JPRS ID: 9362 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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F'OR OFhl('IA1. IiSE ON1.1'
JPRS L/9362
23 October 1980
West Euro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 42/80)
FBIS FORE~IGN Bi~OADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9362
23 October 1980
'~1EST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 42/80)
- CONTENTS
THEATER NUCI~~AR FORCES
FRANCE
Buis Comments on Neutron Bomb Deployment, Cohen's New Book
(Georges Buis; LE NOUVEL OBGERVATEUR, 3-11 May 80). 1
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
Briefs
PCF Treasurer's Report 5
Gas Ration Tickets 5
ITALY
Fiat's Progress Report for First Half of 1980 ~
(LA STAMPA, 24 5~p 80) 6
SPAIN -
Political Profiles of UCD Leadership Figures
(Fernando Alvarez 3e Miranda, et al., Interviews;
- CAM33I0 16, various dates) 11
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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- THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
Bv'IS COMMENTS ON NEUTRON BOMB DEPLOYMENT, COHEN'S NEW BOOK
Paris LE NOWEL OBSEP.VATEUR in French 3-11 May 80 pp 64-65
[Commentary by Georges Buis on the book "Echec a la Guerre" [Holdtng War
in Check]* by Samuel T. Cohen and Marc Geneste, Editions Copernic, 1980,
252 pages]
[,Text] The introduction of a fearsome type of explosive device, the nuclear
weapon, into the arsenals of the major belligerents was certainly not enough
to get the Soviets to reject the "phenomenon of war." They simply s~t ,
about integrating this nuclear firepower into their combat forces. There
is no lack of Soviet statements to this effect. General Zavyalov has
declared that "nuclear firepower will clear the way for the attacking forces."
The reno~rnad�'. Marshal Sokolovski developed the same concept in his book
"Military Strategy." Colonel Sirodenko has said quite bluntly that "the
nuclear attack is a simultaneous attack throughout the depth of the opposing
disposition of forces." In short, the Soviet military intelligentsia consider
, nuclear firepower to be the instrument for breaking through enemy defensive
positions (while NATO still relies on tanks for such penetration!).
In their book "Echec a la Guerre," Samuel T. Cohen and Marc Geneste con-
tenc3 that within the European theater, the neutron bomb alone can pre-
clude nuclear fire from making any opening in the NATO defensive system, or
can, in any case, immediately close any such breach. They explain this
bomb in a book which brings nuclear physics withtn everyone's grasp, and in
which the caustic fury of the French officer angered at having his views
ignored to date blends very effectively with tne unruffled humor of the tena-
cious American scientist.
Death Strip
Before becoming the father of the "enhanced-radiation bomb"--the weapon's
correct designation--, Samuel T. Cohen worked at Los Alamos, beginning in
1943, alongside of Neils Bohr, Fermi, and Oppenheimer. Z'here he witnessed
the birth of the first atomic bomb, and also of the two bombs which succes-
- sively leveled Hiroshiina and Nagasaki. Then he and his friends kept developing ~
*For additional reviews of, commentary on, and reaction to "Echec a la
_ Guerre" see JPRS 76369, 5 September 1980, No 1618 of this series pp 1-17.
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increasingly powerful bombs. Cohen saw the radius of damage drawn on tar-
get maps grow larger and larger, until one day he said to himself: "After
all, there must be a way of killing the sniper in the church tower without
razing the whole diocese." He reached the conclus ion that the solution lay
in an explosive device based on nuclear fusion and no longer on nuclear fis-
sion which is utili~ed in current tactical nuclear weapons. In the neutron
bomb developed by Cohen, this fusion is the reaction between two heavy
isotopes of hydrogen, namely deuterium and tritium.
In a fission-type weapon, 85 percent of the energy released occurs in the form
of blast, heat, light, etc., and S percent in the form of neutrons. With
- the fusion-type bomb, the opposite occurs. "Some 80 percent of the energy
is emitted in the form of very high-speed neutrons capable of traveling
greater c3istances in air." The explosion becomes "an extremely brief flash _
of nuclear radiation: neutrons." Hence it is possible to employ, far
example, against personnel in the open--and against armored vehicles which
neutrons readily penetrate--a fusion-type weapon of 10 times less yield than
a fission-type weapon of similar neutron strength. Inasmuch as attacking
troops, whether or not they are shielded by armor, are compelled to advance
at ground level, they are, therefore, vulnerable and can be effectively
counterattacked because the miniaturized neutron weapon can be fired at
short range and the defensive troops are, unlike the attackers, under cover.
'Phe other side of these important and unquestionable qualities is that, to
avoid slaughtering civilian populations, neutron bombs must of necessity be
used on a glacis forming a continuous strip or belt of terrain all along
tl~e demarcaLmon zone, and to the east of that zone as much as possible.
Friendly populations to the west would have to be either evacuated once -
- the defensive line is built, or instructed i.n withdrawing to nearby shelters
(1.5 meters of earth divide the radiation effect by 1,000). Defending
troops would be deployed throughout a sort of nuclear Maginot Line consist-
ing of five rows of bunkers disposed in depth and protected by a"standard
barrier of obstacles," by a"radiological minefield," or also, as Cohen
recommends, by a system of pipes containing a radioactive fluid with a base
of sodium carbonate in solution. Thi.s final obstacle could be built at
unbeatable prices and would make it possible "to distribute radioactivity
all along the barrier." Destruction teams attacking it would thereby des-
troy themselves.
Such a defense system would be much less expensive than the present flexible
. response system which is illogical in every respect and dooms NATO to having
its back broken at the outset by a preemptive nuclear strike launched by
the Warsaw Pact forces. Cohen and Geneste have no illusions, however, about
their proposed system's chances of adoption. Admittedly the employment
of neutron bombs is called for--in a manner of speaking--in the unpopulated ~
vastness of steppes and deserts, and even more so on the oceans. We have
' been say~.ing this for a long time in tnis very magazine. But the neutron
bomb is too revolutionary to be accepted for use on land where, for the
time being, the taboo of Hiroshima still stands as an obstacle. Samuel T.
Cohen is quite familiar with this taboo. He told us about some 20 years of
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disappointing briefings given to high -level White House and Pentagon off.icials.
The day S. T. Cohen arrived at the White House for a reluctantly approved
_ meeting with Eisenhower, the president could not see Cohen because he was
- practicing on the White House putting green. General Curtis Le May, a
proven scrapper and excellent technical journeyman but a poor air force
~hief staff, believed that the only good bomb was, once and for all, the
one "capable of razing by itself alone the entire Soviet Union." As for John
Kennedy and Rob~rt McNamara, they were both prisoners--and probably,.as
Americans, they were not wrong--of the conviction that employment of nuclear
weapons at the very outset would automatically lead to esr_alation.
The authors also realize that objections im~.~ssible to overcome for politi-
cal reasons will persist. The primary objection is that the FRG, rightly
fascinated by the Ostpolitik, will probably never allow construction on its
soil of a nuclear wall opposite the Warsaw Pact's bondstone and barbedwire
wall.
Furthermore, the system is effective only if authority to fire is delegated
at all times to the force commander or even to the bunker commander. But
the latest American field service regulation--F'M100-16, Operations--revises
the present (and highly contingent) overall nuclear weapon employment authority
delegated by the President of the tinited States to the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, and introduces an additional element of control by reserving to the
occupant of the White House the right to personally open fire with nuclear
weapons, round by round, whether it be concentrated fire or not
One=Shot Game
There is one point on which the authors have not fully convinced us, even
though Samuel T. Cohen did go into greater "detail"--during a lengthy and
free-wheeling conversation with us--about hi~ active par~icipation in the
searching analyses made of this subject in the Pentagon and NATO. The point
in question is the ratio of friendly "civilian" deaths to enemy military
deaths in the center of Europe. Cohen did acknowledge, of course, that with
the "tactical" fission-type bomb currently in service, three or four civilians
would be killed for every military individual because of the magnitude of
the collateral effects (houses collapsing, blast,etc.). He asserted, however,
that small neutron bombs fired with pinpoint accuracy as artillery shells
by a 155-mm gun, for example, would reverse this ratio several times in favor
of the civilian population. And why not, after all, if--as in the days of
the Roman Empire's Limes or Vauban's glacis--the right-minded civilian
populations agree to evacuate the area or stay there and live on the alert
close to their underground shelters? But what government will force this
choice and obligation upon them?
This is, therefore, a book which raises, once again, the issue oF fortress
warfare, a type of warfare that was:not always like the static, bogged-
down Maginut Line warfare. It was a type of warfare which was often the
indispensable basis of dynamic "operative" tactics. It was a war of peoples
who, in defense of their freedom, chose ta play the one-shot game of life
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and death: the city of Beziers against Simon de Montfort, the city of
Tyre against Alexander the Great, and hundreds of others. It does seem that
the time for such wars is past.
In any event, it is our very firm opinion that where France is concerned,
use of the neutron bomb is conceivable solely in ope.rations at sea ar in
the desert, even though such use would still be undesirable. The neutron
bomb can be included for such purposes in France's nuclear arsenal. Its use
inside France proper would be completely st~ipid. With its strategy of
deterrence, France has set itself up as a sanctuary and anything that
questions the sanctuary's validity is antideterrent for the time being. The
neutron bomb could be a remarkable instrument for the defense of Europeans--
which Europeans?--the day Europe--which Europe?--is finally built. In
that case, it would be the weapon of a line of demarcation whose alinement
and defense are not France's problem for the moment.
The fact remains, however, that Marc Geneste and Samuel T. Cohen--who
constantly take turns in expressing their views--do prompt some very
necessary strategic reflection by presenting to the public the first co-
herent argument in favor of the neutron bomb.
COPYRIGHT: 1980, "le Nouvel Observateur"
8041
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
PCF TREASURER'S REPORT--PCF Treasurer Georges Gosnat has presented a dis-
turbing report to the political bureau of the party: money is coming in
very slowly. The militants are complaining of being asked to contribute
too often. Georges Marchais is supposed to make an appeal soon for help
in financing his campaign [for the presidency], to add to the problem.
[Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 10 Oct 80 p 32]
GAS RATION TICKETS--Gas ration tickets are ready, says (Minister of Indus-
try] Andre Giraud who adds, however, that "rationing is not foreseen at
present." To be distributed by the mayors' offices, the tickets would be
the same for everyone regardless of the size of his vehicle. [Text] [Paris
PARIS MATCH in French 10 Oct 80 p 32]
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COUNTRY SE(;TIO1J ITALY
FIAT'S PROGRESS REPORT FOR'FI'RST HALF OF 1380
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 24 Sep 80 p 10
[Article by r.v.: "Fiat--Sector by Sector"~
[Text] Turin--The Fiat group on 30 June acbieved a
total billing volume of 10,423 billion lire (the sum
of all of the billing volumes of tTie various activity
s~ctors, including trade between aectors), as against
8,392 during tfie first fialf of 1979. Looking at tfie
net volume of exchange Between tbe group's sectors, tfie
consolidated billing volume rose from 7,311 to 8,976
billion lire. Investments~came to 381 billions as
- against 358 during the same period of time a year ago;
as of 30 June, tfiere were 354,786 employees, compared
to 356,514 12 months earlier. Tfie Fiat group's finan-
cial position, again as of 30 June, revealed a net sur-
plus of 1,588 billions, with an overall improvement of
100 billions as compazed to the similar position on ~
31 December 1979. Available assets as of that date
were used partly to fi~nance tfie group~s companies and
partly they were invested in Fiank. depostts or sfiort-
term goverrnnent securit~es. Tfiese facts are contai:ned
in the report from Fiat Spa jLimited Company] to CONSOB
[National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange]
(the special commission for cfiecking on stock companies
and the exchange) ~s to tTie group's progress during the
first half of the year, characterized "by the abrupt
reversal of the trend registered in the international
economy starting in the spring." The report to the CONSOB
also contains the progress of the vari:ous operational
sectors.
Autotnobiles
The decline in the European auto marli.et was confirmed by the results of the
first half of 1980 but in many countries exceeded tfie most pessimistic
expectations: at tfie end of ~une, the European detrand (exclud~ng Spain and
- Italy) was 11.2 percent less than during the same period of time in 1979.
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This negative phenomenon has taken on a generalized character in various
countries: France and Germany as of 30 June sfiowed figures 7.I percent and
12.5 percent, respectively, lower tfian tfie demand for the first half of
1979; the English market was 15.7 percent lower and for the United States,
the reduction was 18.5 percent.
Only in Italy did the demand during the f irst half of the year hold up,
totalling 100,000 registrattons more tfian in 1979; but this increase--by
the way, already figured in tfie company forecasts--was anything but suf-
ficient to comFensate for the severe decline registered abroad. As a
matter of fact, the overall drop on the European market (including Italy -
and Spain) was 8.2 percent as of the end of June. Besides= it is feared
that, by the end of the year, there may be a lineup of tfie Italian market
with the negative tendency on markets all over the world.
In addition to the drop in the European demand, there were other factors
which negatively influenced Fiat Auto: the repercussions, i.n 1980. from the
production losses due to strikes tfiroughout last year; the decline in com-
petitiveness also because of the difference in inflation between Italy
and the other European countries, not followed by an adjustment of rates
of exchange; the Japanese attack, whose effect by itself at least accounts
for one-half of the decline in Fiat Auto sales on export markets. Ahroad, -
' as a matter of fact, riat sales dropped 22 percent, slipping from 3G7,000
units during the first half of 1979 to 287,000 in 198~. Excluding Italy
and Spain, the share of Fiat automobiles in Europe dropped from 5.1 per-
cent 1979 to 4.1 percent in 1980 as against an increase achieved by the
Japanese auto makers from 7.9 percent to 11.1 percent.
In Italy, where Fiat penetration came to 52.4 percent at the end (as of 50.3
percent in the middle of 1979), we must report the success of the new
~ models: "Panda" (65,000 units shipped between February and June); "Ritmo
diesel" (11,500 units sold, the most widely used diesel model); and "Lancia
Delta" (18,000 units sold).
Fiat Auto sa1PS overall turned out to be 2.1 percent less than last year
(808,000 units, including vehicles produced by foreign licensee companies _
and distributed by the Fiat network, as against 825,000). Italian outpuC
during the first 6 months of 1980 came to about 77i,000 passenger cars and
commercial vehicles of the Fiat, Lancia, and Autobianchi makes; the 11.6
percent increase however took place against the background of the fact that
the first half of 1979 was heavily penalized by the labor union conflicts
over contract renewals. Foreign production under Fiat license during the
first half came to about 498,000 units (5 percent more than 1979).
Lhe output increase however was not paralleled by an incrtase in sales and
that caused an excessive stock surplus which is why Fiat Auto was forced,
during the first half of the year, to ask the Earnings Insurance Fund to
step in and help for 7 days in taking care of about 78,000 employees, before -
the summer shutdown, plus another 8 days in September.
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The latest petroleum price r~ses, tHe policies aimed at containing inflation,
as adopted by various countries, lead us to expect a decline in the demand
on all of the European markets during 1980, amounting to about 6 percent as
compared to 1979. In Italy, liowever, tfie demand went up during the first
half, after years of depressed m3rket: tfie IBECO made stiipments involving
about 25,000 units (up 35 percent compared to 1979). In spite of some
unknowns regarding tlie progress during the second half, total sales as of
the end of t~:e year should be sligfitly fiigtier tfian what they were last
year.
In France and Germany we anticipate a demand decline of 3 percent by the
end of the year whereas~ a drop of 15 percent is forecast in Great Bri.tain.
IVECO obtained a market sfiare of 10 percent in France (10.4 percent in _
1979), 11.3 percent in Germany (11.1 F~rcent in 1979), and 4.8 percent in
- Great Britain (4.4 percent in 1379). In tfie other Western European coun-
tries TVECO achieved sales that were 13 percent above the 1979 level where-
as the increase was 25 percent on markets ontside Europe,
Overall, output during the first half of 1980 came to 67,983 units in the
various countries (up 15 percent compared to 1979); sales rose to about
, 60,000 units (up 19.8 percent).
Earth-Moving Machinery _
During the first half of 1Q8Q, the decline in the American market in re-
lation to the economic cri~sis in progress was further aggravated. Fiat-
Allis came to feel that serious situation by registering a drop in North
American sales whereas better results were achieved in Latin Anerica, in
the Far East, and Australia. In Europe, Fiat-Allis sales turned out an
average of 10 percent higher, par_tfcularly due to the positive developments
on the French and Italian markets.
Overall, during the first half of 1980, 4,896 earth-moving machinery units
were produced by Fiat-Allis, 9.9 percent more than in 1979, and 5,051 iinits
were sold, an increase of 4.3 percent.
Farm Tractors
In spite of a noticeable drop in the tractor demand, both on the European
markets, and in the developing countries and the United States (between
12 and 30 percent less than in 1979), sales of Fiat Trattori and Agriful-
Toselli during the first half were substantially in line with last year's
levels. By way of confirmation of the product's high quality, it is signi-
ficant to note the volume of exports wfiich amounts to about 60% of the
output; in Europe, Fiat Trattori holds first place with about 12.5 percent
of the market.
Fiat Trattori is continuing to increase its output (28,500 units and 8,650
series sold, amounting to an increase of T.0 percent over 1979) and the
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same is true of Agriful-Toselli (2,500 units, up 38 percent). High-power
(110-180 hp) tractor production was ac~vanced during tiie first half of the
year, completing the range of tfie 80 Series.
Steel Industry
During the first 6 months of the year, the steel induatry maintained
positive progress throughout Western Europe: in Italy, cast steel production,
as in tfie other EEC countries (excluding Great Britain), went up 16 per-
cent; imports grew by 30 percent exports dropped 13 percent.
The total billing volume of Teksid, with tbe companies under its control,
came to 463 billion lire during that period of time (up 40 percent compared
to the figure as of 3U June 1979}. The B~lling volume for customers out-
- side the Fiat Group from Teksid Spa was equivalent to 34.8 percent, while
exports rose 38 percent as compared to 1974.
Components
The total yield of this sector came to about 970 billion lire as against
688 billion lire during the same period of tfine in 1979. This increase
is due to the new joint-venture operat~ons- carried out in some countries
(COMIND in Spain, Weber in tFie United States, etc.), as well as tfie in-
creas e in the demand in the automotive veh~cle sector in Italy as campared.
to 1979. Fareign sales were reduced due to the loss of competitiveness
resulting from the difference in inflation in Italy as compared to the
other countries.
Machine-Tools
The companies in this sector developed a production volume of more than
147 billion lire, getting orders ~n~many countries; in addition to opera-
tions conducted in France (Renault, Citroen, Peugeot), Poland, Romania,
the GDR, we must report the transactions~ in progress with Clirysler (United
States), BMW jBavarian Motor Works] and Ford (West Germany), Ro11s-~Royce
(Great Britain), the USSR, Czechoslov~kia, Yugoslavia, and India.
Civil Engineering
- Buring the first half there was a decline in the worldwide market for
infrastructure pro3ects and a sfiift in the demand in the various countries
toward energy,-mtning, agricultural, and svcial pro~ects. The Impresit
Croup managed to increase i*s order volume in Nigeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia,
- and also on tfie Ttalian market. ~
Energy
- Aviation engines. In the military engine sector, production was launched
for the European aircraft named Panevia-Tornado in addition to ttie effort
now under way on the ~222 and MB339 aircraft. Development was started
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on the engine for the new Ttalian Amx f.igfiter plane and in the c~vilian
sector, plunning was be~un for the JTlOU-232 engine for commercial
~ aviation during the sec~na half of the eighties.
Thermomechanical-Nuclear. The new turbogas power plai.its were completed
at Pietrafitta and Alessandria for ENEL jNational Electric Power AgencyJ
and T.svrion in Greece; other ma~or projects are underway in Italy and
abroad .
_ Railroad Systems
The government program submitted to parliament during the first half of
1980 to boost and modernize the lines and rolling stock of ttie Italian
railroad network is rather lim~ted with subsequent negative influence on
activities in this sector. Tfie purchase of 100 elect�ric streetcars oy the
Turin Transport Agency part~cularly significant.
1 ourism and Transportation
The business volume achieved by Ventana during the first half of 1980 was
maintained and came to about 50 billion lire. Ventana Inc., of New York,
started operating, while the reorgareization of the 'Valtur Group and the Sita _
Group was completed.
Miscellaneous
As far as the other industrial companies of the Fiat Grotlp are concerned,
Telettra recorded a 9-percent increase in orders obtain~d during the first
half of 1980, as compared to 1979 (.46 percent come from abroad); the
Nebiolo company increased its order volume during the same period of time
- from 30.4 to 40.2 billion lire with a billtng volume, as of 30 June,
amounting to 13.8 billions; Sorin Biomedica and Bentley LaBoratories
-registered an increase in their sales volumes likewise in relation to new
generations of products.
~ Operations of Fidis continued positively during the first half of 1980
which, as we know, among other tfiings, controls the companies that fiandle
the financing for sales activities, in Italy, for proclucts~ of the Fiat
Group (I'FA, SCUI, UFI, Sava Leasing) . -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
5058
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~OtJNTRY SECTION SPAIN
.
POLITICAL PROFILES OF UCD I.EADERSHIP FIGURES
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17, 20 Jul, 3, 10, 24 Aug, 14 Sep 80
[Articles about or interviews with Fernando Alvarez de Miranda,
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Pio Cabanillas,
Landeli.no Lavilla Alsina and Rodolfo Martin Villa)
[20 Jul 80, pp 22-23: Article on Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, member
of the Standing Committee of the Democratic Center Union (UCD)]
[Text] Suarez is irreplaceable at the moment, but if the UCD does not
take in other factions and de~cocratize its internal workings, it could
disintegrate, Christian Democrat leader Fernando Alvarez de Miranda
cautions. -
Every so often, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Jesus Esperabe de Arteaga,
Jose Luis Ruiz Navarro and Francisco Soler Valero (all of whom belong to -
the UCD) meet over lunch at a Madrid restaurant with Luis Gomez
Llorente, Pablo Castellano and Rafael Escuredo, from the PSOE
[Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. Despite their distinct party
affiliations, the get-together raises no suspicions whatsoever amor~g
the ranks of the two major parties.
They are simply members of the old congressional board who get
together more often than the boards of directors of some parties at
- these luncheons to recall old times, such as when they guided the
transition from the halls of Parliament, _
The 56-year old Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, a UCD Christian Democrat
leader, still feels nostalgia for tt;at era of consensus and blames
_ many of the ills besetting the country on the fact that Centrists and
Socialists have gotten caught up in the struggle for power without
having completely charted the basic coordinates outlined by the
constitution.
"The first Constitutiona? Assembly was dissolved hastily," he explains
when asked about the country's current crisis. "It was done hastily
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because we had already comp?eted the strictly constitutional tasks but
we had overlooked such important matters as the autonomy statutes, in
other words, the entire framework of the new state."
He speaks with a kindly expression that reflects a well-meaning s~irit
generally recognized by his fellow party members and political
adversaries. His words do not betray the slightest bit of nostalgia
for the chairmanship that he had to yield to Landelino Lavilla,
another party "baron."
Of all of the members of the UCD Standing Committee and, therefore, of
the party's leaderGhip, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda is talked about
the least ac a pcssible replacement for Suarez. Ambition does not seem
to be the forte of the man who used to be president of the former ~
Christian Democrat People's Party (PPDC) and the inspiration of the
Christian Democrat Party that later joir.ed the UCD.
Of all those who joined the centrist coalition, Alvarez de Miranda's
men have caused the least trouble and, according to them, have
profited the least from pcwer.
Nevertheless, Ferr~ando Alvarea de Miranda is not sorry that he joined
the UCD. "I think that time has proven me right vis-a-vis those who
doubted the center coalition's effectiveness and its potential for
becoming a great party," he explains with conviction. "However, I -
thi.nk that we did not do enough at the time to bring in other forces
at the outset that could have given the UCD a different image. I am
referring specifically to the spring of 1977, when the UCD was being
set up and when Paco Fernandez Ordonez and I tried to bring in the
entire Christian Democrat team."
If that er.deavor had worked out, Alvarez de Miranda thinks that Adolfo
Suarez would probably not be president today or at least h~ would be
a different Suarez.
"Suarez would not have stepped dowr. into the political arena," he
asserts. "Suarez would have l~mited his role to the transition period.
He himself conveyed that to us when he invited us to form the UCD. It
was only when we demonstrated our inability to rea~h an understanding
- among the various parti.es forging the coalition that Suarez had to
enter the pictur~."
Adolfo Suarez "is the only leader at this historic moment for the
party," according to Alvarez de Miranda. But this does not shield the
government president from criticism by the Christian Democrat leader:
"A man with his qualities is perhaps very useful in a bargaining stage,
but parhaps he does not have the experience for the parliamentary
stage that we are in now, after the.consensus has fallen apart." �
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In his opini.on, this explains the deterioration of Adolfo Suarez's -
image. "He is not experienced," h~ reasons, "because he nrobably has
some misgivings about the entire process of parliamentary democracy,
and all of this explains why Suarez has hit an all-time low in hi~
political standing with th~ censure motion." For a moment, the
proximity of the Madrid Stock Exchange, across the street from his
office at the Humanism and Democracy Foundation, seemed to have
influenced his choice cf words.
- The foundation takes up some of his time. Although it is not
. excLusively a UCD organ, it helps to spread the UCD's ideological
message in society. With the CongrPSS, the chairmanship of the Inter-
Parliamentar; Com~irtee, th:, chairmanship of the Palencia UCD (he -
represents the province as a deputy) and the chairmanship of the
Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, all of Fernando
Alvarez de Miranda's avsilable time i.s devoted to politics.
In ci_ting his jobs, he does not mention his membership on the UCD
Standing Committee, perhaps because }ie does not care for how it has
uperated so far.
"The meetings have been very inconsisten~," he says. "At some we have
talked about purely incidental issues, such as party dues or dues for -
certain activities, and at o*tie:s we have tackled the basic strategy
for the crisis. But in general, things are not tied together, because _
when ws sit down for a meeting, most of the time we do not know what
the agenda is."
Alvarez de Miranda's criticisms of the party cover all of its factions
and agencies but boil down to basically one: the lack of internal demo-
cracy. The president "has governed too much by himself, with his team,
the company, which has basically consisted of him and two others. The
Political Council or the Executive Committee meets once in a blue moon,
and each meeting is hardly a cataclysmic event for the media or the
party itself." And then there is the parliamentary group; "when the
deputies themselves vote, in most cases they are unfamiliar with the
background of the legislative bill. There is a lack of teamwork between
the parties, not just the UCD, and their parliamentary groups, which
- comes down to nothing other than a lack of democratic input."
Nevertheless, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda is not a prophet of doom
about his party, because although "is it subject to very heavy internal
pressures from its various factions, I think," he says as if to ~
console himself, "that at least as far as parliamentary voting is
concerned, the UCD has shown that it has a clear concept of unity,
unity within plurality."
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He feels that the issue of factions car.not be ignored. The party must
acknowledge and accept them. "Even though the bylaws apparently do
~ not officially recognize factionss I think that it would be absurd and
even undemocratic not to allow these fac~ions, which represent stands,
to exist and consolidate within the party. Regardless of all that is
said, there are often differing positions within the party among the
Catholic Nationals, who follow the Tacito line, the People's Party,
whose most prominent figure is the president of Congress, and the
Social Democrats, or the Liberals or the Social Christians."
There is a point at which Fernando Alvarez de Miranda seems to lose his
composure and natural affability, which during his term as president of Con-
gress led some to accuse him of being weak, and resort to irony. This
is when the com~ercation turns to "the young Turks," the movement
within the UCD that favors a centralized party without leading figures,
families or factions.
"Someone in Congress said jokingly that they were not young Turks," he
comments with a waggish smile, "but rather a Moorish guard. I think
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that they are just a self-defense movement by many people in the party
- who did ::ot hold a specific position and have become a mere interest
group. I find this wholly respectable, but it is clearly an interest
_ gr~up that does not, I think, have major influence in the party.
"Someone might try to sweep the leaders of the various families from
pcwer," he thinks out loud, "and he even might succeed...But I think
that it would be an enormous error from the standpoint of the party
itself, because we would lose the party's most fruitful avenues for
building its ideological content and it would then become a purely _
timserving party without any future at all."
The disagreements that have existed and still exist within the UCD
are minor matters to FernaZdo Alvarez de Miranda: "The major battles, ~
the major debates within the party," he explains, "have never been
ideological struggles between Christian Democrat and Liberal thought.
We have always reached an agreement. There have always been compromise
stands. The confrontations ha~e been between personal interesta, and
these personal interests would be much more violent and unmanageable
in a party like the one they want to fashion by eliminating these
- ideological factions."
Could the UCD break up if next fall the PSOE again goes on the attack
and attempts another censure motion? The Christian Democrat leader
does not consider it likely: "It is highly unlikely that any UCD
- faction would consider the possibility of supporting a motion of -
censure, even partially. I would emphasize that in its plurality of
- factions the UCD has demonstrated the great extent of its unity. Dis-
content can cause uneasiness, protests, criticism. But it is a long
way from that to saying: Let's break up the party..."
He concedes, however, that there could be surprises, because the
debate in the L'CD Congress could be harsh, especially with regard to
internal democratization, "the major bone of contention" for the autumn
assembly. The people who now head up the UCD will either have to
conform to the democratic practices that prevail in all parties in
systems similar to ours, or the outcome could be catastrophic, even in
the view of the moderate and hardly alarmist Alvarez de Miranda.
"Either they conform," he says at the cl~se of our talk, "or they could
cause the breakt~p of a party that, no matter what people would like
to believe, has many things going for it at the moment but that has to
empha~ize self-evaluation, ittternal criticism, debate...This enriches
the party, which needs it, and if it does not do so, I think that it
would be utopian to believe that the Congress can save the party."
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[17 Jul 80, pp 17-19 :Interview with Francisco Fernandez Ordonez~by
Manuel R. Mora; date and place not given]
[Text] He is a"baron" in his own right and, they say,
~ne of the most factious. Fifty-year old
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, from Madrid, an
attorney, Social Democrat and author of the fiscal
reform, has won on his own a place of honor on
the road of transition.
His political career has been a long one, from
presi~lPnt of the National Insti~�.:te cf ?nduss:~ry r
(INI) under General Franco to finance minister
in the democracy. He is a specialist in
government finance and a devotee of poe~ry.
Borges is his pro~het: "Each inatant of my dream '
or vigil is matched by another of the blind coi.n."
Fernandez Ordonez's life has been somewhat like that
in recent years: a vigil to make this country more
rational and juat.
But that "blind coin," the fiscal reform has
prompted rashes, blisters, disagreements and
shows of enthusiasm, though the latter are less
frequent than he would like.
Ordonez is a typical"baron,." just as there are typical
"plumbers," just as there is a"company." It
sounds like a war of words, but it is a war, a
political war and a very hard-fought one.
(Question] Tell me, what does the word "baron" mean to you?
[Answer] It is a typical political party expreasion, but it has no
traditicn in Spain and, therefore, sounds picturesque. In the UCD
the barons are the chieftains [cabecillas], and this word is used
somewhat by design.
[Question] And what atout th~ plumbera? What are they?
[Answer] Ha, ha...The name comes from Nixon's famous plumbers, and
the word has caught on big here. However, as was to be expected,
and I am even amazed chat it has taken so long, the real plumbers have
proteeted because they feel encroached upon.
[Question] And what about "the company"?
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[Answer] The company is a term that was first used, somewhat Ilumor-
ously, by Martin Villa. It means the president and the people around
him. It is somewhatlike the expression "the head of ihe advertising
agency."
[Qc~estion] Ar.d how are the barons, plumbers and the company '
conduciin5 politicc in our country?
(A.nswer] Politics in this country is faced witn much more serious
problems than those words might indicate. The problems are much more
serious. They do not hinge solely on certain figu:es in the government
party; tne political, social, etc problems that we are all familiar
with involve more prominent people than them.
[Question) But at this point in the transition the Spaniah people feel
somewhat insecure: the economj~ is c~oing badly, the outlook is not too
clear. What can the UCD tell the people?
[Answer) What most concerns me is that the country is more afraid of
the future than it ought to be. Let me explain. The fear of the
future is realistic, because since 1974 Spain has been undergoing an
extremely serious crisis, the consequences of which are beginning to
make themselves felt right now. '~his year we have begun to pay for
the crisis, to pay for it in the form of taxes, in the form of very
high oil prices, in the form of unemployment, in other words, to pay
all of the bills that accumulated because we did not undertake the
necessary changes in time.
[Question] Ard Pspeciully payin~ more to the Treasury...
[Answer] Well, to the Treasury that means unemployment payments, all
of the subsidies and transfers, the shoring up policy, the serious
problems posed by an international crisis of this scope...So then,
this fear of the future could paralyze the Spanish peopl.e and bring
the country to a total standstill, in the sense that a number of
questions are being posed to us, and instead of seeking answers, we
just wait for the questi_ons to cease being posed.
[Question) Is the crisis g~ing to pass?
[Answer] The country is at a standstill, waiting for the crisis to
pass. But the crisis is not going to pass. We are the ones who have
to resolve the crisis. When all is said and done, the policy that we
are pursuing is not a policy for overcoming the crisis, which would
require a gigantic effort; it is a policy to administer, to anesthetize
the crisis, which has its limits, and we are now beginning to notice -
that the crisis hurts.
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[Question] That is a Social Democrat di3gnosis. But does the entire
UCD see it that way? ~tl
(AnswerJ Probably most of it does, I think. They often ask me: "What
is a politician Iike you doing in a party like this?" And I always =
answer: "There are a lot of people like me in a party like this..."
What I mean is that most people in my party think that a conservative
solution to the crisis is not enough. The probiem before t~s is not _
- a problem of inteTver.tionism versus libera'lism, as people would have
us believe. The problem posed by the crisis is conservative policy -
versus a policy of change. That is why I absta~n from the liberal-
interventionist dialectic. The choice is between conservative policy
and a policy of change. What the country needs is a policy of change.
rlrs Thatcher's conservative policy has been a failure in England. The
Germans are ~ucceeding in GPrmany with a policy of change and public
sector activity; the public sector in Germany accounts for 50 percent
of the gross domestic product. The public sector must play a role,
but it must do so properly ar,d based on a program.
[Question] That is what a man who institute3 a fiscal reform says...
[An~wer] That is what a Social Democrat says.
[Question] But you must be aware that the fiscal reform has detracted
from your po~ularity.
[Answer) Yo~i never undertake a tax reform to gain popularity; you do
it because you have to. Some time ago I wrote an article entitled
"The Fiscal Reform, A Solitary Gesture." I s2id in it that a reform
like this one, which t~ a certain extent involves a historical and, -
in my judgment, extremely important change, makes sense when it is
complemented, A tax reform is like ar~ orchestra. All of the
instruments have to play their musico The state has to furnish
certain services, make adjustments in its sgending, etc. A tax
reform alone is like hearing only the drum is an orchestra, because
no one likes the tax aspect. So, I do not think that it has made me
less ponular, except, obviously, among segments of the conservative
right wing, whicr have resisted the reform for 40 years. We neede3
to establish democracy to institute a reform backed by the left.
[Question] And has the reform beeir complemented by other steps within
the UCD?
[Answer] Only to a certain extent. I think that the problem with the
tax refvrm is that we have not undertaken the or_her parallel reforms
that have to complement it in public spending, certain social bene-
fits, certzin state-run activities. ~o then, people can see that they
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- are paying more taxes but they do not quite realize why. When it is
explained to them, the Spanish people catch on. I reme~aber that 2 years
ago tax revenues doubled, anu there was an atmosphere of real soli-
darity. This shows that the people do not mind paying taxes but they
want to know what they are paying for. That is the big problem.
_ People are gradually realizing, as time goes by, that unfortunately
the tax reform was unavoidable, not just a luxury or a more or leas
opportuaistic r~ove.
[Question) Th~ tax reform came from a Social Denocrat who holds a
major post in the UCD, but the UCD isn't doing anything to compleinent
the reform. So then, what is the Soci~l Democrat group doing in the
UCD?
[Answer) The policy of the people who think like I do is to force the
UCD at all levels to carry out this very policy of modernization,
change and reform, a refo~ of puhlic administration, government
spending, education, social security, industrial structures. Tn other
words, everything that Spain has to do to be a modern country. I
personally think that my role is to point things out and encourage
people so that the party does not lapse into what I once called the
conservative temptation.
[QuestionJ Pointing things out and encouraging people, fine. But
when the party's Standing Co~nittee is summoned, everyone says yea to -
Mr Suarez.
[Answer) Well, we tell him yes, but...In the sense that we say yes
but at the samc time we ask him to be capable of rebuilding a political
initiative, and I think that the last time we were perhaps successful.
[Question] In other words, the baron-conspirator parallel does not
apply?
[Answerj Not at all. If some of us had wanted to conspire over these
last few months, we would have t~ad golden opportunities to do so. I -
am one ef the individuals who have had the most opportunities for
conspiracy in this country, and everyone knows quite wall that I have
refused to.
[Question]Agreed, you have not conspired. But the Social Democrat
group is being clearly accused of Gtraddling the fence between the
UCD and the PSOE, that ~t is acting like the orchard farmer's dog,
neither eating nor letting anyone else eat.
[Answer) I don't think it is. In my personal case, I have undertaken
with total determination a very in-depth reform that has, as was to be
expected, caused me a lot of headaches and, probably, meant a political
sacrifice. If I wanted to play the popularity game, I would not have
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tackled a tax reform of this sc~pe. I have always thotlght that a person -
serves in goverument not to do what he likes but to do his duty. Thus,
I thiak that our faction in the UCD is doing its duty. When we have
had the opportunity, we have pronosed reforms in keeping with our way
of looking at Chings. Now, with few exceptions, there are none of us
in the government, and hence t:hat we are doing is trying to spur the
U~D ir.to being what it says it is: a reformist party.
[Question] And when Fernandez Ordonez gets angry, does he threaten to
use the parliamer.tary group that is faithful to him and that numbers
around 30 deputies?
[Answer) I never threater., never. I get angry at times, but I never
threacen.
[Questio^] What would have to happen for the Social Democrat group to
break with the UCD?
fAnswer] If the UCD took a reactionary stand, then we would no longer
have any ro:e to play.
[Question] And is this possible?
[Answer] I hope not.
[Question] You just hope not?
[Answer] I am certain that it is not.
[Question) Any evidence?
[Answer] Well, so far it has not been; at this point we cannot say that
the UCD is a reactionary party.
[Question] And what about Suarez? How is Suarez performing?
[Answer] Suarez is basically a man who is going to change his method
of running the party and the government, in the sense that he ia going
to try to rely more on the party's structures. This is an endeavor
that, in my judgment, could be interesting over the coming months.
[Question] What role has the Social Democrat group played in this
change by the president?
[Answer] It has defended in the Standing Committee the idea that the
party o~~ght to have a more open and ahared leadership. I have defended
that idea personally. .
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[Question] The UCD Congress is going tu be held in the next few
months. Will the "hinge" party '-hat is talked about so much have
been formed by that time?
_ [Answer] I think that if you take a look at Felipe Gonzalez's speech
for the censure motion and at the UCD's government program, you will
see that it is very hard to come up with a third text in between the
two. If the forces stay more or less as they are now, a"hinge" party
is unlikely, If the UCD makes a clear-cut move towards conservative
stands, the hinge party could wind up emerging.
[Questian) Let's suppo~ae that the UCD does not move towards conser-
vatism but that it remains quiet, anu then in the fa11. the PSOE
submits another motion of :ensure against Suarez. What would the
Social Democrat group do?
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[Answer) LJhat we have always done, vote with the party. On major
issues I will always vote with the party, and when I no longer agree
with the party, I will leave.
- Francisco Fernandez Ordonez is by this time an influential man in
Spanish po~itics. He served under Franco and then resigned. He was
one of the hardest-working leaders during the transition and now he is
th~ bete noir of the conservative right wing.
[Question] And what would you tell the right wing, Mr Ordonez?
[Answer) You have to tell it what it has forgotten: that certain
reforms are at times necessary to prev~nt revolutior. and that a
~emocratic system cannot tolerate a degree of injustice that society
regards as reprehensible. Th~re is nothing more revolutionary than an
obstinately cor~servative approach.
Fernandez Ordon~z has no direct responsibilities insid~ the
administration, but he does in Parliament. The past legislative year
was very intense and gratifying to him: he got through a major law,
the Autonomnus Communities Financing Law.
And amid his trips znd speeches, he even had time to write a book:
"Spain Is Necessary."
[Question] What did Fernandez Ordonez want to say in this book?
[Answer] Basically, something quite elementary, that Spain is ne~essary,
that I believe in Spa in, even if...
[Question] Even if you wind up sounding like Manuel Fraga Iribarne?
[Answer] Even if I sound like Fz�aga...I probably sound like Fraga on
some thinQS. But I believe in Spain, I obviously believe that Spain
is necessary. I think that in these times of crisis, when societies _
are disintegrating, when tribes abandon their fields and return to
their nests, i?i these times of decay perhaps all of us have an
obligation to defcnd this asset of ours. That is why the word Spain
d;,es not frighten me; on the contrary, I am pleased to bring it up.
[Question] And from your vantage point as a politician and an
intellectual, how do you view Spanish society?
[AnswerJ What defines it best is what I have called "historical
asynchronism." Spain is a country that has been late in arriving at
almost everything in history. It arrived late at part of the 18th
and 19th centur~es. Spain found out late about the last world economic
crisis. The big problem is finding out whether Spain is capable of
making that enormous effort to modernize itself, to transform itself,
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whether we are still creative. There has always been a struggle in
Spain between conservative forces and the forces of change. The
history of our reformers, many of whom died in exile, is pathetic.
[Question) And couldn't that also turn out to be the fate of the UC~
refor~ers?
[Answer] No, because I do not think that there will be an~ more exiles.
That is over and done with, I t~ink that our democracy is irreversible.
We are going to defend it tooth and nail.
And with verses, if necessary, because Fern~ndez Ordonez is almost
never ashamed of ssying that he writes poetry, that he is regarded as
"enlightened," a friend of writers, poets, artiats, an avid reader
of Jorge Luis Borges, "who is a delzght."
[Question] And if this is how politics is doing, what about culture,
Mr Ordonez?
[Answer] Throughout Europe we are going through a phase that I have
called mannerist. Few new ideas are developed; there is a certain
degree of overall decadence, and no great mueical, literary or art
works ar2 produced, which does not mean th~t there are no great
artists, because there are.
[Question] And what about Spain apecifically?
[Answer] Spanish culture, and in this I agree with the great Mexican
wrii:er Octavio Paz, has leng been eccentric. We did not have a 18th
century, or a British liberal industrial revolution or a French
liberal revolution. Therefore, we are not familiar with political
critiques or the Enlightenment. All of this gave rise to a very strange
19th century in Spain: both in culture and in politics.
Amid speeches, meetings of the UCD Standing Committee, readings of
Borges and Umbrai's latest novel, Ordonez atill has time to read
"The Society That Adds Up to Nothing." This is an American book that
_ agrees on many points with "Spain Is Necessary" and that "shows that
ev2rything now happening to *_he world ia not just a recession but the
end af an era, that the party is over. We are moving into an era of
austerity, of limited growth. There are no more mir$r.les. The issue
of distribution is again in the forefront of the modern economy."
But even when he speaks these harsh words, Fernai~dez Ordonez does not lose
a trace of hope, perhaps becau~e he is a poet or certainly as a
politician who has not lost hie ethical view of thinbs,
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Ke spoke smoothly, encouragingly, cheerfully during the entire inter-
view. He gaged and weighed, 2lmost stammered, his worde only in
response to this last question:
[Question] What is Suarez like?
[Answer~ Suarez...Suarez...is already in the history books. He is,
above all, a pragmatist and, therefore, he has more of an ability...
for individual decisions than...for abstract...formulations. I~.
this sense, Suarez is probably a one hundred percent classical
politician.
[3 Aug 80, pp 19 -21: Article on Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo y Bustelo, the
minister for European Community Affairs]
[Text~ Although he is not a member of the party's Standing Committee
and does not belong to a specific ideological family, Leopoldo Calvo-
Sotelo y Bustelo is unquestionably regarded as a baron. Furthermore,
his name has always been .on the lists of possible replacements for
Adolfo Suarez as head of the government.
He is in charge of negotiating Spain's membership in the Common
Market. He has known Suarez since 1975, when his seat happened to be
beside Suarez's at the Council of Ministers, which was chaired by
Carlos Arias Navarro at the time. He is 54 years old and has eight -
children, a modest fortune from his days in pri~~ate busineas, a _
beautiful house in Somosaguas, a library of almost 15,C00 volumes, a
marvelous white piano that he plays almost every day, a wife who is
the daughter of a former minister and whorn he met when he was a '
student and went to argue with her father about aca3emic grievances,
and an encyclopedic ~nowledge, the fruit of endless hours and days of
reading. �
This is Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, or the method, because method is part
of his way of ~ife, of organizing himself, even of his way of looking
- at life and of viewing the current political aituation skeptically,
waggishly and distantly at the same time.
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo or the Cartesian method, the upshot of his
passion for mathematics and music and the fruit of his training as an
engineer.
He would like to app?y a method to everything. He finds fault with
Suarez because he lacks a working method and he criticizes the current
political situation for the same lack of a method in explaining it.
As far as he is concerned, we can emerge from the current situation .
only if we clearly explain what is happening, if we graphically inform
the country of what home rule aims st, if we clarify our foreign
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policy, if we convince the man in the street that the economic policy -
we are pursuing is perhaps the only one that can be puraued, if we
convince everyone that the crisis must be shouldered by all levelg of
income-earners.
He says: "Governing means deciding. You have to wager everything on
one card. If you win, you win, and if you lose, you leave."
- Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo is the only minister among the UCD barons. He
- is also the only one who does not have any political group backing
him. In other words, he has the whole party, because he was the one
who named and organized the UCD in record time so that it could run
at the 15 June 1977 elections.
Nevertheless, Cal~o-Sotelo is not on the party's Standing Committee,
that sort of government by conaensus, parallel to the Council of
Ministers, that President Suarez pulled out of his hat to halt the
erosion of his leadership.
- "I was surprised that the`y did not put me on the committee," he
admitted to CAI~IBIO 16's Jose Oneto and Pedro Paramo in the drawing
room of his chalet in Somosagaus, one of Madrid's most sought-after
residential districts. "It surprised me because although I do not
belong to a specific ideological family, whenever the press draws
up a list of barons, it puts me on it because of my role in the
_ creation of the party. Also, I have always, in fact, coneidered myself
somewhat a member of that group."
But there i.s no inkling of resentment in the words of thia sallow-
complected man who conveys a strong sensation of aplomb, of self-
assurance.
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo is, nonetheless, one of the barons most likely -
and qualified to replace Adolfo Suarez, should the need arise. The
very reason why he was allegedly not named to the Standing Cotmnittee
(his not being backed by a UCD faction) is also why he is in one of the
best positions.
Trained as a highway engineer, after a brilliant career in private
_ industry, he got into politics immediately after the disappearance of
the former regime, in which he rejected a ministerial post. He and
� Adulfo Suarez are the only membera of the first monarchy government
who are still in power, in spite of all that has happened on the
Spanish political scene. Although he says that he got into politics
somewhat late ("You have to begin w!.en you're young, not in your 40's
like I did"), he has gained enormous experience in a short time.
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Aside from his economic experience at the head of Union de Exploaivos
Riotinto, S.A., RENFE or SODIGA, his year and a half as minister of
relations with the European Communities has enabled him to gain an
extrnordinary icnowledge of foreign relatione. His curriculum as an
experienced politician is rounded out with his indispensable input in
- the creati~n of the UCD and the 6 months that he aerved as party
spokesman in Congress. -
Few men with no ties to the Franco era can boast of such a well-rounded
political record with so many possibilities for the future.
Perhaps the most negative aspectof Calvo-Sotelo is his image as a
dry man in a number of circles. Those who know him somewhat do not
undersrand where he is coming from, The fact is that he is a pleasant
conversationalzst and has a very refined Galician aense of humor.
Though he was born in Madrid, Ribadeo (Lugo) is his aentimental home
region, and its presence is felt everywhere in his house, whether in
the nautical map of the estuary or the 19th century poster announcing
the departure of a steamer for Ar.:erica.
Reading and music are his major pastimes. "It's a shame," he complains,
"that when you're young, you can't afford all of the books you'd like
to read and then when you can afford them all, you don't have the time
to read them."
His only complaint about nolitics is that it has kept him away from
thick books of essays. Philosophical and mathematical treatiaes are
among his favorites.
Prominently placed in the drawing room is Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo's
white piano, and on the etand is the acore of Beethoven's Claire de .
Lune Sonata, which he bought on his last trip to Bonn. Any time is �
the right time for the minister to sit down at the piano and try a
few measures. Spain's scorn for music is unjustifiable to him, and he
reproaches Ortega y Gasset for having turned cultured Spaniards away
from the world of music.
With tastes such as these, it is not surprising that Leopoldo Calvo-
Sotelo is more of a baron who walks around the house in slippers than
a drawing room politician. "If I devoted the time I spend reading to
social life, my political career would be otherwise," he says.
His reserve, which could have contributed to his image as a cold and
distant politician, hides, true enough, a Cartesian na~ure but one
that is also optimistic.
Method is fundamental for C21vo-Sotelo. It is when he discusaes the
~ current situation in Spain: "Doesn't it matter to you thzt I am more
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~ 1~uft oFr [CtA1. U5L uNLY
optimistic than normal?" he ask~. "Because the fact is that the
analysis is gloomier than reality. I can see that clearly when I get
out of rtadrid. When I Cravel to the province to preach the good newa
about the cormnunity, I realize that there is great vitality in this
country. If everything looks so grim to us, i.t is simply because we
are in a new era and we are applying 2nalytical tools that belong to
the past."
The country's basic problPm is what he calls "the noise of freedom."
~ "After 40 years of silence and soft background music," he explains,
"everything now sounds to us like an uproar, but this is normal in a
de:;ociatic system. The day that we come to accept the change as a
norm, we will have reached maturity."
To Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, accepting *he charge means accepting it in
all fields, but especially in politics, where leaders have to be
replaced without trauma or violent upheavals.
"Here we are used to seei*!g a permanent leader. Any leader," he
clarifies. "Not only are there problems with finding a replacement for
Suarez, but the same also goes for Fraga, Felipe Gonzalez or Santiago
Carrillo. It seems that there was 2 time here when the registry of
leaders was opened for a few weeks and then closed for good. In a
democracy, that cannot happen. ~he new system has to be conducive to
a change of leaders." _
In Adolfo Suarez's case, Calvo-Sotelo feels that 4 years in power "is
a long time. I'm not saying that such a term is unusual in other
democratic European countries," he ~mmediately notes. "But during
this time Suarez, in addition to resolving the normal problems of
- government, has had to develop programs of far-reaching consequences.
This also is extraordinari_ly wearisome."
To Calvo-Sotelo, the problem of leaders is essentially a problem of
democratic maturity. "There are leaders with special chai-is~a that
are ~ypical of other regimes," he explains. "During the transition,
these charzsmatic leaders have been useful here, but as the country
moves forward along the democratic road, such charisma becomea less
and less necessary. I have had the opportunity to s~eak with most
of the heads of government of the European Economic Coi^,~nunity, and
practically none of them has the charisma that Su~rez has here. Their
replacement in their parties and in government is a natural development."
Will Adolfa Suarez be able to adapt to the new situation and govern
. when he has lost that charisma? The G~lician that lives inside
Calvo-Sotelo ans~oers this one: "I think that he should try to, and he
might succeed. But I also know that it is hard to change one's working
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