JPRS ID: 9373 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040053-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9373
29 October 1980
\l1/est E u ro e R e o rt
p p
(FOUO 43/80)
FBIS FOREICN BROADCA~T INFORMATION SERVICE
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- JPRS L/9373
29 October 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 43/80)
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCI,EAR FORCES
FRANCE
Strategic Considerations for Use of Neutron Bomb
(Jean-Baptiste Margeride; STRATEGIQUE, Jul-Sep SO) 1
Missile Program Launched by Ministry of Defense
(AIR & COSMOS, 13 SQp 80) 12
Demolition Rocket Varieties Described
(AIR & COSMOS, 13 Sep SO) 14
_ Status of Fxocet MM-40 Missile Updated
(AIR & COSMOS, 6, 13 Sep 80) 16
New Ex~cet Adopted
Deliveries To Begin Soon, by Pierre Langereux
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
IT.ALY
PSI's Dido Co~nents on Role of European Parliament
- (Mario Dido; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 13 Sep 80) 18
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
Delpey, Bokassa, Diamond Affair Resurfaces
(Rene Backmann; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
- 20-26 Sep 80) 21
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
FC1R OF.'FICIAL USE ONLY
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How Will Franc Fare With Voter's Budget? i
(Roger Priouret; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 13-19 Sep 80) 24
' Food Industry Needs Boos:, New Goals, Methods
(Henri de Farcy; PROJET, Sep-Oct 80) 27 ;
Injecting Cattle With Estrogen Causes Scandal, Boycott
(Fierre-Marie Doutrelant; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, ,
20-26 Sep 80) 32
SPAIN
ICSA-Gallup Poll cn Andalucia Autonomy
(CAMBIO 16, 14 Sep 80) 37
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THF'~ATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE ~
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOH USE OF NEUTRON BOMB
Paxis STRATEGIQUE in French No 7 Jul-Sep 80 pp 123-134-
[Article by Jean-Ba.ptiste Maxgeride: "The F~ihanced Radiation Weapon - Past
V: Stratzgic-~ Positions and':;~~nclusions"~
[Text] General Points
It is obvious that a nation which agrees to make the necessary effort to
- equip itself with neutron bombs will have obtained new and significant mili-
tary capabilitie~-. It is also necessaxy:
- to have a significant number of weapons. To hold a few samples would
hardly have any practical significance (except for the fact that it would
indicate a high degree of technical and scientific ability~. It implies
that one has large quantities of "military gxade"`plutonium, that is to say
~-239�~' We will return to this plutonium problem;
* The word strategic is used here in its most general sense, that is to say
going beyond the military field.
Let us recall that military Pu is isotope 239 of the element. It is pro-
duced spontaneously in nuclear reactors: the capture of a neutron by a
U-238 nucleus, then emission of an electron which produces Np-239, then
a second one leading to Pu-239� Later on, through the capture of a
neutron, this isotope can produce Pu-24~0, then Pu-241, etcetera.
Pu-24~0 presents the inconvenience of being a much more active neutron
transmitter than isotope 239. Its presence, in a not inconsiderahle
quantity (staxting at 5 to 10 percent?~, within the core of a fission
weapon or in the initial stage of a fusion xeapon can only lead to
a breaking down of the energy of the explosion. In effect, Pu-240 acts,
so to speak, as a permanent premature percussion cap.
The production of Pu-239 in;jthe reactor is proportional ta the length of
time the fuel rods stay in i`tit.,%' The production of Pu-2~0 is proportional
to the period of irradiation`of isotope 239, already present; that is
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- to study~ develop and produce a range of launching systems (ground to
- ground, air to ground, possibly o ound to air~, unquestior~ably closely ;
adapted to each of the contemplated uses; thus, very diversified. Thus, a
- significant financial burden which would be added to the study and develop- ;
ment of the nucleax warheads; -
- finally, and primaxily, the production of these weapons must respond to
a real if not of capital importance need, in view of the above men-
tioned financial burdens and assuming a modest dsfense bud.get.
In this regard, the situation of France is not necessarily the same as that
of the United States, the USSR or �he other nucleax na.tions. What is invol-
ved here is a political-strat~~g~c problem which would require a specific,
very delicate, study because there axe ha,:dly any rigid matheriiatical proofs
in these matters. We will, thus, limit ourselves to touching on these
questions for want of being able to claim having decisive answers to them.
French Neutron Bomb Possible?~
One must distinguish between the scientific and technical capabilities of a
state and its economic and financial capabilities.
to say, ultimately, to theperiod of irradiation squared. Thus, it is
very slow in the beginning, then more and more rapid. What is involved
here is a first approximation, valid oniy for a few weeks, a~ it is ob-
vious that, after a while, Pu-240 cannot be produced more rapidly than '
~-239 frcm which it originates.
Consequently, the obtaining of milit�arv ~rade ~lutonium requires that
the length of time the fuel rods are in the reactor be relatively short. �
This ti;ae period is inversely proportional to the flow of neutrons which
exists in the "core" axea of the reactor where the fuel rod is placed.
As the priming of the fusion only requires a little energy for the neu- ~
tron bomb, one might think that the presence of a significant proportion
of Pu-240 would not cause any inconvenience. It seems that this idea is ~
wrong and that, in this case also, the priming must primarily consist of
Pu-239. As a matter of fact, the presence of significant quantities of
the isotope 24~0 would lead to the deterioration of the tritium and of
- the electronic system; moreover, it would be very difficult to obtain a
well defined primary energy 1eve1; an excessive permanent overheating of
the weapon, etcetera, all of which are phenomena to be avoided.
~ Axticle written prior to the news conference of the head of state, on
- 26 June 1980.
2
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We believe that we are right in postulating that our experts should be able
_ to solve a11 the problems which arise frcm the study, the perfection and
the production of the weapon. However, the possihle decision to go on to
the perfection and production stage belongs solely to the piihlic authorities,
who could not commit themselves without relying on stu3ies, wh'S.ch would be
unquestionably of a preliminary nature, but already important and signifi-
c~,nt. For example:
- scientific and technical studies to define and articulate the difficulties
which will have to be overcome, to develop a calendar of development;
- strategic and tactical studies to determine, first of a11, the real use-
fulness of these weapons in view of the overall defense policy of France;
the types of weapons and delivery systems and the number by type, if their
possession appeaxs necessary; finally, the i.mplementation procedures req,uired.
for the weapons systems decided upon;
- financial studies, because~ once again, defense budgets do not a11ow ,
everything to be done simultaneously and in a11 fields;
- economic studies, because a significant supply of neutron bombs could
only be obtained at the expense of several electricity producing fast breed~r
reactors.~- Now, these reactors appear to be the only way to c~ver the perind
until we have developed for industrial use in the year 2020? 2050? 2100?
the real thermonuclear energy source, that is to say the fusion of
_ Let us recall that the fast lzreeder system allows approximately 60 times
more energy to be produced from a given mass of natural uranium, than do
the current reactors. This means:
- tha,t it multiplies by 60 our national reserves currently considered
to be economically exploitable by -che conventional power stations (PWR
[Fressurized Water Reactor], BWR [Boiling Water Reactor], etcetera~;
- primarily, that it allows the exploitation, under profitable consi-
tions, of ores which ar