent, between Tehran
and Damascus? "
What makes an Arab leader like Libyan President Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi, who
is undoubtedly of old Arab bedouin descent, stand up and say that he
discovered that the Iranian religious leader is his relative, and send
his deputy Major 'Abd al-Salam Jallud to emphasize recognition of
Khomeyni's revolution? This is done at the same time as Iraq demands
that the new Iranian government prove its "friendliness" to the Arabs
by returning three islands to the UAE. These are the same islands that
caused Libya to break its~diplomatic ties with Iran when the latter
seized them in the early 1970's, and which Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr
emphasize that they will neither return to Qadhdhafi [sic] nor to
al-Shaykh Zayid Nuhayan in the early 1980's?
It is Arab conflicts and rivalry which open the way for the foreign powers
to widen differences between the Arabs and polarize them.
_ Distant people do not appreciate the hardships and probLems of others.
There are eastern Arabs, for example, who changed their attitude more
than once on the Moroccan-Algerian conflict over the Sahara.
Why are there no guidelines except convenience, self-interests, and small
alliances that lead to weak and unstable tactical policies?
If there was a national standard, there would have been someone to warn
that it is dangerous to establish an Arab state whose population is only
- 100,000 people in a desert area as large as Syria.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'AR.ABI
9455
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ALGERIA
ARMY WINS: GENERAL STAFF RESTORED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 p 31
~[Text] The cabinet reshuffle on 15 July was not the biggest event in A1-
gerian politics, coming as it did a month after the FLN Party
congreas (16-19 June). The important thing was what that move
camouflaged: President Chadli Bendjedid~s decision to revive -
the army general st aff after a 13-year slumber, and to'replace
Mohamed Saleh Yahiaoui as head of the party. These two deci-
sions indicate something of a break with Boumedienne's poli~ies.
Hitherto accepted as a potential successor to the late President
Houari Boumedienne, party coordinator Mohamed Saleh Yahiaoui now
- steps down. Although still a member of the politburo, he and
former presidential counselor Abdelaziz Bouteflika alone no lon-
ger have positions either in the government or in the party ap-
paratus, and his place at the head of the party has been taken
by Cherif Messaadia. Messaadia, however~ will hold onl,y the ti-
tle of ~~permanent secretary of the central committee." So ends
an experi.ment begun by Bownedienne in 1977 to placate party mem-
bers who wanted, at long last, to build a genuine mass par::y and
give the nation a set of institutions under law.
Still another move marks the break with the Boumedienne tradi-
tion: the army will hav+e a general staff again. This is a
tremendous event in Algeria's political history, in the course
- of which the general staff was often implicated in the uphea-
vals of the Sixties: when in 1963 President Be n Bella named
" Col Tahar Zbiri to head it, the then-defense minister, Boume-
dienne, who was in Moscow at the ti.me, perceived that move as
a plot airaed at him. And it was Zbiri~s support for Boumedienne
that enabled him to overthrow Ben Bella in June 1965. But when
Bownedienne in turn created the post of secretary-general to the ~
defense ministry and chose Col Abdelkader Chabbou to fill it,
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he triggered the wrath of his one-time chief of staff and ally:
Zbiri flung his tanks against algiers in December 1969 in an
attempted ~putsch. Boumedienne had him arrested, and determined ~
~ then and t,here to abolish the general staff once and for all.
He would run the army himself .
Thirteen years later, the decision to "rehabilitate" the gene-
ral staff, the appointment nf two deputy defense ministers (Col
Abdellah Belhouchet as inspector general and Col Kasdi Merba
to handle "support and military industries") and the appoint-
ment of LtCol Mustapha Belloucif as secretary-general to the
defense ministry indicates that Chadli Bendjedid is willin~g, up
to a point, to share his power. Perhaps it also means that he
will be giving mor~ weight to the army than to the party from
now on. It remains to be seen whether he himself purposely
chose to rely on and trust the army, or whether the army forced
that decision upon him.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
6182
- Cso: 4400
~
~
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MAURITANIA ~
EVIDENCE OF 'INTOLERANCE, REPRESSION, VENGEANCE' DEPLORED
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 pp 26-29
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani]
[Text] A single preaident in 20 years, who had "made"
the country and had asaured its stability. After hie
overthrow by the military, three chiefs of atate
followed in 2 years. And the country of the Moora
and Haratines is falling apart.
There was an unusual spectacle in Nouakchott on 10 July 1980. Two years
earlier, on the same day, a military ~unta overthrew President Moktar Ould
Daddah, "the father of the nation," who in less than 2 decades had caused
one state and one capital to arise out of the sands of "the whole of
Mauritania." Celebrating the second anniversary of the coup d'etat, the
country's new master, Lt Col Khouna Ould Haidalla, presided over the
ceremonies flanked by, two of his 1978 companions who were also his prede-
cessors in the presidency: Lt Cols Moustafa Ould Saleck, chief of atate ~
from July 1978 to June 1979; and Mohamed Mahmoud Louly, from June 1979 to
January 1980. The latter had even been "summoned"; and he participated in
the ceremony somewhat constrained. Seated not far from them was Lt Col
Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, former chief of state and former "strong man," who
had contributed to the elimination of~.anything that might atand in the
way of Khouna Ould Haidalla's itinerary. He is said to be back in favor.
In 5pite of the Peace
This unanimity of circumstances to reconstitute "the spirit of 10 July" ~ ~
did not incite unbounded enthusiasm. To mobilize a crowd, it was necessary
on the very morning of the ceremony to circulate rumors about the imm4inent
release of a great number of Mauritanian prit~oners being held by the
POLISARIO; however, the alrplanes which were to have returned these
prisoners never showed up. Another rumor, this one verified: the voluntary
exile of the great imam of Nouakchott, Ould Bousseiri, who from Mecca
announced that he would refuse to return to the country. Taking plac~
after so many others, the departure of this man of religidus stature '
created high feelings.
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FOK Ur~r~1c:1~. U5~ UNLY
The concerns of the Mauritanian military junta were elsewhere. From the
speakers' platform which was erected on Gamal A~del Nasser Avenue, Lt Col
Khouna Ould Haidalla once again rendered homage to the POLISARIO and invited
Morocco to find "an honorable way o ut" of the Sahara conflict as he had
done. However, his optimism is not very evident in the tone of the tracts
which circulated in Nouakchott that day, in particular publications by the
AMEt (Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania) which is advocating the return
of civilians to power.
Nevertheless, for 2 years, Mauritania has been at peace. POLISARIO forces _
no longer stream out of Algeria--on occasion out of Mali--to impose their ~
will and to put "this weak link" of the war in a position of being unable
to do any harm. That did not keep Mauritania from struggling with internal
problems which were to say the least complex. This country, which was once
highly respected, seems to have lost a bit of its sotil, therefore, some of
- its credibility. Of course, some of yesterday`s detractors are unstinting -
in their praise today; and some of them are extolling the "courage" with
which the country abandoned the Sahara and ceased laying claim to territory
formerly considered as its own.
The ancestral ties with the Saharans are many, and Khouna Ould Haidalla -
himself is a native of the Western Sahara where some of his family still
lives .
Since the separate peace signed with the POLISARIO in August 1979, Mauritania
has been seeking "internal peace." Paradoxically, that is the reason for
theae perpetual changes in men at the head of the state. It seems that
the most difficult part is the stabilization of the country's neutrality.
Seven Shakeups .
However, Mauritania has been learning for the last 2 years that the desired
neutrality does not rhyme with weakness. And that each of its close or
distant neighbors and friends would like to put this neutrality to ita own
profit. In addition to the succession of three chiefs of sta te and two
prime ministers, this situation has led to seven more or less profound
shakeups. In this manner, there have also been five ministers of interior,
five ministers of information, four chiefs of staff and even six permanent
chiefs of the Military Committee f or National Salvation (CMSN), formerly
called Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN).
The big national companies have not been spared by these waves of change:
the SNIM [National Industrial and Mining Compaiiy], which exploits the iron
of Zouerate, has also had four changes of general manager in the last 18
months...This has caused a 2-year delay in the start of the p rincipal
- economic project, the Guelbs proj ect, whose iron ore deposi.ts had an over-
all worth of over $1 billion.
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Anxiety and Silence
Moreover, the successive governments have not begun any new project, and
the major works underway, such as the deep water port at Nouakchott, the
construction of the Transmauritanian railroad and many others, date from
before July 1978. The uncertainty and perpetual changes in men and
alliances have more and more prevented efforts at economic recovery.
Recent Iraqi aid has nevertheless provided the.country with time to catich
its breath.
~
Mauritania has moved suddenly from "too much stability" under the Moktar
Ould Daddah regime to the chronic instability of th~ military teams. The
very day after the 10 July 1980 celebration the commander of the Nouakchott
garrison was removed. Suspected of being to~ close to Col Moustafa Ould
Saleck...
These various changes have been m~ide on the pretext that those eliminated
were "pro-Algerian," "pro-POLISAR:[0," "pro-Morroccan," "pro-Libyan," "pro-
French," "pro-Baathist," "pro-Sen~~galese," "pro-Chinese" or even "pro-
Soviet," etc. The eliminations (without violence) have resulted in bringing
anxiety and silence to the great ma~ority of the "pro-Mauritanians."
For 2 years, Mauritania has no longer been a partner but a stake in the
game. That is because it has not been able to make itself reapected any
more. The aigning of the agreement on 5 August 1979 with the POLISARIO
bringing about "definitive peace" is an example of this. And, in exchange
for giving up all territorial claims, the Mauritanians did not even succeed
in freeing their prisoners of war...
This weakness takes Mauritania back about 20 years, to the uncertainties of
the period when it was sought after by many friends and neighbors. However,
*_oday being sought after has changed in form and has become more subtle
than the annexationist ambitions of days gone by.
Today the country is most threatened by an outburst. A kind of "Chadization"
after having been the excellent achievement of a biracial state, a buffer
country between North Africa and the South Sahara, between two civilizations
which in the final analysis are complementary and noncontradictory.
But the cohabitation of those two civilizations supposed a minimum of mutual
, rESpect. That balance appeared to be threatened as soon as there wae a
sign af a deep anxiety, which was less and less covered over, on the part
- of the black ethnic groups in the coastal regions of the Senegal River and
of cadres, pupils, students and government employees in Nouakchott and
elsewhere.
Self-determination?
For them, the real power is increasingly being monopolized by men from the
far north. All at once, the anxieties have rightly or wrongly revived the .
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old reflexes of ethnic or tribal self-defense. The auctioning of a black
woman on the Atar market was enough--if we can put it that way--for the
revolt to start brewing (indeed to take shape).
This deterioration is progressing dangerously fast. We recall, for example,
that at the end of 1977 Senegalese President Leopold Sedar Senghor greatly
shocked the nationalism of the Mauritanian Moors and Blacks: at that tiime
he said that Senegal would demand self-determination for the 500,000 Blacks
in the region of the Senegal River if the Nouakchott government were changed
by force or if the POLISARIO, which, according to him, is "racist," were
to control Mauritania...That statement by President Senghor seems today to
many Mauritanians in this river region "less scandalous."
Some of them are even inclined to encourage the rupture and to speed it up.
Some to make a reality of the dream of the nation of Beidan Moors (the
Whites), others to further group the Black Africans of the river. It is
- within the framework of this Moorish state with a predominance of Reguibats
(those fron~ the far north) that the future Saharan state (the SDAR [Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic]) is perhaps thinking about one day finding land .
suitable for its purposes, not limited to the cramped Western Sahara.
Morocco still has to cede that land...However, in order that this dream
may become a reality, it is nevertheless biethnic and biracial Mauritania
which will have to be smashed. It will also mean the smashing of all those
who at one time or another have helped Mauritania, as a political and
geographic entity, to be more credible and as respectable as possible.
Prisoners of the Desert
~ How are we now to understand the numerous imprisonments and banishments?
The most poignant case is that of Hamdi Ould Mouknass, former minister of '
foreign affairs for 12 years, a very level-headed man, who is fighting
against death from a double cancer in the heart of the desert. In spite
of the intervention of a great number of friends of Mauritania and inter- :
national organizations, such as Amnesty International, several promises
of his release have remained a dead letter. The principal reproach is
addressed to Hamdi Ould Mouknass, also a northerner--from Nouadhibou--for
having "betrayed" his tribe on behalf of "the other Mauritania."
There is a danger of this getting out of hand; and, if Mauritania continues, ~
_ against its own nature, to slide onto the terrain of intolerance, repression ,
and vengeance, it will run the risk of losing not only its unity but also
its soul which is its principal wealth. .
COPYRIGHT; Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 ~ ~
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MAURITANIA
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY HAILED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 p 28
[TextJ One of the courageous and positive actions of the present Mauritanian
military leadership was the abolition of slavery on 5 July 1980. We were
astonished to learn that such practices had survived until then. Although
slavery in Mauritania has had a new resurgence during the last 2 years, the
evil had not been entiraly Eliminat2d at any time since 1960.
In that year, the Constitution (suspended by the military in July 1978)
proclaimed the total equality of all citizens. Several years later,.in
1970, the case of the Haratine slaves was not heard by the traditional
courts (too influenced by secular practices which even ran counter to the
egalitarian thrust of Islam) but by modern courts. Moktar Ould Daddah's
government often denounced the exploitation of man by man. The "proslavery"
sector (the term is certainly too strong for the Mauritanian situation) had
become more hung up and was asha~ed of such practices right up to the
accession of the first military men to power. The leader of the putsch,
Col Moustafa Ould Saleck, condemned "the modernist virus" of the former
government and even encouraged "the return to traditions." Nothing more
was needed to reawaken the old demons. An associate of the Cadi of Aleg,
for example, in 1979 opposed the marriage of his slave un~il her fu~ure
husband had agreed to buy her back for 200,000 Mauritanian ouguiyas (20,000
French francs); four Haratines (Deidah, Brahim, Yekber and Mreizig) were '
held in the Nouakchott prison and beaten for having tried to leave their
master...
The last straw was added in April 1980 when a young Haratine woman was sold
on the Atar market...at public auction! That caused an uproar in Mauritanian
society, particularly among members of the clandest~ne movement E1 Hor which
is energized by several Haratine cadres. On that occasion, President Khouna
Ould Haidalla, was caught between "two groups," the very day after his
return from the OAU summit in Freetown, where President Senghor had once _
a~ain recalled the massacre of black Mauritanians by the POLISARIO.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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SAUDI ARABIA
5AUDIS PREOCCUPIID WITH BALANCING MODERNISM WITH TRADTTION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Jun 80 pp 30-31
[Article: "Saudi Arabia: Concern For Maintaining A Balance Between Mod-
ernism and Faith"]
jText] All bets are off on change in the gulf, more than a year after
the Iranian revolution, which they ~aid would cross the sea and the sands.
Today, the real revolution in the Arab Gulf states is the revolution of
development, for which hundreds of billions of dollars are being allocated,
and the sole concern is maintaining a constant balance between the require-
ments of modernism and development and doctrinal and traditional requi-
sites.
How far has Saudi Arabia succeeded in following the straight and narrow
path between modernism and faith?
More than a year has passed ~ince the Iranian revolution, and in Saudi
Arabia, or in any gulf state, none of the thtngs anticipated by most
western observers pondering the affairs of the "conservative" Arab
states have come to pass.
Every day, the voice of Teheran Radio goes on the air summoning everyone--
child, man, woman, old man, religious man, student and officer--to the
revolution.
But the fiery outcries have all gone for nought, and the Arab societies
have proved that they are not ready to respond to the emotional out-
bursts and leaps as easily as the sages and ayatollahs of the Iranian
- revolution had imagined, however cloChed in the garb of religion.
There may be svme who ask, "Why don't the Arabs respond to the ca11?" ;
Actually, the fundamental reason is not ~ust the drop in "popularity" of
the Iranian revolution among the Arabs as a result of the chaos govern-
ing it and because of the blazing struggle among the power centers there.
Instead, it goes back to the fact that basically the Arab societies are
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still governed more by logic than by sentiment and whim. Gone are the
days of mad, blazing revolutions which destroyed everything in their
path, including stability, the econamy and development.
The average Arab citizen today is seeking stability, not revolution.
This is not to imply that he is given over to inertia, or is satisfied
with conditions or circimmstances which might be bad. But he is seek-
ing change through a desire for construction and development, not de-
struction and demolition.
Perhaps one reason that the shoutings of Teheran Radio have gone for
nought is tha.c the Arab Gulf regimes, whatever might be said of them,
never did follow in the footsteps of the Shah of Iran. They still ad-
here, as regimes and states, to the rulings of the magnanimous Shari'ah.
They are not squandering their oil revenues on pampous construction
projects to breathe life into the mythical dreams of a head of state or
an official. They are constantly trying to reconcile the traditions of
their Arab Islamic societies with rapid steps towards development, as
well as providing social and health security for broad sectors of the
society. In this, they are assisted by a low population density which
does not compare to the population density in Iran, where the offerings
and development rates are eroded by virtue of the rapid population in-
crease.
Although it must be said that there are many administrative, financial
and even moral mistakes and excesses, the Iranian lesson has nsverthe-
less been beneficial in correcting conditions, lining up the ranks, and
reviewing the awareness and accountability of the various levels of the
ruling political leaderships.
Although the complaining has not stopped and never will, in the Gulf
Arab societies ~ust as in other societies, the average, impartial citi-
zen has to acknowledge tha.t the ruling authorities in the gulf have made
considerable progress in putting an end to manifestations of flabbiness
and corruption, and in insisting on controlling matters and remedying
- the causes for complaint.
Saudi Arabia might be a true example of the growing, developing Arab
society confronting various pressures with a great deal of self-
confidence, spread throughout the various levels fram tfie summit to the
base.
All bets are now off, a year and a half after the religious revolution
in Iran claimed that Saudi society would lose its ability to reconcile
its Arab I~lamic traditions with its rapid construction and building
development.
A few weeks ago, the Saudi government announced the largest development
budget not only in the Third World, but perhaps in many advanced
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countries and even the superpowers, with figures amounting to about
$285 billion, whicfi proves that it is following the path of rapid in-
dustrialization without any changes or ~lowness.
The Role of The Religious Organization in Saudi Arabia
At the same time, it can be noted that there is a concentration on pre-
serving the role of the old inherited virtues as repreaented by tradi-
tions, customs and above all the rulings of the Shari'ah.
In Saudi Arabia, the religious organization, radical in its religious
purity, remains the greatest and highest authority in everything per-
taining to societal affairs. It is in charge of ~ustice, decides dis-
putes, issues legal opinions on laws and statutes, and provides counsel
and advice to the ruling political organization.
Adherence to the Shari'ah is not limited to essence alone, but deals with
form and appearance as well, so as to extend to the simplest aspects of
daily life. Pictures of women are prohibited in newspapers and magazines,
and women are forbidden to work in places where they would come in contact
with men. Children's games--doZls and the like--and dog food have disap-
peared from the shops, and the water level in hotel swin~ing pools has
been lowered to prevent their use by foreign women.
Foreign western obserners might find the customs and traditions of this
Arab country strange, for they don't understand the spirit of Islam, and
consider this to be excessive prudishness and asceticism in a society to
which God has given a source of wealth sufficient to permit it to enjoy
all the good things of life.
But the matter is more than an apparent staidness and adherence to trivi-
alities, for Saudi society today, in the first awakening following the
huge jump in petroleum revenues, is overcome.with anxiety that laxity or
flabbiness will lead to the loss of its traditions and its stern adher-
ence to its true religion.
In light of this, many of the recently adopted official steps can be ex-
plained.
There is, for example, an awareness that the foreign worker problem has
become aggravated. Whereas fihe doors had been open to non-Arab workers,
perhaps because of the cheapness of this labor force, Coday there is a
ca11 to close the doors in their faces, especially those wfio do not fol-
low the Islamic religion--not for fanatical or racist reasons, but because
Saudi society doesn't want its traditions to be affected by incompatible
foreign traditions. Therefore, today it prefers Moslem Arab manpower be-
cause it is closer and more in harmony witti it.
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,
However, the problem is not this simple, because there are more than a
million Arab and foreign workers--an unofficial figure-~making up 70
percent of the labor force in Saudi Arabia. There is nothing strange
about this in a country with a low population density compared to its
vast area. Tens of billions of dollars a year are spent on development
proj ects, which in turn require tens of thousands of workers.
- It appears that there are some restrictions which have been imposed on
granting entry permits to foreign w~orkers, and in particular non-Islamic
workers.
On the level of administrative procedures, many measures previously an-
nounced by senior members of the royal family, especially Prince Fahd bin
'Abd-al-'Aziz, crown prince, first deputy prime minister, and brother of
Prince 'Abdallah bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz, second deputy prime mi.nister and com-
mander of the National Guard, have actually been implemented.
One of these, for example, is limiting the role of fictitious middleman
companies in drawing up commercia.l and construction contracts with the
state, as well as limiting the role of Arab and foreign middlemen and
local executors. ~
Another example is the extensive hiring activity in administrative
fields, and the selection of a group of qualified princes who have
proven their administrative and governmental skill and their openness
to the citizens.
The Arrows of the Recalcitrant Friends
The arrows directed at the kingdom do not only come from the other side
of the gulf, but also from the traditional friends of the kingdom during
the 53 years since its establishment. The implication here is not the
arrows from the Egyptian regime after its Israeli exile at Camp David,
but the arrows from European and American capitals.
There is an obvious campaign in western diplomatic and information chan- ~
nels intended to spread various riunors and interpretations about stabil-
i*_y in the Arabian Peninsula.
The campaigns have reached such a pitch that they are plunging into the
family relations which exist within the Saudi ruling family, especially
on the political decision making level.
However, the Saudi regime is not ascribing these attacks to hatred for
- Saudi Arabia for its refusal to ~oin in the Camp David parade or to ex-
~ tend its hand to extricate President al-Sadat from his isolation. Saudi
Arabia is strY.ving for better cooperation with its Arab Gulf sisters, es-
pecially Iraq and the forces developing there, since Arab cooperation
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constitutes the best guarantee of the region's independence, stability
and distance from the current polarization represented by the conflict
of interests arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
American mobilization at the entrance to the gulf.
Reconciling Modernism With the Faith
These are some of the regime's troubles and concerns. Buz what are the
preoccupations and concerns of the new Saudi generation?
Actually, they are concentrated around that constant longing in the
minds o~ the young people to reconcile the parade of development and
modernism with adherence to the faith in form and content.
Perhaps it would be more appropriate here to review what went on in an
indirect television discussion between a Saudi religious scholar,
Shaykh Salih bin Sa'd al-Luhaydan, and some women students at Riyadh
University.
The Saudi girl who is looking for a role for herself in society tries
to subject its traditions to the demands of modernism, although within
the context.and limitations of the rulings of the Shari'ah. In this
discussion, there are some questions which might appear extraordinary,
or unimportant, to a generation of young men and women in another Arab
society. But in Saudi society, in the land of the Prophet and Islam,
they are important--in fact, extremely important.
The answers must not be viewed as the ultimate in prudishness, for in
fact they are extensions of the rulings of the Shari'ah and the Sunnah
according to the Wahhabi school, which restored Islam to its initial
purity, austerity, simplicity and original essence.
Shaykh al-Luhaydan says, in response to a student's question about why
children's dolls are prohibited, that it is because they are "images,"
and that it would be better to read stories to children.
As for cologne and its use by women, he says that cologne has alcohol
in it and therefore is forbidden. Women ought to first wash out what-
ever cologne hangs around her clothing. In general, perfume is not
permitted by law.
In response to another question, the religious man said that it would
be better not to read books'on the interpretation of dreams. It is a
fact that women, by their very nature, are susceptible to these books
and interpretations.
Shaykh al-Luhaydan does not agree that a Moslem woma.n should ride alone
in a car with a driver, "be he unbeliever or Moslem."
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As for listening to songs accompanied by rhapsodizing, supplications or
swaying, that is forbidden. But there is nothing ob~ectionable about
student songs, or girls singing with their friends.
The Saudi religious man adds, in response to a university student's
queation about a girl marrying a man who is very adolescent and who
never prays," that she should reform him f irst. If she ultimately
fails, the final solution is divorce.
Shaykh al-Luhaydan makes no distinction between drawing by hand and
- taking photographs; they are both forbidden.
Qne young girl ventured to ask his verdict on "high heels.and dancing
at evening parties."
The shaykh replies that there is nothing in the Shari'ah prohibiting
high heels, but that they are sure to make wamen sway when they walk,
and this is not permitted by law. Also, the medical profession has
proven that not walking straight affects the spine and may even lead
to rhe~atism.
As for nude dancing, it is not allowed. There is nothing wrong with
normal dancing.
And television?
Shaykh al-Luhaydan says, "Television is an instrument which should best
be left alone if there is any doubt. If there is a need for it, and
the television shows only beneficial things, then viewing it is allowed."
These are some of the questions cropping up in the minds of young women
who are open to the clamoring contradictions present in any society feel-
ing its way between modernism and faith, and these are the answers which
express the opinion of the religious organization, which is strongly in-
fluential and whose opinions carry weight.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
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_ TUNISIA
MEANING OF INCREASED STRIKES ANALYZED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Jun 80 p 26
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen]
[Text] On 12 June, a public transportation strike paralyzed the Tunisian
capital. Bus conductors went on strike out of sympathy with technical per-
sonnel, who had already walked out. SNT (National Transportation Company)
employees are demanding the dismissal of the official in charge of the medical
unit, who allegedly did nothing in time to treat a worker with cancer and who
later died. This explanation, provided by strikers, could only be a pretext.
ImmobiZizing the urban transportation sector is a key move in the strategy
of Tunisian trade unionists practicing harassment while the negotiations
for returning to a representative Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT)
are stalled. -
The prospect of a settlement of the UGTT crisis has become credible since
the change of government on 23 April, for the main protagonists in the crisis
of 26 January 1978 have vanished from the political scene and the return
of "preferred trade union spokesmen," such as Mr Mohamed Ennaceur, to the
Ministry of Social Affairs has been noted.
A settlement of the trade union crisis has since become the main concern
of the day and the difficult, discreet bargaining which has taken place
has led to renewed contacts between the government and trade union members
jailed following the January 1978 riots, in particular former general secre-
tary Habib Achour.
Overwhelming
- These contacts show the willingness of both sides to reach a compromise.
Thus with the exception of two members of the federation's former executive
committee, all trade unionists have been released. Habib Achour is authorized
to receive th~m to work out the formula for a"more democratic federation,"
according to the expression which Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali used in his
formal speech to the Nati~nal Assembly.
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Tl~e temporary solution which both sides seem to support is probably that
of a committee composed of inembers of the federation's current leadership
and some of the leaders ousted in January 1978. The role of this committee
will be to organize elections at the ground level in order to hold a new
congress.
Paradoxically and although essential, this scenario is not the most delicate
question. Because of his overly striking and overwhelming personality,
Habib Achour represents the second aspect of the UGTT problem. Various
approaches have been made to probe his intentions. It is clear that the
old leader will not refrain from having a hand in future elections for the .
general secretariat. The intention is obvious, although its accomplishment
is less so. The main obstacle is President Bourguiba's attitude toward
a man--Aabib Achour--who served him and whom he abused and then restored
to favor in order to cut him down once again. It is true that the president
told the director of the ILO (International Labor Off ice~, Mr Blanchard,
who interceded on Achour's behalf, that he had "nothing against him."
This is a way for the chief of state to encourage Habib Achour to make amends,
which the latter has not failed to do with the support of the UGTT's admini- ,
strative committee. He wrote Bourguiba a letter in which he congratulated
him for the recent change of government, a step which he described as
"courageous."
Legitimacy
While waiting for the Achour affair to be settled, about 20 "wildcat" strikes
are now underway in both government and private establishments. In their
demands, the workers--inevitably--"reaffirm their support for the trade
union federation's legitimate leadership."
The authorities have in turn declared their firm intention not to "direct"
the selection of future candidates for the federation's leadership and to
take steps for a democratic and independent UGTT. If matters proceed in
this way, for Tunisians that would mean that reconstruction has finally
begun.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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TUNISIA
IMPROVEMENT IN AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1849
[Text] This year Tunisian agriculture is at last encountering more satj~-
factory climatic conditions.
Grain production will exceed 10 million quintals.
As the result of beneficial rains which fell on the entire country, we can
say that Tunisian agriculture is.healthy this year. At least in comparison
to the dry years occurring since 1973. The truth of the matter is, however,
that with the exception of the northern part of the country, rainfall has
not been as good as might have been expected on the basis of ineteorological
forecasts which predicted a 30 percent increase compared to 1979.
In fact, according to a report disseminated by TUNIS AFRIQUE PRESSE, [TAP],
the quantities of rain were just average and did not permit the storing of
sufficient water in dams for the use in the next agricultural season, which
is in danger of being subjected to atmospheric hazards all the more so
because Tunisia is permanently at the mercy of climatic caprices. The
fact remains that this uncomfortable situation has induced those managing
water facilities to adopt more rational utilization of available water
resources.
In response to this legitimate concern, a policy was developed which basically
takes into account the agricultural area to be planted, the nature of the
crop [speculation] and methods of irrigation. This new orientation, wh ich
in a word is des3gned to prevent the wasting of water, has benefited from
the support of the farmers, who customarily are reticent when it comes to
contravening the traditions of an outmoded agriculCure. Because of this,
large areas located near dams have been committed to vegetable gardening
and in a general way to crops requiring continuous irrigation. Dry-climate
crops have been reserved for regions with little humidity.
It is for all these reasons that the upcoming agricultural seasons show
promise, particularly in the northern part of the country where the fertility
of the soil and the rain are conducive to a heavy yield by the land. Of
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course, it is difficult for the moment to make estimates with respect to
the precise effect of the rains. However, there is a clear inclination
. toward optimism, even as regards the grain season which thus far has
suffered no damage. In a report which he made to the Council of Ministers
on 19 June, riinister of Agriculture Lassaad Ben Osman said that the grain
season for the whole country would be on the order of 10-10.5 million
quintals. In the Beja gouvernat east of Tunis, for example, the upcoming
grain season promises to be particularly good, quite superior, according to
estimates by the agricultural services of the governor's office, to those of
past years. Wheat production has been estimated at 1.7 million quintals
compared to 1,058,150 quintals last year, and grain production as a whole
2.023 million quintals, representing nearly one-fourth of rcatian3~,"pfoduction.
This is the time to recall that Beja was the largest grain market in North
[romaine] Africa. Of course, the increased grain production registered
= this year is not only attributable to favorable atmospheric conditions.
~ Other factors contributed to the increase, such as expansion of the grain- ,
growing areas, the use of high-yield seeds and technical assistance.
Structural Reforms to Attain Food Self-sufficiency
This improvement in agricultural production expected from the present
season is all the more appreciable because the agricultural sector during
the first 3 years of the 1977-1981 5-year plan had not attained the pro-
duction objectives which had been set for it. That was announced, the TAP
emphasizes, last December at the time of the 1980 budget presentation.
The unfavorable climatic conditions which prevailed during the last few
years have, in fact, particularly affected grain crops, livestock raising
and olive oil, so that for this period there was a production decrease of
0.4 percent per year (while the plan forecast an increase of 2.8 percent
_ per year); an increase in investments, involving larger budgetary resources
th an planned; and a food bill for 1979 alone amounting to 145 million
dinars (1 dinar = about 10.30 francs). In the grain sector alone, the
country's annual consumption totals 14 million quintals.
In the face of this situation, the state recognizes that an overall, in-depth
study is necessary to give the primary sector every opportunity to provide
food self-sufficiency and thereby to permit recovery of the agro-industrial
sector and improvement of the competitiveness of Tunisian agricultural
products on foreign markets.
To achieve these objectives, a series of ineasures has already been planned
which provides principally for:
--Rectification of the situation on collective lands.
--Establishment of large production units, particularly in regions where
agriculture has an important place.
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- --Restructuring of the development offices and establishment of other
~ offices.
--An increase in the number of agricultural mutual credit cooperatives
[mutuelles].
--Improvement in the shipment channels for agricultural products.
--Revision of legislation relating to abandonment of land.
--Generalization and expansion of the activities of the National Company
for Agricultural Machinery.
--Improvement in the management of state lands.
--Establishment of a progressive plan for the development of agriculture,
promotion of livestock raising and an increase in the number of service
cooperatives.
Last week, President Bourguiba called upon an interministerial committee
made up of the ministers of Planning and Finance, National Economy and
Agriculture to present a plan for an overall strategy with a view in
particular to self-sufficiency in grain products and development of animal
products.
Necessary Development of Service Cooperatives
It is by development of service cooperatives and promotion of their role
that the government plans to most improve the parceling of land operation
which is a deterrent to increased p~oduction and through their development
to simultaneously respond to the unending and diversified needs of agri-
cultural undertakings.
Conceived as structures capable of contributing to the economic and social
progress of farmers, service cooperatives are being called upon today to _
increase and to establish themselves wherever there is a felt need for them -
as a means of progress and change. Service cooperatives have a long history
(the first ones were established in 1930); and during the time they have
been in existence, they have attempted to give not inconsiderable advantages
and services to their members by providing increased technical service in
the sector of crop choice, varieties and use of processes and a more or
~ less continuous input of new members [intrants], accompanied by the shipment
and at times the processing of agricultural products.
The present situation of service cooperatives, according to a study conducted
in 19 76 by a UN mission assigned to the UNA (National Farmers Union), is
characterized by the absence of an oversight, control, support and promotion
organization. In fact, the cooperatives have been gradually left to their
own devices and are in a situation resulting from an incomplete restructuring
action, prior economic orientations and recent poor_ly-organized efforts to
revive the service cooperatives.
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Also, production, management, commercialization and service entities, run
by the state or parastate organizations, at times continue to bear the name
of "cooperatives"; e.g., production cooperatives, service cooperatives of
the "polycultural kind," mutual credit cooperatives, wine cooperatives,
central cooperatives, etc.
So that they may resume their activities and play their role fully, action
to straighten out the present situation of the service cooperatives must
be undertaken and focused on: ~ determination of the oversight authority,
responsibilitieG, and prerogatives; definition of the characteristics of
service, credit, commercialization and production cooperatives; rehabilita-
tion of the credit and financing channels .
If the service cooperatives are to attain the desired results, they must be
linked to a gamut of supply, commercialization and processing networks. :
They must also be closely linked to credit channels set up for agriculture.
Thus the service cooperatives wiZl be able to rationaZize the exploitation
of water, the drilling of sur�ace wells, the supply, storage and distribu-
tion of fertilizer, fodder and veterinary products and insecticides. They
will also be able to organize the purchase of tractors, motors an~d sprayers
and assorted agricultural material beyond the means of the individual.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
8143 ~
CSO: 4400 END
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