JPRS ID: 9360 KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9360
22 October 1980
Korean Affai rs Re ort ~
p
CFOUO 9%8~0)
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9360
ii 22 October 1980
KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT
(FOUO 9/80)
CONTENTS
SOUTH KOREA
POLI~'ICS AND GOVERNMENT
Rise of thon Tu-hwan, Pak Chong-hui Compared
(ASAHI SHII~tJN, 31 Aug 80) 1
Pak's Drauglnter Rumored Active Behind Political Scene
- (SHUKAN SHIN QiO, 4 Sep 80) 8
E CONOMY
B rie fs
Declining Role of Exports 13
Alternative Energy Sources 13
Large LPG Stockpile Facilities � 14
S tate of Small-Medium Bus inesses 14
FOREIQJ RELATIONS �
ROK i3ni~illing To Disclose Complete Text of Kim's Trial
(~iE JAPAN TIMES, 7 Oct 80) 75
Briefs
Fi:kuda's Remarks an Kim ~6
Meeting With Indian Ambassador 16
NORZH KOREA
SOCIAL (:ONDITIONS
Japanese Visitor Reports on L3.fe in DPRK, Political
Situation _
(Akira Ishikawa; MAINTCHI SHIMBUN, 24-26 Aug 8Q)....... 17
~ ~ - a - [III - ASIA - 109 FOUO]
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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
RISE OF CHON TU-HWAN, PAK CHONG-HUI COMPARED
Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 31 Aug 80 p 4
[Article by Korean Affairs Team of Foreign Reporters Dept: "Rise of
President Chon Tu-hwan Simila~~- to Pak's Coup; Strong Dissatisfaction in
People's Minds; 'No Successive-Term Presidency' P~edge"]
[TextJ The inaugural ceremony of Chon Tu-hwan to the presidency of South
Korea, elected by the provisi.ons of the Yushin Constitution, a legacy of
President Pak Chong-hui, is scheduled to take place at Chamsil gymnasium
in Seoul at 11 o'clack on the morning of 1 September. While a striking
resemblence is seen between the late President Pak Chong-hui, who took
the power through a military coup d'etat in the early dawn hours of
16 May 1961, and President Chon Tu-hwan in their motives for taking power, ,
in the methods applied in the U.S. reaction against it, and in their
political ideology, a great difference exists between them in the process
of taking power, the lineup of their close associates, and the reaction
of the South Korean people to the change. The difference points up the
19-year time lag between the two coups d'etat. On the eve of President
Chon's inauguration, we are attempting to forecast the future of the Chon
Tu-hwan power system through a comparative study of the "Pak Chong-hui
coup" and the "Chon Tu-hwan coup."
The Coup and Its Main Actors
At 3 o'clock on the morning of 16 May 1961, about 3,600 soldiers rapid~:y
took control of the capital city of Seoul. By 6 o'clock they had occupied
the radio station and announced the Military Revolutionary Committee's
six-item revolutionary public declarations, including a"stronger anti-
conununist stand," and "alliance with friendly nations in the free world,"
and a"sweeping cleanup move against corruption and old ills." A series
of decrees was issued one after another: emergency martial law, a freeze
on financial transactions, dissolution of the national congress, a ban on
all political activities by political parties and groups, and the arrest
of cabinet ministers. The coup was a breathtaking success. On the 18th
the cabinet of Chang Myon resigned en masse, and the following day, the
19th, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction was inaugurated,
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witn full control of the three branches of the government, including the
' judiciary, legislative and executive authorities.
Sense of Crisis Among Iyiilitary Men
The chief engineers of the coup were the young officers of the 8th class of
the military academy who formed the "main forces of the revolution." [The
reasonJ behind the move, were the corruption by the politicians and military
leaders, the chronic poverty of the peasants, and the DPRK, which had waged
various "offensives" against the south from a position of economic strength,
then superior to that of South Korea. These factors were disturbing to the
military men, who held anticommunism and national security as matters of
the foremost importance. The plans to carry out the coup were carefully
formulated, and the actions to follow the takeover were also well planned.
As a result, the coup de grace was successfully delivered with a single
fatal blow.
On the other hand, the "military clean-house coup" of 12 December last year,
which gave President Chon Tu-hwan the chance to take over the government,
came as a countermove against "gradual democratization," the mainstream
of social change brought about in the aftermath of the death of President
Pak Chong-hui on 26 October last year. Maj Gen Chon Tu-hwan and his
colleagues shared the sense of crisis that "democratization" would not
only threaten South Korea's national security but might also invite ~Torth
Korean intervention.
Economic conditions i.n South Korea could not avoid the stiock effect of the
second oil crisis. Despite the 18 years of great advance under the Pak
regime, the country was suffer~ng from the rise in oil prices, inflation,
export snags, an international trade deficit, and recession. High economic
growth, registering a nearly 10-percent annual growth rate, has come to an
end; in its place the complications from such fast growth have emerged.
The concerns of common people with their daily lives, particularly labor
disputes, tend to stir up trouble. Against this "crisis of establish*~ent"
in the political, economic, and social spheres, the military men tried to
apply military-like strong remedial measures, which resulted in the "12
December incident." But the incident was not concluded in a single blow
fashion. First of all, it had its origin in the unexpected incident of
the killing of President Pak Chong-hui. Therefore it started under passive
circnmstances.
The personnel involved in the incident of 12 December, led by Chon Tu-hwan,
commander of the Army Security Command, included No Tae-u, commander of the
9th Division; Chong Ho-yong, commander of the Air'oorne Forces (both were
Chon's classmates at the llth class of the Military Academy); Cha Kyu-hon,
couanander of the Capital City Garrison Command; Hwang Yong-si, co~ander
of the I Corps; and Yu Hak-song, assistant deputy chief of logistics,
Department of Defense. These officers were senior to Chon Tu-hwan. Troops
under their command arrested many military leaders, including Chong Sung-hwa,
martial law commander. However, the "12 December incident" stopped short
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with the securing of leadership within the military establishment itself. �
Therefore, the civilian government of Choi Ryu-hu was allowed to continue
functioning.
United States Extends Recognition in the End
Co~ander Chon took the next step. First, on 14 April this year, still in
uniform, he assumed the post of acting director of the KCIA so as to secure
a position within the c3binet and attend the cabinet meetii:gs. On li May
he had emergency martial law extended to cover the entire country; arrested
Kim Tae-chung, former presidential candidate from the New People's Party,
and Kim Chong-pil, president of the Democratic Republican Party; and placed
Kim Yong-sam, president of New People's Party, under house arrest. Thus he
drove the "three Kims," all presidential hopefuls, off the stage, bringing
the "12 December incident" to a successful conclusion. It was on 31 May,
after the Kwangju area was brought under control, that Chon was installed
as chairman of the Standing Cvmmittee of the National Security Council.
This move firmly established his power in both name and substance. His
National Security Emergency Council was comparable to the Supreme Council
for National Reconstruction of Pak Chong-hui's lo May coup.
The nucleus of the Chon Tu-hwan power structure was formed by the general~
who had participated in the 12 December uprising. They were either Chon's
classmates of the llth class at the Military Academy or fellow officers
from his birthplace of Kyongsang Province. In other words, his power is
based on his academic and geographic background. General Chon has been
closely watching the moves within the military from the vantage point of
being coumiander of the Arnry Securit}r Command, and he has stepped up the work
of personnel assignments aimed at consolidating his own power. But the unity
among the leaders under Chon is seen by many as smaller in size anci weaker
in strength than the "8th class" group of the past, who shared a strong
sense of comradeship among themselves.
The attitude of the United States toward General Chon Tu-hwan during the
process of his bid for power was clearly reminiscent of that toward Pak
Chong-hui's 16 May coup d'etat. At that time, the United States promptly
issued a statement in support of the Chang Myon regime. General Magruder,
commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, and Ambassador Green met with President
Yun Po-sun and urged him to suppress the coup by throwing frontline troops
into Seoul, but P~esident Yun hesitated to make the decision, and this
allowed the coup to succeed. The United States at first treated the
troops involved in the coup as "insurgents" and started to suppress them,
but as soon as Major General Pak appeared to have gained ma~ority support,
the United States turned to extend its recosnition. On 22 June, 6 days
after the coup, Secretary of St~'~. Rusk publicly announced U.S. support
of Pak.
The United States was furious when Commander Chon Tu-hwan moved tihe troops
from the 9th Division of the III Corps, stationed near the armistice line .
in a position that is vital to the defense of Seoul, in order to throw
.
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them into the 12 December operation, without the approval of the commanding
general of the U.N. Command, who has sole operational control over all troops
in Korea. But later, the United States again turned to give it de facto
recognition. In August the announcement by General Wickam, commanding
general of U.S. Forces in Korea, that the "United States supports the
inauguration of Chon Tu-hwan to the presidency" accelerated the mood in
3outh Korea for welcoming the birth of President Chon. The State Department
still shows open displeasure over the leadership of Chon Tu-hwan; however,
the situation appears to be largely stabilized unless an incident such as
the execution of Kim Tae-chung takes place.
y South Korean People and the Future
There is a great difference in the reaction of the South Korean people
toward the military takeovers of Pak Chong-hui and Chong Tu-hwan. At
the time of 16 May revolution, the opposition Democratic Party had been
given the opportunity to run a"free" government, following the student
revolution of 19 April 1960. As a result, street demonstrations continued
- and cabinet ministers were repeatedly shuffled. When the military coup
came, strong opinions such as "we cannot help but turn politics over to
the military" was voiced in some quarters, and an air of welcome c~uld
be detected among the people.
Dark Shadow. of Kwangju Incident
On the other hand, General Chon and his colleagues forcefully suppressed
- the "aspirations of the people for freedom" and Ghe "desire for a process
- of democratization" that prevailed widely among the people after the death
of President Pak. The South Korean people have a strong desire for stability
on the one hand and harbor strong dissatisfactions against the suppression
of the desire for freedom on the other. Further, although the 16 May
incident was a bloodless coup, General Chon has on his hands the bloody
record of the Kwangju incident, which resulted in the death of many people--
189 by government accounts alone. It is undeniable that this record casts
a dark image in the minds of the people against the Cho Tu-hwan control
~ system. Korea has an enduring tradition of Confucian teachings, and the
resulting pattiern of thought places civilian officials over and above
military servicemen in the governemnt~~anking. In the case of President
Chong, he is not only a military man but also a young man, which, in the
context of the Confucian teachi_ng "respect the elders," adds another
dimension of negative image. Al1 in all, the people Iook at him critically.
President Pak applied a tight contrcl over his governing body but at the
same time gave his p~ople the dream of high economic growth. President
' Chon is promoting a social vurification campaign, through the elimination
of politicians and high government officials who amassed illicit fortunes
and a ban on private tutorship, but these measures are too limited in
scope to be called a national dream. In an address on the 22nd, ar.'.a
heremony mar.king his retirement from the military as a full general,
prior to his presidential inauguration, President Chon set the direction
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of his administration: "Our ideal is to build a democratic welfare state
that all of our people desire." He elaborated on the means to achieve the
- goal and presented his three-point principles: 1. Indigenous growth of
democracy suitable to the historical environment and cultural background
of Korea. 2. Construction of a welfare society in which each individual
may en~oy material as well as spiritual well-being. 3. Establishment of
social justice through widespread social innovations.
The above statement is similar to the "Korean-style democracy" announcement
by President Pak under the Yushin system. The new motto, "Democratic
welfare state," seems to suggest that [the administration] will assume
the new taks of rectifying differences in income level brought on by high-
speed economic expansion and of advancing social development pro~ects.
At the same time, President Chon stated in his address that "a tradition
for a peaceful changeover of government will be established." This was a
criticism of President Pak's long tenure in office. At the time of the
16 May incident, Maj Gen Pak Chong-hui's military commission members
promised publicly, in the last item of their six-part revolutionary public
pledge, "when our task is achieved, we will relinquish and transfer
governmental power to new and conscientious politicians at any time and
will prepare to return to our original duties." But the promise was not
kept. Major General Pak was promoted to full general before retiring from
the service and was elected to the presideacy in the October 1963 presi-
dential election, defeating candidate Yun Pa-sun. This was what he called
"transferring the government to a civilian."
Later, President Pak changed the provisions in the constitution stating
that "the term of the President shall be limited to two terms and 8 years,"
ran three times, ana went on to be a three-tex:.- President, defeating Kim
Tae-chung. In 1972, he pushed for "October Yuahin," abolished the clause
in the constitution prohibiting a multiterm Presidency, and established
a "lifetime administration."
In a Matter of a Moment
President Chon ascended to the presidency right on the heels of President
Pak. Immediately after the "military clean-house coup," he made a comment,
"I don't know at all what politics is all about. I became a soldier because
I like being a soldier. I don't intend to take off my uniform." Nonetheless,
he went on to be inaugurated president in a breathless pace which rivaled
in spepd President Pak's ascendancy.
According to the draft of the revised constitution currently under study by
~ the panel of the Constitutional Revision Study Commission, the terms of the
President are limted to 7 years, and no successive term in office is allowed.
The earlier statement by President G'hon was a reference to the revision of
the draft, but few in Korea are thought to take it at face value, because -
the situation in South Korea is too f1u1d and turbulent to forecast the
future--e5pecially the next 7 years. .
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Personnel Ties of President Chon Tu-hwan
President Chon Tu-hwan (Military Academy llth Class)
Nucleus
Pak Se-sik Military Academy 12th Class Junior Class Member
Commander, Capital City Security
Command
Cha Kyu-hon Military Acadeiuy 8th Class Senior Group Member
Deputy Chief of Staff,Arnry
Hwang Yong-si Military Academy lOth Class Senior Group Member
Commander, Third Army
Yi Hi-song Military Academy 8th Class Senior Group Member
Commander, Martial Law Command
Chong Ho-yong Military Academy llth Class Same Class Member
Co~ander, Airborne Forces
Command
No Tae-u Military Academy llth Class Same Class Member
Commander, Military Security
Command
Support Group
Yi Kyu-kwang Uncle of Chon Tu-hwan's wife Relative
President, Mineral Resources
Development Company
Yi Ung-hi Chief Presidential Spokesman, Presidential Adviser
Former editor of TONGA ILBO
Kim Pyong-hun Chief Presidential Protocol Presidential Adviser
Officer
Chong Tong-Ho Chief Presidential Bodyguard Presidential Adviser
Kim Kyong-won Chief Presidential Secretary Presidential Adviser
Kim Pok-tong Military Academy llth Class Same Class Member
Superintendent, Military Academy
Chin Tong-chae Military Academy 8th Class Senior Group Member
Commander, Second Army
Yun Song-min Military Academy 9th Class Senior Group Member
Commander, First Army
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Paik Sok-chu Military Academy 8th Class Senior Group Member
Deputy Commander, U.S.-ROK
Forces
Yu Pyong-hyon Military Academy 7th Class Senior Group Member
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Yu Hak-song Military Academy 9th Class Senior Group Member
Director, KeIA
COPYRIGEiT: ASAHI SHIMBUN TOKYO HONSHA 1980
9364
CSO: 4105
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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
PAK'S DAUGHTER RUMORED ACTIVE BEHIND POLITICAL SCENE
Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 4 Sep 80 pp 40-42 '
[Article: "A Report on Former President Pak's Oldest Daughter's Grudge ,
and Scandal"]
[Text] "This is a story circulating in the power centers of;South Korea."
Such was the beginning of the sto~y. Former President"Pak had three
children, a son and two daughters, by his late wife, who wae killed by .
riun Se-kwang in 1974. The eldest daughter, Kun-hye; tise turned 30 yea.rs
of age, and after her mother's death, ahe acted as~first lady for her
father. She is said to have missed the chance of msrriage because of the duty.
~ The story went: "At the tragic death of her father, the daughter etrongly
wanted revenge. She wanted to get to the bottom of the incident. She felt
that the incident was not merely the work of Kim Chae~kyu, former c~irector
of the KCIA, or of Kim Kye-won, presidential chief secretary. She could not
help but be suspicious of Chong Sung-hwa, arnry chief of staff, who wae in
the vicinity at the time of the aseasaination."
As for the 26 October incident of President Pak's assassination, it was
generally believed that Ki~m Chae-kyu felt a strong hatred for Cha Chi-chol,
chief presidential security guard and, at the same time, had become disgusted
with the pYesident himself for favoring Cha. Fearful of losing Pak's favor,
Kim Chae-kyu seized the oFportunity to commit the criminal act during a
dinner reception at a branch office of the KCIA, according to the story.
But newly obtained information sees the view that Kim Chae-kyu harbored
animosity toward the "arrogant" Cha, who was rapidly gaining powe-r, as being
superficial,
The new story goes: "Kun-hye disliked Cha. After Cha came to Chongwadae
(the official presidential residence), the atmosphere there changed drastically,
and no one was allowed to see the President without Cha's approval, regardless
of how close the visitor might be to the President. Furthermore, Cha
voi.unteered to provide women to the widower President. As a result, the life
of the President in his later years was ravaged with scandals, Kun--hye was
very much upset over all of this.
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"But it was really Kim Chae-kyu behind the whole acheme, manipulating Cha
to do these things. Cha probably did not realize that he wae being used by
Kim. Cba was very much a simple-minded individual. Cha begaa to have the
illusion that he had become a great man, and he started to interfere with
even personnel matters in the military. Disruption of the communication
flow between the President and the people outaide was what Kim Chae~kyu was
aiming at. After all, when the President was killed, Cha was no longer ~
useful to Kim, and a simple-minded persor woald be an obstacle, Therefore,
Cha was also ~liminated."
Another scheme of Kim Chae-kyu involved Kim Kye-won's assignment to be
chief presidential secretary, accoxding to the information~ But we will
not dwell on it here, since it would open up a whole new dimension. How~
ever, the recommendation for Kim Kye~won's assignment was eaid to have come
from both Kim Chae-kyu and Ch~+. Chi-chol~~another point that disputes the
argument about severe friction between Kim and Cha. Anyway, Director Kim
carried out the assassination. On the same day, he had attempted to cause
the presidential helicopter to crash, but the ?aalfunction in the equipment
was discovered beforehand and so Kim chose to shoot the. President himaelf.
He was incorrect in thinking that he could handle the situation following
the killing, but he had felt confident of American support and bElieved he
could get the military to support him after the asaaeaination. In order to
' accomplish this, strict silence about the death of the President would have
to be enforced for 3 days while the reorgaaization of the etructure of
power was taking place. After a period, anyone could be accuaed of the
murder of the President.
The story continues: `'At the time, the United States wanted to see President
Pak eliminated. The successor that the U.S. Government wanted was Chong
Sung-hwa. After the c3eath of Pak, the Yushin system was being deactivated,
but Kim Chae-kyu could not survive. He became a scapegoat. After Pak's
death, Chong Sung~hwa stood at the pinnacle of power as the commander of the
Martial Law Command. Opposing the move was Pak Kun-hye.`~
Financial Aid to Chon Tu~hwan Group
Chon Tu-hwan is a graduate of the llth class of the Military Academy. The
llth class was the beginning of the formal 4~year courae at the Military
Academy in South Korea. The classmates are said to share a strong sense of
being an elite group, and they were united behind General Chon, at the time
of the 12 December "military housecleaning coup d'etat.'~ Before and after
- the incident jPresident Pak's assassination], one man acted in a very
suspicious manner: Army Chiei of Staff Chong Sung-hwa had to be one of the
enemies involved with the death of her father who took ovez power. When
Kun-hye saw this happening, she approached Chon Tu-hwan, commander of the
Army Security Command.
Amon~ the members af th~ llth Class, there were individuals who en~oyed
= President Pak�s special favor. Chon was of course one of them. The others
were: Lt Gen No Tae--u, who assumed the poat of commander of the Army Security
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Command after Chon; Kim Pok-tong, superintendent of the Military Academy;
and Son Yc~ng-gil, who was said to be the most trrilliant student among them,
but who had fallen fr om favor in 1~73, Chon Tu-hwan was given the credit,
when he was the commander of the lst Division, for diacovering the third
underground tunnel dug by the North Koreans under the 38th Parsllel. Hie
promotion wae said to have bePn partially aided by the pulling of etrings
by Chief Presidential Security Guard Cha. Chon had once aerved with Cha in
, the Kimpo airbornP unit, and in 1974 he served ae assistant to the chief of
the Presidential Security Guard, at the recommendation of Cha, Back in 19F1,
when then Maj Gen Pak Chong-hui led his coup, Chon was the leader of
demonstrations at the Mili tary Academy in support of Pak.
The story concludes: "Anyway, Chon Tu-hwan was extremely loyal to President -
Pak, This man was th e commander of the Security Command at the time of the -
assassin3tion. In other words, he was chief of army security and police and,
af ter the incident, he was placed in charge of the joint investigation of -
the incident. For Kun-hye, he was the most trvstworthy man who could be
found. Later, the 12 December incident took place, and Chong Sung-hwa and
- others were ousted, but according to a confidential report circulating among
the central power sys tem of South Korea, the Chon Tu-hwan group was given
financial aid by Pak Kun-hye prior to the 12 December iacident. In this
connection, a rumor has it that the relationship between Chon Tu-hywan and
Miss Pak is extraordinary--to the point of being closely bordering that
between a man and a woman. The takeover by Chon Tu-hwan came about as a
res~~lt of a power struggle fought inside the power structure, or a coup
wi~.hin the royal court, but behind the fighting the alliance with Kun-hye
was said to have played a role."
A source in Japan analyzed the atory : "In South Korea, a popular j oke at
the moment i~ the 'U,B. News Agency.' In the Korean language, a wild rumor -
is called 'yu-on-bi-o,' which ia shortened to 'U.B.' The story of the
scandal must have come from the 'U.B, News Agency.` After the assassination,
Chon Tu-hwan's name became known and people began to ask about him. The
vicous rumor may have star ted because he was closely associated with
President Pak and his family. On the other hand, Miss Kun-hye performed the
duties of first lady after her mother's death by attending off.icial meetings,
presiding over the Semaun movement (Note: spiritual revitalization movement),
and keeping herself b usy with speaking engagemente and moving from east to
west. But Korea is a Confucian country which regards women's active participa-
tion in affairs of st ate with a negative >>iew, particularly when Kun-hye was
only a young girl, un like her middle-aged mother Madame Yuk Yong-suk. Thus
Kun-hye was not too popular among ti~e people. You may find a para11e1 in
case of Marie Antoine tte, who at the time of the French Revolution was made
into a heroine of pornography [as published]. Both have been used as objects
for fun and games of cathareis by people." -
The same source raise d two points as the basis for refuting the scandalous
rumor, One of them was the arrest of Kim Choag^pil. The wife-. of Kim is
the niece of former President Pak. If Kun-hye had that much influence over
Chon Tu-hwan, she would not have allowed Kim Chong-~il to suffer such a terrible
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_ shame in a country like Korea, where bloodkinship is very highly regarded,
extending to the level of lOth-cousin relationship, The second point is
, likewise creditable. There is a man named Ham Pyong-gi who was ambassador
to Canada at the time of the 26 October incident. He is the husband of
President Pak's daughter from an earlier marriage before Madame Yuk.
t~ir Ham was also arrested. He was later released, and his release may have
been due to Kun-hye's intervention with Chon.
Did the Rumor Originate Witb Chon's Close Associates?
Pak Kun-l:ye is a Catholic and wanted to become a nun after the death of the
President. She does not seem to be the type of woman who would want
political power. An intelligent woman who graduated at the top of her
class at Sogang University with an electronics engineering ma~or, she
appears to have made no effort to line up her own political power base.
Many Korean observers attribute the element of Chon's success to the posi-
tion he happened to occupy at the time of crisis: commander of the Security
_ Co~and. Some say that General Chong Sung-hwa's lack of decisive action--he
is nicknamed "Incompetent"--may have contributed to Chnn's success. General
Chong, finding himself in the position of supreme power as conmtander of the
Martial Law Command, started shuffling military personnel in an attempt to
consolidate his power. But the change in the top did not filter down to the
level of young generals and colonels, who hold the real power and who turned
to Chon Tu-hwan.
General Chong`s forces planned Chon's forced retirement or reassignment
from the Security Command, but then suffered a preemptive strike by Chon
and lost the power struggle, Since then, nearly 40 generals reported~y
have been forced to retire or have been reassigned. Former Japanese
Ambassador to South Korea Ka.neyama said: `'In the background of the appear-
ance of Chon, there is the people's distrust of politiciana. The politi-
cians demand de~aocratization, in denial of tbe past, but "the general
public and the military are worried about tbe confueion that may follow .
democratization and the freedom movement,"
The truth of any information from South Korea ia difficult to screen from
the false. A simple judgment ,nay lead to misinterpretation. "Kim Tae-chung
being the symbol of democratization ie, therefore, good; and Chon Tu-hwan
being the embodiment of repression is, therefore, bad"--such a simplistic
determination is not always correct. At the same time, it is true that the
repressive government of Chon Tu-hwan is creating an uneasy feeling among the
people, causing them to wonder where it is all leading. "We don't like _
all this" is how the people think of it. But referring to the "royal court
scandal," an authority on Korean affairs stated: "It is entirely possible.
- I have also heard about it from a sure aource--one on the inside in Chon's
power system," ;
''Korea, both North and South, is a country where people hold blood kinship ;
in extremely high esteem, beyond the imagination of the Japanese people
- today. When power is passed on, the successor must first secure the ~
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blessings of the predecessor. Since President Pak met sudden death, a
representative of the surviving family members acts on behalf of the
President and gives th~ blessing to the succesaor. This is merely a matter
of commonsense well within the norm of Confuciari society, The family -
representative in this case was 2~Iiss Pak Kun-hye. The enemy of the parent
is unconditionally recognized [as the object for elimination] in the context
of Korean moralYty. Therefore, if i~un-hye asked Chon Tu-hwan for t'help," it
would reinformce Chon Tu-hwan's position. I think the fact that the story
of Kun-hye's being behind Chon leaked from Chon's confidant is worthy of our
attention, There may be a danger of wild rumors spreading, aince a young
woman is involved, but it would not be treated as a scandal against Chon
' Tu-hwan, as it would in Japan, because of Korea's traditional custom of
"predominance of man over woman.'' -
T~ne wife of Chon Tu-hwan is the daughter of an instructor at the Military
Academy. How would she be taking euch rumors in connection with her huaband's
official duties?
COPYRIGHT: Shinchosha 1980
9364
CSO: 4105
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S. KOREA/ECONOMY
BRIEFS
DECL�INING ROLE OF EXPORTS--Seoul Oct. 2(OP)--The role of exports in
contributing to Korea's economic growth, production and employment
has measurably fallen off. According to a report released Thursday
by the Commerce-Industry Ministry, Korea's gross national product _
jumped 114 percent from 20.9 trillion won at constant prices in 1975
to 44.9 trillion won in 1979, while production induced by exports
rose by only 85.7 percent from 4.6 trillion won in 1975 to 8.5 trillion
won in 1979. Exports' share in the GNP thus slid from 21.9 percent to
19 percent. The report also shows that the export-related employment
per million dollars worth of exports also declined from an average
of 324 persons in all industries in 1975 to 188 last year. The
decline in such export-led employment is attributed to the effects of
techno3,ogical improvements in production and a growing trend toward
capital-intensive industries. [Text] [SK020930 Seoul ORIENT PRESS
in Engl ish 0110 GMT 2 Oct 80]
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES--Seoul Oct. 6(OP)--The Korean Government
plans to enact a law encouraging the development of substitute energy
sources such as solar heat, wind power and methane gas. Energy-
resource Ministry officials said Monday that the proposed legislation
is necessary to encourage firms to develop such energy sources by
giving them tax favors and other financial and administrative support
in order to reduce Korea's heavy dependence on oil. In view of the
steadily rising oil prices, the economic feasibility of such substitute
energy projects is improving, the officials said, although it seems -
slim at present because of the huge capital requirements. Meanwhile,
the ministry has decided to convert th e country's six oil-b urning
cement plants to the use of bituminous coal by 1983 as part of its
policy to reduce dependence on oil. The decision is designed to cut
Korea's bunker C oil consumption by 12.5 million barre~s a year beginning
with 1984. The proposed substitution of coal will require a capital
investment of more than 91.7 billion won (148 million U.S. dollars),
of which the government will subsidize 75 billion won (121 million
dollars), according to the officials. [Text] [SK060852 Seou1 ORIENT
PRESS in English 0735 GMT 6 Oct 80]
i
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LARGE LPG STOCKPILE FACILITIES--Seoul Oct. 3(OP)--The Korean Government
is to set up largP facilities to stockpile one million tons of liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) a year at a port near the Yochon industrial complex
on the southern coastal area, while seeking more imports of LPG in an
effort to diversify imported energy sources. Seoul's economic
ministers Friday approved an Energy-resources Ministry plan for the
- facilities, which will cost 60 billion won (about 97 million U.S. dollars)
in domestic capital by the end of 1982. Energy-resources Ministry
officials said that an agreement had been already concluded under which
Petromin, a Saudi Arabian state-run oil company, is to supply 250,000
tons of LPG annually to Korea, beginning in 1982. The officials also
said that they would v~igorously seek more imports of LPG and other
energy sources to reduce Korea's heavy dependence on oil. [Text]
- [SK030241 Seoul ORIENT PRESS in English 0126 (~iT 3 Oct 80]
STATE OF SMALL-MEDIUM BUSINESSES--Seoul (OP-Kyodo)--A protracted economic
slump has forced an increasing number of Korea's small and medium-size
enterprises to suspend or curtail operations or to close down completely.
' A CoIInnerce-Industry Ministry report released Saturday showed that 68.5
percent of the country's total small and medium-size enterprises were
operating norma.lly as of the end of July, cou~pared with 77 percent in 1979
and 85.5 percent in 1978o LText~ ~Tokyo THE JAPAPI TIMES in English
7 Oct 80 p 5~
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S. KORFA/FOREIGN REIATIONS
ROK UNWILLING TO DISGtiOSE COMPLETE TEXT ON KIM'S TRIAL
Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 7 Oct 80 p 4
~Text~
A Foreign Mlnistty~ so~rce repeatedly ~plied'that the full
disclosed ~ Monday thaE South text was ln the process ot
Korean authorities obiect tn compilatlon. �
handing the Japanese govern- The Foceign � ~Iinistty has
ment [he tWl text ot the general recently obtair~ed intormation
court martial niling sentencing that the tWl text has beea
dissident leader Kim Dae Jung completed:
- w death on Sept.17. However. because ot fierce
The source said the Japanese opposttion from South Korean
government, through ~ott[cial authorities. there is a strong
diplomatic channels. had asked llkelihood that tt~e Japanese
the South Korean government government may not be able W
for a copy ot the full text. obtatn the tull text after all and
Kim Dae Jung was abducted will be glven oaly an unotttcfal
appare~ltly by South Iforean brie[ing by the South Korean
intelligence agents in August authortties, the souree said ~
- 1973 trom� a Tokyo hotel to Opposition ' partles are ex-
, Seout. .The dispute siemming pected to make'the Kim Qae
trom what the Japanese Jung case a maior tssue at tl~e
government claimed to_be the B a d g e t C o m m i t t e e�
Korean government's violatton deliberations opening ln the~
o[ Japan's sovereignty was D(eE Thursday.
settled pol[tically later that The same Foreign Ntintstry
ye~, soucce said Monday that the
Asked for the tult text later by hlglZer milttary court wiil mosC
the. Japaz~ese, government, the ~ llkely epen the appeai trial o[
South ~ Korean gover~menC '-Kim late ih October
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1980
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S. KOREQI/FOR.EIGN REIATIONS
BRIEFS
FUKUDl~ ~ S REMAItKS ON KIM- A s tateuyent about the fate of Kim Tae-chun~ that
was reported to have been made by foraner Prime Minister Takeo Fuku~a caused
a storm among Liberal-Demvcratic Party leaders and the press on Thursday.
Fukuda reportedly said at a meeting of LDP leaders that President Chon Tu-
hwan had told him that Chon was not in a position to mitigate Kim's sentence.
Yoshio Sakurauchi, secretary-general of the LDP told the press after the
meeting that this was what Fukuda had said. La.ter, however, Sakurauchi
called the press again and said that Fukuda had intended to make the points
that President Chon did no t want to intervene in the affairs of justice at
this uboment and tha.t Chon had not said anything about mitigating Kim's
sentence. Fukuda's state~ent, as it was reported by Sakurauchi the first
time could have become a diplomatic bomb. It is very rare that a statement
- made in a meeting of LDP leaders and announced to the press is corrected at
a second press conference. Under South Korean law, the president can miti-
gate a sentence after the Supreme Court has given its final verdict. The
LDP meeting was held so tha.t Fukuda coulil report on his recQat trip to the
Republic of Korea. ITextJ ~Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Oct 80
p 3~
MEETING WITH INDIAN AMBASSADOR--Seoul Oct. 2(OP)--Korea's Foreign
Minister No Sin-yong Thursday met with Indian Ambassador to Korea
Vasant Vasudeo Paranjpe. No explained the current situation on the
Korean Peninsula and asked for the Indian Government's support in
connection with Pyongyang's recent diplomatic offensive toward the
non-aligned countries, ministry officials said. [Text] [SK021000
Seoul ORIENT PRESS in English 0115 GMT 2 Oct 80]
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N. KOREA/SOCIAL CONDITIONS
JAPANESE VISITOR REPORTS ON LIFE IN DPRK, POLITICAL SITUATION
Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 24, 25, 26 Aug 80
[Article by Akira Ishikawa: "On Our Visit to North Korea"]
[24 Aug 80 p 1]
[Text] High Level Citizen Life; People's Traditional
Customs Remain
Northern side of the Korean peninsula. I had the
opportunity to obs erve the rarely visited Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). What do
, the people think; how do they live? This is the
report.
Fowl Provided for Nutritive Supply
Kim T'aek-song, descending from the stage, said laughingly, "I receive
a cabinet member's level salary. A car is furnished. Three fowl daily
for nutritional supply." Du ring the circus, he gives a unique "artis-
tic sleight of hand show," and holds title to the honored name of
people's actor." Since the abundance of a livelihood cannot be measured
~ by the standards of capital ist society because the ratio which real goods
(home, fuel and the like) o ccupy in compensation for work in socialist
countries is large, Mr Kim did not tell us the definite amount of this
monthly salary. But satisfaction with life w�as inferred by the expres-
sion of not only him, but also of the many movie actors and artists this
reporter met. In the case of painters, they can display their products
at exhibitions and sell Chem. It is possible for men of letters and
artists to act as "professi onals." When these facts are heard, the
balance of spirituai stimulation and material stimulation, which is one
of the difficult prublems in socialist policy, seems to be rather well
adjusted.
The population of North Korea is 17 million, but it has a military force
- of more than 500,000. Tt is said that the defense expenditure burden has
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limited the improvement of the national standard of living. Despite
this, national annual income rose from 1,000 dollars per capita in 197+
to 1,920 dollars in 1979. (President Kim I1-song's "New Year's Address)
This considerably exceeds the figures presumed by the West; and when one
walks through Pyongyang and sees the people's clothin~, the feeling grows
that "they have achieved a fairly high level of living. Of course, the
women who clean the streets and construction workers wear working clothes,
but pedestri.ans are surprisingly well dressed and well groomed. And this
is the norm. I visited the family of So Yong��kyu (45 years old) who lives
in an apartment facing a main street in Pyongyang, and saw their way of
life.
Mr. So is a worker at a thermoelectric powerplant; his monthly salary is
130 won (1 won is approximately 150 yen). Cho Se-pok, his wife (43 years
old, works at a library and her monthly salary is 85 won. So the family
income exceeds 200 won. There are 3 children, headed by the 17-year old
eldest son. Mrs Cho said, "Household expenses, electricity, gas and every-
thing included, are 3 won per month. (In winter, 4 won.) There is no tax,
and life is comfortable. Seven or 80 won per month is enough." If so,
it works out that half of the salary remains, but the wife says, "It would
ha ~nn;? r~ ;:ve; but there are various other expenses. When relatives
or friends get married, a money gift is given. "In the case of a close
~ relative or close friend, 300 to 500 won is sent." This amount is a
large sum of money equivalent to several times the monthly salary of one
person. It is a traditional custom in Korea to pay one's respects at a
wedding or funeral--I understood from the wife that the national charac-
teristic of "treating human relationships as important" has remained in
life in this form.
Apartment--Four Rooms, Dining, Kitchen
For example, in a room in the four-room plus dining and kitchen apartment
where rIr So's family lives, there is a television; and at first glance,
it is no different than a room in a Japanese apartment. But, the floor
is ondol style which has been in Korea since early times. The wife
stated, "The remaining heat from the neighboring thermoelectric power-
plant heats the ondol. After all, life is good with the ondol where _
heat is transmitted from below." National customs are honored even when
it comes to eating habits. Looking at the grocery stores lined up on
the first floor of the apartment complex, kim-chee which the Koreans
love is a best seller. Since it is not the season for Chinese cabbage,
cabbage is used as the ingredient and is sold for 0.2 won per kilogram.
Since early times, the Korean people have made kim-chee in their own
homes and each has enjoyed his own "individual seasoning. Now the num-
ber of people living in apartments has increased and they are satisfied
to buy "px'epared foods" in the grocery stores.
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[25 Aug 80, p 2]
[Text] Aiming at Sovereign Independence. In the "Valley" of Intense
Sino-Soviet Confrontation
The Mansudae Theater in the central part of Pyongyang is a large `
theater built unsparingly of marble. There are many people who say with
admiration, "Such a superb theater is rare even in Western Europe." In
front of the building there is an eye-catching, large fountain--around -
it there are honored guests from foreign countries and diplomats from
various nations who live in Pyongyang, enjoying the moments before the
_ commencement of the performance. When such a spectacle is seen, the
feeling is conveyed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(North Korea) has remarkably improved its position in the international
comcnun i ty .
Still "A State of War"
North Korea has diplomatic relations with more than 100 nations and about
20 countries have embassies in Pyongyang. It has sent observers to the
United Nations and has participated in many United Nations special agen-
cies, but it can never be said that the international environment surround-
ing this country is favorable to North Korea. First of all, with the
cease-fire line in between,the "state of war" with the United Nations
forces, composed mainly of United States troops, has still not been
terminated. At Panmunjom, the soldiers of the people's army glare at the
U.S. soldiers to the south and mutter, "We ought to quickly conclude a
peace agreement with the United States and be done with this 'cease-f ire."'
This situation no~ only impedes the path to north-south unification, but
forces North Korea, which is in a hurry to build up its economy, to
"increase its national defense expenditures."
Secondly, it borders the big powers of China and the USSR. During the
Korean war, both China and the USSR gave full-scale support and since
then, have respected North Korea's diplomatic line. However, in the
midst of the intensificl~tion of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, it is
difficult for North Korea with a population of 17 million to adhere to
an autonomous dipl.omacy. This reporter asked Kim Yong-nam, director of
the International Affairs Department of the Korean Workers' Party about
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but there was no reply. North Korea
- criticized the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as "dor~ination doctrine,"
but there was no formal comment of the Afghanistan affair. Not only that,
but nothing was said about the so-called "self-defense counterattack" when
Chinese troops acted against Vietnam in February of last year. It seems
odd that North Korea, which has a predisposition to theoretically exp lain
everything, did not express its opinion concerning these two incidents
which attracted the world's attention. In this, North Korea's delicate
position of being placed in the middle of the intense Sino-Soviet con-
frontation was brought into bold relief.
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Those involved in Pyongyang's diplomatic relations point out, "If it
joins one camp its sovereignty is damaged. A very good example is the
relationship of South Korea with the United States." Isn't the way out
of this present difficulty contained in the one aim of nonalinement
diplomacy with which ilorth Korea has grappled in its nationwide attitude
for these last several years? In its long past history, North Korea
has tasted the misery of losing its "sovereignty and independence" when
it was oppressed by China and coloni.alized by Japan. rlany of the non-
alined nations have the same kind of intense allergic reaction to out-
s ide control--on the basis of this "kindred spirit," North Korea has
appealed to solidarity with the nonalined nations and made the appeal
that "overthrowing 'big powerism,' is the road to protecting peace."
- Post-Tito Leader
I have heard the words again and again that "our respected President
Kim Il-song will be the center of the movement of post-Tito nonalinement
diplomacy." It is worthy of note that the visits to Pyongyang by the
leaders of the Third World countries has increased more and more. Ani-
mals from many countries, including the two pandas from China, have been
sent to the zoo in the Taesongsan Amusement Park in suburban Pyongyang.
Besides the friendly nations of Eastern Europe, such as Poland, those
sending animals are overwhelmingly Third World countries, such as
Tanzania, Somalia, Madagascar, Mali, Guinea, Rawanda, Indonesia and
Thailand. There is speculation that North Korea is steadily trying to
strengthen its bilateral relations.~
From such a situation, it is thought that North Korea which has such
pressing problems as the outstanding question of improving relations
with the United States and with Japan is concentrating its energies on
the nonalinement movement and is trying to seek solutions to all of its
problems with its cultivated "autonomy" as the lever.
[26 Aug 80, p 3J
[Text] Indestructible Unification System. Harsh Conditions.
First, Nationbuilding
Pyongyang is now bubb ling with excitement since the sixth party congress
of the Workers' Party of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(North Korea) to be held in October is close at hand. All over the
city, banners written in Korean characters (Hangul), "Success in the
Party Congress," catch one's eye. On the occasion of important events
in socialist countries, a feeling of mission often rises up with the
crisis consciousness of "whatever is not accomplished is irrevocable"
as the background. North Korea has experienced that many times in the
past, such as the Chollima movement. But the Pyongyang authorities are
saying that the "people's enthusiasm this time is the highest ever."
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The slogan of the unfolding movement is the "100 days battle"--which means
that during the 100 days from July until the party congress begins, all
the workers in industry and agriculture will labor energetically and
assiduously in their production, and will exceed the goals of the Second
7-Year Plan.
"Stable Environment"
North Korea has furthered an economic buildup since liberation. North
Korea has been hit by the worsening environment of the world economy sur-
rounding the energy problem, and its nonfulfillment of foreign debts has
also become a topic of conversation. But concerned parties have declared,
"A general overview indicates a steady course." Those in charge of policy
are bullish, saying, "The weather is abnormal this year, but agricultural
production will be favorable." Grain, which was 9 million tons last year,
will be 9.5 million tons this year. Industrial production is also favor-
able."
Those concerned with the economy state, "There are no oil resources in
our country. So, most of our energy is dependent on coal." They state
with pride, "We put emphasis on coal even when it was possible to import
oil cheaply." Oil is imported from China, the USSR and the Middle East;
it can be said that this is North Korea's weak point, just like Japan.
However, since thermoelectric powerplants use all coal as fuel, and
demand for oil is controlled to a minimum, there is no concern at all.
The 100 days battle has been advanced within such a"stable environment."
The problem is what are the people of North Korea expecting concretely
from the sixth party congress.
' Many people are thinkin~; that "important domestic and foreign policies
which will become guides of the future will be decided at this congress."
Some university students state that "we think that important policies con-
cerning the unity of our homeland, our deepest desire, will be forthcoming."
In the West, there is the opinion that President Kim I1-song's son, Kim
Chong-il, will be appointed to an important post at the sixth party con-
gress and a successor system will be established. Kim Chong-il is the
influential person leadin~ the Three Revolutions Teams (ideology, culture,
technology) and it is said that for several years he has been recognized
as "the successor" within the country. However, North Korea has not
formally explained Kim Chong'il's position to the outside. No matter
what country, the problem of a successor is a difficult question, and
speculation has arisen with regard to the quesCion of whether "the more
competent the acting highest leader is and the more the unification
structure is well ordered, the more the person who inherits the position
will be able to skillfully control policies as ever."
In addition, there is the criticism from those opposed to the position
of North Korea that "political power is personalized."
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Preparations for Next Generation
However, this reporter did not see the name nor picture of Kim Chong`il
no matter where we traveled, such as factories, farms and homes. What
did come to our attention were the words, "the guidance of our great ~
President Kim Il-song." Confirmation of the position of successor would
signify the existence of a number two. If so, there is the possibility
that unification leadership would be weakened. In order for North Korea
to weather severe domestic and foreign situations and to advance its
nationbuilding, it is thought that the resolution was made not to
~ demolish the un if ication system of the "respected President Kim Il-song.
Despite this, po litical preparations for the next generation are neces-
sary, but it is uncertain whether or not "conclusions" concerning this
will be forthcoming at the sixth party congress. Every day the people
of Pyongyang are throwing themselves wholeheartedly into completion ~f
the 100 days battle without the least regard for such concerns of the
F1est .
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1980
9400 ~D
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