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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= GIA-R~P82-00850R000300040030-1 ' t } ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 - FOR OF'~IC[,4L USC ONLY JPRS L/9350 17 October 19~0 Latir~ ~~ereca Re ~rt - p c~ouo ~ 9iso~ 4' FBIS FOREIGIV BROADCAST INFORM~?TION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 N~TE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets - are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed zn parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the sosrce. Times within items are as given by source. The conrents of this publication in no way represent the poli- ci`s, views or attitud~s of the U.S. Government. For further information on report content call (7031 351-2643, COPYRIGHT LA.WS AND REGL'ZATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ JPRS L/9350 17 October 1980 LATiN AMERICA REPORT (FOUO 19/80) CONTENTS ` - ARGENTINA USSR, U.S. Policies Toward L.A. Termed Contradictory (Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 21 Sep 80) 1 Columnist Defines Strategy of Reorganization Process (Eduardo J. Paredes; LA OPINION, 14 Sep 80) 6 Magazine Reveals Shipment of 40 Antiaircraft Guns (Karl Guenther Barth, Peter Hoebel; STERN, 14 Aug 80) ?.1 EL SALVADOR Red Cross Recognizes Virtual State of War ~PRELA, 13 Se~ 80) 13 MEXICO Briefs PCM Leader Shot to Daath 15 PERU ~ YCP Changes Suggested by Conference Implemented ' (PRELA, 4 Sep 80) 16 ' a- LZII - LA - 144 FOUO] FOR OFFICIA.L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFIC'~~I. USE ONLY ABGENTINA IISSB, U.S. POLICIES TOWASD L,A, ~ CONTRADICT08Y Buenos Aires LA OPINION in 2i Sep St~ p 12 [Article by Sergio Cerons "II~S, I,ends Economic S~pport to Aicaragu$ and USSR Approaahes .Bolivia"~ [Text] p(7f most importance for the security of the Weetern Hemisphere, and therefore for the ftii$ura of the United Statee~ is II.S. foreign policy with respect to Latfn America itselP," This sentenae comes from Dr Jean P~i.rkpatrick~ Eonald Rea~gaa~s ad~viser on in~ternational affairs, and vae uttered at a Cariference held at the office of the Arg+entin.e Council for Internationa.l. Relations~ ~erefore~ it is doubly important. First, beoauae it expresaea a line of ~~-L, thought agreeing wi~z that of t~he Hepnblican candidate for the presidency~ Second, and more fa:r-reaching tbaa the snccea~ or fa3lure of 8er~n's at- tempt to repl.aoe Ji~y Carter in the White House, becauee it represents a atrategic and geopolitical view tba?t appears to be gaining ground in the American intellectna~. world. Everything seeme to ind.icate that we are canfronted with a situati~n similar ta the one existing in Europe, parti_ cu].az~ly in France, ahere aaa,].yst 8a3nnond ~ron symbolically persoaif3,es e democratic�, intelligen~ and pragaia~ic Mgh~ wing. %irkpatriak, a Columbia University political science graduate, pointed out to her audience tha~t, as a result of the ~Pietnam ~trauma~" mar,y people have focused their attention on the IInitecl St~tes~ undergo~slg minor crisea, wbile of importancc for the ftiiture of the West is the aeourity of La,tin America. - No doubt thts new visitor to Buenos .~ires, r~hose pr~sence reveals f,he sig~- nificaaee Argentina is assumix~g in the eyea of iffiportant ,A~neriaan represen- tative sectors, a~rees with tr~e conaept of world strategy that assigna~ the "three~ .Amex3.cas" the fanciamental a,^ole of bastion of defense for the West, assuming that an improbable bnt pasaible xar betwean the superpowers should quickly put &~rope out of ac~fon, either thron~ military occupation of the latter or although this wonld seem to be a fic~ional. poasibility - ~hrough its voluntary neutralizatiaan, Ia tliat event, the LTnf.ted States 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFIC~CAL USE ONLY would to fa7.1 back on the continent and sia~ul.taneously consolidate the sphere of influence represented by a possible 53no-tiTapanese alliance~ In this way, I,a~in A~nerica and the F~ar East wculd become the trro arm~ of a pincer movement that would attempt to limit the 3oviet IInion's ability to expaad, In this scenaxio, as we repeatec?ly pointed out in this colu~, Argen- tina would play a triple role: 1. On the s~rategic front, it w~uld pa~- ticipate in controlling the Sou'~~h ~~laatic and the interoceaaic sea lanes that pass by Cape Hnrn and the Cape of Good Hope, 2, Qn the ener~y front, it wonld be a short-term supplier of gas and fhel oil to IIrugu$y and Brazil, and possibly a mediaa-term supplier of oil to the West, that Y~ydrocarbon deposits are fonnd in the Arg~entine Basin. 3~ On the food front, a supplier of food to its Wes~ern allies. Concerning the first point, we must not forget the importance of the air rnute across whiai. the union could supply ita Ea,stera allies with sophisticated military equipment (missiles, electxonic equipm~ent, etc.), making uae of its big tra.nsport planes over one of the few routes eafe from attack from ene~ aircraft. Ideology and Security As did Roger Fontaine~ the profesaor whom many feel to be Heagan's chief foreign policJ a.dviser, before her, ;iean Kirkpatrick mairr~tained that Jir~r Carter is convinced that; "we are living in a new era of interdepeat~ence, due to a technological development that fo~ces ua to adopt a new overall approach to comnaiunist problems~" To a~eaq,~t extent, the thinking of the ,~merican representative is only a reflection of the trilateral doctrine - that has replaced ~the doctrine of confrontation with that of eoonomic and ~ technolog3cal cooperation wit.'~ the socialist countries in the conviction that ~his would, on the one haud, help mutua,l understanding and a sort of union of interests while, on'the other, higb].i~ting the technological supremacy of the West and the coa~anist natitms~ subordination to it. This is an essenti~lly ideological appmach based on atiother the~retical assumption: that the doctrine of hun~an rights has giv+en the Western demo- cracies the first ideological weapon they have had since, following World War II, the IISSR rai~ed fihe baaner of national liberation struggles in the former ~hropean colonies of Africa and laia. Up to no~r, t~he resnlt of this stxate~y, nourished by the laboriaus efforte uf progressive intellectu.als, has raised no hopes in those sectors most inclined to consider the world criais f~om the strategic point of view~ They believe it is apparent and 9n connection xith this we muat point out that they often forget China'a bre~k [with the USS&] and ~nwar at- Sa,clat's swi.tch to the West - that the Soviet IInion has rapidly a.dvaneed on the international chec~cerboard at the expense of the IInited States, Consequently, security reasons prevail over considerations of an ideolo- gical na~tvre, Of course, this is the positi.on traditionally ma.intained by the Pentag~on and by the powerful industrial-military group but~ ae 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044430-1 FOR OFFIC:~'AL USE ONI.Y time goes by, it is being a,dopted by an ever larger number of intellectuala, both in university departments and a~nong those urrho devote their time to strategic or geopolitical analysis~ So, we recently seen that, whi1Q interpreter~s of the Carter doctrine have emphaeized the need for making Latin America democrd,tic as soon as - possible aad at any coet, Ronald $eagan~s advisers have shown their concern fur establishing a sort of "cordon sanitaire,f0 starting with the Sourthern Cone, - to separate their country~s "strategi~ backyara"~ from the Marxist virns~ . In t,he end, both are tzying~ to do battle with the increase in influence Moscow has achieved since that fatef~l day in 1959 that saw tha.t unl~own, ' romantic arld contra~clictory lawyer, Fidel Ca,stro, come to power in Havaaa,~ Received with a hero~s laurels by ~he progressive sectors aad the liberal ' press of the United States, Castro did not trait too lcrag to proclaim to the world his position as a n~.litaat Marxf,st. ~ren today, people axgue over whether he was really a Marxist or ~rhether he felt himself :forced to aeaume tha,t position because of the blindne8a with t~hieh the II. S. Government re- acted to a goveznment of advanced ideas bnt basically representing a sort of leftist n2~ionaligm that could be saQed for democraey, Sterile Debate In ar~y case~ this is a aterile debate. ~e reality is th,at Cuba became a beachhead for Soviet penetration on the continent, the praiaoter of ultra- _ leftist subversion in I.atin America, ~d starti~g wlt~h the 1970's t~e sup- plier of military forces that made possible Moacow's strateg3c advaaee in Africa thro~ugh an intermediary~ tirithout xiaking a head-on collision with the United States. In a world marked by para,doaes, we have come up with a reallq unnsua,], situ- - ation~ While the Carter adminisi,.ration made efforts to get Congress to approve a$75-million loaa destised to consolidate the Saadinist Liberation Fxont'a Max~xist regime in DTi~r.gua~ the IISSR has been approaching Gea Luis Garcia Meza's g~av~ernment, ieolated by ~he big Weste~ natione, for the pur- pose of beefing up the Bolivian economQ~ and acqniring influence in a key geopolitical. area, Wbile the Demoeratic Paxty bas in pr3x~ciple aacepted Sen Edw~.rd Kernmedy�s recommendation to temporize with Caba and Nicaragua and apply pressure on the military reg3mea of the 5outhern Cone~ Mc~acow is negotiating a big grain contract the Arg~entine Governiaent and of~ering La Paz the chance to refine its ores aad count on having aa export market for them~ What difference cau we see between the two positions? It is h,azd for Wash3ngton to neutralize militant Maixi.sta in power or lying in wa,it to seize power~ For them there can be no poseible deal with the "capitalist bourgeoisie"; it is all or nothing and they will accept nothing less than total power. On the other hand, the IIS~ has set its sighica on ezploiting tho confrontation betweer~ the White Houae aad the militaxy g+ove~ments o~' I+a4in .America, attempting to separate the latter from the g~c~vernment that 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ought to be their natural ally, It :nas two alternative ob~ectivest to maintain rriendly relations with the United States and, in the avent o~ a collapse provoked b~ State Department pressure, to capitalize on the chaos and excesses that usually follor~ the noisy downfall of a Castro government. On the left or on the rf~t, like a11 grood alei~t-of-hand artists, Moscow has an ace up each sleeve, Thia crucial situation is coming to a head inasmuch as, through i~orance _ of the real situation in Latin America, Washington is pxessuring fox haety democratization~ Elections are not an end in themselves, rather an i.nstru- - ment to serve a nation's t~ill realization, one which in order to be really . effective and usef~l must be applied when the suitably ob~ective conditions exist, Any haste, any imprudent handling of the political timing, can produce catastrophic results, such as what basically happened in Bolivia where a political. and social situation was produced which went far beyond what its protagonists wanted. To believe that everything can be reduced to a unilateral decision made by a"reactionary" sector of m.i.litary leaders , is a simplietic and childish attitude. If Bolivian society had been pre- pared to receive a democracy composed of cor~ventic~al features inherent in those of the big Western nations, no military aectox would have ha.d enough power to ornnipotently impose its will on it, Prudence and F'lexibility It is, therefore~ imperative for Washin~ton to learn to use prndence and flexibility in its relations with the L~.ti.n-American countries, because otherwise, as it applies pressure by "hammering away to democratize" the cont~nent, it will run the risk of instead creating the conditions for a rebirth of subversive activities. Although it is a simplistic view, some obr~ervers feel that Luis Gaxcia Meza's coup, intellectually inspired by the Republican right, is a sort of couxiteroffensive of South A~nerican militariem against the Democratic administration. And, enlisted in tha ranka of the "progressive movement," State Department advisers feas that Buenos Aires may mobilize an attempt ' to render the brand-new democra.-tic regimes ef Pern and Ecuad.or unstable~ The president of Bolivia and some of bi.s collaborators haxdly did llt�g~entina. a favor in raising the red bullfighter's cloak of a I~ypothetioa.l "Southern Cone pac~" to stir up the Andean Group. Althougi~ Garcia Meza's attempt at applying presaure with the threat of from that ~roup of countries and joining the one that ha.d presumablg been ski11t1xlly prepared ~ on the banka of the Plata for the purpose of forcing Venezuela, Colombia, _ Ecua.dor and Peru to recognize h3m waa tx~nsparent, there were some who really believed in the ezistence of this southern specter. The Palacio San Martin categrorically aet matters straigYit, but we all lnlow that on the slippery turf of diplomacy no one fully believes e~yone else~ The doubts . persist. During his stay in Nerr York, I?1ini.ster c~f Forei,gn Relatioas Ca.rlos Washington Pastor will probably try to c;onvince people of the transparency of A.rgentina's attitude in_ the ta.lks he has announced he will have with other colleagues from the continent. ~t FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044430-1 FOR OFFICTAI. USE ONLY Meanwhile, it is necessary for us ta direct our attention to a resurgence of subversi~e activity in South Amer.ica and its transnational effects~ The^e remains little doubt that the assassination of Sna,sta,sio Somoza was a service performed by Argentine exi;remiat orgaziizations for the Sandinist movement~ A few months ag~o~ the in~eraational presa published photos of Firaenich and Vaca Narvaja strollin$ down the streets of Managua Ha,zdly had he been killsd rrhen the Costa 8icau Government, traditionally neutral and one which played an important role ~n the over~hruw of Somoza, did not hesitate to affirm that it was the work of lrg~entine subversive elements, Bolivian. sources, on the other hand, published an alleged correspondence between Fixr~?enich an.d Heraan Siles Zuazo. While the real situa.tion demon- strates how little we can trust theae sources, excessively biased and ele- mentary in their tactical propoaals, there is no reason to i~ore the pos- sibility, A few hours ago, retired M~j Gen Richaxd Glutterbuck of the British Army maintained that "fihe ringleaders of the armed leftiat groups that were operating in Argentina up until the end of 1978 are now active in Ebrope and many of them are in Brazil, tryi.~g to set up a revolutionazy Junta,~ n There are too many voices raised in agreement with this, from other placea, for Washington to ~turn a deaf ear to their r~arnings~ ~e fate of the con- tinent and of the Western world is at stP:Re~ COPYRIGHT: LA OPINION, 19ao . 11,466 cso: 3010 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFIC=AL USE ONLY ARGENTINA COLUNINIST DEFINES STRATEGY 0~ REORGANIZATION nROCESS Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 14 Sep 80 p 13 [Article by Eduardo J. Paredes in the column "The Political 5cene": "The Strategy Is Not Based on the I}iscrediting of the Parties"] [Text] The Chilean people have democratically said "no" to democracy. Gen Luis Garcia Meza, president of Bclivia, told the Argentine magazine SOMOS that there cannot be democracy in his country with 35 percent illiterate and 65 pzrcent of the population lacking in culture, steeped in.corruption and ethnically divided. Colonel Gutierrez united the military commands of E1 Salvador with one slogan: It is impossible to maintain democratic systems if an alliance with Marxism is necessary for so doing. In Colombia, President Turbay Ayala is attempting to arrive at an agreement with the subversives - confronted by haughty indifference from the militzry and labor, seemingly related to the advent of ano ther "Colombian-style pact," this time without Liberals and Conservatives, with populism. There is a democratic fatigue in Latin America. And what about at home? There is fatigue, a general fatigue, both democratic and militar.y. The agree- ments among politicians are as spent as the agreements between the military and coxporations. The mathematics inevitably leads to a new equation: the - accord between the military and the politicians, backed by sectorial influence. It may be the only element without signs of fatigue. The military have one advan tage: The fatigue has its days numbered in accor- _ dance with their continliance in military activity.. There is no personal fatigue. However, they have a disad~vantage: The fatigue which does not in- volve~ personality nevertheless affects the,institutional area. The opposite holds true for the politicians. In the personal realm, there is fatigue caused by waiting, but in the institutional realm the parties freeze and thaw without much internal trauma. The miLitary engage in political action quickly, and end up fatigued, but almost unharmed, while the institution on the other hand runs the risk of suffering a collapse. The politician engages ( FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFZCIAL USE ONLY in activity with dreadful fatigue, ending up in intensive care; b ut the party con tinues to be run by those who are waiting for the attrition of the upper _ echelons. This would lead one to believe that, if agreement is reached between the mili- tary and the politicians,.it will have to be between military without signs of fatigue and politicians ~without fatigued parties. The minister of interior, Gen Albano Eduardo Harguindeguy, made the inciden- tal remark that the term of oovernment to begin in 1984 would ~e led by the military again unless the goals of the national reorganization process were attained in 3 years (something that he considered difficult ta achieve), allowing for traasition toward democratic stabilization of the institutions. The fact is that some political leaders react to the vicissitudes of the pro- - cess with a childishness c~�hich, as the saying goes, would be funny if it were nat tragic. With innocent assurance, they say that the.term from 1981 to 1984 must be the last one wherein the president is elected by the Junta system. It is something like the boy who lends his bicycle to a little friend and says to him: "All more ride around the block, and then return it to me...won't you?" With a blend of impertinence and blindness,. they are some who still believe that they are the owners of the bicycle, whereas they ought ~ to admit that it was never theirs, r.ot even outwardly, much less now, when those who are p~daling have met with episodes such as the defeat of subversion. ` the checking of economic chaos and the social resolution of a mess, accompanied by sign~ of civil war. This is why Harguindeguy notes that what ~s said d~ring the dialog in the office, facing the tape recorder, is onP thing, and what the par ticipants ~ usually tell the press is something quite different. In faet, there are _ very few politicians who acknowledge their lack of �orcefulness. And if they had access to the polls taken by the Ministry of In.terior, their hair would stand on end. In one of the Iatest ones, 65 percent of those queried replied thd t they by no means trust the politicians. That lack of trust may be unfair in part, but it is real. Let the reader use his own family and social group, and take the poll, without forgetting to add the various social s trata (ser- vice personilel, the janitor, the somewhat deaf retired autit and the plumber) and he will receive a shock that is no reason for rejoicing among those who trust in democracy. This column began with the example of Chile, which serves as a counterpart for understanding the matter of the "ob~er.tives" of the process. Pinochet, faced with the lack of force among his country's politicians, has legitimized his d#.c tatorship with a plebisc:~te which has enabled him to expand his unlimited exercise of political power. It is ridiculous tu depict the case of Chile as an option between Pinochet and hell. No one calls a plebiscite without the - assurance that he will win it, and bringing up the ~;ase of Be Gaulle is rather valid, because the old French general s~t up i:he 3pparatus so as to win if he was winning and win if he was losing; since, after his decline, 7 ` FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 I ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY there emerged Pompidou, Chirac, D'Estaing, Barre and the trick of "ballotage" (second ballot], a means of dooming Francois Mitterrand to being the first one to come in second.... The strategy of the process appears to indicate quite the opposite. ~he poli- . tical "ob~ective" is unquestionably to give backing to the structure of an integrated nation and a country organi zed in the c apitalist, liberal manner, so as to build a bridge to a new poiitical leadershi~ that will not have on its shoulders tne burden of lack of fo rce. The reader should take note that the handling of government propaganda is based on guidelines of harmony and unity, and not on systematic attack on the parties or politicians. Further- more, in the audiovisual campaigns against s ubversion, there is taken from Peron's highly controversial role only his repell ing of terrorism, deliberately overlooking the many times when he encouraged it; in what I suspect is a cal- culatei action not to upbraid Peronism in the ima ge o� its late leader. More- F over, if certain proceedings were judicially activated, Maria.Estela Martinez de Peron might be washing her clothes a~t the ~ood Shepherd, instead of resting at the San Vicente estate; another way of respecting a questionable but real former holder of the presidency and the understandable outbursts of _ Peronist emotion, since Peron's widow is invalved. Moreover, the political leaders who attended the dialog, such as T31bin, Manrique and Matera, are not unknown youths elected by indication, nor did the~~go to express their opinions to Harguindeguy concerning the political bases wi th a bouquet of flowers. Furthermore, this journalistic profession, always suspected by sworn followers of government policy of prior censorship and of a heap of nonsens~e, was what enabled the public to become informed of the prob lems of Governor Saint Jean over excessive illumination (not of him, of course, but of a section of the route) in the railroad "affair," and the political or union protest revolving about it. ~ The process is not based on the deterioration of the politicians, but rather on their own aecomplishments, and on a patient trend toward assimila ting the mistakes. And it is overly generous in allowing a political leader from a party whose latest electoral performance brought results amounting to 8 per- cent of the total vote to say that everything is a disas.ter, and us in the newspapers to publish it in small prin t at the bo ttom of the page, not out of fear of angering the military, but because of a hint of shame at the con- stant appearance of genuine dimwits. However, the many unquestionably irre- proachable political leaders who voice their criticism from a clearcut stand- - point, regardless of whether they ar.e right or not, have in the newspapers the space that they want to argue with Dr Alemann or to engage in any other substitute sport. It may be claimed that th is policy does not prevail on the television channels. Up until. now, it has been a problem for the state. - We shall have to wait for the new law on the subject. But let us agree that television is not generous in giving the politicians a platform, but it does not systematically engsge in catapulting the military either. We may say _ that it is dreadfully bad and politically incompe tent as a whole. If Peron were in Videla's place, and with the four channels, ~he March of the Soys would even be sung by my daughter, Laurita, who is not yet a month old; and instead of a baby's rattle, her gift would b e a bass drum.... 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The politicians cannot complain about the ir.tentions of the process, much less after comparing it with Pinochet's distasteful. trick. It is all right for them to criticize the government's measures., because, regardless of how worn out they are, it is their obligatfon. But if they want to regain the people's con.:'idenc tfiey should begin all their diatribes with a brief reflection of the mistakes that have been made, livin~ under the protection of an elitist, oligarchical and gerontocratic system which left them without ' a people, without a citizenry. They should at least admit ~hat they often filled a slate of deputies or councilmen with dol.ts, and that many of their best members were never candidates because they did not kowtow to the leader, or because they had to make way for the one w:~o collected the mo~t signatures. Not long ago, I wrote that the trick in this process consists of the fact that there is no trick, a comment which I noted to have been copied extensive- ly by Minister Harguindeguy, who shoul,ci not be worr.ied, because I do mt intend to assert economically my unquestionable rights as author. My grand- father, who was a Galician, taught me that one should never bring suit again:~t a Basque, because the trial would prove endless. But, to return to the comment, I am now more convinced than ever of it. Does the trick consist of their saying that they are going to stay, and then their leaving some day? No. They will stay until the political accord has been reached; and, once it has been reached, they will remain in$titutionally and constitutionally present in the country's political.power, precisely by virtue of the political accord that�has been reached. Does the trick consist of making a threat of union democratization, so as to confound the trade union movement, a~d later trap it in a populist col'lusion? No. There will be union democracy until tMe Peronist trade union movement rids itself of the partisan commitment and~the leaders become used to going - to the union in the morning and to the committee in the afternoon. Does the trick consist of causing a dispersion of Peronism and setting up a government party to win in eleetiozs sub~ect to conditions? No. There will . be a statute on the parties, to be implemente3 at all costs, and the internal problem of Peronism will be solely that of Peronism. There no govern- ment party, although certain military sectors will not conceal their desire for the formation of a great new moderate party, which could take.part in the electoral contest with chances against Peronism and Radicalism. Does the trick consist of running the economy outside.of the political con- text, to create a plutocratic structure that would seal the country's fate, over and above ideologies? No. The armed forces assigned.Dr Martinez de Hoz to put his.arm in the dungheap up to the elbow, until he found that - ruined country of 1975, to wash, perfume and put it on the table. He has now done so. Applause. It is certainly not the economic country that Also- garay, Frigerio, Pugliese, Gomez Morales or Alende.would, for different reasons, like to see. But it is the country which is (let us say) sufficiently 9 FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFl'CIAL USE ONLY Presentable to enter anywhere by the main door, and not by the service entrance, as was the case 5 years ago, when any country in the world would have perferred to sign an agreement *aith Uganda rather than ~aith Argentina. ,Ievertheless, this so-called pragmatic structure, which ~.s not stringently monetarist nor essentially austere nor decidedly developmentalist nor remote- ly socializing, but which has traces of statism, is precisely what has enabled the armed forces to maintain an economic philosophy for the future, but to apply to it all the variab.ies that common sense would dictate to them. And ' it is in this respect that I suspect a rash blunder on the part of all the - politicians blindly to the theory that Martinez dP Hoz, like a kind of stylish, cultivated versien of Lopez ::ega, has bewitched the ff~ilitary with an infallible, esoteric plaii of his own. Martinez de Hoz carried out " a mission in the process, with a good percentage of success, and during periods of very difficult international relationa. He revamped the market, he liberated prices, he combated the speculative economy, he cut hyperinfla- tion to a serious but manageable degree, he appeared in international er.onomic forums and at least deleted us from the list of undesirables, he surmounted recessive situations and he did not stop the public works essential to the country's overall growth. All that has been enumerated might represent a poli- tical commitment between the armed forces and the economic group. There is no such thing. There is a sharing of ideas on various fundamental points in that economic policy. But when mention is made of continuity, it does not mean a necessary repetition of mistakes. In fact, it is unfair to c18im that Mar- - tinez de Hoz is pragmatic. It ie the military who are pragmatic. The politicians can be at ease, There is no campai$n to discredit them any more than they are, nor are there any tricks for their self-destruction. Amid successes and mistakes, there ts a serious program for organizing the nation, with touches of conservatism that are as logical as they are tolerable. The bridges will be built. If anyone traverses them backwards, it will not be the fault of the armed forces. Until Sunday. I am going to watch the races, influenced by the successful incorporation of Carrasco, with the vague feeling that this is one of the 33 Orientales reincarnated. May God help us. Copyright: LA OPINION, 1980 - 2909 CSO: 3010 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE OlvTLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ARGErITID1A MAGAZINE REV~ALS SHIPMENT OF 40 ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS ~tamburg STERN in German 14 Aug SO pp 102-ZOS ~ [Excerpts from article by Karl Guenther Barth and Peter Hoebel: "~Iretched Business Deals `~ade in Germany"] [Text] The Federal GYiminal Police Bureau and the Federal Prosecutor's Office are investigating the re- spected German firca Rheinmetall ragarding illegal exports. 'ihe arms manufacturer Heckler & Kock is also ' delivering to tension areas. _ "I have never worked under such lousy conditions," swore Peter Lerschmacher. In the drafty shop of the Fabrica de Armas near the Spanish town of Oviedo, the fingers of the foreman of an eight-ma.n team of inechanics from the Duesseldorf Rheinmetall weapons firra became so numb from cold that they could not even hold tools on occasion. The men from Duesseldorf were working on 40 German twin cannons of the Rh 202 type, priced at DN: 500,000 a copy. . It took the German mechanics 3 months before the antiaircraft guns were mounted, calibrated and tested ~iy the end of December 1979. Always present were officers of the Argentine military ~unta, using the testing of the automatic weapons on the pier of Gijon harbor as a welcome training op- portunity. They also went on board when the weapons were loaded on an Argentine freighter in the Spanish port city. Rheinmetall called the operation "top secret." For 2 nonths the Duesseldorf prosecutor has been investigating Rheinmetall for a possible violation of para~raph 4a of the Arms Control Law. The case has.been assigned file number Js 489/80. "Because of the political explosiveness," the investigating agencies have also classified the proceedings as secret, just as they have done with two other investigations concerning the renowned arms firni in Duesseldorf : Via NA:O me:nber Italy, the firm is said to have delivered 1,500 machine guns to Saudi Arabia in 1977 and in the same year to have sent a complete munitions plant to the South African apartheid regime via Paraguay. Rheinmetall in Duesseldorf founded a"Rhein~?etall International S.A." in Brussels in 1978. It occupied an entire suite ~n prestigious Boulevard du Souverain. From there arms merchants such as Dieter Koehler, Lodewi~k 11 FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 r~ux ur~r'l~ lAL U 5~ UN LY Stahl and Pieter Iluynda~ deliver military equipment to the whole world. The merchants in Brussels have formally severed all relations in Duessel- dorf. Secret additional agreements secure their pensions in Germany, how- ever. Fictitious payrolls are maintained for this that even increase from year to year. In the Duesseldorf headquarters of Rheinmetall, the Burssels subsidiary is denied. "That is the founding of a Dutch firm," the plant headquarters claims. But a look in the commercial register shows that of the 1,250 shares of the Belgian firm, the Rheinmetall Duesseldorf GmbiI [limited liabiliCy company] owns exactly 1,244. The othPr six shares are in the hands of the Dutch ammunitions f irms ~ de Kruithooren, NWM Industries, and :iollaendische Rheinmetall International (all three in turn are 100-percent subsidiaries of Rheinmetall), and of top salesmen Duyndam, Stahl and _ Xoehler. The latter was also the manager of the Argentine deal, the in- vestigators believe. The background for Rheinmetall's Spanish detour was the following: The Federal Office for Industry (BATa) had approved the export of 28 anti- aircraft cannon to Argentina. The optical sights for the dual cannon were procured through the Bonn Defense Ministry from the Italian firai Galileo. _ It was noticed on the Hardthoehe that Rheinmetall had bought more sights than necessary. The Duesseldorf armsma'.cer thereupon applied for per- mission to export 40 antiaircraft guns to Spain. They ended up in Argentina. L , ~ 'I~in antiaircraft gun Rh 202, unit price DM 500,000. The Italian optical sight alerted the ministry COPYRIGHT: STERN, 1980 9240 CSO: 3103 7-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EL SALVADOR - RED CROSS RECOGNIZES VIRTUAI, STATE OF WAR PA132328 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2?.35 GMT 13 Sep 80 [Text~ Managua, 13 Sep--At least 40 persons have been killed in E1 Salvador during the past few hours by the repressive forces of the Christian Democratic Military Junta. Reports from that Central American country indicate that 15 bullet- riddled bodies of inen and women were found in the city of Apopa, 12 km north.of San Salvador, and 7 more were found in Santa Tecla. Most of the bodies showed si.gns of torture. It was also reported that four dPad youths were found inside a vehicle in the vicinity of the Central American Technology Institute in the Salvadoran capital. The New Nicaragua News Agency (ANN) reported from San Salvador, mean- while, that the International Red Cro~,s has recognized a vir~tual state of war in that country with the signing of an agreement with the Salvardoran Foreign Affairs Ministry which establishes that it will act as a"neutral organization in the event of civil war of domestic disturbances." The agreement specifies, ANN adds, that the Red Cross will not be in a position to grant political asylum to citizens of that country. The decision of the Red Cross, it adds, confirms reports by Salvadoran political-military organizations that the Christian Democratic Militar}* Junta is waging fierce repression against the people with the characteristics of a "silent genocide." It was also repprted that the Catholic "YSAX" radio station, official spokesman for the San Salvador archbishopric, was blown up by government - agents this morning, interrupting its transmissions. ~ 13 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040030-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The electricity company in Soyapango was burned by a bomb explosion in an action to which the armed forces of national resistance claimed credit. Meanwhile a command of the peoples revolutionary army attacked the mayor`s office in Cuscatacingo, 5 km north of San Salvador, causing heavy damage to the buildings and to nearby establishments. The Farabundo Marti People's Liberation Forces (FPL) has claimed credit for an attack which reduced to cinders a large commercial footwear establis'hment in downtown San Salvador. CSO: �3010 l~. 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