JPRS ID: 9414 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300050034-6
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• Document Page Count: 82
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9414
25 November 1980
West E~ro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 49/80) .
~
_ Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST IfVFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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- Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated 3re ,
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Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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JPRS T/9414
25 November 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
- (FOUO 49/80)
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FRANCE
Former Defense Minister's Views of Nuclear Deterrence
(Yvon Bourges; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Oct 8Q) 1
Briefs
Neutron Bomb Development 4
COUNTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Imbalance in EC Finance Structures Detailed
(Roland Wartenweiler; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 10 Sep 80) S
FRANCE
Possible Schedule of 1981 Election, First Round 26 April
(POWOIRS, No 14, 19E0) 14
- Communist Successes With Electorate Explained
(Albert du Roy; L'EXPRESS, 11-17 Oct 80) 15 ~
Evolution of Public Opinion Toward F.c~card, Mitterrand ~
- (Jean-Luc Parodi, Pascal Perrineau; POUVOIRS, No 13, 1980) 21
Reason for Ariane Launch Failure Still Sought
(Pierre Langereux; AIR � COSMOS, 4 Oct 80) 31
New Details on Short Range Missile Provided
(Pierre Langereux; AiFc & COSMOS, 27 Sep 80) 33
Role of National Defense in Nation's Economy Viewed
(AIR & COSMOS, 4 Oct 80) 34
4 - a- [ III - wE - 15a Fouo~
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Draft Defense Budget for 1981 Discussed
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 8 Oct 80) 37 _
Finance Coimmittee Reviews Defense Budget
(AIR & COSMOS, 25 Oct 80) 43
Coordination of ASW Operations Explained
(Michel d'Oleon; ARMEES D'AUJO'JRD'HUI, Sep 80) 47
AS~T Techniques in Coastal Waters Explained
(Eric Escoubet; ARMEES D'AUJOURD`HUT, Sep 80) 51
Committees Examine 1981 Transpr.~rtation Budget
(AIR & COSMOS, 25 Oct 8d) 56
Nation's Position on Air Transport Matters Outlined
(AIR & COSMOS, 27 Sep 80) 59 ~
Six Armed Forces Films Made Available to Public
(AIR & COSMOS, 11 Oct 80) 60 :
i
Brief s ~
PCF's Financial Straits 61
Aid to Dj i:bouti 61
March Military Maneuvers 61
Additional Aircraft Ordered 61
ITALY
Ci~npi Speech on Balance of Payments, Its Implications -
(Carlo Azelio Ciampi speech; IL SOLE-240RE, 21 Oct 80) 62
UNITED KINGDO~M
Journalist on Threat of Protectionism to EEC Trade -
(Michael Shanks; THE TTMES, 12 Nov 80) 69
Poll of MP's on Attitudes to Government, Tndustry, Economy
(Peter Kellner; NEW STATESMAN, 24 Oct 80) 73
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
~
FORNER DEFENSE MINISTER'S UIEWS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Paris ARMEES D'AU,]OURD'HUI in French Oct 80 p 7
[Article by Yvon 8ourges, defense minister: "Realities of French Nuclear
Deterrence"]
[Text] The deterrence policy is not being challenged by any of the major political
- organizations of our country today. If you can taik ~out a consensus on eny topic
_ it is this one. And yet, for many people, this represents havi-~ come a long way.
This is because France's nuclear weaponry has now become a reality. Nobody refers
to the "French bomblet" anymore.
The reason for this is the level which our nuclear forces have attained. It is
the result of e policy followed for the past 20 years with quite remerkeble co-
herence and continuity. Underst~debly, I wou~d like to particulerly emphesize
the importance and value of this effort over the past six years. The preaent
state of our nuclear capabilit;~ must not be thought to be simply the result of
decisions and ections dating from the previous 15 years. If such was the case,
we would have only thi�ee SNLE's (Missile Launching Nuclear Suhmarine) equipped
with megaton weapons whereas we now have four, since March or ti~is year. The
Mirage IU Stretegic Air Force w~uld be on its way ta extinction whereas it has
_ been modernized, with a squadron scheduled to receive a new extended-renge
thermonuclear weapon in the next decade. The Albion Plateau rockets would still
be equioped with "A" weapons and their resistance capability against electro-
magnetic efFects would not be reinforced, whereas the opposite is taking place.
These are already important measures which go beyond the maintenance of presently
established resources; they have qualitatively enhenced end quantitatively in-
creased our nuclear weaponry.
' 8ut even more important decisions have been made since 1974; they will teke full
effect starting in 1985. They testify to the susteined priority assigned to our -
nuclear weapons in the effor+, undertaken to increase our means of defense.
As early as December 1974, the President decided to build ths M 4 system which
provides eech rocket aboar.d our SNLE's with several nuclear weapons. The set goal _
was the launching in 19~35 of the first submarine thus equipped. This is proof oP
the exceptionally persevering defense policy since this was quite precisely the
goal which a Defenae Council had declared as "desirahle" in December 1972. This
objective was not questioned, and all necessary efforts were reso,lutely mede to
fully achieve it; this is whet deserves t.o be pointed out, being better refutation
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tF~an mere words would be, against the accusaticns ?f doubt or hesitation which,
- eccording to some opinion, have been said to cher~cterize our defense policy.
It is true thet it is with the M4 weapons and with them only that France is
reaching the technological level of nucleer powerg today. When the Inflexible is
launchec+ in 1985, it will sir;gle-handedly make more nuclear ueapons operable than
could our five SNLE's combined. This is why the government gave priority to this
program. From 1985 to 1991 the present SNLE's will be successively modified. ~
Because the ~aPacity for inflicting an an aggressor the damage which can deter _
him from his aggression, must be achieved with the least possible delay, the
government has chosen the solution t`ie only,solution which allows for the
_ swiftest end greatest possible increase in the Strategic Naval Force (FOST). I
repeat: ~he swiftest. The emergence of the first M4 we~ans at the beginning oF
_ 1985 anounts to a real exploit for which the country is indebted to the skills and
devotion of its scientists, engineers, and technici~ns, 5o�h civilian end military,
in the Atomic Energy Commission. It is not technically feasible to shorten this -
delay, and this is neither a matter of financing nor of determination. Before
_ insisting on acceleration or expansian of our programs, our critics would do well
to become informed and take these fects into account.
_ The realizatien oP this essential project wil]. take up the current decade. Its ~
importance is clearly indicated by this figure: the FOST retaliation capability
will be more than tripled in 10 years.
6eyond this program, studies are now actively being pursued, first on the devel~p-
ment of third-generation SNLE's, and secondly, on the realization of a new -
strategic ground-to-ground system~ designed to counter aggression from ~he new
= weapons threatening our terr.itory. The programs will be determined in the near
- future; their objective will be to maintain our strategic nuclear weapons systems
at the required quantitative and qualitative levels, so that our deterrent policy
rema?ns credible and therefore effective. Just as the value of our nuclear weapons
can no longer be held in doubt, no one can deny the reality of the considerable and
persevering achievements of the past six years to ensure the future of our
strategic deterrent forces.
For e true and accurate awareness of this situation, I would like to remi~d you of
the amounts which were budgeted for it. There are three mein categories of -
~ expenditures: industrial and military infrastructures; vector and weapons manu-
facture; and research, experimentation, and studies.
Investments needed for manufacture of nuclear products, specific materiel, and _
military infra~tructures amounted to 9 billion from 1959 to 1969, a little over -
2 billion from 1970 to 1974, and 2.2 billion from 1975 to 1980, thus demonstrating
that industrial and military infrastructures hed to be built from the very outset
of our military nuclear policy, for which they were a prerequisite. Today these
expenses ~n~unt only to 10 percent of FNS (Strategic Nuclear Forces) allacetions.
The construction of vectors and nuclear weapons required 6 billion from 1~959 to
1969, 2 billiori from 1970 to 1974, end 13 billion from 1975 to 19~0. These
figures reflect the gradual development and increased power of nuclear for~es.
8ut I want to point out that from 1976 to 1980 these ellocations grew by 166 per-
cent, which corresponds essentially ta the SNLE's M20 Weapons, the Albion Pleteeu
S3 weapons, and thz Mirage IU's ASMP (Antisubmarine Pluto). -
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Finelly, the amounts for research, studies, and experimentation were 21 billion
f~om 1959 to 1969, 11 billicn from 1970 to 1974, and nearly 27 billion from 1975
to 1980. This second look reveals evidence of the very special effort mede since
1975 for studies and research (especially since t~e cost of e~perimentetion became
stebilized after the inceptian of underground testing in 1974), this effart being
preparation for t?ie future, which is clearly not a 9ign ?f a policy of renouncement.
These deta testiry to the efforts made for our deterrent forces. I have alread~~
mentioned the remarkable conaist,ency of thinkir~g and the continuity of action in
this area. This is why our defense policy has imposed itself both domestically
1 and abroad; it is not only accepted but understood by our allies; it brings a
precious contribution to the authority of France in Europe and in �he world. It
would be rather ironic iT baseless doubts inspired by partisan bias, or by
ignorance, which is just as serious were to damage it.
The caun+ry must be able to face seve:al types of direct or indirect threats.
Locking ourselves into an all-nuclear strategy would condemn us to isolation and
would lead to a neutralist policy which would ultimately amount to abdi~ating the
role of France in the world and first of all in Europe. The safeguard of our
interests, the support of our diplomecy, and the guarentee of our independence
require a militarv compl.2x which is polyvalent in capabilities and flexible in
application. It is to meet this requirement that the effort undertaken in 1975
to improve the organization of the armed forces, of their weapons, and of their
operational capehilities, had to take into account delays or make up for the
inedequacies of our conventional forces, as such inadequacies threatened the very
cohesiveness of our defense. 8ut it would be inaccurate to conclude from this that
such actions could open our deterrent policy to question. The facts and figures
reexamined here are the best answer in this regard. They testiT~ to the value and
_ reality of the nuclear deterrent policy which has underlain the iation's
security and independence for the past 20 years.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 - Revue des forces armees francaises "armees d'~~ujourd'hui"
11,p23
_ CSO: 3100
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- THF.~iTER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE ~
BRIEF~
I~EUTRON BOMB DEVELOPMENT--The new minister of defense, Joel Le Theu le, revealed at .
a defense committee meeting that France has already spent 451 million francs on
perfecting the neutron bomb, and plans to devote 250 million more next year.
- [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 3 Nov 80 p 23]
CSO: 3100 ~ !
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= COUNTRY SECTION _ INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
IMBALANCE IN EC FINANCE STRUC7URES DETAILED
Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIV in Ge rman No 17. 1Q Sep 80 pp 521-52$
[6rtir_le hy Roland Wartenweiler, Brussels correspondent of NEUE ZUERCHER
_ ZEITUNG: "Imbalances in the EC cinance Structures"]
[TextJ The Coaunon Marke~t is ira a state of fexment. The process of decom-
position of thp co~im ity substance began among the six founding states and
after 197~, with the commim ity compriaing nine members, it underwent marked
acceleration. Now the co~im ity will be starting a new round of expansion--
at the begin.ning of 1981, it will admit Greece and probably about three
years la.ter, Portugal and Spain. Moreov~er, according to present calcula-
tions, the EC's financial capacities will in the present legal framework
reach their li~mits as early as 1982.
First of all, the comim.inity will have to reclarify its true ob;ectives.
What type of association do the nine, ten or twelve members want? Do they
sti11 want an organized association with uniform principles applicable to
- all? Or do they want an interiin solution--an assaciation a la carte, in
which the respective partners choose themselves the areas of cooperation,
or an association characterized by different rates of development, in which,
a common program objective i~ attained by stages--in consequence of the
differences among the countries in regard to the political and economi~c
developmental possibilities.
Thzs predicament is reflected in the intra-co~nunity disputes concerning
the EC financial organization. The Brussels Compromise of 30 May 1980 con-
- cerning the easement of the EC budgetary burden imposed on Great BritaYn ~s
a short-term expedient.l In the next 18 months, the EC institutions wfll
again be faced with the question as to whether and how one could establish
a political, structural and financial balance among the various EC policies
and to what extent the EC should f:nance projects from its own resources.
The Legal BasiG of the CoIIanunity's Financial Principles
Leafing through the original set of EC agreements, one notes the lack of
any real financial principles for the community. As principles of the EEC
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integration conce pt, the Treaty of Rome established the "four freedoms."
In a customs union, one of the prerequisites for conditfons resembling a
domestic market is the free movement of goods, persone, servicea and
capital. While the trade in commercial and industrial goods is regulated
through the policy of competition, agricultural products fall under a truly
community-oriented policy. In the view of the French, this duality is the
real foimdation of the EC. In the speech he delivered in Trier on 20 Jime
1980, the French prime minister, Raymond Barre, stated that the cornerstone
of the community was the final reconciliation between France and the
Federal Republic of Gerc?any that took place in 1958, ~hen Paris consented
to a free exchange of industrial goods and when Bonn in return agreed to a
genuine com~or. market for agricultural products. ~
Leaving out of consideration expenditures on couperative, legislative and
administrative EC policies, the Treaty of Rome focvses on three complexes
of expenditures. In the French view, the formation of two EC agrarian
funds is compensated by the consent to an EC Social Fund and by the estab-
lishment of th�a E uropean Investmen t Bank (EIB). The Social F~d and the
EIB are meant to support the Co~non Market in regard to its employment
policy and the regionally oriented structural policy. These three finan-
cial instruments underscore the co~mmunity's desire "to unify its national i
economies and to promote their harmonious development by reducing the
developmental differences between the individual regions and by apeeding up
the development of less favored regions."2
In the 1960's and 1970's, the EIB performed its function on an increasingly
large scale--within the natural limits imposed on a corporate credit bank
run in accordance with commercial principles. The Social Fimd remained
rather insignif ic ant; so far, it has not outgrown its embryonic form. In
support of the French initiative, the comznunity developed a comprehensive
agropolitical sys tem: In 1969, the then president of the state, Georges
Pompidou, made his approval of Great Britain's accession to the EC contin- -
a gent upon the adoption--prior to Great Britain's accession--of a relevant
financial framework for the EC. In the Hague Communique of the European -
Suumiit Conference of. 2 December 1969, the goyernment leaders and heads of
state confirmed their desire in regard to the perfection of the integrative _
measures "to estab lish the definitive financial regulations concerning the
joint agrarian policy."3 They stated that the principles Lmderlying this
_ regulation must not be distorted by the community's expansion. As early as
April 1970, Paris attained this objective. The com�nunity passed an autono-
mous financial constitution for the EC, which came into effect--upon
ratification--on 1 January 1971. From the outset, France, too, was aware
of the fact that this financial concept was not in accord with tl~e inter-
ests of the Unite d Kingdom, which was ready to ~oin the community.
T'hus it was only shortly before the EC's expansion from six to nine member
states that the financial principles, which had so far been implictly
reflected in the EC solidarity, in the comanunity's preferential status and
. in the formal equality of the member states, were incorporated in the
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co~n~mity's legal framework proper. Ztie financing of the--largely agricul-
turally oriented--joint palicies from the revenues deriving from the EC's
financial sovereignty (customs duties, agrarian levies and the 1-percent
share of the value-added tax revenue) was made a universal principle. The
community partners were fully aware of this one-sided legal situation
eatablished as a result of French pressure. The Paris Siamnit Meeting of
21 October 19i2 already listed a n~ber of promis ing EC policies, including
social policy, regional policy, environmental policy, energy policy and
- research policy. As compared to the rapid expans ion of the EC's protective
measures in the agrarian sector, not much has so far been done in these
fields. Probab ly the only measure worth mentioning in this counection is
the resolution on the establishment of an EC Regional Ftmd which was passed
at the Paris SuIIanit Meeting of 10 December 1974.4 Howeve;t, the relatively
modest volume of the fund and the mode ~f distrib ution agreed upon (indis-
criminate scattering) proved insufficient for effectively coim terbalancing
the predominance of the agricultural sector. After years of inaction, the
EC Commission on 30 May 1980 was urgently inetructed by the Council of
Ministers by the end of J.me 1981 to consider effec ting structural changes
in the development of the co~nunity's policies, "without jeopardizing the
hasic principles of the community's agrarian policy or the ~oint financial
responsibility for these policies financed ~rom the community's own
resources."5
Strained Financial Solidarity
The one-sidedness of the EC's legal structures is reflected in the actual
situation--both in regard to revenuea and in regard to expenditures. As a
result of the biased definition and interpretation of the obligations con-
cerning financial contributions in the system of the EC's capital resources,
the community partners ar~ treated unequally. For most countries, the
- advantages and disadvantages--measured against the respective country's eco-
nomic capacities--largely cancel each other out, whereas in the case of Great
Britain--not least owing to insufficient regard for the co~nity's prefer-
ential status--all elements are concentrated on th e debit side. The
British remittances derived from customs revenues are comparatively higher
than those by the other member states, since on Albion's island there has
come about a situation that is surprising in an industrial state: tlside
from raw materials, it is increasingly semifiniehe d and finished goods that
are bought abroad and outside the European free trade area. In regard to
the agrarian levies, the British share of agricultural imports from the
rest of the world is likewise high, what with the country's low level of
self-sufficiency. Finally, as regards the monies London pays Brussels from
the value-adde d tax, the situation is nut a~uch better, since the invest-
ments and exports not subject to the value-added tax constitute only a
small share of the national income. In short, the current financial regu-
lations in the Common Market place at a disadvantage the member states
characterized by a low level of agricul~ural self-sufficiency, by a weak
export sector and by a low rate of investment.
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As regards expenditures, the agricultural bias derives from the EC's one-
sided legal evolution as it affects the f inancial situation. The agrarian
policy--as the only consistently integrated EC policy-swallows up approxi-
- mately 70 percent of the EC budget. In itself, this fact is a logical and _
' cogent consequ~ence resulting from the perpetua.tion of the agreed-upon
community principles. This aituation is bound to continue, unless auch
general princ iples are extended also to cover basic concerns of social,
environmental and transportation policy. However, the way the agrarian
monies are utilized gives rise to concern. The inflation of the agropolit-
ical expendit ures in the last few years is not so much the result of a
purposeful, long-term EC agrarian policy as the sum of shortsighted politi-
cal compromises, in which all nine member states participated. The finan-
cial agro-transfers are questionable in that the growing EC funds increas-
ingly flow to those areas that are most heavily involved in the Common
Market's increasing production of surplus ~ilk, m~at, wine and grain. In _
place of encouragement of a healthy and well-balanced agrarian structure--
involving due regard for regional and sociopolitical points of view--it is
distortions and excesses that are rewarded.
However, this consideration of the com~unity's financial structures would
be incomplete, if it did not show the most important limits of such an ;
- analysis. The community's volume of available financial resources daes not
even equa.l 1 percent of the overall gross domestic production of the nine-
member couanunity. In its present form, the co~munity budget cannot perform
the function of a financial redistribution mechanism benefiting the econom-
ically less successful cotmtries. With good reasons, the EC Commission has
repeatedly pointed out that the comu~unity budget is only one aspect of the
actual benef it deri,ved from the mere fact of Common Market membership. For
the most part, it is difficult financially to quantify such indirect trans-
fers, let alone ascribe them to any particular member state. For example,
the EC member states differ in regard to the benefit they derive from their
affiliation with a single large market in Western Europe or from the advan-
- tages offered by a common trade policy. An informative cost-benefit analy-
sis would have to consider the aff~.liation with the coffinunity as a whole,
if questionable conclusions are to be prevented. Secondly, one must not
overlook the fact that the results ob tained in the co~nity in regard to
integration policy are interrelated and cannot be isolated from each other
in regard to their essential aspects. Considered f rom a global point of
view, the mere budgetary effects of the EC's agrarian policy are probably
less signif icant than their farther-reaching economic consequences, e.g. in
regard to the income distribution policy, the employment policy, the re-
gional social structures or the social policy.
Great Britain's Insular Pragmatism
These qualifications notwithstanding, the shaping of the legal framework
and the actual development of the community underscore the basic ~ustifica-
tion of Grea t Britain's demand for a balancing of the EC policies in the
interest of all nine members. However, the form in which London has been
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pursuing this important objective reveals a high degree of insular prag-
matism. After the successful French move concerni.ng the EC financial
policy, Great Britain was at first preFared to pay the re~uired high "con-
tributory price" f~r its EC accession--iti the hope of being able later to '
remedy the situation from the inaide. Z~~~ ~etablishment of the EC Regional
r'und was a first amall consolatory measure. A second attempt--this time in
the frameworec of th. "renegotfstion of the accession conditions" hy Chs
Wilson Government--ended in the nine-member resolution of 11 March 1975 on
the so-called Dublin Finance Mechanism.6 As could b~e predicted even at
that time, this instr~ent proved to be finance-politi~z'_ eyewash that
could not outwit reality for long. In fact, on account of its many condi-
tions and restrictions, a special repayment to Great Britain was never
made. Nevertheless, in spite of its slant in favor of British interests,
this arrangement rema~r~ed ~;;st within the limits set by the basic E~ prin-
ciples; its financial and economic criteria applied indiscriminately to all
nine member states. At the same time, Great Britain was able at tfiat time
firmly ta estahlish an important EC ob.jecti.ve: In the �uture, the commu-
nity was to prevent conditions incompatihle with its smooth fUnctioning b.y -
making sure that none of the member states carry an excessive burden in
regard to the financing of the community budget. -
In view of the unsatisfactory results, Britain as early as 1979 made a new
attempt that was qualitatively different in that the Thatcher Government
was no longer prepared to accept the actuaJ. basic principles of the coffiu-
nity's financial solidarity. Repeatedly, the energetic woman prime minis-
ter across the English Channel showed a Iack of an intuitional grasp of the
EC's normal decision-making process. From her insular, defensive position,
, she shortsightedly attacked--in a spirit of national arrogance-the EC's
integration efforts . Although in keeping with the definition the EC's o~m
. resources are outside any framework of national allocation, Mrs Thatcher
s tated that the British people wanted to recover "a large part of their own
_ money." Under its British president, Roy Jenkins, the Commission, which -
_ for years had strictly opposed any watering down of the EC principles con-
~ cernj.ng budget-oriented calculatiou models, soon ~oined in this game. The
Brussels IDP machines generated heaps of data, all of which were flawed in
- that they showed or.ly part of the truth and--through their very existence--
served to undermine the fotmdation of the community.
That London's tactics finally--on 30 May 1980--yielded another partiel suc-
cess is not so much a result of Margaret Thatcher's energy as a consequence of
the r~ ther desolate state of the community. Ttie symptoms of paralysis that
had for some time been apparen~ fn th~ EC integration effort put the commu-
- n{ty's solidarity to a severe test. Lacking direction, the nine member
states drifted from one opportunistic project to the next--without any
long-term conception concerning the actual cc~mon objectives, all of which
were shelved--along with the Tindemans Report on the European Union. With
remarkable matter-of-factness, the government leaders and heads of state of _
the nine member s tates talked at their successive summit meetings about
policies and procedures that were hardly compatible any more with the
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substance and spirit of the EC agreements. In the loud-voiced triangle
London-Paris-Bonn, it was France alone that called to mind--naturally for
reasons of national self-interest--the keystones of the community. Federal
Chancellor Helmut SchmidC stood in between, vac:illating between economic
considerations, coalition-related imponderablea; ~nd foreign policy- _
oriented preferences.
- This general development originates from a poJ.itical trend that has been -
- apparent for several years: The EC member states give priority to their ~
in part rather shortsighted national interests over long-term community
objectives for the benefit of ali partners. As regards the nine-member
_ community's political and economic h~eavyweights, e.g. France, Great Britain
- and the Federal Republic, this may be taken as an indication of their grow-
_ ing self-assurance. But the other, smaller EC member states surprisingly _
- hold their own. They do not try--or no longer try--join tly to advocate or '
enforce--through systematic mutual consultation--the common interests with
- which one would expect them to be most concerned. With their disunity and
~ lack of solidarity, they incapacitate themselves and enable the three
b igger partners further to strengthen their present dominant position. -
The "Cash Compensation" for Great Britain
~
The Brussels finance compromise, wh ich is intended to ease the financial
burden on Great Britain, is the latest symptom of the EC'.s confused state .
On 30 May 1980, after a protracted nigh t session, the n ine foreign minis-
ters agreed on a solution based on a rapid-rescue opzration. As regards. _
its formulation and ideological premises, the agreement does not li�~e up to
J the former integration ideas. One-sidedly favoring Great Sritain, i~t sus-
pends--by extending the range of the Dublin Finance Mechanism and hy means
of special measures pertaining to regional policy--the EC principles of
financial solidarity and equality at least for the next 2 years.~ One
cannot rule out the possibility that such an arrangement could set a prece-
dent in regard to the EC partners' conduct in community-related coopera-
tion. As regards the ;nodulation of the natural interest balance among the
- nine members, it appears that the favored instruments are no longer formu-
lation and intensification of truly community-oriented policies, but exer-
tion of massive political pressure with the object of enforcing nationally
oriented prerogatives. Although it will probably be difficult to abandon a
course once chosen, the nine member states kept open a back door in the
hope to be able--through a special political effort--to replace this expe-
dient in the next 18 months by genuine, structural cammunity policies. -
In the aforementioned framework, it was finally only a question of how
large the "cash compensation" for Great Britain should be. The financial
haggling about sums that in comparison with the national budgets of the
larger EC member states are more than modest was discussed at meetings of -
the nine member states' government leaders and heads of state and hy a
great many ministerial conferences. The extensive ~aralysis of the EC
institutions and the threat to the very existence of the community were
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� -
finally overcome in Brussels at a decision-making level that ~ould have
been attained in Luxembourg months ago. A positive aspect is the fact that
a solution was found after all, that the mutual blocking was ended and that =
the states were able to resume their normal community-oriented work. The
arrangement casts a shadow upon the future af the co~unity. In the
f utu~e, the member states' political initiative must increasingly he
oriented toward the immedia*_e domestic premiaes of the individual EC part-
ners--i.P. taward tho~,e that are historically more deeply rooted and these
that are the result o~ party policies. While it was by no means easy to -
reconcile the economi~:, political and cultural differences in the old sfx- -
member community, thr-se diffic ulties were small in comparison with the
problems inv~lved in the link-up of the British Isles to continental
Europe. The planned southern expansion of the EC, increasing the memher-
ship from six to nir:e, further magnifies these difficulties.
- Preservation of the~. EC Substance or Reorientation?
Many politicans in the community have not accepted the diminution of tr~e EC -
substance effected by the Brussels Compromise. However, no one is prepared -
to make a clear st;stement as to what course should be pursued under the
present political condi.tions: Safeguarding the results attained in regard
to integration? Revitalization of the hitherto operative EC principles, or
reorientation of the community? For the time being, the EC Commission has
lik2wise adopted a position of wait-and-see. Most likely, impulses from
this side can be expected only ~rom the future Commission team under its
president designate, Gaston Thorn, the present foreign minister of
L uxembourg.
In the meantime, there have been introduced in the international arena twa
diametrically opposite trends of thought concerning a reexamination of the -
basis of cooperation within the community. The first of these points of
view originated in Bonn and advocates a reorientation of the EC. Proceed- -
ing by logical inference from the Brussels Finance Compromise, the propo-
nents of this view ask whether the establishment oi an upper limit for the
financial net encumbrance of Great Britain should not perhaps be general- -
ized by establishing a similar principle for the EC partners through a
calculated net credit value. It was Federal Chancellor Schmidt who during -
ttte search for a solution of the problems involved in the British financial
demands introduced this equalization idea in the discussions. The Federal
~ Republic is now complementing this position, which unhinges the principle
concerning financial solidarity within the EC, undermines the principle of
the community's preferential status and relativizes the principle of
equality.
The second approach was iretroduced by Paris. The French Government has not
made any explicit proposals; however, through the well-known tactics
employed during the period before Gre~t Britain's accession, it is exerting
pressure on the community partners. According to President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing and his prime minister, Barre, it is imperative that for the
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present difficulties of the communi~y a permanent solution be found before
the accessian of Portug3l and Spain; serious negotiations concerning acces-
sion are impracticable as long as the co~?tmity has not attained clzrity as
to what should be the subject of the discussions. Advancing rather
involved arguments, France makes its consent to the EC's southern expansion
contingent upon the reaffirmation of the hith erto operative financial prin-
ciples of the EC. In the French view, the prese~vation of a vital agricul- .
tural sector and of competitive faWily-owned enterprises in the future '
community is a fundamental prerequisite--as an essential contribution to
the maintenance of the economic and social equilibri~; the hitherto opera-
tive principles concerning the co~im ity's preferential status, price unity -
and financial solidarity must not be affected by any of the potential
changes in the EC's agrarian policy. France thus insists on safeguarding
the EC substance, for which it has been fighting so successfully in the
last 20 years. The French government holds that once these preconditions
are accepted, the community may even discuss production-related agricul-
tural price guarantees or consideration of the special economic circum-
stances of certain farmers.
Thus France's future course appears to be predetermined. Great Britain _
indulges in shortsighted pragmatism, without showing much understanding of _
the fundamental ideas concerning the community's integration work. The ~
Federal Republic stands in between; showing a fair measure of economic and ,
finance-political opportunism, it flirts now with the one and now with the
other partner, all the while strictly adhering--the only sign of an inde-
pendent policy--to the limits set in 1970 in regard to the extent to which
the community should f inance projects from its own resources. It is
difficult to predict the outcome of the politically difficult and complex
- disputes concerning the integration and existence of the EC. However, as
regards the fu::ure form and intensity of the co~unity's cooperation, Bonn--
as the finance-oriented partner--holds a key position.
FOOTNOTES
1~ See the text of press release of the Council in: EUROPA-ARCHIV No 14,
1980, pp D 378 ff. -
2. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of the European Economic Commu-
nity, in: "Vertraege zur Gruendung der Europaeischen Gemeins~h~f~�^"
[Agreements Concerning the Establishment of the European CoIIUnunities],
Luxembourg, 1973, p 173.
3. Text of the Communique in: EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 2, 1470, pp D 42 if.
4. Text of the Communique in: EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 2, 1975, pp D 41 ff
(D 45) .
5. See EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 14, 198~, p D 378.
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- 6. Official summary of the Dub.lin Conference in: EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 7,
1975, pp D 176 ff.
7. According to the documentation of the German Federal Ministry of
Finance, the EC member states--according to present estimates of the
Brussels Commission--contrib ute to the relief of Great Britain in 1980
and 1981 tnrough the following changes in their calculated net halances
in the EC budget (in mill.ion units of account) :
1980 19~1
from to from to
Germany -1192 -1725 -1360 -1978
Great Britain -1784 - 623 -2140 - 783 -
France + 15 - 365 + 10 - 355
Italy + 808 + 684 + 860 + 645
Ireland + 535 + 545 + 680 + 689
Belgium + 484 + 427 + 600 + 523
Netherlands + 425 + 380 + 560 + 493
Luxembourg + 287 + 284 + 320 + 317
Denmark + 422 + 406 + 560 + 546
. Source: BMF FINANZNACHRICHTEN, No 26, ~1 Nov 1980.
COPY?tIGHT: Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn, 1980
8760
CSO: 3103
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
~'OSSIBLF SCHEDllLE OF 1981 ELECTION, FIRST ROUND 26 APRIL
Paris PQUVOIRS in French No 14, '1980 p 150
[Proposed schedule of 1981 electione]
[Text] In paragraph 3, article 7 of the Constitution stipulates that "the
election of a new president shall take place at least 20 days and at most _
35 days before ~~e ;,ower of the incumbent president expires." Given that
_ Mr. Giscard d'Estaing was inaugurated on 27 May 1974, the following dates
are possible.
- Decree callin~ for elections
Deadline for declaring candidacies Wednesday 8 April Tuesday 14 April
Deadline for publishtng lists of
canc~idates Saturday 11 April Friday 17 April
Official campaign opening Saturday 11 April Friday 17 April
Closing of official campaign Friday 24 April Friday 1 May
First round Sunday 26 April Sunday 3 May
Deadline for anouncinR results
of first round Wednesday 29 April Wednesday 6 May
Closin~ of official campaign Friday 8 May Friday 15 May
Second round Sunday 10 May Sunday 17 P1ay
Deadline for anouncin~ final
official resulte Wednesday 20 May Wednes~sy 27 May
Installation of new president Wednesday 27 May 1981
- President's message t~ Parliament
(optional but tradition.sl) Wednesday 27 May Wednesday 27 May
COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980
11,023
CSO: 3100
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COUNgRY SECTION FRANCE
6
COMMUNIST SUCCESSES WITH ELECTORATE EXPLAINED
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 11-17 Oct 80 pp 130-133
[Commentary by Albert du Roy: "Why People Still Vote Communist"]
[Text] Last Sunday, 12 October, Georges Marchais was selected as the Communist can-
didate for the presidential election in the apring of 1981. By a revealing slip of
the tongue coimnitted 15 days ago--"I [word in italics] am the only anti-Giscardian
candidate"--the secretary general had shown that he was in reality self-selected. !
But it was necessary �or the parody of internal democracy this weekend to dissimulate ~
the fact--for those who want it that way--that the PCF [French Communist Party] is ~
sub~ected, ~ust like any other "reactionary party," to personal power.
The hurdle of this election will be difficult to surmount for the Party and for its
chief. Increasingly evident bankruptcy of the pseudosocialist regimes of the East,
reinforced subservience of the French Party to the Kremlin's strategy, serious doubts
about the integrity of the secretary general: all the conditions seem to have come
- together to bring about a setback.
However, the Party has weathered so many storms that nothing permits the forecasting
of a collapse this time. The graph at the top of the page vividly shows this: for
22 years, one out of five Frenchmex~ has voted communist. In spite of Budapest, de
Gaulle, May 1968, Prague, the Gulag, Mitterrand, the scuttling of the Union of the
Lef t .
This set in concrete percentage is abnormdl and harmful.
Normal Percentage. Of all the comparable developed countries, France is the only
one to have an important Communist Party. Without speaking of the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany, where rather undemocratic constraints have been
plsced upon its development, the Cammunist Party does not exceed 5 percent, except
~ in Sweden, and there by very little. It does not total 4 percent in Belgium, nor
2 percent in Denmark and the Netherlands, nor 0.5 percent in Norway and Great
Britain. Even in the less developed and erstwhile dictatorial Mediterranean countries
the Communist Party's percentage remains below that of the French Communist Party:
10 percent in Spain, 17 percent in Portugal. It is only in Ita1y, a special case,
that the PC exceeds its French counterpart: 30.4 percent.
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Politologues Denis Lindon and Pierre Weilll have attempted to measure the intention
of French voters to vote for such and such party. Vis-a-vis the Communist Party,
the electorate is first divided into two very unequal masses: on the one hand, 63
- percent of the "out-of-reach" voters wham nothing will induce to vote communiat; on
the other hand, a"nucleus" of 9 percent of the voters who are naturally communists.
_ Between the twoi 28 percent of the "undecided" or "potential" voters who can be
- ~tt~acted by the PC. 'I'he "an~~maly" of its percentage is strikin~~y shown in the
f igures: during its per-iods of counterperformance (1958 vis-a-vis de Gau~le, 1968
after May, 1978 after its e�;ident re-Stalinization), the pC should have reconciled
itself to the 9 percent which constitute its nucleus. But made claim to 20 percent.
And, there�ore, in spite of everything, is dipping into the reservoir of undecided
votera.
T'his is also a hamnful percentage because the PC's power is blocking any alternative
in the government. For 22 years, the same parties have been governing France. For
nearly 10 years, the new socialist dynamism, which counts on the support of communist -
votes, has been running into this double iron wall: the allegiance of the Communists
to the Moscow line and the anticommuntsm of the ma~ority of the French.
We are familiar with the general characteristics of this communist electorate through
dozens of studies based on surveys, which at times have been ordered by the PC .
itself . 2
Thus we know that out of 100 communiat voters, about 40 are less than 35 years of .
age, which makes it the youngest electorate in France. About half of these voters
live in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants or the Paris region, which makes it the
most urban electorate. Finally, about one-half of them belong to the working sector.
However, although one out of two communist voters belongs to the working world, only
one out of three French worke~s votes cammunist. The same studies show in fact that
out of 100 workers, 35 vote for the PC, 33 for the PS, 22 for the ma~ority. The
other categories of "workers," white collar employees or peasants, only partially
figure in the communist battle. Z'his electorate is also very unequally distributed
throughout the national territory. Further along, Emmanuel Todd e~plains the con-
traction in its geographic dist?-ibution,
How can we explain the fact that the PCF feels that it owns the votes of 20 percent
of such a diversity of Frenchmen, and this in a country with a high standard of
living, which is profoundly individualist and attached to the freedoms?
The reasons for this claim are many and complex. They are based, according to the
case, on historical circumstances, the communist savoir faire and the power of the
Party's apparatus.
Memory Is TYansmitted in the Blood
_ Jean-Francois Deniau, a Giscardian minister thrown into the assault on the Cher
"red" bastion, was amazed to observe that a few kilometers apart, and under identical
living conditions, one village could vote massively communist and another conser-
vative. The explanations he found derive more from historical subconsciousness than
from logic. Certain communes, for example in Sancerrois and Cevennes, at the time
of the Edict of Nantes, saw themselves shorn of their protestant elite who went
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abroad and are said have acquired a congenital hostility for government because .
of it. Deniau also wonders whether the same reflex was iiot operative in communes ~
where a priest resided who had preached a revolutionary sermon and, finding himself
banished, had communicated his revolt to his entourage. "Memory is transmitted in
- the blood," Deniau concludes, quoting a Chinese proverb.
In gny event, the fact of the matter is to be found there: the Communist Party is -
above all the party of discontent. And heaven kno~os that France has the art of _
creating and multiplying discontents! While the first German social laws dat~ bac'~c
to Bismarck, French workers had to wait until 1936 to exact the first concessions.
In France, a problem is rarely resolved until it is posed ~n terms of violent demands.
Everything is "won by fighting," which supplies headlines emulating the f ighting
banners of L'H'UMANITE.
Elsewhere, in places where immobility is less entrenched, reform parties of the
social-democratic kind have succeeded in personifying the wish for social progress.
In France, the socialist movement has been stifled between the immutable established
order and upheaval.
Z'he PC has �illed this vaci:~~m with an exceptional savoir faire. And, first, by
establishing as an absolute principle that it was "the party of the working class." ;
An arguable truth, as we have seen, but so firmly set in the mind, that many com- '
munist voters are claiming they belong to the working class although they are not ~
part of it.3
Militant workers, who are often devoted and generous, are the architects of this
identification. The Party has 10,000 ceils in the enterprises. At times these .
_ cells are all-powerful, as in the Renault plants in. Billancourt, the "red citadel~"
At times persecuted, as in the Citroen factories in Rennes (see Jacques Roure's
article). The former are part of worker mythology and the latter of social martyrdom. _
The PC, not without cynicism, makes use of both to strengthen its worker image.
This image would probably not have lasted as long as it has if it had not been con-
solidated by a form~dable helpmate [relais]: the CGT [General Confederation of ~
Labor], of which almost the totality of fQderal or sectional personnel is communist
and which carries on an enormous effort to impregnate the worker world, above and `
beyond the communist nucleus.
"In Epernay, the PC's strength is that of the CGT," explains Bernard Stasi, fow:er
UDF [French Demncratic Union] mayor. The repair workshops of the SNCF [French .
National Railroads] is a reservoir of trade union and,therefore, political cadres.
Upon retirement, at the age of 55 years, these cadres can devote their time exclu-
sively to Party matters. The CGT monopoly at Moet et Chandont, whose owner, _
Ghislain de Vogue, was deported with former trade union leader Gaston Martin, has
contributed to the strengthening of this CGT force in the other champagne cellars."
As for Pierre Beregovoy, the socialist candidate in the North, he said, "The worker
citiea of Mons and Charleroi, several kilometers on the other side of the Belgian
_ border, have experienced the same industrial problems as Douai and Valenciennes.
Nevertheless, on this side the PC does not exceed 4 percent while on the ott?er it is
the majority party. Why? Because the FGTB [General Federation of Labor of BelgiumJ,
which is very powerful, is socialist while on the French side the CGT dominatea
everywhere." What better illustration could there be o~ the procurer [rabatteur]
_ role played by the CGT vis-a-vis the PC? -
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This helpmate role is performed in all sectore by over 200 cultural, corporative,
touristic, sports, rural, regional, banking, real estate, family, insurance...
organizations. All tvgether they fulfill three functione: to attract passive or
active sympathies--electoral or activist; to diaseminate alogans; to gather mon2y.
,
Also matchless is the central exercised in the popular communes and suburbs. In the
name of a perfectly noble principle: to be close to the concerns of the people.
But for an ambiguous reason: to serve the interests of the party which ie defending
the interests of the people.
"The PC's aecret is simple" i.t plugs away," said Claude Germon, PS mayor of Massy
(Yvelines). "Its strength rests basically on its organizational capability and the
weakness of the other parties. Wher~ no one is there to oppose them, the communists,
who are everywnere, are permitted to give credence to everything they say." From
now on, Germon will manage to arrive at factory gates before the communists.
Echoing his remarks, Andre Laignel, SP mayor of Issoudun (Indre) said, "The PC's
basic strength is in its social assietance work." Laignel immediately organized a -
system of free legal consultations.
Cities abound in which the urbanization policy has contributed to the PC's v-t~tory
or has strengthened the Party. In Mans, no sooner had the oil shock caused HLM
[Low-cost Housing Program] rates to climb than its president, who was a lso the
Gaullist� mayor, was defeated. In Reims, HLM construction in the city doomed UDF
Mayor Taittinger.
In Troyes, Robert Galley (RPR [Rally for the Republic]) placed such construction
- outside the commune and was not affected. In Le Havre, the new HLM unite in the
center of the citq are strengthening the CP in the may.oralty.
Every collective building, every district association, is then taken over by the
- activists who, on a case basis, post or play up their politic:al label.
! The leadership of a municipality is a master trump. "In Noel, in Le Havre,"
recounts Antoine Ruffenacht (RPR), every person over 6S years of age receives a
That does not resolve the problem of the senior citizen -
package from the mayor.
but the mayor assures himself of the gratitude of the old people~" Such cleverneas
is not proper for communist mayors, but they practice it with great effectiveness.
Control over a city can be further strengthened when a mayor knows how to create
for himself a clientele which passes beyond the limits of the class or ideological
nucleus. Typical cases: Nimes (see Michel Labro's article), Le Havre, Amiens, where
the entire communist cleverness consists in hiding Party control behind a debonair
- personality.
Like the CGT trade union sections, the 1,559 municipalities under co~nmunist direc-
tion--including 72 cities with over 30,000 inhabitants out of 221--are a reservoir
of active propagandists. "In Le Havres" Ruffenacht explains, "the elected com-
munists are all permanent Party members. Therefore, they devote full time to muni-
cipal management, something that the elected officials of the other parties cannot
do anywnere." "In Mana," said Jacques Chaumont (RPR senator), "commun ist sides are
paid but the Party, while the socialist elected officials must continue to perform
their professional duties."
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Municipal control is, the~efore, so complete that most often the municipa7.ity has
become irreversibly communist.
The moat astonishing thing is that, thanks to the length of time it has been act3ve
and the depth of its distribution, the CP is now benefiting from a heritage of _
co~nmunist voting." This is manifest in the rural area: the red vote in Allier--
near conservative Cantal--is born of peasant hatred for the big landowners who
abandoned their land, leaving its exploitation to overly demanding managers. "The
great-grandsona o� these peasants are riding around in CX's and are playing tenn3s;
however, they continue to vote communist," one mayor said about Allier.
This heritage is manifested in the middle-class world: "For me, voting com�nunist is
- going back to my roots, since my father was a worker," explains Christine, the wife
of a f inanc ier .
Finally, this heritage is manifested in the very heart of the apparat: The CP is _
assured of the loyalty of those who are promoted, daughters and sons of ~he prole- _
tariat who have succeeded in their s~+cial climb," writes Jean Chesneaux. They
have played th~ game and have won; however, they are a bit annoyed by it. They
would not like to lose contact with their place of origin, for which they have sin-
cere nostalgia." -
Thus the pYan is clear: a historical, sociological and geographic predisposition to
discontent is picked up by a party wh3ch seduces, staffs and organ3.zea its troops
with such skill and such power that the latter can never again eacape from its
control. -
No one is ar~y longer ignorant of the reality of the communist countries. No one can
deny the dependence of the French Communist Party on Moscow. No one can doubt that,
behind activist generosity, there is an implacable apparat. But, nevertheless, out
of tradition, out of habit, out of conviction, out of solidarity, 5 million dis-
contented Frenchmen continue--and doubtlebs will continue unperturbably--to vote
_ communist.
This is a formidable challenge which the other large French parties have failed to
accept for a half century, leaving the impostors to monopolize hope and the future.
FOOTNOTES
1D. Lindou and P. Weill, "Explanatory Model of Electoral Behavior," Editions de
Minuit .
2Louis Harris Surveys, Sofres, Ifop, published from 1973 to 1980 in L'EXPRESS, LE
MATIN, LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, LE POINT, FRANCE NOWELLE.
3Jean Ranger, "Notebooks of the National Political Sciences Foundation," No. 175.
4"The PCF, An Art of Living," Editions des Lettres Nouvelles. ~
18
r, nn l~1~T. Tl~T AT Tror. n~r* v
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300050034-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300050034-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Le vote communiste aux I~gislatives depuls 1945 ~(par rapport aux suffrages exprim~s)
46 47 ' 48 ;1950 . ~5~ 52 53.'; 54 1955 ~ 56 .s a57 58 , - ~59 ;;1960 6i ~ 62
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