JPRS ID: 9327 JAPAN REPORT

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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-R~P82-00850R000300040007-7 ~ ~~T~~E~ ~.~~0 t F~l~~ ~ ~F ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9327 2 October 1980 , Ja an Re ort p p - cFocs~ 26iao~ r FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATtON SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 NOTE - JPRS publications contain information primarily from foxeign - newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or fo.llowing the last line of a brief, indicate how the original in~~ormation was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in par~ntheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- _ tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. ~ The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 FOR OFFICIAI, U5E ON~ JPRS L/9327 2 October 1980 JAPAN REPORT ~,~M - , ~s:.~ ~ ~ - CONTENTS POI,ITICAI~ AND' SOCIO?AGICAI, Japan's Role in Southeast Asia Viewed _ (Editorial; MAIPIICHI DAILY NEWS, 21 Sep 80) 1 Change in Japa~1's Policy Cited (Minoru Hirano; MAINICHI DAII,Y NEWS, 7 5ep 80) 3 LDP Factions Awaiting Developments (Takehiko Takahishi; MAINICHI DAIZY NEWS, 11 Sep 80).. 5 Suzuki Attenrpts To Silence Hawks (Raisuke Honda; THE DAILY YOMIURI, $ Sep 80) 7 ~YONIIURI~ on Money, Politics (Editorial; THE DAIZY YOMIURI, 11 Sep 80) 9 MIZITARY Wea,lrnesses in Hokkaido Defense Causing Concern (SHUKAN 5HINCHO, 7 Aug 80) 11 ECONOMIC ~YOMIURI' Urges Real'istic Approach to Japan-PRC Economic Ties , (Editorial; TH~ DAILY YOMIURI, 16 Sep 80) 17 Efforts Aimed at Bolstering Econot~y Welcomed ~ (Editorial; THE DAII,Y YOMIURI, 6 Sep 80) 19 Finance Ministry Considering Measures To Support Yen (JTJI, 12 Sep 8G) 21 SCIENCE AND TECHNOI~OGY Development of VISI in Japan Followed (JOURNAI~ OF THE INSTITUTE OF ET,ECTRONICS AND CO~II~IUNICAT20N ENGINEERS OF JAPAN, May 80)..........,,.~, 22 - a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO] FOR OFFT('!TAT! 'iTGF. r1NT.V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ~ - JAPAN~S ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA VIEWED OW221035 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 21 Sep 80 p 2 [Editorial: "Japan's Role in Southeast Asia"] [Text] Japan's relations witl~ ASEAN (The Aseociation of Southeast Asian Nations) has imdergone a swift change in the past few years due to persis- tent shaky and uneasy political situations in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia. A Japanese diplomatic initiative designed to further solidify the bilateral ~ " relations on the principle of "heart-to-heart talks," promoted by fonner Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda during his visit to the ASEAN region 3 yeare ago, was well received. The growing regional support for the new Japanese diplomatic approach, however, diminished fast in strength, to be replaced with a strong ASEAN call urging Japan to play a more significant political role in the region's endeavor to maintain its security--a call directed at Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito when he visited Thailand toward the end of last month. The ASEAN countries, especially Thailand, have become increasingly jittery and apprehensive about a serious and lingering threat posed by Vietnamese forcea, which still continue their presence in Cambodia and which penetrated into Thailand last ~une. Against this backdrop, at the recent Third Japan-ASEAN Sympoaium held in Singapore under the sponaorship of the MAINICHI newapaners and the Asian Affairs Research Council, the participating ASEAN paneliats voiced various opinions in regard to Japan's poeaible emergence as a military ~ power. - Many ASEAN panelists shared the vie~ca that it is inevitable f.or Japan to emerge as a military power. A stm~narizing report adopted on the final day even contained a paragraph which said in effect that a11 the ASEAN panelists were unanimous in agreement that Japan has the legitimate right to demonstrate its increased independence in the military field. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 ~vu va~aivicw uat. vi~t~~ Againet this, Saburo Okita, the Japanese cocha~rman of the symposiuin and the Japauese Government repreaentative for external economic affairs, said Japan will continue to conduct its experiment of being a ma~or economic power with no military strength, and voiced the hope that Japan can contribute to global peace through the auccess of this experiment. tn the summarizing report, a statement was made to the effect that a11 the Japanese panelists beli_eved Japan would not follow the path of becoming a major military power. These views amply illustrate the ASEAN countries' deep sense of danger because of the "vacuum of strength" created by the post-Vietnam war U.S. withdrawal from the region. However, the ASEAN panelists were split as to their assessments of Japan's becoming a strong military country. One group outlined the concept of a power balance which they believed would be beneficial of the region. They contended that Japan, if it becomes a strong military nation, would be an important new element in the regiona.l power balance, giving the region greater clout. - The opposing side emphasized its great concern that Japan, if it becomes a strong military nation, could bring great influence to bear on the Asian region and that a longing to aee their nation become a superpower could begin ea~ing at the hearts of the Japanese. Evidently, sentiments the ASEAN countriea entertain toward Japan are mixed, as is evidenced by the fact that all the ASEAN panelists subscribed to the idea of attaining "peace, friendship and a neutral zone" in their earnest quest to establish political stability and maintain aecurity in _ the Southeast Asian region. Accordingly, Japan's obvious reluctaace to become a ma~or military power is ~uatifiable in this respect. Japan should reaffirm ite belief that itQ greatest contribution toward maintaining aecurity in the ASEAN region ~iea in the area of extending economic cooperation and not in its positive response to a hasty call for a milltary buildup voiced by eome ASEAN panelists. , Of course, Japan should play some political role commensurate with its power in an attempt to solve the Cambodian question which is worrying the ASEAN nations. But the question of "how" is difficult tn answer. It may be that Japan should work to convene an international conference to seek a political solution of regional conflicts. COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1980 CSO: 4120 2 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POZITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAZ CHANGE IN JAPAN'S POLICY CITED Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 7 Sep 80 p 3 L"Behind the Scenea" coluam b,~ Mimoru Hirano; "Change in Japan's Policy"~ ~Text~ - Asian countries look to Japan to' play - Moreovei; evei~ody'a triend h~?a a a more Isoaitive politicai role, Pbreign Min- etrong inatlnct to look atter htmaeli. He ister Ito toid s preas conference at Ehe waat~ al~vaya to remain unacsthed. P'oreign Miniatry upon his retura Thurs- d country which triea to be everyb~dy's day irom a tour oi Thailand, Burma, In- lriend ca~ot purnue a posltive ionign dia, Pakistan and China. policy. He asid Japan should not onlq fu181 The recent tour oi Asian countries bq such expectationa but should aLso step up Ito was not s mere goodwlll tour. He act- ita economic aid to the area. ed ia ltne with the asid atrategy and tac- To periorm � more active polittcal. rnle ti~a. Whea he waa told by Thailsnd that in reeponse to the e~cpectattons of Mian the !!te A13EAN oountriea deslred Jap~?n to countria, Japaa should shape its btrategy poitt~ively auppart the Pol Pot regime'a re- and ta?ctica. The "atrategy" is to be aliga- prieentstion in the UN, he conveqed thia ed with the Western camp in order ~ to dedre wherever he went and inatructed strengthen the aecurity of thls camp. The t2~e Japaneae .amliaaaad'ora. _to__mon than "tactica" is to support ASEAN and to act 40 ~~tries in the Arab world, Atrica and in concert wlth ASEAN, in line with thla ~pu~ pmerlca to positlvely maneuver in policy, Ito v~aited Thailand Sirst on hia re- aupport o! the Pol Pot regime. cent tour, and personally chalred a meet- ~ pa~t~, which is directly aSected ing in Bangkok oi Japanese ambassadors to by the 8oviet invasion of Atghaniatan. Ito the countries of Southeast Asla. There is e~,~~d the Japaneae C3overnment'a poll- a strong probability that also in line with ~ conWnue its economlc sanctiona this policy; Prime 11~nlater Suzuki will viait g~~gt the Soviet Union and Lo atep up the ASF.�AN countries next January on hia ;~d to the countriea borde~ing the disput- Srst o~erseas tour since he became prime i ed area in order to beef up the security ~~~r� ~ oi the Weetern camp. Plans to increase Both "the atrategy and the tactica evi- economic aid to Patiatan nnd extend eco- dently signal a pollcy change irom the namic aid to the Cambodian refuQee~ !a "omnidirectianal loreign policy," whtch ;~~~nd and aid to Thailand itaeli are Japan once pur~ued. D+irlag hia tour, Ito, ,~ed at contatning the 8uvlet Union. said that it was good to have a free hand in foreign policy without aligning oneaeli Japaai's own national lnterest is involved with anq epeciSc country but such an at- in such poslWre maneuvers by Fbrel~n ~itude mi'gh~ eatrange one's frlende. M1~~r I~� ~i1e visiting India, Tto ex- Omnidirectional ioreign policq is an pressed Japan'a intenaon to stand aa a "everybody'a friend" attitude. Everybody's candldate for s nonpermanent aett on irlend is nobody's irlend. the UN Securitq Council for 1981-82. In 3 FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 1~UK U1~K1l:lAL u5~ oNLY -~Tie prevfous -'eTec~�ton ~oi noiipermenent membera oi th0 councll, held in November 1978, Japsn faikd to obtain ~upport oi even hali o! tt?e 38 Asisn cr.:untries snd ' waa defeated by Hsn~ladesh. the rlval candidate ia As1s. Ito'a recent tour oi . Aais~ waa, in a way, s pre~andldacy cam- paign by Japan for electioa to Lhe UN Securlty Councll. ' It waa natural that India, which is on iriendlq terma ~vith. the 8oviet IInion, re- sponded coldly to Ito'a pro-A9lEAbT attitude ~ and Japan'a policy o! alianment with the Weatern camp. Yndla gave no commitment ~ to aupport Japan !n the UN Becurity Coun- , cil election. , Pbrelga l~iniater Ito'a 2irst loreign bour, where he acted ae ioreign minister oi a member country of the Weetern csmp, is alao being criticiaed ~vithln JApan for nar- rowing down the toreira pollcy options o! the governa~ent aud weakenina ita poei- tion' aa an lateraational mediator. However, the atrategy and tactica whlch Japan has hammered out in order to per- form ita political role will not change. Thia will become even clearer during Ito's visit to the U8 irom 8eptem'ber 18 snd his tallca - with Soviet Fbreigt~ Attniater Andrei Qro- myko during the IIN (3eneral Assembly. COPYRYGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1980 CSO: 4120 l.G - FOR 0~'F`ICIAL US~ ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAI, AND SOCIOLOGICAI, r LDP FACTIONS AWAITING DEVELOPI~NTS ~ Tokyo MAIDTICHI DA~LY NEWS in English 11 Sep 80 p 2 r"Nagatacho Aoiags" coluaat by Takehilw Takahishi: "LDP Faction Awaitiag Development10J . I Text ] ~uFi a~s~on,nTa a w~k partY cab~s The Z~sucTfii ~~-aPPeaed;~~ere . movementa of ~varlouk LDP W~ �a ~~B likelihood tdat factioas can be observed qaietly maet of tl~ee members ot the wlthin it. How long this M~ ~d leave with situation will continue is Komoto. Mlki theretare "saved problematical. , f~ce by disabar?ding his fac- G7~airtnan Susumu Nllcaido of : t~~~~ the LDP's Executive Council is � 'Ut~ugh t~hls may ~t dave saying that "there is no ~le raaso4 ft was movement among the faMiona ~tedty a potent reason. now, but if the Suzuki cebfnet T~ ~ a~~ by the later starts to totter. factloaal formation of the Komoto tac- movements will begin to ap- t~A. pear." Nikaido is said'to be 1n a On Sept. 4, members of the forn~er Mild taction who sup- position representing the poM Komoto held a meeting at Tanaka faction, He himselt has the Komoto o[tice. They agreed a faction wlthin the LDP but to form a group .for the ex- seems to believe that now is tbe change of information and , timetoremairr'quiet. . provide "material and ~ At the time the Suzuki ad- spiritual" support for the minIstratlon c~tne into being,' coUection of polltlcal funds, the bilki faction called for a thereby strengthening their disbandment of factions. There solidarity. are many rumors as to the Oi 90 members o~~he House of reason for this. One of them is Representatives who belonged that "Komoto considered it to the former Miki faction, 1? dlsadvantageous, in order to ~ attended this meetwg. Kinji win in the party presidential ~ MoMyama, former trapsport competttion, to be a member of ' m 1 n i s t e r, b e c a m e t h e the Miki faction. Komoto ; representatlve caretaker of ti~e - therefore told Mtki that he group.� Probably all the would like to leave 6is faction: members ot the former Miki 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX faction will eventually join this ~ Ishihara i former director group. Tbis meaas the blrth ot a: general of the Environment new Komoto tact~On aitD~ tba ` Agency)� s~n,d---~ie-7tNew~ LDP. ~ Polft#+nal=Lcnnomic St~ndq , Prlor to the formation ot the ~~r.'~ Tbis soc~ety ass led - Komoto taction. a meet'u~g of at aae tfine by the Iate 4kinon - ' the Tanaka faction.was beld. At Kaya, tormer flnance mWster this time an agreement was and justice mintster. It hasbe~n reached to snpport Justice revived by Ishihara. ~ Minister Seisuke Okuno. ~e l~t meeting after the Although Okuno is outwardly revival was held at the end of not atflliated with any fac~ion, it August. The representative is well known that he is close to caretakers are, besides former the Taaaka faction. Because of p~e ~~ister Fukuda. Shigeo his statements concerning the ~a~ ~ Sohei Nakayama. ConstItution. Justice Minister Oguno das begun to be strongly Kaya was Nagano's senior, attacked by the opposition. . both dailing trom HUoshima Since demands are llltely to be Pr~fecture. Nakayama was niade for "the f ustice ministeCs ~ Ishihara's senior~ both being resigaatton," the ~anaka gtaduates ot Hltotsubashi - faction is countertng this and Unfversity. Fuhuda was the one giving support so that Prlme who appolnted Ishihara to head Minister Suzuki will not call for the Eavtronment Agency at the Okuno's resignatton. time of the Futcuda cabinet. ' Disbandment I~~~ bolds a positton equivalent to secretary general Former Prime Minister in the "Nakagawa group" Takeo Fukuda has long ad- headed by Ichiro Nakagawa. vocated the disbandment of director general ot the Science - factions. Nevertheless. the and Tech~wlogy Agency. For Selwakai association of the Ishibara to have boldly Fuhuda iactbn stW retains its established such a political office and cabinet ministers fwida association can be looked wbo have been appolnted froat upoa as meaning that Posi~ive the Futuda factioa call on ~ actbn will be .taken henceforlh ~ Fuknda irequently. No tac- to torm an Ishihara group. tional movements are beiaS� Prime Minister Suzuki carried out bat a struct~ is . regards "harmony". ~ as the being maintained so that, as basis of politics. As against this. Nikaido i~as stated, "if the ~ some critlcs asserts that his ~ Suzuki cabinet starts t~ totter." ;politics is like ttrat of ~�a the Fukuda factlon can take ~caretaker ot a joint building." ~ a~tion at once. ;The o~cupants of varlous rooms In this way tbe tactions are ~ � in this building, namely the - watcdirrg and awaiting; facUons, seem prepared to developments, but, in the midst ~ag[tate at any tlme, depending of thls situation, a movment ~on the attitade of the caretaker. establlsh a new factlon is under ' (The wrlter is an advlser to way. This centers oa Shlntaro ' The ~NaWchi Newspapers and tormerchkf editortal writer~. COPYRIGST: Mainichi Daily News 1980 CSO: 4120 6 FO~t OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 FOR OPFICIAI. IISE ONLY POI,ITICAI~ AND SOCIOZOGICAL SUZURI ATTEMPTS TO SILENCE HAWKS Tokyo THE DAILY YOI~IIIURI in Ettglish 8 Sep 80 p 3 IPolitical Beat column, by Raieuke Honda: "Silencing the Iiawks"~ ~Text~ . - Prime Minister 8uzuld and other govera- . --~~uce s~riew,. �independent" con- ment aad Liberal~DemocrattC Party (I.DP) ~~~n to replace the exlstiag cl~rber, leaders appear perplezed over npeated ~ parEy ~aya ~vaa drs~vn yp under "hawldsh" remarks .by Justicx Mlnfater 8ei- ~ p=~s oi the occupaWoa aut2wrlties. . snlce Okuno reQarding. the highly eenattive ~ f~ Lherefore only natural for any i~sue oi a constttutionsl revlsion. ' Lbbrsl-Democfitt to take s vie~v fa~?orina Their embarraumeat over the Ol~na re- ` ~~n of the oonstitution. . m4rl~s seemi ~o be nlated to mounting ' ~ Ia tset, ~morti i.DP Diet aaembers h~ve criticfsm smong Lhe oppoaltion partiea !or i been aQlllsted a?lth the Dletmea'~ Les~ue the Susu~i csbiaet's "s~vlne to the sl~ht for the Re~tloa oi aa Indepeadent Con- Amoag the ~i8~ that the oppoaiti~ snd stituttoa chaired b9 tormer prime min- ~ t2u public re~srd sa the puauld sdmtais- ~ iatei Nobusalte Biat~f. ' � ~ tration'a "prorightlst leaninga" stre tlse ' ~ yDp ~membera who belonaed to the vieit to Yasukun! Bhrine made by Prea~lei ' ~~~d faction led by the late 3uauic! and moet oi h1a cabinet members pn~~ ~y~~ Ohira, howersr, were - on August 15, the annlversary oi the ead ~d to be tli~ most "dovLsh-minded" oom- oi 'the Padtic War, end Lhe governa~en~ pQ~ ~p{},g other LDP membera. decisioAS .te arm Air 9elf-Defenae Pbrce ~ 3uch fo~mer senior membera of the late planea and Maritime Seli-Defense Bbrce Ohira'a faction as Chiei Cabinet 8eeretary escort shipa with miaslles and torpedoee~ ; K2ich! Mtyaaaws and P'oreiga Minister D~a= reaDecttvely. : , aaqoshl Ito bave not ~oined ttu Dietm~n's Cloae aides of the premier are reportedlq ! Ie~gue !or ~+evlvn~ the ooastitutlon, al- e~a~dons that auch a aequence o! eti?ente thongh Premier 8uauld~ who waa also ~ would lead to . eerioua "mfeunderatanding" ~s~g ~mber of the asme factton, 1s by th~e peopk of the funda~ental policy ~ aialiated wlth the lea~ue. linea o! the Suzuki government, unlese it ' ~~Yore, there fa no nason why the comea out explicitly with its ni~~or poHcq ap~~a part4es ehould accuse the 8uzulci g�~' ' cabinet of beln~ the "mo4t rightiat cabi- Apparentlq in a~ Wd to clear auch a, � net" in the history o! postwar politics. mi~underatanding, Suau~i, in maging a ~ curnnt rash o! event~ that aeem to keynote speech Sundey at an LDP policy � s"tilt to the rlght" by the LDP atudy. meeting at Hakvne, said he had no ~~dy $ttrlbutable bo some LDP le~d- lntentlon at all of ~eeldng a revieion 10! ~~~g o8 efter the land~IIde victory the war=renouncing coaatttution. o!, the LDP in the last "double'~ Diet elec- Apart irom 'the cunent fua~ over the iustice minleter'a � remarks calling for ~ ~ona. amending the conatitutlon, the LDP's plat- ~ The ~ problem in thia connection ia that fortn dces make it clear that its goal ia Premier 8usuk! haa been unable ~ to show 7 FOA OFFICIAL ~TSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 FOR UFFiCIAL USE UNLY eftective enough leadership to hold ~ such IndicatSona are that Premier Suzuki inadvertent remarks in check. wouid Snd it virtaallY impossible to 8re One former member of the late Ohira's O~~O ~~~r ~ lon~ aa the ` - iactton says: "The Suzuki cabinet 1s un- heavily depend t Son~thenstr~ h ot the doubtedly dovlsh ~ in character. It is re- Tansks iactlon. ~ - grettable that the premier is so aSable as ~t t~ p~~~r's right-hand man, M1Ya- to alloav hia cabinet members to make ya~~ has opsnly expressed hia displeasure remarks'as the~ 1lke, to the eztent oi in- at Okuno's remarks, sayinB: "I cannot curring unnecessary misunderstanding from ~deratantl why he has made it a point the public: ' ' ~ gpeak out what mlght well be left un- "The pnmfer as well as the chiei caDi- y~d . net secretary should strongly urge the ~~n ~p ~~n~ry-C~eneral Yoshio 9a- cabineC members to be more careful in ~,ucht, who himself caused an earlier apeech and behavior," he siresaed. ~~otlon ior hia remarks in favor of re- Mesnwhlle, . the faction led , by 2ormer o~g ~ ~onstitution, including war- premier Kakuei Tanaka at its senior mem- ~no~~g ~rticle S, is critical of Okuno's . bers meeting 9eptember 3 decided to mage re~g$ ~~aing gone too far." - utmoat eaorta lest Justice Minister Oguno, y~~ough there is no immediate aiBn uf knowa fbr his friendlq ties~ with the Ta- ~traparty strile in the ITiP, the lack of naka iactton, ahould be forced to restgn leaderehip oi Pnaaler Suzuki, 1! left as it hii post because of hta recent remarks. arould eventually lead to Browina dis- cord in lsctlonai relations. COP'YRIGHT: The D~ily Yomiuri 1980 CSO: 4120 F 8 FOtt OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 FOB OFI+ICIAL USB ONLY POLITICAI~ AND SOCIOLOGICAZ 'YOMIURI~ ON MONEY, POLITICS Tokyo THE LIAILY YOMIURI in English 11 Sep 80 p 2 ~Editorial: "Money and Politics"~ ~ Text ~ Not only di~ nolitical donations rea.ch a record hi;h of ~86,800 million in 1979 but there was a marked increase ia the trend of professional organizatione ~ contributing #o political parties. . The aharp rise in donations reported by the Home AE~aiPS Miniatry is obviously due to the fact that there were unified local elections in April of last year - and a. general election in October. Also, campaign funds were being amsesed for the House of Coun- cilors election scheduled for the gummer of thia year. The pronounced riae in donations by organizations representing profeesiona or trade is worth noting. There organizations now ha.ve become pressure g~roupa in Japanese politics. Such well larown organizations _ such as the Japan Politieal League of Dentists wer: - again on the list. However, there were also some new organizationa. - These included the Political League of Health Insur- ance Associations, the National Political League of Oil Producers and Dealers, the Japan Political League - of Licensed Tax Accountants and the League of Liq- uor Retailere. These ranlc high within the top 25 organizations making coirtrlbutiona. . Suspicious Donations - - These organizatione made contributions to support certa.in politicians. And we suapect that the organiza- tiona expect the politicians to do something for them in return. For instance, there was diacussion last year over whether the 3apan Political� League of Licenaed Tax Accountants made cbntributions to politicians for the purpose of obtaining their help in revieing the La~v of Licensed Tax Accountants. 9 . FOR OFII+ICIAL OSB ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 ru~c urrl~uw u~b unLi - _ _ Ia recent years, sn Increasing numher uf political - leagues representing people engaged in the same pro- fession have been aet up. This does not n~~iiy mean tY,at this developmznt will lesd to political cor- ruption. However, both the organizationa donating - funds and the politiciana receiving them should prac� tice restraint. ' Misuse Of Donation~ , Another prnblem is that some politiciane use part of the donationa for their personal use ~r even to make fortunea. It moet certainly is wrong for politi- cians to spend theae ~3onations to go to cabarets or to buy clothes. Money, spent for personal purpoaes should come from the politici~.ns` own salaries. Common people have taxee deducted from all the money they reaeive and pay for their own partiea. Politiciana ahould nox anjoy speeial privileges by mis- _ ' using money donated for campaigns. After the Watergate scandal, a' US law made it obligatory for politicians to disclose the amount of their aesets. A similar law should be enaeted in Japan. The Political Funds Regulation Law comes up for revision next January, and some Liberal-Democrats - are urging that the ceiling on the amount of political donations be raised. This i~ wrong. Japan should hold down donations by nrganizationa and encourage po- - litical donations by individuals. , ( $eptember 11) - COP'YRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1980 _ CSO : 4120 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY MILITARY WEAKNESSES IN HOKKAIDO DEFENSE CAUSING CQNCERN - Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 7 Aug 80 pp 28-32 [Article; "Early Attairiment of 'Medium-Term Operations Estimate' Is Not Impoasible, But It Is Unrealistic"] [Text] "If America aneezes, Japan catches cold." This was eaid to - epitomize Japan-U.S. relations in the paet. More recently, regarding ya economic relationa, aneezing on the part of America has no longer caused Japan to catch cold. But, economic issues aside, Japan-U.S. relations in other respects have not changed a bit. For eaample, when the United States broached the sub~ect of an increase in Japan's defense spending, it threw - the entire Japanese nation into an immediate uproar. Moreover, in addition to report~d U.S. pressures for bolstering defense funds vis-a-vis Japan's GNP, the main thrust of the U.S. request r~port~dly lies in "the buildup of defense power in Hokkaido." A certain expert in Japan-U.S. affairs points out that "this is indeed a very serious atate of affairs." He continues: "In fact, it is not the firat time the United Statea has expresaed misgivings regarding Japan's weakness in its capability for defense of Hokkaido. The American Govern- ment has held this notion for some time. But it had kept silent in consideration of the Japanese Government's position. The Americans knew it was taboo for an outeide nation to point out Japan's defense conditions in apecific terma. "However, t~e II.S. attitude changed abruptly following the overwhelming victory by conservative forces in Japan's recent 'double election.' The - debate over Japan's strength, which was considered taboo until then, became a ma~ority positinn within the nation. The U.S. Government approved of ~ the change within Japan and, shifting ita position, decided to take the _ opportunity to make its desires known. The result has been a renewed re- quest for an early increase~ from 0.9 percent to 1 percent in Japan's defense spending vis-a-vis its GNP (Note: actually expediting the plan by 1 year), as reportedly agreed on by President Carter and the late Prime Minister Chira, and Japan is now faced with the demand that it strenghten its weak defenses in Hokkaido." 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 r~ux ur~r~l~iEU. u~r~ uNLZ _ Also, the ratio to thp GNY is a ma3or topic carried daily b}� Japanese newspapers in connection with the problem of Japan's Defer?se Agency budget for the coming fiscal year. However, for whatever reason, the demand for "strengthening Hokkaido's defensea" is being treated with indifference by the newspapers. The only noteworthy article given space by the papers was a KYODO dispatch from Washington on the 23rd [July] under the caption, "U.S. shares diacuasions on anti-Soviet defense of ffiaritime tranaportaCion." Accordir.g to the KYODO dispatch that day, an afficial of the U.S. Defense Departmant pointed out to the KYODO TSUSHrN correspondent "the poasibility of a landing in Hokkaido by Soviet forces as a hypothetical invasion of Japan." The dispatch said: "Until now, U.S. Government sources had strictly avoided making any demands on the Japanese Government for a buildup of de- fen~e strength, or revealing specific details concerning Japan's defense power, in front of Japanese newsmen. Today, however, a Pentagon official explained that the reasons for Japan's lack of strength to repel a Soviet attack on Hokkaido were 'widely circulated,' and pointed to the lack of stockpiles of ammunition and fuel." tQ'ioted from the KYODO dispatch in YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 25 July) _ A Washington bureau correspondent of KY0D0 TSUSHIN spoke as follows: - "Since the contents of the article were deliberated upon at the Japan-U.S. security treaty meeting held in Tokyo, it may not be news to high officials _ af the Japanese Government or to informed afficers of the Defense Agency. Nonetheless, deepite its wide circulation, this reporter feels that the unpreced~nted discvssion of such epecifi.c details by the U.S. official in front of a reporter makes big news. Whr:n an exclusive interview was re- quested, it was not only granted but a venue was set up for the interview. Judging from his attitude, it could be said that the U.S. official spoke with the Japanese public in mind. If ic had been merely an expression of a personal view, the official would not have acted so formally. Recently there have been four or five editorials snd reports concerning Japan's military strength published in the United States. This clearly indicates an awareness that Japan's internal allergy toward the defense issue has softened and the fact that the U.S. Government has changed its position vis-a-vis Japan." 2,000 Soviet Planes to Japan's 500 Of course,.according to the expert on U.S.-Japan foreign relations _ mentioned before, behind such a shift in the U.S. position lie several reasons,.aside from the "favorable change" in Japan's political climate. "One is probably the deterioration of the U.S. economy and a shift in U.S. world strategy. At present, the ma3or focus of U.S. world strategy is directed, after all, toward the Mideast. That is, it has divided the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific Ocean into two groups and sent one group to iz FOR 0~'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040007-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044407-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the western Indian Ocean. It has dispatched the Sixth Fleet, stationed in the Mediterranean Sea, between the Mideast and the Indian Ocean at will. It is surely America's intention that 'we will defend the Mideast, so you (Japan and the European nations) should defend the security of the Far East and Europe.' "Secondly, if public opinion in Japan is turning hawkish, U.S. public opinion is also hardc: