JPRS ID: 9346 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040026-6
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• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9346
14 October 1980
- Sub-Saharan Afr.ica Re ~ort
p
FOUO No. 692
F'B~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9346
14 October 1980
SUB-SA{IARAN AFRICA REPORT
. FOUO No. 692
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Southern Africsn Trade To Use Mozambique Facilities
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Sep 80) 1
Briefs
Arabo-African Conf~erence 2
ANGOLA
Briefs
Cem~nr_ Agreement With Denmark 3
ETHIOPIA
Offensive in Tigre Launched
(Dan Connell; REUTER, 5 Sep 80) 4
TPLF Spokesman on Fighting in Ethiopia
(REUTER, 12 Sep 80) 5
GABON .
'Isle of Prosperity' Turns Into Isle of Insecurity
(Mari~m Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 15 Sep 80) 6
National Prosperity Only Serves Minority, Foreign Interests
(Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 1 Sep 80) 9
Briefs
- New Oil Finds 12
IVdRY COAST
Current Democratization Cau?paign Discusaed
(Jonathan I:olela; AF1tIQUE-ASIE, 18 Aug 80) 13
- a - LIII - NE & A- 124 FOUO]
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Two Decades of Economic Growth Examined
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Aug 80) 18
. NIGERIA
- UK Financial Paper Interviews Foreign Minister
(Ishaya Audu Interview; FINANCIAL TIMES~, 30 Sep 80). 30
- b -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE TO USE MOZAMBIQUE FACILITIES
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80 p 40
[Text] Thanks to the railroad cars from Zimbabwe, it will be possible
to export copper from Zambia and Zaire from the Mozambican ports of
Maputo and Beira toward the end of 1982. Thus, the declarations of
intent on African regional cooperation in the field of transportation
are being implemented through concrete projects.
At the end of August, the railroad administrators of five southern and
centra~ African countries (Malawi, Mozambique, Zaire, Zambia and
Zimbabwe) met in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second largest city. As early as
5 September, the first project far cooperation was announced: the
construct3.on of a railroad line between the cities of Mchin~i in Malawi
and Chipata in Zambia; the Canadian Government has been asked to finance
this undertaking. On 6 September, the EEC announced it ha3 agreed to
finance the purchase by Zambia of 250 railroad cars (over $7 million)
manufactuxed in Zimbabwe. Delivery of these cars will be effected
within 9 months. This corresponds approximately to the Mozambican self-
imposed deadline for the moderniza~ion of its port facilities. As of
next year, Maputo--which can acco~odate at present only medium-size
ships (60,000 tons)--would be able to handle freight amounting to
1.5 million tons, the equivalent of hal� of Botswana's, Zaire's,
Zambia's and Zimbabwe's exchange~ now transiting throu~h South ~,frica.
As is known, Zairian copper, for instance, cannot be exported through
Angola any longer due to the closing of the Benguela railroad, Zambia's
copper has not been exported through Tanzania ever since the famous
Tan-zam became inoperative. The upshot is that instEad of decreasing,
ce~:endence on Pretoria has only been strengthened, with South African
ports serving as a vital element in the Zambian and Zairian economies,
an~ especially in that of Zimbabwe, 78 percent of whose foreign trans-
ac~:ions still goes through South Africa.
C~rYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
- ARABO-AFRICAN CONFERENCE--Following Madagascar's withdrawal, Mali will be
host to the Arabo-African People's Conference (28 November-3 December).
The conference, which is under the auspices of Libya, would reportedly be
aLte~ided by--besides Mali--Angola, Benin, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Togo,
Zambia, the PLO, the Egyptian Patriotic Movement, as well as by the South-
ern Africa liberation movements. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French
24 Se; 80 p 50]
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ANGOLA
B RIEFS
CEMENT AGREEMENT WI~i DENMARK--Angola and Denmark have signed in Luanda a
~ protocol for a cooperation agreement in the cement industry, according to
which Denmark will build the fourth oven in the CIMANGOL cement plant.
This would significantly increase the production of this Angolan company.
1he protocol was signed by the deputy minister of fjnance, Augusto
Teixeira and by Jesper Peterson for Denmark. Informed rircles in Luanda
emphasize the importance of this protocol, since Angola exports several
thousands of tons of cement per year. The CIMANGOL production presently
exceeds 700,000 tons, as specified by the JORNAL DE ANGOLA citing the ANGOP
agency. Jesper Peterson was leading a delegation constituted by members
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives of the DANIDA agency,
which specializes in international development. [TextJ [Paris MARQiES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEFNS in French 12 Sep 80 p 2259]
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ETHIOPIA
OFFENSIVE It~ TIGRE LAUNCHED
JN051829 London REUTER in English 1811 GMT 5 Sep 80
[Article by Dan Connell]
- [Text] Khartoum, Sudan, 5 Sep, REUTER--Savigt-backed Ethiopian troops
launched a major offensive against anti-government guerrillas in the
~ northern province of Tigre this week, guerrilla o6ficials said. More
.~i than 40,000 government troops supported by Soviet tanks, artillery and
aircraft were involved in the campaign on four fronts, according to a
spokesman for the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF).
"This is far [as received] the biggest offensive they have ever made in
Tigre, but we are also stronger than we've e~-~r been before," TPLF
political bureau member Seyoum Mussa said in an interview in the Sudanese
capital.
The guerrilla leader arrived in Khartoum yesterday from the Ethiopian
war zone, where he said guerrilla activity had restricted government
forces to a few big towns.
The 1'igrean guerrillas fighting for autonomy are allied with nationalist
guerrillas of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) in the
neighbouring Red Sea territory of Eritrea.
Spokesmen for the EPLF have been predicting an Ethiopian offensive there
since mid-June, but it now appears that the Addis Ababa government, which
is also fighting ethnic Somali nati-nalists in the south-eastern Ogaden
region, has decided to move first in Tigre.
"They want to clear the supply line to Eritrea before they launch the
offensive there," Mr Mussa said.
The guerrilla leader said that Ethiopia's freshly-trained 18th division
was sent to Tigre 4 weeks ago to reinforce troops already there. The new
unit was specially prepared for mountain warfare, he said.
Tnree Soviet colonels based in the Tigrean capital of Nekele and in the
northern garrison at A;cum were advising the Ethiopian forces in the �
four-pronged assault, according to Mr Mussa.
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ETHIOP'IA
TPLF SPOKESMAN ON FIGHTING I�N ETHIOPIA
JN121033 London REUTER in English 1007 GMT 12 Sep 80
[TextJ Khartoum, 12 Sep (RE'JTER)--Secessionist guerrillas in northern
Ethiopia said today they had killed 14L Ethiopian troops and blown up
an ammunition convoy in a 90-minute battle.
The Ethiopians used helicopter gunships, MIG jets and tanks, the guerrillas
said.
A spokesman for the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) said the battle
- Iast Tuesday was the second engagement in the first week of a new govern-
ment campaign against the guerrillas of Tigre Province.
He said Soviet advisers with the Ethiopians' forces were heard using field
radios during the fighting and were picked up by helicopters and flown
to the local garrison at Aduwa.
1'he clash began with an ambush of the ammunition convoy eight kms (five
miles) south of Aduwa, the spokesman said.
He added that the guerrillas seized large quantities of arms from the
convoy.
Last weekend the TPLF said it killed 200 Ethiopian troops in a six-hour
battle on the Tigrean section of the main highway linking Eritrea Province
with the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
The TPLF spokesman said the Ethiopian Government had launched the campaign
in Tigre to secure its supply lines through the province in preparation _
for a renewed offensive against the bigger secessionist guerrilla groups , r
in Eritrea.
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GAB CI~T
' ISLE OF PROSPERITY' TURNS IN~ ISLE OF INSECURIT'Y .
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 15 Sep 80 pp 37-39
[Article by Mariam Sysle: "Breaches in the Fortress"]
[E:~cerpts] The ceremonies marking the twentieth anniversary of Gabon's
independ~nce on 17 August gave President Bongo the opporttmity to award
himself a new certificate of satisfaction in the presence of his friends
and ranking guests, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Rnbert
Galley, the French minister of cooperation. Gabon, he s~ated, en~oys
"Africa's most progressive social legislation"; as for the 1977 crisis
due to "excessive indebtedness," it has been "surmo~ted." Zhe recovery
and stability plan set up in 1978 and 1979 "has been entirely successful."
- If any probleffi still exist, it is only because Gabon "has registered
- difficulties in finding access to the developed countries' markets and
technology and is faced with increasingly prohibitive prices for equipment
goods which must be imported for the most part."
Except for this problem--which is iadeed real and is shared by all third
world countries--everything is fine in the best possible country. True,
it would have been easy to be caugfit in the i~lusion when seeing the tens
of ~housancls of people who had come to applaud the impoaing military
parade on the occasion of the twentieth anzii�versary, followed by that of the
"mass organizations" of Bonga's party. It would also have been possible
to believe that the Gabonese are wnanimously behind their president, who
en~ oys--as he likes to repeat--the full trus t of his people. And yet, what
a whirlpool of deep and diverse trends is h:Cdden under this apparent _
~animity !
Clan struggles, e.thnic co~flicts based on anc~ exacerbated by a p~licy of
favoritism which fail to cover up the concessions made in haphazard
fashion, lassitude and dissatisfaction of those whom the fictitious
prosperity created by the manna of the natural resources reserved for
export has overlooked; all of this makes up a background which indeed
worries the powers-that-be in a co~mtry where the activities of secret
police agents and of local and foreign businesemen add��to the confusion �
and the instability of the situation. To be sure, as a"p~ter familias"
who knows how to use the carrot and the stick, as a"good boss," Bongo
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has so far been able to keep the reins of pawer. His government knaas how
to snuff out protest movements by either distributing money or striking
~ hard. An entire system of close surveillance and systematic reporting is
able to prevent the worse. Corruption, peculation, favoritism take care
of the rest, and whenever necessary, the government touches the chord of
chauvj.nism, channeling dissatisfaction on scapegoats: the immigrant
workers--preferably from neighboring co~mtries--who must shoulder the
responsibility for whatever has gone wrong.
Today, despite optimistic speeches, the malaise is spreading. Due to the
economic recession, hundreds of Gabanese have lost their jobs and been
compelled to return to their villages where the problem of daily survival
is acute. As for the urban population, its purchasing power has been
severely eroded. 1he SMIG/interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage/ has
remained stable for the past 3 years and when one is familiar with the
exorbitan.t price reached by basic foodstuffs,--not to even mention rents--
- one can easily imagine the fears of valor neceasary to satisfy daily needs.
~
Crying Anomalies
Everyane is aware, of c%urse, that only those enjoying extremely high
salaries are able to live decently in Gabon. As is common wherever the IMF
experts put their hand to the task, it is the Gabonese population which must
bear the burden of Bongo's vaimted austerity pl,an. Economic measures such
as the closing.af embassies, or demagogic initiatives like raising the
price of :hampagne do not fool anyone. Gabon's social situation is character-
ized by the fact that the gulf between that handful of privileged persons
who are profiting from the current prosperity to enrich the~elves and
_ lead luxurious lives, and the majority of the pppulation which must face
increasing difficulties, is ever-widening. _
Zhose in power are, of course, quite conscious of the danger this situation
entails : since the second extraordinary congress of the PDG (Gabanese
Democratic Party) , they have been ceaselessly--but vainly--proclaiming the
need for "an effort to provide social justice."
In reality, Bongo's Gaban looks very much like a boiling kettle. Lat~t May's
troubles constitute proof of the strong social tension pervading the
cotmtry and of the exasperation felt by the lawer rank-and-file of the
civil service.
If, indeed, the literacy rate is high, the Gabonese educational system's
main characteristic is its total inadaptability to national realities; it
fosters the uprooting of people who will almost surely be tmable to find
employment--unless they have the right connections.
Velleities of Nationalism
When the highest rimgs of government provide the example of corruption and
of the race to wealth, it is highly likely that any exhortations will, ~ust
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like in the past, remain ineffective. But the fortress built by Bongo is
beginning to present breaches on all aides. In addition to social tension,
one can now witness a very perceptible political malaise. Increasing
n~m~bers of Gabonese--including some among those in power--are becoming
aware that the present policy of devielopment can only lead the country
sooner or later, to total ruin. ~ere are also those who are begin*~ing to
_ think that Gabon has nothing to gain from continuing to follow the course
of the former French mother-country of which--as is known only too well--
it is one of the most zealous servants.
Finally, certain velleities of nationalism are becoming apparent through
masked hostility toward French exaptriate cadres and interests, as well
as through the search for other avenues of cooperation which would loosen
France's hold on the coimtry. However, the survival of Bongo's regime--
j us t like that of Bokassa's empi~e--depends on France's pleasure, al l the
more so si.zce Gabon has become a French military basis, especially
strengthened by the withdrawal of the Qlad occupation forces. Meanwhile,
a climate of "settlement of accounts" reigns in Libreville, a city which
increasingly resembles Bangui at tYie time of former "emperor" Bokassa.
The extortions of the l~broccan presidential guard are compounded by those
of tolerated gangs. Zhe most fantastic rumors are persistently circulating
about the sometimes tragic disappearance of persons who have somehaw fallen
out of favor with the presidential couple or with other influential
persons of the regime. Zhis has reached such proportions that Bongo's
tiny isle of prosperity has surely become a tiny isle of insecurity, into
which one should anly venture with caution.
COPYRIQiT: Afrique-Asie 1980
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= GA,BON
NATIONAL PROSPERITY ONLY SERVES MINORITY, FOREIGN INTERESTS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 1 Sep 80 pp 42-44 ~
[Article by Mariam Sysle: "A Small Island of Prosperity. A Tiny Little :
Island: for Foreign Companies and 5everal Hundred Privileged Individuals"] -
[Excerpts] The experts of the Il~IF, who exercise a close surveillance on
the management practices of the Libreville authorities, are satisfied with
the Gabon of Mr Bongo. The recovery and austerity plan set up after the
years of "overheating" and the excessive expenditi~res of 1977, for which
the OAU conference had been the pretext, has reportedly reached its ob~ec-
tives.
According to some Gabonese financial sources, the gross national product,
which had fallen to 600 bil]:'ion francs CFA, has returned to the level
reached during the period of expansion (720 billion francs CFA) ; the
balance of payments, which had registered a deficit of 44 billion francs
CFA in 1977 showed a slight surplus (10 billion) in 1979; as for the bal-
ance of trade, it presents a largely positive balance, exports having in-
creased from 280 billion francs CFA in 1978 to 377 billion in 1979, while
imports have fallen off from 177 billion in 1977 to 113 billion in 1979.
Finally, the national debt has gone from 575 billion francs CFA at the
end of 1977 to 440 billion at the end of 1979, and it is anticipated that
it will not exceed 365 billion at the end of 1980.
Acts of Generosity
As can be seen, everything seems to be getting along fine in Bongo's realm,
at least for the foreign interests to which the country is more and more
enslaved each day, and for the privileged class which shields them and is
inseparably linked to them.
The Specter of Bankruptcy
But above all, beyond the internecine struggles taking place among foreign
interests in Gabon, beyond the apparent improvement of the financial situa-
tion, one fact demands recognition. Here is a country whtch is fortunate
enough to possess, among other things, three particularly sought-after
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strategic resources--oil, uranium, and manganese. But instead of being
utilized as a driving lever for the harmonious and diversified development
of the entire economic sect~r, and to provide work and a relative well-
being to all (which is all the more realizable as Gabon only has a small
population of less than a million inhabitants), instead of contributing to
freeing the country from for.eign domination, these riches have only fos-
tered the emergence of a pr:Lvileged class totally detached from the basic
preoccupations of the population and have helped to further sub~ugate the
country to the domination of extra-African capital.
- The recovery plan in progress has no other objective than to perp~etuate
the present status, that of an Eldorado for the bankers and unscrupulous
businessmen of every sort of the capitalist world. Should it be remodeled
for increased efficiency, the policy of pillage of national wealth will be
intensified: such is the meaning of the solicitude displayed by the bank-
ing consortiums and the IMF.
Meanwhile, the squanderings of the past years have not ceased to weigh
heavily on the future of the country. The implementation of large econamic
pro~ects, which had en~oyed noisy publicity, is either slowed (such is the
case with the progress of the Transgabonese works), or remains hypothetical.
But ab.~ve all, behind the (sorry) official optimism and the "grandiose ac-
complis:zments," it is the specter of bankruptcy which stands out. Even in
the ruling circles, there are some who are aware of it. They perceive with %
amazement that true development has not yet really begun. That is how the
Gabonese daily L'UNION last July prepared a catastrophic b~alance sheet for
the agricultural situation. This sector, which still employs close to
80 percent of the population, but which contributes only 4 percent of the
gross national product (GNP), "still registers some serious difficulties
inhErent to the very situation of under development which exists in the
whole country," the newspaper noted.
That illustrates clearly the gulf which, in Bongo's realm, separates words
from acts, especially when one knows that the he$d of state has not failed,
for more than a decade, to proclaim the priority of the need to develop
agriculture, as we11 as hold out bright prospects through a series of
projects, one more wonderful than the next.
Nevertheless, the results are there, (considered "catastrophic" by L'UNION),
which points out some of the most flagrant evils: decline in productivity,
_ a rural exodus, increased dependency on food imports. At the time of the
f irst five-year plan (1966-1970), the state aid to the ~gricultural sector
was only 1.3 billion francs CFA as opposed to 48 billion for the mining
sector. For the second plan (1970-1975), agriculture received only 4 bil-
lion francs CFA, that is to say, 1.7 percent of the investment budget pro-
vided for by the plan.
Abandoned
Zn reality, agriculture has been utterly neglected and food crops are by
and large in decline.
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To be sure, large programs, in the agricultural sector as in the others,
are not lacking. Let us cite for example the banana tree pro~ect of Ntoum
(600 hectares of plan*_ain under production); the Haut-Ogooue ~ugar Com-
pany (SOSUHO), which ought to supply 30,000 tons of sugar in 1980; the
Port-Gentil Agricultural Company (AGRIPOG), whose ob~ective is to ensure
the food and vegetable supply of this area and possibly that of Libreville;
finally, the reclamation project of the cocoa plantations (SONADECI).
But there again, one has no illusions, since these projects are charac-
terized by improvisation and motivated, in the main, by the profit-making
ob~ectives of the foreign interests which have given rise to them and head
them. A report, prepared by the staff of the competent ministry entitled
"'I~wenty Years of Agriculture in Gabon" and which the newspaper L'UNION
an.alyzes, ~s significant in this respect. One notes that the studies to
implement the large national agricultural pro~ects initiated in 1975, have
been carried out by foreign research firms, on the basis of information =
furnished by the technicians of the Gabonese Ministry of Agriculture, who,
nevertheless, have not at any time been associated in any way with those
studies, much less with the implementaCion of thE pro~ects. These, accord-
ing to the report, are only hande~ over to them when financial resources
are exhausted, as was the case with the market-garden project of Medouneu.
One observes, on the other hand, that foreign participation is in the
majority in most cases (as in the case of AGRO-GABON and SOSUHO). Finally,
these projects cause an influx of foreign cadres, a fact which "dangerously
burdens the budgets allocated for their implementation. Thus, for example, _
the previously mentioned report states that for the period 1973-1973, on -
a total investment of 822.2 million francs CFA, the technical assistance
for the Woleu-Ntem cocoa culture pro~ect alone consumed 509 million...
As for the isolated operations launched by the government to alleviate the
food shortage, they aim at the introduction of crops reserved for the well-
to-do classes such as the market-garden crops of the AGRIPOG project, but
one seeks in vain tiie range of products which comprise the basic nourish-
ment of the majority of the Gabonese people...
It would be difficult to present more glaring proof of the failure of a
government solely guided by a concern to give full freedom of action to
foreign interests and to satisfy the insatiable appetites of the small
class of "nouveaux riches" who direct it.
It would be equally hard to show any better who profits from the much
touted "prosperity" of this little island of "peace and stability," as
Mr Bongo calls his realm. -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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GABON
P
BRIEFS
NEW OIL FINDS--Elf-Gabon has just ma~ie two oil finds, the first in the area
of Baudroie-Marin and the other in N'Dindi, acc~rding to a coffinunique pub-
lished by the company on 8 September. The Baudroie-Nord-Marin exploration
we 11, located 7 kms northwest of the Baliste f3eld which was recently
opened, has hit two oil-soaked la.yers wh ich have respectively provided
400 and 275 cubic meters daily. This well is owned by Elf-Gabon (operator)
and Mitsubishi Petroleum Development Company. The Mwengui exploration well,
located 6 kms from the M'Bya Sud platform, also found on oil-soaked
layer. 7.tao tests produced between 50 and 115 cubic meters per day. Additional
work is needed in order to elaluate the importance of tt?is disc.overy, the
co~imique states. 7.he production of this well, located i.n the N~Dindi permj.t,
is shared by Elf-Gabon (55 percent), SNEA [expansion unknownJ (30 percent;
and Shell (15 percent). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 12 Sep 80 p 2251J
CSO: 4400 ~ ~
.
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IVORY COAST
CURRENT DEMOCRATIZATION CAI~AIGN DISCUSSED ~
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Aug 80 pp 100-102
~
[Article by Jonathan Kolela: "Ready for Democracy"]
[Text] The Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally
(PDCI-RDA), the single political party in power conducted elections in
July to replace the secretariea generals of its subaections. This was
accomplished by indirect election. Candidates, all eminent party members--
or claiming to be such--vied for the votes of village or urban committee
members who had th~mselves been elected by the party's rank-and-file members,
in other words the entire population. A young high-Ievel Interior Ministry
official explained the procedur~ to us: "In cities, the district or ward
co~ittees correspond to t~e village committees. Both types of committee
, are democratically elected on the basis of at least 100 persons per committee.
Each committee then meets and in turn elects the subsection secretary
gener~l.
The interest aroused by these elections seems to be primarily in the ~act
that Ivorians view them as holding in themselves the seeds of profound
changes. Such is the case, for example, in Agnibilekro, an important
village with a population of a few thousand persons, in the prefecture of
Abengourou. This village is linked to Abidjan by an asphalt road wixose .
perfect ~ondition im~ediately surprises the visitor. Like the entire region,
this large village owes its prosperity to coffee and cocoa crops, and forestry.
The village's name is a reminder that its inhabitant~s,the Agni--one of the
five components of the Akan ethnic group found in several African countries--
emigrated from Ghana 2 or 3 centuries ago. The border between the two
countries is but a few kilometers away. And as if to highlight the fuCility
of territorial boimdaries imposed at the whim of colonial rivalries, popula-
tions on both sides of the border continue to live in total symbiosis as
their ancestors did. It is not unusual to see farmers from this side daily
crossing the border to work in their fields on the other side, and vice versa.
Late this July, Agnibilekro bustled with exceptional activity. In the vil-
lage center, inside a hall decorated wf:th the Ivorian national colors,
villagers were preparing to vote. The prefect addressed them directly as
follows: "What you must keep in mi.nd about this open democracy is the com-
plete freedom all party members have and must have in choosing their political
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representatives at all levels. Nobody is exerting any pressure on you in
this voting. The President of the Republic emphasized this point at the
meeting of the national council. The political bureau has made no recom-
mendation as to candidates. Any candidate who during his campaign told
you he had the backing of the President of the Republic or the political
bureau, has lied. The chief. of etate backs no carididate." The voting
which followed was calm and orderly. On four or five occasions, however,
the government's emissary did have to consult representatives of the three
candiates--also charged with seeing that the election proceeded in an orderly
manner--to ask them if a voter who had forgotten his identity papers--but
had been recognized by two witnesses--could be allowed to vote. The emissary
also had to convince an elderly lady who had obviously never voted before
in her life, that she should insert her ballot, and not her identity card,
in the b allot box.
From Agnibilekro to Man, from Abidjan and San Pedro to Korhogo and Ferkesse-
dougou, the Ivory Coast seethed with uncustomary excitement throughout the
month of July, the period allowed for the election of the party's basic
cadres. In some localities there were as many as 18 candidates, but the
national average was about three or four. A few rather strange incidents
were observed in this country where the family hierarchical structure is so
deeply rooted: a woman voted against her husband; and a father and daughter
ran against each other. Many of the regime's "political bosses" were
defeated after having vainly begged the Old Man--a familiar nickname given
~ Houphouet-Boigny by Ivorians--to give them a lift that would have enabled
them ~o save their positions. The orders given prefects and subprefects to
remain strictly neutral seem to have been gen~erally followed. They had
been warned a few weeks earlier: "Your career is at stake in these elec-
tions." Voting by secret ballot had been recommended, but in some villages,
voters who could not read voted by lining up behind the candidate of their
choice.
� In a country where, since independence in 1960, the political class has
known few upsats, a.^.d where the party congress serves more as a recording
' studio than a forum for democratic debate, Houphouet-Boigny's decision to
liberalize the country's nolitical life had a bombshell effect.
It all began on 7 I?ecember 1979 at Katiola in the Tagouana region. On the
19th anniversary of the country's independence, the Ivorian chief o~ state
gave his fellow countrymen a message of "caution and hope" in which he
announced: "In the days to come, I shall apply myself to seeing that the
will of our people is expressed more and more freely, and at levels. Our
party's structure makes this possible without demagoguery or excesses."
Most of his audience underestimated his words of caution because they were
no doubt inured to those reforms that are periodically announced as imminent
but whose implementation is always deferred. This undoubtedly explains the
anxiety which currently reigns within certain leadership circles where there
is much speculation about the real extent and significdnce of the announced
changes.
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Selection Criteria
When we asked the Ivorian chief of state about these two aspects and about
the belated adoption of a measure he had long deemed essential to the PDCI-
RDA's survival, he told us: "Immediately after our country's accession to
independence, to govern the country with me, I called upon a number of
young executive types who had taken no part in our struggle for independence.
In fact, some of them were unknown even in their own village. In those days,
i~ was not possible to have them face the voters on their own. Consequently,
we adopted the system of a single national slate of candidates, thereby
enabling them to be elected along with me.
"At the same time, we encouraged them to make themselves known in their
villages. I now believe they have had ample time to do this and we can,
therefore, move on to the next stage. The Ivorian pevple are ready for
democracy."
� The Ivorian president has repeatedly affirmed there is no place in the Ivory
Coast for a multiparty system. So when we asked~him how far this new
experiment will go, he explained: "We have decided to apply democracy at
all levels. Thus there will no longer be a national slate of candidates
for the parliamentary elections, although the 147 members of the future
National Assembly--compared with its previous membership~~of 120--will be
elected from candidates competing with each other under the single banner
of the PDCI-RDA. Municipal elections will be held after the parliamentary
elections, and under the same conditions. We shall make no recommendatioa.
And even in the presidential elections after the party congress and before
the parliamentary elections, any party members will be able to run against
me." As if to give additional we~ght to his statements, at a recent politi-
- cal bureau meeting, Houphouet-Boigny is reported to have curtly informed
a very high-level government official who allegedly intends to seek to
succeed Houphouet: "Sir, qou kn.ow full well that you can run~against me!"
As might have been expected, the liberalizing wind sweeping over the Ivory
Coast has produced varied reaetions. The majority of the Ivorian people
seem to have welcomed it enthusiastically. A taxi driver in Abidjan told
us "The former system of a single national slate resulted in keeping in
office'too many persons who instead of serving the country served pximarily
their own selfish interests. From now on, the only acceptable criteria
in selectdng public officials will be each one's honesty and devotion to
duty." Some 1,000 kilometers from there, in Korhogo, the chief town in
the northern region, the same view was expressed. "Things cauld not go on
like this any longer," sighed a young civil servant who felt the president
should have taken this action sooner. "We are finally going to be able to
get rid of all those corrupt politicians involved in scandals.. For you
can rest assured the people know who they are. They will not be elected
e4ther as secretaries general or as members of parliament."
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Close examin~tion of the initial results of the voting thus far, shows they
already appear to partially confirm this young civil servant's views. Con-
versely, many governmental dignitar.iesy while feigning not to be nersonally
affected by the present wave of purges, are, in private, rather circumspect
and even worried. The fact is that politicians themselves, like the man
in the street, find it difficult to calculate the extent of the embryonic
changes. Although the opposition is scattered and relatively absent from
the political scene, it does concur in minimizing the importance of what it
calls "eyewash." An official of an organization recently formed "to fight
for establishment of a soci~list regime in the ~vory Coast and free this
country from the lap of French imperialism," told us recently: "The govern-
ment feels winded. The current democratization campaign is designed mainly
to conceal the flaws in the government at a time when Houphouet-Boigny's
succession is currently at issue and the parties concerned are unable to
reach agreement."
Be th3t as it may, a few things are certain. First, at government level:
Houphouet-Boigny wiil larg~ly reshuffle his cabinet, with 80 percent of the
ministers being drawn from the new legislative assembly. At party level:
a secretary general will be appointed. Does this mean the incumbent secre-
tary general, Philippe Yace, long consi_dered the regime`s number-two man,
will step down in favor of another and retain only the presidency of the
National Assembly? It is more than likely. In certain Abidjan circles,
the person frequently mentioned as Yace's successor is Jean-Baptiste Mockey
who has long been one of Houphouet-Boigny's close associates. J. B. Mockey
fell out of favor and was imprisoned following an attempted coup d'etat.
No positive proof of his complicity was ever produced. He was fully rein-
stated and is currently the minister of state charged with public health.
Certain facetious or puzzled observers have noted that he is the only
ir.cumbent cabinet minister to have run in the elections for the position
of subsection assistant secretary gen~era~--he was elected--and that, by an
irony of fate, he may well eventually succeed the very person whose entry
into politics he had sponsored, a person who, so it is said, did nothing to
save him from disgrace.
- Viewed as almost certain is the foreseeabl2 amendment of the constitution.
President Houphouet-Boigny is reported to have the intention of amending "
the constitution, following the parliamentary elections, and creating the
position of vice president of the Republic. Yettta matter how crucial
these matters may be, they now appear, on the eve of th2 preliminary congress,
to have been pushed somewhat into the background by the stir caused by finan-
cial rehabilitation measures announced at the June meeting of the national
council.
Faced with the country's present d.ifficult financial and economic situation,
Ivorian authorities decided to g.~tacr'.end'to the, alas, inordinately widespread
waste and malfeasance. ~In implementation of the "Ekera Report," 12 state-
owned companies were purely and simply disbanded while the charters of 11
others were radically changed. Their personnel, heretofore handsomely paid--
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even though financi al results did not always warrant these high salaries--
will now be paid according to civil service pay scales. This means certai.n
general managers w ill soon find their salaries cut in half. This also
means that on the eve of the seventh PDIC-RDA congress, there is undoubtedly
some resentment masked behind Abidjan's present gen~ral facade of unanimity.
Oulai Affaire, a Simple Common Law Matter ~
Should we or should we not mention the "Oulai affaire?" As Pope John Paul II
was beginning his visit to the Ivory Coast in May 1980, there were persistent
rumors in the Ivorian capital, rumors confirmed by some of the participants
in the French-African summit meeting in Nice, an occasion which the Ivorian
president did not attend. These rumors were about a plot to overthrow thE
latter, which had b een foiled at the last minute. Its presumed instigator,
Zoumana Oulai, a po Iice lieutenant in Bouake, reporteiily planned to take
advantage of the p ublic ceremonies organized for the pope's tour to assassinate
the Ivorian chief of state.
President Houphouet-Boigny assured us: "There never has been an attempted
coup d'etat in the Ivory Coast. As in 1967, this particular incident was
also a simple common law matter." According to Ivorian officials, Lieutenant
. Oulai had previous ly served as commander of the president's motorcycle escort.
He had been relieved from that assignment following a series of malversations,
and transferred to Bouake. Having once again been found guilty of similar
offenses, he found no better defense than to inform some of his superiors,
natives of the same region as Oulai, of his intention to overthrow the
government. His s uperiors immediately alerted the government. The chief
of state, who had disclosed the incident at the 10 Jtnta meeting of the
i~ational council, views Lieutenant Oulai as "nothing more than a small
scoundrel." He was indicted on two counts of "schemes and actions such as
to jeopardize public safety or cause serious political disturbances" and
"embezzlement, forgeries, and u�e of forgeries." In late July, a military
cour~--the only tribunal qualif ied to try military and police personnel--
convicted and sentenced Lieutenant Oulai to 3 years in prison on the second
count. Houphouet-Boigny explained: "We have adopted the principle ot not -
shedding the blood of our brothers by carrying out death sentences. We are
also making evary ef fort to haue no political prisoners. Indeed, the word
'prison' does not exist in the Baoule language."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
8041 -
CSO: 4400
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IVORY COAST
TWO DECADES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Aug 80 pp 49-56
~ [Article: "Assessment of Ivorian Economy Over Period of 1~ao Decades"]
[Text] With the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI)
Congress and parliamer.tary and presidet~tial elections in the
offing, this is a convenient time for the Republic of the '
Ivory Coast, born in 1960, to take stock. Has it been a
period of "growth without development," as Samir Amin con-
tended in his highly controversial book published in 1967?
Or has there been "an ivorian economic miracle?" We have
asked a group of African and French economists to give -
us their diagnosis.
President Houphouet-Boigny is fond of saying that "in the Ivory Coast,
we must not have our Third World and our privileged groups (the haves)."
The Ivory Coast has neither a Green Book nor a Red Book. Nevertheless, all
newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts to begin with a thought from
the president. And this fact summarizes better than a long and erudite
speech what is perhaps the onZy real ma~or problem already facing the
country.
An observer need only have followed the Ivory Coast's evolution over the past:
20 years under the tenacious and ambitious leadership of Houphouet-Boigny,
"the entrepreneur," to realize that the disparity between developing areas--
primarily urban--and lagging areas--mainly rural with the exception of the
large plantations--constituted a risk from the very beginning. Much has been
done to reduce this disparity, but it has not disappeared.
Performances
The gap between--at least--two worlds or coum~unities is very obvious to the
visitor whose first steps in the Ivory Coast are taken in Abid~an, or
"Little Manhattan" as it is called. The capital reminds him more of Western
or Latin American metropolises on oth~n:continents. But some of Abidjan's
inner suburbs, Treichville in particular, offer him a view of a different
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urban Africa, even if these suburbs no longer ha~?e the same shantytowns of
old. And the contrast will be just as glaring between Yamoussoukro--a
sort of Brasilia, wrote Bechir Ben Yahmed in 1976--or Bouake, the center's
chief city, and their surrounding areas. Nevertheless, the emphasis given
to developing and diversifying agricultural production has contributed to
narrowing the gulf between the urban and rural communities. Today, however,
recriminations, a reflection of the gulf separating the classes, are generated
more by the overall development effort, likewise diversified in all sectors,
which has increased people's needs but produced wider and sharper discrepan-
cies between standards of living. These recriminations are perhaps more
discernible because they emanate from a new middle class. They have also
reached a high pitch in this period of economic crisis, even though the
latter may be less pronounced than in other African countries.
A recently released International Monetary Fund (IME) report enables us to
better grasp the present economic and social situation in the Ivory Coast
as that cauntry stands on the threshold of its third decade of development.
In a Third World prey to all kinds of upheavals, the Ivory Coast remains
a"special case." It annoys, fascinates, exasperates, or compels respect,
but leaves nobody indifferent. With no exceptional natural resources, it
has achieved one ot the world's best l~vels of economic growth for 20
consecutive years. It does not claim to be socialist and yet it successfully
distributes its national wealth better than the supposedly socialist coun-
tries. It calls upont~e~help of private enterpri'se. It flaunts its~arro-
gant liberalism. Yet at the same time, it develops a powerful s tate-con-
trolled sector, without the latter interfering with the former. It is sta-
tistically on the verge of ~ real economic take-off, yet continues to
remain underdevelo~ed in many respects. ~
In its 20th year, the age of ma~turity, this country covering an area of
322,500 square kilometers,.somewhat smaller than Japan (369,000), larger
than Italy (311,000), and slightly more than half the size of France, now
has a populatic,n of 7.9 million, 2 million of whom are foreigners.
The 'Miracle'
In 1979, its gross domestic product (PIB) totaled 1.942 trillion CFA
francs. Since independence its PIB has increased at an average annual rate
of 7.5 percent (in real terms). Per capita, the 1979 PIB comes to about
245,600 CFA francs or 1,169 dollars. It has grown at an annual rate of 4
percent, while the population too has increased at an annual rate of 4 per-
cent. These results are quite simply remarkable for a countrq that up to
now has had neither oil, nor uranium, nor any other abundant natural mineral
resources. Consequently some observers unhesitatingly refer to "the Ivorian
miracle."
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A few comparisons are enough to convince oneself of this "miracle." The
1979 per capita Ivorian PIB ranks, in Africa, just below those of Libya,
Algeria, and Gabon--oil producing countries--and Tunisia.
Even more significant is.the Ivorian PIB's annual rate of growth. With
a rate of 7.5 percent per }ear, the Ivory Coast ranks among the world's
lead group of countries in this respect. It is almost on a par with Japan,
slightly surpassed by such countries as Korea (9.5 percent) and Brazil
(8 perc:~nt), but ahead of all European countries, Canada, and the United
States, and very far ahead of most African countries like Ghana (1.5 percent),
Senegal (2.7 percent), Tanzania (5.2 percent), Cameroon (4 percent), Nigeria
(5 percent), and Algeria (4.8 percent), to mention but the best.
'Until Tired'
The PIB's per capita growth rate has been slowed by an especially high
increase in population. Yet with a 4 percent annual growth rate, the
Ivory Coast also holds a respectable position in comparison with Japan
(7 percent), Brazil (4.9 percent), France (4.2 percent), Tunisia (4.3
percent), Algeria (2.1 percent), Nigeria (3.6 percent), Ghana (-0.3 percent),
Senegal (-0.2 percent), as well as wi.*.h all other African countries that
hardly reach the level of 2 percent. �
Yet do these figures justify calling this economic performance a miracle?
Yes, if we accept the fact that simple common sense has miraculous virtiues.
The secret thereof is primarily the remarkable stability of the country's
economic policy. President Houphouet-Boigny defined his development stra-
tegy at the very beginn~.ng of his country's independence and steadfastly
followed that strategy "until tired." This strategy was based essentially
on a sector of the economy in which the country had already proved itself,
namely export-oriented agriculture. But it was also a strategy consistent
with "the entrepreneur's" personality. A physician by formal training,
Houphouet was also a planter and tool.c pride in being recognized as such.
He knew what could be expected from a well-kept plantation. He knew how
to convert good annual rainfall into CFA francs.
Under the colonial regime, the Ivory Coast had already very successfully
grown and marketed coffee and cocoa. Why should it now deprive itself of
this expertise? The colony was also renowned for its fine tiinber. The
republic continued to harvest timber without the,slightest regard for the
principles of good forest management, so much so that its forests are now
severely damaged and it will take a few decades to restore them.
Coffee, cocoa, and timber were thus the starting point of the "Ivorian
miracle." In addition, a stabilization fund was established to give pro-
ducers a guaranteed price, but also to retain surpluses when world prices
are particularly favorable.
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This system very quickly enabled the government to show increasingly larger
financial surpluses that were used to support capital investment budgets.
The record surplus was achieved for the 1976-1977 farming season when, with
the help of particularly high world prices, coffee and cocoa crops left
the government with a surplus of 230 billion CFA francs. This initial
development strategy has been remarkably successful. The Ivory Coast is
now the world's third largest producer of coffee and cocoa with 5.7 percent
of world coffee production and 20 percent of cocoa production. It was,
therefore, on a firmly proven hase that the country subsequently initiated
the indispensable diversification of its agricultural activities and a
spectacular "redeployment" of its development programs.
New Crops
Export crops were diversified. Limiting export earnings to two or three
products could only increase the system's vulnerability (which is still
evident) and its dependence on the vicissitudes of world markets. To
expand the base of the country's foreign currency income, new crops were
introduced: pineapples, oil palms, cotton, and rubber. At the same time,
banana production was increased. Insignificant in 1960, these crops accounted
for 8.2 percent of total export revenue in 1975. On the other hand, the
percentage respresented by coffee and cocoa dropped from 74 percent to 60
percent.
Subsistence crops were then diversified. The country's sustained population
growth and intense urbanization demanded such diversification. In addi-
tion to expanding traditional food crops, two new products were introduced.
The first was rice, in wh ich the country can expect to be self-sufficient
by ~985. The other was sugar which will be an export crop by 1980. This
diversification policy has made it possible to maintain the relative magni-
tude of food imports at a stable level. In 1960, food accounted for 11.5
percent of total imports. In 1977, the figure was still 10.9 percent, but
that same year, rice and sugar imports represented 22 pezcent of all food
imports. Hence substantial improvement sti11 has to be made.
Imbalance
An intelligent and dynamic agricultural policy will remain the keystone of
Ivorian economic growth for a long time to come. For the first 20 years of
independence, this policy has enabled the country to maintain a continuous
favorable balance of trade with exports exceeding imports by a margin varying
from 110 percent to 120 percent. And all this has been achieved despite
a capital investment policy carried to the ultimate, often to the limit of
what is reasonable.
In 1960, total capital investment compared with the PIB was 13.7 percent.
It rose to 18.4 percent in 1965. It stayed between 19 percent and 22 per-
cent from 1970 to 1976 and then suddeni.y climbed to 25 percent in 1977,
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31 percent in 1978, and 32.6 percent in 1979, i.e. more than 600 billion
CFA f rancs in absolute value. Until 1976, this investment effort was the
most conspicuous indicator of a degree of dynamism whi~h enablecl the Ivory
Coast to stand comparison even with the most industrialized co~mtries.
The gost-1976 excessive increase in capital investment beyond the country's
capacity to absorb it did not fail to create serious prob lems all at once.
We sh all discuss this aspect later. For a long time, the public and pri-
vate sectors shared the financing of the investment effort on nearly a
SO-50 basis. As of 1975, however, an imb alance appeared, and by 1979, the
public sector's share exceeded 75 percent.
This "omnidirectianal" investment effort literally changed the appearance
of the country, its cities as well as its rural areas. It was applied to
all sectors without exception and produced spectacular results. Its achieve-
ments were considerable in the field of highway, rail, air, and sea trans-
portation. By enhancing the flow of persons and goods, these achievements
also constituted a basic contribution to economic development.
More Balanced Growth
In the energy sector, large-scale oil exploration programs have produced _
favorable results. In the 1960's, hydroelectric power represented only 25
percent of the total power generated annually. It now represents more than
~ 7~ percent, thanks to the dam-building policy.
Urban capital investments were amply justified by the rapid tempo of urbani-
zation. The urban population has increased from.20 percent of the total
population in the early 1960's to currently more than 35 percent. In some
cases, however, one may~legitimately speculate about the full implication
~
of certain projects:;. The city of Yamoussoukro is one such example. It
was built from scratch and at a cost of certainly tens of billions of CFA
francs. Will it eventually share the role of capital city with Abidjan?
Education is another sector that has benefited from these investments.
In 1960, there were 200,000 students enrolled in elementary schools, 8,300
in secondary schools, and only 48 in institutions of higher learning. In
1979, enrollments had risen to 892,000, 143,000, and 9,600 respectively, for
an average annual growth rate of 8.5 percent, 16 percent, and 32 percent
respectively.
Among the productive sectors, the industrial sector has been the principal
beneficiary of investment spending. Begun in the mid-1960's, industrial
activity has concentrated on producing goods to replace imports, and also
on processing and enhancing the value of the country's agricultural products.
Industrial projects are both ma~y and varied. They range from cement to
textiles--mills are almost totally integrated, thus permitting raw cotton
to be transformed into printed fabrics-- and include palm oi1, chocolate, -
instant coffee, canned fruits, shoes, wood finishing plants, building
materials, etc.
~
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The main objective of this ambitious investment pr~gram was and remains a
more balanced economic growth by sector and by region. And her.e also,
results are most eloquent. In ~.960, the primary sector's--agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries--share of the ~IB was 43.5 pexcent versus 14. 1 for
the secondary sector i.e. industry, power generation, and construction firms.
From 1960 to 1979, these two sectors evolved in different direct3ons, and
now at the end of the second decade, the primary sector accounts f or 25
percent of the PIB, the secondary sector for 22 percent. During this same
period, industry's share rose from percent to 13 percent.
Subsidies
The situation at regional level is marked by a very great disparity (that
persists) between the coffee-producing and cocoa-producing richly forested
regions and the rest of the country. For this reason, all new agricultural
activities are located mainly in the most deprived regiona of Che center
and north. This policy oriented toward better regional balance is being
actively pursued. It is supported by a po licy of almost systematic sub-
sidization of all new agricultural activities : rice, sugar, cotton, oil
palms, rubber, etc. Results in this field are necessarily slow, and
- advancement can only be commensurate with the system's financial capabili-
ties.
An unfailing, reasonably controlled liberalism, a very flexible--de facto
if not de jure--tax system, and extremely liberal foreign exchange
regulations have enabled the national private sector and (above all) the
foreign private sector to contribute actively to the der?elopment effort and
derive substantial profits therefrom in return. Nevertheless, the private
sector's dynamism has not always been on a level with Ivorian ambitions.
Consequently the government has been gradually compelled to intervene
directly, and undo ubtedly much beyond the limits it had initially set for
itself.
War Against Underd evelopment
This entire magnificent machinery for waging war against underdevelopment
has operated wonderfully for 20 years in what resembles a veritable pitched
battle that is perfectly planned and executed. Admittedly with the help of
some luck, results have been spectacular and have frequently exceeded
expectations.
And yet the system now shows signs of slackening. There is said to be a
certain malaise almost everywhere. People are worried. The future is less
certain and even the most dyed-in-the-wool believers have doubts about
their own success. What are the whys and wherefores of this attitude?
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I.eaving the political aspect aside, the problem is basically economic.
Ivorian economic growth is highly dependent on foreign production factors.
This initially obvious--and accepted--dependence has considerably increased
concurrently with economic growth itself. Has it now reached u~i intolerable
point? This dependence exists in three areas: markets, f inancing, and
human resources.
The markets first: 20 years of diversification effort have not appreciably
lesaened a healthy Ivorian economy's dependence on the caprices of foreign
markets. AgriculCure continues to be powerfully dominated by export crops
despite efforts to dive~sify. It s~~ll weighs heavily in the PIB. In
addition, though the country still has an enormous agricultural production
capacity, it realizes that it cannot easily move forward without the bles-
sing of its "allies." And today its "association" with the Common Market
is proving to be a bitter experience. In this connection, its recent
experiences with sugar and cocoa are glaring examples. Europeans--and
others--are scrambling to se11 Cheir "hardware" to the Ivory Coast at
high list prices and with all s.orts of promises, but when the country asks
to participate in the Common Market-ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific
countries) sugar agreement, "its request remains unanswered, except by its
own echo."
As for cocoa, when the Ivory Coast attempted to retain stocks of that
commodity in the face of th e disastrous collapse of world prices, the
same Common Market's most authoritative spokesman did not hesitate to
state in Abidjan: "We are surprised to see that the country decided to
fight this battle without prior consultation with its f riends, its allies."
A statement whose arrogance is equalled only by ~ts hypocrisy.
Even more serious is the fact that when ivorian industry is in a position
- to expand its import-replacement industry into a more sophisticated export
industry, the Common Market will certainly not be the one to make this task
any easier. All of these things tend to confirm reports that President
Houphouet-Boigny is feeling more and more bitter toward his allies, his
partners. This bitterness is all the more understandable in that unfor-
tunately there is hardly no available alternative to "European generosity."
Frenzy
The Ivorian economy is dependent on external financing. This dependence
emerged in a way that was as brutal as it was unexpected. The Ivory Coast
could easily provide for its economic growth with marginal external finan-
cing. Unf ortunately, in 1976 it quite simply fell victim to uncontrolled
euphoria.
The fact is that coffee prices began skyrocketing in 1976. By 1977 they
had reached the highest levels in ~.~.history. The coffee stabilization fund
recorded unprecedented revenue. The country experienced the equivalent �
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of a~~ "oil boom." Investments zoomed. For the period 1977 to 1979, the
first 3 years of the 1977-1981 Five-Yeax Plan, total investments exceeded
plan estimates by 35 percent.
This i_~vestment frenzy did not take long to absorb all surplus liquid
assets. Oddly enough, the Ivory Coast's indebtedness increased most at
a time when the country was wealthier than ever. We could comment ad infini-
tum on the Ivorian foreign debt, its unexpected and equally unwarranted
growth, its impact on the future and the country's solvency, etc.
Correct Present Course
A few figures will help the reader better understand this debt situation.
In 1966, some 6 years after independence, the real debt for loans received
amounted to 205 million dollars, and the annual debt service--payment of the
interest and of such installments of the principal as are legally due--
represented less than 5 percent of foreseeable annual export income.
By the end of 1975, these figures had risen to 958 million dollars and 6.8
percent respectivPly. At end-1979, according to the IMF report, they were
3.786 billion dollars and 16.6 p ercent. Can it be said, as some experts
readily contend, that the Ivory Coast has now definitely reached the danger
point and that the change in its foreign debt situation is liable to
affect its solvency and its credit rating with international financiers?
Why should a ratio of 17 percent place the Ivory Coast in the danger zone
when much higher ratios are (almost) accepted without batting an eye for
most Latin American countries such as Bolivia,.Chile, Peru, Mexico, Brazil,
and Uruguay where the ratio of debt service to export ineome varies from
30 to SO percent? In defense of the pessimists, it must be acknowledged,
however, that: �irst, the sudden and sharp increase in the debt, especially
from 1977 to 1979, is bound to be disturbing; second, considering the size
of the debt, the Ivory Coast is liable to find itself by 1981 with a deht
service of slightly more than 25 percent; third, and above all, the quality
of recent investments is not commensurate with the financing effort which
has been made.
In ather words, these past few years in the Ivory Coast there have been more
infrastructure--indeed, even prestige--capital investments and less and
less productive investments, in relative value, of course. It must be
anticipated, therefore, ehat this investment effort and especially this
financing effort will not have the same impact on the Ivorian economy as
in the past. The Ivory Coast will have to correct its present course by
improving the quality of investments and absolutely reducing the size of
its investment program.
The problem is more difficult than it appears at first glance. Any reduc-
tion in the growth rate of investments, even in a rate deemed excessive,
would immediately trigger a recession scare with all its negative effects,
particularly at the social level. Such being the case, no matter ~?hat the
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J Ivory Coast's real or apparent financial difficulties may be, representatives
of international financial interests are continuing, nevertheless, to
haunt Che outer offices of cabinet ministers in an effort to submit tempt-
ing and equally ruinous proposals. There is no doubt that Ivorian officials
are still finding it more difficult to politely get rid of these business-
men than to seek their support.
Easy Way Out
The third and by far the most serious dependence has to do with human
resources. In 1979, the Ivory Coast's total population of 7.9 million
included no less than 2 million foreigners, or more than 25 percent. About
50,000 of these 2 million foreigners are Europeans, mainly Frenchmen.. Some
100,000 are Lebanese and Syrians. The remainder are Africans: Upper Voltans,
Malians, Guineans, but also Mauritanians, Senegalese, Ghanaians, etc.
The Europeans are in top-level positions, primarily as technical assistance
personnel in the ministries and public enter~rises. While in many cases
they are more than abundantly present, they are actually the administration's
driving element at the conceptional, managerial, and even executive level.
Most of them being technical advisers, Europeans also occupy positions of
authority or command. Their number has noticeably increased since indepen-
dence and the importance of their role is certainly the expression of a
political decision dictated by the insufficiency--or incompetency--of
Ivorian executive and managerial personnel.
Europeans also hold posi~~ions in the private sector which is largely dominated
by foreign interests. Europeans constitute the large majority of executive
and managerial personnel in this sector. As general managers, engineers,
administrators, and often even in less lofty positions, they exercise
almost total control over the private sector, a control that is seemingly
not unduly contested.
European technical assistance personnel have definitely played a positive
role in the past. Today, however, they are the most visible curb on
the training and advancement of a responsible corps of Ivorian executives,
managers, and administrators. Ivorian authorities have too long taken
that easy way out which makes it more convenient, even if it is more costly,
to employ a foreign expert than to train an ivorian one. This policy thus
neutralizes to a large extent the noteworthy investment effort made in the
Ivorian educational system and creates a situation that is explosive right
now and which even the smallest protest movement is liable to exploit.
Aggressive Dynamism
The Lebanese and Syrians are engaged mainly in the wholesale and even the
retail trade. A considerable nu~t~er of them are in the food, textile,
and ready-to-wear clothes sectors. They are, however, present nearly
everywhere, from the real estate business to the taxi buisness.~ Active
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canny, and resourceful, they have a temperament which adapts itself quite
well tu the Ivory Coast's economic liberalism. While they do make--and
transfer--substantial profits, most of them do not arrive empty-handed
and do not hesitate to invest in the country. A large community ever since
independence, their number has increased considerably since civil war has
ravaged Lebanon. They too have contributed to the Ivorian economy's aggres-
sive dynamism, but they too are largely blocking Zvorians from access--
' which would otherwise be easy--to the middleman or retail trade, as we11 as
to other fields in the service sector.
The bulk of the non-Ivorian Africans represent the country's cheap labor -
force. Doomed in their own country to hopeless unemployment, or fleeing
a lasting drought, they are entering the Ivory Coast at a rate of approxi-
mately 100,000 per year, having nothing to offer but their wi3.lingness to
do manual wo~k. They are found primarily in the countryside where they
constitute most of the unskilled labor working in commercial or village
plantations. Some also live in the city where they are willing to work
for employers who unlawfully pay them less than the guaranteed minimum
wage, and where they completely monopolize all of the most menial jobs:
attendants, cleaners, domestics, stokers, porters, stevedores, etc. There
are very few Ivorians who work at such tasks.
Local authorities have reacted against this " invasion" and the Labor Office
now authorizes the (official) hiring of a foreigner only when it is proved
that no Ivorian is availab.le for the job.
This mass of human resources currently is a dominant factor in the Ivorian
situation which has defintely reached the point of no return. Experts have
estimated that of the modern sector"s 239,000 permanent jobs in 1978, 33
percent were filled by non-Ivorian Africans, 4.5 percent by non-African
foreigners, and 62.5 percent by Ivorians. This listing itself represents
only aban+.t half the total of all permanent jobs indentified, to which must
be added the traditional sector and all "clandestine" employment.
Ponderous Presence
These foreign human resources unquestionably represeat a decisive "striking
force" in the country's economic growth and it is not wrong to say that the
country has developed in part because of foreign brains and labor. It is
just as evident, however, that this foreign manpower.creates problems at
least equal to its contributions.
First of all, it is almost certain that the country can no longer look
forward to sustained economic growth without permanent and progressive
recourse to non-Ivorian African manpower. But a question of greater con-
cern is whether the country.will be able to limit this manpower influx to
its actual needs. Given the situation of its neighbors and the permeability
of its borders, the answer is certainly negative. Hence the country must
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accept the fait accompli and learn to live with it. Back in 1965~
Hou~~houet-Boigny had proposed to grant Ivorian nationallty to any Afri~an
citi.zen settled in the country. This was one of the rare occasions on
whihhl~e was disavowed by almost unanimous adverse naCional reaction.
While th.e ponderous presence of foreign technical assistance personnel at
higher levels can be lightened first by an assertive political will and then
by sustained action to train an ivorian c:orps of executive and managerial
personnel, the same is not true for the ~~rivate sector. The disappointments
experienced inthe managementof state-ow,ied companies-what country has not
- had similar blighted hopes?--and the courageous, but excessive in some
instances, decision to disband most of these companies is liable, on the
contrary, to substantially increase the role of the private sector at a
time when the national middle class is not yet ready to take over. Conse-
quently the country will once again turn to foreigners, thereby intensifying
their hold on tli~ ~national economy .
Where then.does Ivorian society fit in this overall picture? Served by a cheap
lumpenproletariat, guided if not man'ipulated by generouslq paid leaders, it
has become, slowly~but surely, the country's soft underbelly..
From the businessman, who usually is no more than a figurehead, to the student
who prefers to buy his exams or the worker who balks at performing certain �
tasks, this society is characterized more often than not by disconcerting
complacency, the absence of civic-mindedness, a limited sense of responsi-
bility, and the hidebound obsession with easy money. And that is
certainly wherein lies the most seriousdanger to the country's future.
There are, of course, some exceptions, but do they confirm the rule or are
they a ray of hope? .
What Does the Future Hold?
In the course of the past 20 years the Ivory Coast has set the finest
example of economic development for the African continent, an example
that could be followed by many other countries. Its future may be even
more promising than its past. Recent oil discoveries already assure it a
minimum annual production of 7 million tons by 1985. This represents an
exceptional potential for the future in a country where new project plans
are being steadily initiated and implemented, a country that has been able
to give agriculture its rightful place.
The"image of an ivory Coast in the year 2000 as a rich and flourishing
country of 20 million people, a highly industrialized country comparable
to a medium-size European countfy, is by no means farfetched. On the
necessary condition--the sine qua non- that Ivorians take full cognizance
of their responsibilities.
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Will they eventually fall victim to their own success? Their borders will
of necessity remain open. But will they be able first to control and
then to integrate al 1 of this influx of manpower which is currently the
backbone of the country? Lastly, will the Ivory Coast be able to integrate
its "Third World" and its "privileged groups," two elements whose
opposition to each other has already approached the explosive stage?
15~ Un endettement trop rapide ~4~
~ �l31'
13 ~
1200 ~
1100
t ON
121
9
1 - Croissance
du viR en
tsrmes r6e/s
/base 100 ~
en 1960)
2 - Courbe 5
des invesilsssmenis
an pourcentage ~
du Pie
(base f 00 3~
en 1960J.
3 - Courbe de 2
croiss~nce ds ~
l'sndettsment
en dollars ~
constants (1966J 81 62 63 64 65 66 87 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 7576 77 78 79 80
(Base f 00
an 1966J.
Key: 1. Growth of gross domestic product in real terms (base of 100 in 1960)
2. Capital investment as percentage of gross domestic product (base
of 100 in 1960)
3. Growth of public debt in constant 1966 dollars (base of 100 in 1966)
4. Public debt grows too rapidly
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af ri que GRUPJIA 1980
8041
CSO: 4400
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~ . . . . . . . . w
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NIGERIA
UK FINANCIAI. PAPER INTERVIEWS FOREIGN MINISTER
LD301235 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 30 Sep 80 FINANCIAL TIMES ~
_ survey: Nigeria p 32
[Interview with Professor Ishaya Audu, Nigerian external ~ffairs minister
by Bridget Bloom, in Lagos in September; no day given]
[Text] Nigeria's civilian government would nationalise foreign oil
interests if it became convinced that this was "the only effective
weapon" to gain its foreign policy objectives. So said Professor
Ishaya Audu, Nigeria's foreign minister in an interview in Lagos earlier
- this month.
Professor Audu, once vice chancellor of one of Nigeria's premier
universities, is a mild mannered man. His tone was far from belligerent
and he made it clear that Nigeria had no intention of taking any such
action now. But he wanted to make the point that neither the country's
foreign policy options nor its policies had changed in the year since
the military reti~ed to barracks.
Eighteen months ago, the then military government nationalised British
Petroleum's share in oil exploration, because it said, SP had flouted
Nigerian policy on trade with South Africa. "We certainly would not
rule out taking similar action for similar reasons," Professor Audu said.
Hostility towards continued white rule in southern Africa has been one
of the consistent themes of Nigerian foreign policy over the years; to
make sure that Nigeria backed the successive attempts to settle the
Rhodesian problem had long been an objective of British policy in Africa.
But that hostil3ty remains despite Zimbabwe's independence. "No one
can deny Zimbabwe is progress," Professor Audu said: "though the outcome
of the election was not what Br3tain wanted, they honorably accepted
it and we wholeheartedly commend them.
"But there is still Namibia--and South Africa itself. We are sti11
hoping that Brita3n, which has more investment in South Africa than
any other European country, will use its influence more effectively.
But we don't believe that when it comes to the crunch, and we are trying
to enforce embargoes and the like, that Britain will be serious."
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Trade Partners
Professor Audu would not be drawn on specific action Ni~eria might take,
although he said that government was alarmed at its trade imbalance
with Britain, in particular, and was studying the possibility of
switching to alternative trade partners in certain areas in the longer
term.
Professor Audu was in London in July on a diplomatic fence-mending
visit; relations between Britain and Nigeria plummeted in 1976 when
Nigeria alleged that Britain had intervened to help the would be coup
makers; they remained for~nally uneasy, mainly because of Rhodesia,
even into the early part of this year. The London visit apparently
went well, though with [word indistinct] meeting of minds.
Professor Audu felt the need for a tougher approach to South Africa.
He met Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington. "I put our message across
strongly,�but I got the message back 'oTcay, you've made your point.
We're sticking to our guns.
- Nigeria, perhaps more than other African states, remains suspicious
of current role of the former European colonial po~zers in Africa.
Professor Audu reserved his most stinging rebuke for France, not Britain.
While he criticized Britain's attitude towards Nigerian students
(believing that the raising of university fees for commonwealth and not
EEC students had essentially racist "Powellite" motives), the foreign
minister declared that Nigeria had "more immediate foreign policy
problems generated from the French than from anyone else."
France "has p~ut a spoke in our wheel for years, quite unequ~~ocally and
in every conceivable way," Professor Audu said. "They do it directly,
or more often they use their 'satellites,' their former colonies." Asked
to be specific, Professor Audu declared that but for the French failure
to honour the agreement, the accord on Chad, signed in Lagos a year ago,
could have ended the strife there.
Common Market
He also insisted that France was impeding agreement between Nigeria
and the Cameroon, a former French colony, on their joint maritime
borders and that France continually "stirred up disagreement" within
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)--the [word -
indistinct] attempt to forn? a conmion market to bridge the economic
barriers between the Nigerian giant and its much smaller neighbours.
Finally, Professor Audu charged that France's espou5al of the trilateral
commission, to involve African and European states and members of OPEC
was a deliberate effort to break up what might have developed as a re-
sult of the Organisation of African Unity economic summit," which was
held in Lagos earlier this year. _
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Turning to Nigeria's own role in Africa, Nigeria's foreign policy
priority had to be to make sure that its relations with African, and
in particular west African states, ran smoothly. Professor Audu
declared: "We do not seek leadership, and if we're not necessarily
resented we certai?ily don't get love from our smaller neighbours."
But a greater degree of cooperation, such as that provide~l for in
ECOWAS, was essential, and often of more value, for the smaller
states than for Nigeria. "Nigerians don't seek work in other countries,
but everyone comes here for the oil boom."
Had Nigeria's policies towards military governments elsewhere in the
continent changed? It had been widely reported that Nigeria had
been instrumental in keeping master sergeant Doe, who took power in a
bloody coup in Liberia last April, from attending a series of African `
sumanits. Not so, Professor Audu maintained. Nigeria sti11 endorsed
the OAU's belief in non-intervention in the internal affairs of
member states.
Clearly, however, the government found it distasteful. "Pres~dent
Shehu Shagari said: 'You cannot kill my brother today and expect me
to sit down to breakfast or lunch with you tomorrow.' That's it.
That's what we were saying."
Professor Audu decZared that the action of the Liberian soldiers, who
had "lined people up and shot them like rabbits" was repugnant. But
had not an earlier admittedly military government in Nigeria done
the same thing when it publicly executed alleged plotters on a beach
near Lagos? "I do not and will never uphold such conduct by anyone"
Professor Audu retorted.
- COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1980
CSO: 4420 END
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